Chapter II: Part 2

In the Thirty Years’ war, the proportion of cavalry to infantry was
as 1:1, or 1:2, and frequently the cavalry even predominated. In
the Swedish army one gun per 1,000 men was considered sufficient.
During the era of linear tactics in the 18th Century the proportion
between the two principal arms had become as 1:2 and 1:3; in the
Napoleonic wars as 1:6 and 1:8. The number of guns was increased to 4
per 1,000 men. In the course of a campaign the ratio changes to the
disadvantage of infantry. At the outbreak of the war of 1870-71, the
relative proportions of the three arms in the German IInd Army were
as follows: cavalry to infantry as 1:8; and 3.4 guns per 1,000 men.
The proportion between the two principal arms in the IIIrd Army Corps
of the German army, at the outbreak of the Franco-German war, was as
1:18.8; on the first day of the battle of Le Mans it was as 1:16.6;
at the opening of the campaign there were 4.6 guns per 1,000 men, at
the close of the campaign 5.8 guns per 1,000 men. This was still more
marked in the Ist Bavarian Army Corps, which, on October 31st, had
5.8 guns and on December 9th even 11.1 guns per 1,000 men. At present
Germany has approximately 6, and France 3.63 guns per 1,000 infantry.

The manner in which infantry fights imprints its distinguishing mark on the tactics of an entire period; thus, according to the combat formations of infantry, we may speak of a period of “linear,” “column,” and “extended order” tactics. Infantry can be equipped more cheaply and trained more quickly than the other arms. In July, 1870, the French army consisted of 116 infantry regiments and 21 rifle battalions, but 38 rifle battalions were raised in addition to a large number of regiments of _gardes mobiles_ and volunteers.

Infantry is as well adapted for combat with firearms as for combat with the bayonet, for attack as for defense, for action in close as in extended order. It can fight on any terrain which is at all passable, and is more independent of weather and seasons than the other arms; it surpasses the other arms in endurance, a man, on account of his will power, bearing privations and exertions better than a horse. On the other hand, the losses suffered by foot troops in action and through exertions on the march are greater than those of the mounted arms.[25]

[25] Percentages of cases of sickness in the campaign 1870/71:

Infantry: 69.8; Field Officers: 13.26; Captains: 10.19;
Lieutenants: 3.85%
Artillery: 57.7; „ „ 4.04; „ 4.84;
Lieutenants: 4.52„
Cavalry: 37.5; „ „ 5.61; „ 2.29;
Lieutenants: 3.24„

The rate of march of infantry is so slow that in reconnaissance it can only by great exertions attain results which a small force of cavalry would obtain without appreciable effort. Infantry acting alone therefore unquestionably requires the assignment of mounted men for reconnaissance and messenger duty. As regards reconnaissance, infantry is like a man walking in the dark, who can guard against collisions only by stretching out his hand and feeling his way.

The lack of artillery support will also make itself felt when infantry encounters fire at ranges at which it is defenseless, owing to the limited range of its rifle. Infantry cannot dispense with artillery when it has to attack localities or fortified points in villages.

The infantry of the 19th Century fell heir to the distinction made in the 18th Century between heavy infantry (infantry of the line) and light infantry, the latter being employed only in skirmish duty and in the service of security. In the 18th Century the expensive method of recruiting by means of bounties made it necessary to avoid using troops in indecisive, costly fire actions, and to preserve the expensive personnel for decisive shock action _en masse_. Skirmishing was left to volunteer battalions, to Jägers, and to Füsiliers. In Prussia the number of Füsilier battalions was increased to 24 at the close of the 18th Century. Napoleon I. was, on principle, opposed to the theory of light infantry. He demanded but one species of infantry, “a good infantry.” In spite of this, however, he became the originator of an _élite_ infantry, when, for reasons of discipline, he created one _voltigeur_ and one _grenadier_ company in each battalion. While battalion tactics predominated, _i.e._, until the close of the campaign of 1866, this arrangement was imitated in most states. At the time of the Russo-Turkish war, Russia still had in each battalion a fifth company, one of sharpshooters, which, though not recruited at the expense of the other companies, was formed of better material and received special training in extended order fighting. Following the example set by Austria, Prussia, in 1812, designated the third rank principally for extended order fighting, by forming it into a third platoon in each company when in action. This was called the sharpshooters’ platoon and was composed of the best shots and the most skillful men of the company. As late as the campaign of 1866 there were instances of the employment of the combined sharpshooter platoons of a battalion. Here we have an actual _élite_ force assembled in provisional organizations, not at the expense of the rest of the troops, however.

The system of column tactics, which required that every company should be equally skilled in extended order fighting, led to the abolishment of _élite_ companies. The Prussian _élite_, consisting of the platoons formed from the third rank, although not always compatible with the employment of company columns, was not abolished until 1876. The experience of the Franco-German war had shown that, in view of the extensive use of extended order formations, an independent employment of single platoons was out of the question, as in the course of an action the firing line absorbs not only entire companies, but regiments and brigades; and, moreover, that every platoon, as a unit for fire action, must possess those elements which will carry it forward even after its leader has fallen.

Napoleon formed his Guards by selecting men and officers from the entire army for use as a battle reserve. By granting them privileges and by loading them with distinctions, he attached them to his person, and they assumed the character of household troops of a dynasty.

The Prussian and Russian Guards are differently constituted. They are not, strictly speaking, _corps d’élite_, for they are not selected from the ranks of the army. While it is true that the Prussian Guard receives a better class of recruits and the composition of its corps of officers and the selection of its commanders guarantee conspicuous results, its principal superiority lies in the fact that it serves constantly under the eye of the emperor.

Since the introduction of accurate breechloading weapons, and their use by all infantry, Jägers and riflemen have no tactical excuse for existing, except where they are specially trained in mountain warfare (_Chasseurs alpins_, _Alpini_)[26], or where they are intended to serve as a support for cavalry divisions. (France). While Jäger-battalions are at present employed like the rest of the infantry, they are retained by us as such because of tradition and for reasons of organization (they are recruited from forestry personnel), and an attempt is made in their tactical employment to turn their excellent marksmanship and skill in the use of ground to good account whenever possible. Jägers will be employed in defense, preferably for holding important points, and for combat and service of security on difficult terrain. Military experience has shown, however, that in actual war it was seldom possible to take advantage of these special characteristics; that in most cases the Jägers were used as other infantry, and that infantry units fighting shoulder to shoulder with Jägers accomplished as good results as the latter. Since the war of 1866 the demand for special employment of Jägers has ceased. The brief course of the campaign of 1866, in which our infantry acted mostly on the offensive, gave the Jägers an opportunity for profitable employment only where, contrary to accepted notions, they fought side by side with the rest of the infantry.[27]

[26] See _Über Gebirgstruppen_, VI, p. 273, and also
_Schweizerische Monatsschrift für Offiziere aller Waffen_, 1907, May
to July.

V. GRAEVENITZ, _Beiheft zum Militär-Wochenblatt_, 1903.

[27] The 6th Jäger-Battalion on July 3rd at Sendrasitz; the 4th
Jäger-Battalion at Podol; the 5th at Skalitz; the Jägers of the
Guard at Lipa; or where during an action a reverse threw us on the
defensive (1st Jäger-Battalion at Trautenau, and also at Rosberitz).
The superior commanders, in attempting to assign them a special role,
frequently employed them unprofitably in taking up rallying positions
(3rd, 7th, and 8th Jäger-Battalions on July 3rd), sometimes even to
escort baggage (3rd and 4th Companies of the Jägers of the Guard at
Soor; and the 1st and 4th Companies of the 5th Jäger-Battalion at
Schweinschädel); or they distributed them along the whole front for
the purpose of conducting extended order fighting. When they were
thus distributed among infantry organizations their efforts merged
with those of the infantry.

For example, at Königgrätz half companies of Jägers were posted
on both flanks of the Guard Infantry Division, and the 2nd
Jäger-Battalion was on this day distributed by companies along the
front of the entire division.

V. MOLTKE, _Kritische Aufsätze zur Geschichte des Feldzuges von
1866_.

KUNZ, _Die Tätigkeit der deutschen Jäger-Bataillone im Kriege
1870/71_. On page 169, et seq., a number of excellent examples are
recorded (for instance: 5th Prussian Jäger-Battalion in the actions
on November 29th and 30th, 1870, and on January 19th, 1871, in siege
positions in front of Paris).

Mountain warfare presents such difficult problems to troops, requires a sum total of endurance, energy and intelligence, physical qualifications and special familiarity, that neither every recruit nor every unit of the army will quite fulfill all its demands, although the experience of Suworov, during his campaign in the Alps, apparently contradicts this statement. Many disadvantages can be neutralized by peace training and discipline, of course, but training alone will not suffice. For overcoming the difficulties peculiar to mountain warfare, a suitable equipment permitting free movement, and at the same time ensuring the comfort of the men while at rest, is necessary. The lack of such mountain equipment is keenly felt even during short exercises lasting only a few days. Even Switzerland plans at present the formation of three mountain brigades. Austria already has special mountain brigades assembled for mountain warfare in its Kaiser-Jäger, Rural Riflemen, and also in the troops of Bosnia and Dalmatia. The Italian _Alpini_ (consisting of 22 battalions in time of peace, to which militia companies are attached on mobilization, and which have in addition a reserve of 22 territorial companies) form a selected corps which is doubtless capable of accomplishing excellent results. The Italians propose to attach machine guns to these units. It is worthy of note that these troops carry explosives. In France the troops garrisoned in the Alpine districts are divided into thirteen groups, each consisting of one battalion, one mountain battery, one engineer company, and machine guns.

As modern fire effect makes it impossible for mounted officers to direct the firing line, it was natural to use the more improved means of communication, the telephone and telegraph, in addition to the visual signals employed by the navy.

The improvements made in weapons have had a further influence on the transformation of the infantry. Even a small force of infantry can with its magazine fire inflict annihilating losses in a very short time on closed bodies offering favorable targets, especially when this fire is delivered from a flanking position. This requires, on the one hand, that greater attention be paid during combat to local reconnaissance, which can be but imperfectly made by mounted officers with the troops, and, on the other hand, it necessitates the employment of smaller independent detachments for our own security and for harassing the enemy. Intimately connected herewith is the introduction of machine guns, possessing great mobility, which enables them to take advantage of rapidly passing moments for pouring a heavy fire on the enemy and also for reinforcing the independent cavalry in advance of the army.

In England it was decided to form mounted infantry charged with the additional duty of augmenting the fire of a cavalry division, and of furnishing the commander-in-chief with a reserve possessing the requisite mobility to permit its being thrown to any threatened point of the long battle lines of today. But of what importance is the fire of a single battalion in the large armies of the present day? The principal drawback to the employment of mounted infantry is, however, that, when mounted, it is defenseless against cavalry, and that, while in motion, it really needs a supporting force. In the Boer war the mounted infantry grew finally to a strength of 50,000 men. As it was not confronted by cavalry, it made good during the execution of wide turning movements, which Lord Roberts employed with success for the purpose of striking the flank of the Boers, who always rapidly extended their lines. In spite of these good services, it could not be denied that mounted infantry had many faults. The men knew nothing of the care of their mounts, as is evidenced by the large percentage of horses which became unserviceable. As mounted infantry units were improvised bodies, they lacked the requisite training in marching and tactical employment. After the war had lasted for some time, the mounted infantrymen, however, had completely forgotten their infantry character and deported themselves like cavalrymen, even if only as poor ones. Thus, we find toward the close of the campaign numerous attacks made by mounted infantry on the British side, as, strange to relate, also on that of the Boers.

In this experiment of creating mounted infantry, all those drawbacks which had been learned for centuries were exemplified. As an improvisation, mounted infantry disturbs the cohesion of organizations; if permanently organized, it must become cavalry, just as the dragoons became cavalry: for mounted infantry is neither flesh, fish, nor fowl and cannot endure.

The British Drill Regulations (1904) for mounted infantry lay down the following principles for its employment:

In the practical employment of mounted infantry, sight must not be
lost of the fact that this arm is drilled and trained as infantry. On
account of its greater mobility, it should be able to cover greater
distances, and, in addition, be capable of executing wider turning
movements than infantry. As a rule, mounted infantry is to be used in
the following cases:

(a) It is to perform the service of security in the immediate front
of infantry divisions in conjunction with cavalry and the horse
batteries assigned to the latter, in addition to augmenting the
fire of the cavalry. It is further to occupy, as expeditiously as
possible, tactically important positions. It is to find positions
from which it can bring fire, preferably flanking fire, to bear on
the flanks of hostile cavalry before the actual combat begins. It
is to improve every success gained and constitute a formed nucleus
in case of a retreat. Moreover, mounted infantry should enable the
cavalry divisions, far in advance of the army, to devote themselves
exclusively to the strategical reconnaissance with which they are
charged.

(b) In addition, the mounted infantry is to constitute a light
mobile reserve which the commander-in-chief can despatch at a
moment’s notice from one wing to the other for the purpose of lending
assistance, or for influencing the action at particular points
and for which other troops are not available on account of the
extraordinary extension of modern lines of battle.

(c) Finally, mounted infantry is to fill the role of a mobile
column in minor warfare or in expeditions in colonial wars, and in
performing this duty assume the functions of the absent cavalry in
the service of reconnaissance and patrolling.

The following is the organization and strength of mounted infantry
organizations:

In war every infantry battalion is to furnish one company of mounted
infantry, consisting of 5 officers, 138 men, and 144 horses; and
every brigade (4 battalions) one battalion of four companies. To each
battalion of mounted infantry is assigned: one machine gun platoon,
consisting of two guns and two ammunition carts (2 officers, 40
men, and 54 horses). Hence the aggregate strength of a battalion of
mounted infantry is: 28 officers, 630 men, and 676 horses.

The creation of mounted infantry is only proper where climatic conditions make long marches by European troops impossible, or in cases where the arrival of a few soldiers at distant points will exert a potent influence on the actions of an opponent. As shown by our experience in Southwest Africa, the proper field for mounted infantry is colonial (guerrilla) warfare, especially when it is important to prevent the outbreak of threatened disorders and to let the country return quickly to a state of peace upon completion of the principal actions. On European theaters of war, space is lacking for the employment of mounted infantry, and, moreover, there are not enough horses. In organizing mounted infantry, an auxiliary arm, which can be of use only occasionally, has been created at the expense of infantry and cavalry. The infantry itself should endeavor to meet all demands for local reconnaissance and communication, without weakening the cavalry for its principal duties, and without, in so doing, crippling its own fighting efficiency.

For the purpose of reconnaissance, patrols or scouting detachments are used. Their usefulness in difficult country and in enterprises against the enemy’s flank or rear cannot be denied. In minor operations, by advancing on side roads, they can hamper the enemy’s reconnaissance, secure the flanks of their own force, ascertain the probable extent of the prospective battlefield, and, finally, having gained a firm foothold, they can become very annoying to the hostile artillery. In a large battle the necessary elbow room for such employment is lacking. To form special organizations of picked men, as is done in Russia, is always of doubtful value. An organization cannot dispense with its best men in action; it needs them as group leaders and as substitutes for disabled non-commissioned officers. While everything goes without a hitch, the withdrawal of good men from an organization is of little importance; the drawbacks to this procedure become apparent, however, when heavy losses deplete the ranks, when the line begins to waver, when, in the absence of officers, only the example of courageous men prevents the weak-kneed from running away. Our regulations properly appreciate the importance of psychological impressions during critical combat situations; they state: “The man who feels his courage and coolness going, in the excitement of battle, should look toward his officers. Should they have fallen, he will find plenty of non-commissioned officers and brave privates whose example will revive his courage.” (Par. 268 German I. D. R.). If it becomes necessary to despatch a stronger infantry force on a mission of minor importance, it will usually be better to detail an entire company than to improvise a detachment whose leader would know his men only imperfectly. From the standpoint of training, scouting detachments have an entirely different value. They give young infantry officers, who are tied to a command, an opportunity to develop self-confidence, decision, and tactical judgment; to cope with hardships and difficulties on their own responsibility. In this manner characteristics may be developed in the young officers which will be of benefit to them in a large battle. It is obvious that scouts should be assigned bicycles to give them the mobility which infantry lacks.

If the roads are good, cyclists[28] will frequently be able to take the place of cavalry in messenger service. In this case they remain with their organizations and perform the same duties as the other soldiers. The employment of cyclists is in accord with the principle that in war every resource the country offers for warfare should be utilized. The advantage of the use of cyclists for messenger service and their value to the command generally is obvious; they are, in addition, adapted for reconnaissance work and for reinforcing the divisional cavalry. Cyclists, however, do not lend themselves to the formation of separate organizations for battle purposes (each division has 110 cyclists), for a large number of picked men would thereby be withdrawn from the ranks of the troops engaged. An improvised cyclist detachment would, in addition, accomplish very little, as it would lack the thorough peace training requisite for cohesive action as an organization. If the opinion is entertained that cyclist detachments could furnish substantial aid to the cavalry[29] in advance of the army, that they could be employed profitably in the supply districts and in minor operations, and, finally, if the available material in the country is to be utilized, nothing remains but to proceed to the creation of cyclist companies in time of peace. The material necessary for repairs and for ammunition supply can only be entrusted to permanent organizations. The advantages of cyclists are their great mobility,[30] their prompt readiness for firing, and, above all else, the noiselessness of their movements. Their weakness lies in their dependence upon a complicated machine, in the comparatively large road space taken up by them on the march (100 cyclists in column of twos take up about 250 to 300 m. road space), and in their dependence on the terrain. The last mentioned drawback can be remedied apparently only by the adoption of a folding wheel, but, since the cyclist’s equipment cannot be secured on the machine, it is better in difficult country to push the wheels or to leave them behind under guard when necessary.

[28] Pars. 78, 82, 86, 99, 101, 132, 151, 152, 194 and 200, GERMAN
F. S. R.

[29] By occupying positions so as to give the cavalry freedom of
action; by advancing ahead of the reconnoitering cavalry for the
purpose of re-establishing contact with the enemy, of forestalling
him in occupying important points, or of outflanking him: finally, by
coöperating with cavalry in cavalry combats, in covering a retreat,
in outpost duty, and during the execution of technical work.

[30] According to the _Italian Regulations of 1904_, the rate of
march of cyclists is as follows: slow rate 8 km., maneuvering rate,
10-12 km., road speed, 12-17 km., accelerated rate of march, up to 20
km. per hour. Cyclists can ride up to 80 km., without long rests. For
riding 90-100 km., from 5 to 6 hours are required.

In Italy, France, and England more has been done towards the
formation of cyclist detachments than elsewhere. In Italy each
_Bersaglieri_ Regiment has one company of cyclists, which is to be
employed in supporting a cavalry brigade. Cyclists have accomplished
a good deal in surmounting difficulties of the terrain. In England
the development of cyclist bodies is left mostly to the volunteers
and their exercises have demonstrated that such units are capable of
expanding in a brief space of time.

In France the cyclist movement is led by Major Gerard, who rendered
valuable service during a short maneuver of the cavalry division
(1905). Opinions are as yet divided as to the advisability of forming
cyclist battalions. Both Major Gerard and General Langlois are
advocates of their employment. General Langlois desires to oppose the
brutal German battle tactics with rapid maneuvers of mobile reserves
which he would form of cyclist battalions, artillery, and cavalry.

According to the Cyclist Regulations dated September 10th, 1904, the cyclist company is to be looked upon as infantry, which is capable of moving at great speed, but is tied to the network of roads. The cyclist companies are principally intended for defensive action, holding an important point until the arrival of infantry. They are also to serve as support for cavalry and artillery, but are not adapted for reconnaissance work. Since it is difficult for them to secure their flanks on the march, they are to be used mainly in combination with other arms.

In winter campaigns, when wheel and horse cannot be used, recourse is had to the Canadian snowshoe (a web shoe) or to the Norwegian snowshoe or ski (skee). In France, Italy, Austria,[31] Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland marching on snowshoes is assiduously practiced, while in Germany the troops have so far done little in this line. The ski is, however, coming more and more into vogue among the rural population of the German mountains.

[31] One of the most remarkable snowshoe marches ever recorded is
without doubt that made by the ski detachment of the 4th Regiment
of Tirolese Kaiser-Jägers (Austria) stationed in Salzburg. In
June, 1905, this detachment, consisting of 4 officers, 15 men and
4 guides, all with field equipment, marched around the base of the
“Grosz Glockner,” via Mittersil, Felber-Tauern (elev. 2,500 m.),
Windisch-Matrey, Lienz, Dolsack, Hochtor (elev. 2,570 m.), into the
Fuscher valley, despite violent cyclonic snow storms, a journey
which, even in mid-summer, can only be undertaken by experienced
tourists. In several of these detachments experiments were made with
white covers for uniform and equipment, which enabled individual men
and patrols to approach unseen to within 200 to 300 m. of an opponent.

Deep snow is an effective obstacle for troops not equipped with snowshoes. This is not entirely due to the fact that the march is retarded, but to the unusual difficulties attending the service of security. Covering bodies are stalled. Besides, the difficulties of maintaining communication with neighboring detachments are increased when valleys or abrupt declivities intervene between the forces. The only remedy in such cases is to employ the snowshoe, upon which one can move rapidly without regard to roads, and up or down hill without difficulty. Patrols can be despatched to adequate distances from the marching body on skis alone. Ski-runners can perform the same duty which cavalry performs on the plain; for instance, they can occupy points in advance which are of importance to us, dispute crossings with the enemy, and hold him at bay. Ski detachments alone are able to reconnoiter the condition of roads and test the carrying power of snow in advance of a command, and they alone can furnish the connecting links in an extended outpost position, because they alone are able to move off the roads. During halts they furnish guards; in action they easily turn the enemy’s flanks, reconnoiter his weak points as well as the position of his reserves; and after the fight they maintain contact with him as patrols. They can hasten forward in advance of a command and prepare cantonments and bivouacs, and attend to the cooking.

The great depth of a detachment of ski-runners is a disadvantage. Each ski-runner takes up 2.20 m., and in addition a distance of 1 m. must be left between men. Besides, as the men are not all equally skilled in using skis, the road space taken up by a detachment of runners is increased considerably. This necessitates the employment of small detachments not exceeding 100 men. The proper sphere of ski-runners is patrol duty. In winter campaigns ski-runners are a necessary substitute for cavalry. In Scandinavia reconnaissance detachments are composed of ski-runners and cavalry, the horses pulling the runners. This permits a very rapid movement over snow-covered ground and may also be employed where the use of the much slower sled is impracticable owing to the nature of the terrain. Much practice is undoubtedly necessary to acquire proficiency in this sport[32], for it surely cannot be easy to preserve an upright position on skis behind a galloping horse, while at the same time overcoming all the difficulties of the ground. When troopers cannot continue to perform reconnaissance work, they are replaced by snowshoe or ski-runners. The snowshoe performances in France, since the establishment by War Department order of a training school in Briançon, are worthy of note. According to the experiences gained at that institution, a period of four weeks is ample for training men for extended mountain marches. On January 18th, 1904, a body of men on snowshoes covered a distance of 80 km., including a climb of 1,700 m., in 20 hours (4 hours’ rest included).

[32] During the Norse winter sports of 1905, the winner covered a
distance of 67 km. in 2³⁄₄ hours.

2. THE TACTICAL UNIT.

By the term tactical unit is meant the smallest element of a body of troops capable of sustaining an action independently, of performing a simple combat task, and the elements of which (man and horse) are personally known to the leader. Moreover, the tactical unit should be small enough to allow of its being controlled by the voice of a single leader. This requirement limits the battle front of the tactical unit to about 100 m., which corresponds approximately to the front of a troop[33] (_Eskadron_) in line, or to that of a battery of six pieces. The frontage of the tactical unit of cavalry might with advantage be decreased, while that of artillery, on account of its stability in action, might be extended, were it not for the fact that the increase in the quantity of matériel and in the number of horses involved in such extension would make the supervision of the unit too difficult for a single person. In nearly all large armies the strength of a troop (_Eskadron_) of cavalry and of a field battery is approximately 150 horses.[34] This corresponds approximately to what the farmer of northern Germany considers suitable to keep together in one establishment. If the estate is larger, requiring more than 150 men and horses, subsidiary farms[35] are established.

[33] _Eskadron_ has been rendered by “troop” in this work. The
German _Eskadron_ consists of 4-5 officers, 138-144 men, and 135-139
horses. It is the smallest administrative unit of the German cavalry
and is divided into four Züge (platoons). _Translator._

[34] GENERAL MARMONT, in his _Esprit des Institutions Militaires_,
p. 41, states that experience has shown that the most suitable
strength for a troop is 48 files, divided into four platoons; but, he
recommends that platoons should consist of 16-18 files in order to
maintain this strength throughout a campaign.

[35] _Vorwerke._

While column tactics were in vogue, the above mentioned requirements of a tactical unit were completely fulfilled by the battalion, but this is no longer the case. It is quite impossible for one voice to control the movements of a battalion in action; this is scarcely possible in case of a company. On the other hand, a company is too weak to carry out an independent mission in action. Nothing less than a battalion possesses the requisite fighting power, strength, and capacity for subdivision, to sustain an action independently, to solve minor problems of combat, and to remain a body full of fighting efficiency even after sustaining serious losses such as are unavoidable in every modern infantry action.

To attempt a further definition of the term “tactical unit” would be of little value. General von Scherff in a logical manner[36] constructs a “troop unit”[37] from “fighting groups”[38] (squad of infantry or cavalry, or one gun), several of which form a “fighting unit”[39] (company, troop or battery), “possessing the requisite power to carry out a specific task,” and placed under the command of a responsible leader. “The definition of a fighting unit includes, on principle, its indivisibility in action. Dispersion is a crime, division at least an evil.” The “combat unit”[40] consists of a number of fighting units. “The commander of the combat unit (infantry battalion, cavalry regiment, or artillery battalion) should be able to lead it as a compact entity, and should have the power of employing its component parts independently for combined action against some point.” General von Scherff has found imitators in Austria, where the term body of troops (_Truppenkörper_) is applied to an organization having the necessary means for feeding, clothing, and equipping the men, and which is composed of a number of “basic units.”[41] Such “basic units” as can be supervised, handled, and controlled directly by one leader, who knows the individual men thereof and their characteristics, are the troop (_Eskadron_), battery, and company. Von Boguslawski[42] applies the term “fighting unit” to organizations from the company (troop) to the brigade, which act in accordance with the tactics of their arm, supported by the other arms, in the sphere assigned to them by orders or by circumstances. Divisions, which, by the coöperation of the three arms, are capable of independent employment on the march and in action, he calls “combat units.” According to Boguslawski, army corps are “battle units,”[43] with which the commander reckons in battle, and which are strong enough to meet an energetic attack or to execute one themselves.

[36] _Von der Kriegführung_, p. 49.

[37] _Truppeneinheit._

[38] _Kampfgruppen._

[39] _Kampfeinheit._

[40] _Gefechtseinheit._

[41] _Schlachteneinheiten._

[42] _Entwickelung der Taktik_, III, p. 125.

[43] _Grundeinheiten._

3. ORGANIZATION.

The basic unit of infantry is the company, from 200 to 250 men strong in the larger armies. It seems hardly practicable to exceed a strength of 150 men, as this is about the greatest number in which a relation based upon personal influence of the leader on his subordinates can still be obtained. In armies in which companies are composed of more than 200 men, the numbers in excess of this figure may be regarded as a margin of safety, intended to maintain the company at a strength of 200 rifles after the first casualties of a campaign, produced by marching, detached service and battle losses. In view of the losses, which frequently increase with extraordinary rapidity in modern battles, it appears undesirable to fix a lower figure than that above mentioned, as the companies would otherwise lose their independence and could no longer be considered basic units.

===========+=========+===================================++
| | ||
| | ||
| | ||
| | ||
| | (a) PEACE STRENGTH. ||
|Company. +-----+--+------+------+------+-----++
| | | | | |Offi- | ||
| | |N.| | |cers’ |Hosp.||
| |Offi-|C.|Musi- |Pri- |Ser- |Corps||
| |cers.|O.|cians.|vates.|vants.|Men. ||
-----------+---------+-----+--+-------+-----+------+-----++
~=GERMANY=~|Minimum | 4 |15| 4 | 128 | ... | ... ||
|Maximum | 5 |17| 4 | 142 | ... | ... ||
-----------+---------+-----+--+-------+-----+------+-----++
~=AUSTRIA=~|Minimum | 4 |11| 2 | 76 | 4 | ... ||
|Maximum | 4 |14| 2 | 109 | 4 | ... ||
-----------+---------+-----+--+-------+-----+------+-----++
~=ITALY=~ |Infantry,| | | | | | ||
|Bersa- | | | | | | ||
|glieri | 3 |13| ... | 87 | ... | ... ||
| | | | |Musicians (trum- ||
| | | | |peters only) and ||
| | | | |sappers armed with||
| | | | |rifle. ||
|Alpini | 4 |19| ... | 121| ... | ... ||
-----------+---------+-----+--+-------+-----+------+-----++
~=FRANCE=~ |Ordinary | 3 |15| 2 | 108| ... | ... ||
|Maximum | 3 |15| 2 | 158| ... | ... ||
|Chasseurs| 3 |21| 2 | 125| ... | ... ||
| | | | | and| | ||
| | ...|..| ...| 150| ... | ... ||
-----------+---------+-----+--+-------+-----+------+-----++
~=RUSSIA=~ |Approxi- | | | | | | ||
|mately | 3 | 7| ...| 96 | 4 | ... ||
| | | | | | [44] | ||
-----------+---------+-----+--+-------+-----+------+-----++

===========+=========++=========================================++
| || ||
| || ||
| || ||
| || ||
| || (b) WAR STRENGTH. ||
|Company. ++-----+--+------+------+------+-----+-----++
| || | | | | |Lit- | ||
| || |N.| | |Train |ter |Hosp.||
| ||Offi-|C.|Musi- |Pri- |Sol- |Bear-|Corps||
| ||cers.|O.|cians.|vates.|diers.|ers. |Men. ||
-----------+---------++-----+--+------+------+------+-----+-----++
~=GERMANY=~|Minimum || 5 |20| 4 | 226 | 4 | 4 | 1 ||
|Maximum || ... |..| ... | ... | ... | ... | ... ||
-----------+---------++-----+--+------+------+------+-----+-----++
~=AUSTRIA=~|Minimum || 4 |19| 4 | 195 | ... | 4 | ... ||
|Maximum || ... |..| ... | 4 Pio- |4 Officers’||
| || | | | neers. | servants. ||
-----------+---------++-----+--+------+------+------+-----+-----++
~=ITALY=~ |Infantry,|| | | | | | | ||
|Bersa- || | | | | | | ||
|glieri || 5 |16| ... | 180 | ... | ... | ... ||
| ||Musicians (trumpeters only) and sappers ||
| || armed with rifle. ||
|Alpini || ... |..| ... | ... | ... | ... | ... ||
-----------+---------++-----+--+------+-------+-----+-----+-----++
~=FRANCE=~ |Ordinary || 4 |28| 4 | 218 | ... | 2 | 1 ||
|Maximum || ... |..| ... | ... | ... | ... | ... ||
|Chasseurs|| ... |..| ... | ... | ... | ... | ... ||
| || | | | | | | ||
| || ... |..| ... | ... | ... | ... | ... ||
-----------+---------++-----+--+------+-------+-----+-----+-----++
~=RUSSIA=~ |Approxi- || | | | | non-combatants. ||
|mately || 4 |22| ... | 200 | ... | 20 |... ||
| || | | | | | | ||
-----------+---------++-----+--+------+-------+-----+-----+-----++

===========+=========++===============
| ||Difference
| ||between
| ||minimum peace
| ||strength and
| ||war strength.
|Company. ++-----+--+------
| || | |
| || |N.|
| ||Offi-|C.|Pri-
| ||cers.|O.|vates.
-----------+---------++-----+--+------
~=GERMANY=~|Minimum || 1 | 5| 103
|Maximum || ... | | ...
-----------+---------++-----+--+------
~=AUSTRIA=~|Minimum || ... | 5| 132
|Maximum || 4 Officers’
| || servants.
-----------+---------++-----+--+------
~=ITALY=~ |Infantry,|| | |
|Bersa- || | |
|glieri || 2 | 3| 93
| ||Musicians (trum-
| ||peters only) and
| ||sappers armed
| ||with rifle.
|Alpini || ... |..| ...
-----------+---------++-----+--+------
~=FRANCE=~ |Ordinary || 1 |18| 110
|Maximum || ... | | ...
|Chasseurs|| ... | | ...
| || | |
| || ... | | ...
-----------+---------++-----+--+------
~=RUSSIA=~ |Approxi- || | |
|mately || 1 |15| 104
| || | |
-----------+---------++-----+--+------

[44] In addition, five non-combatants.

After the heavy losses at =St. Privat=, two companies were combined
into one for tactical purposes in some regiments of the Guard
Corps. The administration of the consolidated companies had to
remain distinct on account of the preparation of casualty lists,
recommendations for promotion and decorations. On the day of the
battle of =Orleans=, the strength of the German battalions varied
from 459 men in the 1st Bavarian Army Corps to 747 men in the 40th
Infantry Brigade. During the pursuit after the battle of =Le Mans=,
the strength of the 56th Füsilier-Battalion was even reduced to 280
men.

The actual training of troops must be completed in the company. Combat by an independent company is the exception; combat by battalion the rule. By the consolidation of four companies into one unit, the battalion, consisting of 800-1,000 rifles, is formed. The French Chasseur battalions are the only ones that consist of six companies, because their proposed independent employment, for instance, in mountain warfare, makes it more often necessary to detach small units than is the case in operations on more favorable terrain.

As, in the course of time, the independence of companies in action
developed, and as the combat of the battalion as an entity was
transformed into combined action of the four companies, the strength
of the company increased from 120 to 250 rifles while the number of
companies in a battalion diminished. The battalion of Frederick the
Great was divided for administrative purposes into five companies
and for tactical purposes into eight _pelotons_. The battalion of
the first empire consisted of six _Füsilier_ and two _Voltigeur_
companies, and the Austrian battalion, until the reorganization after
1866, consisted of six companies of which each two formed a division.
Until 1866 the six company battalion predominated in the infantry of
all European armies (France, Italy, Austria, and the minor German
states), but early in the seventies most of the states adopted the
four company battalion, Russia being the last to do this (four line
and one sharpshooter company). In the regulations of 1812, Prussia
had adopted the four company battalion. The independent employment
of the four united sharpshooter platoons of a battalion was the
exception even during the campaign of 1866. At present only the
British battalion consists of eight companies, which cannot, however,
be said to possess a capacity for independent action on account of
their small size.

In the four-company organization the battalion possesses an asset which enables it to adapt itself easily to any combat situation. The battalion organization is the outgrowth of practical necessity; the regimental commander cannot handle 12-16 companies without difficulty, and an intermediate unit, the battalion, is necessary. The battalion is the practical, and the regiment, consisting of 3 or 4 battalions, the ideal unit. Regiments consisting of two battalions do not possess the same advantages, as the regimental staff becomes superfluous during each necessary division of the regiment. Two battalion regiments do indeed facilitate command; they are, however, more expensive in time of peace and are of advantage in action only when formed into brigades of six battalions each, in which case the commander has a compactly organized reserve available.

“The regiment, by reason of its history, the uniformity of its training, the _esprit de corps_ of its officers, and its division into three battalions--thereby facilitating subdivision--is pre-eminently fitted for carrying out definite combat tasks.” (Par. 470 German I. D. R.). A glance at the map of the battle of Vionville (5B of the German General Staff work on the Franco-German war) shows that regiments, whenever they entered the field intact, fought as unbroken units throughout the battle, whereas brigade organizations were frequently broken up.

This breaking up of brigades is practically induced by the two regiment brigade organization. (Par. 471 German I. D. R.). When once the brigade commander has assigned sections or points of attack to his regiments, there remains very little for him to do. He can form a reserve only by taking two battalions from one regiment, or one battalion from each. The brigade is, however, not like the regiment, an entity of bodies of troops, but a unit assembled for tactical purposes, which may, without regard to the whole, be increased or diminished by one or more battalions in case of necessity. On the march and in action the brigade organization as a subdivision of the division cannot always be maintained; groups are frequently formed in which the normal units must be broken up. In large battles the brigade is the largest force which may yet be employed as an intact unit, although the employment of infantry by regiments will continue to be the rule. Brigade commanders are necessary for decreasing units of command and desirable for relieving the division commanders of a part of their work. In time of peace brigade commanders are useful for directing recruitment and, moreover, as connecting links between regiments and the division. The unmistakable advantages of the three-battalion organization have induced the United States to form its brigades of three regiments, each of three battalions (of 400 men each). An English division consists of three brigades of four battalions each.

4. INTRENCHING TOOL EQUIPMENT.[45]

[45] In the Russo-Japanese war the Russian companies were equipped
with 80 small spades and 20 hand axes; the Japanese companies with 68
small spades, 17 mattocks, 8 hatchets, and 30 wire cutters.

Earth as a covering material and, incidental thereto, the adoption of the small spade after the Russo-Turkish war, have increased in importance owing to the greater penetrating power of the modern infantry bullets. The disadvantages of the spade lie in the danger of its being misused and in the consequent impairment of offensive spirit. There is, moreover, danger that the fire effect will be impaired and subordinated to considerations of cover. The spade should therefore not be employed on every occasion, but only when the tactical purpose in view requires it.

What the weight of the portable intrenching equipment of the Japanese, Russian, and British infantry will be, is still undecided, but experiments are being made with a uniform tool. When we consider, that for the purpose of intrenching, one man requires a space of 1.20 m., and for handling his rifle a space of 0.8 m., and that when intrenching under fire all the men cannot work, it is obvious that it would be impracticable to equip each man with an intrenching tool. According to all experience, it is sufficient to furnish every other man with spade or pick. In addition to this, however, a company requires a large number of wire cutters. Only the French infantry is equipped with explosives, every regiment having 108 cartridges.

The following table shows the intrenching tool equipment available in each battalion:

+=========+================================+=================+=======
| FOR EARTH WORK. | FOR TIMBER WORK.|
----------+-----------------+--------------+---------+-------+-------
| Small | Large | Small | Large |
| Intrenching | Intrenching | Intrenching |
| Tools. | Tools. | Tools. |
----------+-------+---------+-------+------+---------+-------+------
|Spades.|Mattocks.|Spades.|Picks.|Hatchets.| Axes. |Total.
----------+-------+---------+-------+------+---------+-------+------
Germany | 400 | 40 | 20 | 10 | 35 | 8 | 513
Austria | 400 | 64 | 8 | 16 | ... | 8[46]| ...
Italy[47] | 32 | 8 | 36 | 18 | ... | 62 | ...
France[48]| 448 | 128 | ... | ... | ... |... | ...
----------+-------+---------+-------+------+---------+-------+-------

[46] Each company has 4 pioneers, which carry intrenching and
carpenter tools in addition to their rifles. These men are formed
into a pioneer platoon of 64 men in each regiment.

[47] The adoption of portable intrenching tools, 50 spades and
12-15 mattocks per company, is contemplated.

[48] The following demolition tools are available in each
battalion: 64 picks, 64 fascine knives, and 16 wire cutters. Sappeur
sections carry in addition a mattock or a pick apiece, and each
ammunition carrier also carries a pick, a fascine knife, or a saw.
The large intrenching tools are apparently being changed at the
present moment.

5. THE LOAD OF THE INFANTRYMAN.

The load carried by the infantryman should not exceed one-third of the man’s weight (84 kg.), or not more than 28 kg. According to the “Regulations for the Employment of Infantry Equipment, M/95,” the load of a soldier whose height is 1.67 m. (the equipment consisting of new experimental pieces) is about 27 kg., distributed as follows:

Clothing 5.397 kg.
Equipment[49] 3,964 „
Baggage[50] 5.600 „
Arms and ammunition 8.507 „
Rations (including breakfast). 3.238 „
----------
Total 26.706 kg.

To this must be added intrenching tools:

Small spade and scabbard 0.89 kg.
Hatchet 1.08 „
Mattock 1.48 „
Load with spade 27.596 „

[49] Tent equipment 1.620 kg.

[50] Iron ration, 2.388 kg. The British soldier carries only a 269
g. ration on his person, sufficient for 26 hours. It consists of two
parts, one containing cocoa paste, the other concentrated extract of
beef (Pemmican).

COMPARISON.[51]

===========+==========+=======+========+=======+=======+===========
| | | |Weight| | Weight
| | | | of | Weight| of
| Without | With |Clothing.|knap- | of | ammu-
| spades. |spades.| |sacks.|rifles.|nition.[52]
-----------+----------+-------+---------+------+-------+-----------
Germany |26.706 | 27.596| 5.397 |20.919| 4.707 | 4.714 kg.
Austria[53]|26.615 | 26.443| 4.428 |22.187| 4.200 | 4.080 „
Russia |28.216 | 29.206| 4.000 |22.622| 4.576 | 3.426 „
France |26.125 | | 6.222 |19.903| 5.049 | 3.675 „
Italy |29.135[54]| | 5.993 |23.143| 4.505 | 4.320 „
Japan |26.365 | | 3.475 |22.890| 4.435 | 3.600 „
-----------+----------+-------+---------+------+-------+-----------

[51] According to _Journal of Military Scientific Societies_, 1906.

[52] Italy 162, Japan and Germany 150, the other states 120 rounds
per man.

[53] Depending on whether the man carries intrenching tools (front
rank only) cooking utensils (rear rank and a few men of the front
rank).

[54] Alpini carry 32.096 kg.

II. THE FORMATIONS.

1. THE ISSUE OF ORDERS.

Troops are set in motion by words of command, and, when these do not suffice, by orders. (Orders give information of the situation and the intentions of the commander, and assign tasks, but leave the recipient free to choose the method of carrying them out). When commands are given from a distance, time and energy may be saved by employing the telephone and visual signals. To these may be added shouts, signs, and the following signals: _To advance_, the leader raises the arm; to indicate that the command is _to follow him_, he extends his raised arm in the direction of march; _to halt_, he lowers the arm; _to deploy_, both arms are raised laterally to the height of the shoulders, and if necessary the direction the skirmish line is to take is subsequently indicated with one extended arm; _to assemble_ his men, the leader describes a circle above his head with one arm. These signals may also be made with the sabre or rifle. Additional signals should be agreed upon beforehand in each separate case. If a signal is made to a body of troops in close order, it is meant, in the first place, for its leader. (Par. 11 German I. D. R.). Other signals, such as those indicating a change of direction of march, or a change in the battle formation, must be specially agreed upon beforehand. Trumpet signals are only used by troops in garrison at drills, and in barracks or billets as service calls. To prevent troops from misunderstanding signals or from obeying those not intended for them, all trumpet calls in battle, except “charge,” “fix bayonet,” and “attention,” are forbidden.

During the engagement of =Trautenau= (27th June, 1866), the trumpet
signal “assemble,” given at another point, caused four Prussian
battalions to withdraw.[55] See also the effect of the signal
“assemble” after the taking of =Problus=.[56] Notice the effect of
the signal “form square” during the assault on the =Forest of Bor=
(=Königgrätz=).[57]

[55] KÜHNE, _Kritische Wanderungen_, 3, 2nd Edition, pp. 55 and 85.

[56] _Geschichte des Infanterie-Regiments Nr. 16_, p. 230.

[57] _Geschichte des Infanterie-Regiments Nr. 57_, p. 47. HÖNIG,
_Untersuchungen über die Taktik der Zukunft_, 4th Edition, p. 61.

On the morning of June 26th, 1866 (day of rest), reveille sounded
by a trumpeter was mistaken for an alarm signal. The 7th Infantry
Division assembled and the signal was repeated in two other army
corps. Two days previous another useless alarm had occurred because a
trumpeter, surprised by a number of Radetzky Hussars, had blown the
alarm signal.[58]

[58] _Geschichte des Regiments Nr. 66_, pp. 48/49.

The village of =Diletz= (action at =Gitschin=, 1866) was to be
evacuated at the sounding of the signal (Saxon) “First Brigade
withdraw.” The signal was, however, understood and carried out
by only three battalions; two battalions, which were at the time
engaged, did not hear it at all and maintained their position until
they were taken in reverse by hostile fire and forced to withdraw.[59]

[59] _Anteil des Königlich-Sächsischen Armeekorps_, p. 130.

In the crisis of the fight of the Füsilier Battalion of the 48th
Infantry and the 1st Battalion of the 52nd at =Vionville=, the signal
“assemble” was sounded and repeated by other trumpeters, further
mischief being averted by the energetic efforts of the officers who
prevented trumpeters from blowing the call and ordered them to blow
“commence firing” instead.[60]

[60] _Geschichte des Regiments Nr. 52_, p. 59.

2. THE PURPOSE OF FORMATIONS. COMPARISON BETWEEN LINE AND COLUMN.

The object of assembly formations is to unite troops, usually prior to a movement, in a restricted space permitting an easy survey of the entire body. Assembly formations serve also the purpose of placing troops in readiness before starting on a march, before beginning an action, and for moving them on the battlefield when out of reach of hostile fire (columns). Route formations should permit an orderly, comfortable march of the troops, as much of the available width of road being used as possible, a space being left for orderlies and mounted messengers, and for troops which are drawn forward. In order to permit a prompt deployment of troops for action, it is necessary to reduce their depth. Columns only are suitable for moving troops. The situation existing at the moment will determine to what extent allowances may be made for the comfort of the troops, or how far considerations of comfort should be ignored in view of readiness for action, and to what extent the depth of the columns should be decreased.

The formations for moving troops (to be employed in marching across country and to be used on the battlefield) should be such as to cause the least discomfort to the troops, should make it possible to avoid obstacles, to utilize cover, facilitate changes of front and direction of march, and permit a prompt deployment in any direction. These formations are columns unless the hostile fire effect makes a deployment into line necessary.

Battle formations should be such as to permit the employment of all weapons (rifles, lances, sabres, and guns). This requirement is not satisfied by columns, but only by the line. Modern fire effect excludes every employment of close order formations under effective hostile fire and compels the most extensive deployment.