Chapter XI: Part 11

The Japanese attached much importance to local reconnaissance,
whereas the Russian leaders considered it as something unusual, so
that Kuropatkin was finally obliged to prescribe it in army orders.
“Local reconnaissance was performed by 20 to 30 infantrymen. These
carefully approached our positions in small groups. One man of each
group laid his rifle aside and crawled close up to our trenches,
raised his head and observed, while three or four of his companions,
whom he had left farther in rear, opened fire on the trenches.
Occasionally all of these men threw themselves flat on the ground for
protection. This mode of procedure continued for seven hours.”

The thoroughness of the reconnaissance generally made a timely
deployment possible, even when the enemy was well concealed, but that
neglects occurred nevertheless is borne out by the advance of the
Japanese 2nd Division at =Fuchau= and =Kapukai= on March 10th, 1905.
This division advanced without reconnoitering, struck the fortified
Russian position, was unable to move forward or to the rear, and had
to fight under unfavorable conditions, and while suffering heavy
losses, from early morning until 4 P. M., when the general situation
compelled the enemy to evacuate the position. The advance of the
Russian 54th Division (Orlof) during the battle of =Liao Yang= (2nd
Sept.) is a similar example of disproportionately greater importance
and with a tragic ending. The noise of the battle at =Sykwantun=
caused the commander of the 54th Division to leave the position
assigned him on the heights of the =Yentai= mines and to march toward
the sound of the cannonading. The division, advancing over covered
terrain without adequate reconnaissance, was taken in flank and rear
by the Japanese 12th Brigade (Sasaki),[258] and thrown back in utter
rout upon its former position, carrying with it the troops which had
been left there. Thus the Yentai heights fell into the possession of
the Japanese.

[258] For details of the attack made by Sasaki’s Brigade, see
GERTSCH, _Vom russisch-japanischen Kriege_, I, sketch 14.

The primary object of local reconnaissance is to protect a force from surprise. This may be accomplished by sending out combat patrols, and by company commanders riding ahead in time. (Par. 457 German I. D. R.). The latter are likewise charged with picking out avenues of approach to selected fire positions, and the sooner they begin the reconnaissance the better, for the accidents of the ground can then be utilized to the best advantage.

The difficulties of the reconnaissance are increased when we have to reckon with the measures taken by the enemy to screen his force.[259]

[259] The attacker’s reconnaissance must be prevented as long as
possible. Frequently patrols in the foreground will suffice for this
purpose. (Par. 406 German I. D. R.)

Weak infantry patrols can neither break down this resistance nor create the necessary opening through which the leaders can reconnoiter in person. Stronger forces are requisite, and “reconnaissance companies” may have to be sent out toward the enemy to serve as a support for the patrols, to reinforce them when necessary, and to constitute natural collecting stations for messages. “Reconnaissances in force” are the result of these endeavors to obtain information,[260] for the defender will not reveal his dispositions unless the attacker threatens an attack. Reconnaissances in force are especially appropriate in this case, since the information obtained in regard to the position and strength of the enemy can be utilized at once. (Par. 134 German F. S. R.).

[260] See _Taktik_, IV. p. 214, et seq. The results of the
reconnaissance in force made at Neuville aux Bois were very
unsatisfactory.

In France great importance is attached to forcibly gaining information by means of detachments of all arms which also prevent hostile reconnaissance. In minor operations the French send out infantry detachments, which, from secure hiding places, pick off observers, screen the position of their own force, and prevent the enemy from using covered avenues of approach. However, these very patrol combats may cause the commander to come to a false conclusion in regard to the hostile position. If the cavalry reconnaissance has determined that the enemy intends to accept battle within a particular area, the details of his intentions must be obtained by local reconnaissance. Then the commander will wish to know whether or not an immediate attack is feasible, or whether it is advisable to wait until nightfall for bringing up the infantry. The local reconnaissance determines where the flanks of the enemy are located; whether the position in front is the hostile main position or only an advanced post; whether the enemy has made preparations for defense; and where the hostile artillery is posted. As a rule, it will be impossible, until after the engagement has begun, to recognize a skillfully located fortified position,[261] to distinguish between the real and dummy trenches, determine the position of obstacles and estimate whether they can be surmounted with or without adequate apparatus. Then it likewise becomes necessary to find and mark covered avenues of approach.[262] In moving to new firing positions, it is important that advanced positions, masks, and dummy trenches be recognized in time. The commander of a unit on a flank should make dispositions for observation on his flank, and for permanent communication with neighboring units, even though no specific orders have been received by him to that effect. Strange as it may seem, the troops deployed on the road Gorze--Rezonville (battle of Vionville), by their failure to get into early communication with the troops which had been on the ground for some time, neglected to take advantage of the information gained by those troops.[263]

[261] See _Taktik_, V, p. 243, et seq.

[262] HOPPENSTEDT (_Schlacht der Zukunft_, pp. 134 and 140) draws a
graphic picture which is a faithful reproduction of reality.

The procedure outlined by that author (_Ibid._, p. 122) for
indicating, by means of flag signals, points sheltered from hostile
fire, seems practicable. He states: “Holding his flag upright, the
member of the patrol proceeds steadily on his way to Weyer. Now he
has arrived at the point where the road bends slightly toward the
south; his flag descends,” etc.

[263] KUNZ, _Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, 8-9, p. 128, et seq.,
p. 243.

The necessity for thorough reconnaissance is illustrated by the
successful “fire surprises” carried out by the Boers at Modder River
on November 28th, 1899, and at Colenso, against Hart’s Brigade
advancing in dense masses, on December 15th, 1899.

The enumeration of these tasks shows that local reconnaissance should not be restricted to the preparatory stage of the combat alone, but that it must be kept up during the whole course of the action. To the duties enumerated, we may add, occasional tasks, such as picking off staffs and signal men; sneaking up on artillery that has been incautiously pushed forward; and annoying the enemy by flanking fire. For such tasks, so-called “scouting detachments,”[264] after the Russian pattern, have frequently been recommended. Their usefulness in difficult country and in operations against the enemy’s flank and rear cannot be denied. In minor operations, if provided with ample ammunition and advancing on side roads, they can hamper the reconnaissance of the enemy, secure the flanks of their own force, ascertain the probable extent of the prospective battlefield, and finally, having made a skillful lodgment, they can become very annoying to the hostile artillery. In a large battle the necessary elbow room for such employment is lacking. To form picked men into special organizations, as is done in Russia, is always of doubtful value. The constant transfer of their best men to the mounted infantry during the second part of the South African war was fatal to the British infantry battalions. An organization cannot dispense with its good men; it needs them to replace wounded non-commissioned officers. While everything goes without a hitch, the withdrawal of good men from an organization is of little importance; the drawbacks to this procedure become apparent, however, when the line begins to waver, when, in the absence of officers, only the example of the courageous men prevents the weak-kneed from running away. Our regulations properly appreciate the importance of psychological impressions during critical combat situations; they state: “The man who feels his courage and coolness going, in the excitement of battle, should look toward his officers. Should they have fallen, he will find plenty of non-commissioned officers and brave privates, whose example will revive his courage.” (Par. 268 German I. D. R.).

[264] V. TETTAU, _Die Jagdkommandos der russischen Armee_, Berlin,
1901.

HOPPENSTEDT, _Patrouillen- und Radfahr-Kommandos_, 1907.

If it becomes necessary to despatch a stronger infantry force on a mission of minor importance, it will usually be better to detail an entire company than to improvise a detachment whose leader would know his men only imperfectly.

Before the 95th Infantry (French) made its attack on the brewery
of =l’Amitié= (south of =Noisseville=), on August 31st, 1870, a
reconnoitering detachment had ascertained the strength of the
position and the manner in which it was held by the defender.[265]

[265] _Wald- und Ortsgefecht_, p. 192.

=Examples of the successful employment of flanking fire by small
forces:=

The flanking fire, delivered from the =Bois des Ognons= by about
30 men of the 12th Company, 72nd Infantry, compelled the French to
withdraw their left flank. (Combat on the Gorze--Rezonville road,
16th August, 1870).[266]

[266] KUNZ, _Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, 8-9, p. 146.

At =Gravelotte-St. Privat=, flanking fire is said to have caused the
withdrawal of nine French battalions which had until then delivered
an effective fire upon the Prussian Guard Artillery.[267]

[267] _Ibid._, 10, p. 24, and 12, p. 24, et seq.

8. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE TERRAIN.

The defense requires extensive, open terrain, permitting unobstructed view, while the attack requires stretches of ground hidden from the observation of the enemy and sheltered from his fire, in order that the troops may be deployed for action at the decisive ranges. A piece of ground will rarely possess all these advantages, but, nevertheless, well-trained infantry will be able to defend successfully a piece of ground that has a poor field of fire, and infantry which is energetically and skillfully led will be able to cross even an open plain.

At the longer ranges, a force will, in the first place, endeavor to keep concealed. While advancing, troops will rarely be able to take advantage of available cover, but at a halt and while firing they will be able to do so. Their taking advantage of the ground should not lead to a diminution of the energy of the advance, and should not cause parts of the force to fall behind.[268] “The terrain exerts considerable influence on the formation of troops. Open country requires that distances be increased so that the losses may be minimized, while close country permits distances to be reduced. The commander should take particular care not to let this advantage escape him, since it is often necessary in this case to reinforce the first line promptly. Close order formations may be retained longest on covered terrain.” (Par. 307 German I. D. R.).

[268] This is equally true of ground that is difficult to march
over; the troops must cross it. The evasion of difficult portions of
terrain usually leads to disorder and a dispersion of the troops.
For the advance of the 18th Infantry Brigade at Wörth, see KUNZ,
_Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, 14, p. 101. (Thick underbrush in
the woods on the Fuchshübel.)

An attack over a plain devoid of cover “should be avoided as far as possible, or weak, widely extended detachments only should be ordered to advance over it, while the bulk of the force is launched at a point where an approach under cover is practicable. If suitable terrain is lacking to permit this, then the decisive attack must be led over the open plain.” (Par. 325 German I. D. R.). In contrast with the continuous skirmish lines of the past, which are still favored by the Austrians, the German regulations permit a gap to be left in the line where an open plain devoid of cover exists, without thereby implying that it cannot be crossed. The French regulations (par. 257), contrary to the German, contemplate that “only weak detachments be left in the open, fire swept spaces,” and that the troops intended for the fire fight be pushed forward under available cover, separate groups being thus formed.[269]

[269] This should be an important hint for the opponent. The lines
of approach may perhaps be sheltered with reference to a certain
point, but there will always be portions of the enemy’s line from
which a fire may be directed upon these avenues of approach and the
troops marching thereon.

“This mode of fighting in groups does away with the continuous firing lines of the past which no longer fulfill the requirements of modern battle.

“The rearmost fractions of the force endeavor to avoid open spaces, or such as are swept by hostile fire, by moving, sometimes in a close order formation and again widely extended, toward the lines of cover, without regard to the direction in which the enemy may happen to be. The unit that finds the advance easiest takes the lead, and all the others, supported by the fire of their immediate neighbors, endeavor to follow it.

“Depending upon the character of the terrain and available cover, the forces deployed for the fire fight will, therefore, advance in a rather dense formation in the areas favorable for such a procedure, while weak forces only will be found on open and fire swept ground. The advance is regulated by designating the objective of the attack and by stipulating the necessity of mutual coöperation.”

This French group attack owes its existence to the silently accepted fact that an open plain cannot be crossed when swept by unsubdued hostile fire; it reckons with an unfavorable terrain such as an attacker will only find in exceptional cases. We by no means fail to recognize the fact that individual portions of the attacker’s force, when favored by the terrain, will be able to advance more quickly than others, and that other portions may even be compelled to discontinue their advance for a time; but it seems a precarious proceeding to lay down this result of the hostile fire effect as a guide in the training of troops. The group tactics of the Boers stood the test only on the defensive; they could not prevent individual groups from being attacked by far superior forces. In an attack, the units favored by the terrain will constitute the framework upon which the units which are compelled to advance more slowly, will form. There is, however, danger that these leading groups will succumb to the superior fire of a defender who is deployed on a broader front. Although this may not happen, the spirit of the regulations tempts leaders to drive everything forward, to rush ahead with isolated parts of the force. An additional drawback of these systematic group tactics lies in the difficulty of deploying the troops moving in the narrow avenue of approach. If the French infantry really desires to avoid the plain and wants to stick principally to cover, who will guarantee that the great freedom allowed it, will not cause it to crowd together under cover, lose the direction to its objective, and become completely mixed up?[270] This danger is the more imminent since no importance is attached to a more definite limitation of the frontage to be covered, while wide extension is, on the contrary, actually preached. The fear of losses will gain the upper hand and the attack will lose its energy. “It is easy to teach troops to be over-cautious, but it is a precarious undertaking to lead such troops against the enemy.” (Sir IAN HAMILTON).

[270] The plentiful cover along the ravine of the Mance brook was
by no means an actual advantage for the Ist Army. The 18th of August
presents the strange phenomenon of the success of the attack on St.
Privat, made over terrain devoid of cover, and the failure of the
attack on the French IInd Corps, made over the most favorable terrain
imaginable.

Whither such an endeavor to utilize cover must lead, is shown by the
advance of the 35th Füsilier Regiment past =Vionville= on =Flavigny=
and the group of trees north of that village. The violent fire
directed upon these companies caused them to deviate to right and
left, to leave their battalions, and to lose the march direction
designated by the regimental commander.[271] One company of the IInd
Battalion 35th Füsilier Regiment, which formed the center (march
direction, a point north of Flavigny), participated in the assault
made on Flavigny by the IIIrd Battalion; the other companies moved to
the left against Vionville and were joined by a company of the IIIrd
Battalion.--“A peculiar feature of this fight was the fire directed
from the group of trees on the attacking force which advanced against
the center of the hostile position. Ten of the twelve companies of
the attacking force (3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th and 11th of the
35th Füsilier Regiment, and 9th, 10th and 12th of the 20th Infantry)
were scattered to right and left by this fire, and forced to move
in a totally different direction than was originally intended. The
direction was maintained to a certain extent only by two companies
(the 3rd and 11th of the 20th Infantry).”[272]

[271] _Gen. St. W._, I, p. 560.

[272] V. SCHERFF, _Kriegslehren_, II, p. 106. With a sketch (A)
showing lines of advance of the companies.

While the new German Infantry Drill Regulations do not underestimate the difficulties of an advance over open ground, they require that the march direction be maintained and that cover be utilized only within the assigned “combat section”; they leave it to subordinate commanders to choose suitable expedients for crossing such unfavorable ground. “Within the limits of the section assigned to an organization for an attack, the plain devoid of cover should be avoided as far as possible, or weak, widely extended detachments only should be ordered to advance over it, while the bulk of the force is launched at a point where an approach under cover is practicable. _If suitable terrain is lacking to permit this, then the decisive attack must be led over the open plain._” (Par. 325 German I. D. R.). For purposes of instruction, it is entirely correct to require “that even on terrain devoid of cover, well-trained infantry should not open fire until the medium ranges are reached.” (Par. 326 German I. D. R.). The necessity, when under hostile fire, of adapting movements to the accidents of the ground, should not impair the energy of the advance and cause portions of the attacking force to lag behind, thereby disintegrating it. On the other hand, we should not be afraid to leave gaps in our attacking line, as the enemy would, in any case, not be able to use them for his own advance.

Thus we have here the German united attack, on the one hand, and the French group attack, on the other. Since group tactics no doubt diminish losses, they should be used in delaying actions, in holding attacks, and in defense; they should unquestionably not be employed when a concerted, rapid movement of skirmishers to the front becomes necessary. How should the Vth Corps at Wörth and the Guard at St. Privat, for instance, have attacked, according to the French regulations?

VI. MACHINE GUNS.[273]

[273] _Exerzierreglement und Schieszvorschrift für die
Maschinengewehrabteilungen_, 1904.

Captain BRAUN, _Das Maxim-Maschinengewehr und seine Verwendung_,
Berlin, 1905.

1. DEVELOPMENT OF THE ARM.

The effect of canister had decreased considerably with the introduction of rifled guns, and this was the more noticeable, because, simultaneously therewith, the accuracy and rate of fire of the infantry rifle was greatly increased. The attempts to re-invest the artillery with its one-time superiority were directed in two channels: one aimed at perfecting shrapnel, which had been rather neglected up to this time (England, Prussia, Austria), while the other resurrected the mediaeval idea of the “barrel-organ gun,” with a view of assembling a number of rifle barrels and of combining thereby the accuracy of the small arm with the moral effect of canister. Thus, among others, the 4-10 barreled _Gatling_ gun was invented in America in 1861, it being the oldest representative of this type of weapon. In order to obtain a weapon matching the Prussian _needle_ gun, Bavaria adopted the 4 barreled _Feldl_ gun and France the 25 barreled _mitrailleuse_.[274] The name _canon à balles_, which was given the gun, sufficed to indicate the manner in which it was intended to be used. As these guns frequently failed in action, offered the same target and required the same equipment and approximately the same road space as field guns, the states who had first adopted them, finally decided to dispense with them on European theaters of war. The further development of machine guns was not especially accelerated by the fact that the French _mitrailleuses_ had not fulfilled the expectations entertained for them during the Franco-German war, isolated cases excepted,[275] and that they were quickly silenced by the German artillery, which was equipped only with percussion shell, as soon as their position was ascertained. Thus, these guns seemed useful only in colonial wars and on board war ships for warding off torpedo boats. Although they took up very little room when in position, they were not considered useful for flank defense in fortresses, on account of the frequent breakdowns. In addition to their height, other defects developed; for example, they could obtain only a very insignificant rate of fire, betrayed their position by the powder smoke, and lacked the means for ascertaining ranges.

[274] The 25 barreled _mitrailleuse_, cal. 13 mm., fired volleys at
the rate of 125 rounds per minute. Its fire was considered equivalent
to that of 50 needle guns; its weight was 1,485 kg., each of its
four horses pulling 371 kg.; its maximum range was 3,000 m. Its most
favorable, practical range 500-1,500 m.--A glaring defect of the
gun was that fire pauses occurred whenever cartridges were fed into
the slot and that the lateral spread of its cone of dispersion was
extremely small.

[275] Battle of Gravelotte. _Gen. St. W._, pp. 705-712, 723 and
781. The employment of three Gatling guns in rear of the park wall
of Yoré, during the defense of the plateau of Auvours. (_Revue
d’artillerie_, 1900, p. 297; _Gen. St. W._, IV, p. 817).

The situation changed entirely when a practicable, smokeless powder was invented, and Hiram Maxim, an American, succeeded in utilizing the energy of the recoil (a factor neglected up to that time, although annoying to the marksman) for opening the breech, inserting a fresh cartridge into the chamber, closing the breech, and automatically firing the piece.[276] Through this invention it became possible to fire a maximum of 900 and an average of 500 rounds per minute, from a single barrel moving laterally back and forth. The desire to obtain a still greater rate of fire was checked effectively, because of the fact that with such an increase the danger of jamming increased and the use of infantry ammunition was precluded. The water in the jacket continues to be a decided drawback to this type of gun, for it is not always easily procured, impairs the mechanism by freezing, makes it difficult to change barrels, and constitutes a considerable weight. If cooling the barrel by means of water were to be dispensed with, the accuracy of the piece would rapidly diminish, and, after 1000 rounds of continuous fire, bullets would tumble even at short ranges. At the present time water is still the most effective means of cooling the barrel.[277]

[276] Of the other types the following may here be mentioned:
_Hotchkiss_ (France), insufficient cooling of the barrel by air;
_Schwarzlose_ (Austria), machine gun model 7, a very simple weapon
which has only a single spring.

[277] In the _Colt_ Machine Gun, which is not water-cooled, after
500 rounds had been fired, a cartridge inserted into the piece
exploded in seven seconds, and cartridges placed in the chamber a
quarter of an hour later exploded in 20 seconds.

Machine guns fire ordinary small arms ammunition carried in loops on a canvass belt (weighing 1 kg. when empty), which is generally capable of holding 250 rounds of 8 mm. cartridges weighing 8.315 kg. These belts are very carefully manufactured, the material being shrunk, so as to prevent their shrinking when in use. Two men can refill an empty belt with 8 mm. cartridges in seven minutes, according to Swedish experiments, while a belt filling machine can refill one in a still shorter time. The rate of fire of machine guns is approximately 500 rounds per minute. They are variously mounted,[278] according to circumstances, on sleds (in which the gun rests on a frame similar to that of a wheelbarrow), on tripods, or, for mountain warfare, on basket frames. Although the greatest readiness for firing was obtained with guns mounted on cavalry carriages (two-wheeled carts, similar to limbers, and equipped with shafts), which also permitted the greatest amount of ammunition to be carried along, these guns offered such a high target that their use, in an infantry action, was entirely out of the question, leading only to their being quickly silenced. Another defect was that the guns were unable to follow immediately upon the heels of the organization to which they were attached. Guns mounted on light tripods possess the least readiness for firing, as the gun must be dismounted during each change of position; but tripods are indispensable in mountain warfare. In India a tripod frame on wheels is employed. The basket frame, which is very light and is carried on the back of a soldier, affords nothing but a rest for the gun. This type of mount has the disadvantage of necessitating, in reality, freehand firing when the barrel is supported near the muzzle; that the operator, when firing continuously, becomes greatly fatigued, and that the accuracy suffers in consequence thereof. The advantages of the tripod and the wheeled carriage have been skillfully combined in the carriage adopted in Germany. In this the gun rests on a sled; this is in turn supported by the carriage proper, which is wheeled. In exceptional cases the gun may be fired from the carriage, but ordinarily it is fired from the sled, which is detached from the carriage for that purpose. This sled permits the gun to be laid at any desired height and enables it to follow the infantry anywhere during an action.[279]

[278]

British cavalry machine gun with mount 152.3 kg.
Machine gun with tripod } 16.5 + 18 = 34.5 „
Machine gun with basket frame } latest model 35.0 „
Machine gun with sled } 16.5 + 24 = 40.5 „

[279] The following complement per gun is considered necessary:

Germany 14¹⁄₂ men 9 horses.
Switzerland 8¹⁄₂ men 12 horses.

In the Russo-Japanese war the machine gun detachments of the Russian
cavalry were equipped with _Rexer_ guns which can scarcely be
considered machine guns owing to their slow rate of fire and extreme
heating of the barrel.

Machine guns can be transported upon larger vehicles capable of being unlimbered; they can also be carried on pack horses or other pack animals, and for short distances by men. Although pack animal transportation enables the guns to follow the troops anywhere, the amount of ammunition that can be carried along is limited, and the opening of fire is retarded, since gun and tripod must first be assembled; the opening of fire may even be delayed when a pack animal falls; ammunition cannot be carried on the gun; and the animals get sore backs even if pack saddles are carefully adjusted.

2. THE POWER OF MACHINE GUNS.

The machine gun is noted for its adaptability to any terrain, and the constancy of its high rate of fire as compared with that of a body of infantry, which decreases with the range, the diminishing visibility of the target, and prolonged fire. On the other hand, a single jamming can make a machine gun valueless, at least for the time being. For this reason, the Germans employ machine guns only in platoons, as a rule, and the Swiss let both guns of a platoon fire simultaneously only in exceptional cases. Theoretically, the maximum rate of fire of 600 rounds per minute will rarely be attained; and 200-300 rounds per minute will usually suffice against prone targets. In Germany volley and continuous fire are employed; fire by a single piece is used only to ward off patrols when the machine guns do not want to betray their position.[280]

[280] The following kinds of fire are used in the countries named
below:

Austria: Single shots; volleys (20-25 rounds); fire by a single
piece.

Switzerland: Fire by a single piece; volleys (20-30 rounds); rapid
fire (volleys of 100 rounds); and fire at will (both pieces of a
platoon simultaneously employing rapid fire). The last-named is
only employed in exceptional cases, for example, when the danger is
imminent and when favorable opportunities offer.

A volley consists of about 25 rounds and is followed by a pause for observing the effect of the fire. It is employed in adjusting the fire upon difficult targets in rolling country. Fire for effect consists, as a general rule, of “continuous fire,” and is interrupted only when the tactical situation requires it. The water in the jacket should be renewed and oiling attended to during the pauses in the fire, whether these grow out of the tactical situation, or are made necessary by technical considerations.

The fire is either directed upon a point (concentrated fire), the elevation and direction of the piece being fixed, or it is distributed over the entire target or over a designated part of the same (sweeping, and progressive fire).[281]

[281] For example, when sweeping the crest of the parapet of a line
of trenches, or the edge of a wood, both hands move the gun slowly
and evenly from side to side. When searching an area in the direction
of depth and obliquely (progressive fire with sweeping), the left
hand gives the gun the proper horizontal direction, while the right
manipulates the slow motion elevating gear. When firing on rapidly
moving targets--for example skirmish lines advancing by rushes--or
targets advancing over rolling country, both the traversing and
elevating movements may be unclamped. The rapidity with which the gun
is moved, when sweeping or searching, depends upon the range and the
kind of target on which the fire is directed. As a rule, the piece
is moved slowly and steadily. The accuracy of the fire is impaired
when the gun is moved too rapidly. When the fire is well observed,
it might be advantageous, in exceptional cases, when firing against
either stationary or moving targets, to direct the gun, without
aiming, after the bullets have been seen to hit their mark, by
properly manipulating the elevating and traversing apparatus while
the firing is in progress.

The ballistic properties of the gun are the same as those of the infantry rifle.[282]

[282] The destructive power of the projectiles fired from a machine
gun, as they strike within a small space, is, of course, much greater
than that of the scattered projectiles of a body of infantry. Trees
having a circumference of 30 cm. are felled by machine gun fire in
about 15 seconds at a range of 450 m.

In the machine gun an important factor in the dispersion of infantry fire--flinching and errors in aiming--is eliminated, while the heating of its barrel and the vibrations of its carriage in continuous fire do not produce a corresponding increase in dispersion. On this account the cone of dispersion of the machine gun is more compact than that of the infantry rifle and its accuracy at long ranges is therefore considerably greater than that of the latter.[283] Firing tests indicate that the accuracy of machine gun fire diminishes only very slightly with increasing range, provided the appropriate elevation is used.[284]

[283] According to Austrian experiments the depth of the beaten
zone of a machine gun is only ¹⁄₃ to ¹⁄₂ that produced by the fire of
a platoon of infantry.

[284] The following average results were obtained in experiments
made at the Musketry School, while firing on infantry targets
advancing alternately at quick and double time:

At ranges from 2000-1600 m. 1.72% hits
„ „ „ 1500-1200 m. 2.53% „

Firing against disappearing head targets placed at intervals of
0.60-0.70 m.:

At 600-800 m. 1.89% hits „ 800-1100 m. 1.69% „

In firing first with an elevation of 1800, then with one of 1750 m.
(the range being 2000-1600 m. and 254 rounds being expended per gun),
on 50 advancing, kneeling targets, placed at intervals of 1 m. 3.10%
hits were obtained and 52% figures were placed out of action in 1¹⁄₂
minutes.

In firing at the same targets for 2¹⁄₃ minutes, with an elevation of
1900 m. (304 rounds expended), the result dropped to 0.3% hits and
8.3% figures placed out of action.

In war the influence of the compact cone of dispersion will be still more potent, for we will then have to reckon with a single, specially selected machine gun marksman who is well protected, while the excitement of battle will produce a far different impression upon an organization composed of men differing materially from each other. The compactness of the cone of dispersion of the machine gun requires that the appropriate elevation be used if the fire is to be effective against well concealed prone skirmishers. This can be accomplished only in part by employing range finders. Since the probable error of these instruments is ±5% of the range, this determination is so inaccurate for machine gun fire that nothing remains but to increase the dispersion artificially. When it is impossible to observe the strike of the bullets, the dispersion may be artificially increased by employing combined sights, two in a single platoon and three in a machine gun battery (company), and above all by sweeping. The employment of combined sights would appear to be too rigid a method; sweeping fire is at any rate better.[285]

[285] Lieutenant-General ROHNE, _Schieszlehre_, 2nd Ed. p. 185, et
seq.

From general ballistic data, Lieutenant-General ROHNE[286] computes that the following results would be obtained by a machine gun and a detachment of skirmishers when firing with the appropriate elevation at a broad target 1 m. high:--

Machine Detachment
gun of skirmishers
At 500 m. 32.4 16.8% hits
„ 1000 „ 15.3 8.1% „
„ 1500 „ 10.2 5.1% „
„ 2000 „ 6.4 3.2% „

[286] _Jahrbücher für Armee und Marine_, 1901, IV, p. 268.

This nearly double superiority is reversed, however, when the appropriate elevation is not used:

======+========================================================
|Firing on a target 1 m. high, the following percentages
| of hits may be expected when the error in estimating
| the range is--
Range.| 50 m. | 100 m. | 150 m. | 200 m.
+-------+-----+-------+-----+-------+-----+-------+------
|Machine|Skir-|Machine|Skir-|Machine|Skir-|Machine|Skir-
| guns. |mish-| guns. |mish-| guns. |mish-| guns. |mish-
m. | | ers.| | ers.| | ers.| | ers.
------+-------+-----+-------+-----+-------+-----+-------+------
500 | 27.5 | 16.0| 19.0 | 13.8| 7.0 | 11.7| 1.3 | 7.3
1000 | 9.2 | 6.8| 2.0 | 4.8| 0.2 | 2.7| -- | 1.0
1500 | 3.6 | 3.9| 0.2 | 1.8| -- | 0.5| -- | 0.1
2000 | 1.7 | 2.2| -- | 0.8| -- | 0.2| -- | --
------+-------+-----+-------+-----+-------+-----+-------+------

From this it follows that the good qualities of the machine gun can be utilized to the fullest advantage only when the appropriate elevation is used. When this is not accurately known, the fire effect of the machine gun drops down to zero more quickly than that of a skirmish line. Where local conditions are at all favorable, the determination of the appropriate elevation is facilitated by observing the strike of the projectiles in “volley fire.”

According to British firing tests, at ranges from 500-1000 yards an
error of estimation of 100 yards, reduces the effect of the fire
50 per cent. According to firing tests 75% of all shots fired by a
machine gun and body of infantry are distributed as follows:

=====+==================+==================+====================
| Machine gun. | Detachment of |Errors of estimation
| | infantry. | permissible for the
At |Depth of 75% strip|Depth of 75% strip| machine gun.
m. | m. | m. | m.
-----+------------------+------------------+--------------------
450 | 112 | 192 | 54 = 12 %
900 | 63 | 108 | 31 = 3.5%
1350 | 54 | 90 | 27 = 2 %
1800 | 67 | 140 | 31 = 1.8%
-----+------------------+------------------+--------------------

It is clearly apparent that the permissible error of the range finder is smaller than the depth of the vertical dispersion strip covered by 75% of the bullets.

The difficulty of hitting a target lodged in some feature of the terrain requires that the machine gun be used first of all against large targets that are visible for a short time only. When the appropriate elevation is used, a decisive effect may be confidently counted on within a short space of time; when an inappropriate elevation is used and the fire is not properly observed, only accidental hits can, as a rule, be expected, even when the fire is directed on tall, dense targets. When the fire is directed on skirmishers lying down, the effect produced is not commensurate with the amount of ammunition expended, and a slight error in the elevation used may nullify the effect entirely. A straight line of trenches, which is plainly visible, is, on the other hand, an eminently favorable target. The heating of the barrel, and the difficulty of replenishing ammunition and renewing the water in the jacket, tend to work against a participation of machine guns in a protracted fire fight. The machine gun is not at all suited for carrying on a prolonged fire action.

It is very difficult to determine the relative combat value of a body of infantry as compared with that of a machine gun. One will not be far wrong in placing this value between 50 and 60 men.

In experimental field firing at the Swiss Infantry Musketry School, it was demonstrated that 30-40 skirmishers almost in every case rapidly gained the upper hand over a machine gun in the open, at 900 m., but that the infantrymen had small chances of success when the position of the machine gun could not be accurately determined. In Switzerland a machine gun is considered equivalent to 50 infantrymen. Skirmishers are the most difficult target for machine guns to fight, and, at the same time, they are the most dangerous. When the fire is well observed, a good effect can, indeed, still be counted on, when the fire is directed at prone skirmishers at ranges up to 1000 m., but this is not true when the fire cannot be observed; in the last mentioned case, no effect worth mentioning is produced.

=Austria.= In a field firing test (which was repeated four times)
between a machine gun (gun pointer covered by a shield) and 30
infantrymen, the following results were obtained at 600 m. in 1¹⁄₂
minutes:

Infantrymen 120 rounds 10 hits (9%)
Machine gun 215 „ 14 „ (7%)[287]

[287] Firing tests of the Army Musketry School at Bruck, a.d.
Leitha, 1905. _Streffleur_, Apl. 1906, p. 524.

=England.= At the Infantry School at Hythe, in a firing test at 300
yards, lasting 5 minutes--perhaps the longest period during which
continuous fire is possible--the power of a Maxim gun was found to
be equivalent to 60 rifles. In field firing this comparative power
dropped down to 25-35 rifles. In this connection, it should be
borne in mind that moral influences do not make themselves felt in
firing under peace conditions, and that, on the other hand, a single
favorable hit can place the machine gun out of action for a long
period, while the skirmishers can keep up the fire.

3. INFANTRY VERSUS MACHINE GUNS.

It will rarely be possible to concentrate upon a machine gun battery of six guns a fire equivalent to its own. Because of the small target offered by machine guns, it is necessary for a firing line to concentrate its fire upon one machine gun at a time, thus gradually silencing the battery in detail. This procedure is feasible because it is very difficult for the machine guns to reach with their fire all parts of a well concealed skirmish line. The normal relation, unfavorable for the infantry, changes in its favor, however, as machine guns cannot keep up a high rate of fire for a prolonged period, even when nothing is considered but ammunition supply; as serious breaks are especially apt to occur when the gun is worked to its maximum capacity; and as the ammunition expended in one minute (3600 rounds) cannot produce an effect unless not only the correct range but also the proper elevation is accurately known.

The fight against machine guns may be advantageously conducted according to the following principles:[288]

1. Infantry skirmishers should conceal themselves so well that it will be difficult for the hostile machine gun battery to find them. Color of immediate vicinity (shade) and background should be considered; platoon and other leaders must not stand upright; objects that are clearly visible should be avoided.

2. It should be made difficult for the hostile machine guns to observe their fire (ricochets) and to measure the range. (No prominent features that would facilitate such measurements should be located near the infantry position).

3. The firing line, as far as this is possible, should not be continuous; the several parts of the line should be posted in echelon.

4. Kinds of fire: Lively fire at will should be used.

5. Expenditure of ammunition: At least 600 rounds should be expended against each machine gun.

6. At the outset a single company should concentrate its fire upon a single machine gun, picking out the one that is most clearly visible. Machine guns on the flanks are not good targets, as a strong wind may deflect the fire directed upon them.

[288] Switzerland: Machine guns, “on account of their small gun
squads, are more sensitive to losses than artillery. They cannot
adjust their fire so easily as artillery, but, when once on the
target, the effect of their fire is great.

“The principles governing the combat against artillery are
applicable, in general, to the fight against machine guns. It may be
assumed that at medium ranges, one platoon of infantry will suffice
for silencing one machine gun, provided the platoon of infantry
fights the action under favorable conditions. At short ranges, a few
good marksmen suffice for silencing a machine gun. For this reason
selected men are sent forward, when the situation permits, to sneak
up to the machine guns and to pick off the men serving them.”

The following rules, governing the conduct of infantry when exposed to machine gun fire, may be deduced from the above:

Even skirmish lines cannot continue their advance over terrain devoid of cover, when exposed within a range of 1500 m. to the unsubdued fire of machine guns; nothing remains but for them to lie down, and to gain ground to the front in groups, or one by one.

The same is true of route columns. They can only deploy to the right and left front at double time, and take cover.

The most unsuitable formation under machine gun fire is the column of platoons, whether lying down or in motion.[289]

[289] Within ³⁄₄ to 1 minute a column of platoons (lying down)
sustained an average of 4.22% hits at 1400 m. and 4.31% hits at
900-1100 m. with 42 and 32%, respectively, figures placed out of
action.

If the column of platoons is reached by effective machine gun fire, when lying down, line must be formed. The men must not rise, however, to execute this movement, but the platoons should crawl forward into line. For the men to rise would mean annihilation.

The low target offered by machine guns makes them a difficult target for field artillery to hit, in spite of the accuracy with which the latter can adjust its fire.

4. MACHINE GUNS IN GERMANY.

The German machine gun (drawn by 4 horses driven from the saddle) is mounted upon a sled which forms the firing frame. On the march, this sled is placed on a wheeled carriage, from which it must first be detached (10-15 seconds) before the gun is used; in exceptional cases, the gun can be fired from the wheeled carriage.

The gun commander is mounted. Two of the gunners are seated on the axle chest of the carriage, their carbines buckled to the gun carriage; two are seated on the limber chest, their carbines slung over their backs. When surprised by a direct attack, all the men that can be spared form as skirmishers in the intervals between the guns of the machine gun battery. The machine gun can be served by a single man. The water in the jacket need not necessarily be renewed when the gun is fired for a short time only.

The machine guns can be used on any terrain passable for infantry. When detached from the wheeled carriage they can even surmount considerable obstacles. In action, they present no larger target than skirmishers fighting under similar conditions, and are capable of offering more resistance than infantry.

The sled can be carried or drawn by the men for short distances. The ammunition, placed in belts holding 250 rounds each, and packed in six boxes, is similarly drawn on an ammunition sled. If the conditions permit, the guns may be drawn by horses.

The “fighting battery” consists of six guns, formed into three platoons, and an ammunition platoon (three ammunition wagons and one store wagon); the combat train consists of officers’ and other led horses. The field train consists of one baggage wagon, one ration (commissary) wagon, one forage wagon, and a second store wagon.

Lead Team Hitched to Gun.

Carrying the Machine Guns.]

The movements and gaits of a machine gun battery are the same as those of a field battery: the order in line, at close or extended intervals, in which the guns are abreast, the intervals between them, measured from center to center, being 5 and 17 paces, respectively. The order in line, at extended intervals, is used in moving to the front or rear; the order in line, at close intervals, for assembly, for movements in that formation, for parking, and for parade. The section column[290] is the principal maneuver formation on the battlefield; it is employed as an assembly formation on a road, and as route column. (Par. 320 German F. S. R.). In section column the guns follow each other at a distance of four paces. In addition to this column, a column of platoons is used, in which the platoons follow each other at a distance of 22 paces. (This may be reduced to 6 paces).

[290] The guns are placed in rear of each other, the ammunition
wagons and other vehicles bring up the rear. _Translator_.

A machine gun battery has available 87,300 rounds of ammunition (10,500 rounds with each gun and 8100 rounds in each ammunition wagon, or a total of 14,550 rounds per gun), which may be drawn forward to the firing position upon sleds, in boxes holding 250 rounds each. The ammunition wagons are refilled from the ammunition wagons of the light ammunition columns of the cavalry division and from the wagons of the infantry ammunition columns marked with a red stripe, which carry ammunition for machine gun units. A reserve machine gun is carried with the ammunition column.

The machine gun battery combines high infantry fire power (approximately equivalent to that of the skirmishers of a German cavalry regiment, armed with carbines, or to that of 4-6 platoons of infantry)[291] with instant readiness for firing, and a mobility which enables it to follow the mounted arms anywhere. The chance of producing a sudden fire effect within a short space of time must be especially utilized, and, therefore, an endeavor should be made to put entire machine gun batteries into the first line. The employment of single guns is precluded owing to the danger of breakdowns, and the employment of platoons is especially proper on the defensive as well as in action at short range.

[291] A German cavalry regiment at peace strength numbers from 552
to 576 sabers: a platoon of infantry (on a peace footing) numbers
from 48 to 53 men.

In making a comparison between a cavalry regiment and a machine gun
battery, it must be borne in mind that horse holders are deducted
from the strength given for a cavalry regiment. _Translator_.

(extended intervals).]

(closed up).]

(Route Column).]

(close intervals).]

The duties of machine guns naturally grow out of their tactical advantages. Their fire power should be saved for decisive moments, when the development of strong fire power at short ranges is requisite, and when the available time and the situation do not permit of pushing infantry into action. The machine gun batteries, which constitute an independent arm, and which are assigned to cavalry and infantry divisions, are best adapted for these duties.

The heavy matériel and the teams designed for rapid movements make the machine gun battery less suited for employment in infantry combat, where such a high degree of mobility is not so necessary. In the battle on the Shaho an employment of machine guns by platoons in the first line, came about quite naturally. The guns prepared the assault, reinforced weak points, and supported the advance. In Germany, provisional machine gun companies consisting of six two-horse machine guns, driven from the carriage (these guns cannot be fired from their carriages), have been adopted for this purpose. These machine gun companies are principally an auxiliary weapon of the infantry, and, distributed by platoons to the battalions, or sent into action as a single unit by the regimental commander, they serve the purpose of augmenting the fire of the infantry.

Movements at increased gaits are possible in exceptional cases only; as a rule, the guns follow the infantry at a walk, and in combats terminating in a defeat, it may frequently be impossible to keep them from falling into the hands of the enemy. The permanent assignment of machine guns to battalions does not seem to be advisable.

5. GOING INTO POSITION.

The principles which govern the reconnaissance and occupation of a position by field artillery are applicable also to machine guns. The tactical situation determines whether the guns should move into position under cover or in the open. As a rule, the interval between two adjacent machine guns in line is 17 paces; but the proper utilization of favorable cover does not preclude posting the guns close together. It may likewise be advantageous to post the guns in echelon on the flanks.

In action the carriages remain, as a rule, in the nearest cover in rear of the line. The advance from this point is effected by the men carrying or dragging the detached guns and ammunition sleds; under certain circumstances, it may also be advisable to have the guns or ammunition sleds drawn forward by single horses (mounts of gun commanders). On level ground the ammunition platoon and the wheeled carriages of the machine guns take post in rear of and as close as possible to the guns. Whether the two groups are combined, or whether the machine gun carriages should occupy the nearest, and the ammunition wagons the more distant cover, depends upon the available cover. The commander of the machine gun carriages sends full ammunition sleds to the firing line at an early moment and has empty boxes and belts brought back.

6. THE FIRE FIGHT.

The machine gun. squad consists of one gun commander and four
gunners, numbers 1-4; number 2 is the gun pointer. The gun commander
sees that the gun is set up for the prone, sitting, or kneeling fire
position, according to the terrain, supervises the service of the
gun, which can be served in any position of the body, and removes all
obstructions that interfere with its effective use. The gun pointer
handles the gun, _i.e._, he loads it, sets the sight, aims and fires
it. No. 3, who lies to the right of the gun pointer, assists the
latter in these duties, places a box of ammunition on the right of
the gun, and feeds the ammunition belt into the slot. When necessary,
he takes the place of the gun pointer. No. 1 lies in rear of the gun
pointer, keeps his eye on the battery and platoon commanders, and
transmits their orders to the gun commander and gun pointer. No. 4
has charge of the replenishment of ammunition; he takes cover or lies
down 20 paces in rear of, or on a flank of the gun.