Chapter VI: Part 6

It is worthy of note that the packed knapsack affords protection against all shrapnel bullets having a velocity of 100 m. and against half of those having a velocity of 200 m. The overcoat roll stops shrapnel bullets having a velocity of less than 250 m. The penetration of these bullets is so great, at ranges under 2000 m., that when they strike bones or vital organs of horses, they produce instant incapacity for action. This is especially true when the interval of burst is less than 100 m.

B. INFANTRY FIRE.[123]

[123] Lieutenant-General ROHNE, _Schieszlehre für die Infanterie_.
Colonel MINARELLI-FITZGERALD, Austrian Army, _Modernes Schieszwesen_,
1901.

The modern infantry rifle, cal. 6.5 to 8. mm., is a magazine arm employing steel jacketed, pointed bullets, arranged in clips. The adoption of automatic rifles is contemplated. In these rifles the recoil energy is utilized for throwing out empty shells and for placing a fresh cartridge into the chamber at the same time. The objections made to the adoption of such a rifle (complexity of the mechanism, danger of wasting ammunition) are similar to the reasons advanced against the adoption of breech-loading and magazine rifles. In addition to the increased rate of fire, the advantage of eliminating the effect of the recoil on the skirmisher must not be underestimated. Moreover, the elimination of the recoil makes a further increase in the initial velocity of the projectile possible.

The effect of infantry fire may be considered from two points of view, viz.: the effect on the enemy of a single projectile, and the effective hit in itself.

1. THE EFFECT OF A SINGLE PROJECTILE ON ANIMATE TARGETS.[124]

[124] See _Löbells Militärische Jahresberichte_, 1905, p. 475,
and 1906, p. 412, which contain complete references to military
literature. _Militär-Wochenblatt_, No. 1, 1906.

During the Russo-Japanese war the contending parties used the following small arms and projectiles:

======+=========+=======+=====+=====================+=========
| Rifle. | Model | Cal.| PROJECTILE. |Initial
| |(year).| |Description. |Weight.|Velocity.
| | | mm. | | g. | m.
------+---------+-------+-----+-------------+-------+---------
Japan |{Arisaka | ’97 | 6.5 |Hardened lead| 10.5 | 715
|{Murata | ’94 | 8.0 |core with | 15.42 | 564
| | | |copper-nickel| |
Russia| ---- | ’91 | 7.62|jacket. | 13.7 | 615
------+---------+-------+-----+-------------+-------+---------

The ballistic qualities of the _Arisaka_ rifle were superior to those of the Russian arm, but the maiming effect of the two rifles was about equal. The striking energy of the projectiles was not sufficient in every case, however, to put a man out of action. The explosive effect produced by bullets striking interior organs and bones at short ranges (within 500 m.) was more evident in wounds made by the 8. mm. than by the _Arisaka_ rifle.[125]

[125] “The projectile that penetrates animal organisms displaces
and consequently destroys the tissue fibers lying in its path. The
projectile communicates a portion of its energy to the molecules
struck, and these in turn transfer that energy to adjoining ones.
The greater the velocity of the projectile at the moment of impact,
the more rapid is this transfer of motion. Especially in organs
filled with fluid are the molecules, like firm bodies, thrown with
the greatest rapidity. This has a destructive effect which in the
past has never been observed to be so extensive, and which gives the
impression that the projectile has exploded in the body. In order to
produce this effect a velocity of about 350 to 400 m. is required,
which was, of course, not obtainable in rifles of older pattern,
and was only possible in the immediate vicinity of the muzzle.
Whenever the projectile strikes a marrow bone with great velocity it
shatters it completely at the point of impact, and splinters it to
a considerable extent, all because the bone is filled with a liquid
substance.” ROHNE, _Schieszlehre für die Infanterie_, p. 69.

At mid ranges the wounds were generally of a mild character, unless produced by tumbling bullets.[126]

[126] See also _Ricochets_, p. 185 infra.

Experiments prove that a projectile will tumble if it encounters varying resistance (for example, if the projectile strikes an obstacle, even if that be only a twig) or if it penetrates materials of different density (for instance, if, in penetrating a body, it strikes first upon a fleshy part, then upon bones). In the last mentioned case the bullet will frequently tumble in the body. If a projectile be fired through a series of boards, placed at intervals, it will tumble in the second board, or if not there, then certainly in the third board. Projectiles which ricochet on the ground before penetrating a human body change their form more or less, according to the character of the ground on which they ricochet. As the jacket is frequently torn, thus exposing the leaden kernel, wounds may be produced which will equal those made by explosive bullets.

The striking energy of the projectile is sufficient to perforate two men at 1200 m. From experiments made with the _Lebel_ rifle on corpses, it appeared that the projectile passed clear through 5 bodies at 100 m., through 4 bodies at 400 m. (even when large bones were struck) and through 2 bodies at 1200 m.

In the Russo-Japanese war wounds were distributed as follows, on a basis of 100 hits: lower limbs, 39.5; upper limbs, 25.4; abdominal region, 16.5; chest, 15.5; spinal column, 15, and head, 11. Flesh wounds are generally slight. This is due to the fact that the hole made by the bullet is small, that the exterior flow of blood is insignificant, and that the wound rarely becomes infected. Projectiles remain in the body now much more rarely than in the past.

The central portion of marrow bones is frequently splintered by projectiles, while thicker flat bones (shoulder blades) are cleanly perforated.

Unless a tumbling bullet or a splinter of a bone penetrates the lungs, chest wounds appear in much more favorable forms than in past wars.[127]

[127] “A soldier of the 3rd East Siberian Regiment, who had been
shot in the chest, for instance, subsequently walked to the nearest
railway station, a distance of over 20 km., and felt fairly well
except for a slight difficulty in breathing. A lance corporal of
the 36th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, having received a similar
wound, began his journey to the nearest railway station on a
two-wheeled cart. The motion of the cart nauseated him to such an
extent, however, that he preferred to complete the journey on foot, a
distance of 30 km.” Dr. SELDOWITSCHI in _Wratsch_.

According to observations made in the Russo-Japanese war, wounds in joints healed without suppuration, the joint and its mobility being saved. Amputations were extremely rare, and the surgeon’s skill was, as a rule, seldom necessary in the treatment of shot wounds. Chest wounds were slight, and often many men walked a few _versts_ to the dressing station, some of them complaining of difficulty in breathing. As a rule, such wounds healed in fourteen days. Chest wounds were more serious when the heart or the large blood vessels were injured; but even in these cases cures were effected. Abdominal wounds were not so serious as in the past. Contrary to past experience, skull wounds, in which the projectile had passed entirely through the brain, were treated with fair success.

The campaigns in South Africa and Manchuria have amply demonstrated that wounds produced by jacketed bullets of small caliber are not so serious as those caused by 11 mm. projectiles. In addition, these campaigns have shown that a further decrease in caliber is undesirable from the tactician’s point of view, for a hit by no means affords the certainty, in every case, of putting a man, much less a horse, out of action.

Moreover, the wounded man is cured so quickly that in a short time he can again participate in action. The British report of losses for the battle of Paardeberg, on February 18th, 1900, contains the names of a great many men who were wounded at Magersfontain on December 11th, 1899. According to British statements, 40 men out of every 100, seriously wounded by steel jacketed bullets, could be returned to duty after 36 days of surgical treatment. Dr. Küttner estimates that of 154 men hit in the chest, 73 were able to return to duty with their organizations; while, out of 92 men wounded in the knee, only 28 could be sent back to duty. Wounds produced by the small caliber _Arisaka_ rifle during the Russo-Japanese war healed more rapidly than those caused by the Russian weapon. Flesh wounds of Japanese soldiers, for example, healed in ten days, those of Russian soldiers in four. The following observations were made on wounds produced by the Russian rifle: Within a week slight wounds were covered by a scab; after three weeks they were covered by fresh skin and a part of the wounded were then able to return to the front. The remainder, irrespective of the number of wounds received by any one individual, were ready for duty in seven months. Wounds in which bones were perforated without splintering, healed in four to six weeks, so that the men could return to duty within four or five months after receiving the wound. When bones were splintered the cure was, of course, considerably retarded.

The ballistic advantages of a small-caliber projectile (undesirable from the military surgeon’s point of view) have been obtained by the adoption of a pointed-nose bullet (called the “S” bullet in Germany and the “D” bullet in France).[128]

[128]

Rifle Rifle
mod. ’88. mod. ’98; Lebel rifle;
“S” bullet. “D” bullet.
Caliber 7.9 mm. 7.9 mm. 8. mm.
Weight of bullet 14.7 g. 10. g. 13.2 g.
Initial velocity 640. m. 860. m. 730. m.
Remaining velocity at 800 m. 270. m. 362. m. 377. m.
Maximum ordinate of trajectory
at 700 m. 3.80 m. 1.85 m. 2.10 m.

_Militär-Wochenblatt_, 1906, No. 53; _Vierteljahrshefte_, 1907. II,
p. 281.

A further advantage of these bullets is that they produce serious wounds on account of their tendency to tumble. These wounds, while not inhuman, instantly disable the man struck, or, at any rate, postpone his recovery indefinitely.

=The Effect of “S” Bullets on Corpses.=

======================+====================================
| THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN
Of the Total Number +--------+---------+--------------
of Men Hit | Fatally|Instantly|Incapacitated
in Each Case. |injured.|disabled.|for some time.
| % | % | %
----------------------+--------+---------+--------------
Flesh wounds 800 m | ---- | 36.4 | 27.3
----------+ | |
produced at 1350 m | ---- | 43.8 | 37.3
----------------------+--------+---------+--------------
Bones struck 800 m | 20.3 | 79.2 | 75.0
----------+ | |
at 1350 m | 11.1 | 88.9 | 88.9
----------------------|--------+---------+--------------
Average | 7.97 | 62.07 | 57.12
----------------------+--------+---------+--------------

2. THE EFFECT OF “S” BULLETS ON MATERIALS.

The following thicknesses of dry pine are pierced by the “S” bullet (rifle model ’98) at the ranges given:

60 cm at 100 m.
80 cm at 400 m.
35 cm at 800 m.
10 cm at 1800 m.

In sand and earth the penetration of the “S” bullet amounts to 90 cm. According to experiments, 3 mm. steel plates were pierced at 350 m., while hay stacks afforded protection when 4 m. thick; when of less thickness, the latter caused bullets to tumble. Embankments of frozen snow 1 m. thick, of packed snow 2 m. thick, and of loose snow 3 m. thick, were not pierced even at 250 m.

IV. THE EMPLOYMENT OF INFANTRY FIRE.

Infantry fire may produce either a stunning and paralyzing effect on the hostile forces, or it may gradually exhaust, wear out, and consume them. The fire will have a stunning and paralyzing effect when it is suddenly concentrated upon a narrow front, thereby producing fear and terror, provided actual losses are added to this moral effect.

On the other hand, the fire will gradually exhaust, wear out, and destroy the hostile forces when it is distributed for a prolonged period over an extended front. In this case the material losses suffered and the exhaustion of his physical energies may force the conviction on the enemy that he has no longer a chance to gain the victory. This conviction will cause a suspension of all his energies and consequently of his determination to fight.

At =Modder River= (28th November, 1899) the Boers opened fire on the
British at 1000 m., although they had intended to hold their fire
until the British arrived within 300 m. of the position.[129]

[129] General MINARELLI-FITZGERALD, _Die Gefechte in Natal und der
Kap-Kolonie_, 1899.

The miscarriage of the contemplated sudden burst of fire resulted
in a fire fight, which tended to destroy gradually the physical and
moral powers of the British. The Boers, however, gave this gradually
destroying fire a paralyzing effect by concentrating it suddenly and
continuously on tactically important targets that were comparatively
easy to hit. Minarelli makes the following comments on the attack
made by the British 9th Brigade and Brigade of Guards at =Modder
River=: “All further attempts to induce the Guards to advance had to
be abandoned. For hours they lay on the dearly bought ground under a
blistering African sun, utilizing as cover every ant hill, every tuft
of grass, on the apparently deserted battlefield, and being morally
certain that to get up would draw a deadly hail of shot.” In regard
to the fight of the 9th Brigade, the same author states: “Meantime
the 9th Brigade fared no better. It had in part been able to get a
little closer to the enemy (550 to 900 m.), but was then unable to
advance farther. The actual losses were very small in the ten-hour
fight, amounting only to seven per cent. The Highland Brigade,
surprised at =Magersfontain=, fared still worse. The fight growing
out of the surprise lasted almost ten hours. At the short range at
which this action was fought, the Boer method of fire (_i.e._, to
fire only when an enemy raised himself to get better aim, and then to
employ only an effective concentrated fire) necessarily produced a
depressing effect.”

In order that such a fire effect may be obtained, it is necessary that the individual soldier combine coolness and presence of mind with good marksmanship, and that company, platoon and squad leaders maintain fire control and fire direction.

1. FIRE DISCIPLINE.

Fire discipline is indispensable to fire control and fire direction. It embraces the conscientious execution of all orders and signals, as well as the scrupulous observation of all regulations bearing on the handling of the rifle and on combat in general. Fire discipline must be maintained even though the fire control and fire direction exercised by the leaders is imperfect or ceases entirely in the course of the action.

=Fire discipline= requires:

Perseverance under hostile fire, even when that fire cannot be returned; constant attention to the orders of the leaders, and careful observation of the enemy. It requires further, taking advantage of the ground; care in setting the sight and in delivery of fire; an increase of fire by individuals whenever the targets become more favorable, and a cessation of fire when the enemy disappears; finally, economy of ammunition.

The decision is prepared by the fire of infantry, supported by machine guns, field, and heavy artillery. The fire of troops pushed to within short range of the hostile position will in many cases suffice to induce the enemy to give way, so that the assault encounters nothing but evacuated or feebly defended works. The Boer war and the Russo-Japanese war demonstrate that determined troops will hold a position until the attacker has massed sufficient troops to charge, or at least until he threatens to attack with the bayonet. Examples: Terrayama, on October 11th, 1904. Assault made by the 2nd Division on March 1st, 1905, at Mukden, on Redouts 17 and 18.

Training in bayonet fencing has by no means lost importance, irrespective of the fact as to whether or not bayonets will ever be crossed in future. “Bayonet fencing is one of the most important means of strengthening the moral force of the individual soldier; of developing in him energy, initiative, and courage for making a dashing advance.”[130]

[130] _Introduction to German Bayonet Fencing Regulations._

Since the armament of the different armies is almost the same, good individual marksmanship, coolness, fire control and fire direction, and firmly rooted fire discipline, are the deciding factors in an action in which two equal skirmish lines contend for the superiority of fire.

2. FIRE CONTROL AND FIRE DIRECTION.

The principal object of fire control and fire direction is to bring about a superiority of fire at the decisive point by suddenly concentrating the fire of a large number of rifles upon it. This is the only way in which a moral effect may be produced on the troops against whom the fire is directed, while, at the same time, their losses attain such proportions as to become unbearable. At mid and long ranges, the efficacy of fire depends more on fire control and fire direction than upon good individual marksmanship.[131] Whenever the appropriate rear sight elevation is not used, the densest portion of the cone of dispersion will not strike the target, and the chances of its hitting the target diminish as the error in estimating the range and the standard of excellence of the marksmanship increase.

[131] See ROHNE, _Schieszlehre für die Infanterie_, 3rd Edition,
p. 85. “The importance of the line shot (_i.e._, a hit on the
vertical stripe through the center of the German bull’s-eye target)
in the marksmanship training of the soldier should by no means be
underestimated, but rather appreciated at its true value. The line
shot forms the basis of known distance firing, just as the latter
forms the basis of field firing. Instruction in line shooting
(_i.e._, hitting the vertical stripe of the German bull’s-eye target)
becomes a moral factor of the highest value in field firing. It
cannot be denied, however, that the importance of the line shot, as
such, decreases with the range. Likewise all attempts to transfer
the zone of the line shot from short to long ranges have completely
failed.” Captain KRAUSE, _Die Gestaltung der Geschoszgarbe der
Infanterie_, Berlin, 1904, p. 1.

Fire control and fire direction lie in the hands of platoon commanders,[132] who regulate the fire as their judgment dictates. Fire control and direction embrace: the opening and cessation of fire; the designation of a target and of the elevation to be used; the kind of fire and its distribution; the number of rounds to be fired, and the observation of the effect of the fire. As a rule, the fire will be distributed over the whole front, but portions of the hostile line that are not clearly visible should by no means be neglected (distribution of fire). Regulations prescribing the scope of authority of individual leaders are not considered desirable. The platoon commander possesses in his squad leaders a medium for communicating with his platoon. (Pars. 162-165 German I. D. R.). The movements of the skirmishers, the correct _comprehension of the target_, the _distribution of fire_, the _rate of fire_, and the _employment of the terrain to the best advantage_, are regulated through the squad leaders. The lack of thoroughly drilled coöperation on the part of squad leaders inevitably results, as might be expected, in a so-called “skirmish mob.” The platoon commander cannot communicate directly with every individual man of his platoon, but he can control his platoon through his eight squad leaders, who, by reason of their position in the line, can exert the proper influence on their skirmishers.[133]

[132] The _Belgian Firing Regulations_ require that the officer
directing and controlling the fire fight be able to determine: 1. The
time necessary to produce a certain effect with a given number of
rifles; 2. The number of rounds necessary to produce a certain effect
in a given period of time; 3. Whether a given target justifies the
expenditure of ammunition in view of the situation or the efficacy of
the fire. The requirements of the _Italian Firing Regulations_ are
similar.

[133] Austria: The position of the platoon leader is not so
definitely fixed as in Germany; neither is it prescribed that squad
leaders participate in the firing. In skirmish line fire control
and fire direction are to remain as long as possible in the hands
of the company commander. The battalion commander is charged with
concentrating and distributing the fire; with reinforcing, at the
proper time, the companies in the firing line; and with replenishing
the ammunition. At long ranges he designates the companies that are
to fire, and also the position from which fire is to be opened.

The squad leaders are charged with _constantly supervising_ the setting of sights; the distribution, the careful delivery, and the rate of fire; and the expenditure of ammunition.

_The squad leaders participate in the firing only_ when their duties as leaders permit; and this will frequently be the case in a prolonged engagement in the same position, especially at short ranges. These remarks apply also to the range finders.

In Italy and Switzerland the squad leaders participate in the firing when the whole platoon is engaged in a fire fight. The advantage of thus gaining a few better shots for the firing line is more than offset by the more careful supervision of the skirmishers as is required in Germany, France and Austria. The platoon leader unaided is in no position to supervise the proper use of the rifle and the expenditure of ammunition; his subordinates must assist him. It is also desirable to relieve the company commander from the actual duty of fire direction and fire control. The company commander is responsible for leading the company on the battlefield; this does not preclude his thoroughly supervising his platoons and observing the effect of their fire.

“Whenever the company commander is in the firing line, he selects and designates the target and gives orders for opening fire. He announces the range found by the range finders and observes the effect of the fire. Aside from this, he leaves fire control and fire direction to his platoon commanders, and interferes only when he desires to concentrate the fire of several platoons, or of the whole company, on a certain target, or when he observes something that has escaped the notice of the platoon commanders.” (Par. 216 German I. D. R.).

In the course of an action, fire control and fire direction will frequently be imperfect, whether this be due to the loss of the leaders, or to the difficulty of hearing commands in the noise of the combat. To provide for such contingencies, the skirmishers must be taught that, in the absence of fire control and fire direction, they may fire (_not that they must fire_) at all targets within 600 m.; that between 600 and 1200 m., they should fire at tall and wide targets only; and that, at ranges over 1000 m., as a rule, they should not fire at all.

In the pamphlet entitled, _Actual Experiences in the Russo-Japanese
War_, p. 11, et seq., Captain SOLOVIEV, 34th East Siberian Rifle
Regiment, 1st Siberian Corps, states: “* * * There was an almost
ungovernable tendency among the men, as soon as they had thrown
themselves down, to open fire without orders; paying attention
neither to the target designated, nor to setting their sights.

“This haste is, first of all, brought about by the desire of drowning
the consciousness of danger by means of increased activity. * * *
It is simply impossible to control and direct the fire when the men
have not been carefully trained. The din of battle, the explosion of
hostile projectiles, and the thunder of our own artillery make such a
deafening roar that one can scarcely hear one’s own voice. The long
firing lines make it extraordinarily difficult to transmit orders;
even squad commanders can not make themselves understood. Volley
firing must therefore be dispensed with.

“Only whistle signals, if repeated by all non-commissioned officers,
can be heard; but the men must be trained to obey the whistle signal.
With strictness and application much can be accomplished in this
direction; it may even be possible to stop the firing along the whole
length of the deployed company in the hottest phases of the fight.

“The difficulties of fire control and fire direction increase in
proportion to the intensity of the hostile fire and the proximity of
the enemy, especially on the defensive. The men get more and more
restless, their nervous tension increases, the danger seems nearer
and greater. In such a moment the leader must make every effort to
keep his men in hand, and prevent the firing from degenerating into a
wild blazing away at nothing. This is always a sign that the leader
has lost control of his troops.

“The greatest obstacle to good fire control and fire direction is the
nervousness that usually pervades troops which are not accustomed
to active service. Only thorough peace training and strict fire
discipline ensure the maintenance of order in battle and give the
fire the necessary efficacy. * * * The more laborious the struggle,
the more embittered the fight, the greater the losses, the more
fatigue and nervous strain gain the upper hand, the greater and
more important the role which the officer has to play. The success
of the 200 men under his command depends entirely upon the company
commander. The war in the Far East might well be called the war
of company commanders. The soldiers watch their leader constantly
and attentively. Two hundred lives depend upon his bearing, his
determination, firmness, and personal bravery. The men judge the
situation, the imminence of danger, success and failure, by the
conduct of their leader. The authority of an officer may rise to
great heights, but it may also sink very low. To show depression or
faint-heartedness is fatal; the feeling of despondency is at once
communicated to the men, the leader loses control of his command, and
the mischief is done.

“In battle, more than anywhere else, the officer must be a commander
and rule with an iron hand. Nowhere does discipline play as great a
role as in action. Woe to the troops who have not in time of peace
become thoroughly disciplined, to whom discipline has not become
second nature! They will pay dearly for this deficiency in war.

“I have observed that in the most critical situations a resolute
shout, in a correspondingly imperious tone, had a marvelously
quieting effect upon the men. It is likewise advisable to make, here
and there, a remark concerning routine duty. For example: ‘Why have
the sights not been set in that platoon? Platoon commander, see at
once that it is done.’ Because the commander is angry, and notices
neglect, everything goes well, so the men reason, and no danger need
be apprehended. The men quiet down, forget the whistling of the
bullets, set their sights carefully, point their pieces properly, and
aim again.”

3. SELECTION OF THE LINE TO BE OCCUPIED.

While a good field of fire is indispensable for reaping the maximum benefit from the power of our rifles, the tactical situation is the determining factor in the choice of a position. The requirements as to a field of fire and the use to be made of it will vary, depending upon whether it is desired to avoid an engagement at short range (delaying action) or whether a decision is to be sought (decisive action). In the first case a free field of fire at short ranges may be dispensed with.

Cover may be used only to the extent that it does not interfere with constant observation of the enemy. It is not permissible to hide entirely behind cover, unless expressly ordered in each case. To rise from behind cover, for the purpose of firing, and to disappear subsequently behind that cover for loading, is out of the question in the firing line. This is physically impossible and much less attainable for psychological reasons; in addition, the skirmisher will present a much larger target than when lying down. When portions of the firing line cannot see the target during an attack, the platoon commander should consider this a hint, either to gain a better position farther to the front, or to suspend his fire temporarily. (Par. 190 German I. D. R.). In defense, in a similar case, cross fire would frequently be the proper expedient. The attacker will often see nothing except the heads of the skirmishers who must fire kneeling in order to sweep the foreground, while these men will present targets of half a man’s height to his bullets. Since smokeless powder is employed, it is important to select positions that cannot easily be found by the enemy. Positions in which the skirmishers are silhouetted against the sky line should be avoided whenever possible. Faintly illuminated targets, or those lying in the shade, are not fired on at all, according to all experience, while the fire is above all else directed against sharply outlined targets. The leaders must take to cover also, for in many cases single officers standing upright draw attention to the position. The extent of the position must be commensurate with the strength of the force; too dense a line reduces the efficacy of fire and increases the losses, while, on the other hand, too dispersed a force increases the difficulties of fire control and fire direction.

4. THE STRENGTH OF THE FIRING LINE.

This depends upon the purpose of the action. Although a thin firing line may be employed when the situation is still in doubt (protection against surprise), it must be strong when the superiority of fire is to be attained. If the firing line is made too weak, we are condemned to fight a superior force continuously with an inferior one because we have voluntarily sacrificed the advantage of our numerical superiority. On the defensive, as soon as the direction of the hostile attack develops, the firing line is made as strong as seems necessary for holding the position. In a delaying action, however, we should endeavor to place as few men in action as possible; and to compensate for the lack of rifles by an increased expenditure of ammunition. All firing is done from the prone position, in so far as the ground permits. The French attempt to regulate the volume of fire by prescribing the number of rifles to be employed instead of designating the kind of fire to be used.

In Switzerland and England,[134] it is recommended that supports use “Fire of position” where the terrain is suitable (hilly country). The German Infantry Drill Regulations (par. 340) contain a similar provision. When the supports cannot see the firing line on account of the conformation of the ground, this fire is not likely to endanger the latter.

[134] _Infantry Training_, 1905, p. 132, par. 2; p. 134, pars. 1,
2; p. 136, par. 6; p. 155, par. 1. See p. 154, infra.

5. ASCERTAINING RANGES.

(Pars. 78-98, 190 and 191 German I. F. R.).

Efficacy of fire depends upon a knowledge of the range. An imperfect knowledge of the range may be compensated for by the flatness of the trajectory of the individual rifle and by the favorable conformation of the ground in respect to the cone of dispersion. In collective fire, at mid and long ranges, each rear sight graduation commands a beaten zone approximately 100 m. deep--good aim, proper elevation, and careful firing being presupposed. The nearer the target is to the densest portion of the cone of dispersion, the greater the efficacy of the fire.

The following results were obtained in Italian firing tests in which 100 skirmishers fired at a plate 1 m. high and 30 m. wide with the 6.5 mm. rifle:

=====================+======================+=======================
| MEASURED RANGE. | ESTIMATED RANGE.
+----------+-----------+----------+------------
| Slow fire| Rapid fire| Slow fire|Rapid fire
| [135] | [135] | [135] | [135]
|Percentage|Percentage |Percentage|Percentage
| of hits. | of hits. | of hits. | of hits.
---------------------+----------+-----------+----------+------------
At 500 m. | 21.5 | 15.8 | 14.8 | 11.3
At 1000 m. | 11.1 | 8.1 | 6.5 | 5.3
At 1500 m. | 5. | 3.4 | 2.6 | 2.2
Average results at-- | | | |
Ranges under 1000 m. | 18.2 | 13.6 | 12.1 | 9.3
Ranges over 1000 m. | 7.1 | 5.1 | 3.2 | 3.2
---------------------+----------+-----------+----------+------------

[135] Slow fire four shots, rapid fire fourteen shots, per minute.

Beyond 600 m., an error in the range exerts a greater influence upon the efficacy of fire than does the marksmanship of the skirmishers.[136] When an improper elevation has been selected, the efficacy of the fire decreases as the compactness of the “cone of dispersion” increases; in other words, the efficacy of the fire decreases as the excellence of the marksmanship of the men and their coolness in the face of the enemy increase. (See pp. 170 and 171, infra).

[136] ROHNE, _Das Gefechtsmäszige Abteilungsschieszen der
Infanterie_, p. 13.

The following expedients for ascertaining ranges may be mentioned:

(_a_) Pacing and galloping;

(_b_) Estimating distances on the ground by eye (by comparison with known distances; by estimating part of the distance);

(_c_) Firing trial volleys (ranging);

(_d_) Taking the range from a map of large scale or obtaining it directly from infantry or artillery already engaged;

(_e_) Measuring the range directly on the ground.

Pacing (employed in Russia, France, and Austria) gives inaccurate
results. There is a difference between the number of paces a man
takes per 100 m., on a chaussee and in a ploughed field. Length of
pace depends upon the character and slope of the ground.[137] In
pacing over varied ground, a man follows the slope line while the
projectile follows an airline. Therefore it would seem that pacing is
only practicable at short ranges when the enemy is not near. The same
is true of galloping over the distance. (The length of a horse’s jump
at a gallop is on an average 3 m.).

[137] Professor RZIHA ascertained the following diminution of the
length of a pace at different degrees of slope:

_Descending_ slope, degrees. 0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Length of pace in cm. 77 70 62 56 50 45 30
Number of paces per 100 m. 129 143 161 179 200 222 333

_Ascending_ slope, degrees. 0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Length of pace in cm. 77 74 72 70 67 60 50
Number of paces per 100 m. 120 135 138 143 148 166 200

According to Major CZERNY, Austrian Army (_Treffwahrscheinlichkeit_,
in _Streffleur_, 1906, II), the error may be as much as 16 per cent
of the range.

In estimates made by individual men, the error amounts approximately to one-eighth (12.5%) of the range;[138] this may be corrected by taking the mean of a considerable number of estimates, or by employing combined sights at ranges over 1000 m. (the difference between rear sight elevations being 100 to 200 m.), thus increasing the depth of the beaten zone. The accuracy of the resulting fire is influenced by local and atmospheric conditions. (Par. 80 German I. F. R.). Estimates usually fall short of the correct distance when made in bright sunlight; in clear atmosphere; when the sun is in rear of the man estimating; when made over uniform surfaces; over water; when the target is set off by a bright background; when made over rolling ground, especially when the several depressions cannot be seen. On the other hand, estimates frequently exceed the correct range when made in a flickering light; against a dark background; against the sun; when the sky is overcast; during foggy weather; in the dusk; in woods; and against an enemy who is only partially visible. According to the Swiss Firing Regulations (1906) estimates made from a height downward are usually too short, and those made from low ground up, too great.

[138] Lieutenant-General ROHNE, _Das Gefechtsmäszige
Abteilungsschieszen der Infanterie_, 4th Edition, p. 12.

The following statement is taken from a report made at the British
Musketry School at Hythe (5th Nov., 1905). In a great number of
estimates under 700 yards (630 m.) the results given below were
obtained:

--------Error-------- Greater
Correct ±50 yards ±100 yards errors
Officers of the Regular Army 15 49 20 14%
Officers of Militia and
Volunteers 20 44 22 20%

France: Officers made errors of 20% at the beginning of the period of
instruction, 12% at its close; rank and file of the Regular Army and
non-commissioned officers of the Reserve made errors of 30%.

In action, under the influence of danger, estimates are usually short.[139] Peace training proves that the skill of the majority of soldiers in estimating distances can be improved only up to a certain point.

[139] The advance of the IInd Battalion of the 2nd Hessian Regiment
on August 18th, 1870, from the Bols de la Cusse against the height
northwest of Amanweiler: “The companies, who supposed the enemy to
be much nearer” (the actual range was 1,100 to 1,200 m.), “advanced,
cheering, and were received with mitrailleuse, shell, and rifle fire
(from hill 1,030) which swept the railroad line.” HESSERT.

Battle of Plevna, September 11th, 1877. Debouchment from corn
fields: “The distance still to be crossed before the Turkish
works were reached was underestimated. One company cheered when
at a distance of 900 to 1,000 paces from the hostile works:
the other troops took up the cry and rushed forward at a run.”
KUROPATKIN-KRAHMER, _Kritische Rückblicke auf den Russisch-Türkischen
Krieg_.

=Germany.= All the men are practiced in estimating distances up to
800 m. Officers, non-commissioned officers and suitable men (range
finders) are to be trained in quickly and accurately estimating mid
ranges, and practiced in ascertaining long ranges. (Par. 78 German I.
F. R.).

“Even a skillful range finder, if he is conscientious, can do no more
than give a minimum and a maximum estimate of what he considers the
range to be. The ranges must be communicated to the men accordingly.
The differences between maximum and minimum estimates should be as
follows: At ranges up to and including 500 m., 100 m. (for example:
350-450, or 500-600 m.); between 500 and including 1000 m., 200 m.;
over 1000 m., 300 m.”

=Italy.= Subalterns are, as a general rule, charged with estimating
the ranges. Non-commissioned officers must be able to estimate ranges
up to 1000 m. All non-commissioned officers as well as suitable
privates participate in estimating distance drill, which is conducted
by an officer in each battalion. The results are recorded in a book.
The following is the classification:

Excellent range finders: Those whose error rarely exceeds 50 and
never 100 m.

Good range finders: Those whose error does not exceed 100 m., and in
exceptional cases 150 m.

Fair range finders: Those whose normal error does not exceed 150 and
never 200 m.

Poor range finders: Those whose error exceeds 200 m.

The =Russians= estimate only short ranges, as a rule; the longer
ranges are determined by means of range finding instruments. In the
first year of their service all the men are drilled in estimating
ranges from 400 to 800 paces; officers and twenty specially selected
men from each company up to 3000 paces. The latter (both officers
and men) are to make at least 36 estimates in nine days. (Par. 190
Russian I. F. R.). The result is considered good when the error in
the estimate does not exceed the figure given below at the ranges
named:

Range in paces. Error in paces. Percentage of error.
400 to 1000 paces 50 or 12.5 to 5 %
1000 „ 2000 „ 100 „ 10 „ 5 „
2000 „ 3000 „ 200 „ 10 „ 6.6„

The Russian range finding instrument (_Souchier_) is used by
officers and specially trained non-commissioned officers; errors in
determining ranges are not to exceed a maximum of 2-3 per cent.

In =Switzerland= recruits are trained to estimate distances up to
600 m. and specially skilled men up to 1500 m.; all non-commissioned
officers estimate ranges up to 1000 m. and officers up to 1500
m. Three weeks after the recruits join, those of the most skilled
in estimating distances--about an eighth of the total number--are
selected to undergo further instruction. For this purpose they are
placed under the orders of an officer charged with this instruction,
who trains them for at least three hours, every other day, in
estimating distances on varied ground. The better half of these men,
regardless of the company to which they may belong, receive further
instruction. Exercises on wholly unknown terrain are to be had with
these men and not only extended marches but even railway journeys not
exceeding 30 km. are authorized for this purpose.

In =Austria= the men are required to estimate distances up to 800
paces (600 m.),_i.e._, up to the range within which they might
frequently have to choose their target independently. Only officers,
non-commissioned officers, and specially skilled men are required to
estimate ranges up to 2000 paces (1500 m.). The mean error of twenty
determinations at short, mid, and long ranges, of a “reliable range
finder,” is not to exceed 12 per cent. The _Roksandic_ range finding
apparatus is said to give errors not exceeding 2-3 per cent when
skillfully used.

To memorize distinguishing marks on the enemy as an aid in arriving at a correct estimate of the range, is not considered as simulating actual service conditions, since the power of vision of the men differs. Furthermore, one sees the enemy mostly in a prone position in action, and it is not to be expected that the men will remember the various rules for determining the range by the appearance of the enemy’s skirmishers. The same is true of the regulation which prescribes that the soldier estimating the range is to judge the effect which the target makes upon him. (England and Austria).

It will rarely be practicable for infantry to scale the range directly from a map. Infantry ranges are usually so short, in comparison to the scale of most of the maps, especially those available in the field, that it is difficult to take them between the points of a pair of dividers. Moreover, in an infantry action conspicuous objects are not likely to be located often enough near the position of the skirmishers to make it practicable to find them quickly even on the most accurate maps. The artillery is much better off in this direction; its ranges are longer and therefore more easily scaled from a map. Moreover, artillery is generally posted on or near prominent points, which may be found on almost any map. It should be remembered that a map is a horizontal projection, that any range scaled from a map is the base of a right triangle, and that the line of sight of a rifle, when firing uphill, follows the hypotenuse of that triangle.

An accurate knowledge of the range to within a meter is not necessary, as meteorological conditions,[140] especially temperature and illumination (degree of humidity of the atmosphere) affect the range of the projectile. Meteorological conditions may necessitate sight corrections amounting to 100 m. at mid ranges and to 150 m. at long ranges. According to the French Firing Regulations a difference of temperature of ±10 degrees C., changes the range of the Lebel rifle by 18 m. at 1000 m. The altitude of the terrain increases the range on account of reduced barometric pressure; this becomes a factor in the selection of a rear sight elevation at an altitude of approximately 1000 m. According to the French Firing Regulations, the range of their rifle at 1000 m. is increased as follows: At an altitude of 500 m. by 18; at 1000 m. by 42; at 1500 m. by 63; and at 2100 m. by 89 m.

[140] Lieutenant-General ROHNE, _Schieszlehre für die Infanterie_,
p. 51, and also par. 70 Austrian I. F. R. The effect of temperature
and of the altitude of the battlefield was strikingly illustrated in
the Boer war.

These meteorological influences can be eliminated by obtaining the range from troops already engaged (artillery) or by determining the proper rear sight elevation (not the range) by trial volleys (pars. 190 and 191 German I. F. R.) or by an animated fire at will (Switzerland: fire at will, one round).

To ascertain the range by firing trial volleys is, however, practicable only when the terrain near the target is visible; when the target itself is stationary; when the ground is such that the strike of the bullets can be observed; when the firing party is not under fire; and, finally, when the necessary time is available. Since all of these preliminary conditions will rarely be fulfilled, it will only in exceptional cases be possible to determine the proper elevation by this method.

When this method is employed, volleys are fired either by sections or
by platoons, with the same sight, at some one point of the target.
For the first volley a rear sight elevation sufficiently below
the proper one should be selected, so that hits on or in front of
the target can be expected with certainty. This procedure is then
repeated, as often as necessary, with correspondingly raised or
lowered rear sight leaves, until the correct elevation is obtained.

This “ranging” by trial volleys promises no result, however, if any one of the above-mentioned preliminary conditions is not fulfilled. It is advantageous to establish a bracket by firing volleys, as is done by artillery, but even with a good glass it is very difficult to observe the strike of small caliber bullets. Whether it would be advisable to adopt for this ranging a specially designed weapon, firing thin-walled shell weighing about 400 g., is a question.[141]

[141] The 32 mm. _Nordenfeld_ machine gun fires a shell weighing
400 g.

The older range finding instruments depend upon angle measurements at both ends of a line (up to 25 m. long). The large range finder (_Hahn_) has been adopted in the German army. (Pars. 88-98 German I. F. R.). This apparatus permits a range to be measured from one point, up to 1200 m. on low targets, and on taller targets, such as skirmishers standing, up to 1600 m. Measurements are considered sufficiently accurate when the error amounts to

2-3% up to a range of 1000 m.
3¹⁄₂-5% „ „ „ „ 2000 „
3-3¹⁄₂% „ „ „ „ 1500 „

On the defensive the large range finders will find employment before and during the action. The men charged with the measurement of the range should be careful not to betray the position by their activity, before fire is opened. The utility of these instruments is much more restricted in an attack. However, it will often be possible, before the fire fight begins, to ascertain the range from the point selected for the first firing position, to the position to be attacked. According to Soloviev range finders failed completely in action in Manchuria. (See p. 137 supra).

6. SELECTION OF A TARGET AND TIME FOR OPENING FIRE.

In selecting a target and opening fire it must be remembered that the fire cannot have a decisive effect unless the target is well within effective range. The leader should ask himself whether the result to be expected is properly commensurate with the probable expenditure of ammunition entailed, and whether this expenditure is warranted in view of the total amount available. But the decision to fire upon a target once made, the ammunition necessary for the attainment of the object of the fight must be expended without stinting, since all experience teaches us that an ineffective fire impairs the morale of one’s own troops, while it raises that of the enemy.

In the selection of a target, its tactical importance is the principal determining factor. The fire is first directed upon the most dangerous, generally the nearest target, or the one which is soon to become the most dangerous. Subsequently the fire should be directed upon targets which, owing to their height, width, depth, and density, promise the greatest number of effective hits.

Infantry will, as a rule, offer the most important and promising target, and the fire should be directed against the firing line, since the troops following it in close order will in any event come within range during their advance. In Italy, when two targets are available, the fire is to be directed on the one promising the best results.

Ballistic and tactical considerations determine whether fire should be opened at long or at short ranges.

Adequate results may be expected when the fire is directed against low targets at ranges of 800-1200 m., but at ranges over 1200 m. a decisive effect is only attainable by the expenditure of a large amount of ammunition. Skirmishers standing may be fired on with good effect even at ranges over 1200 m. (long ranges).

When the fire is properly controlled and directed, it will be effective against tall and deep targets within ranges corresponding to the highest graduations of the rear sight leaves. However, when the targets are narrow, a side wind is very apt to throw the cone of dispersion off the target.

The idea of using our accurate, long range rifle at long ranges in defense, thus bringing it into effective play, at a time when the danger to our own troops is still very small, is, at first glance, very tempting. Military history shows that such fire was successful here and there, especially where one of the contending parties was armed with a much superior weapon, or where the enemy failed to apply the proper remedy. But even in these cases it was successful only up to a certain point. There is this to be said against employing long range fire: Its effect is insignificant when compared with the expenditure of ammunition entailed; it is difficult to replenish ammunition and it tires the eye and the arm of the skirmisher. Poorly trained troops finally do not raise their rifles at all, but blaze away without aiming. To be sure, fire opened at an early moment annoys the advance of the enemy, but it cannot seriously retard it. Once the fire is opened, we want it to be effective; we don’t want to injure the enemy--we want to annihilate him.

Although we fully appreciate the good results obtained at long ranges on the target range, we prefer to utilize the entire staggering fire effect of our weapons at short and mid ranges, wholly for the purpose of annihilating the enemy.

Since only small targets, often scarcely discernible by the naked eye, present themselves to the attacker, the fire of the defender should not be returned at once. The forward movement should be continued by utilizing every expedient (rushes with breathing spells, and cover) until serious losses are sustained and the leader has reason to fear that his men will lose their morale and throw themselves down without orders. Frequently several groups will open fire while the others continue to advance. The endeavor should be to open fire only when the attacking force has gotten as close as possible to the lower limit of mid combat range (800-1200 m.).[142]

[142] At Paardeberg (18th March, 1900), the left wing of the
Highland Brigade advanced, without firing a shot, to within 450 m. of
the hostile position. This advance, to be sure, was made under cover
of the fire of the right wing of the 9th Brigade, which had made a
lodgment within 750 m. of the enemy’s position.

Errors in estimating the range are offset by the flat trajectory of the rifle only at short ranges, and only at these ranges can there be any question of an effective preparation of the attack by fire. These views are expressed in the German regulations.

Recent wars demonstrate that, whenever the attacker opened fire at long ranges, the attack finally came to a standstill, that the troops in many cases fired away all their ammunition, and that the whole attack failed.

“Whenever the attacking regiment opened fire this was unfortunately
a sign that the attack had been repulsed.” This remark made by
Kuropatkin in regard to the fight of the Russian infantry (center
group) on Sept. 11th, 1877, at =Plevna=, is characteristic of the
Russian ideas. On the occasion referred to, the Russians advanced on
the Turkish works without fire preparation; the firing lines halted
400 to 600 m. from the Turkish position and commenced firing. They
succumbed because it never occurred to the leaders to reinforce
them and attempt to gain a superiority of fire. Even in Skobeleff’s
attack there was no sign of actual fire preparation, but, as soon
as the line halted, strong reinforcements were pushed in to carry
it forward. The attack, made on a front of about 800 m., suffered
heavy losses, but succeeded, although all organizations were in
complete disorder. After advancing 1000 m., the decimated first line
(8 battalions) halted; fifteen fresh companies carried it forward
some 150 m.; then Skobeleff threw in twenty companies in one body,
which carried the line forward to within approximately 100 to 150 m.
of the work. At this moment Skobeleff threw himself into the fight
and succeeded in taking the Turkish position with his badly cut up
troops. Doubtless an act of undeniable gallantry, but not one worthy
of imitation.

The war between Servia and Bulgaria (1885) is very instructive in
this connection. As in 1859, 1870 and 1877, that force was defeated,
which, trusting to the superiority of its rifles, opened fire at
long ranges. The Servian skirmishers often did not even get within
decisive range of the position of their opponents.