Chapter III: Front Matter (3)

The police force was still at the Penn street crossing when General Reeder arrived at the depot. The railroad officials requested General Reeder to move into the railroad cut to release a train that was in the hands of the mob, and as that was on the direct route to Penn street crossing, the point to which he wished to go with his force, he commenced his march through the cut. The cut is some three squares long; the banks about thirty feet high at the highest place, and at the ends tapering down to nothing, with streets crossing it by bridges in two places, and walks at each side near the top of the bank, with a stone wall down the face of the bank, and a parapet three or four feet high to protect the walks.

On nearing the cut, General Reeder's force was met by a large crowd hooting and jeering at the soldiers, and throwing stones, and the General, seeing the temper of the mob, ordered his musicians to the rear and his men to lead. The mob gave away, but as the troops entered the cut the mob, which lined both sides of the cut, began to throw brickbats, paving stones, and other missiles down on them, which the soldiers bore until they were two thirds of the way through the cut, when one or two pistol shots were fired at them, and one soldier fired his piece in the air, which was followed by scattering shots, and then by a regular volley, and firing was kept up until they reached the Penn street crossing, where the police were stationed. Of the two hundred and fifty-three soldiers only about fifty escaped being hurt, but none were seriously injured. Of the crowd eleven were killed, and over fifty wounded, two of the killed and some of the wounded being mere lookers on, and not engaged in the riots.

It being so dark that no one could be readily distinguished, seven of the policemen who were in line across the railroad at the Penn street crossing were wounded by the fire of the troops, some of them quite seriously, but they all recovered. This collision broke the spirit of the mob, and no destruction took place after that at this place. But the mob was threatening for several days, so much so that five companies of the Sixteenth regiment were immediately sent to General Reeder, from Norristown. This did not improve the condition of affairs, as the men of the Sixteenth regiment openly fraternized with the rioters, and declared their intention, in case of further trouble, of siding with them, and furnished them with ammunition. This soon destroyed the morale of the Fourth regiment, and General Reeder asked leave to move them to Allentown, which was granted, and General Bolton started for Reading on a special train, after giving orders for the movement and disposition of the balance of the men of his division. On arriving at Reading he found matters rather quiet at the depot, with the Sixteenth regiment in possession. The authorities fearing trouble that night, and the police having been out that day again trying to raise extra men for the force, and failing, General Bolton telegraphed to General Reeder, who was at Temple station, six miles distant, to return at once with the Fourth regiment; to which General Reeder answered that "the men positively refused to return to Reading to-night; the regiment and company officers are perfectly helpless;" and from Colonel Good: "The men of the Fourth positively refuse to return to-night; I can't get twenty-five men," and General Bolton finally ordered General Reeder to rendezvous at Allentown and await further orders. It is enough to say that three hundred United States troops arrived that day at Reading, and no further serious trouble was apprehended or occurred; that General Bolton ordered the Sixteenth regiment to return to Norristown; but company I mutinied and refused to return, and was disbanded in dishonor by the general. He afterwards issued an order to disband companies C, D, E, and H, of the Sixteenth regiment, subject to the approval of the Governor, for general insubordination and mutinous conduct while under orders.

At Scranton, the railroad men began to feel the effects of the strikes in other places, and on Monday, the 23d of July, rumors were circulated that a strike was to be inaugurated on the roads running through that place. Mayor R. H. McKune was at Ocean Grove, and seeing the accounts of the troubles at Pittsburgh in the newspapers, hurried home, where he arrived on the evening of the 23d. On the 24th, he tried to get the city council together to prepare for the emergency, as the strike, according to rumor, was to take place the next day, the 25th; but the council were opposed to doing anything in that direction, and refused to take any action. On Wednesday, the 25th, a committee of trainmen waited on the superintendent of the Delaware, Lackawanna and Western railroad, and informed him that no trains would be allowed to leave, except the engine with a mail car. The superintendent asked the mayor for a force to protect the trains, but the regular police force of the city had been reduced to ten men, which was entirely insufficient, and the superintendent was advised to run the mail cars for the present, and not undertake to move regular trains until more assistance could be got, which advice was finally followed.

On the 26th of July, the miners of the Lackawanna Iron and Coal Company held a meeting at the Round woods, at which from six thousand to eight thousand persons were present, and a committee was appointed to confer with the general manager in regard to wages, and the crowds began to gather in the streets. The mayor called an advisory committee of seven of the leading citizens, on Thursday morning, the 26th, and it was agreed to raise and swear in a special police force of the citizens, to act during the emergency, which arrangement was carried out, and quite a number of them raised that day, and placed under the command of officers who had seen service in the army. A room was procured at the company store, as it was called, for this special force to meet and organize in, and meetings were held and necessary arrangements made to meet any emergency.

The miners had resolved to quit work and not allow the mines to be pumped, and there was great danger that they would be flooded and immense damage inflicted. On Sunday, the 29th, the authorities met a committee of the miners and represented to them that the damage of flooding the mines would--a great portion of it--fall on them, as the mines could not then be worked for a long time if once flooded, and it was finally concluded that the pumps might be worked, so that on Monday the pumps were generally going again. On Monday the city council met, and resolved that no necessity existed for special police, and that none would be paid by the city. The mayor on that day sent for the executive committee of the trainmen, and informed them that on Tuesday, the 31st, it was proposed to start the regular trains at nine, A.M., and if resisted the mayor would use all the force at his command to put the trains through. In the afternoon the trainmen had a meeting and resolved, by a large majority, to resume work, and by evening of that day all fears of any further trouble had passed. The special force of citizens which had been sworn in were armed partly with Remington rifles and partly with muskets, and it was arranged that they should assemble at headquarters on a given signal through the church bells. Wednesday morning, August 1st, a meeting of the laboring men of the vicinity was held at the silk-works, a mile or so below the city, at which some seven thousand or eight thousand men were present. Accounts conflict as to the purpose of this meeting, some contending that it was called to hear a report of some committee, and some that no object was specified in the call, which was by word of mouth from man to man. No committee made any report, but a letter was read by some demagogue, purporting to be written by W. W. Scranton, general manager of the Lackawanna Iron and Coal Company, saying that he meant to have the men at work for fifty cents a day, and when they died bury them in a culm pile. Mr. Scranton denies having written any such letter, but it answered the purpose of its author by inflaming the minds of those at the meeting, and they broke up with the cry, "let us clean out the company's shops." About half-past ten, A.M., the mayor was informed that a crowd of men was coming up from the silk-works. The mayor, with a friend, started out to see what was the trouble, and on his way notified some of the special police to meet at head-quarters.

On arriving at the corner of Lackawanna and Washington avenues, they saw a crowd of from three to four thousand coming up the latter street, and swarming about the machine and other shops, and about the railroad. The mayor went down into the crowd, which opened for him, and he went as far as the machine shop, and turned and came back to the roadway of the Delaware, Lackawanna and Western shops. He had said to them: "Boys, you are doing wrong; you must disperse and go home." On arriving at the roadway, a company of one hundred and fifty or two hundred, who had been driving the men from the shops, and beating and maltreating them, came along, and the leader asked who that was. On being told it was the mayor, he said, "kill the son of a bitch; he has no business here," and immediately two shots were fired, and the mayor was struck between the shoulders by a club, or some heavy weapon, so hard as to cause hemorrhage of the lungs; a stone struck him in the small of the back, and several persons struck him with sticks. Several friends gathered about the mayor, and Father Dunn, a Catholic priest, came along to assist him. He was slipped out under the railroad bridge and toward Lackawanna avenue, followed by the crowd. The mayor had, before entering the crowd, given orders to have the signal given for the assembling of the extra police force, which order had not been executed, but word had been passed to a number of men, and when he got back to the avenue, he saw a body of them coming down towards him. At this point the mayor was hit by some heavy instrument, which broke his jaw and knocked him senseless for a time, but he went a short distance down the street and back again to where the mob and extra force of citizens were just about to meet. The mob, on leaving the machine shops, had cried out, "now let's clean out Lackawanna avenue," (the principal street of the city.) "Let's clean out the town." The force of citizens--about fifty in number--were passing Washington avenue just as the mob came up it and struck Lackawanna avenue, and they closed in behind the citizens and on both sides of the street around them; then a large number of stones and other missiles were thrown at the special police, with cries of "kill them; take their guns from them," and similar threats, and shortly two or three pistol shots were fired by the mob, and then the order was given the citizens to fire, which was immediately done, and three of the ringleaders killed the first fire. This dispersed the mob, which fled in every direction. The citizens gathered again at the company store to the number of two hundred, and a policeman soon reported the crowd gathering again.

The mayor, at the head of twenty-five of his men, immediately went to the crowd and ordered them to disperse, which order they obeyed. This force of citizens kept up their vigilance, not allowing any crowd to gather until the troops arrived on August 2d, and took charge of the military affairs at that place. A great deal of ill feeling and dissatisfaction still existed among the miners and mill men, but no open outbreak occurred, and before the troops left that section quiet and order was fully restored. Too much praise cannot be awarded the mayor and citizens' special police force of Scranton for the admirable organization they created, and for the prompt and vigorous measures taken when the emergency arrived. Had the action of the city council been approved and its advice taken, no special police force would have been raised, or had there been timidity among them when called out, Scranton would, no doubt, have suffered as badly as did Pittsburgh; for nowhere in the State was there a harder set of men than at Scranton and vicinity, many of the Molly Maguires, driven out of Schuylkill county, having gathered in and about that city, besides the scores of other hard cases who had been there for years. Riotous demonstrations were made at several other points in the State, but none of them assumed any great magnitude, except at Altoona and a few places in the anthracite coal region, and the occurrences at these places being described in the movements of the military as reported in the report of the Adjutant General for the year 1877, and being so similar to those that took place at the points particularly described herein, except as to magnitude, it is not deemed necessary to further notice them in this report.

Your committee has not thought it necessary to give a detailed account of the general movements of troops, except so far as they relate to the troubles at some particular point, where the same was necessary to a correct idea of all the circumstances occurring at such point, these general movements being all detailed fully in the Adjutant General's report above referred to.

As it is made the duty of your committee to report "by what authority the troops of the State were called out, for what purpose, and the service and conduct of the same," we approach this part of our labors with considerable diffidence, on account of the peculiar situation of affairs at many of the points to which troops were sent; the fact that this kind of service was new to most of them, and that, unaccustomed as our people are to the use of the military to enforce the laws, the opportunities for forming a correct judgment are few, and the chances for being mistaken are many. It is perhaps easy, after a thing has happened, to criticise the actions of those engaged in the transaction, to point out where they failed, and to say where they ought to have done different, but if the theories of the critic had been tested by actual experience, he too might have produced no better results than did those he criticises. Bearing this in mind, and endeavoring to treat the whole subject fairly and conscientiously, we proceed to give our views upon this part of the matter under consideration. And first, the troops of the State were called out, in the first instance, by orders from James W. Latta, Adjutant General of the State, on a call from the sheriff of Allegheny county, the orders being signed by him, the Adjutant General, the Governor's name not being attached thereto, the Governor, as before stated, being absent from the State. He, with his family, started for California on the 16th of July, and before leaving had a conference with the Attorney General, Adjutant General, and Secretary of the Commonwealth, as to whether there was any reason why he should not go. It was agreed by all, that everything in the State was quiet at the time, and no prospects of any disturbance, and that there was no reason whatever, why he should not take the contemplated trip. Before leaving, however, he instructed Adjutant General Latta that if there was any trouble in his absence he should exercise the authority vested in the Commander-in-Chief, in accordance with the same rule and principles previously established, which were that on a call from the sheriff of a county for troops to assist in enforcing the law, the military should only be sent after he became satisfied that the sheriff had exhausted his powers and authority to suppress the disorder, and that the lawless element was too strong to be controlled by the civil authorities.

General Latta, after directing General Pearson, at Pittsburgh, to order out one regiment, and to take command of the military situation, reported what had occurred, and his order to General Pearson, to the Governor, which dispatch reached the latter at Antelope, on the Union Pacific railroad, July 20, before noon, which was answered by the Governor from Cheyenne, at half past one, P.M., the same day, directing General Latta to "order promptly all troops necessary to support the sheriff in protecting moving trains on the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, and go to Pittsburgh and keep supervision of all troops ordered out." From this time communication by telegraph was kept up by the Governor until his return, and all troops were ordered out in pursuance to general orders given by him. The Governor received a telegram from C. N. Farr, his private secretary, and General Latta, at 2.20, P.M., the 20th instant, that everything was going on well, and the riot would be suppressed, and for him to go on. He accordingly pursued his journey to Salt Lake City, where he received a telegram Saturday evening, the 21st, at nine o'clock, giving an account of the collision between the troops and the mob at Pittsburgh, when he immediately procured a special train, and started on his return. These facts show that the troops were called out by the proper authority of the State, on a requisition of the civil authorities of the locality where the troops were to be sent.

We believe that neither the mayor of Pittsburgh, nor the sheriff of Allegheny county, had exhausted their powers under the law to disperse the mob before calling for troops, and that under the rules adopted by the commander-in-chief the steps prerequisite to ordering out the troops had not been properly taken by the civil authorities. The purpose for which the troops were called out was to assist the civil authorities in enforcing the law, and preserving the public peace, and it was at no time supposed by any one of the military officers that they superseded the civil power, although at some places they were obliged to act in the absence of the civil officers, the latter having run away, or refused to do anything to suppress the riotous disturbances.

The service and conduct of the troops was generally good, considering the circumstances under which they went into service, except in a few instances, which will be more particularly specified hereafter. It should be remembered that never before were the militia of the State placed in so trying a position as that in which they were placed in July last. Rarely, if ever, were regular soldiers placed in more trying circumstances. Called upon without a moment's warning, they left their homes, with but little or no preparation, and hastened to the scene of the troubles. Nothing had occurred to give the people of the State or the railroad officials any indications of an outbreak at that time, but all at once the storm burst upon the city of Pittsburgh, and threatened its destruction. In this emergency the National Guard was called out, and most of the commands arrived at the scene of the troubles with great promptness, and there met a foe more formidable than they had any expectation of meeting. The active National Guard of the Commonwealth, being made up of volunteers from the people of the locality in which the military organization exists, is usually composed of all classes of the citizens of the locality, and the members of the military will, therefore, naturally be impressed with all the feelings of the community in which they reside, and be infected with any spirit of resistance to constituted authority that may exist among any great class of their neighbors.

Hence it is that this guard cannot be always relied upon to do its full duty in case of troubles at home, requiring the intervention of the military.

Not being brought up to the profession of soldiers, and the officers being their friends and neighbors, and when at home being no better and having no more authority than themselves, they are sometimes loth to obey orders when these orders run contrary to their wishes and inclinations. The military discipline, which comes from actual service, is wanting, and being accustomed to do their own thinking, having an opinion on all matters that come before them, and freely expressing it, it is very hard to come down to the condition of executing orders without a why or wherefore, even in ordinary cases; but when it comes to using their weapons against their friends, neighbors, and perhaps relatives, it is not to be wondered at if they sometimes waver in their duty. Every member of the active National Guard ought, however, to be taught that as a soldier it is his duty to obey the orders of his superior officers without question; that in case of a mob or riot in his neighborhood, strong enough to defy the civil authority, the organization of which he is a member is the first to be called upon, and that this aid to the civil powers is one of the principal duties which devolve upon him, and one of the principal reasons for maintaining such an organization. Taking into account the difficulty of overcoming these natural feelings of men, a large majority of the troops called out in July last may be said to have behaved nobly. General Pearson has been severely censured for having (as was alleged) given the command to the troops at Twenty-eighth street to fire on the mob, and the troops have also been denounced for the firing which occurred at that point.

Your committee have found, from the evidence, that General Pearson did not give the orders to fire, but we are of the opinion that he would have been justified in so doing, and that if he had been present at the time, he would not have been justified in withholding such an order for a moment later than the firing actually occurred. Neither can any blame be attached to the troops themselves. They had been pelted with clubs, stones, and other missiles by the mob, and this was continually growing more severe, when some persons in the mob fired pistols into the ranks of the men, and others were trying to wrench their guns from their hands, and it had become a question of submission to the mob on their part, or to fire in self-defense before a gun was discharged by them.

As it is usually the case in such occurrences, some innocent persons were killed and others injured, but for this the soldiers were not to blame. Being where they ought not to be, their presence whether so intended or not encouraged the mob, and the soldiers could not in such a crowd distinguish friend from foe. Spectators ought to keep away from such mobs at all times and not let their curiosity get the better of their judgment and discretion. It has been questioned whether it was a wise movement to order General Brinton's command into the round-house and shops on the evening of the 21st. The move itself we do not care to criticise, but having been made, we think a stronger picket guard should have been thrown out, all approaches more thoroughly guarded, communication kept up with the Union depot, where the supplies of ammunition and food were stored, and whenever the mob began to assemble in the neighborhood a sufficient force should have been ordered out to disperse them, which could have been done with the means at General Brinton's command.

The great mistake was made by General Pearson in ordering General Brinton not to allow his men to fire on the mob when they began to re-assemble, and showed their murderous disposition by firing on the troops, and the other measures taken by them in the early evening. General Brinton asked for leave to fire on the mob when they began to assemble around the round house and fire on his men, but General Pearson would not allow it. It was of no use to march out for the purpose of dispersing such a mob unless the men were allowed to fire, if necessary, as blood had been shed, the mob had become enraged by this and emboldened by the position and apparent inactivity of the troops, and nothing but the most severe measures would now be sufficient to overawe and disperse them. General Pearson was evidently intimidated by the denunciation which he received, at the hands of the press and people of Pittsburgh, as the supposed author of the order to fire on the mob at Twenty-eighth street. In his evidence he states that if he had given the command to fire at Twenty-eighth street, and it had not been followed by the frightful destruction of property which ensued, he would have been tried, convicted, and hung for murder, such was the sentiment of the people of Pittsburgh at that time. We think he should have taken vigorous measures against the mob after the occurrences at Twenty-eighth street, and not have allowed it to assemble again in that vicinity, and that he ought not to have left the round house at the time he did. For what occurred after that time he is blameless, for on reaching the Union Depot Hotel he was practically relieved from his command by General Latta. We think this was a mistake also; that it was giving way to the sentiment still prevailing in Pittsburgh that the attempt to disperse the mob at Twenty-eighth street was wrong, and the killing of the persons at that place nothing less than murder. The military had commenced a move to accomplish a certain purpose under the lead of the sheriff, and as his posse; a collision had occurred, the sheriff had left, the mayor refused to cooperate with the sheriff or military, and it was the duty of the military officers to carry out the movement, (to wit: dispersing the mob,) in a vigorous manner, and not in any way be swayed from their duty by the sentiment above spoken of.

We think the order given by General Latta, sent by Sergeant Wilson to General Brinton in the round house, which closed as follows, viz: "If compelled to escape at last, do so to the eastward; take Penn avenue if possible, and make for Guthrie, at Torrens," was a mistake. Some question has arisen as to the right of General Latta to give orders to General Brinton at all. We think that it is enough to say that General Latta was directed by the commander-in-chief to "go to Pittsburgh and keep supervision of all troops ordered out;" that he went there in pursuance of these directions, issued orders as if he understood himself to be at the head of military affairs after General Pearson left, was so recognized by all, and his orders obeyed as if coming from the commander-in-chief, and that, therefore, he cannot escape the responsibility of any orders issued by him, or the failure to take such steps as a military commander should have taken under the circumstances. If General Brinton was to leave the round house he should have been ordered to the Union depot, where he could have fed his men, and received a supply of ammunition, and from there he could have taken the most available position to disperse the mob and protect property. Of General Brinton's ability to have made this movement, if so ordered at any time, there can be no doubt.

Life would probably have been sacrificed in making such a move, but law and order must be upheld, even at the sacrifice of the lives of such persons as composed that lawless mob, or those who innocently mingled with it. The loss of life on the part of the troops could not have been greater than it was by pursuing the course afterwards taken, and it probably would have been much less, as mobs are always cowardly, and every demonstration made against this mob after the collision at Twenty-eighth street by any persons having authority, either civil or military, scattered it. Colonel Guthrie, with the Eighteenth regiment, should have been ordered from Torrens to Pittsburgh Saturday night, and the only excuse we can conceive for not doing this promptly, without waiting for the troops from Walls Station, is the fear that being Pittsburgh men they would refuse to obey any orders which would bring them in collision with the mob. This is not sufficient excuse. The proper order should have been given, as this regiment had not shown any insubordination, was not allowed to mix or talk with the mob, and would no doubt have obeyed all orders.

The conduct of the Fourteenth and Nineteenth regiments has been severely criticised by some, but many considerations are to be taken into account in coming to a just conclusion in regard to these men. The mob was made up in part of their neighbors and their fellow-laborers, and it was hard for them to take up arms to assist the sheriff in enforcing the law as against men having so much of their sympathy. This accounts for their dilatory movements in assembling when first called out, and the failure to report of many of their men. Their officers were to blame for allowing them to mingle with the mob, or rather for allowing the mob to mingle with them, and for the lack of strict discipline on Saturday, the 21st of July. Neither the officers nor men were to blame for their mismanagement on the night of the 21st, General Brown being alone responsible for that order.

This conduct of General Brown was unaccountable, until it was ascertained that he had been for some time previous suffering from severe physical ailments which had seriously affected his mind, and that he was not responsible for a failure in judgment at the time. It is no wonder the order called forth the indignant protest of Colonel Gray, but coming as it did from a superior officer, it was reluctantly obeyed. These regiments were afterwards sent to the coal fields, and there acquitted themselves like true soldiers.

As to the dispute between Colonel Norris and General Brinton, it is important only in treating of the conduct of General Brinton. The Adjutant General, in his evidence before your committee, stated that his duty was to assemble the troops, and that the command devolved upon the senior major general, (in the absence of the commander-in-chief,) who was General A. L. Pearson. He further stated that when General Pearson came to the Union depot hotel, before relieving him of his command, he was particular to ask him if he had left General Brinton in command, and that General Pearson replied that he had left him in full command. If General Brinton was in command, he had a right to act on his own judgment. But while General Latta's statement is correct when applied to him as Adjutant General, yet it must be remembered that he had assumed to act for the commander-in-chief, and gave orders to General Brinton during the night, and assumed the direction of the troops. It is evident that General Brinton considered himself bound to obey the orders of the Adjutant General, and we take it for granted that he was. The important question then is, did General Brinton disobey the orders of General Latta? It is clearly proven and conceded by all parties that General Brinton did not receive the written order given to Captain Aull to convey to him until the 1st day of August, a week or more after it was dated. Colonel Norris says in his testimony that he did not deliver it as an order to General Brinton; that he did not consider he had a right to do so, but that he told him that Captain Aull was on the way to him with an order from General Latta, and communicated to him the substance of the order. He further said General Brinton said he might return if he got positive orders to do so. This remark shows that General Brinton did not receive it as an order.

And further, Captain Aull not reaching General Brinton during the day, in the evening he sent Major Baugh, a member of his staff, to the Adjutant General's head-quarters, at the Monongahela House, for orders. The Adjutant General gave Major Baugh a written order, which he delivered to General Brinton, who obeyed it promptly. If Colonel Norris had reported it to General Brinton as an order coming from General Latta, and General Brinton had received it as such, he would not have sent to head-quarters for orders, as he did. As your committee understand the evidence, all that Colonel Norris claims is, that he told General Brinton that Captain Aull had an order for him, and communicated the substance of it to him, and that General Brinton understood it. True, that in this he is disputed by General Brinton, but it is not necessary for your committee to settle this question of veracity between them. The only question for us to settle is, did General Brinton disobey the order? We do not think that he did. Colonel Norris does not say he gave him the order. He simply told him Captain Aull had an order, giving him the substance of it. General Brinton, it seems, did not consider it his duty to act until the order reached him. Captain Aull not reaching him, he did what was very proper, sent to head-quarters for orders.

General Brinton has been censured for going so far out from the city, and not staying in its immediate vicinity. No one in his position could be expected to do differently. Ordered into the round house, not allowed to fire on the mob which was gathering around with the avowed purpose of killing his men, hooted at by the same mob which cheered the Pittsburgh troops, the Pittsburgh troops disbanded at a time when the mob had surrounded and besieged the shops in which his command was stationed, fired at from the windows of the houses, street corners, and even from a police station, not an official (except the sheriff) or citizen of the place to come near him at any time, or express a word of sympathy or encouragement in the disagreeable and delicate duty he was bound to perform, and after all, rebuffed at the United States arsenal, where he expected aid and sympathy, he had good reason to believe he was not wanted in the city, and needs no excuse for putting a reasonable distance between his command and that place.

The Sixteenth regiment seems to have been the most unreliable of all the regiments called on for service during the time of the troubles. Company I was disbanded in dishonor, for insubordination, cowardice, and mutinous conduct in disobeying orders and furnishing ammunition to rioters at Reading, by Major General Bolton, and he afterwards disbanded companies C, D, E, and H for mutinous conduct, subject to the approval of the Governor. The bad conduct of these companies commenced before they left home, in refusing at first to go aboard the cars, and continued until they got back again. The Fourth regiment, after having a serious collision with the mob at Reading, and behaving like men through that trouble, became badly demoralized by the action of the above named companies of the Sixteenth regiment, and, for a day or two, was entirely unreliable, but afterwards recovered its morale and did good service. A squad of some fifteen or twenty men, of General Brinton's division, (company and regiment not known,) which failed to report in time to leave with him for Pittsburgh, afterwards came on and were stopped near Altoona, and being unable to go further came back to a short distance above Harrisburg, and then left the cars to pass that place on foot by a circuitous route, as it was reported that the mob was in possession of the railroad, and would allow no soldiers to pass through. This squad stopped at some place across the river from Harrisburg. Some two hundred to two hundred and fifty men and boys, on the 23d of July, went across the river and came back escorting this squad of soldiers, a lot of boys carrying their guns, and they were taken to some place near the railroad, fed and afterwards put on the cars for Philadelphia. Such an isolated instance as this ought not to condemn the command to which it belongs, but it is discreditable to those engaged in it, and, it is learned, a court-martial has been ordered to sit on their case.

The National Guard of the Commonwealth is a necessity, and in a State like ours, with large numbers of illiterate and unprincipled men concentrated in certain localities, many of whom are foreigners, and imbued with the spirit of foreign communism, which is spreading in this country, the Guard must occasionally be called on as a posse to assist in enforcing the law; but it never should be called on until all other means are tried and exhausted. It has become too common to call on the Governor for troops, in ease of a mob, and the experience of the summer of 1877, demonstrates that in any community where the civil authorities and the citizens wish the law enforced, and act together harmoniously and vigorously, order may be maintained and mobs dispersed without the intervention of the military. At Philadelphia, large and angry mobs were dispersed by the police, which, if allowed to have been together for a day or two, would have become so strong, as to defy the ordinary authorities, and the result would have been riot and destruction. It was the same at Harrisburg, and also at Scranton, except at the latter place the city council refused to cooperate with the mayor and citizens, but notwithstanding this disadvantage, the wisdom of the measures of the mayor was vindicated at the first collision with the mob. It is but just to the people of Pittsburgh to say that the above places had the example of the latter place before them, and had learned the danger of temporizing or in any way sympathizing with anything like a mob, however just they may believe their original demands to be.

In conclusion your committee adopt the following clause of the Governor's message, which fully coincides with their views, viz:

"I have been thus solicitous to present the conditions of a militia campaign, because the conduct of our troops during the late crisis has elicited every variety of criticism, from mild censure to absolute condemnation, and because there has grown up in Pennsylvania a spirit of caviling at its militia, in marked contrast with the kindly feeling and pride manifested by other States towards their citizen soldiery. Now, that a temperate review of the facts may be made, I believe it will not be considered a partial judgment to say that during the conduct of the State troops during the late strike was, upon the whole, commendable and creditable. In Pittsburgh before a final decision, many considerations must modify our judgment. The conditions were not purely military. It was not simply a question of preserving a body of soldiery intact, of holding a position or defeating an enemy. Expecting to march into a friendly community, whose moral support would be cheerfully given them, they entered a practically hostile city, were denounced and threatened by press and people, and attacked by men who lurked in the security of a sympathetic crowd, and used women and children as shields and instruments. If, under such circumstances, their action lacked the energy and severity that purely military canons would have justified, it cannot be a matter of surprise, that having so long been accustomed to peace, they were unable to comprehend at once the sudden conditions of war. As it was, though not executed with the skilled precision of regular troops, the movement accomplished its purpose, and the failure to move the freight trains out of the city, to which more than any fact the subsequent burning is attributed, was the result of the want of cooperation of an adequate and competent police, and the desertion, at the critical moment, of the railroad employés.

"The behavior of the Pittsburgh troops, in a military sense, is without excuse; but was it any worse than the defection of officers and men in the regular army, who, in 1861, deserted their comrades in arms to join the communities in which they were born and bred? Such things are not military, they are political or social; and it cannot be expected that they should be judged by the severest military code. It was, in fact, the temporary excitement of unthinking men, carried away by the universal clamor around them. For that reason, when the burst of passion was over, I re-instated them; otherwise, new troops would have had to be enlisted, while these might be trusted to have a keener sense of duty, from a desire to retrieve their fame. In the case of the Philadelphia troops, although disheartened by being placed on the defensive, and a part of the command demoralized by a too precipitate retreat, the general steadiness and obedience to orders, under comparative hardships, and in real danger, show them to have been composed of the best of soldiery material. The failure to subdue a city in insurrection against the laws is not to be attributed to the want of courage, capacity, or fidelity in the officers and men, but to a natural disinclination to take life indiscriminately, and the uncertainty as to how far, under the laws, they could exercise a purely military discretion. For myself, I have every confidence in the Guard, and shall not hesitate, if another occasion should unhappily arise, to rely upon its fidelity and courage. The after service of the Guard, when assembled together, prepared for active campaigning, was all that could be desired. The fact that as many answered the call for a service likely to be long and dangerous, as assembled in the pleasant encampment at the centennial, is conclusive proof of the general zeal and fidelity of the troops."

The causes which led to the riots are, in the opinion of your committee, as follows, to wit: The riots grew out of the strike of the railroad men, and the strikers themselves were the protest of the laborer against the system by which his wages were arbitrarily fixed and lowered by his employer without consultation with him, and without his consent. There are many other causes that combined to bring about the strikes, but the cause mentioned underlies the whole question, and it is the foundation of all the trouble.

Instead of capital and labor working together in harmony, as their community of interests would dictate, a conflict has been growing up between them, which, if not averted or discontinued, will lead to more serious troubles than any that have yet occurred, and which must result, as all such conflicts do, in the defeat of the labor interests and in consequence thereof placing labor at a still greater disadvantage than it now occupies. This conflict has been engendered and kept up by demagogues who, for their own advantage, seek to control the votes of the laboring men for base and partisan motives and who, in order to more surely secure their ends, profess to be the only and true friends of the laborer, and persistently misrepresent the capitalist. It is much easier to move a body of men (which, like a large portion of the laboring class, has but little time to investigate the problem of the true position of labor and capital towards each other) by appealing to passion and prejudice, and in this respect your demagogue knows the material he has to work upon and allows no scruples of either honesty or modesty to restrain him. He is the leading spirit in organizing and keeping up so-called labor organizations of one kind or another, and which organizations, as heretofore managed in this country, have never resulted in any advantage to the men in whose ostensible interests they are gotten up, but, on the contrary, have inflicted untold damage on them. The demagogue likes to be appointed to some position in the labor organizations, and is not slow in suggesting a traveling agent or lecturer, with some supposed duty, where he can travel about the country, living at his ease on the fruits of the hard labor of his comrades, and spending freely the money that is as freely furnished him.

Why cannot the laboring men of the country see through the flimsy disguise of these men, and look at them as they are, the leeches and vampires who prey upon the life-blood of the interest they profess to befriend. There are men in all parties who have, or claim to have, some reputation as statesmen, who are not above the arts of the common demagogue, and who seem at times to be running a race with him to see which can stoop to the lowest tricks to secure the votes of the dear laborer. By the efforts of these men, and the tricks they practice, this conflict has been brought on. But the capitalist himself has not been blameless; instead of, in the common phrase, meeting his workmen half-way, and trying to come to a fair understanding with them, he has put himself on his dignity, and has placed all the blame of the results brought about by the demagogue upon the laborer himself. He must remember that the laborer is human, with hopes and aspirations as well as passions and prejudices, and that it is much better to cultivate the former by fair, frank, and courteous treatment, than to inflame the latter by the opposite course. The laborer believes, as he has a right to believe, that his wishes should be sometimes consulted, and that he should be recognized as one of the parties to the contract, and as such, fully consulted whenever the same is to be changed or abrogated. We believe it is in the power of the capitalist who is an employer of men, by fair, frank, and just treatment of his employés, not only in the immediate question of wages, but also in looking after their social and educational interests, to completely undermine and destroy the occupation and influence of the demagogue spoken of, and create that mutual trust and friendship which ought to exist between labor and capital, and thereby put an end to the frequently recurring strikes which inflict such serious damage on the business of the country, and do no man or set of men the least particle of good.

Many instances of the favorable results following such action might be given, but we will only refer to one instance, which occurred in Yorkshire, England. Titus Salt, whose father was a woolen manufacturer at Bradford, in Yorkshire, at the age of twenty-one years, started out in business for himself, by hiring a small mill and one or two men, who, with himself, did the work of the establishment, and so diligently and wisely were his affairs managed that in a few years he found himself doing a successful and rapidly increasing business, and by a lucky discovery of the value of the wool of the Alpaca sheep, and its manufacture in dress goods, he soon acquired a fortune. This necessitated the enlargement of his mill, and to do this the more conveniently, he moved some two miles from town and erected a large manufactory, in which he gave employment to some four thousand operatives. Having been a laboring man himself, he knew the needs and wants of the laborer, and he accordingly erected neat and convenient cottages for the use of his employés, which were rented to them at a moderate rental, with the privilege of buying to those who were able, thus assisting them to procure a home of their own, and giving them a substantial interest in the success of the business they were employed in. He also caused to be erected churches which all could attend, and also school-houses, wherein every child could receive a good and thorough education. A public park was laid out and completed, bath-houses built, and clubs and lyceums established, Mr. Salt taking the lead and encouraging his people to carry out and sustain these institutions. In a short time a thriving town was built up which was named Saltaire, in honor of its founder, and here the laborer has an opportunity to enjoy himself like other human beings, with no thought of occasion for strikes, the employer or capitalist and employés all feeling a common interest in the fortunes of their place, and with none of the jealousies or prejudices now commonly existing between these two classes. Mr. Salt has been created a baronet, but this can add no additional honor to the name of a man who has successfully solved the problem of the true relations between labor and capital, and who has taught the capitalist to what noble duties it is possible to devote himself, and the laborer, that the barrier between the sympathies of the master who employs and overlooks, and the man who works, may be broken down in other and better ways than by hostile combination. Such a town as Saltaire, with its neat cottages, pleasant parks, clean streets, fine churches and schools, where labor is respected, and intemperance banished, is a better monument than any made of marble or stone, and will perpetuate the name of its founder more surely and completely than if he had made a fortune by grinding down his human help to the last farthing, and then on his death-bed bequeathing it to some public institution.

The immediate cause of the first strike which took place in Pennsylvania, in July, 1877, to wit: that at Pittsburgh, July 19th, was the order by the Pennsylvania Railroad Company to run "double-headers" from that place to Derry. This order of itself, had there been no previous reductions of wages or dismissals of men on account of the depression in business, would probably have caused no strike, but following so soon after the second reduction, while the ill feeling engendered thereby was still having its effect on the men, together with the spirit of independence and probably recklessness which was brought about by the organization of the Trainmen's Union, with its general plan for a strike on the 27th of June, and the feeling of uneasiness and dissatisfaction existing among the laboring men of the country generally, caused by the want of labor and the low price thereof as compared with a few years previous, all together combined to set in motion this strike, which was followed by results so disastrous as to be forever memorable in the history of the State, results unforeseen and unanticipated at the commencement by the actors therein. The few trainmen who refused to take out the freight trains on the morning of July 19th, while not intending or wishing to cause any destruction of property or loss of life by their action, still cannot escape the primary responsibility of the fearful scenes enacted at Pittsburgh during the few following days. The order which the railroad company made was one it had a right to make, and if the men did not wish to work under the order, they had a right to refuse to do so. So far there can be no question among reasonable men. The order having been promulgated several days before it was to go into effect, gave the men plenty of time to consider its effect, and if they did not wish to go out on double-headers, fair treatment would have dictated that they should have given the officers of the company reasonable notice of their decision prior to the time at which the order was to take effect, but this did not comport with the intentions of the men. They not only did not intend to work themselves under that order, but they did not propose to allow those who might be willing to accept service of the company on the double-header trains to do so, and when they combined together and raised their hands to prevent other men from working, they committed an act for which there can be no excuse.