Chapter M: S. Quay,

_Secretary of the Commonwealth_.

The witness: That was issued that night. It got into the morning papers, I think of the 25th, in which I called upon the people to organize, and aid the civil authorities.

Q. Have you a telegram notifying you of the issue of the first proclamation?

A. Yes, sir.

HARRISBURG, PA., _July 20, 2.20, P.M., 1877_.

GOVERNOR J. F. HARTRANFT, _on No. 3, Sherman, Wyoming_:

Trouble on the P.R.R., at Pittsburgh. Railroad officials
over-anxious, fearing trouble would extend to Philadelphia, where
train hands were in session last night.

Scott suggested your return, but there is no necessity.
Proclamation issued. Go on. Where can we telegraph next? We go to
Pittsburgh this afternoon.

(Signed)

JAS. W. LATTA,
C. N. FARR.

Q. When you arrived at Pittsburgh, state whether you were met by any committee of citizens or not?

A. When I came to Allegheny there was a large number of citizens--a committee in fact. They had telegraphed to me before I arrived. The names in the dispatch were John Kirkpatrick, John Harper, chairman of committee, G. Johnston, Joseph McCune, John B. Guthrie, George A. Berry, John H. Bickelsen, John D. Scully, and there were some twenty or twenty-five citizens, most of whom I was personally acquainted with, asked me to remain. My intention was to go right to Philadelphia, to consult with General Hancock, who had charge of the regular troops that had been sent into the State, and with General Schofield, who represented the President of the United States. I did not see what I could do in Pittsburgh without troops, but, to satisfy them, I remained, went to the hotel, and had the wires brought into the room, and probably lost no time by doing it. I did a great deal of work that night. I became satisfied, by my inquiries, that the roads leading into Pittsburgh would have to be opened as soon as possible. The committee claimed that their supply of coal for the manufacturing establishments, for their water-works, and gas-works would not be sufficient to hold out more than about a week, at least, not two weeks, and if that supply should give out, together with the supplies of food, there would be a terrible state of affairs, and that made me more earnest and determined, perhaps, to organize a force and get back as soon as possible. I then went to Philadelphia and consulted with these gentlemen--the officers I named--and we all agreed that there was but one thing to do, and that was to organize a sufficient force and go to Pittsburgh and open the roads, which was done.

Q. Was there any resistance in the city of Allegheny to your passage through the city?

A. No, sir.

Q. By the rioters or strikers?

A. No, sir; they received me very kindly. They cheered me. I would not say they were rioters, but they were the strikers connected with the road.

Q. They were blockading freight, or holding freight trains, at that time in Allegheny city?

A. Yes; but there was no destruction of property. Mr. R. A. Ammon sent the following dispatch to me as I was coming into Pittsburgh. I received it about fifty or one hundred miles out of Pittsburgh: "We bid you welcome home, and assure you a safe passage over Fort Wayne road." He was very prominent at the depot when I arrived, and I did not see any other person that assumed to have any authority over the road when I arrived.

By Senator Yutzy:

Q. Will you please state who this R. A. Ammon is?

A. I saw him that day, and have never seen him since.

Q. Was he a railroad official, or was he one of the strikers?

A. I think he was one of the strikers. I think he had possession of the telegraph--I am not sure about that. He told me--I do not know whether it is proper to state this--that the principal railroad official, I forget his name, sent him word to protect the property, which he said he did.

Q. Mr. McCollough, was it?

A. I do not remember now. Very likely it was--Layng, I think, was the name.

Q. State when you left the State, whether there was anything at all to induce you to believe that there was any liability of a disturbance of the peace?

A. Not the slightest in the world. I said at the time I had the conversation with General Latta, that I thought things never looked better than they did now--at that time.

Q. Since that time, in your intercourse with the railroad officials of the State in any way, have you got information as to the causes of the outbreak?

A. Not sufficient for me to express any opinion. I have never investigated that.

Q. Far enough to express any opinion on the subject?

A. No, sir; I guess you know more about that than I do, by this time.

Q. Have you had any conversation or communications with any of the railroad employés who were engaged in the strike, other than Mr. Ammon?

A. No, sir.

Q. Did Mr. Ammon give any reasons for his taking charge of the railroad and telegraph at Allegheny City?

A. No; the only reason he gave, so far as protecting the property was concerned--I think it was Mr. Layng that sent him word to protect the property that night--the night of the 21st--and he claimed that he had. He claimed a good deal of credit for what was done--I do not know, of my own knowledge, whether he had anything to do with it. I might say that there was a committee of engineers came to see me at Pittsburgh, when I was there with the troops on Sunday. They pretended that they were informed that I had authority to settle this question between them and the railroad company. Of course, I told them I had nothing more to do with it than any other citizen, so far as their differences were concerned. Another committee also came to see me, when I was at Kingston with troops--that was in Luzerne county--but there was nothing of any importance passed, because there was nothing that we could do--nothing that I could do. I went simply to preserve order.

Q. Had you been at home at the time of receiving the call from the sheriff of Allegheny county for troops, would you have asked him what measures he had taken to suppress the disturbance, before you would have ordered out the troops?

A. It is very likely I would; but I would have been influenced by the magnitude of the threatened disturbance to a very great extent. Of course, we always resist the sending of troops to the last moment; but, in this instance, I think it was perfectly proper to send troops.

Q. You would be influenced by the magnitude of the disturbance, then, rather than by the efforts put forth by the sheriff to suppress it?

A. If I knew the exact character of the sheriff I would be very much influenced by his call; but they are nearly always strangers, and I do not know to what extent they can be relied upon. I always avail myself of all the information I can get, and is very difficult to say what would control the Executive in making up his mind just at the last moment. Some sheriffs are very timid, and they throw the responsibility off as soon as possible. They think the moment they get troops that they are relieved. Others have a good deal more pride, and they try to control matters themselves. I think a great deal more could be done by sheriffs than is generally done.

Q. After ordering out the military force of the State, are the civil authorities relieved or superceded by the military force?

A. No; not as long as they appear active and on the ground. If they retire, of course the responsibility falls upon the Executive and his troops.

Q. To preserve the peace?

A. Yes, sir. Then we come under the act of 1864, which, I suppose, was the case in this instance.

Q. If the civil authorities in the locality should retire and do nothing towards the suppression of the riot, then you deem it the duty of the military to preserve the peace?

A. Yes; I would not hesitate a moment.

By Senator Yutzy:

Q. Would you not regard it the duty of both military and civil authorities to coöperate?

A. I would have the military support the civil authorities, and I think the latter ought to appear somewhere all the time, even if not in any great force, or with much power, because the rioters must be arrested and tried by civil authorities.

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. And the military is to support?

A. Is to support.

By Senator Yutzy:

Q. And the civil authorities are not relieved from any responsibility after that just because the military are present?

A. I do not think so. I do not think that the laws relieved them. They relieved themselves.

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. I understood you to say you have never found it necessary to fall back upon that act of 1864--the particular section that authorizes the commander-in-chief to call out troops--I think it is the ninety-second section?

A. At Susquehanna Depot the sheriff was active all the time, and there was no conflict. In fact, we never had a conflict before. We ordered the troops to Luzerne county again the next year--they were sent there upon the call of the sheriff. He was not very active. I finally told him to come to my office, and we consulted as to the necessity of withdrawing the troops, and we both decided that it was not the time to withdraw the troops. He would not take the entire responsibility, but I divided it with him. That was the nearest to taking the supreme control before. I considered the July riots of such a magnitude and so wide spread over the State--railroad communication stopped--the highways of the State obstructed--that it was necessary to exercise the authority given by the act of 1864. Although the troops went to Pittsburgh on the call of the sheriff, and to Luzerne on the call of the mayor of Scranton and the mayor of Wilkes-Barre, after they got on the spot, it was necessary, I think, to assume general control.

By Senator Yutzy:

Q. Under the act of 1864, you have the authority or the power to call out the military whenever you get information from any source that there is a disturbance of the peace that cannot be quelled by the civil authorities without being called on, or request made by the sheriff or mayor or other civil authority?

A. That is my construction of it. I am quite sure that that was the intention of the act, when it was passed.

Q. We are required to examine, and inquire into the conduct of the military during the riot--will you please give us a statement of their conduct--of the militia.

A. I think that would be simply expressing an opinion which the committee is called upon to do after investigating the facts. I have investigated the facts, and give my opinion in my message. You can take that as my evidence.

Q. What you know of your own professional knowledge of the conduct of the military?

A. That is a very comprehensive question. A great deal might be said, _pro_ and _con_.

By Senator Reyburn:

Q. I suppose you can tell what the conduct of the militia was after you came home and took charge?

A. I had every faith in them. The troops that I went to Pittsburgh with, and the troops I went to Luzerne county with, I think they would have done anything I could have expected with that many men.

By Senator Yutzy:

Q. Did you consider their conduct, as troops, commendable during the time that you had charge of them after your return to the State?

A. Oh, yes; we had no conflict afterwards at all.

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. I suppose what Mr. Yutzy would like to know is, whether there was any individual instance of misconduct on the part of any officer or soldier, after you took charge, that came within your own knowledge--came under your observation?

A. No, sir; I had no occasion to have anybody court-martialed for any misconduct.

By Senator Yutzy:

Q. If they had misconducted themselves you would have had them court-martialed?

A. I would have taken notice of it in that way. A militia officer occupies a very singular position. He ought to have more judgment and more courage than an officer of like grade in the field if he is confronted with any great emergency. The men that he commands are part of the people--part of the very people he is called on to oppose--and in a disturbance like this, suddenly thrown up, a large proportion of the community may be against the troops and in favor of the disturber of the peace. It is a very difficult position to hold, and it requires a great deal of judgment. In fact, a great deal more than it would require in the field.

By Mr. Means:

Q. It is not like meeting an enemy on the field to meet these people?

A. No. Of course this is only at first blush. After everybody cools off and they begin to realize that there must be law and order, then the reaction comes, but in the first instance it is a very difficult thing to determine just what to do. I would not like to loosely condemn people. I cannot tell what I would have done if I had been there. No man can tell. It is probably much easier to tell what ought to have been done after it is all over, and I am very confident now what I would do in the future. I have learned a great deal from these riots that I never knew before, and the experience has been quite valuable to the officers of the National Guard, and everybody. I do not think the like would occur again, unless there is a general revolution.

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. I would like to ask you this question: Whether you have noticed any tendency of the civil authorities of the State to rely upon the National Guard and shirk their own responsibility since the organization of the guard?

A. There has always been a National Guard in the State. As to the main question, there is a tendency to rely too much on the guard.

Q. Is that tendency growing, so far as your observation is concerned?

A. About two years ago we had a good many calls. They seemed to want troops for every little disturbance. I think there were four calls for troops from the western part of the State--two in one day, I believe. The troops were not sent. There has been no call since this late riot, and there had not been before that for a long time.

Q. Has the National Guard been increased under your administration?

A. No, sir; we have diminished it. Companies that would not come up to the standard at the annual inspections were mustered out. Last year we mustered out twenty companies.

Q. I suppose the Adjutant General's book shows the number of the National Guard?

A. Yes; the most they can have is two hundred companies--two hundred is the limit.

Q. Those companies are not full, I believe, now?

A. Oh, yes; they are full. Our minimum is forty. They must all be above that. Some of them have fifty or sixty, and a few companies have more than that, even. The number of the companies is simply an arbitrary number fixed by statute.

Q. Any further statement you desire to make you can do so?

A. I have none. We have a large quantity of telegrams and papers.

Q. In addition to these that are published in the message--in the appendix?

A. Oh, yes; but they are not of very great importance. I picked out those that were the most important.

* * * * *

Chester N. Farr, _affirmed_:

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. You are the private secretary of the Governor?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. State where your residence is, Mr. Farr?

A. I reside in Reading, Berks county.

Q. State where you were last July--on the 19th?

A. I was in Reading, at home.

Q. Just go on and state from that point what intelligence you received of any disturbance in any portion of the State, and how it came to you, and your knowledge of what transpired after that?

A. On the evening of the 19th, about nine o'clock, I received a telegram from the Executive Department, embodying the telegram of the sheriff of Allegheny county to the Governor, and I left in the ten-thirty train to come on here with the expectation of meeting General Latta; and after I arrived here, I found that General Latta had left on the train from Philadelphia, and he was on the way, and during that time, sometime in the morning, about two o'clock, I think, of the 20th, I got a dispatch from the sheriff--at least a dispatch came--it was to the Governor, and I answered him that General Latta was on his way, and that there would be a consultation and action taken if necessary. On the morning of the 20th, I went down to the depot and found out when General Latta was expected to arrive, and went down to meet him at the train, and found he had ordered General Pearson's troops on duty in Pittsburgh; then prepared the proclamation, which is given in the appendix to the message, and went up to the hotel and took an hour or two's sleep, and in the morning the general telegraphed to the Governor that the proclamation was issued or would be issued. I don't remember the form.

Q. That was on Friday morning?

A. That was Friday morning.

Q. Friday morning, the 20th?

A. The 20th. During the day there was a number of dispatches by the general to the department, and at three-forty-five the general and myself and his clerk and the Assistant Adjutant General took the train for Pittsburgh, and on the way we received advices frequently in regard to the character of the situation--the threatening character of it--and having ordered General Pearson out, the general was waiting to find what had been the result. It was calculated that the Pittsburgh division--General Pearson's division--would furnish about a thousand men; but sometime in the afternoon we got advices from General Pearson that he had only succeeded in getting two hundred and thirty men. Then the general--if I recollect rightly--General Pearson in the same dispatch advised that the situation was so serious that he thought, in order to save bloodshed, there ought to be some other troops. General Latta then ordered General Brinton or requested General Brinton to have his troops notified, and afterward, when another dispatch came from General Pearson, very much of the same character stating that he had only a very small force out, and the men were not responding promptly, and that the situation was very threatening and would require a great many troops, he ordered General Brinton's division to report to General Pearson at Pittsburgh.

Q. What time was that order given to General Brinton?

A. Sometime late in the afternoon--I don't know the exact time.

Q. Do you remember the point from which the order was sent?

A. No, sir; I don't remember the point.

Q. It was while you were _en route_ to Pittsburgh?

A. It was while we were _en route_; yes. We arrived at Pittsburgh, at the Union depot, between twelve and one o'clock, on Saturday morning. We had been joined on the way by Colonel Norris and Mr. Linn. We were met at the depot by General Pearson; informed us that in the course of the few hours that had intervened, he had succeeded in getting together about six hundred men. I think he stated he had at the depot about three hundred and fifty men; the other two hundred and fifty, composing the Eighteenth regiment, were at Torrens station. The matter was talked over, and it was decided, as I understood, that no movement was to be made until the Philadelphia troops came. I believe General Pearson had intended that afternoon to attempt to run the trains, but had given it up for some reason. I suppose because he thought that if he had more troops, he could do it without a collision. In the morning, it was intended to wait until there was a large force there, for the purpose of having as large a force as possible, so as to avoid any collision if possible. During the morning--I suppose between three and four, or four and five o'clock--the hill at the side near Twenty-eighth street--I never went down to the ground, and don't know anything about it, except from the conversation that took place at the time--the hill at the side of the track at Twenty-eighth street, was occupied by the Fourteenth regiment, and Breck's battery. I believe the intention of that movement was to keep the crowd off the hill. About two o'clock in the afternoon of Saturday, the first detachment of the First division arrived, and after the troops had been fed, they marched down the track, and shortly afterwards--I suppose it was five o'clock--between four and five o'clock--we were told a collision had taken place between the troops and the rioters. We saw one or two of the Pittsburgh soldiers coming up the streets carrying their guns. The crowd would collect around them, and something would pass between them, and there would be cheers or something of that kind. About six o'clock, or perhaps later, we were told that the troops had gone into the round-house, and about nine o'clock--the time is merely in my mind as a sequence of events--I did not look at the time--I suppose it was about nine o'clock--General Pearson himself came into the room, but left shortly afterwards. All telegraphic communications stopped about that time, and we had no communications with the troops in the round-house, or where they were, until some time after that, when Sergeant Wilson, of the cavalry, came in dressed as a laborer, and brought some dispatches from General Brinton. During the night there were several dispatches brought, and answers returned in the same manner, and in the morning, about nine o'clock--half-past eight or nine o'clock--we were told the troops had left the round house.

Q. At this point, Mr. Farr--because there are some questions I want to ask prior to that--what time was it after you received the dispatch at Reading bearing the sheriff's dispatch?

A. It was after supper some time. I don't remember the exact time, but about supper time.

Q. On the 19th?

A. On the 19th; yes, sir.

Q. Thursday evening, then, after supper?

A. It was Thursday evening, either about supper or after that time.

Q. Have you that dispatch, or can you get it?

A. I think I have it home. I don't think I have it with me.

Q. Who was that signed by?

A. It was repeated by Mr. Keely.

Q. From the Executive Department?

A. From the Executive Department. It might be I am wrong about the dispatch. It may have contained simply Gardner's dispatch. My recollection is, it was the same as the sheriff's, but the sheriff's may have come the next morning. I think I have all those dispatches collected together. I don't know whether that dispatch contained any man's name, or whether I simply assumed it was from the sheriff, from the fact that it may have said, "The following dispatch was received at this office." I think I have the dispatch, and I can get it when I go home and look over the dispatches.

Q. What time did you arrive at Harrisburg?

A. I got here--that train gets here about midnight; leaves Reading at ten-thirty, and gets here some time between twelve and one.

Q. Did you have any communication with the Secretary of State, on your arrival, Mr. Quay?

A. The Secretary of State was not here.

Q. He was not here?

A. No, sir.

Q. What time did you meet General Latta?

A. Some time between two and three o'clock, I think. The time may have been later. I think it was two-fifty; I am not positive.

Q. And you then prepared the first proclamation?

A. Yes, sir; drew the draft of it, and, after the general had ordered the troops out, the proclamation was issued.

Q. The general didn't make the order until after he arrived here and ordered the troops out?

A. I understood him to say he had ordered the troops from Lancaster.

Q. Did that proclamation appear in the morning papers?

A. That I don't know. I think it did. I am not positive of that. My recollection is it was telegraphed to Pittsburgh. I am not positive.

Q. Do you know what time you telegraphed it to Pittsburgh from here?

A. No, sir; it was sometime in the morning. It must have been some time about four o'clock.

Q. Had you any other intelligence from Pittsburgh than that contained in the telegram of Sheriff Fife?

A. That, and simply what I learned from General Latta.

Q. You had no other telegrams or communications to you or to the Executive Department?

A. Not to me.

Q. At the time of issuing the proclamation?

A. This other telegram may have been there. I had received one other dispatch from Sheriff Fife, just before I saw General Latta, which, as I stated, I had answered by saying that General Latta would be here. I think you will find that dispatch in the Governor's message.

Q. Was that directed to the Governor?

A. Yes; it was directed to the Governor, and I think it embodied this dispatch.

Q. If you can get both of those dispatches we would like to have them?

A. That I answered by stating that General Latta would be there.

Q. Where did you meet the Secretary of State first?

A. At Pittsburgh.

Q. On your arrival at Pittsburgh?

A. No, sir; he came in Saturday morning, I think, just after daylight--just about daylight, probably. He was at the Monongahela. We had telegraphed him to meet us at the Monongahela house, and after we got to the Union depot we found General Pearson and the troops were stopping there and were detained. Colonel Quay came in in the morning.

Q. After your arrival there and consultation with General Pearson, it was determined not to attempt to move any train until the Philadelphia troops arrived, as I understand you?

A. I understood that to be the determination. Of course in these military consultations, although I listened, I did not take any part. That was my understanding of the result of the conversation.

Q. Did you understand General Pearson to be giving directions to the military force there?

A. I understood General Pearson to be in command.

Q. And that the Adjutant General was there exercising his powers and duties as Adjutant General proper?

A. So I understood. I understood that the Adjutant General had authority from the Governor, and was exercising his authority so far as getting the troops there.

By Senator Reyburn:

Q. As commander-in-chief?

A. That is, he had directions from the commander-in-chief to issue the orders necessary to assist the authorities.

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. In calling out the troops?

A. Yes; but after the troops were gathered together, they were in command of the officer of the division--that is, so far as any military operations were concerned.

Q. And that General Latta was not giving directions to the troops after they came there--not taking command of the troops, or superseding General Pearson at all?

A. That was my understanding.

Q. After the collision occurred, what time was it when General Pearson arrived at the Union Depot hotel?

A. I cannot tell the time exactly, but it was nine or ten o'clock, as near as I can say. I don't think I looked at my watch the whole twenty-four hours. I merely remember the time by the sequence.

Q. What was his purpose in coming there, or did he express any purpose?

A. My recollection is, he said he had come to see whether he could get provisions and ammunition, and I think that is the same reason that he gives in his report.

Q. What efforts did he make to get provisions and ammunition to the troops that night?

A. None at all, that I know of.

Q. You saw no efforts made?

A. I understood from the conversation that took place, that it was admitted that General Pearson could not get back to the round-house, and that he alone, without any force--there was no force there--could not get any provisions to the troops, and that as he seemed to be particularly obnoxious to the mob, it would be safer--or at least keep the mob from going to extremes--if he was out of the way. For these reasons he accepted General Latta's suggestion that he should leave.

Q. How long did he remain at the hotel?

A. I suppose--perhaps half an hour, perhaps longer.

Q. Do you know where he went?

A. No, sir.

Q. Do you know where he started to go?

A. No, sir; I don't. He came there with, I think, four members of his staff.

Q. Did they go with him, or did they remain?

A. I think one of them remained. I am not positive about that. I did not know the gentleman at that time. I cannot always rank them--there were a good many of them there.

Q. Who was to take command of the troops after he left?

A. That was understood to devolve upon General Brinton. In fact, that was something that I heard the Adjutant General ask--whether he, General Pearson, had left General Brinton in command, and whether General Brinton expected him back. And he said that he had told General Brinton if he did not come back he was to take command, and I always understood after General Pearson left, General Brinton to be in command of the troops.

Q. Of all the troops there then, including those of the Sixth division?

A. I don't know that I have any reason for being so explicit as that. I simply supposed that General Brinton was in command of the troops who were in the round-house, whether they were Pittsburgh or Philadelphia troops, who were there at that time. The detachment there was regarded as under his command.

Q. What time was the telegraphic communication between the Union Depot hotel and General Brinton cut off?

A. Just about the time General Pearson came. I think it was almost simultaneously about the time General Pearson came in, they announced that the communications were closed. The telegraph operator said he could not communicate.

Q. Was anything said or done there about moving General Brinton or getting any word to General Brinton--any communication in any other way?

A. Oh, yes; there was some talk--very considerable. I think it was believed that General Brinton was perfectly safe with his troops until after the firing began. Then there was considerable anxiety.

Q. That is after the burning?

A. I mean the burning--after they set fire to the cars. There was very considerable anxiety in regard to him, but the railroad officials stated that the buildings the troops were in were perfectly fire proof, and it was supposed that he was perfectly able to take care of himself.

Q. Did you see or hear anything from General Brown or his command that night?

A. After we first got there--during Saturday--General Brown was in and out several times in citizen's dress, telling about his conversations with the rioters, and the manner in which they talked to him, and various other things. I did not see him that night after the fire.

Q. Did you know anything about his dismissing his command--ordering Colonel Gray or Colonel Howard to dismiss their regiments?

A. No, sir. If the Fourteenth regiment came to the Union depot on Saturday night, I did not see it. There was one company of the Fourteenth regiment--I think it was the Fourteenth regiment--that was left, or came in afterwards in some way, that was there that night at the depot, and there were eighteen--eighteen or twenty men of the Black Hussars. There was about thirty thousand rounds of ammunition there.

Q. Eighteen of the Black Hussars, do I understand you to say?

A. I think there were eighteen or twenty--something like that. They were unarmed, except with the sabers, so far as I could see.

Q. Nothing but sabers?

A. That is all.

Q. Was there any talk by the Adjutant General, or any effort made, to get a communication, or to communicate with General Brinton in any way during the night of Saturday night?

A. Oh, yes. After the firing took place--I did not see it, I only knew this, of course, from hearsay--there was a wagon sent out with provisions for the troops. It was loaded up and sent down, but the mob prevented it getting to the troops. That was, I think, just before night-fall, and during the night there were several efforts made.

Q. There were none of those Black Hussars, or of Colonel Howard's, or of Colonel Gray's brigade sent, were there?

A. There were no troops there. The Black Hussars--it would have been madness to have sent out eighteen or twenty men with sabers into that crowd.

Q. Neither was the other company that you spoke of?

A. The other company--I don't remember just when that company came in. I noticed it sometime during the night. I didn't see it when it first came. I don't think it was left there when the troops went down. It was considered better to attempt no military movements during the night time, because of the crowd in the streets.

Q. When the burning commenced, was there any efforts made by the military in any way to stop the burning so far as you know?

A. None that I know of.

Q. Was it a subject of conversation at the Union hotel, between Latta and yourself, or any others that were in consultation there?

A. I don't understand the question.

Q. Was that subject talked of?

A. Do you mean, whether we were to prevent it, or whether as to the possibility or the feasibility of General Brinton's preventing it?

Q. What was the feasibility of General Brinton himself preventing it?

A. I cannot remember that there was anything said particularly about it. Although at that time it was supposed, before we received any communication from him--it was supposed he was able to take care of himself. He had five hundred men and two Gatling guns, and he had taken, I think, twenty rounds of ammunition per man and a couple of thousand for his gun, and until we got that first dispatch from him, it was generally supposed that he would be able to take care of himself.

Q. Which was the highest in rank, General Brinton or General Brown?

A. General Brinton was the highest. General Brinton was a major general, and General Brown, brigadier. He is brigadier of the Sixth division. While we were in the depot, after the firing took place, there were a number of wounded men brought in--soldiers. I heard the surgeon state, that he had ten or fifteen--I have forgotten which--anyway it was quite a number--it was nearly a dozen at least, and they were sent away on the next train. Most of them were wounded with pistol shots, so he stated.

By Senator Reyburn:

Q. Where did those soldiers come from?

A. From the front, where the collision had taken place.

Q. Do you recollect how many soldiers were brought in wounded?

A. There were from ten to fifteen.

Q. All of General Brinton's command?

A. I don't know. They were all with that detachment, but there were some troops down there who were not of the First division. General Brown had the Fourteenth, of the Sixth division, and Breck's battery, at Pittsburgh, and the Jefferson cavalry. But I think most of those wounded were Philadelphia troops. I judge so simply from the fact that they were sent down in the train--with the last train that was permitted to go through.

Q. What time did you leave the Union depot--just go on from that point?

A. After the troops had left the depot, this scout came in and informed us that General Brinton had left the round-house. I believe, however, General Latta had known it just before he came in. The first I knew of it was when he came in and informed us that the troops had left. Then General Brown came in shortly afterwards, and stated that the troops were in bad condition. The report was that they were being massacred by the citizens, and General Brown expressed great indignation then. He said he didn't care what happened to the mob after their exhibition of brutality, and made other expressions of that kind. Afterwards we found out that these were entirely exaggerated reports; that the troops had marched out in reasonably good order. We stayed at the Union depot until nearly noon, or about eleven o'clock, I should judge. That was about nine o'clock. The proprietor got very anxious about the matter, because he thought our presence there would induce the mob to set fire to the building. General Latta would not leave until he made arrangements to save the ammunition, and arrangements were made. The building was then deserted. Nearly everybody was out of it, so far as the occupants of it. There were a number of muskets that had been left by the troops. They were taken up stairs, and put in the room. Between eleven and twelve o'clock, or thereabouts, we left and went down stairs, attempted to get a carriage, and could not find a driver. Then we went across the street and took cars, and went to the Monongahela house; and while there we received information from Colonel Norris, who, with Colonel Stewart, had started in the morning after General Brinton. And we received the same information in various ways--I don't know the exact channels--that the troops were beyond Sharpsburg, across the bridge, and wanted provisions, and efforts were made to get them.

Q. The Monongahela house was then the head-quarters of General Latta--General Latta made his head-quarters there?

A. Yes; he stopped there, and notified every one with whom we had telegraphic communications where he was.

Q. How long did he remain there?

A. Until nine o'clock in the evening.

Q. That Sunday evening?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Yourself and the Secretary of State with him?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Any other?

A. The Assistant Adjutant General, the Deputy Secretary of State, and Colonel Norris, and Mr. Russell, the clerk. When we went into the Monongahela house, we registered our names, and when I looked at the register afterwards, I found they had scratched them all out and put in fictitious names. While we were there, we heard that the mob had set fire to the Union depot. Of course, we could see the light, and I supposed the proprietors were afraid they might serve the Monongahela house the same way during the night that they had the Union depot. It was within my own personal knowledge that the Adjutant General was endeavoring to get the other detachment of the First division, and the Eighteenth regiment--Colonel Guthrie's regiment--that was at Torrens station, in such a condition that they could join General Brinton in the morning. It was supposed that General Brinton would have no difficulty in staying where he was until that juncture was effected, but the trains were all stopped, and it was difficult to get engineers to run them, even where they could be run, and the junction was not effected, and General Brinton was directed, or instructed whatever it may be, to make that junction himself when he left the round-house.

By Senator Reyburn:

Q. He didn't make that?

A. No, sir. As I understand it, the intention was to get the troops concentrated together after the collision, so as to get as large a force as possible, but they were in detachments, and the railroads were stopped, and many of the troops were without ammunition. Wherever it was possible ammunition was sent to them. It was wagoned down to the detachment of General Brinton's--his second detachment--and it was sent down the Ohio river to the Erie division and wherever it was possible.

Q. Were any of the officers of the railroad company at the Monongahela house?

A. Yes; both at the Union depot and Monongahela house. They came in.

Q. Were there any efforts--did you know on Sunday that Colonel Gray and Colonel Howard's regiment had been dismissed on Saturday night?

A. I knew nothing of it?

Q. You had no knowledge of it?

A. I had no knowledge of it. It was generally understood that the Pittsburgh division had gone to pieces, except the Eighteenth regiment.

Q. Did the civil authorities, the mayor of the city of Pittsburgh or the sheriff of the county, have any consultation with General Latta at the Monongahela house during that day?

A. Not at the Monongahela house?

By Senator Reyburn:

Q. Did they at any time after your arrival?

A. I don't remember of seeing the sheriff. I don't think he was there in the room at all, although I understood he went with the detachment to Twenty-eighth street. The mayor came, as I understood, when he was sent for by General Latta, and stayed, I suppose, twenty minutes.

Q. When was that?

A. That was during Saturday night. It may have been early Sunday morning, but it was before daylight.

Q. While you were yet at the Union Depot hotel?

A. At the Union depot. He came when he was sent for, and I did not take any part in the conversation, or hear it, but he talked with General Latta, afterwards with Secretary Quay, and then left, and that was the last I ever saw of him.

Q. Were you in consultation with citizens on Sunday?

A. Citizens were very scarce. I never saw many Pittsburgh people. Whenever a Pittsburgh man left, he very seldom came back.

Q. Did you know where the head-quarters of the citizens' committee was during the day, Sunday?

A. No, sir.

Q. And you were not called upon by them?

A. Not that I know of, sir.

Q. Was it known through the city where General Latta was?

A. It was in every paper that I saw in the morning.

Q. And you registered when you went to the Monongahela house?

A. Our arrival there the night before was in every morning paper that I saw of the city, and we were registered at the hotel, and we registered at the Monongahela house when we went there, and this very party who had been sent out in the interim we had gone to the Monongahela, they had no difficulty in finding us.

By Senator Reyburn:

Q. Did you understand the railroad company--the officials, I mean--to believe that they could run trains? Did they seem to have that impression after you arrived in Pittsburgh?

A. It was understood that they had the crews ready just as soon as the track was clear, and if protection was given them, they could run trains?

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. How did you get that information? From what railroad officer?

A. I don't remember. I think it was stated generally--it was so understood.

Q. Mr. Cassatt was there, I believe. Was he not?

A. Mr. Cassatt was there.

Q. And Pitcairn, the superintendent?

A. Mr. Pitcairn was there. I think Mr. Pitcairn was the man I heard make the statement that he had the crews?

Q. Ready to start?

A. Yes, sir; I am not positive as to that.

Q. Do you know what efforts General Latta made during the day--Sunday, I mean--to stop the burning, or to collect a force--collect troops for that purpose?

A. I understood he was engaged all day in endeavoring to get those troops in the condition that they could be used.

Q. Colonel Guthrie's regiment at Torrens station, and General Brinton's command--he was trying to get them to form a junction, so that they could be used?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Were there any other troops within the reach of the city?

A. I think there was. The second detachment of the First division was on its way, and it must have been near the city, some place.

Q. Who was commanding that regiment?

A. Colonel Rodgers, I think.

Q. Do you know where they were that night?

A. No; I do not know of my own knowledge, at that time. I know, since, they were within a few miles. They were, I suppose, twelve or fourteen miles, perhaps less; but they were without ammunition.

Q. What time did you leave the Monongahela house, and where did you go from there?

A. We left the Monongahela house and took a boat and went to Beaver.

Q. What time did you arrive at Beaver?

A. About midnight, I guess.

Q. Sunday night?

A. Yes sir.

Q. And from Beaver where?

A. From Beaver the intention was to go to Erie. Upon inquiry at Pittsburgh, the railroad officials informed us that they could not get their trains through to Harrisburg, and so the intention was to go from Beaver to Erie, as we understood the Erie railroad was running, and go to Harrisburg; but when we got to Beaver we found that the road running to Erie was stopped also, then General Latta and the Assistant Adjutant General and myself took a carriage and drove over to Allegheny City, and found that the train was running on the West Penn and took that train, and got to Harrisburg.

Q. The purpose in coming to Harrisburg was to collect more troops?

A. The communications were uncertain, and there was no way to get ammunition or orders to these troops.

At this point the committee adjourned until Monday afternoon, at two o'clock.

HARRISBURG, _Monday, March, 11, 1878_.

The committee met pursuant to adjournment, in Senate committee room, No. 6, at four o'clock in the afternoon.

All members present, except Messrs. Means, Torbert, Dewees, and Larrabee.

* * * * *

Chester N. Farr, _recalled_:

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. Is this the first dispatch you received? [Indicating.]

A. That is the first dispatch I received. I received that after supper, Thursday night, the 19th.

Q. After supper, about what hour?

A. About nine o'clock. It was shortly after, and little before the train left.

Q. Dated received 9.16.

A. It was about that time. The dispatch was as follows:

HARRISBURG, PA., _July 19, 1877_.

Received at 10 No. Sixth street, Reading, 9.16, P.M.