Chapter XV: Part 15

[377] It is only necessary to invite attention to the first attacks
made by the Prussian Guard against St. Privat, and to the attack made
by the 72nd, 40th and 11th Infantry Regiments against the height
of Maison Blanche south of Rezonville, on August 16th, 1870. KUNZ,
_Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, 8-10, p. 128.

For carrying out the attack itself, it is immaterial whether the commander launches it against the hostile front or a hostile flank; individual companies, battalions, and, in large units, regiments, finally make a frontal attack anyway. The fear of the front of the enemy should not lead the enveloping force to attempt to execute another enveloping movement when it encounters a newly formed front. Surprise is, to a certain extent, essential to the success of a flank attack.[378] The troops holding the enemy in front [secondary attack] must, therefore, hold him in such a manner as to keep him in ignorance about the true point of attack, must so engage his attention that he will finally place the bulk of his force into the frontal action. If this does not occur, the opponent will soon distinguish sham from reality and will not oppose a weak, inactive containing force with more troops than are absolutely necessary. In this connection, compare the conduct of the 1st Army at Königgrätz and of the Prussian Vth Army Corps at Wörth with the vacillating action of the Russian IIIrd and Ist Armies at Sandepu.[379] So long as the enemy is not firmly held in front, he will be able to evade an envelopment by withdrawing. The combats of the Boers in the Orange Free State furnish numerous examples of this fact. The Austrian regulations have very properly coined the term “attack on two fronts”, which better indicates the task of both parts of an attacking force.

[378] The attack of the Guard at Chlum (Königgrätz). V.
LETTOW-VORBECK, II, p. 474. The assault and capture of the hill of
Forbach at Spicheren by six battalions of the IIIrd Army Corps. _Gen.
St. W._, I. p. 356. The assault and capture of the Mont de Brune
(Beaumont) by 6¹⁄₂ Prussian companies, which were followed by 4²⁄₃
companies more. The hill mentioned was defended by 6 battalions and 3
batteries; 6 guns were captured. HOPFFGARTEN-HEIDLER, _Beaumont_, pp.
132 and 227.

[379] _Taktik_. V. p. 42.

Whether the decisive blow is directed against the front or a flank, depends upon the result of the fire. The advantages offered by an enveloping movement must not lead to holding the enemy once and for all in front, while the main attack is directed against his flank. A frontal attack made in conjunction with a threatening demonstration against the hostile flank frequently offers far greater prospects of success.[380] If a superiority is to be employed to advantage, an envelopment must be made; all objections advanced against the “enveloping craze” are disposed of by this statement.[381] “A condition precedent to an envelopment is that the enemy be held in front. For this purpose a determined demonstration is most effective.” (Par. 392 German I. D. R.).

[380] The attack on Flanville, on September 1st, 1870, is an
instructive example. KUNZ, _Noisseville_, p. 87. _Gen. St. W._, II.
p. 1407.

[381] V. D. GOLTZ, _Das Volk in Waffen_, pp. 328 and 332. BLUME,
_Strategie_, p. 170. MECKEL, _Truppenführung_, p. 221.

The risks involved in an envelopment must not be overlooked--overextension and dispersion of the troops;[382] the possibility that the troops fighting in front and those fighting on the flank, separated from each other, may be defeated in detail, whether this be brought about by the defender assuming the offensive, or by the force holding the enemy in front allowing itself to be enticed into making a premature advance and suffering a defeat before the envelopment has a chance to become effective.

[382] The attack made by François’ Brigade during the battle of
Spicheren. _Gen. St. W._, I. p. 318. Between 12 and 1 o’clock, this
brigade covered a front of 4000 m. See p. 262, supra.

“The envelopment is effected in the simplest manner if the forces designated for this task, when still at a distance from the enemy, are given a march direction that will bring them against the hostile flank.

“When initiated during the development for action or when carried out by retained reserves, the envelopment is much more difficult.” (Par. 393 German I. D. R.).

In the last-mentioned case it may happen that the force detailed to make the flank attack strikes the enemy’s front instead of his flank. The same is true of attempts to envelop with parts of the infantry of the first line that are already deployed, perhaps already engaged, when the terrain is not specially favorable for such a movement. Such movements may, in special cases, be carried out at night. (Enveloping movements of the divisions of the Japanese IIIrd Army at Mukden). As a rule, this brings about only an overlapping and flanking of the parts of the hostile position next adjacent to the wing making the movement, but does not produce a concentric effect on the hostile flank. Yet, even weak detachments that reach positions from which they are able to enfilade the enemy, facilitate the advance to the front.

In starting an enveloping movement when at a considerable distance from the enemy, the force which is to make it, is directed upon a point located in rear of the hostile position, approximately where his reserves are presumed to be. If then the fighting line is further extended toward the outer flank, the assailant avoids facing the hostile front directly, and will almost invariably have a start over the defender in extending the threatened wing. The troops still in the act of withdrawing from the route column naturally take charge of the protection of the flanks.[383]

[383] Compare the deployment for action of the 1st Guard Division
at Königgrätz with that of the 4th Japanese Division at Wafangu. In
the last-mentioned case, the leading (10th) brigade was launched
in a very skillful flank attack; the second brigade took charge of
protecting the flank.

If a flank march in front of the enemy should become necessary, it can be undertaken with sufficient safety only when proper preparations have been made--distribution in depth, shortening of route columns, due regard being had to protection of the front and flanks--to permit a deployment of the force at the right moment and in a suitable formation toward the hostile side.[384] Within effective range of the enemy, such a movement by the flank can be carried out only when cover is available, otherwise the hostile fire will very quickly force the troops making the flank march to face to the front.[385]

[384] V. SCHLICHTING. _Taktische und strategische Grundsätze_,
I, p. 90, et seq. The attack of the six Brandenburg battalions
against the Hill of Forbach (Spicheren) is especially instructive
in this connection. The attacking force was threatened by hostile
troops lodged in the Stiring Wald. The first deployment caused the
attacking force to face toward the front of the French position.
As soon as this was noticed, the skirmishers were withdrawn in
order to be pushed into the fight again at another place. GERNIER,
_Einmarschkämpfe_, p. 184.

[385] Look up the conduct of the 22nd Infantry Division at
Villermain-Cravant, on December 8th, 1870. It is indeed true that a
violent snow storm and thick weather made it possible for this force
to disengage itself from the enemy and to join the 1st Bavarian Army
Corps at Cravant.

The attempt of the 16th Infantry Division to envelop the French
position on the =Hallue=[386]: The 30th Brigade used the road leading
along the hostile front from Querrieux to Frechencourt, for its
movement. The leading regiment of the brigade, the 28th Infantry,
on debouching from Querrieux, immediately faced toward the annoying
flanking fire and endeavored to advance in the face of it, while the
brigade commander, energetically carrying out the orders given him,
led the 68th Infantry toward Frechencourt, thus forestalling several
French battalions that were hurrying up from the east. The village
was occupied and held by the 68th Infantry, but a frontal offensive
movement against the hostile main position could not be carried out
from here either, in spite of the inferiority of the French troops.

[386] V. MALACHOWSKI, _Frontalschlacht und Flügelschlacht_, p.
24, et seq. KUNZ, _Nordarmee_, I, p. 134, et seq. In regard to the
conduct of the 15th Infantry Division, which was to hold the enemy in
front and which advanced prematurely before the enveloping movement
of the 16th Division had become effective, consult p. 282 supra, and
_Taktik_, V. p. 163.

Whether an enveloping force can be sent into action at once without being first placed in a preparatory position[387] or whether it should first be concentrated, depends upon the situation of the troops engaged in front with the enemy (the necessity of relieving the pressure on the Ist Army engaged in front with the enemy at Königgrätz), and upon the counter-measures taken by the enemy. If the assailant encounters a newly formed front, it would be a mistake for him to attack successively with the different units.

[387] According to the opinion of General V. SCHLICHTING, a
preparatory position should be taken up. _Taktische und strategische
Grundsätze_, III, pp. 133 and 154, et seq. See _Taktik_, V, p. 174.

Whether the troops holding the enemy in front participate in the assault during an enveloping movement, depends upon circumstances. They may frequently better ensure the success of the attack by delivering an enfilading fire than by advancing. The commander should, at any rate, not lose sight of this advantage. If both groups (the enveloping and the holding group) advance to the decisive attack, they should do so simultaneously. The group holding the enemy in front must resist the temptation of moving to the front before the envelopment can become effective.[388]

[388] Consult _Der 18. August_, pp. 377, 561 and 590. In regard to
the attack made by the Guard and the Saxons and the premature attack
made by the Guard at St Privat.

The attack on =Ste. Marie aux Chênes=, on August 18th, 1870,[389] and
that made by the 37th Infantry Brigade on =Ladon=[390] are models
worthy of imitation. “The brigade commander personally directed
Lieutenant-Colonel v. Hagen (commanding the troops holding the enemy
in front) to have the signal ‘forward double time’ sounded as soon
as he could see the skirmishers of the 78th Infantry coming over the
heights to the right front.”

[389] The 1st Infantry Division of the Guard received orders “to
form for attack against St. Privat, but not to attack that village
before the expected arrival of the Saxon Corps.” _Der 18. August_,
pp. 167 and 288.

[390] HÖNIG, _Gefechtsbilder_, III, pp. 58 and 49.

At =Gorni Dubniac=, on October 30th, 1877, the scheme of designating
the moment for attack by means of artillery salvos, failed. During
the attack on =Scheinovo=, on January 9th, 1878, the simultaneous
advance of Prince Mirski’s troops was regulated by the clock.

If the attacker desires to deliver an effective blow against the enemy’s flank, _a considerable interval must be left between the troops charged with the holding attack_ [secondary attack] _and those detailed to make the flank attack_, when the envelopment is initiated. (Par. 393 German I. D. R.). The width of this gap is increased to a seemingly dangerous degree by the range of modern weapons, but real danger is not to be apprehended as a counter-attack of the defender exposes both of his flanks to an enveloping attack. If the enveloping group continues to advance, that advance in itself will very soon set a limit to the enemy’s counter-attack. The seemingly dangerous gap in the line, at the commencement of an action, is closed more and more as the enemy is approached. Nevertheless, this gap may induce a cautious leader to draw the enveloping group closer to the frontal group, thereby impairing the effectiveness of the envelopment. The flanking groups accomplish the best results, but in following up tactical objectives, they should never lose sight of the annihilation of the enemy. The difficulty of coördinating the action of the separated parts of the line is greater than the danger to be apprehended from a hostile counter-attack against the frontal group. As a rule, the entry of the enveloping group into action will be the signal for a general attack. The effectiveness of the enveloping attack is proportional to the energy with which it is made, but the danger to be apprehended from a hostile counter-attack increases in the same ratio.

Provisions of Various Regulations.

=Austria.= When possible, the reserve is to be designated to make the
enveloping movement. (Par. 407 Austrian I. D. R.). When practicable,
a part of the reserve is employed from the start for the envelopment,
and, under certain circumstances, also for the purpose of gaining
positions from which an enfilade fire can be delivered, and for
supporting the advance of the frontal attack. The group holding
the enemy in front may at first fight a purely defensive action to
prevent a hostile counter-attack, to screen our own dispositions, and
finally, by means of a fire fight at effective ranges, to hold the
hostile troops in their position.

=France.= The envelopment is occasionally mentioned in the
regulations (for example in pars. 290, 301 and 302). The Field
Service Regulations, in discussing the attack, whose different stages
may vary in length depending upon the intentions of the commander,
state, however, that the attacker “may assail a wing or a flank of
the enemy, with superior forces, for the purpose of annihilating him.”

=England.= The importance of flank attacks, even those in which
the defender is subdued by the flanking fire of mounted troops, is
specially mentioned, but, in this connection, it is emphasized that
it is immaterial whether the attack is finally directed against
the front or a flank of the enemy. The holding attack is to be
carried out with energy in front to prevent the enemy from drawing
reinforcements to other points.

=Italy.= While the regulations of 1891 still unqualifiedly
acknowledged that any frontal attack might succeed, the regulations
of 1903 called attention to the importance of the envelopment,
without denying “that the frontal attack might be the decisive one.”
Surprise is an advantageous factor for success, and for this reason,
even covering troops, for example, may have to be dispensed with on
the march.

If a force desires to take the enemy by surprise, it must carefully
take advantage of the ground. The surprise may be made more complete,
if the accompanying frontal attack is energetically pushed. On the
other hand, considerations for the troops in the holding attack, set
a limit to the extension of the flanking movement. The fire power of
the troops in the holding attack must not be exhausted, or the troops
themselves defeated by a hostile counter-attack, before the moment of
the general advance arrives. They must pay the strictest attention to
the course of events on the opponent’s side; if the enemy retires, or
shifts parts of his force in order to meet a flank attack, the troops
in the holding attack must act with energy. If such signs are not
apparent, a frontal advance will, as a rule, be proper only when the
pressure of the flank attack makes itself felt on the enemy’s line.
This is the only way in which “simultaneous action by both attacks
may be ensured, and this is of decisive importance to the successful
issue of the combat.”

7. REMOVAL OF PACKS.

It is advisable for infantry to remove packs for an attack; such tremendous physical exertions await the troops that everything ought to be done to reduce the load carried by the individual man.[391] “As soon as it becomes doubtful whether the troops will be able to perform the task assigned them in action without such relief, all independent commanders, and, in organizations larger than a regiment, commanders of regiments and of higher units, have authority to order the men to remove their packs. In issuing such an order they should bear in mind the disadvantages which may result from leaving the packs behind. When knapsacks are removed, the ammunition and iron rations should be taken from them. Overcoats, cooking utensils, canteens, bread bags, and intrenching tools remain on the men.” (Par. 301 German I. D. R.).

[391] Examples from military history in _Militär-Wochenblatt_,
1902, No. 32.

According to the French Manual of Field Engineering, the skirmishers, especially when intrenching, may utilize the knapsack as cover.

In a defeat knapsacks will frequently be lost. Thus the Russians, after the second battle of Plevna, and Frossard’s Corps, after the battle of Spicheren, lost their knapsacks with camp equipment and iron rations, and, in consequence thereof, suffered great hardships during the succeeding days. On the other hand, during their retreat, the 43rd, 44th and 45th Infantry Regiments of the Ist Army Corps managed to recover without trouble the packs which they had removed before entering the battle of Trautenau.

The infantry of the Xth Army Corps had left its knapsacks behind
on August 8th, 1870, and did not get them again until the early
part of September. The knapsacks were not hauled on wagons after
the organizations, but were left at the railroad station of St.
Ingbert. On August 6th, 1870, the Würtemberg Field Brigade had left
its knapsacks in a bivouac near Reimersweiler at the risk of never
seeing them again. Among other reasons, General v. d. Tann considered
it impossible for the 2nd Bavarian Division to advance beyond Wörth,
because the organizations might perhaps thereby have been separated
for several days from their baggage, which they had left behind
between Preuschdorf and Görsdorf.

When knapsacks are removed, a detachment will have to be left behind to guard them, otherwise they may be robbed of their contents.[392] The troops always consider the trip to the rear to get the baggage a special hardship; wagons will very rarely be available for this purpose, as after great battles all the wagons in the entire neighborhood will be requisitioned for transporting the wounded, and as supply wagons will, as a rule, not be at hand.

[392] This was neglected by the 20th and 35th Infantries, on August
16th, 1870.

8. THE EMPLOYMENT OF MACHINE GUNS.

In an attack upon a defensive position which is held in force, machine gun batteries will generally be held in rear for the time being. They form a mobile reserve in the hands of the commander-in-chief, who may employ it for quickly reinforcing threatened points, for exerting a pressure upon the wings and flanks of the enemy, and for preparing the assault. Machine gun companies, either broken up into platoons or not, as the case may be, endeavor to reach positions from which they can facilitate the advance of their infantry.

It is especially advantageous if the fire that is directed upon the point where the hostile position is to be penetrated, comes from a position permitting a good view, or from an oblique direction, because the fire will not have to be discontinued even when the infantry continues its advance or moves to the assault. If such a position, permitting the greatest fire effect, is reached (at about 800 m. or less from the hostile position) any further advance of the machine guns is faulty, because it interrupts the fire and necessitates fresh laying and adjustment.

Upon the victorious termination of a fight, the machine guns should participate in the first stages of the pursuit by making an extended use of their fire. They hurry forward into the captured position, as soon as it is apparent that the victory has been gained, in order to support the infantry in holding the position, to cover the infantry while it is re-forming, and to reduce the last vestige of the enemy’s resistance. If the attack fails the machine guns cover the retiring troops.

9. THE CONDUCT OF THE ATTACK.

In an infantry attack, the art of minor troop leading consists of pushing a firing line, superior to the enemy, to the strip of ground from which the power of our rifle can be utilized to the best advantage for vanquishing the enemy; secondly, of bringing up supports, without exposing them to unnecessary losses, so that they will be promptly available in case of need. The preparations which the enemy has made for attaining the maximum fire power (by intrenching, placing ammunition in readiness, and by ascertaining ranges) must be offset by employing a superior number of rifles. The commander who brings a greater number of rifles into action than his opponent, may count on gaining a superiority of fire quickly and with certainty.

The task of higher troop leading consists of simultaneously launching the troops against the common objective.

The effect of modern projectiles requires that, on open ground, the first deployment be made when 4000-5000 m. from the enemy. The best scheme would be to advance, without halting, to within decisive short range of the defender, and then to open fire, but, as previously stated, the defender should endeavor to prevent the assailant from ever reaching these ranges. This design of the defender must be frustrated; if artillery is unable to accomplish this, machine guns or a part of the infantry must enter the fight; but all parts of the force not required for this fire fight at medium ranges should continue their movement without interruption.

The most difficult task that infantry may be called upon to perform consists of advancing over an open plain, in the face of unsubdued artillery, when the situation does not permit night or the effect of an envelopment to be awaited.

The first deployment as skirmishers is made for the purpose of protecting the advancing troops against surprise. Frequently, a squad or a section per company will suffice for this purpose, but these units should cover the entire front available for the organization to which they belong. A uniform and simultaneous advance along the whole line is impossible however, on account of the diversity of the ground at various points. When cover is available, skirmish lines may be formed quickly and pushed forward as entities, but when cover is lacking, firing lines may have to be deployed slowly and piecemeal. The unit that has pushed farthest to the front must facilitate with its fire the advance of those who have encountered greater obstacles in advancing.

Long, dense firing lines and the supports following them are exposed to such heavy losses in open country, even at long ranges, that their advance will soon hesitate. Moreover, the defender will only fire on targets whose size and density promise a great number of hits. Therefore, the assailant should endeavor to lead his infantry forward in loose, disconnected skirmish lines, which are difficult for the enemy to hit. As a rule, the assailant should not open fire until after he has been reinforced and has sufficient fire power available. (Par. 334 German I. D. R.). The situation in which these thin firing lines are placed is by no means a favorable one, as the defender will concentrate his fire on the points where the assailant seems to be filling up his line “for the purpose of overwhelming the defender permanently by a superiority of fire.” (Par. 413 German I. D. R.). The skirmishers will then quite naturally open fire for the purpose of interfering with the cool delivery of the defender’s fire.

Such a piecemeal, almost independent advance, during which the effect of the accustomed word of command is considerably reduced and control and supervision of the individual skirmisher is impossible, presupposes that the troops are well-drilled, individually trained, and, above all, intelligent. Attention must also be called to the fact that the firing line can offer but a weak resistance to an enemy advancing unexpectedly in force. But, in spite of these drawbacks, this mode of advance has its advantages for crossing a plain devoid of cover. It permits favorable fire positions to be reached with greater safety, especially if these positions can be picked out with the aid of field glasses, than would be the case if dense skirmish lines were led forward simultaneously.

The advance of the infantry under hostile fire, over open ground, may accordingly be conducted--

1. At a walk, by long rushes made by strong units (by platoons at least), supported by powerful artillery fire or by the fire of a machine gun battery or a detachment of skirmishers posted in a favorable position;

2. By shorter rushes made by smaller units (“proper only when conditions demand it”);

3. By crawling, or, in exceptional cases (for example in passing through fields of standing grain), by employing

4. Fire while in motion.

The fire fight at long ranges and near the extreme limit of mid ranges is only a means for the purpose of reaching the decisive battle ranges, and of interfering with the undisturbed delivery of the enemy’s fire. Fire must be opened at as late a moment as possible. Our firing line should in any case be strong enough, upon entering the zone of mid ranges, to reply effectively to the enemy’s fire. Experience has shown that an assailant who opens fire at “long” ranges rarely reaches short ranges. (See p. 149 supra).

The distances at which the echelons in rear follow the firing line should be less (as laid down in the Italian and Russian regulations) than the distance which separates the firing line of the attacker from that of the defender. The distances may be increased without danger at this stage of the combat, as the decision is not imminent, but on the flanks the supports will have to be brought up closer in order that an unexpected flank attack may be effectively opposed. All parts of the attacking force move--as long as possible at a walk--straight to the front. Subordinate leaders, taking advantage of all available cover, should endeavor to lead the supports skillfully after the firing line. This requires that the ground to be crossed be reconnoitered. As a rule, a movement by the flank upon leaving cover is costlier than an advance by squads or sections over open ground. Long lines make it easier for the hostile artillery to adjust and observe its fire, while, when a greater number of targets of smaller frontage is exposed, this is made more difficult. For this reason, supports are not led forward as entire units, but, on the contrary, they are broken up, and, under certain circumstances, even disintegrated into smaller units. The units following in rear remain as long as possible in close order formations, preferably in route columns. “Man is by nature exceedingly timid. Soldiers, even those drawn from the educated classes, who were fully aware of the supreme importance of gaining the victory, broke down on coming under fire. In close order the moral encouragement due to the proximity of superiors and comrades kept up their courage.” (Hessert).[393] Where cover is lacking, the supports will also have to be deployed. Large units are broken up into platoons, which deploy and follow each other at considerable distances.[394]

[393] “We are prone to place the individual on too high a pedestal,
and, in doing so, to ignore the psychological element of combat.”
Major-General Stieler.

[394] The losses sustained during the advance of the Russian
reserves at Plevna (11th September, 1877), and during the attack made
by the Guard on Gorni Dubniac, led to a spontaneous deployment on the
part of the reserves.

As soon as the enemy opens fire, platoon commanders must decide whether or not it ought to be returned; but the closer one can get to the enemy without firing a shot, the better. According to the German F. S. R. (par. 296), a prolonged, uninterrupted forward movement of skirmish lines in the open, at less than 1000 m. from the enemy, is possible only when supported by adequate fire. On the other hand, even skirmishers lying down suffer serious losses when 600 m. from the enemy.

Thus, at mid ranges, begins the actual, protracted fire fight, which, in the first place, is to make a further advance possible, and which, subsequently, is to produce a superiority of fire. As taught by experience, this cannot be accomplished from a single position, if the enemy is efficient.

A so-called “main firing position”, which was to be located 400-600
m. from the enemy, was frequently used during peace maneuvers for the
purpose of bringing cohesion and harmony into the attack. In making
use of such a position, the principal difficulty of every serious
infantry attack, that of crossing the space lying between the first
firing position and the assaulting position, was not appreciated.

=Austria.= (Par. 589 I. D. R.). “When conditions are very favorable,
it might be possible to choose the firing position in which the
decisive fire fight is to be begun, so close to the enemy that the
decision can be gained from it.”

The fire fight must be taken up by enough troops to make it impossible for the defender, who holds his position strongly, to gain a superiority of fire over some parts of the attacking force. The supports will now move closer to the firing line, in order to fill every gap in that line and to meet every attempt of the defender to gain the upper hand. The echelons of the second line which have not as yet been absorbed by the firing line, move up in a similar manner. If the hostile fire abates, parts of the firing line should endeavor to get closer to the enemy; they are followed by the next adjoining units. At this stage of the action the attacker will have to give up, to some extent, his distribution in depth.

Superiority of fire is an essential condition to victory. It is attained by better marksmanship, fire control and fire direction, by taking advantage of cover, and by concentrating a powerful fire against the decisive point. When the attacker’s troops are not well trained, a greater number of rifles and more ammunition will be required to gain this superiority. Accordingly, the attacker will either make an envelopment or employ fire of position. The attacker possesses a great advantage, in that he does not need to gain a superiority of fire along the whole front, but only at a single point. It suffices for him to contain weak portions of the hostile front with suitable, well concealed combat groups capable of quickly developing a powerful fire, while he masses the bulk of his forces against the decisive point. The defender, who never knows where the decisive blow is going to fall, ought not to allow himself to be enticed into occupying portions of his line more weakly than the rest.

The attainment of the superiority of fire requires time, and, in addition, coolness and patience on the part of the leaders. All the ammunition that is expended in gaining this superiority is later compensated for by fewer losses. The heavy losses sustained by the Prussian troops on the slopes of Point du Jour, on August 18th, 1870, may be traced directly to the fact that the leaders did not know how to wait.

Superiority of fire[395] is absolutely essential to the success of the attack. Any failure to appreciate this principle will lead to such heavy losses that even if the assailant were to reach the enemy’s position, he would be too weak to gain the victory.[396]

[395] For the situation of the British Guard at Modder River
(28th November, 1890), see p. 182 supra. The Guards were closely
hugging the ground at a distance of 800 m. from the enemy. After
29 ammunition carriers had been shot at the very beginning of the
engagement, all attempts to carry orders or ammunition to the firing
line were abandoned. No attempts were made to relieve the pressure by
means of the fire of sharpshooters, by bringing up reinforcements, or
by gaining ground by crawling.

[396] “Battles are won by the superiority of fire.” FREDERICK THE
GREAT in his _Military Testament_, 1768.

During the fluctuating fire fight, which lasts for hours, the attacker will have succeeded in working forward little by little until he is close to the enemy’s position. His superiority will now make itself felt; the fire from the part of the hostile line that is to be penetrated will begin to abate; and, at first, single groups, then several, and finally, whole units of the enemy’s line will commence to crumble away. The attacker should wait until this effect is produced before he begins the assault; if he does not do this, the attack is sure to fail.

_Austria._ (Par. 590 I. D. R.). “The close approach of a long firing line to an enemy who occupies a good position, may well pass as a proof of the assailant’s superiority. Nevertheless, this does not, under all circumstances, furnish assurance that a forward movement for the purpose of penetrating the hostile position will now succeed; a premature assault may still result in disaster. _As long as the conduct of the opponent does not show clear indications that his fire power is crippled, nothing remains for the attacker but to continue the fight for the superiority of fire._”

Even in this, mistakes are not precluded. It is far from easy to recognize when the defender of a position has been sufficiently subdued by fire to make an assault feasible, and when the proper moment has arrived for launching the reserves. It is only necessary to recall the premature advance of the artillery and cavalry over the ravine of the Mance brook, on August 18th, 1870.

The cessation of the defender’s fire, in itself, is not a sure sign that his firing line is shaken, as the attacker is unable to distinguish between a fire pause ordered by the commander on the defensive and the forced discontinuance of the fight. Sure indications are not available until men actually leave the defender’s fighting line here and there, and attempts of the leaders to hold the wavering ones are clearly apparent.

At this moment, a leader who has resolved to assault, should order bayonets fixed.

* * * * *

The temporary interruption of the fire occasioned by fixing bayonets is of no importance, as the superiority of fire has already been gained. If bayonets are prematurely ordered to be fixed, the accuracy of the fire will soon be impaired, as the firing of rifles, weighted down by the attached bayonets, increases the fatigue of the men. When the troops are excited, the downward deflection of the bullets caused by fixing the bayonet can, however, only produce a good effect. It is best to fix bayonets at the signal “Fix bayonet”. In the excitement prevailing at the moment, it will be impossible to execute the order with any uniformity, but it is a good plan, in time of peace, to require one man of each file to fire while the other one fixes his bayonet. The approaching reserves fix bayonets while on the march.

10. THE ASSAULT.

“The assault does not, strictly speaking, belong to the domain of tactics. Rules, showing in what formations and under what conditions the assault should be made in war, cannot be formulated. At any rate, fire tactics are not only an essential factor but also the crowning act of combat; the assault is nothing but the postlude. All modern combats show that the morale of the men suffers most, and that, in consequence thereof, troops deteriorate quickly when they are exposed to the annihilating effect of fire. This lesson was thoroughly learned by the Austrians in 1866, and by the Russians in front of Plevna. Of what avail were ‘self-sacrifice’, the ‘unconquerable determination to gain the victory’, the ‘desire for hand to hand conflict’, and all the other terms that are employed to prove that the moral factors are the decisive ones in war? That they are the decisive factors needs no proof whatever; it follows, as a matter of course, from uniform training, uniform leadership, and uniform arms. But tactics fit for use in war, are to furnish, above all else, ways and means, showing how and by what methods the fighting energy of troops may be preserved most effectively, and thus contribute directly toward preventing the premature deterioration of the morale of the troops.”[397]

[397] Colonel KEIM in _von Löbells Jahresberichte_, 1899, II, p.
561.

“The defeat of the opponent is consummated by the assault with fixed bayonets.” (Par. 324 German I. D. R.). A premature advance to the assault, with all the peculiar features attending it, produces an aversion against the attack, an undue extension of battle lines, and makes it impossible for reinforcements to come up, except under cover of darkness.

The decision for making the assault emanates either from the subordinate leaders in the firing line or from the commander of the whole force. The latter may give the impulse for the assault by launching the reserve. This is undoubtedly the safer procedure. “When the decision to assault emanates from the commanders in rear, notice thereof is given by sounding the signal ‘fix bayonet’, which must be repeated by all the units that are to take part in the assault. At this signal the skirmishers increase their fire to the utmost. The parts of the firing line which are still in rear, move forward, as quickly as possible, to a position close to the enemy. All reinforcements in rear hasten straight to the front. As soon as the leading line is to form for the assault, all the trumpeters sound the signal ‘forward, double time’, all the drummers beat their drums, and all parts of the force throw themselves with the greatest determination upon the enemy. It should be a point of honor with skirmishers not to allow the supports to overtake them earlier than the moment of penetrating the enemy’s position. When immediately in front of the enemy, the men should charge bayonet and, with a cheer, penetrate the position.” (Pars. 346-348 German I. D. R.).

It is very difficult for a superior commander to perceive when the proper moment for making the assault has arrived, as he is compelled to remain so far in rear of the fighting line, especially where large forces are concerned, that he can only follow the general course of the attack. The first indication which he receives as to whether the enemy’s fire power has been broken all along the line, is the advance of his own firing line. He will still more rarely be able to see in time when the resistance of the enemy abates at some one point, and it will be quite impossible for him to issue orders with sufficient promptness to turn such an advantage quickly to good account.[398]

[398] “The attack fed from the rear, which may be likened to the
closing of a telescope, is one of the most peculiar results of
constructive theory, which seeks, by this means, to increase the
energy of the first line, but only succeeds in massing too many men
in front of the enemy, a better condition than which the enemy could
not desire.” VON MALACHOWSKI, _Scharfe Taktik und Revue-Taktik_, p.
230. Incorrect estimate of the situation by the commander of the
Ist Army on August 18th, 1870. F. HÖNIG, _Vierundzwanzig Stunden
Moltkescher Strategie_, p. 145. _Der 18. August_, p. 271.

The firing line will, therefore, frequently have to take the initiative in bringing about the assault. It is absolutely necessary, especially if the enemy evacuates the position, that the firing line, quickly taking advantage of this moment, pass over to the bayonet attack. If the firing line were to wait until the reserves are up, valuable time would be lost, under certain circumstances; the enemy might recover from his temporary bewilderment and re-form, or might even receive reinforcements. In addition, hesitation on the part of the attacker would enable the enemy to gain time, evacuate the position unmolested, retire in good order, and perhaps take up a new position, or at least evade quickly the pursuing fire of the assailant. The firing line would be the first, in such a case, to perceive when and where the resistance of the enemy abates; it should therefore make the most of this knowledge and throw itself upon the part of the defender’s force that is in the act of withdrawing.

When the impulse for the assault emanates from the firing line, there is danger that instead of a general attack only a local one will result. It is impossible to conceive that the whole firing line will simultaneously consider that the moment for the assault has arrived; in general, only a part of that line at a time will come to this conclusion. Such local attacks are hazardous, however, and have some chance of succeeding only in covered terrain. A local assault made by a single battalion or company will usually attract the fire of a considerable portion of the hostile line and quite naturally dash itself to pieces against it. Even assuming that a gallantly charging unit succeeds in unexpectedly penetrating the hostile line at some one point, the defender will at once attack it in vastly superior force and compel it to retire with heavy loss. Furthermore, the failure is usually not confined to the one unit. The troops on the right and left of it, although they are perhaps farther from the enemy, and have not yet shaken him sufficiently by their fire, nevertheless join in the assault, as soon as they see the first unit rush forward. As a rule, when the decision to assault emanates from the firing line, a series of unsuccessful assaults will result. These will, however, bring good troops closer and closer to the enemy, until the great moment of definitely gained superiority finally arrives.

The General Staff account of the Franco-German war[399] very aptly
describes the decisive moment for the assault: “The tension of
the tactical situation was increased to the highest pitch by the
prolonged fight at close range; the time was now ripe for the
decision and the German corps commanders issued orders for the
assault. Before this order reached the leading line, however, the
German general officers on the spot had decided, at about 7:30 P.
M., to undertake the assault on their own responsibility, as they
considered the attack sufficiently prepared. On the signal given by
them, and in many instances of their own accord, the Prussian and
Saxon battalions hurled themselves, just as the sun was setting, on
the position which had been so long and so tenaciously defended by
the enemy.” (=St. Privat=). Consult, _Der 18. August_, pp. 525 and
571.

[399] _Gen. St. W._, II, p. 800.

“When the XIth Army Corps issued from the =Niederwald= (near
=Wörth=), the infantry encountered such a heavy fire from the
direction of =Elsaszhausen= that the troops had to choose between
either advancing farther or giving up the advantages that had been
gained at such great sacrifices. The former course was indeed open
to objection, as the troops were exhausted, as organizations were in
confusion from the fighting they had just gone through, and as only
three formed and fresh battalions were available.”--“General von Bose
now ordered a general attack. At the signal ‘the whole force will
advance’, the firing lines rushed from the Niederwald and, with loud
cheers, threw themselves upon the enemy.”[400]

[400] _Gen. St. W._, I, p. 267.

The assault was thus not a result of the superiority that had been
gained, but an act of desperation in a situation that had become
unbearable. Moreover, the success of the assault was not due to any
numerical superiority of the attacker, but to the lack of initiative
of the defender, and to the fact that he confined himself to purely
defensive action.

It is, therefore, after all, an open question whether the initiative of parts of the line should govern the conduct of the entire force. In some instances, it certainly ought not to govern, if disaster is to be avoided. When a portion of the firing line advances, however, and the tactical situation in any way permits, neighboring units should at once conform to the movement. The units in rear, in particular, should, in this case, promptly hurry forward by the shortest route without regard to losses, support the firing line, and prevent it being repulsed. (Par. 345, German I. D. R.).

This brings up the question, as to whether the trumpeters of the assaulting units should sound the signal “fix bayonet,” in this assault, and thus bring about a prompt general assault by the entire line. This might obviously cause the troops to advance prematurely to the assault, a danger which might be brought about by the junior platoon commander. No one but the supreme commander, therefore, has the right to order this signal to be sounded when he wishes a general assault to be made. This is prescribed in the German Infantry Drill Regulations (par. 347). If the commander of the firing line decides to assault, he transmits his decision to the rear by means of signals (s. s. s.). The supreme commander can still restrain the skirmishers by the signal h. h. h., or bring about a general assault all along the line by giving the signal “fix bayonet”. If a unit moves to the assault contrary to the wishes of the supreme commander, he should possess enough nerve to look on calmly while it is being defeated. It is much better for him to allow a single unit to be defeated than to cause the failure of the general attack by a premature advance.

“Although the assault should be made as nearly simultaneously as possible, this is not to be understood as meaning that all the units should penetrate the hostile position at one and the same time. Such simultaneous action is immaterial, and might, indeed, cause parts of the line who had a chance of successfully carrying out the assault, to hesitate because others are still in rear. The power of the attack would accordingly be impaired. All units that have once started must continue to advance uninterruptedly.” (Par. 349 German I. D. R.).

It depends upon the situation whether the troops intended for the holding attack finally participate in the assault itself. If they can bring an effective fire to bear upon the point of attack from an oblique direction and thereby ensure the success of the attack, they should make the most of this advantage. (Par. 340 German I. D. R.).

When the enemy advances to the frontal counter-attack, as laid down in the Russian and British regulations, the skirmishers throw themselves down for the purpose of firing. The supports in the act of moving up continue their march. If the enemy faces about, all the troops press after him.

The French regulations (par. 270) also consider such a counter-attack:

“If the attacker presses forward too hastily and if he threatens
to carry the defender’s position, fresh troops, which have been
assembled in a place sheltered from view, attack him energetically,
while the troops already engaged increase the intensity of their
fire. This powerful and energetic counter-attack produces confusion
in the enemy’s ranks and compels him to retire, or at least to
discontinue his forward movement until he has had time to recover....
The troops in the counter-attack should move forward without
hesitation and regardless of the cost. When such a forward movement
has to be discontinued, the commander must decide where it shall
cease. The efforts of all should be directed toward one object, that
of tiring and demoralizing the enemy by constant counter-attacks,
until the moment arrives when the commander must order the offensive
to be assumed.”

The German Infantry Drill Regulations contain no further rules for the conduct of the assault. If the physical and moral power of the enemy is so broken by the preceding fire fight that he commences to evacuate his position, it is quite immaterial what sort of an assault is made; the men simply fire and rush quickly after the retiring enemy. In this case the assault is nothing but a postlude of the fire fight.

A brave and well disciplined opponent who is energetically led, will not allow himself to be forced to evacuate his position by fire alone; to compel him to evacuate his position will at the very least require that an assault be threatened.

Before the Boer war, the British held the view that the effect of the fire fight alone was so great that the assault would strike nothing but an evacuated or, at most, a feebly defended position. The assault was to commence after the enemy had ceased firing and had sought protection in his trenches. The following statement is made by one who fought on the Boer side:

“The artillery supported the advance until the latter had arrived
within 300 or 400 m. of the enemy; then it ceased firing. After a
brief period of preparation by fire, the British infantry began the
assault simultaneously in one long line. This assault, made without
fire support, was repulsed without trouble by the Boer fire. On
several occasions, short lines of our opponent had begun to advance,
but these were in every instance forced to throw themselves down
after a few moments had elapsed. Thereupon the whole British line,
in my estimation at least 300-400 men strong, began to advance. One
could clearly hear the British leaders call to their men to cease
firing, could clearly hear the command ‘fix bayonet’, and the cheer
‘God save the Queen’! run along the British line. Then the whole
hostile line rose. As they rushed toward us, they looked to me like a
grayish yellow swarm, the men being almost shoulder to shoulder and
the line being in places three to four men deep, just as frequently
happens in charges made during our own peace maneuvers. At the same
moment, we began firing. Our fire was at first somewhat wild, but
was soon better controlled by our more experienced fighters calling,
‘Steady boys, steady, then none of them will reach us’. More and
more men fell in the British line, and, when it had arrived within
100 or 80 paces of our position, its energy had spent itself. A
part of the men threw themselves down behind boulders and fired,
while the majority rushed back to the shelter of some bushes; but
even there it was for the most part impossible to hold them. An
assaulting enemy who does not fire, is not dangerous, even if he is
numerically superior. In this case, the defender can fire a number
of times, and the closer the assailant is to the defender’s position
the more quickly and certainly will his force dwindle away. No one
will, however, be able to induce the same men to advance again under
hostile fire over an open field, that is, to expose themselves
without shelter to the hostile fire.”[401]

[401] Supplement 8 to the _Militär-Wochenblatt_, 1901.

The same lesson was learned long ago at =Gorni Dubniac= and at
=Plevna=.

It is obvious that fire support is essential to the success of such an assault. This should be furnished in the first place by the artillery. In furnishing this support, artillery can employ time fire only until the infantry arrives within 300 m. of the enemy, while percussion fire may be continued until the infantry arrives within 150 m. of the enemy. During the attack on Pieters Hill (1900), Colonel Kitchener is said to have told his artillerymen that he would not censure them if two or three of their shrapnel burst in the ranks of his infantry. The following statement appears in a British memorial on the lessons of the war in the Far East: “The moral effect produced by artillery fire, which forced the defenders to take to cover and did not even permit them to raise their heads above the parapet, was so highly esteemed by the Japanese infantry that it requested the batteries to continue firing, without regard to the losses thereby inflicted in its own ranks, until it had taken the position or unfurled small national flags as an indication that fire support was no longer necessary. According to the opinion of the Japanese themselves, the losses inflicted in their infantry by their own guns were insignificant in comparison to the losses which the defender could inflict by delivering his fire undisturbed at a range of a few hundred meters, when not kept down by the attacking artillery.” According to the Austrian regulations, one unit is to remain halted for the purpose of directing its fire upon the point of attack or upon any reserves that might appear. This provision involves a grave danger, in that it may induce the leader to retain a considerable number of troops in rallying positions, instead of launching his whole force in the assault.

When fire support is deemed necessary in an attack, the artillery will perhaps be best able to furnish it until the infantry has reached a certain point. Then a moment will arrive, however, when the guns will have to cease firing, and when even the infantry units which have been left behind to support the attack, will no longer be able to direct their fire upon the enemy on account of the wide frontage of the assaulting force. The defender’s troops would have to be poor indeed, if they would not at this moment, when the assailant’s fire has practically ceased, raise their heads above the parapet for the purpose of emptying their magazines once more at the assailant, even though the fire be unaimed.