Chapter I: Part 1

Transcriber’s Notes

Text printed in italics has been transcribed _between underscores_,
bold face text =between equal signs=. Text printed in a different
(sans-serif) type has been indicated ~by tildes~. Small capitals have
been replaced with ALL CAPITALS.

Footnotes [513]-[516] were not present in the source document text;
please see the Transcriber’s Notes at the end of this text for more
details.

More Transcriber’s Notes may be found at the end of this text.

TACTICS

BY

~BALCK
Colonel, German Army.~

VOLUME I.

INTRODUCTION AND FORMAL TACTICS OF INFANTRY.

TRANSLATED BY
~WALTER KRUEGER,
First Lieutenant 23rd Infantry, U. S. Army,
Instructor Army Service Schools.~

Fourth completely revised edition.
With numerous plates in the text.

U. S. CAVALRY ASSOCIATION,
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS.
1911

COPYRIGHT, 1911,
BY WALTER KRUEGER.

=PRESS OF KETCHESON PRINTING CO.,
LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS.=

TRANSLATOR’S PREFACE.

The translation of this book was undertaken at the instance of Major John F. Morrison, General Staff, who desired to make use of it in the course in tactics in the Army Service Schools.

It is an epitome of the interpretation and application of tactical principles in the various armies, discussed in the light of the tactical views and methods prevailing in Germany, and amplified by numerous examples from military history.

The professional value of this book to all officers of our Regular Army and Militia who are endeavoring to gain a working knowledge of tactics, is so obvious that any comment would be superfluous.

Army Service Schools,
Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas,
December, 1910.

PREFACE.

The first volume of “Tactics,” which appeared in its first edition in 1896, and for which the preparatory work reached back more than a decade, now appears in its fourth edition in a completely changed form. The lessons gained in war and improvements in weapons have corrected many earlier views. While the Boer war confused the views on infantry combat and brought forth more lessons in a negative than in a positive form, the Russo-Japanese war has had a great educating influence, in that it corroborated the soundness of the lessons gained in the Franco-German war, but also in that it amplified those lessons commensurate with the improvements in weapons. The fundamental principles upon which success depends have remained the same.

For a long time I hesitated to comply with my publisher’s wishes for a new edition. It would not have been difficult to publish long ago a new edition, based upon the many lessons of war communicated to me by members of foreign armies soon after the Russo-Japanese war. But, after an extended period of theoretical work, I was more inclined to avail myself once more of the opportunity of gaining practical experience by service with troops. Pure theoretical reflection is only too apt to depart from the requirements of practice and to overlook the friction appearing everywhere. The battalion commander, more than any one else, is called upon to act as the tactical instructor of his officers and knows best where the shoe pinches. Moreover, the proximity of the maneuver ground to my present station gave me an opportunity of observing the field training of a large number of battalions and regiments of infantry and artillery, and to compare notes with brother officers of the other arms. In addition, several trips abroad and, incidental thereto, visits to battlefields, furnished valuable suggestions. I postponed issuing the new edition until the publication of the new Russian and Japanese Drill Regulations, which, with our own excellent regulations, best illustrate the lessons learned from the war in the Far East. For this fourth edition I was further able to draw upon the new French (1904), Italian (1905), Belgian (1906), U. S. (1904), British (1905), and Swiss (1908) Drill Regulations. This enumeration alone justifies the statement, “completely revised,” appearing on the title page.

I have earnestly endeavored to make use of foreign experiences in detail. The words of Lieutenant-General Sir Ian Hamilton of the British Army, to whose writings I owe a great deal, deserve special attention in studying the drill regulations of foreign armies: “It is a blessing that the greater and prouder an army, the more immovably it is steeped in conservatism, so that as a whole it is finally incapable of assimilating the lessons gained by other armies. Military attachés may discover the most important points in the training and employment of foreign armies and urgently recommend their imitation, but their comrades will pay no more attention to them than did Napoleon III. to Stoffel’s reports on the Prussian army before the outbreak of the Franco-German war.”

The treatment of the subject matter has remained the same throughout; it represents, as in the first edition, the principle that tactical lessons must be deduced from human nature, from the effect of weapons, and from experience in war, proper regard being had for national characteristics and historical transmission. _Tactics is psychology._ My statements in regard to fire effect are based, as before, upon the works of His Excellency, Lieutenant-General Rohne. The publications of Historical Section I of the Great General Staff and the splendid works of the late Major Kunz, furnish the basis for examples cited from military history. An almost too copious literature is already available on the Russo-Japanese war. The monographs (_Einzelschriften_) of the Great General Staff, and of Streffleur, especially “_Urteile und Beobachtungen von Mitkämpfern_,” published by the latter, afford a rich field for research.

It is not difficult to cite examples from military history in support of any tactical procedure, but such examples require a very careful sifting before they can be recommended as worthy models for our action in front of the enemy.

The Austrians deduced the necessity of the most brutal shock action from the experience gained by them in their combats in Upper Italy in 1859, and the British were not very far removed from completely denying the feasibility of making an attack soon after the Boer war; but the desire to avoid losses was forced into the background by the necessity of annihilating the enemy. In the Far East the Russians finally had to learn again the same bitter lessons as at Plevna.

Simultaneously with this fourth edition, there appears in Athens a translation in Modern Greek from the pen of Captain Strategos of the Greek General Staff, well known to many German officers from his War Academy days.

It is hoped that the fourth edition may receive the same kind reception at home and abroad that was given its three predecessors. For all communications, suggestions or corrections, directed either to me or to my publisher, I will be sincerely grateful.

THE AUTHOR.

POSEN, March, 1908.

CONTENTS.

=INTRODUCTION.=
PAGE

=1. War= 1
Eternal peace 1
War the _ultimo ratio_ of state policy 2
Courts of arbitration 3

=2. Strategy and Tactics= 4
Definition of strategy and tactics 4
Relation of strategy to tactics 6

=3. The Method of Instruction= 7
Value of examples 8
Applicatory method 10
Advantages and disadvantages 10
Arrangement of the subject matter 12

=4. Drill Regulations= 13
Instructions for campaign 15
Regulations and the science of combat 15

=THE FORMAL TACTICS OF INFANTRY.=

=I. ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT= 19

=1. The Importance and Employment of Infantry= 19
Relative strength as compared to other arms 19
Élite infantry. Guards 21
Jägers and riflemen 22
Mountain infantry 23
Machine guns 24
Mounted infantry 25
Patrols and scouting detachments 27
Cyclists 28
Snowshoe runners 30

=2. The Tactical Unit= 32

=3. Organization= 34
The company 34
Peace and war strength 35
The battalion 36
The regiment 37
The brigade 37

=4. Intrenching Tool Equipment= 38

=5. The Load of the Infantryman= 39
Comparison of the loads carried by infantrymen in various
armies 40

=II. THE FORMATIONS= 41

=1. The Issue of Orders= 41
Trumpet signals 41

=2. The Purpose of Formations. Comparison Between Line and
Column= 42
Assembly and route formations 42
Maneuver and combat formations 43
Napoleonic columns 44
Comparison between line and column 44
The origin of column tactics 44

=3. The Company= 46
(_a_) Formation of the company 46
Number of ranks 46
Interval and distance 47
Front and facing distance 48
(_b_) Division of the company into three or four platoons 48
Losses among officers 50

=4. Length of Pace and Marching= 53
Comparison (table) 54
Double time 55

=5. Movements of the Company in Line= 56

=6. The Columns of the Company. Movements in Column. Formation
of Line= 56
Column of twos 56
Column of squads 57
Route column 57
Column of fours 58
Double column of squads 59
Comparison of column of fours with column of squads 59
The importance of the squad 59
The employment of the column of squads 59
Company column 60
Column of platoons 61
Column of sections 61
Guidon flags 63
Posts of platoon commanders 63
Movements in column 64
Suggestions made by Colonel Fumet, French Army 65

=7. The Battalion= 67
Normal formation of the German battalion 67
The color 68
Formations in various armies 69
The value of double column 71
The battalion in route column 72

=8. The Regiment and the Brigade= 73
Formation in line or in echelon 73

=9. Extended Order= 75
Thin and dense skirmish lines 75
(_a_) The formation of the skirmish line 78
(_b_) Movements in skirmish line 81
Advance by rushes 82
Time required for making a rush. Strength of the force making
the rush 83
Rising 84
Short or long rushes 85
Advance by crawling 86
Lessons of the Boer War 88
Lessons of the Russo-Japanese War 89
Provisions of the various regulations relative to the advance
by rushes 90
Fire while in motion 92
Examples of the employment of fire while in motion 93
Examples of the employment of rushes 93
(_c_) Reinforcing the firing line 96
(_d_) Closing up. Assembling. Re-forming 97

=10. Supports= 98
Duties 98
Distance 99
Commander 100
Movements 100
Formation 100
Supports in rear of the firing line or not? 101

=11. Comparison Between Close and Extended Order= 102
Necessity of drill 104
Combat drill 105
Training 105
Training of leaders 109

=III. THE POWER OF FIREARMS AND EXPEDIENTS FOR MINIMIZING LOSSES= 111

=A. THE POWER OF FIELD ARTILLERY= 111

=1. The Field Gun= 111
Percussion shrapnel 111
Time shrapnel 112
Shell 115
The French _obus allongé_ 115

=2. The Light Field Howitzer= 116

=3. The Heavy Field Howitzer= 118

=4. Expedients for Minimizing the Effect of Fire= 118
(_a_) Increasing the difficulties in the adjustment of the
hostile fire 119
(_b_) Minimizing the effect of fire 120

=5. The Results Obtained by Artillery Against Various Targets= 122
French data 123

=6. The Effect of Shrapnel Bullets on Animate Targets= 125

=B. INFANTRY FIRE= 126

=1. The Effect of a Single Projectile on Animate Targets= 126
Explosive effect 127
Tumbling bullets 127

=2. The Effect of “S” Bullets on Materials= 131

=IV. THE EMPLOYMENT OF INFANTRY FIRE= 132
Stunning and exhaustive effect 132
The engagement at Modder River, Nov. 28, 1899 132

=1. Fire Discipline= 133
The employment of the bayonet; bayonet fencing 134

=2. Fire Control and Fire Direction= 134
Squad leaders 135
Company commanders 136
Uncontrolled fire 136
Russian experiences in the Far East 137

=3. Selection of the Line to be Occupied= 138

=4. The Strength of the Firing Line= 139

=5. Ascertaining Ranges= 140
Influence of the knowledge of the range upon the efficacy of
the fire 140
Ascertaining ranges by pacing or galloping 141
Influence of the terrain upon the length of pace 141
Errors of estimation 142
Provisions of various regulations 143
Memorizing distinguishing marks on the enemy 144
Scaling the range from maps 144
Obtaining the range from other troops 145
Trial volleys fired for the purpose of obtaining proper sight
elevation 145
Range finding instruments 146

=6. Selection of a Target and Time for Opening Fire= 147
Short or long range fire 147
Limit of long range fire 147
The moral effect of withholding the fire 151
Marshal Bugeaud’s narrative 151
Provisions of various regulations 153
General rules for opening fire in attack and defense 154

=7. Pauses in the Fire= 155

=8. Kinds of Fire= 157
Volley fire and fire at will; bursts of fire (_rafales_) 158
The rate of fire 160
The influence of the rate of fire upon the efficacy of fire 161
The volley 163
Bursts of fire (_rafales_) 164

=9. Rear Sight Elevations and Points of Aim= 165

=10. Commands= 166

=11. The Observation of the Fire= 167

=12. The Effect of Fire= 167
Comparison between losses produced by infantry and artillery
fire 167
(_a_) Influence of training 168
(_b_) Influence of the error in estimating the range 170
(_c_) Fire effect as regards time. Number of rounds to be
expended 172
(_d_) Additional influences affecting the accuracy of fire 173
Wolozkoi’s theory of the effect of the constant cone of
misses 173
(_e_) Influence of rifle-rests in firing 178
(_f_) Influence of the ground 179
Danger space and beaten zone 179
Firing upon hill positions 183
Indirect rifle fire 184
Ricochets 185

=13. Losses In Action= 185
Losses in the various formations 186
Losses among officers 189

=14. The Moral Effect of Fire= 191
The impressions produced upon General Bonnal by the battle
of Wörth 191
Surrenders of British troops in South Africa 192
Limit of endurance in battle 193
The “void of the battlefield” 194
Mixing of organizations 195
Fighting power of improvised units 197
Overcoming crises in action 198

=V. DEPLOYMENTS FOR ACTION= 201

=1. Normal Procedure= 201
The normal attack 202
Drill attack 204

=2. Concentration, Development, and Deployment for Action= 205
Development for action 207
Deployment for action 209

=3. The Battalion, the Regiment, and the Brigade= 210
The battalion 210
The regiment 214
The brigade 216
Base units 218
Examples of changes of front 220

=4. Distribution in Depth and Frontage of Combat Formations= 222
Dangers of distribution in depth 222
Plevna and Wafangu 222, 223
Distribution in depth necessary during the preparatory stage 224
Contrast between distribution in depth and frontage 225
Dangers of over-extension (Spicheren) 225, 226
Influence of fire effect and morale upon frontage 227, 228
Influence of the task assigned a force 231
Delaying actions. Night attacks. Defense 232, 233
Approximate figures for the extent of front that may be
covered 233
Frontage of the several units 235, 236
The Boer War 238
The Russo-Japanese War 239
Table of troops per km. of front 240
Recapitulation of the most important points governing
frontage 241
Provisions of various regulations 241

=5. Combat Orders= 243
Combat tasks 243
Division of work in staffs 245

=6. Communication on the Battlefield= 246
Signal and wig-wag flags 246
Signal arrangements in the Austrian, French and British
armies 248

=7. Local Reconnaissance of the Infantry= 248
Reconnaissance in force 251
The object of local reconnaissance 251
Scouting detachments 252

=8. The Importance of the Terrain= 254
The attack over an open plain 255
The French group attack 256
Combat sections 257

=VI. MACHINE GUNS= 259

=1. Development of the Arm= 259
Mounting and method of transportation 261, 262

=2. The Power of Machine Guns= 262
Kinds of fire 263
Combat value of machine guns and infantry 267

=3. Infantry Versus Machine Guns= 268
Conduct of troops when exposed to machine gun fire 268, 269

=4. Machine Guns in Germany= 270
Organization 270
Formations 273, 274
Machine gun companies 275

=5. Going Into Position= 276

=6. The Fire Fight= 283
Machine guns in the engagement at the Waterberg 283

=7. Machine Guns in Other Countries= 284
Switzerland 284
Austria 286
England 289
Japan and France 290
Russia 290
Machine guns at Liao Yang, 1904 291

=8. The Employment of Machine Gun Batteries= 293
Rencontre and attack 295
Rear guards 295
Defense 295
Coöperation with cavalry 296
Machine guns versus artillery 297
English views 297
Swiss views 299

=VII. INFANTRY VERSUS CAVALRY= 301
Deployment for firing 303
Moral effect of a charge 306
Aiming positions 307
Time for opening fire 308
Selection of sight elevation 310
Kind of fire 310
Distribution of fire 311
Charge of the French Cuirassiers of the Guard 311
Advance against cavalry 313
Infantry versus dismounted cavalry 313
Provisions of various regulations 314

=VIII. INFANTRY VERSUS ARTILLERY= 316

=1. The Passage of Infantry Through Artillery Lines= 316

=2. The Advance Under Artillery Fire= 318
Increasing the difficulties in the adjustment of the hostile
fire 318
Fire for effect 320
Formations used by infantry when under artillery fire Russo-
Japanese War 322
Lessons of war 321, 323

=3. Firing on Hostile Artillery in Position= 324
Cover afforded by steel shields 324

=IX. THE ATTACK= 329
Attack and defense compared 329

=1. The Surprise= 330
Examples of surprises 331

=2. The Rencontre= 333
Conduct of the advance guard 334
Issue of orders 336
Conduct of the main body 338
Provisions of various regulations 339
Examples 339

=X. THE ATTACK ON AN ENEMY DEPLOYED FOR DEFENSE= 340

=1. Lessons of War= 340
Boer War 340
The infantry attack in the Russo-Japanese War 340
Russian infantry 340
Japanese infantry 341
Examples 343, 344

=2. The Conditions Upon which Success Depends= 345

=3. Preparation of the Attack= 346
Reconnaissance. Preparatory position 346

=4. The Coöperation of Infantry and Artillery in Battle= 351
Preparation of the assault 352

=5. The Point of Attack= 355

=6. Envelopment= 356
Holding attack 357
Launching the enveloping force 359
Separation of holding and flank attacks 361
Provisions of various regulations 362

=7. Removal of Packs= 363

=8. The Employment of Machine Guns= 365

=9. The Conduct of the Attack= 365
The advance of the firing line 365
Distances 368
The fire fight 369
The superiority of fire 370
Fixing bayonets 372

=10. The Assault= 373
The decision to assault 373
The decision to assault emanating from the firing line 375
Fire support during the assault 379
Bayonet fights 382
Wounds produced by cutting weapons 384
Assaulting distances 385
Conduct after a successful attack 385
Conduct after an unsuccessful attack 386

=11. The Use of the Spade in Attack= 387
Sand bags 390
Results of Russian experiments 390
Provisions of various regulations 392
General rules governing the use of the spade in attack 393

=12. The Employment of Reserves= 394
Launching or withholding reserves 395

=13. The Conduct of the Leaders in Action= 399

=14. United Action Versus Tactical Missions= 401
The attack on the “Tannenwäldchen” at Colombey Aug. 14,
1870 402, 403
The attack on Grugies (St. Quentin) 403
The dangers of assigning tasks 405

=XI. THE DEFENSE= 408

=1. The Passive Defense= 409

=2. The Defense Seeking a Decision= 409
Troops required to occupy the position 410
Division of the position into sections 411
Advanced positions 413

=3. Fortifying the Position= 415
Battalion groups 417
Observation of the foreground 420
Clearing the foreground 421
Dummy intrenchments and masks 421
Cover trenches and communicating trenches 421
Obstacles 422
Russian views 422

=4. The Conduct of the Defense= 423
Protection of the flanks 425
Employment of machine guns 425
Occupation of the position 426

=5. The Counter-Attack= 428
Position of the general reserve 429
The moment for making the counter-attack 432
The counter-attack after the position is carried 433
The counter-attack in conjunction with a movement to the rear 434
Frontal counter-attack 436
Provisions of various regulations 438

=XII. THE RETREAT= 440
Breaking off an action 441
Rallying positions 442

=XIII. CONTAINING ACTIONS= 445
The delaying action and the holding attack 445

=XIV. THE INFANTRY COMBAT ACCORDING TO VARIOUS DRILL REGULATIONS= 448
The Austrian Drill Regulations of 1903 448
The Italian Drill Regulations of 1903 and 1906 451
The French Drill Regulations of 1904 453
The British Drill Regulations of 1905 459
The Japanese Drill Regulations of 1907 463
The Russian Drill Regulations of 1907 466
The Swiss Drill Regulations of 1908 466

=XV. THE EXPENDITURE AND SUPPLY OF AMMUNITION= 468

=1. Historical Sketch= 468
Table showing ammunition supply of the various armies of the
world 475

=2. Regulations Governing the Supply of Ammunition in Armies= 476
Germany 476
Austria 479
Russia 480
France 480
England 482
Italy 483

=3. What Deductions May Be Made From the Regulations of the
Various Armies= 483

=INDEX= 487

=INDEX OF EXAMPLES FROM MILITARY HISTORY= 527

ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THIS TRANSLATION.

C. D. R. = Cavalry Drill Regulations.
F. A. D. R. = Field Artillery Drill Regulations.
F. A. F. R. = Field Artillery Firing Regulations.
F. S. R. = Field Service Regulations.
Gen. St. W. (_Generalstabswerk_) = German General Staff account of the
Franco-German War (unless otherwise indicated).
I. D. R. = Infantry Drill Regulations.
I. F. R. = Infantry Firing Regulations.

g. = gram = 15,432 troy grains.
kg. = kilogram = 1000 g. = 2.2 lbs.
kgm. = a unit of work accomplished in raising a kilogram through a
meter against the force of gravity.
m. = meter = 39.37 in.
km. = kilometer = 1000 m. or ⁵⁄₈ mile.
x = pace.

INTRODUCTION.

1. WAR.

Clausewitz, in his work _On War_, defines war as “a continuation of state policy by other means; an act of violence committed to force the opponent to comply with our will.” The civil code is incapable of furnishing full satisfaction to individuals in cases of outraged honor, and is obliged, under certain circumstances, to allow the injured party to obtain such satisfaction by immediate chastisement of the offender or by challenging him to a duel. In like manner there is no law which could afford nations complete satisfaction for affronts to their honor; and it is obvious that it would be as impossible to abolish war in the world, in the family of nations, as it would be to abolish dueling among the subjects of a state. The total abolition of dueling would produce the same results on the life of the individual that the cessation of wars would produce on the development of the national life of every state and on the intercourse of nations with one another. “Eternal peace,” wrote Moltke on December 11th, 1880, to Professor Bluntschli, “is a dream, and not even a beautiful one; for war is a part of God’s system in ruling the universe. In war, man develops the highest virtues; courage and unselfishness, devotion to duty and self-sacrifice even to death. Without war the world would stagnate in materialism.” Treitschke ventured a similar opinion in 1869.[1] “Every nation, especially a refined and cultured one, is apt to lapse into effeminacy and selfishness during a protracted period of peace. The unlimited comfort enjoyed by society causes not only the downfall of the state but destroys at the same time all those ideals which make life worth living. Narrow provincialism or selfish and worldly activity, looking only toward the gratification of all desires of the individual, undermines the foundations of a higher moral philosophy and the belief in ideals. Fools arrive at the vain conclusion that the life object of the individual is acquisition and enjoyment; that the purpose of the state is simply to facilitate the business affairs of its citizens; that man is appointed by an all-wise providence to buy cheaply and to sell at a profit; they conclude that war, which interferes with man’s activities, is the greatest evil, and that modern armies are only a sorry remnant of mediaeval barbarism. * * * It proves a positive blessing to such a generation if fate commits it to a great and righteous war, and the more it has become attached to the comfortable habits of mere social existence, the more violent the reaction which rouses it to warlike deeds in the service of the state. * * *” “The moment the state calls, ‘My life, my existence is at stake,’ there is aroused in a free people that highest of all virtues, the courage of self-sacrifice, which can never exist in time of peace nor be developed to such an extent by peaceful pursuits. Millions are united in the one thought--the fatherland; they are animated by that common sentiment of devotion unto death--patriotism--which, once experienced, is never again forgotten, and which ennobles and hallows the life of a whole generation. * * *” The greatness of war lies in those very phases which an effeminate civilization deems impious. “A great nation must be powerful,” exclaimed Scherr, in 1870.[2] “That is not only its duty, but its nature. If opposition is encountered, a nation is not only permitted to force a way for its righteous cause and resort to war, but it is its duty to do so. War always has been, and, so long as men and nations exist on the earth, it always will be, the _ultima ratio_.”

[1] _Das konstitutionelle Königtum in Deutschland_, in _Historische
und politische Aufsätze_, New edition, II.

[2] _Das grosze Jahr_, in _Hammerschläge und Historien_.

Since war is the _ultima ratio_ of state policy, and as a sovereign state must insist on absolute independence in determining its affairs and its course of action, it follows that the verdict of a court of arbitration, on the larger and more serious questions, can have a decisive influence on the action of the contending parties only if the arbitrator possesses the power to enforce his decision, and is embued with a determination to use that power. Thus the Pope was able to arbitrate the question of right between Germany and Spain as to the possession of the Caroline Islands, but a like verdict could never decide the question of might between Germany and France as to the possession of Alsace-Lorraine.[3]

[3] The constitution of the old German Confederation provided for
a settlement of disputes arising among its members; this verdict was
to be enforced by summary proceedings when necessary. The war of
1866 proved that the paragraphs of the constitution mentioned, of
necessity had to fail the moment the vital interests of two powerful
states came into conflict. See VON LETTOW-VORBECK, _Geschichte des
Krieges von 1866_, I, p. 115.

The utopian plans for a universal international court of arbitration are chimerical and conjured up by idealists unacquainted with the harsh facts of reality, if their ideas are not, indeed--as are many proposals for disarmament--calculated to serve as a cloak for ambitious plans.

If diplomatic means do not suffice to adjust a dispute, then the question of right between two states at once becomes a question of might. But the existence of a spirit of fair play is taken into account nevertheless, for each party to the controversy will seek to have the justice of its cause recognized. The moral support engendered by fighting for a just cause is so great that no state is willing to dispense with it.[4] This circumstance, coupled with the growing power of public opinion and with the influence of representative government, has contributed to reduce the number of wars. Wars between cabinets, like those in the days of Louis XIV., are no longer possible. As a result of the universal liability to service, the whole nation takes part in a war; every class of society suffers and has its pursuits interfered with; everything presses to an early decision, to a prompt crushing of the opponent.

[4] “If princes wish war they proceed to make war and then send for
an industrious jurist who demonstrates that it is therefore right.”
FREDERICK II.

“Every war is just which is necessary and every battle holy in
which lies our last hope.” MACHIAVELLI, _Il Principe_.

This is attained by defeating the enemy’s forces, by occupying the hostile country and seizing the enemy’s sources of supply, so that he will be convinced of the futility of further resistance. (Campaigns of 1859, 1866, and 1870-71). Only in the rarest cases will it be necessary to continue the war until the power of resistance of the hostile state is completely destroyed. (American Civil War). The extent to which the enemy’s power of resistance may have to be crippled or broken, in order to compel peace, depends upon his tenacity. Political considerations will also have to be taken into account in answering this question. From the military point of view, however, the purpose of every war will always be the complete overthrow of the enemy.

2. STRATEGY AND TACTICS.

Precise definitions of strategy and tactics, clearly fixing the scope of each, have been vainly sought in the past. That efforts in this direction have led to no results is only natural, as tactics and strategy are complementary subjects that often encroach upon each other, while grand tactics is frequently identical with strategy.

Von Bülow, the author of _The Spirit of Modern Warfare_ (1798)[5], calls those movements strategical which are made outside the enemy’s sphere of information. Von Willisen considers strategy the science of communications, tactics the science of fighting. Von Clausewitz calls strategy the science of the use of battles for the purpose of the war (Jomini: “_l’art de diriger les armées sur les théatres d’opérations_”)[6], tactics the science of the use of military forces in battle (Jomini: “_l’art de diriger les troupes sur les champs de bataille_”).[7][8] General von Horsetzki (1892) defines strategy as the study of the conditions necessary for success in war. Archduke Charles calls strategy the “science of war” and tactics the “art of war”. Frederick the Great and Napoleon always employed the term “_l’art de guerre_” instead of the term “_strategy_”. None of these definitions are comprehensive enough, because they do not cover marches, outposts, the supply service, and enterprises in minor tactics. Professor Delbrück’s definition is much more appropriate: “Strategy is the science of utilizing military resources for the attainment of the object of the war, tactics the art of leading troops into and in battle.” Thiers, the French historian, instead of seeking to define strategy and tactics, contents himself with explaining the problems of each: “_Le stratège doit concevoir le plan de campagne, embrasser d’un seul coup d’oeil tout le théatre présumé de la guerre, tracer lignes d’opérations et diriger les masses sur les points décisifs. Le tacticien a pour mission de régler l’ordre de leurs marches, de les disposer en bataille aux différents points, indiqués par le stratège, d’engager l’action, de la soutenir et de manoeuvrer pour atteindre le but proposé._”[9] Fieldmarshal Moltke calls strategy “the application of common sense to the conduct of war.”[10] For practical purposes it is sufficient to define strategy as the _science of the conduct of war_, tactics as the _science of troop-leading_. Strategy brings about the decision on the theater of war, while the duty of carrying it out, in the manner desired by the commander-in-chief, devolves upon tactics. Thus the strategical idea culminates on the battlefield. The concentric advance of the Prussian armies into Bohemia in 1866 naturally led to a complete envelopment of the Austrians on the field of Königgrätz. The German attack in the battle on the Hallue, Dec. 23rd, 1870, was based on the strategical requirement of driving the French from their line of retreat leading to Arras and Bapaume, by enveloping their right flank. The attempts made by the 15th Infantry Division, which was holding the enemy in front, to envelop the left wing of the French, interfered with the execution of the correct strategical plan. Thus, in following up a success, in itself quite unimportant (the capture of Bussy), the leading basic principle was forgotten. The same thing happened here that Moltke censured in his official report on the war of 1866, wherein he stated: “The higher commanders have not been able to make their influence felt down to the subordinate grades. Frequently, as soon as the divisions and brigades have come in contact with the enemy, all control over them has entirely ceased.”

[5] _Geist des neueren Kriegssystems._

[6] “The art of directing armies In the theater of operations.”

[7] “The art of directing troops on the field of battle.”

[8] “Everything affecting the use of troops in battle and the
regulation of their activity with reference to battle, has been
included in the term ‘tactics’, while the term strategy is synonymous
with ‘generalship,’ exclusive of such matters as fall into the domain
of tactics.” BLUME, _Strategie_, p. 33.

“Tactics teaches _how_, and strategy _why_, one should fight.”
General V. SCHERFF.

Strategy determines direction and objective of the movement of
armies, while the manner of execution belongs to tactics.

[9] “Strategy should devise the plan of campaign, take in with a
comprehensive glance the entire probable theater of war, establish
the lines of operations and direct the masses on the decisive points.

“It is the mission of the tactician to decide upon the order of
march of the troops, to form them for battle at the various points
determined by strategy, to begin the action, to sustain it, and to
maneuver so as to attain the desired end.” THIERS.

[10] V. MOLTKE, _Tactical Problems, No. 58_ (1878) p. 133.

Archduke Charles considered the subordination of tactics to strategy a law. “Tactics should execute the conceptions of strategy; where the two come in conflict, where strategical considerations are opposed to tactical interests, the strategical considerations should, as a rule, take precedence. Tactics must occupy a subordinate place and attempt to neutralize existing disadvantages by skillful dispositions.” Clausewitz not unjustly censures Archduke Charles for placing advantages of terrain in the first rank, and for failing to attach the proper importance to the annihilation of the hostile forces. Should the demands of strategy conflict with those of tactics on the battlefield, the latter must unquestionably take precedence, since the general’s foremost thought must be the annihilation of the hostile forces. Tactical considerations should likewise govern in the selection of the direction of attack in a battle, strategical reasons for striking in this or that direction becoming effective only after the attainment of tactical success. It is true that strategy, by directing the armies and their concentration on the battlefield, provides tactics with the tools for fighting and assures the probability of victory; but, on the other hand, the commander-in-chief appropriates the fruits of each victory and makes them the basis for further plans. “The demands of strategy are silent in the presence of tactical victory; they adapt themselves to the newly created situation.” Fieldmarshal MOLTKE.[11]

[11] The view that the direction of attack should be governed by
the possibility of easy execution in minor warfare only, is held by
General v. Scherff, who says: “General v. Moltke was not influenced
by the question ‘will the attack here or there be tactically
easier or more difficult?’ Only the question, ‘will it there be
strategically advantageous or not’ was able to determine his course
with reference to measures on the battlefield.”

3. THE METHOD OF INSTRUCTION.

While Archduke Charles considers mathematical axioms the basis of the higher art of war, military history is for us the principal source from which to gather knowledge.[12]

[12] See lecture by Prince HOHENLOHE: _Kriegserfahrung und
Kriegsgeschichte_, Neisse, 1879.

“Let my son often read and meditate upon history; it is the only
true philosophy. Let him often read and meditate upon the wars of the
great captains; it is the only means of learning the art of war.”
NAPOLEON I., on April 17th, 1821.

“Past events are useful to feed the imagination and furnish the
memory, provided their study is the repetition of ideas that judgment
should pass upon.” FREDERICK THE GREAT.

In military history we have a guide by which, if we lack personal experience in war, we can test the results of our reflections and of our experience on the drillground. Military history moreover enables us to appreciate those controlling factors which, in map problems, do not appear at all, and which, in exercises on the terrain, appear only in a restricted measure. One must learn the conduct of war from the experience of others; one’s own experience is costly and is almost invariably gained too late. That experience in war, of itself, is not sufficient (aside from the fact that it is gained too late in a given case) is illustrated by the defeat of the Austrians in 1866, of the French in 1870-71, and of the British in South Africa. “_Les Autrichiens_,” says Colonel Foch,[13] “_ont fait la guerre sans la comprendre, les Prussiens l’ont compris sans la faire, mais ils l’ont étudiée._” “Military history is neither a compilation of clever theories nor a book designed for whiling away idle moments. It is, on the contrary, a careful teacher, who, if we are attentive, allows us to view and grasp matters which we have never before been in a position to see, but which, nevertheless, are liable to confront us in the same, a similar, or a changed form, and demand unpremeditated, instant and decisive action, entailing heavy responsibilities. Military history, it is true, offers us, in the first instance, only events and their outline, conditions and phenomena, but it also presents, what the cleverest theory is unable to furnish, a graphic illustration of the disturbing elements in war, an illustration of the influences, doubts, embarrassments, unforeseen accidents, surprises and delays. It describes the course pursued by commanders and by practical military common sense in surmounting these difficulties. It prepares in advance the mental balance necessary at the moment of action; it should prepare also for the unexpected. It affords a substitute for lack of military experience, for the accumulation of which the life of the individual, prior to the moment of action, has been too short.”[14] The pedantic enumeration of a few examples in support of a stated opinion cannot suffice. It should not be difficult to find examples from military history in support of any opinion; frequently even an incorrect tactical contention can be vindicated by such examples. For in war the action taken is as often wrong as correct; the scales are turned by factors which in most cases appear indistinctly or not at all. The experiences of military history must, therefore, only be used with caution if tactical lessons are to be drawn from them. “A mere allusion to historical events,” says Clausewitz in his chapter on examples, “has the further disadvantage that some readers are either not sufficiently acquainted with these events, or remember them too imperfectly to enter into the author’s ideas, so that such students are compelled to accept his statements blindly or to remain unconvinced. It is, of course, very difficult to describe historical events as they ought to be described if they are to be used as proofs, for authors usually lack the means, as well as the time and space, necessary for such descriptions. We maintain, however, that in establishing a new or a doubtful view, a single event, thoroughly described, is more instructive than a mere allusion to ten. The principal evil resulting from a superficial reference to historical events does not lie in the fact that the author cites them incorrectly in support of his theory, but in the fact that he has never become thoroughly acquainted with those events. In consequence of such a superficial, haphazard treatment of history, a hundred erroneous views and theoretical projects are created, which would never have appeared if the author had been compelled to deduce, from a careful analysis of the connected facts in the case, what he publishes and wishes to support by historical proofs. If we have convinced ourselves of the above outlined difficulties attending the employment of historical examples, and appreciate the necessity for thoroughness in their treatment, we will come to the conclusion that the more recent military history is the most natural source from which to select examples, inasmuch as recent history alone is sufficiently known and analyzed.”[15] The events from military history mentioned in this work are cited simply as proofs of certain phenomena; the proper analysis of these proofs must be left to the student.

[13] _Principes de la Guerre_, 1903.

“The Austrians,” says Colonel Foch, “made war without understanding
it; the Germans understood war without making it; but they studied
it.”

[14] From _Meinungen und Mahnungen_, Vienna, 1894.

[15] _On War_, II, Chapter 6, p. 111.

See also CLAUSEWITZ’ remarks on “_Criticism_,” II, Chapter 5.

The applicatory method[16] is used frequently by preference as the system of instruction, but its creator, General von Verdy du Vernois, considers it merely a complement of the deductive method, on which it is predicated and based. “The weakness of the whole applicatory system of instruction lies in the fact that a textbook based upon it, although written by a master hand, can portray only isolated examples, and that these, studied again and again, soon lose their value in the same manner as a maneuver terrain that has become too well known. For, although we ordinarily find principles represented in a connected form, this method of instruction can only convey them in a fragmentary manner in connection with the details of the events described.”[17] The success of the applicatory method depends largely upon the individuality of the instructor, and owes its charm to the personal intercourse between teacher and pupil. Only an expert, who possesses a thorough professional knowledge, who is master of his subject, and who has the faculty of presenting it skillfully, will be able to produce imaginary scenes which faithfully represent reality and are free from objectionable features. By constant practice with specific cases, under the most diverse situations, the nature of war may in this way be taught and initiative developed as well as facility acquired in issuing appropriate, clear, and concise orders. One danger of using nothing but the applicatory method must be noted. The instructor, as representative of a definite theory, finds it comparatively easy to select the conditions governing a specific case in such a way that the theory which he represents necessarily appears to be the correct one. This is especially true when the director of an applicatory problem determines the action of the opposing side. The two methods (the applicatory, or inductive, and the deductive) must be so supplemented that the lesson in tactics clearly illustrates the purpose and object of a tactical operation and allows of the attainment of a thorough knowledge of the means necessary to gain that object.[18] “He who is able to understand the situation, has a definite purpose in view, and knows the means with which to carry out that purpose, will, by a simple mental operation, arrive in each particular case at an appropriate decision, and will be able, furthermore, to carry out that decision, provided he does not lose his head. If a clear comprehension of the purpose in view and of the means for carrying out that purpose lie within the sphere of theory, the estimate of the situation and the decision are governed by the circumstances of the particular case. Should the training in this direction lie outside the sphere of theory, it will logically belong to the domain of the applicatory method of instruction. The two methods must, therefore, supplement each other.

[16] See KÜHNE, _Kritische Wanderungen_, 4 and 5, Preface p. 5.

[17] VON BOGUSLAWSKI, _Entwickelung der Taktik_, II, p. 17.

[18] “When one attempts to establish a principle, immediately
a great number of officers, imagining that they are solving the
question, at once cry out: ‘Everything depends on circumstances;
according to the wind must the sails be set.’ But if you do not know
beforehand which sail is proper for such and such a wind, how can you
set the sail according to the wind?” BUGEAUD, _Aperçus sur quelques
détails de guerre_.

If the decision is to culminate in action, strength of character is required, providing the determination to execute, in spite of unavoidable difficulties, what has been recognized as proper, and also the professional ability necessary to carry out the determination to its logical conclusion. All that theory can do toward forming this character is to emphasize its importance and to refer students to military history. The applicatory method, however, can develop strength of character by compelling the student to form decisions under pressure of a specified time limit (in solving problems) or by subjecting him to the influences of certain situations such as would be encountered in war (maneuvers). The means available in tactical instruction in time of peace, for the development of strength of character, are, however, very limited when compared with the great demands made by the abnormal conditions of war, so out of all proportion to those of peace. This should be thoroughly understood, lest we overestimate the value of these means as well as the results to be obtained from them in times of peace.

After theory has fulfilled its mission of clearly indicating the purpose and object of an operation, as well as the means by which it may be attained, and applicatory practice has performed its office of developing initiative and professional skill, a third factor is still necessary--the study of military history. From this fountain of knowledge both “theory” and “applicatory method” must draw their material; to this source they must again and again refer in order to guard against erroneous ideas of their own creation, which are often as different from reality as day is from night.”[19]

[19] F. C. V. H. (_Fieldmarshal Lieutenant General_ CONRAD V.
HÖTZENDORF, Chief of Staff of the Austro-Hungarian Army). _Zum
Studium der Taktik_, p. 2.

Viewed as the science of the leading and employment of troops, tactics may be divided into two parts:

1. =Formal tactics=, or that contained in drill regulations. This portion of tactics furnishes the formations used by troops when assembled, on the march, and in action, and contains the regulations governing the conduct in battle of troops acting alone without regard to the coöperation of the other arms, and without reference to the terrain.

2. =Applied tactics=[20] deals with the combined action of the several arms on the march, in camp, and in action, taking into account influences of the terrain, seasons, and the time of day in field warfare. Fortress warfare should, strictly speaking, be included under this heading; that is to say, the employment of tactical principles[21] pertaining to the mobile arms, in conjunction with foot-artillery and technical troops on a prepared battlefield. The principles are the same in field and fortress warfare; the only difference between them lies in the employment of the means necessitated by the preparation of a field of battle in time of peace. Military history shows that a clear distinction between field and fortress warfare is impossible. (Sebastopol, Düppel, Plevna, and Port Arthur).

[20] V. BOGUSLAWSKI, _Entwickelung der Taktik_, II, Chapter
23. “The higher, Grand Tactics, is the Initiation and conduct of
battles--subordinate, or minor tactics, is the manner of fighting, or
the battle-tactics of an arm considered in its details.”

[21] MAJOR GUNDELACH, _Exerzierreglement und Festungskrieg_,
Berlin, 1908.

4. DRILL REGULATIONS.

Drill regulations are the accumulation of the tactical views and lessons of a certain period. They illustrate the tactical condition which becomes perceptible at the moment of a certain development of the fighting tools as represented by man and weapons. Man, in his peculiarities, in his weaknesses, is the constant. He constitutes the psychological element, inseparable from the science of combat, and as such is the definitely given magnitude; the effect of weapons, however, appears always as the variable factor. New weapons, therefore, necessitate new tactics.

It will be observed also “that changes of tactics have not only taken place _after_ changes in weapons, which necessarily is the case, but that the interval between such changes has been unduly long. This doubtless arises from the fact that an improvement of weapons is due to the energy of one or two men, while changes in tactics have to overcome the inertia of a conservative class; but it is a great evil. It can be remedied only by a candid recognition of each change.”[22] The history of the tactics of the 19th Century furnishes more than one instructive example of the magnitude of such “obstinate conservatism.”

[22] MAHAN, _The Influence of Sea Power upon History_, pp. 9 and 10.

It is a marked peculiarity of manuals of instruction, that, no matter with what far-sightedness such regulations may have been originally compiled, they become antiquated in a comparatively short time. Napoleon estimated this period at ten years. Frequent changes are certainly not desirable, if tactical development is not to be interfered with and if inconveniences are to be avoided in organizing our mobile army from our peace organizations, Reservists, and Landwehr. On the other hand, the regulations must keep abreast of requirements if the conditions to which they owe their existence have changed. In his “Military Fantasies” the Prince de Ligne wrote in 1783: “An article which should be added to all drill regulations, and which, I know not why, is omitted, is: ‘Act sometimes contrary to the regulations.’ It is just as necessary to teach that one must act contrary to the regulations, as to teach the disorder of troops as it will occur in action.”

It is always dangerous to be behind the times, as troops thereby relinquish a superiority previously possessed over others, which knowledge they must later purchase, with streams of blood, in the face of hostile bullets. Of what avail, to the Austrians in 1866, to the Russians in 1877, were all their valiant assaults, made with tactical formations that had outlived their usefulness in the face of newer weapons, although made with the firm determination to conquer?

The self-sacrificing spirit and firmly rooted discipline of the troops found an insurmountable obstacle in the rapid fire of unshaken infantry. The war experiences of our regiments show that bullets quickly write a new tactics, demolish superannuated formations and create new ones. But at what a sacrifice![23] In the Franco-German war, superior leadership and a better artillery permitted us to pay this price for the lesson. But how an army fares when it lacks these auxiliaries is shown by the British experiences in South Africa. The initial failure of accustomed tactical formations causes a dread of the frontal attack and finally leads some tacticians to deny entirely even the feasibility of such an attack. In peace training, therefore, set forms are of less importance; stress should be laid on developing the faculty of adaptation to changing conditions of combat and terrain.

[23] It is frequently customary on the outbreak of a war to issue
“Instructions for campaign,” in order to prepare troops, trained
according to superannuated regulations, for action on a strange
theater of war. It is desirable to disseminate the first experiences
gained in action to all parts of the army. We failed to do this in
1870, and all organizations were therefore compelled to gain this
experience for themselves. Even as late as the 18th of August, 1870,
the Füsilier Battalion of the 85th Infantry advanced in double
column formed on the center, although the campaign in Bohemia had
already demonstrated that this formation was out of date. See MOLTKE,
_Feldzug von 1859_, p. 65.

Further development and justification of the principles of the drill regulations, and the modification of those principles under certain assumptions, are reserved to the science of tactics. Drill regulations should not be textbooks of tactics, but, on the other hand, a textbook of tactics should deal with formations only in so far as that is necessary to ensure a clear comprehension of the fundamental principles.

“Regulations and the science of combat are in a certain sense very different subjects. The regulations are law, authority--no doubt can be entertained on this point; but that also invests them with the character of something fixed, at least for a certain space of time. They cannot be kept up to date so as to meet quickly enough the rapidly changing and ever growing demands of modern combat: that would indeed be an unfair requirement, impossible of realization. Here must enter the science of combat, which should be independent in every direction, which should know no fixed rules, and which should point to no other authority than that of truth and reality. It is not the province of the science of combat, like that of regulations, to retain that which is in keeping with prevailing views and forms; it must take into consideration the fleeting theory and practice, ever developing and changing anew.”[24]

[24] KEIM, _Gegenwärtiger Stand der Gefechtslehre_, p. 1.

A positive system of tactics will therefore be based upon one’s own drill regulations, from the standpoint of which it will investigate and compare the principles of the service manuals of the different powers, and finally develop the science still further by the aid of experience gained from military history and the knowledge of the effect of weapons. While these are the ever changing but nevertheless measurable factors of tactical reflection, a third, perhaps the most important factor, must be added, viz., that the leader must reckon with the action of men frequently exposed to the influence of great exertions and great mental agitation. _A doctrine of tactics which does not properly appreciate the psychological element stagnates in lifeless pedantry._

THE FORMAL TACTICS OF INFANTRY.

I. ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT.

1. THE IMPORTANCE AND EMPLOYMENT OF INFANTRY.

In all modern armies infantry is, in virtue of its numbers and importance, the principal arm. Since the introduction of firearms, infantry has gradually increased in importance and numbers as compared with the other arms.