Chapter C: A. Fife, sworn with uplifted hand (13)

A. General Latta's room, at the Union Depot hotel. And then General Latta suggested me--he asked the question--and says he, "Is General Brinton in command out at the round-house." Says I, "He is." Says he, "Then I think the best thing we can do for the situation of affairs and the protection of your troops, and to try and quell this disturbance, is for you to go away from here. If you do not go, you will be hanged." I told him there was a sufficient number of us there to make a hanging very agreeable to all, and I did not think there was much danger; if any one was hanged, somebody would be hurt. He said it was no time to use any levity; the situation was very serious, and my life was not worth a penny, and that my remaining in command of the troops was doing an injury; that I had been blamed for the whole thing. I asked him what he wanted me to do.

Q. What time was that in the evening?

A. It was between nine and ten o'clock.

Q. Saturday night?

A. Saturday night. Says I, "What do you want me to do? Do you wish me to change my head-quarters? If so, will I go to the Monongahela house?" "No; you will just be as bad off there as here," and then Major Evans, of my staff, spoke up, and said, "General Latta, if you insist that this ought to be done, let General Pearson come to my house." General Latta said, "Yes; that is the very thing to do." I had never been at Major Evans' house, but knew it was in the neighborhood. The address was taken by General Latta, and I think by Mr. Farr, of the Governor's staff. At that time, Mr. Dalzell, one of the attorneys of the road, came into the room, and I spoke to him, and I spoke to Quay. Says I, "Mr. Quay, do you think I ought to leave this place?" Says he: "I certainly do. The situation of affairs is such in the manner in which you are blamed for this, that you are doing an injury to the troops;" and others of the Governor's staff spoke up in the same way. Says I, "Very well, I take this as an order, but before I go I will leave you three members of the staff." I left my brother, Mr. Murray, and Major Steen, stating that I would be prepared to perform any duty. That these officers knew where I could be found, and anything they wished done, I would do. Major Evans and myself left. There was no possible way of getting out front, and we crossed a small bridge, and went up over the hill-side, and reached Major Evans' house. At that time there had not been a car fired, and there had been no torch communicated to anything--buildings or cars.

Q. Where was Major Evans' house?

A. Major Evans' house is situated in what is known as Oakland. I do not know what street he does live on.

Q. What distance from the Union depot?

A. I suppose it is in the neighborhood of a mile and a half. We reached Mayor Evans' house, and I then sent him over to find out, if he could ascertain anything about my family. I had heard my house was ransacked, and I know that my daughter had been driven away. She drove down in an open buggy after the firing. Came down to Twenty-sixth street and the round-house, where the troops were, drove through the mob, and tried to get some communication from me. It had been reported that I was shot. It was impossible to get any communication with her, and the mob drove her off. I sent Major Evans over to see if he could find out anything about my family. While he was gone, Colonel Moore and my brother came out for me to give him an order for ammunition at the Allegheny arsenal. The ammunition had been stored there and could not be taken out, except by my order. I gave the necessary orders. At that time everything was quiet. They started away with the orders for ammunition. Subsequently Major Evans came in and reported that so far as he could learn everything was quiet. At about ten o'clock, Sunday morning, I was wakened up and told of the fact that the rioters and mob had set fire to the cars and burned out the round-house, and I immediately sent a written communication to General Latta, by Major Evans, stating that I had heard what had taken place, and desired to receive some instructions from him. That I was ready to perform any service, and to do any duty, and to go any place, and suggested the propriety of immediately telegraphing the Governor for his return. Probably about one or two--it might have been after that--Sunday afternoon I received a verbal reply by Major Evans stating that General Latta had stated for me to remain where I was until I got further orders. My appearance then would only aggravate matters and do more harm than good, and for Major Evans to report on the Monday following. I sent Major Evans in on the Monday morning, and at the same time General Latta had left. I believe he did not see him. I know nothing at all about the situation of affairs from that time up.

Q. How long did you remain at Major Evans'?

A. I remained several days there, and the family being a strange family to me--had never seen his family. I knew the major very well--and having received intelligence that there was a likelihood of the major's house being mobbed, and not desiring to put them in a situation of that kind, I left Major Evans' house. Subsequent to that--of course, when I left the Union Depot hotel, I looked upon that as being virtually a relief from my command, and found, by reading the daily papers, that General Brown had assumed command of the division. I think it was the 1st of August--a number of days subsequent, anyhow--I received an official communication from the Governor, instructing me to hold my command in readiness to move at an hour not later than eight o'clock, and to go up to Luzerne coal regions, where difficulties were apprehended.

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. Did you go?

A. At that time I found that the division had been ordered to disband--verbal orders had been given by General Brown to disband the troops, and by accident I was at Colonel Guthrie's head-quarters, and I suggested the propriety of him not disbanding just at that time, and he concluded that he would not. That he would have a street parade of his regiment that evening. I returned to my head-quarters, and when I returned, I got orders from the Governor, ordering me to have my division in readiness to start off at an hour not later than eight o'clock. I immediately communicated with various officers of the division, and at the hour indicated I was ready to move with the entire command. Transportation could not be procured at that time, and we did not leave until the neighborhood of twelve o'clock--started off with, I think, one thousand and thirty-five men, and went to Luzerne county. Do you desire me to give an account of how we proceeded there, and what took place?

Q. You might state whether the mob went to your house in search of you?

A. Of my own personal knowledge, of course, I do not know. From what I have heard, they did go.

Q. You ordered Colonel Gray and Colonel Howard to move their commands to the transfer station, I believe you said?

A. Yes, sir; I did that, because I considered it my duty to put these men in positions I considered the most dangerous--they were my own troops. The transfer sheds were long, low frame buildings, extending probably in the neighborhood of a square, open and unprotected, and I thought it was my duty at least to expose my own troops much more than strangers who were coming here from a long distance. I placed General Brinton's command in brick buildings.

Q. Was it General Brinton's suggestion, or because you deemed it the best position, that you placed him in the round-house?

A. I found that no trains were to be run at all, that it would be mere and utter foolishness to keep General Brinton's troops standing upon the railroad tracks, and to place them upon the hill side would be exposing that command to danger, as all the hill side and all the buildings on it were filled up by railroaders, I believe, and consequently, to place General Brinton's command on the hill side would subject them to any troubles that might occur from the railroaders living above them, and of the mob getting round on top. Then, the further fact that the mob would have taken possession of the round-house and used the cars as barricades, and he could do nothing. He suggested the propriety of bringing them into the round-house, and giving them some chance to rest, and getting them provisions; and I say now, that knowing all the facts of the case, if the thing was to be done over again to-morrow, I would do exactly what was done. To have placed them in any other position than that in which they were placed, would have been a piece of folly that I would not be guilty of. A man that would have taken troops and placed them upon the hill side, under the situation of affairs, I would characterize as an ass, and not worthy of commanding troops.

Q. Would it not have been better to have retired the troops to the Union depot, inasmuch as there were no trains to be moved that night?

A. It would have been a great deal pleasanter to the troops, but it would have given entire possession of the cars, round-houses, workshops, locomotives, and the entire moving machinery of the Pennsylvania railroad--placed it entirely in the hands of the mob.

Q. Could you not have sent out detachments to have driven away any mob that might have gathered for the purpose of burning buildings?

A. That might have been done in an open field, but the fact that the railroad tracks ran along Liberty avenue, are probably ten or twelve feet above the grade on Liberty avenue, and then on the right of the tracks is a hill side, and Brinton did not bring one thousand eight hundred men, Brinton brought about six hundred men, and Colonel Guthrie was at Torrens, and to have scattered the few men out along the railroad tracks--men who did not know the situation of affairs, and did not know the general locality of the ground, they would be subject to all sorts of annoyance, and could be shot down at pleasure by those people. There is one thing the committee must understand, that this mob did not only congregate at Twenty-eighth street. They formed in position on the south side; that they came over in a compact body by regiments. They formed in different localities in Allegheny City, and different places, and they were all marched to a given point, and to have sent a few troops along the line of the track they could have picked them up, one by one, and carried them off body and breeches. There was but one thing to do, and it was to take possession of the buildings, and the only mistake that was made was General Brinton's not calling out his pickets and shooting down the people, as they should have been shot down, and the property would have been saved, and if it had been saved, General Brinton and others would have been hanged for murder, because the feeling in this community at that time was such that if it had not been for the fact that the railroad property had been burned down, and private property had been taken and robbed, and private buildings burned down, there was no officer in command of troops safe, and his life was not worth a penny. The feeling in the community was such that I have no hesitancy in saying indictments would have been found and the officers convicted of manslaughter.

By Mr. Means:

Q. Is there no similarity between this riot, and the military force meeting the enemy in the field of battle?

A. Certainly not. Meeting an enemy on a field of battle, you go there to kill. The more you kill, and the quicker you do it, the better; but in this instance you had a division of six hundred men--my division was six hundred men. Colonel Guthrie was at Torrens, surrounded by a mob. The balance of my troops were at Twenty-eighth street, and here you had men who had fathers and brothers and relatives mingled in the crowd of rioters, and it was very natural for them to have a feeling that to fire then and kill these men, was like shooting their own relatives. The sympathy of the people, the sympathy of the troops, my own sympathy, was with the strikers proper. We all felt that those men were not receiving enough wages.

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. You say you meet an enemy on a field of battle, and you go there to kill. What was the purpose of the troops in going out to Twenty-eighth street?

A. The purpose of the troops was to try to preserve order and preserve peace. There would be no difficulty of us going out there and commencing to shoot if that had been an enemy. The first thing we would have done, would be to throw out a skirmish line and commence to shoot.

Q. You were to preserve the peace at all hazards--if necessary to preserve the peace to call, you are justifiable in doing it?

A. Certainly.

Q. When an attack is made upon your troops with clubs and stones, and firing into your troops, are you not justified in killing?

A. My opinion may be different from a great many other military men. I look at it in this way: when troops are officered, it is the duty of the officers to do the thinking. If every man that carries a musket has a right to think and shoot just as he thinks, there is no occasion to have any officers at all, because, when we started out from the Union Depot hotel these Philadelphia men were insulted long before they arrived. Colonel Guthrie was insulted at Torrens, and if each man had carried out his own thoughts and commenced to shoot, it would have showed a great want of discipline.

Q. Would not the commanding officer be justifiable in giving the command to fire?

A. Most undoubtedly so. He would not only be justifiable, but it would be his duty so to do, and I have no hesitancy in saying, from what I have learned from the manner in which General Brinton's troops were received and treated, and the shots that were fired at them, the stones that were hurled at them, and the fact that these men were knocked down, it was his duty to have given the order to fire, and if I had been there I would have had no hesitancy in giving the order.

Q. What I understand you to say is, that there was not a public sentiment that would have justified the commanding officer in giving that command to kill?

A. The sentiment afterwards showed that the sentiment was directly against the firing.

Q. Do you mean to say that the civil authorities, the civil arm of the government, would not have protected the military officer in giving a command to fire under circumstances of the attack made there at Twenty-eighth street on the militia?

A. I have got to answer that in a twofold capacity. As a lawyer, I believe that the courts would most undoubtedly have sustained the officer. I believe that the mayor and his police were in direct opposition to the troops--after having heard the crowd state that the mayor and his police were in sympathy with them, and finding that no arrests had been made, and knowing the fact that upon every occasion that mayor's police were only too anxious to protect men up for disorderly conduct, that there was not a police officer to be found at Twenty-eighth street, and that no arrests had been made, although there was any number of chances to arrest for disorderly conduct and other offenses--finding that none of those officers were there, I had no other way to think that these men had said truly, that Mayor McCarthy and his police were in sympathy with the mob. I telegraphed Mayor McCarthy after the troops had been taken into the round-house--I telegraphed him, and I told him I thought his presence there might be the means of saving life. I believe then, and I believe now, that if Mayor McCarthy had come at that time and talked to the crowd, something might have been done. There was then a terrible feeling against the troops, and no feeling against the police. I believed then, and I believe now, that if he had responded to my telegraph, many valuable lives might have been saved. There was no sympathy extended to the troops by anybody outside of the sheriff and his posse. The sheriff and his posse were the only ones that gave any aid or assistance to the troops. He did all that he knew how and all that he could.

Q. Did you have any communication with the sheriff, after the firing at Twenty-eighth street?

A. No, sir; I did not see the sheriff after that.

Q. Do you know where he went?

A. I have no idea.

Q. You were in communication with him up to that time?

A. Certainly; he was at the head of the troops.

Q. And you, as commanding officer, were to protect him in making his arrests?

A. Yes; he was armed with warrants from Judge Young to arrest certain parties therein named, and we went out with him.

By Senator Yutzy:

Q. You speak of an order you received from General Latta. Did that order purport to be signed by order of the Governor, sent by him as Adjutant General?

A. No, sir; it was not by order of the Governor; it was a telegraphic communication, ordering me to order out one regiment.

Q. Was it official?

A. I think so. I have not got it, because they were destroyed at the Union depot. I think the Adjutant General's report shows all those telegrams. I think that gives all the telegrams that passed.

Q. Did you, at any time, give an order to the troops to fire?

A. I am sorry to say that I did not. I am sorry to say I was not there when the occasion required such an order. If I had been there, I would have given the order, and in such a manner that the active rioters would receive their reward of merit. They deserved it, and they ought to have had it. I am only sorry to say I was not there.

By Mr. Larrabee:

Q. You said the people expostulated with you about calling out the troops. What people were they that came to you and expostulated?

A. Oh, very early in the morning. Of course, the Friday morning papers had the order, and people came to me, at the Union Depot hotel, and say, "You ought not to do this thing; these men are workingmen; they have their rights."

Q. Were there many of them--more than two or three?

A. I was stopped on the street by women--respectable women. I was stopped in the streets by business men of the place.

Q. Business men of the place expostulated with you?

A. Yes; and after the firing, men came to me and insisted upon my taking the troops out of the round-house. I want to say this in regard--there may be an impression in regard to the manner in which the Sixth division responded to my order--that it may not be known to the committee that we have no direct way of calling out the troops--that is, by any alarm--not by a fire alarm or anything of that kind. An officer has to hunt up his officers, and they, in turn, have got to hunt up their men, who are scattered all over through two cities, and when I notified Colonel Guthrie, I found him early in the morning and he was hard at work, and they responded as promptly as any regiment could possibly respond. There was no way to get his men together any sooner than they did. They went to Torrens station, as per order, and I believe remained intact until the 6th or 7th day of September. I do not know of them having disbanded for a single instant, from the time that they were first called out, until the end of the trouble in Luzerne county, and the Fourteenth regiment, as I have subsequently learned, performed their service as well as a regiment could. They had been ordered to disband, contrary to the wishes of Colonel Gray and his officers, and nearly obeyed an order made by a superior officer.

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. You knew nothing of the command which General Brown gave?

A. No, sir; there are officers who heard the command and know all about that.

Q. He did it upon his own responsibility?

A. Certainly. Had General Brown carried out the instructions he received at Twenty-eighty street, and kept the hill side and the tracks clear, with the plans I had adopted of taking General Brinton out, and letting him occupy the position, and sending a portion of General Brown's command to Colonel Guthrie, and used a portion for the taking out of trains, I think there would have been no subsequent troubles. Instead of that we found the ground entirely occupied and in possession of the rioters and sympathizers, and the result was just as you know.

Q. Could the destruction of property have been prevented by any other distribution of the troops that night, do you think?

A. I presume, had we known the fact that the rioters had converted themselves from men to devils, and had concluded to roast everybody alive, and gone into it in the manner in which they did, that something might have been done. Of course, no one could anticipate the fact that those men would send burning flames of oil down upon the troops in the round-house. No man living could ever think of such a thing.

At this point the committee adjourned until ten o'clock, to-morrow morning.

MORNING SESSION.

PITTSBURGH, _Friday, February 22, 1878_.

The committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at ten o'clock. Mr. Lindsey in the chair. All members present.

* * * * *

Mayor W. C. McCarthy, _affirmed_:

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. Where is your residence?

A. My residence is 95, Robert street, Eleventh ward.

Q. What official position did you hold in this city last July?

A. I was mayor of the city.

Q. How long had you occupied that position?

A. Since the 1st day of February, 1875--the last time--I occupied it before.

Q. When did you first learn of any disturbance at the Pennsylvania railroad?

A. On Thursday, the 19th of July, in the forenoon.

Q. About what time?

A. That I am not able to say, but I suppose it was in the early forenoon.

Q. How did you learn of the fact?

A. Mr. Watt came to me in the mayor's office, asking me if I could furnish him with ten men. I told him no. By and by--before I come to that, I will give you the police force and the disposition of it. Every person connected with the police force consisted entirely of one hundred and twenty, having a supervision over twenty-seven square miles. Five of them were simply lamp watchmen, leaving one hundred and fifteen policemen. They were divided as follows: One captain, one chief, two turn-keys at the central station, eight station-house keepers, eight front office men. These eight men were all the men we had in daylight, all told, the rest were put on night duty. One night watchman at the city hall, two roundsmen. These roundsmen are men who perambulate the whole city, for the purpose of having an eye to the different police, that they were attending to their duty, and we had one corner man--a man stationed at the corner of Fifth avenue and Smithfield street--and nine lieutenants, and eighty-two patrolmen. These eighty-two patrolmen are men whose metes and bounds were set out to travel. We had one hundred and fifteen police of all kinds, classes, and individuals.

Q. How much ground was covered by each one of these patrolmen?

A. Some less and some more, if you knew the city I think you would know it. Well, take for instance, starting at the corner of Fourth avenue and Smithfield street, go following the cars down to the river; downwards, go down Fourth avenue in that direction and you cross Wood street, and you cross Market street, and you come to Ferry street, then you go along Ferry street, which may be called the lower end of town, to Second, then you reverse and come up this way, you come to Smithfield street, and you walk up to the corner of Fourth avenue and Smithfield street, the place of beginning, a route that really would be too much for two men, one man had to do it.

By Senator Reyburn:

Q. How much ground would a man have to cover taking in all the side streets?

A. He would have to cover six squares, and extraordinarily large squares at that, and I think that it would take him over twenty minutes to rapidly walk it.

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. These police were night watchmen then all of them?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Had you before that had any day police?

A. Oh, yes. Previous to that, altogether the whole police force of policemen, including ten lamp-watchmen, consisted of two hundred and twenty-six men, and in consequence of the heavy taxation, and the absolute inability of the treasurer to pay for the policemen, they were compelled to cut it down one hundred and eleven men, or rather one hundred and sixteen men altogether--I am talking about policemen, I leave the lamp watchmen out--and then there was a deficiency of sixteen to eighteen thousand dollars for the year.

Q. When was that done?

A. That was done on the 1st of July, or thereabouts, maybe a little before that.

Q. You may state what occurred when Mr. Watt came to your office, on Thursday, the 19th?

A. Mr. Watt came and stated that he wanted ten men. I told him I couldn't furnish him ten men. I would furnish him with what we could, but if he would pay for them, we could pick up some of those discharged policemen who were not employed, and he very promptly answered that he would pay for them. So I told Detective McGovern and some others to take what they could, and all our own men, and fill up with the idle policemen, and that the policemen would be paid by Mr. Watt. Mr. Watt requested me to go up with them, which I declined to do. I couldn't see any reason why the mayor of the city of Pittsburgh should go to the Pennsylvania depot to take cognizance of a disturbance that only required ten men, in his own opinion, and I sent a very faithful and one of the best officers in charge of the men, Detective McGovern, a very clear-headed man.

Q. What did he say as to the extent of the disturbance up there?

A. He made no remarks about that.

Q. Did you ask him anything about it?

A. No, sir. Gave him what he asked for.

Q. Was any report made to you by Officer McGovern.

A. Oh, yes. We had reports all the time from that until this morning. Officer McGovern reported to me--I cannot say whether it was McGovern, or who it was--but the first intimation I had of any violence was a report come to me that a man by the name of McCall had struck Mr. Watt; that he was arrested and taken to the station-house by the police. Then I heard afterwards from this time out--what I have got to say about Thursday will be hearsay. You can produce evidence and substantiate whatever I may say--I heard there was a train somewhere about three o'clock to go out, and the police aboard the train told the engineer they would protect him. The track was clear, and the engineer refused to go on, and got down and left the engine in the possession of the police.

Q. What police was on the train?

A. That was in the afternoon.

Q. What police was on the train?

A. I cannot exactly tell you, but I think that Mr. Motts, Mr. Coulson, and some others were there.

Q. How did you obtain this information?

A. From the police.

Q. An official report from the police?

A. Oh, no. We didn't have that much red tape about these things. The only red tape we had was the morning report of the different lieutenants. I can produce the men; I suppose you will want them to verify it.

By Senator Reyburn:

Q. They would report to the lieutenant would they?

A. No; they were in charge of Mr. Watt. The truth is, these men are under the control of the officers of the Pennsylvania railroad, and I felt it my duty to send as many men as I could there, who were paid by the city, and the others had to be paid by the railroad company, as I told you, but all the men we had in July was nine men.

Q. Did you send any of those nine men?

A. Oh, yes; McGovern and White and some more of them--I am a little mixed; and there was another order given for men as I understand. I started Mr. Davis to get them, but on that I am not so clear--I am a little mixed on that; Mr. Davis, however, can tell. He told me he met me on Fifth avenue and told me an order had come for more men, and I started then from Fifth avenue to get them.

Q. Did you receive any word from Mr. Watt after he left you with the ten police?

A. Directly from Mr. Watt?

Q. Yes, sir.

A. No; not a word.

Q. Did you receive any telegram from him calling for fifteen more men or twenty-five more men?

A. I didn't receive anything of the kind; but I guess that must be the word Mr. Davis speaks about when he says he met me on Fifth avenue, and I told him to get the men.

Q. Didn't your clerks or any of your subordinates notify you that such a telegram had been received from Mr. Watt?

A. I don't know what Mr. Davis says he told me on Fifth avenue.

Q. For fifty men?

A. No, sir; I took supper at Castle Shannon. I left at a quarter to five, and came back at eight, and then there were some persons from the Pennsylvania had been there for policemen, and the Pennsylvania railroad got all the policemen they wanted. They got so many that they sent back word that they did not want any more.

Q. Did they send any such word to you personally?

A. No; I can prove it.

Q. I want just what they said about--the next that took place between you and the officers?

A. I got no communication directly from the officers of the Pennsylvania, from the time Mr. Watt had been there in the forenoon.

Q. Did you receive any telegram from Mr. Watt calling for fifty police?

A. I didn't.

Q. Were you notified by your clerks or subordinates that such a telegram had been received at your office?

A. Not in the shape you put it.

Q. Did you see Mr. Watt after he left with the ten men?

A. No, sir; I don't think that I did. I have no recollection of it whatever. I don't believe I did.

Q. Where were you from eight o'clock Thursday night, during the balance of the night?

A. I was at the office, and in the neighborhood.

Q. Were any reports made to you during the night, from the policemen?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. In regard to the situation?

A. Yes; that everything was quiet.

Q. From what men?

A. I cannot name them, but I can bring the men here who were there to testify. Let me tell you what the police told me--the men that were out there.

Q. It is hearsay evidence. I think it is hardly proper?

A. Hear my statement, then, for your own guidance.

Q. I understand you to say that you didn't receive any dispatch from Mr. Watt, calling for fifty men, nor it was not communicated about in that form?

A. No, sir; it was not. Nothing of that kind occurred. He may have sent a dispatch, but I think I can very conscientiously affirm that I never saw it.

Q. Do you allow your clerks to act upon intelligence received at the office, without instructions from you?

A. Most undoubtedly. When I am away a riot or disturbance ought not to be going along until I come back. They know the general rules I act upon.

Q. Communications, in the shape of letters and dispatches, are they placed on file in your office, when received in your absence?

A. No, sir; not placed on file at any time. They are attended to and thrown away.

Q. Attended to by your clerks?

A. Yes; the chief of police and the clerks. If I am up in the Eleventh ward, they would have to wait an hour and a half until I got down.

Q. If a dispatch was received at your office, notifying you of a disturbance in one part of the city, and you are in another part of the city?

A. It would be attended to.

Q. It would be attended to without notifying you of the fact?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. You have telegraphic communications to all parts of the city, I suppose--stations?

A. With the station-house. We have got one station-house in the Thirty-sixth ward, Thirtieth ward, one in the Twenty-first, and one in the Second, or rather the telegraph is in the Third, one in the Eleventh, one in the Twelfth, and one in the Fourteenth, one in the Seventeenth, and one in the Nineteenth.

Q. Did you receive any reports during the night--Thursday night?

A. Yes; and everything was quiet.

Q. What officer had charge of that part of the city near Twenty-eighth street--what police officer?

A. Lieutenant Coates had.

Q. Did you receive any reports from him during the night?

A. I do not know that I did.

Q. Were there any affidavits made before you against parties--against any disorderly conduct?

A. There was on Friday forenoon.

Q. Did you issue warrants for that?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. For how many?

A. Well, I guess there was eight or nine, maybe more--I have forgotten.

Q. In whose hands were those warrants placed to execute?

A. I cannot tell distinctly, but I think it was in the hands of Mr. McGovern.

Q. Did he execute the warrants? What instructions did you give him about that?

A. I told him that in consequence of the calling out of the soldiers that the public mind excited, and it would be very dangerous to act as we usually acted, and for him to be exceedingly cautious, and cause no disturbance.

Q. When you placed the warrants in his hands, what instructions did you give him?

A. That is what I gave him.

Q. Had the soldiers been called out?

A. Yes; I was perfectly astonished when I took up the newspapers. Here was a whole lot of telegraphic dispatches, that had been flying from one end of the State to the other.

Q. On Thursday morning or Friday morning?

A. On Friday morning.

Q. You did not tell him to make the arrests?

A. Absolutely?

Q. Yes?

A. No, sir; I knew too much for that. The policemen at any time create a riot in the street by going at it brashly, and after the soldiers were in it, I thought it very dangerous.

Q. Why?

A. Because they were under the control of men who were rather of the narrow gauge pattern, about 2×3.

They were men who knew no law but the law of force, and had no knowledge that truculent defiance always begets truculent defiance. Had the force been in the hands of men who thought with Coleridge, when he said:

"He prayeth well who loveth well, Both man, and bird, and beast."

Had it been in the hands of men, who had any idea like Coleridge, there would not have been a life lost, nor a dollar of property destroyed, in my deliberate opinion.

By Mr. Means:

Q. You speak of those two or three, do you allude to the military now?

A. I allude to the men assuming charge--that had control of the force after I was displaced by the military and counsel.

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. Did you not have charge of these in the beginning of the riot or disturbance?

A. No, sir.

Q. Why not?

A. Because Mr. Watt came over and asked for ten men, and they were given to him.

Q. He asked you to go out, didn't he?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. You refused?

A. I did, for the reason that I could see no reason from anything he said that the mayor should start out to take charge of ten men, and control it--it must have been a very small affair.

Q. You received notice that another call had been made by Mr. Watt, didn't you?

A. No, sir; I have reason to believe, from what I heard--that Mr. Davis informs me--that I told him to go ahead and send them.

Q. Didn't Mr. Watt inform you that your presence could do a good deal towards quelling the disturbance there?

A. Not that I can remember.

Q. Would not it have had that effect, in your opinion?

A. Indeed, I do not know. I think a disturbance that in Mr. Watt's opinion only required ten men, didn't require the city to go there in the person of the mayor, because it was a very slight affair, as he represented it--it made no impression upon me.

Q. A man, such as Mr. Coleridge described in that quotation you have made, would have had that effect?

A. No, sir; he would have been called upon, and if he had been asked to call for troops, it would have come in. Let me say about calling for troops, that if Mr. Mackey and Mr. Hartranft--but I should say Governor Hartranft and Mr. Mackey--had been in Harrisburg, there would not have been a troop brought here, and peace would have been preserved, but, unfortunately, neither of these two gentlemen were there. Let me tell you, sir, we had a puddler's strike here, and that I had some hand in, and the peace of the city was preserved; and notwithstanding the peace of the city was preserved all the time, some person, I don't know who, sent a request to the Governor for troops, that the peace of the city was disturbed and it could not be preserved. Mr. Hartranft did not know what to do, so he sent for Mr. Mackey. Mr. Mackey came to him and told him, says he, "Wait a few minutes, and I will let you know what to do." Mr. Mackey told him----

Q. Are you testifying to facts within your knowledge?

A. Within my knowledge. Mr. Mackey telegraphed to a gentlemen that I know very well, as to what the condition of affairs was. The gentleman telegraphed back that it was idle and futile to send soldiers here, and it would only create a disturbance. They could keep them away. They were kept away, and there was not a man killed, and not a dollar's worth of property destroyed.

Q. When was that?

A. It was two years ago.

Q. You say that you acted in attempting to keep and preserve the peace here and keep down violence until superseded by the military?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Is not the military always in subjection to the civil authorities?

A. The Constitution says so, but the facts of the case are otherwise.

Q. Had you not entire authority and control, at all times, within the limits and jurisdiction of the city?

A. Not when the sheriff comes to the front. He is the chief peace officer of the county, and has the whole county at his beck and nod. The mayor is simply the city.

Q. Is not it the duty of other head officers to coöperate with the sheriff?

A. That depends upon circumstances. I could not coöperate with the sheriff, because the matter was under control of men who were acting entirely different from any way that I would have acted in the case, and I could not assume responsibility in a state of facts that I believe would lead to what was the ultimate result.

Q. Is not your power as magistrate, within the city limits, identical with those of the sheriff?

A. They are.

Q. What hindered you from acting then?

A. Because the sheriff took possession of the case, and called upon the troops. Had the sheriff come to consult me, instead of going to the Pennsylvania Railroad Company's office, and assumed control in calling for troops, the result would have been different. But I was thrown aside. I didn't suit.

Q. You were asked to go up to the scene of the disturbance, were you not?

A. No, sir.

Q. Didn't Mr. Watt ask you?

A. Not that I know of.

Q. Did he at ten o'clock, on Thursday, ask you to go to the scene of the disturbance?

A. He did.

Q. And you refused to go?

A. Yes, for the reason that I told you, that he asked for ten men, and I knew no reason--when he got all the men he asked for, and it was only ten men--I didn't see any reason why the mayor should go up there.

Q. Did you go up to the scene of the disturbance at any time during Friday?

A. No, sir.

Q. Friday night?

A. No, sir.

Q. Saturday?

A. No, sir.

Q. Saturday night?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. At what time?

A. Well, I think when I got out there, it must have been ten o'clock.

Q. What did you find there?

A. I found a howling mob, many of them armed.

Q. Did you know that this firing was going on all this time between ten o'clock Thursday and ten o'clock Saturday night, when you went to the scene of the disturbance?

A. I knew nothing of the disturbance at all. I heard that the soldiers had fired upon the crowd.

Q. You knew that there were crowds there, didn't you?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. You knew they prevented freights from running?

A. I did not.

Q. You know that they prevented freight trains from going out?

A. No, sir; I believe the fact is otherwise. I believe the fact is that after the police got possession of a train, on Thursday afternoon, that the engineer deserted, and that the Pennsylvania Railroad Company didn't attempt to put another freight out--that is what I heard.

Q. That is hearsay, isn't it?

A. That is, and I guess it is very true, too.

Q. You had come out then to see?

A. No, sir; I didn't.

Q. On Friday, did you increase your police force any?

A. No, sir.

Q. Did you increase them any on Friday night?

A. No, sir.

Q. On Saturday?

A. No, sir.

Q. Saturday night?

A. Saturday night, when we heard of the shooting I directed the officers to go round and inform the proprietors of the gun shops of what had taken place, and to put themselves in a state of defense, and to get their arms out of the road; for they might be assailed, and directed the chief of police to insert an advertisement in the Sunday papers, calling upon the discharged policemen to appear at the mayor's office for duty. My idea of that was that there might be a necessity for these men performing police duty in the streets. I had no idea, until at that time, that where the city and county authorities had a thousand men under their command, in the Twelfth ward, that any policemen would be required or needed on the property of the Pennsylvania railroad, but I did think there would be very great excitement, and it would be necessary to have a force on the streets, not knowing what would happen, and I directed a call to be made for an immediate meeting of the police committee, on Sunday morning.

Q. Were the day force placed back on duty on Sunday morning?

A. Let me go on, as nigh as I can, in a chronological order of events. My mind, as to hours, after I got in the Twelfth ward and saw the state of affairs there, is a blank. I could not give you an hour from that time up to Monday morning, but I was on deck all that time. I went up to the Twelfth ward, saw a crowd there, and mixed in among them. Had a talk with quite a number of them, and tried to dissuade them from acts of violence and disorder, but I was talking to a lot of crazy men. Words were nowhere. Somewhere, as nigh as I can guess, I was in front of the Twelfth ward station-house, immediately above Twenty-sixth street or Penn avenue, and I was too late. It struck me then that there must be some cars set on fire. I left there and went up to the corner of Liberty and Twenty-fifth street, and saw a car on fire immediately above Twenty-fifth street. I looked at the situation, and turned back to the corner of Twenty-eighth and Penn streets, and I there met a policeman, who I think was Mr. Scribner. Says I, "Has the box been pulled?" Says he, "No; the crowd won't let us, but the alarm has been sent down to the police telegraph." I then waited there a very, very long time, expecting the fire department to come. When I stayed there long enough, and hearing nothing of the fire department, I came to the conclusion that the message sent by the police telegraph had failed. By this time Alderman Barclay was along side of a police officer, and a large man, whom I knew by sight, but not by name, and I said to the alderman, says I, "Can't we send an alarm in on this box." The alderman said, "We can try it." He went, I think, into the drug store and got a key, and four of us went to the box, and nobody interfered with us--there were very few up at that corner, and the alderman opened the box, and this man, I believe, he pulled it. We waited another long time--a very long time--and heard nothing of the fire department. Then I began to make inquiries, and I ascertained that a portion of the fire department had come up Penn avenue, and for reasons satisfactory to themselves, had stopped immediately below the Independence engine house, on Penn avenue, somewhere about Twenty-first or Twentieth street--I cannot give you the number--and that they had been stopped there, and were afraid to go on. I do not know what reason they had--they had some reason. I then went to the station-house; but, by the by, I may say here, when I left the lower end of the city the mob was still going through the streets, and I should have stated before, chronologically--what I forgot--that I issued orders by telegraph, and the men met at eight o'clock in the evening, at the station-house, after having lit the lamps.

Q. Saturday evening?

A. Saturday evening. I ordered all the policemen from the first, second, fourth, seventh, eighth, ninth districts, to leave their station-houses, and to come at once to the central station, as soon as the men would come to the station-house. These men came between eight and nine o'clock, most of them nine o'clock, may be later. Some of them had to walk a distance of two miles, and they were put on duty immediately through the streets, and when I thought that I could leave things safely to the direction of the police, I went to the Twelfth ward to see how things were standing. That was the position of matters. When I found that the fire department had not or could not come, I went to the station-house--the Twelfth ward station-house--and telegraphed down to the central station to send up all the police that could be spared. That was done, and as these policemen came up, two or three or four or five or six, &c.--there was a great quantity of stealing going on.

Q. How many policemen came up?

A. I will get at that in a few minutes. As they came there was a great deal of stealing going on, and as fast as they came to the station-house, I started them out on to Penn street, to arrest the people that were carrying off goods. They continued at that work until such times as I thought I had enough policemen to assist the firemen, at which time possibly I may have had fifty or sixty, may be forty. I do not suppose I had over forty or fifty. When I thought I had enough to protect the firemen, I told officer Coulston to go to the fire department and tell them that we now had police sufficient, I thought, to protect them, and to come on, and we would do the best we could. Coulston started off with that message. After a lapse of sufficient time he came back and told me he had informed the parties in charge, of my message, that they replied to them that they would not move until they were ordered by the chief of the fire department and the fire commissioners, and I supposed, that at that time I may have had, all told, fifty or sixty--about fifty policemen--the fifth district and the sixth district had not been called in. The fifth district and the Lawrenceville district immediately adjoining the point where the Allegheny Valley railroad runs through, they were not called in because I supposed they would have as much to do in their own districts. The sixth district was not called in because Torrens station and the stock-yards were in that district, and I thought it altogether likely that the police of these two districts would be wanted to take care of things there for the reason I have given you.

Q. How long did you keep those policemen there in the Twelfth ward?

A. They were kept there until their regular time of going on duty.

Q. What time was that?

A. Well, the regular time was six o'clock, but they were there long after that.

Q. Sunday morning?

A. Yes, sir. I will tell you about that. I stayed up there until somewhere in the neighborhood of daylight. The soldiers, I had supposed, that had taken refuge in the houses there, that their strategy was to stay until daylight would come, and then they would come out upon the railroad track and take possession. That is what I supposed--nobody communicated to me what they would do.

Q. Did you make any effort to communicate with General Brinton or General Pearson?