Chapter VIII: Part 8

According to experiments made by Colonel Wolozkoi, a good shot makes a mean angular error of ±8 minutes, when using the horizontal aiming position; a poor shot, one of ±40 minutes; the average error being ±25 minutes. In this, however, the sources of error, due to excitement on the part of the marksmen, are not considered. “The principal angular errors can be traced to the nervousness of the marksmen; and this is directly proportional to the magnitude of the danger and the suddenness of its appearance. The soldier judges the magnitude of danger by the number of hostile projectiles and by their effect. Therefore, the livelier the hostile fire, and the longer it continues, the greater the danger appears to him; while the less the effect of that fire, and the better he is sheltered from it, the less he will think himself endangered. On this account, the nervous tension of the individual soldier will reach different degrees of intensity according to the magnitude of the danger.

“Now there are combat situations where the danger is insignificant, and entire engagements in which the impression produced by danger may be called moderate; moreover, even in lively actions phases may occur in which this is equally true. The circumstances of each particular case will, therefore, determine how long it is possible to fire as prescribed in the firing regulations, and from what moment a reduction of efficacy, according to Colonel Wolozkoi’s theory, is unavoidable.

“The arrival of this moment will be postponed more or less by better discipline and training; and, in addition, at the commencement of an action, we may count on the men putting into practice, to a certain extent, what they have been taught in time of peace. However, the efficacy of rifle fire will deteriorate gradually, as the danger and the intensity of the fight increase, until it reaches the stage which Wolozkoi considers peculiar to all of the more serious actions.

“When discipline is still further reduced, the efforts of the men to keep under cover may lead them to duck even their heads and to fire their rifles at high angles. In this case the decisive short ranges would not be swept by fire, making it possible for the more determined of the two opponents to advance to the assault.

“This reduction of the efficacy of fire (_i.e._, the delivery of fire at high angles) may also take place when troops are surprised and, in consequence thereof, fire hurriedly. This explains why the enemy’s fire passes entirely over a body of troops which has gotten quite close to his position--by no means an unusual phenomenon in surprises.”[165]

[165] F. C. v. II. _Zum Studium der Taktik_, p. 97.

Wolozkoi assumes that the core of hits of his constant cone is formed by projectiles fired at a mean angle of departure of less than 4 degrees, while the lower trajectories of the whole cone of fire correspond to an angle of 1 degree and 30 minutes, and the upper trajectories to one of 14 degrees and 30 minutes. If we apply these figures to a particular rifle we obtain a beaten zone containing 50% of the hits (central zone) at 560-1500 m. for the _Chassepot_ rifle; at 1000-2000 m. for the 8 mm. rifle, and at 1200-3000 m. for the 6.5 mm. rifle. It should once more be emphasized that these figures are applicable in combat phases in which the men themselves are under fire, while firing, or deliver their fire hurriedly or with bad aim.

During the =Franco-German war= the German troops learned by
experience that the defender’s fire inflicted serious losses on
the attacker at long ranges, but that the efficacy of his fire did
not increase as the skirmishers came closer to his position; that,
on the contrary, the intensity of the hostile fire effect fell off
noticeably at ranges below 600 m.

During the attack made by the Prussian Guard against =St. Privat=,
the greatest number of dead and wounded were counted at ranges
from 1200-1500 m., and the fewest losses were sustained at ranges
from 500-600 m. from the enemy’s position, where it had to remain
stationary on the slope for about an hour awaiting the effect of the
enveloping movement made by the Saxon Army Corps. A range of 1500
m. corresponds approximately to an angle of departure of 5 degrees
for the _Chassepot_ rifle. The 20th Infantry Division was molested
by rifle fire from =St. Privat=, during its march from =St. Ail= to
=St. Privat= (the range in this case was 2200 m., which corresponds
to an angle of departure of 15 degrees 30 minutes for the _Chassepot_
rifle) although the skirmishers of the Guard, against whom this fire
was directed, were only from 400 to 500 m. from the French position.

In the =Russo-Turkish war= of 1877-78, the same thing occurred.
Infantry projectiles reached the Russian reserves while they were
still 2500 m. from the enemy (this range corresponds to an angle of
departure of 14 degrees 30 minutes).

Kuropatkin corroborates the statement that at 1500 m. and beyond
(5 degrees 50 minutes), the losses produced by the Turkish rifle
fire were very serious; that at 400 m. (1 degree 8 minutes) from
the hostile position, on the other hand, the losses were remarkably
small, sometimes even ceasing entirely. The Turks finally kept their
heads under cover altogether.

A correspondent writes the following in regard to the engagement
at =Slivnica= on November 17th to 19th, 1885: “When at 400 m. from
the enemy, the firing lines suffered scarcely any losses, while the
reserves, stationed far to the rear, suffered severely from stray
shots.”

It must be the endeavor of peace training to prevent the occurrence of unaimed firing in battle. This necessitates careful supervision by squad and platoon leaders over the individual soldier in the firing line, and the severe punishment of every act of carelessness in pointing, aiming, and setting of the sight, in peace time. In war one must constantly endeavor to avoid opening fire prematurely, as it tires the eye and the arm of the soldier, to check any unjustifiable rapidity of fire, and to hold the men down to a steady and slow fire. This includes, in addition, the avoidance, by the leader, of haste in giving directions for firing. In defense, one will have to make every effort to withdraw one’s men from the moral effect of the attacker’s fire preparation, and to keep them in proper condition to repulse the assault. This requires the construction of splinter proofs, head cover, and, in case the hostile fire becomes too deadly, a cessation of fire, which is again resumed when the enemy attempts to advance. To carry this out properly, covered observation stations should be built, and the men instructed to line the parapet and to open fire at a signal previously agreed upon, sights having been set and ammunition replenished before they leave cover. A body of troops is not unfit to resist an assault simply because it has suffered a certain percentage of losses, but because each individual soldier is so mastered by the feeling that he is in danger of losing his life that he fires his piece without raising his head above the parapet. A body of troops in such a state will fire its projectiles in Wolozkoi’s “constant cone.”

A mobilized organization, thoroughly trained in time of peace, will still fire a by no means inconsiderable fraction of its projectiles with good aim and with the proper rear sight elevation, provided its officers are equal to their task.

(e) The Influence of Rifle-Rests in Firing.

Freehand firing increases the rate of fire. Whether the skirmisher fires freehand or from a rest is of influence on the accuracy of the single shot at short ranges. The Belgian, Dutch, and Italian regulations authorize the bayonet, in the absence of other expedients, to be stuck into the ground as a rifle-rest, while this is forbidden in Germany. Collective fire of short duration delivered at mid ranges has not been found superior because of the use of rifle-rests. Fire delivered from a rest is undoubtedly superior, however, when the barrel of the piece is heated by continued firing (position of the left hand supporting the piece when firing standing, prone, or kneeling) and when the arm of the skirmisher gets tired. When firing from a rest, high shots result from vibrations of the barrel;[166] and there is also danger, when under fire, that the men will not raise their heads over the parapet, but will fire their pieces into the air. This, as corroborated by the more recent campaigns, is why a fire fight at short range is by no means decided in so short a time as the peace performances of modern rifles lead one to suppose, for great losses do not take place until skirmishers, who have heretofore hugged the ground, rise. At Spionskop, the two opposing firing lines remained stationary for hours at 250 m. from each other.[167] The Japanese found in their attacks that at ranges from 150 to 75 paces the hostile fire had no effect.

[166] According to the _Swiss Firing Regulations_ the change in
height in the point of the target struck amounts to ¹⁄₁₀₀₀ of the
range.

[167] The British Infantry (consisting of 2694 men, exclusive of
subsequent reinforcements), which was engaged at short range on
Spionskop from 3 A. M. until 9:30 P. M., lost 40 officers and 721 men
in 18¹⁄₂ hours (one officer to every 18.5 men), _i.e._, 28.2%. See p.
189 infra.

(f) Influence of the Ground.[168]

[168] MONDEIL, _De la résolution des problèmes de tir sur le champ
de bataille_, Paris, 1900.

So far we have considered only the effect of infantry fire on level ground. The efficacy of fire is, however, greatly influenced by the inclination of the ground upon which the cone of dispersion falls. Where the ground rises in respect to the line of sight, the depth of the beaten zone is decreased; where it falls in respect to the line of sight, the depth of the beaten zone is increased.[169]

[169] Lieutenant-General ROHNE’S definitions are given below in
explanation of certain technical terms:

“_Danger Space_” is the distance measured along the line of sight
within which the trajectory neither rises above the height of the
target nor falls below the target.

“_Beaten Zone_” is the distance measured along the surface of the
ground within which the trajectory does not rise above the height of
the target.

Whether a target will be struck by a bullet when the range has not
been correctly estimated depends entirely upon the danger space.
In pointing at the bottom line of the target, the aiming position
(_i.e._, the height at which the piece is held) does not affect
the danger space. When pointing at the center of the target the
danger space changes, increasing for low rear sight elevations and
tall targets, and decreasing for high rear sight elevations and low
targets, as compared with aim taken at the bottom line of a target.
“The evil effects of errors in estimating the range decrease as the
‘danger space’ increases, which, by the way, is wholly dependent upon
the ballistic properties of the rifle, upon the range, and the height
of the target. The danger on the ground in rear of the target fired
upon, and the difficulty of bringing up reinforcements and ammunition
over it, increases directly as the beaten zone, which in addition
depends upon the inclination of the ground to the line of sight.”

The importance of this circumstance is frequently so magnified in
the French infantry that sight is lost of tactical requirements. For
example, they employ formulae to ascertain the point from which a
height can be covered with grazing fire, or propose to defend the
ascent to a plateau by evacuating the military crest and occupying
the reverse slope, keeping the slope facing the enemy under a grazing
fire with the tail ends of the trajectories.

Let A B B¹, in the accompanying figure, represent a horizontal plane pierced by trajectories C B and C¹ B¹, at an angle α, forming the beaten zone B B¹. If now the ground falls from B in the direction B D, it is obvious from the figure, that the angle of fall β decreases and the beaten zone B D increases. The limit of this increase is reached when the angle of slope is greater than the angle of fall of the projectile. In this case there is a dead angle beyond B and toward D. If, on the other hand, the ground be rising, the angle of fall will be C¹ D¹ B and the beaten zone[170] decreases to B D¹. The smaller the angle of fall of the projectile the greater the influence of the ground.

[170] The computation of beaten zones is based upon the formula
deduced by Lieutenant-General ROHNE in his work _Schieszlehre für
Infanterie_, p. 127:

Let α = angle of fall;
γ = angle of slope (rising or falling);
β = beaten zone on level ground;

then
α
----- β = beaten zone on falling ground;
α - γ

α
----- β = beaten zone on rising ground.
α + γ

From this it follows that when fire direction is in competent hands the appearance of the enemy on the terrain as at B D will be fully taken advantage of, while firing on slope like B D¹ should be avoided. Troops will, however, rarely be in a position from which they can see a target on the slope B D. The efficacy of the fire will in such a case be more or less a matter of accident. A body of troops in broad formation will in this case receive a greater number of hits than a column, since each meter of front of the crest line receives a certain number of projectiles. It is otherwise, however, where the slope rises in respect to the line of sight. A line is more easily missed than a column of considerable depth on the march.

The following data in regard to the increase (diminution)
of the depth of the beaten zones is taken from the work of
Lieutenant-General ROHNE on _Das gefechtsmäszige Abteilungsschieszen
der Infanterie_, p. 44:

======+===============+================
Range.| Rising Slope. | Falling Slope.
m. | 1° | 2° | 1° | 2°
------+-------+-------+-------+--------
800 | ¹⁄₂ | ¹⁄₃ | ∞ | ∞
1000 | ²⁄₃ | ³⁄₄ | 2 | ∞
1200 | ³⁄₄ | ³⁄₅ | ³⁄₂ | 3
1400 | ⁴⁄₅ | ⁴⁄₆ | ⁴⁄₃ | 2
------+-------+-------+-------+--------

The above figure, taken from Lieutenant-General ROHNE’S work,
_Schieszlehre für die Infanterie_, p. 128, shows the influence of
the ground on the efficacy of fire when “poor” shots are firing at a
target, 100, 200 m. etc., in rear of which are other targets of the
same dimensions but situated either on level ground, on a 2-degree
rising slope, or a 1-degree falling slope. On a rising slope of 2
degrees the depth of the beaten zone is decreased by half, and on a
downward slope of 1 degree increased by half.

“The knowledge of this influence of the ground is of great
importance to the tactician. For this reason I have selected ‘poor’
shots for the above example because the efficacy of infantry fire in
battle will approximate theirs more nearly than any other. From this
we may deduce that where the ground slopes upward in rear of a firing
line, less distance will suffice to withdraw supports from the fire
directed at the firing line than on level ground; and that, if the
ground in rear of the firing line slopes downward, the distances must
be increased unless the slope is so great or the hostile trajectories
so flat that bullets pass over the crest, forming a ‘defiladed
space,’ into which no projectiles strike.”

On ground rising in respect to the line of sight (_i.e._, on the
slope of heights facing the enemy, or opposite to commanding ground,
the slope facing the plain) columns suffer the greatest losses; on
ground falling in respect to the line of sight (on the reverse slope
of hills and on plateaus) line targets suffer the greatest losses.

Where the ground falls at a greater angle than the angle of fall of
the projectiles (about 5 degrees at 1500 m., and 1 degree at 800
m.) a defiladed space is formed, which makes it possible to bring
supports nearer to the firing line than would be practicable on level
ground. If we assume that each graduation of the rear sight over 600
m. commands a space 100 m. deep with the normal core of hits, we
obtain the following depths of the beaten zones at a range of 1500
m., with rifle model ’98 (angle of fall 5 degrees and 22 minutes):

Ground rising 1 in 10 = 6° = 50 m.
„ „ 1 in 20 = 3° = 64 m.
„ „ 1 in 50 = 1° = 81 m.
Ground falling 1 in 10 = 6° = 360 m.
„ „ 1 in 20 = 3° = 180 m.
„ „ 1 in 50 = 1° = 113 m.

The figures on pages 181 and 182 show to what extent the ground is
capable of increasing or diminishing the efficacy of fire. The French
assert that the Würtembergers deliberately applied these principles
in the defense of the park wall at =Villiers=. It was, at any rate,
only an accident that the masses of troops on the west side of the
gently sloping Mamelon de Villiers suffered heavy losses on November
30th, 1870.

General PAQUIÉ of the French Army[171] lays down the following rule:
“When the angle of slope of falling ground corresponds to the angle
of fall of the lowest trajectory of a cone of dispersion, the depth
of the beaten zone will be 2¹⁄₄ times greater than on level ground.
When the angle of slope of falling ground is equal to the angle of
fall of the mean trajectory of a cone of dispersion, the depth of the
beaten zone will be 2¹⁄₂ times greater than on level ground. When the
lowest trajectory of a cone of dispersion passes over the crest of a
hill at the height of a man, and when the reverse slope of that hill
is equal to ¹⁄₁₀₀ of the range, the depth of the beaten zone will be
five times as great as on level ground.”

[171] See also _Le tir de guerre et les expériences pratiques
du camp de Châlons_. _Journal des sciences militaires_, Sept.,
Oct., Nov., 1808--_Le Joindre Général. Petit Guide pour les tirs
collectifs_, 1904.

These data are of no practical value in war. They serve only to
increase the appreciation of fire effect when examining the terrain,
and train the eye in judging such situations.

The character of the ground may exert great influence when firing
on intrenchments. Fire delivered from low ground against an enemy
in shelter-trenches is absolutely ineffective--as shown in the
action against the French IInd Corps at =Point du Jour= and by the
experiences of the Russians at =Plevna= and =Gorni Dubniac=. This
condition becomes aggravated the smaller the angles of fall of the
projectiles, and the higher the target is situated relative to the
firing position of the attacking party.

Attacks on hill positions show that there is a range at which the
greatest efficacy may be obtained from fire directed against the top
of the height itself. This maximum efficacy gradually dwindles as
the position is approached. This fact has led the Swiss to retain a
_Main Firing Position_. (See Figure, p. 182. Fire effect from A and
from B). For the purpose of determining the favorable range, “D,”
corresponding to a certain height (of the enemy’s position) “H,”
Lieutenant-General ROHNE has deduced the following formula for rifle
model ’88:[172]

D = 15.H + 500.

[172] Capitaine CUGNAC, D = 14 (H + 50). See also the work
of Captain KNOBLOCH, _Zur Technik des Feuerangriffs gegen
Höhenstellungen_, _Swiss Monthly Journal_, 1907.

The well-known plateau of the “Galgenhügel” at Wörth, which is at
present crowned by the monument of the 50th Infantry (elevation 35
m.) could be effectively swept by the fire of our present-day weapons
at 1025 m.; a further advance would reduce the fire effect. For rifle
model ’98 the formula might be stated: 20. H + 600.

It is only in fortress warfare that it might occasionally be possible
to apply this formula. To determine at what distance the defender
must take position in rear of a crest, in order to sweep the slope
facing the enemy with his fire (aiming points being resorted to)
without being himself exposed to view, is of still less value for
use in the field. According to General Warnet of the French Army, if
“p” is the degree of slope expressed in centimeters, the defender
should choose between two points which lie between (p + 5) 1000
and (p + 3) 1000. When the degree of slope is 1 cm. in 10 cm., the
defender should take up his position either 600 or 300 m. in rear of
the main crest. In such a position the defender will, it is true, be
protected to a certain extent from the enemy’s fire, but can only
very inadequately defend the slope facing the enemy. A concentration
of fire on certain targets is impossible and the attacker is given an
opportunity to reach the crest, here and there, without coming under
fire. Thus ballistic advantages must be given up in the face of the
numerous tactical disadvantages. We have mentioned this subject here,
to show the strange excrescenses which an undeniably sound basic
principle may develop in the hands of theorists, who have entirely
forgotten that in war only that which is simple succeeds.

“Indirect Rifle Fire” is to be used in firing on a target not visible
from the firing position. In this connection, the following is
taken from the report of Captain KNOBLOCH, Austrian Army,[173] on
_Schieszaufgaben unter feldmäszigen Verhältnissen_:

[173] _Verstecktes Gewehrfeuer. Vorschläge zur Erhöhung des
Gefechtswertes unserer Infanterie_, Vienna, 1904. _Feldmäsziges
Schieszen der Infanterie aus versteckten Stellungen._ _Organ der
militär-wissenschaftlichen Vereine_, Nos. 1 and 2 of 1906. _Resultate
der Schieszversuche mit verstecktem Gewehrfeuer._ _Mitteilungen
über Gegenst. des Artillerie- und Geniewesens_, No. 12 of 1905.
_Militär-Wochenblatt_, 1907, No. 28, pp. 144 and 155.

“Indirect rifle fire is infantry fire in which aiming points are
used. These should lie above and beyond the target and in line with
it. It goes without saying that an aiming point fulfilling all these
conditions will rarely be found. Moreover, the aiming point must not
be selected at random at some particular elevation, because the angle
between target and aiming point, expressed by graduations on the rear
sight leaf, might possibly lead to a negative sight setting.

“In the practical tests made on varied ground against targets of
appropriate height, splendid results were obtained as regards effect;
but the aiming point had to be indicated by means of a flag. Despite
the fact that the terrain was covered with numerous objects, such as
trees, woods, factory chimneys, etc., no suitable aiming point could
be found on the terrain itself. This largely determines the value of
indirect rifle fire in the field.”

This class of fire is, however, worth a trial at any rate. Moreover,
its tactical, combined with its moral, advantages are so great that
we could afford to accept calmly a fire effect poorer by comparison.
Indirect rifle fire will, at times, give troops an opportunity to do
damage to the enemy without being themselves seen or fired upon.

It remains to mention briefly the effect of =ricochets= which, as a rule, tumble[174] after striking. Their range upon rebounding is short. Bullets ricochet most frequently on water, on rocky and hard ground, more rarely on wet meadows, and on tilled soil, but they do not ricochet at all on sandy soil. Ploughed fields, in which the furrows run obliquely to the line of fire, eliminate the effect of ricochets almost entirely. When jacketed bullets (but not the massive French “D” projectiles) strike upon rocky ground, they have a tendency to alter their form materially, or to tear the jacket, thereby considerably increasing the severity of the wound which is produced. The range of ricochets upon rebounding depends mainly upon the angle at which they are deflected. When the lateral deflection is 30 degrees their range may amount to about 1300 m. The nearer a bullet strikes to the skirmisher firing it, and the smaller the angle of deflection of the consequent ricochet, the greater its range; under favorable conditions this may amount to 2500 m. According to French experiments, in firing at a range of 800 m., 4% ricochet hits struck a target, the height of a man, at 1400 m., and 1% ricochet hits a similar target at 1850 m. from the skirmisher who did the firing.

[174] According to tests, our small-caliber bullets tend to tumble
even when only grazing small twigs.

13. LOSSES IN ACTION.[175]

[175] See _Taktik_, V, p. 76 _et seq._

An attempt to move troops in close order formations within the zone of uninterrupted infantry fire at ranges under 1500 m. when the enemy is still in condition to direct his fire on them, is bound to lead to losses which make the further tactical employment of these troops impossible.

Bodies of troops following the firing lines will also have to deploy when the hostile fire reaches them, unless they can find cover. It is a disadvantage for them to deploy, and every opportunity to return to close order formation must be utilized.

Troops in rear, not directly fired upon and exposed only to accidental shots, should employ narrow rather than broad formations. It might therefore seem advisable to remain in route column so long as no flanking fire is received. The Italian Firing Regulations contain the following figure showing the effect of fire directed on troops in the formations indicated.

Vertical axis: Percentage of hits to be expected.
Horizontal axis: Range in meters.

Dash-dot curve: Company Column.[176]
Dotted curve: Line of platoons.[177]
Solid curve: Line of skirmishers.
Dashed curve: Line of platoons in columns of fours, at 15-pace
intervals.]

[176] In Germany called “Column of Platoons.”

[177] In columns of fours, at 6-pace intervals.

According to the figure, the Italian Company Column (German Column of Platoons) suffers the greatest losses; the least losses are sustained by the company formed in line of platoons, each in route column, at intervals of 15 paces. According to French experiments, this formation is said to be no longer suitable when subjected to infantry fire at ranges under 1300 m.

According to French firing tests made in Châlons,[178] the following percentages of hits may be expected when using the Lebel rifle firing old model steel jacketed bullets:

==========================================+===================
| At a range of
+----+----+----+----
|1200|1400|1600|1800
| m. | m. | m. | m.
------------------------------------------+----+----+----+----
Platoon (one rank) | 4.4| 3.4| 2.2| 1.4
Skirmish line, men at 3-pace intervals | 1.2|----|----|----
Platoon in column of fours | 6.6| 3.8| 2.2| 1.3
Platoon in column of twos | 5.6| 3.2| 1.9| 1.1
Company column (German column of platoons)|22.0|18.0|14.0|10.0
------------------------------------------+----+----+----+----

[178] _Le Joindre, Petit Guide pour les tirs collectifs_, p. 15.

Lieutenant-General ROHNE, in his work, _Schieszlehre für die Infanterie_, p. 117, computes values for the relative vulnerability of the several formations. At a range of 1200 m., purely frontal fire only being considered, we obtain with every 1000 rounds fired with the appropriate elevation, the following number of hits against--

========+=====+=========+=============
|Line.|Column of|Infantry in
| |platoons.|route column.
--------+-----+---------+-------------
Standing| 116 | 160 | 98
Prone | 20 | 65 | 72
--------+-----+---------+-------------

And against a company deployed in line of platoons:

=========+================+==================+===================
|3 platoons, each| 3 platoons, each |6 sections, each in
|in route column.|in column of twos.| column of twos.
---------+----------------+------------------+-------------------
Standing | 57 | 39 | 29
Prone | 28 | 25 | 14
---------+----------------+------------------+-------------------

The company deployed in line of sections in columns of twos would thus seem to be the most favorable formation for movements, and the line lying prone is especially well suited for halts. For movements under purely frontal, concentrated fire, the line is the least favorable formation, while the route column offers the narrowest target. In this, the character of the terrain plays a decisive role. In firing on targets consisting of columns, it has been assumed that a single projectile will place only one man out of action. Under shrapnel fire the formations are similarly arranged as regards their vulnerability, the line formation being less favorable than the column of platoons, since the former receives all bullets deflected laterally.

The total losses in battles and more serious engagements amount to from 10 to 20% of the participating troops. In some organizations the losses in killed and wounded may amount to as much as 50-60%. The loss that an organization will endure is directly proportional to its efficiency. Good troops, which unexpectedly get into a difficult situation (as, for example, the British Brigade of Highlanders at Magersfontain), and which have been trained to look upon heavy losses as unavoidable, will be capable of enduring a loss of 25% in the course of a battle without going to pieces and without discontinuing the attack.[179]

[179] It is notorious that colonial wars with their moderate losses
spoil troops and their leaders in this respect.

At the battle of =Gravelotte=, in which 166,400 rifles, 21,200
sabres, and 732 guns, extending over a front of 19 km., participated
on the German side, only 109,200 rifles and 628 guns fought the
decisive action. The losses amounted to 9.51%, distributed as
follows: 899 officers and 19,260 men; according to arms: infantry,
10.96%; cavalry, 0.66%, and artillery, 5.74%. On the decisive flank,
the infantry of the Guard suffered a loss of almost 30%. On this
flank, the Rifles of the Guard (_Gardeschützen_) lost 44%, the 1st
Battalion of the 2nd Regiment of the Guard, 55.5% of their enlisted
strength, the 6th Company of the latter regiment losing even 141 men.

Although losses are, generally speaking, smaller than during the
18th Century, and at the opening of the 19th Century, nevertheless
they may amount to a considerable figure in a brief space of time in
single bodies of troops which suddenly encounter a heavy fire.

At =Magersfontain=, (December 11th, 1899) the British lost 13% of
their total strength; the Brigade of Highlanders, 23% (39% of the
officers; i.e., 1 officer for every 14.9 men); the IInd Battalion
of the Black Watch, 42%, and the IInd Battalion of the Seaforth
Highlanders, 23.9%. At =Colenso= (Dec. 15th, 1899) the British lost
6.4% of their total strength; the IInd Battalion of the Royal Dublin
Fusiliers, 23.9%.

=Spionskop= (Jan. 24th, 1900):

Attacking troops 2,694 men in 18¹⁄₂ hrs. 40 officers, 721 men = 28.2%
Supports 1,600 „ „ 10¹⁄₂ „ 8 „ 95 „ = 6.4%
Reserves 1,500 „ „ 4¹⁄₂ „ 15 „ 170 „ = 12.3%
Staffs ---- ---- 5 „ --- ----
----------------------------------------------------
5,794 men 68 officers, 986 men = 17.5%

This action illustrates strikingly how rapidly the officers directing
the fire were shot down.

Attacking troops 1 officer for every 18 men
Supports 1 „ „ „ 12 „
Reserves 1 „ „ „ 11 „
--------------------------
1 officer for every 14 men

For the purpose of comparison, we should like to mention that the
Prussian Grenadier Battalion “_von Wedel_,” consisting of 12 officers
and 390 men, lost 10 officers and 301 men (77%) in about one hour
during the battle of =Soor= (Sept. 30th, 1745). The losses suffered
by the Grenadier Battalion “_von Münchow_” at =Kesselsdorf= are
possibly not much lower. The effective strength of the last named
battalion is not given; it lost 5 officers and 371 men.[180]

[180] _Kriege Friedrichs des Groszen_, II, Appendix 3, pp. 11 and
47.

At =Kolin=, the Grenadier Battalion “_Nymschöfsky_” lost 652 men,
and six infantry regiments lost between 900 and 1188 men, _i.e._,
considerably more than 50% of their strength. Two days after the
battle, the Grenadier Battalion “_Nymschöfsky_” numbered only 24
men and the enlisted strength of six infantry regiments was 233,
296, 602, 651 and 711 men respectively. The number of stragglers was
undoubtedly very great.[181] At =Kolin=, the infantry lost in all
12,307 men out of 19,000, _i.e._, 65%.

[181] _Ibid._, III. Appendix, pp. 11 and 20.

The losses among officers are especially heavy. This is by no means due to the attempt of the hostile skirmishers to pick off the leaders in the combat at short range, but to the fact that, in order to lead their men, officers must expose themselves. This becomes more and more necessary the greater the moral effect of the combat on the nervous systems of the men, and the poorer the troops. According to past experience, the casualties among officers are especially heavy in the early stages of a war.[182]

[182] See _Taktik_, V, pp. 81, 88 and 358.

The relative losses of officers and men in the battles named are
given, in round figures, in the following table:

At =Weiszenburg (Vth Army Corps)= 1 officer for every 14 men;
„ =Wörth (Vth Army Corps)= 1 „ „ „ 20 „ ;
„ =Wörth (XIth Army Corps)= 1 „ „ „ 15 „ ;
„ =Vionville (IIIrd Army Corps)= 1 „ „ „ 21 „ ;
„ =Vionville (Xth Army Corps)= 1 „ „ „ 24 „ ;
„ =Gravelotte (Guard Corps)= 1 „ „ „ 22.5 „ ;
„ =Gravelotte (XIIth Army Corps)= 1 „ „ „ 20 „ ;
„ =Colenso= 1 „ „ „ 15 „ ;
„ =Magersfontain= 1 „ „ „ 11.8 „ ;

Colonel HESSERT[183] writes the following in regard to the losses
among the officers of the 25th Division on August 18th, 1870: “Eight
of the 16 field officers and 6 of the 14 adjutants present with
the regiments and battalions were either wounded or killed. Almost
all of these officers were mounted. Seventeen of the 40 company
commanders--almost all of them dismounted--and 43 of the 151 company
officers were placed out of action. This would be a loss of 50% in
field officers, 42% in adjutants, 37% in company commanders, and 29%
in company officers.”

[183] _Betrachtungen über die Leistungen der französischen Gewehre
M/74 und M/66_, Darmstadt, 1879, p. 115.

On this day the Rifle Battalion of the Guard lost 100% of its
officers and 44% of its men--19 officers and 431 men, in about
three-quarters of an hour.

On Sept. 11th, 1877, at =Plevna=, the _Ugla_ Regiment lost 20 of its
officers, _i.e._, 40%; the _Jaroslaw_ Regiment, 25 officers, _i.e._,
64%; the total loss of the first named regiment amounted to 42%,
that of the last named to 49%. Of the 15 company commanders of the
_Vladimir_ Regiment, 14 were placed out of action.

After the assault on the =Tuminling Pass= on Oct. 12th, 1905, the
East Siberian Rifle Regiment had only 2 officers with its firing
line, and after the battle of =Sandepu= only 5. These examples are
not isolated ones. After the battle on the =Yalu=, the 11th Rifle
Regiment had present for duty only one field officer, and the 12th
only 3 captains. On March 7th, 1905, the _Yoshihoka_ Regiment (3rd
Japanese Division) had present for duty only 3 lieutenants; one
battalion was commanded by a first sergeant and one company by a
private.

14. THE MORAL EFFECT OF FIRE.

The moral effect may make itself felt in a two-fold way: as the sum of the impressions influencing the soldier at all times in action, and as the momentary general impression produced by a sudden considerable increase in the losses. The great material effect of fire creates such a consciousness of danger in men’s minds that in a defeated force more than half of its numbers succumb to this moral effect of the fire.

“Troops do not retreat because they are unable to maintain themselves owing to their numerical inferiority, but because they fear the losses which they would suffer if they advanced further. The determination to conquer has been overcome by the desire to live. The confusion of impressions increases with the size of the force. Taken individually, the men might behave quite sensibly, but in a crowd they are claimed either by insanity or lethargy. The activity of the mind is completely replaced by imagination; everything is believed; nothing is appraised; exaggeration prevails everywhere; and precipitation produces unthought of results. When the men come to their senses, it is as if they were awakened from a stupor; they are unable to understand how fear could have induced them to do the very opposite from that which would, most surely, have saved them from destruction.”[184]

[184] KUROPATKIN-KRAHMER, _Kritische Rückblicke auf den
Russisch-Türkischen Krieg_, I, p. 150.

In the midst of the impressions of the battle of St. Privat, General von Kessel wrote: “The men appear to be either extraordinarily excited or stupefied. Their faces are distorted and only a few still retain firm will power.”

General Bonnal describes his first impressions at the battle of Wörth as follows: “Since half-past seven our battalion was lying, facing eastward, in the neighborhood of the wood of Fröschweiler. The shrieking of the Prussian shells, but especially the noise of the shells bursting in the midst of the batteries of the 3rd Division in position in our rear, made a considerable impression on our men. Their joking ceased, and nervousness was plainly visible in their pale faces. Men to whom tobacco was offered declined it; they had no desire to smoke. All eyes were focused upon the officers. The latter were congregated here and there in small groups; a few were trying hard to joke, others were walking up and down, with a cigarette between their lips, making convulsive efforts to appear at ease; a small number were entirely calm as if no danger was present.... The first batch of wounded made a strong impression. The battalion was to reinforce the Turcos in the edge of the wood of Fröschweiler. The fire of the Turcos drowned all other sounds. There was nothing to indicate that the enemy was also concentrating a heavy fire upon the wood. We deployed into line to the right. The deployment began, but scarcely ten men had reached the edge of the wood when a terrible cracking and rattling commenced. It was a mitrailleuse battery which fired a volley directly under our very noses. At this moment our men lost their heads. They blazed away like mad, crowded in three, four, and five ranks at the foot of the downward slope. The men in front had thrown themselves to the ground, the others fired kneeling or standing, leaning against trees. Since all of the men fired without aiming, enveloped moreover by a dense, impenetrable cloud of smoke, the advanced lines were in greater danger of being hit by French bullets than by those of the enemy. We had to throw ourselves to the ground to avoid being shot down by the lines in rear. On the hill opposite to us, at a range of 300 to 400 m., there rested a white smoke cloud, and we could indistinctly discern the enemy, who was keeping up a lively fire. The powder smoke enveloping us was so dense that we literally could not breathe.” This excitement gradually subsided and the leaders were able to get the troops again under control.

The numerous surrenders of British troops in the engagements of the Boer War were due to the peculiar conditions existing in the theater of war. Besides, Boer and Briton spoke the same language. During the first few days of the campaign, surrenders of detachments of considerable strength took place. These were not punished with sufficient severity. One almost gains the impression that the men considered the surrenders justifiable in order to escape from a difficult situation.

On the South African battlefields, devoid of cover and swept for great distances by the hostile fire, it was indeed very difficult to penetrate the hostile position, and retrograde movements were undoubtedly attended with heavy losses. To this may be added the fact that it was easy for the Boers, who were mounted, to bar the way to isolated British forces. It must be remembered, moreover, that the operations took place during the hottest season and in a country where water is scarce; and that the men felt they had arrived at the limit of their powers of physical endurance at an earlier moment than would have been the case under different conditions. Thus, the surrender at Stromberg of troops exhausted from a night march, is perhaps excusable; not so, however, the surrender of Colonel Carleton’s detachment, which laid down its arms at Nicholson’s Neck after offering a feeble resistance. In the last-mentioned case, it is true, several Englishmen, who had already laid down their arms, stood among the Boers so that the commander of the British force did not really know just what action to take in this situation. His hesitation decided his fate. The demand must unquestionably be made in future also,[185] that troops surrounded in the field make a serious attempt to cut their way out before permitting thoughts of surrender to enter their minds.

[185] In contrast to this view the British court of inquiry found
all but three of the 226 surrenders, which occurred up to June 1st,
1900, justified. In the three cases in which the verdict was adverse
only a few men had surrendered. Within a period of eight months
the British lost a total of 1680 officers and 2124 men killed and
wounded, while their loss in prisoners amounted to 182 officers and
4984 men.

It is impossible to determine theoretically what losses troops are able to endure. After the Franco-German War it was believed that troops had reached the limit of endurance after losing one-third to one-fourth of their strength. Nowadays this limit would appear to be reached much sooner. It may be pointed out, however, that the neglect of continuing the attack at Colenso (loss 5.8%), and at Spionskop (loss 7.2%), may, in part, be charged to lack of energy in the commander; and that the Brigade of Highlanders, consisting of 2000 rifles and deployed on a front of about 4000 m., in the engagement at Paardeberg (loss 13.4%), lacked the necessary depth to continue the attack. The greater the degree of efficiency and freshness of troops, and the less the degree of suddenness with which they enter a difficult situation, the greater the losses which they will be capable of enduring. Furthermore, we should not forget that our modern personnel has become much more susceptible to the impressions of battle. The steadily improving standards of living tend to increase the instinct of self-preservation and to diminish the spirit of self-sacrifice. The spirit of the times looks upon war as an avoidable evil, and this militates directly against that courage which has a contempt for death. The fast manner of living at the present day undermines the nervous system,[186] the fanaticism and the religious and national enthusiasm of a bygone age are lacking, and, finally, the physical powers of the human species are also partly diminishing. The influence exerted by officers on the firing line is nowadays, however, considerably smaller than in the past, so much so that they can actually control only the nearest skirmishers. In addition, the nerve-racking impressions on the battlefield are much greater at present than in the past. The “_void of the battlefield_”[187] has become especially pronounced since the introduction of smokeless powder. “_The invisibility of the enemy directly affects the morale of the soldier, the sources of his energy and his courage. The soldier who cannot see his enemy, is inclined to see him everywhere. It is but a step from this impression to hesitancy and then to fear._ The inertia of the troops for whole days at Magersfontain, Colenso, and Paardeberg, frequently more than 800 m. from the enemy, was not produced by their losses, but by the moral depression which is caused within the effective zone of rifle fire.” (General NÉGRIER.)[188]

[186] See SPAITS, _Mit Kasaken durch die Mandschurei_. After the
author had turned away in disgust from a Chinese execution, he wrote:
“And we Europeans will feel just like this in war. We will get to a
certain point where the strength of our will and our physical powers
will succumb to the weakness of our nerves, and this state we will
reach more quickly than did the Russians, who were better off in
regard to nerves than members of those armies in which nervousness is
carefully fostered.” See also this author’s remarks about _Courage_,
_ibid._, p. 206.

[187] This complaint of the “void of the battlefield” is not
new. A Saxon officer complains of it in his _Vertrauten Briefen_
(Cologne, 1807), and the French officers report on the “void of the
battlefield” in the fights around Metz. BONNAL, _L’art nouveau en
Tactique_, p. 90.

[188] _Revue des deux mondes_, for June, 1902.

The effect of danger on the battlefield is indicated by--

1. Derangement of tactical units;

2. The mixing of men of the different units during the action; and

3. The dissolution of units into disorderly masses.

According to the _History of the Kaiser Franz Regiment_ (p. 113)
immediately after the battle of =St. Privat=, most of the companies
numbered only 30 men, and the whole regiment only 340 men, although,
allowing for losses, there should have been 1922 men. The three
companies of the 39th Füsilier Regiment which had fought in the
=Stiring Wald= at =Spicheren=, numbered only 6 officers and 150
men at the close of the fight in the evening,[189] which means
that, allowing for losses, 350 men were missing. After the battle
of =Colombey=, when the Füsilier Battalion of the 55th Regiment
was assembled, three companies numbered only 120, 60 and 40 men,
respectively. This battalion had lost about 300 men.[190]

[189] _Gen. St. W._, I, p. 366.

[190] _Geschichte des Regiments_, p. 347.

The plan of the battle of Colombey given in the General Staff Account
(_Gt. St. W._) shows at 7 P. M. 17 companies belonging to 5 different
infantry regiments, and to two different infantry brigades, occupying
a front of 1200 paces, in the following order:

7. 1. 4. 8. 4. 6. 12. 7. }
-------, ----, ----, ----, ----, ----, ----, ----, }
Jägers. 55. 15. 15. 53. 15. 15. 15. }

{ 10. 11. 12. 1. 1. 9.10. 4.3. Cos.
{ ------------, ----, ----, -----, -----,
{ 13. 13. 73. 15. 73. Inf.

At =Wörth= 17 different regiments were represented on a front of 5700
paces.

“The assault on =Elsaszhausen= (=Wörth=), after preliminary forest
fighting, mixed up the troops of the different brigades and in some
cases caused the dissolution of battalions.... The 44th Brigade was
the only one that remained in fairly good order. Abreast and in rear
of it were portions of all the other regiments (of the XIth Army
Corps) which, at the moment, however, represented no actual reserves.
Even the battalions in the first line hardly appeared to be tactical
entities.”[191]

[191] _Gen. St. W._, I, p. 268.

At several points it was possible to assemble the stragglers into
formed bodies; but the men in these, commanded by strange officers,
easily succumbed to the influences of the combat, and the units
disintegrated rather quickly as soon as they came under fire.[192]

[192] For details see KUNZ, _Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, XVI,
pp. 122, 124, 177, 231-234.

In the =Giefert Wald= (=Spicheren=) out of 32 companies (4
brigades) only four companies fought together as a battalion. In
the little =Wenzelberg Wood= (at =Nachod=) there were engaged 7¹⁄₂
Austrian battalions (belonging to four different regiments) and 2
Jäger-Battalions, all of these troops belonging to three different
brigades.[193] No attempt was made to lead these troops as one body.

[193] _Austrian Gen. St. W._, 1866, III, p. 81.

In the oak wood at =Dubno= (=Skalitz=), there were engaged 12¹⁄₂
and 8¹⁄₂ battalions belonging to four different regiments and to
two different army corps. “The Prussian orders led to a breaking up
of the order of battle and to a considerable mixing of brigades,
regiments and battalions. In consequence of this, control was lost to
a certain extent by the commander-in-chief, and the result achieved
was mainly due to the skill and intelligence of the subordinate
leaders--especially that of the commanders of battalions and half
battalions.”[194]

[194] KÜHNE, _Kritische Wanderungen_, II, p. 48.

“The wooded region in rear of =St. Hubert= was thickly infested with
stragglers of all arms. White, red, and blue shoulder straps were to
be seen in profusion; men with and without rifles; some with helmets,
some with caps, some bareheaded. There were no officers present
except those stretched wounded upon the ground. The superior officers
riding through the valley assembled the men they found, but it proved
only a small force that they gathered, for the greater portion of
the men were safely ensconced to one side of the bottom of the
valley.”[195] “At 5 P. M., the garrison of =St. Hubert= had increased
to 43 companies, belonging to seven different regiments, and the
result was utterly hopeless confusion.”[196]

[195] HÖNIG, _Vierundzwanzig Stunden Moltkescher Strategie_, p. 139.

[196] _Ibid._, p. 167.

“At 10 P. M., 48 battalions of the VIIth, VIIIth and IInd Corps
occupied a space of barely 1500 m. front and a depth of 1000 m., east
of the Mance ravine opposite the French position. Fortunately the
enemy was so exhausted that we were able to commit the most serious
mistakes with impunity under the very muzzles of his rifles.”[197]

[197] _Ibid._, p. 224.

“At =Sedan= bodies of infantry of the XIth Corps, as well as of the
46th Infantry and of the 5th Jäger-Battalion, had gotten mixed up
with the 43rd Brigade during the course of the battle. The regiments
of the 43rd Brigade had likewise been so disorganized that after the
capture of =Cazal= the brigade commander had nothing at his disposal
but the most heterogeneous mass of troops consisting of about a
battalion.”[198]

[198] _Gen. St. W._, II, p. 1249.

“In penetrating into =Lovtcha= (1877) the foremost battalions became
disorganized. The companies, and even single soldiers, stood around
in irregular groups on the streets, crowded into the houses and
sought cover in drainage ditches.”[199] “In one battalion of the
_Kasan_ Regiment, which was to move through the town from the left
flank, officers and men threw themselves down when the enemy’s fire
became effective and only with difficulty could they be induced to
rise. When the regimental commander fell, everybody fled, carrying
along those in rear. Only two company columns, composed of stragglers
of different organizations, resisted, deployed into a dense skirmish
line and, encouraged by their officers, rushed forward cheering.”[200]

[199] KUROPATKIN-KRAHMER, _Kritische Rückblicke auf den
Russich-Türkischen Krieg_, I, pp. 68 and 72.

[200] _Ibid._, I, p. 72.

This fighting power of improvised units, when there were officers
left to lead them, was displayed on several occasions at =Plevna=.

The IInd and IIIrd Battalions of the _Kaluga_ Regiment (in the third
battle of =Plevna=) after taking the second crest, thoughtlessly
continued the advance in complete disorder.

“Skobeleff foresaw the coming reverse and attempted to form a
reserve, but only by dint of the greatest exertions on the part of
the officers was it possible to collect about 100 men belonging
to various companies. The men of the IInd and IIIrd Battalions of
the Kaluga Regiment were scattered all over the battlefield, the
companies had become completely mixed up, and it was a matter of the
greatest difficulty to re-form them.”[201]

[201] _Ibid._, I, p. 154.

“Dense firing lines, composed of men of all the regiments,
attempted to climb the opposite slope but they got only half way;
400 paces from the Turkish works they halted. The survivors of the
organizations participating in the action gradually assembled in
Work No. 1, which had been taken. While only a couple of hundred men
had taken the work, thousands were now assembled there. Not a single
company or battalion was intact, every vestige of organization had
disappeared; the commanders, and officers generally, had become
separated from their units.”[202]

[202] _Ibid._, I, pp. 236 and 238.

“Prince IMERETINSKI succeeded in forming stragglers into the
following improvised units:

3 provisional companies of the _Libau_ Regiment.
2 „ „ „ „ _Susdal_ „
2¹⁄₂ „ „ „ „ _Vladimir_ „
1 detachment of 100 men of the _Reval_ Regiment.

“These re-formed stragglers were despatched to Skobeleff’s assistance
and made a successful assault on Work No. 2 from Work No. 1.”[203]

[203] _Ibid._, I, p. 243.

“These stragglers subsequently formed the nucleus of the garrison of
Work No. 2. During the night of the 11/12 September, the Russians
succeeded in gathering 1000 more men, which were assembled in
companies irrespective of the regiments to which they originally
belonged. This gathering of stragglers lasted, by the way, up to the
afternoon of the 12th of September. The continuance of the fight was
made possible only by constantly re-forming the remnants into new
organizations and then sending these forward into the fight.”[204]

[204] _Ibid._, I, p. 258.