Chapter IX: Part 9

The remedies provided by the regulations against these evils are, above all else: Restriction of the front of the several units, the deployment of tactical units side by side in action (instead of in rear of each other) and the use of every opportunity for re-establishing the original organizations. Other suggestions for stemming the tide of disorder as made by the author of _Summer Nights Dream_ (1888) (platoons formed in single rank, volley firing, and constant closing toward the center) are impracticable in a serious action. The disintegrating effect of a battle is stronger than tactical cohesion. It is better to recognize this fact than to face the enemy with illusory ideas.

It is necessary to train the men in peace time to follow willingly any officer, whether he belong to their own or to another organization; and, for that reason, exercises in provisional organizations are requisite for tactical training--a large number of officers being told to fall out at these exercises to assimilate losses which would occur in action. The control of mixed firing lines by word of command of an officer is the foundation of order and troop leading, and thus a prerequisite of success in the battles of the future. In a successful engagement, the evils above mentioned are less evident than during a reverse when troops unexpectedly suffer heavy losses or receive fire from the flank or rear. Troops formed into well-organized units can well stand such a test, but in an improvised organization, composed of fractions and men of different units, especially when their own officers are absent, such a crisis may lead to panic.

The following battle episode is very instructive: The 1st Battalion,
4th Infantry, deployed in line of company columns, advanced at
=Colombey= (14th August, 1870) under French shell and _Chassepot_
fire. The morale of the 3rd Company was visibly impaired by two
shells which burst, one after the other, in its ranks, placing 15-20
men out of action. “The men began to hesitate; their steps grew
shorter; and, as if impelled by an invisible power, the company
executed a half right turn, another half right turn, then another
and another. One would have thought the movement was being executed
at command. The column was now facing to the rear, and although
not running, not fleeing, it was moving back to the Brasserie with
suspiciously lengthening steps. The drummer, one Borchert, did
everything to bring the men to their senses; the non-commissioned
officers assisted bravely, but in vain; the column continued its
movement to the rear. Filled with shame and indignation, the
perspiration pouring out of every pore, I shouted to the men,
repeatedly commanding: ‘Company ... Forward!’ But all in vain. At
that moment the battalion commander--he was called the ‘marble
statue’ on account of his coolness--galloped up on his bay, shouting:
‘Look at the 5th Company over yonder; see how far it has advanced.’
Then another superior officer jumped in front of the men with the
words: ‘Is there no officer here at all?’ At this instant I yelled
again as if my life depended upon it: ‘You men belong to the color
company; Company ... Forward!’ and the spell was broken. As if on
the parade ground the Grenadiers faced to the front; obediently they
executed my command: ‘To the attack! Carry arms ... Forward!’ and
soon thereafter we again occupied our position between the 2nd and
4th Companies.”

The company lost many men as soon as it entered the fight, among them
its company commander; then the two shells burst in rapid succession
within its ranks, and this explains the temporary panic. The company
lost a total of 86 men (including officers).[205]

[205] RETZLAFF, _Aus meinem Tagebuch_.

Nothing is more contagious in the zone of danger than the example of fear or cowardice.[206] Appeals, threats, and intimidation are of little avail. The most effective remedy lies in developing the individual soldier’s initiative, in training him to act with common sense even when his officers are absent. We should send our soldiers into battle with a reserve of moral courage great enough to prevent the premature moral and mental depreciation of the individual.

[206] Some interesting proofs in support of this statement are:

The attack made by Captain Bechtoldsheim at Custozza against
Italian infantry. _Oesterreichs Kämpfe_, II, p. 74.

The combats at the Mance ravine on Aug. 18th, 1870.

HÖNIG, _Vierundzwanzig Stunden Moltkescher Strategie_, pp. 170,
184, 193 and 215.

_Sedan_, _Gen. St. W._, II, p. 1243.

_Wald- und Ortsgefecht_, p. 179. (Aymard’s Division after the
capture of Servigny).

LEHAUCOURT, _Campagne de la Loire_, II, p. 272. (The French Gardes
Mobiles after the taking of Le Tuilerie at Le Mans).

V. DEPLOYMENTS FOR ACTION.

1. NORMAL PROCEDURE.

The characteristic tendency of modern times is the liberation of the individual from antiquated ideas and from the restraint exercised by ostensibly reactionary governmental power. The key-note of this tendency, which places individualism above collectivism, is absolute independence of the individual in municipal and national affairs, in science and art. Even tactics has been influenced to a certain extent by this tendency. Success in battle, however, will not be assured by the sum-total of a number of negative or positive individual efforts, but only by the simultaneous launching of masses controlled by a single will. Within these limits the independence of the individual is permissible, for a commander does not exact apathetic obedience, but, on the contrary, intelligent coöperation on the part of everyone, and this cannot be regulated by hard and fast rules.

Instead of laying down rules to cover all cases, the German Drill Regulations leave the leader free to dispose of his troops according to the purpose of the combat and the nature of the ground. In this he is assisted by the initiative and independent action of his subordinate leaders. Normal formations for attack and defense are requisite however, in armies in which the tactical training of commanders and subordinate leaders is deficient and where it is feared that the latter will abuse the latitude allowed them. Where such normal formations are prescribed, it is assumed that hard and fast rules are requisite for training; that the average officer cannot be expected to estimate a situation correctly and arrive at proper decisions; and that the majority of them must be given definite rules for combat if they are to render any service at all.

Drill regulations should facilitate quick mutual understanding between leader and organization and lay down general principles for ordinary situations, for combat tasks, and for formations, but should not, by their rules, direct the actions of a leader from the very beginning into definite grooves. If the regulations contain a normal procedure, there is danger that it will be employed where inappropriate, and that the mental alertness of the leaders will relax and fail in war at the very moment when its presence is most vitally necessary.[207]

[207] “Leaders who have been trained only in the mechanical part of
drill and who subsequently have to act independently, fare like the
lame man deprived of his crutches, or the near-sighted man deprived
of his spectacles.” VON SEIDLITZ.

“Tactics will always vary according to the nature of the ground, therefore it is impossible to tell beforehand what might happen in each particular case.” (FREDERICK THE GREAT). Whether or not a particular normal procedure is appropriate does not depend upon the terrain but solely upon the tactical situation.[208]

[208] It is only in cases where precisely identical situations
may be presumed to exist that there can be any question of a normal
procedure. The last stages of the infantry attack in fortress
warfare present features of this nature and on that account a normal
procedure has been formulated for it in almost all of the European
armies.

While there is considerable unanimity of opinion as to the general manner of carrying out an attack, opinions differ radically as to details. “If all the advocates of a normal attack had to describe it in words, there would be about as many suggestions as there are advocates. Which of the many normal attack schemes is the most suitable for average troops? A conference called for the purpose of investigating this point would probably have the strange result that each representative would concede that what the others desire is practicable but need not be done.”[209] Anyone who thinks himself capable of evolving a normal procedure, should bear in mind that all such systems have invariably failed to fulfill the expectations entertained for them because of obstacles which could not have been foreseen during their preparation. Regulations that prescribe too many details are very apt to lead to stereotyped forms and to that which cannot stand the test of actual war. So far every war has had surprises in store for the troops and this will be equally true in the future. Troops will be able to find a way out of such situations only if they have been taught to follow the spirit rather than the letter of their regulations, if they have been individually trained and accustomed to strict discipline, and if their leaders have been taught to reflect on tactics. It is better to send troops into battle with the order, “Help yourselves as best you can,” than to encumber them with combat rules of doubtful value which leave them in the lurch at the first opportunity, because the troops have not been taught to depend upon their own initiative. The consequent indecision is increased in the same proportion as the faith the troops and their leaders had in the lauded universal remedy, the normal procedure. In spite of the excellence of our regulations, we should accustom ourselves to the idea that a future war may correct their provisions.[210]

[209] General BRONSART V. SCHELLENDORFF, _I, Betrachtungen_, etc.
p. 42

_British Drill Regulations_: “Although a normal attack is
apparently capable of being changed to suit the various situations,
the continual practice of it leads to a stereotyped formation, to
lack of skill and mobility. The disadvantages coupled with a normal
attack are not apparent in time of peace, but in war they will make
themselves felt through losses and failures.”

[210] Major VON HÜLSEN, _Schema oder Selbständigkeit?_, (Berlin,
1906).

The enunciation of certain technical combat principles as a guide in the training of the troops is, however, far removed from laying down a stereotyped form for attack (normal attack). Every thinking officer will anyhow, consciously or unconsciously, formulate in his own mind some sort of a “normal attack”, which is nothing but a firm opinion of how he thinks an attack ought to be carried out. If such combat regulations are called “drill attack” (_Schulangriff_), many of the objections advanced against the normal attack are eliminated. Such definite provisions facilitate in a great measure the intercourse between leader and troops.

“Instructions as to what to do in battle,” says Clausewitz (_On
War_, II), “must not be taken for more than they are; they should
not be regarded as hard and fast rules or systems, but merely as
good general forms which individual judgment can utilize as is most
suitable.... By means of a uniform method, commanders attain skill,
precision, and confidence, the possession of which qualities on their
part will make the whole machine run easier....

“The drawback is that the habit of acting in a certain groove tends
to become fixed and thus antiquated while the attendant circumstances
imperceptibly change, and this should be prevented by enlightened and
thorough criticism. When, in the year 1806, the Prussian generals
(Prince Louis at =Saalfeld=; Tauenzien on the =Dornberg= at =Jena=;
Grawert in front of and Rüchel in rear of =Kapellendorf=) without
exception came to grief by employing Frederick the Great’s system
of tactics, it was due not merely to the fact that they had gotten
into a certain groove of acting which was out of date, but to the
most dire poverty of resource to which a fixed system of tactics has
ever led. Owing to this incapacity of thinking for themselves, they
involved Hohenlohe’s army in such ruin as has never before or since
overtaken any army on the battlefield.”

General von Boguslawski[211] demands that the conduct of the attack
be regulated by precise instructions both on the drill-ground and in
action. He states: “The many different methods of dealing with even
the simplest cases, unquestionably evident in the army at the present
time, are an evil calculated not only to train but also to confuse
the soldier and the subordinate leader. Precise regulations are by
no means incompatible with adaptation to the varying features of the
terrain in a given case, and will infuse unity and certainty into
offensive movements. A normal formation must be prescribed, but it
should be flexible.”

[211] _Taktische Darlegungen_, p. 51.

Elsewhere he makes the following statement in regard to a normal
attack: “I believe that the normal attack should be regarded as the
basis of troop training--a solid foundation for further development.
In carrying out the spirit of this procedure, further work should be
done on varied ground. This spirit aims at the unity of the attack.
The formations taught on the drill-ground should be retained as
long as possible. The training of officers and men must be such,
however, that they will deviate, whenever necessary, from these
normal formations. But if the formations, as well as the training
and drill, are truly practical and adapted for war, departures from
the scheme laid down in the regulations will be insignificant. This,
briefly, is my idea of the normal attack or uniform procedure, which
not only does not have a detrimental effect, but, on the contrary, is
absolutely necessary in order to facilitate the work of the higher
leader.”

General von Scherff states:[212]

“It would contribute to clearness and to proper division of
responsibility if the regulations would definitely prescribe:--

“1. That only the superior commander who makes dispositions for
battle according to his own judgment, be charged with assigning
appropriate missions;

“2. That the subordinate leader, charged with the execution of
a mission, determine, by an independent choice of any expedient
provided by the regulations, the formation in which his organization
is to carry out the task assigned; and, finally,

“3. That the subsequent conduct of such an organization be governed
by a definite normal procedure, familiar to the men from the
drill-ground, so as to ensure mutual coöperation of its component
parts.”

[212] _Einheitsangriff oder individualisierter Angriff_, Berlin,
1902.

2. CONCENTRATION, DEVELOPMENT, AND DEPLOYMENT FOR ACTION.[213]

[213] _Aufmarsch_, _Entfaltung_, _Entwicklung_.

Column tactics, which influenced us even after the Franco-German war, required that troops be concentrated, prior to an action, from the narrow route column into a broad combat formation. This tedious systematic =concentration=[214] was invariably employed before entering an action, except when, in critical situations, companies and battalions had to be launched into the fight directly from route column. The commander of a force could reduce the time required for going into action only by approaching the field of battle in assembly formation.[215]

[214] “By _concentration_ is meant the passage from route column to
a broader close order formation. It is employed for the purpose of
decreasing the depth of a column and for assembly.” (Par. 315 German
I. D. R.)

[215] Examples: The approach of the IInd Army to the battlefield of
Gravelotte, see _Taktik_, III, p. 305.

The advance of the 1st Army from its cantonments toward the
Bistrits to the battlefield of Königgrätz was a mistake. The
army first approached in route columns, then concentrated, again
formed route columns, and finally concentrated for action. V.
LETTOW-VORBECK, II, pp. 407 and 480. From what I know of the terrain
the advance should in this case have been made in assembly formations.

Valuable time was thus lost. Even when the situation was not pressing, the leader was obliged, for example, to allow a regiment having a depth of 1200 m. to close up to a depth of 100 paces. When this had been done, he was forced to wait until thin skirmish lines gained a proper distance to the front. The rear elements were able to follow only when the skirmishers had gained a distance approximately equal to the former depth of the entire column. Such a concentration is only proper however, when the commander wishes to launch his troops subsequently in several directions. Advantage should be taken of every opportunity for decreasing the depth of the column (by forming column of sections).

The advance of large bodies of troops presents no difficulties even in close country, if, as recommended by the author,[216] the battalions in route column are placed abreast of each other and are permitted to go around obstacles and take advantage of the cover available. However, even at long ranges, troops in such formations present favorable targets to hostile machine guns and artillery.

[216] See _Taktik_, III, p. 307.

The British were surprised in close order formations at
=Magersfontain= and =Colenso=. In subsequent engagements, in order
to avoid this, their infantry, when still a great distance away from
the enemy, took up an attack formation which permitted only movements
directly to the front (at =Poplar Grove,= for example, this was
done when 10 km. from the enemy). An advance in such a formation
was possible only because the plains of South Africa presented no
obstacles, and because the British had only to hold the enemy who
stood passively on the defensive. Each brigade formed its four
battalions into an open double column with a front of 2000 and a
depth of 800 m., the distances and intervals between battalions being
300-400 m. Each battalion deployed from this column so that its eight
companies, each in a thin line (with 2 and finally 20 pace intervals
between the men), followed each other at a distance of 100-120 paces.
The advantage of having troops in hand so that they can be used in
other directions than straight to the front, had disappeared.

during the advance on =Poplar Grove= on March 7th, 1900. Front about 800 m., depth, 1800-2000 m.]

When an engagement is expected, the different elements, each in route column, are directed upon their several objectives, i.e., the column is _developed for action_. This is done because it is necessary to gain a start over the enemy in deployment and advantageous to move in route column. Thus a =development for action= (_Entfaltung_)[217] is nothing but an extension of front accomplished by breaking up the original route column into a number of separate columns. The latter march on diverging lines and can generally remain in route column. Deep column should not be formed unless an immediate extension is not anticipated. During the development for action, preparations should be made providing for the necessary depth of the combat formation.

[217] The German I. D. R. make a distinction between extension of
front, “development for action” (_Entfaltung_, pars. 315 and 466),
and “distribution in depth” (_Gliedern_, pars. 287-291 and 427). The
term “to form for attack” (_Auseinanderziehen_, par. 241), means that
troops are given a combat formation both as regards frontage and
depth.

When the necessity for engaging can be foreseen, the concentration into an assembly formation should be avoided, since it generally entails a loss of time and energy, and the development for action chosen instead. (Par. 315 German I. D. R.). The latter has the additional advantage of affording a higher degree of readiness for action without letting the troops get out of hand. It should be practiced not only from route column but also from assembly formation.[218]

[218] See the defeat of the Russian Reserve Brigade under Orlov
on September 2nd, 1904, at Liao Yang, in _Angriffsverfahren der
Japaner_, by von Lüttwitz.

The development for action should begin as soon as there is danger of getting under effective artillery fire. The length of time required for going into action may be reduced by shortening the route column (by concentrating the troops into deep column); by forming several route columns abreast, unless column of sections has already been formed; by clearing the roads of troops; by marching across country; by indicating beforehand on which side of the infantry the artillery is to be brought up (pars. 315-323 German I. D. R.); and, finally, by directing the heads of the various elements upon their respective objectives. (Development for action).

In the Austrian regulations, the development for action is not
so clearly emphasized: “A concentration preceding the attack in
rencontres is permissible in only those exceptional cases when it
becomes apparent, during the preparatory stage of the action, that
the enemy has a visible start in deployment.” When time is not
pressing, the regulations prescribe a concentration for action and,
simultaneously therewith, such a grouping of the principal units (if
possible out of range of the effective fire of hostile guns, and
well concealed) that the attacking troops need move only straight to
the front. A more extended formation is taken up when the zone of
hostile artillery fire is reached. The march to the battlefield is
discussed in detail by the French regulations: In the first place,
in order to take advantage of cover and to keep the roads clear for
artillery, it will be necessary to leave the road and to advance
across country. This will, as a rule, result in widening the front
of the advancing force, even though this be only to the extent of
placing columns abreast of each other. Hourly halts are to be made,
so as to give an opportunity for replenishing ammunition and time for
reconnaissance. Small columns are preferred in woods and in close
country and larger columns on passable ground. Attention is specially
called to the danger to which troops are exposed when surprised in
defiles by hostile fire. This march to the battlefield is followed by
a concentration of the troops in concealed and protected positions.

The =deployment for action= (_Entwicklung_) consists of forming the troops for battle and includes the extension into line of skirmishers. As a rule, the deployment follows the development for action, but may be made directly from route column or from an assembly formation.

It is impossible to define clearly where the development for action ceases and where the deployment begins. The formation of a line of skirmishers to cover a route column does not constitute a deployment. There is no room for doubt that the regulations have in mind the rencontre, in which the passage from route column to skirmish line proceeds naturally and smoothly. In attacking an enemy prepared to defend a position, the procedure is much more cautious. In this case the force which has been developed for action is withdrawn as much as possible from the view and the fire of the enemy (par. 367 German I. D. R.), and led forward from cover to cover. (Par. 369 German I. D. R.). Even in situations in which haste is required, it is a good plan to follow the procedure laid down by the regulations, viz: “First direct the troops upon the proper objective, then give them a suitable formation.”

An analysis of the question as to whether an immediate launching
of troops into action is necessary (5th Infantry Division at
=Vionville=) or whether they should first be regularly concentrated
(6th Infantry Division at =Vionville=) is of special interest. The
concentration of the 1st Prussian Army Corps at =Waterloo=, and
of the 5th Bavarian Infantry Brigade at =Nehweiler= (=Wörth=),
almost in rear of the French, is justly criticised. At =Nachod=,
the Austrian brigades, owing to their time-consuming concentration,
lost an opportunity of throwing the weak Prussian advanced troops
from the heights south of Wysokow, while the latter were reinforced
by parts of the main body which arrived by half-battalions. This
reinforcement, while made in driblets, was, however, sufficient.

During its march to the battlefield of =Gravelotte=, the 3rd Infantry
Division concentrated at Buxieres for the purpose of cooking. Then
it formed again in route column, concentrated once more south of
Rezonville, and from there moved on in echelon formation. The
concentration of the 28th Infantry Brigade on August 6th, 1870
(=Spicheren=), was still less justifiable. About noon, when the head
of the brigade reached the exit of the Kollertal Wood at Raschpfuhl,
it received orders to cross the Saar. Upon receiving this order, the
five battalions present concentrated, unfurled their flags and then
marched across country to the railroad bridge of Mattstall. In order
to effect a crossing, route column had to be formed again. The delays
which occurred here led the parts of the force which had crossed
first, to throw themselves into the fight.[219]

[219] _Geschichte des Regiments Nr. 77_, p. 51.

3. THE BATTALION, THE REGIMENT, AND THE BRIGADE.

When part of a larger force, the battalion may be broken up into companies either by directing the latter upon their respective objectives, or by forming for attack by command.

When forming for attack by command, the front, the base company, intervals, distances, and the relation of the companies to each other must be indicated. The intervals should be sufficiently large to permit the companies to move unhampered, and so maintained that irregularities of marching will not be communicated from one to the other.

A space approximately equal to the front of a platoon will suffice for this purpose. Thus the interval between companies at war strength would be 150 paces, and between companies at peace strength 100 paces. Intervals may be increased or diminished when necessary so as to enable the troops to take the fullest advantage of cover. The same holds true for distances. For rules in regard to the distance between the second and first line, see p. 121, supra. When a battalion has formed line of companies at long range from the enemy for the purpose of reducing the effect of the hostile fire, distances should be diminished to facilitate the transmission of orders.

When the battalion is acting alone, the intervals depend upon the purpose of the combat. In the fights around Mukden, some of the Japanese battalions, stationed at points where the decision was not sought, were each assigned a front of 800 m. In these cases the four companies of each battalion had to be deployed abreast of each other at large intervals.

It is impossible to prescribe fixed forms of deployment for particular situations. In each case the formation of the battalion depends upon the situation, the purpose of the combat, and the nature of the ground, the battalion commander having the option of going into action in one, two, or three lines.

Moreover, the formation depends upon whether--

1. The battalion is acting alone or as part of a larger force; and whether one or both of its flanks are resting on impassable obstacles;

2. Whether it is fighting a decisive or a containing action; whether it is to attack or to stand on the defensive;

3. Whether it is to prepare the attack by its own fire or is to take advantage of the preparation effected by other troops; and, finally,

4. Whether or not it has to fight at night.

=A battalion acting alone=, whose flanks are not resting on natural obstacles, will, as a rule, place entire companies successively into action so as to retain complete organizations for other purposes. It will seldom be proper for the battalion to form for attack in the regular manner. When this can be done the battalion should form in three lines in conformity with its task of initiating, carrying out, and deciding the fight. In this case the leading company is reinforced by the second company as soon as the situation has become sufficiently clear. More frequently, the battalion commander will send only a single company into action, retaining the others for the time being under cover.

The =advance guard battalion= of a regiment will, as a rule, be compelled to develop considerable fire in a _rencontre_ (par. 357 German I. D. R.), in order to check the advance of the enemy, and for this purpose it will frequently place two companies into action at once. But since the battalion commander cannot count upon reinforcements and, moreover, as he does not know on which flank the combat is subsequently going to develop, he will provisionally retain the other two companies in rear of the center, or echelon them in rear of both flanks. (See “a” and “b” above figure).

In a =containing action= one should endeavor to employ few rifles but, on the other hand, expend much ammunition, and keep supports and reserves far in rear so as to minimize the losses. If the force is to deploy first of all only for fire action, but is later to participate in the decisive attack, it will be advisable to place two companies in the first line, one in the second, and one in the third. The companies in the second and third lines will then be less exposed to hostile fire, and the battalion commander will be able, by first launching one and then the other company, to exercise an influence on the course of the action during a longer period than would otherwise be possible. (See “b”).

=When a battalion is fighting as part of a larger force=, and when both its flanks are secure, it will need only supports for feeding the frontal attack (par. 289 German I. D. R.) and can cover a greater front. A reserve may either be entirely dispensed with, or made very weak.

When only one flank of the battalion is secure, the threatened flank should be protected by echeloning the supports and the reserve in rear of it. In this position, these echelons are not so apt to be bullet-stops as when they are placed in rear of the center. Besides, they can more easily execute enveloping movements and can take a hostile flank attack in flank. When both flanks are in the air, only the most essential precautions should be taken on the one flank, while on the other everything available is united for the decisive attack.

In =defense=, three companies can sometimes be taken into the first line for the purpose of developing a strong fire, while the fourth company is held in rear of a threatened flank or in rear of the center. (See “d”). When it is desired to employ the reserve offensively, only one or two companies are placed in the first line, the others being held in reserve in rear of the flank which is to take the offensive. Interval and distance increase with the size of this reserve.

When a battalion from the reserve is called upon to make an immediate attack which has been prepared by the fire of other troops, all its companies may be taken at once into the first line. In this case the battalion may be formed for attack with its companies at close intervals. This might also be a suitable combat formation for night operations. All these formations are subject to change however, as soon as the proper utilization of cover makes it necessary.

The general principles stated for a battalion are also applicable to a =regiment=. The regiment may either be directly formed for attack, or the heads of the battalions may be deflected toward the points where the deployment is to take place. An interval of 300-400 m. between heads of battalions is best calculated to facilitate the subsequent deployment. The distances depend upon the nature of the ground and the purpose of the combat.

The regimental commander assigns tasks to his battalion commanders, but leaves the latter entire freedom of action in regard to the formation to be taken up and the manner of deploying. He should interfere with companies only in exceptional cases. Such interference is justified only when the conduct of subordinate leaders threatens to impair unity of action in the combat and when time is lacking to observe the proper channels in communicating an order.

In developing the =brigade=[220] for action, the depth of column begins to exert an influence. Every concentration of the brigade retards its entry into action. If the longest distance to be covered in developing the brigade is assigned to the leading element of the column, the march into action will be accelerated.

[220] For historical references in regard to the importance in
action of the brigade, see essay published in _Jahrbücher für
Armee und Marine_ (August-September number of 1877) entitled, _Die
Infanterie-Brigade in ihrer Entwicklung aus der Brigade von 1812_. In
regard to the employment of the regiments in line or in echelon, see
MOLTKE, _Kritische Aufsätze sur Geschichte des Feldzuges von 1866_.
MOLTKE’S _Taktisch-Strategische Aufsätze_, p. 99, et seq.

When an infantry brigade approaching the battlefield is to prolong the flank of the fighting line, its entry into action might be hastened, perhaps, by letting the rear regiment continue the march in the original direction while the leading regiment takes the longer route. The rear regiment would then be abreast of the leading one after about 15 minutes. If the battalions are subsequently developed on radiating lines, the development of the whole force will, after a few minutes, have progressed far enough to permit a deployment of skirmishers.

When the brigade takes up a combat formation, each regiment is assigned a separate task (attack of a point, or defense of a section). If the tasks assigned are definite and harmonize with each other, mutual coöperation will be assured. The brigade commander ordinarily sends his orders to the regimental commanders, but, when circumstances (haste, correction of errors) compel him to depart from this rule, he should inform those officers of the action taken. In a brigade consisting of two regiments, its commander, in order to be able to influence the action, will be compelled to retain at least one battalion as a reserve.

Brigades of three regiments[221] (each of three battalions) have an advantage in this respect. But if such an increase in infantry units were contemplated, it would be better, for reasons that will be given later on,[222] to form the additional troops into a third division in each army corps.

[221] The British division consists of twelve battalions formed
into three brigades.

In the United States the three unit organization is most clearly
marked. The division consists of three brigades, each brigade
of three regiments, and each regiment of three battalions. The
battalions have a strength of only 400 men.

[222] _Taktik_ (_Kriegsgliederung_), III, p. 31, et seq.

Base Units.

The possibility of regulating the movements of a body of troops by means of a base unit, depends upon a number of preliminary conditions which will seldom be fulfilled in war:

1. _The leader of the base unit would have to remain unharmed to the very last._ If he were disabled the command of the unit would devolve upon the next in rank who would perhaps not join it in every case.

2. _The fresh organisation which imparts the impetus necessary for a further advance, would have to maintain the direction after the original base unit had ceased to exist on account of the mixing of organizations._

3. _The base unit would have to encounter less difficulties during its advance than the other units of the force._ If the base unit were to encounter greater difficulties than the other units, this might serve as an excuse for reducing the rate of advance. In attack, the organization nearest the enemy, in other words, the one that is led better and more energetically than the others, is quite naturally charged with maintaining the direction. Moreover, this organization will be able to facilitate by its fire the advance of the elements in rear.

The designation of a base unit[223] or unit of direction on the battlefield cripples the energy of an entire line and the initiative of the individual in favor of uniformity of movement. A base unit is only profitable in night operations, in crossing unfavorable ground (woods), and in bringing the fighting line up to the effective zone of hostile fire. “With the entry into action, the importance of the base company gradually decreases as the demands made by the combat increase”. (Par. 242 German I. D. R.). In all other cases, it is better to indicate either the objective on which the troops are to march, or the flank toward which they are to maintain connection.

[223] “A unit may also be designated upon which the others have
to regulate their movements without thereby being curbed in their
endeavor to advance (base unit of combat).” (Par. 371 German I. D. R.)

In France units of direction are prescribed (_la direction est
confidée aux unités qui suivent les chemins ou les lignes naturelles
du terrain_), but their duties are not given in detail. Units of
direction are also prescribed in Austria.

A _change of direction_ of march is executed by wheeling or turning with the subordinate units toward the new front. (Par. 185 German I. D. R.). A _change of front_ is effected in the same manner. With long lines, echeloning and movements by the flank will result, which can only be rectified gradually by issuing appropriate orders. When skirmishers have been deployed in a wrong direction, or when a deployment in another direction becomes necessary after the conclusion of a combat, it is advisable to deploy a new line in the desired direction, from the closed bodies still available, and to withdraw, at the same time, those parts of the former skirmish line which are no longer necessary.

Examples of Changes of Front.

1. Engagement at =Helmstedt=, on July 25th, 1866. The 20th Infantry
had to deploy to its left rear after its successful attack on the
Ütting Hill.[224]

[224] _Geschichte des Regiments Nr. 20_, p. 54.

2. The battalions of the XIth Army Corps wheeling toward the
=Niederwald= after crossing the Sauer (battle of =Wörth=).[225]

[225] _Gen. St. W._, I, p. 254, sketch p. 262.

3. The wheel executed by Kottwitz’ Brigade during the battle of
=Loigny-Poupry= (2nd Dec., 1870). (This is also cited as an example
of the conduct of a counter-attack made by the defender). Toward noon
the advance guard of the 17th Infantry Division held =Lumeau=. The
33rd Brigade, its battalions in double column, was concentrated south
of =Champdoux=. The division commander retained two battalions as a
reserve and ordered Major-General von Kottwitz “to execute a quarter
wheel to the right and to form his command for attack in the general
direction of Loigny,” for the purpose of relieving the pressure on
the Bavarians defending =Schlosz Goury=. The attack was directed
against the French Division Jauréguiberry, which was attacking
Schlosz Goury. This division first came under fire at 3-400 m. and
then approached to within about 150 m. of the defenders’ position;
strong reserves followed in rear of its right flank, but otherwise
nothing was done to protect the right.

By wheeling at once to the right, the right wing of Kottwitz’ Brigade
would still have struck the eastern garden wall of Schlosz Goury,
and, as Loigny had been indicated to the general as the objective, a
fan-shaped extension of the brigade, precluding mutual coöperation,
would have been unavoidable. The general had fourteen companies
at his disposal and decided to advance in a southerly direction
until his second line overlapped the most advanced hostile line, so
that the attack as planned would have struck simultaneously both
the first and second lines of the enemy. The slight loss of time
involved caused the general no uneasiness, as he could carry out
his intentions without interference beyond range of the fire of the
enemy, whom he could observe during the entire movement. The brigade
formed for attack, during its movement to the south, when about 1200
m. from Goury. The general, who was on the right flank, halted the
brigade after it had advanced far enough, and wheeled it to the right.

As the second line overlapped the first, the Füsilier Battalion of
the 76th Infantry had to shorten its step until the 2nd and 3rd
Companies of the same regiment had come abreast and until the 6th
and 8th Companies of the 75th Infantry had also joined the line. The
center half-battalion, (2nd and 3rd Companies of the 76th Infantry),
the unit of direction, was ordered to march on the church spire of
Loigny. All the units of the force, with the exception of the IInd
Battalion, 76th Infantry, at once deployed lines of skirmishers. The
1st and 4th Companies, 76th Infantry, and 5th Company, 75th Infantry,
covered the left flank and turned toward Ecuillon. Of the eleven
companies launched in this flank attack, six were in the first line
(approximately 1100 rifles on a front of 800 m.), and five in the
second.

The bulk of the second line, in an endeavor to close with the enemy
quickly, joined the firing line when 400 m. from the enemy. The
attack came as a complete surprise to the French; their lines were
taken in flank, and all their attempts to form new defensive lines to
oppose the onslaught of the Hansards proved unavailing. The dense,
unwieldy masses of the French were more and more crowded together by
the uninterrupted advance of the Hansards and offered good objectives
to the German marksmen. The advance of the brigade was supported by
the artillery in position near Lumeau. This artillery followed the
brigade to Ecuillon.

The Hansards traversed a distance of 3500 m. during this attack. The
right wing and the bulk of the 2nd and 3rd Companies, 76th Infantry,
which had been detailed as the unit of direction, with orders to
march on the church spire of Loigny, strayed to Fougon; the left wing
penetrated into Loigny.[226]

[226] See HÖNIG, _Volkskrieg_, IV, p. 80; also KUNZ, _Loigny_, p.
105.

4. The advance of six battalions of the IIIrd Army Corps against the
=Forbach Hill= (=Spicheren=).[227]

[227] _Gen. St. W._, I. p. 356.

4. DISTRIBUTION IN DEPTH AND FRONTAGE OF COMBAT FORMATIONS.[228]

[228] See _Taktik_, V, _Gefechtslehre_, p. 38.

The infantry combat is decided by the combined action of long firing lines. Retained forces, not launched against the enemy for the purpose of crushing him, exert no influence whatever on the decision, since they only increase losses without contributing to the fire effect. In the battles of the past, distribution in depth at the decisive stage of the combat (unless necessary as a measure of precaution, in securing the flanks, for example), was only permissible so long as the short range of the weapons allowed reserves to be kept in readiness so close to the firing line that they could assault _en masse_ at once and without any diminution of their strength. The deciding factor, which rested in retained reserves during the Napoleonic era, lies at present in the firing line.[229]

[229] The French still entertain a contrary opinion.

=Distribution in depth= _is, therefore, only a means to an end; an expedient made use of to maintain a dense firing line permanently at a constant strength; to give the firing line the impetus for the assault; to protect it against a reverse; and to secure its flanks. Victory is assured only by the simultaneous employment of superior fighting forces. A force should go into action in a deep combat formation, but it must extend its front during the fight._ To launch an insufficient number of troops for combat and to reinforce them gradually is a fatal error, as we are thereby compelled to fight a superior force continually with an inferior one, without being able to take advantage of the superiority which we may actually possess.

The Russian attacks in the battles around =Plevna= are very
instructive in this respect. On July 30th, 1877, the =Grivica=
intrenchments were attacked by two columns consisting of nine
battalions. The Ist and IInd Battalions of the 121st Infantry
succeeded in reaching the trench, but then the attack failed. The
IIIrd Battalion then attacked, with a similar result Thereupon the
IInd and IIIrd Battalions of the 123rd Infantry were launched, but
these also only succeeded in reaching the edge of the ditch of the
trench. The attack of the left column proceeded in a similar manner,
likewise that made by the reserves. An attack made simultaneously by
the entire force undoubtedly would have been successful.[230]

[230] _Russisch-Türkischer Krieg_ (_Gen. St. W._), German
Translation, III, pp. 254 and 264.

On September 11th, 1877, after the attack made by the 63rd and 117th
Infantry Regiments on the =Omar Bey Tabia= had been repulsed, the
64th and 118th Infantry Regiments of the IVth Army Corps, and the
31st Infantry Division of the IXth Army Corps (the last mentioned
force was not under the orders of the commander of the IVth Army
Corps) were placed in readiness for a renewed attack at 3 P. M. In
spite of the heavy losses (42 and 49%) and the fact that the failure
of the first attack had demonstrated that such a small force was
insufficient for taking the Turkish work, only two regiments were
again sent forward to the attack (in other words, 6 battalions
instead of 18). When this assault had also been repulsed, and
one regiment from the reserve had in addition been thrown in, 6
battalions of the 15 still intact, were again sent forward, but they
likewise failed to take the work. A regiment began its attack only
when the preceding one had been repulsed with loss. The 24 battalions
lost 115 officers and 4319 men. A timely reinforcement by troops in
reserve would have averted a reverse at any rate, and a simultaneous
employment of adequate forces would have assured the success of the
Russian infantry.[231]

[231] KUROPATKIN-KRAHMER, _Kritische Rückblicke auf den
Russisch-Türkischen Krieg_, I, p. 211.

The same thing occurred at =Gorni-Dubniac=. As the Russians, who
advanced on a broad front, did not attack simultaneously, the weak
garrison of the trenches was able to concentrate its fire on the
isolated attacking groups which followed each other.

The same peculiar feature, namely, small frontage with insufficient
fire power and strong reserves, was frequently observed during the
battles in the =Russo-Japanese war=. On the left flank, at =Wafangu=
(15th June, 1904), the 1st East Siberian Rifle Division advanced
with one battalion of the 2nd Regiment and one of the 3rd in the
first line, with four battalions in the second line, and with three
battalions of the 1st Regiment in the third line. A full development
of the fire power of the division did not take place at all.[232] The
2nd and 3rd Regiments, in all about 6000 men, lost 49 officers and
1464 men. The 1¹⁄₂ batteries attached to the division were shot to
pieces in a short time and fell into the hands of the Japanese.

[232] LÖFFLER, _Russisch-Japanischer Krieg_, I, p. 56.

Distribution in depth is necessary during the preparatory stage of the fight, as it enables the commander to meet unexpected developments in the situation. Moreover, it is justifiable so long as the information in regard to the strength and intentions of the enemy is insufficient. When reconnaissance work is not thoroughly performed, the force may be obliged to deploy in a direction other than the one originally chosen. This will be difficult to do as changes of front and movements by the flank can only be made when the front is narrow. Moreover, after a force is once deployed within the zone of hostile fire, it is committed to the direction chosen and can only move straight to the front. Considerable changes of front can only be executed by the lines in rear. The troops held in rear are to reinforce the firing line and to increase its density to the maximum at the decisive moment. As the losses are smaller in defense than in attack, a force can cover a broader front and keep its supports in closer proximity to the firing line in the former than in the latter case, especially if it was able to strengthen its position. The reserve, however, should be kept at a greater distance from the firing line than in attack, in order that it may retain complete freedom of movement--in covering the retreat, or in making a counter-attack--and may not be involved in the fire fight.

The reserves of the attacker are to protect the flanks, give the impetus for the assault, serve as a force upon which the attacking line can rally, and cover the re-forming of the troops after a successful attack. The several echelons of the attack formation, except the small fractions immediately supporting the firing line[233] and covering its flanks, should have become merged with that line by the time the decisive moment of the combat arrives. The commander who takes up an unnecessarily deep attack formation dispenses with an advantage; on the other hand, the one who prematurely deploys in force, exposes himself to grave danger. _The troops should be sent into action in a deep combat formation, since the firing line is to be fed from the rear until the decisive moment arrives, but every available man should be thrown in for the assault._

[233] The advantage of having such supporting forces in rear of the
line is clearly shown in the fights of the 18th Brigade at Wörth.
KUNZ, _Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, 14, pp. 110, 129 and 172.

=Distribution in depth and frontage= are interdependent; the greater the frontage, the less the distribution in depth, and vice versa. In every deployment for action the following question awaits solution by the troop leader: “How deep ought the formation to be and how great an extension of front is allowable.” The result of the combat depends in many cases upon a happy answer to this question. Broad combat formations have great initial energy, facilitate turning and flank movements, but their energy is not constant when the means are not available to replace casualties. In addition, the difficulty of leading, the danger of the line being penetrated, and the weakness of the flanks grow apace with the extension of front. Distribution in depth makes it possible to initiate the combat with a part of the force and to get information of the situation; to fight the action with another part of the force in accordance with this information; and, finally, to bring about the decision and reap the fruits of that decision with the third part. A deep combat formation enables the leader to exercise a constant influence on the course of action; it gives him the means with which to execute turning movements or to repulse them--something which would be entirely impossible, or, at any rate, only possible under great difficulties, with troops deployed in the first line. As only a limited number of rifles can be brought into play in a deep combat formation, it is obvious that this is an element of weakness of which an opponent deployed on a broader front, may take advantage.

Although the danger of going too far in distributing a force in depth is not inconsiderable, this is, at any rate, a smaller error than the opposite extreme, that of deploying troops, from the very start, on too broad a front.

At noon on August 6th, 1870, General von François received an order
for his brigade to dislodge the hostile artillery posted on the
=Roten Berg= of the =Spicheren Heights=,[234] it being assumed that
only insignificant hostile forces were in front. The other brigade
of the 14th Division was expected to be able to take part in the
action in about three hours. When the attacking force was 2000 m.
from its objective, the IInd Battalion, 74th Infantry, and the IIIrd
Battalion, 39th Infantry, were set in motion against the French right
flank, while the Ist Battalion and the Füsilier Battalion of the 74th
Infantry were retained as a reserve. The brigade accordingly covered
a front of about 4000 m. While the frontal attack on the Roten Berg
was undoubtedly difficult,[235] this wide extension, which made all
leading impossible, increased the difficulties still further. In the
first place, the brigade commander led his two reserve battalions
against the Roten Berg and fell finally while leading a company. The
brigade was too weak to carry out the task imposed upon it. The 28th
Brigade, which followed, came into action at various points of the
battlefield, so that the two brigades became mixed, thus considerably
increasing the difficulties of leading. At 3 P. M., the following
troops were in the first line on the right wing:[236]

I. Bn. II. Bn. 1. 2. and ¹⁄₂3. Cos. 4. and 1. Cos.
-------- ------------ -------------------- --------------
53. Inf. ~=74. Inf.=~ ~=74. Inf.=~ 77. Inf.

10. 11. and 12. Cos. ¹⁄₂3. Co.
-------------------- ------------
~=39. Inf.=~ ~=74. Inf.=~

[234] _Gen. St. W._, I, p. 310.

[235] _Gen. St. W._, I, p. 318.

[236] The units printed in heavy type belong to the 27th Brigade.
The 4th Company of the 74th Infantry was separated by 2.5 km., as the
crow flies, from the left flank of its battalion.

The following troops were in the second line:

Füsilier Bn. 2. and 3. Cos.[237] II. Bn. and Füsilier Bn.
------------ ------------------- ------------------------
53. Inf. 77. Inf. 77. Inf.

[237] These two companies were separated by about 1 km. from the
other companies of their battalion.