Chapter XVII: Part 17

1. The 26th Infantry Brigade was alarmed and put in march toward the
battlefield to support the advance guard brigade of the VIIth Army
Corps, engaged at =Colombey=. The commander of the 26th Infantry
Brigade received orders from the commanding general to engage. It
was not necessary for the brigade to provide its own reserve as the
25th Brigade had been directed to concentrate between Marsilly and
Colligny, and to be at the disposal of the corps commander. The
troops already engaged were in a critical situation; their moral and
physical energy was exhausted. It is only too patent that the first
battalion (1st Battalion, 13th Infantry) appearing on the scene was
thrown into the fight to afford at least temporary relief, but this
insufficient reinforcement was involved in the general failure. After
about a quarter of an hour, the 25th Brigade (the IIIrd Battallion,
73rd Infantry had remained in bivouac at Pange) was concentrating
for action at Coincy, but, instead of its making a united attack,
only the 1st Battalion of the 73rd Infantry was launched. This
battalion did, indeed, penetrate into the “Tannenwäldchen” at the
“Todten-Allee”, but was then surrounded on three sides, had to fall
back with considerable losses, prevented the further advance of the
IInd Battallion of the 73rd Infantry, and rallied on the Füsilier
Battalion of the 13th Infantry, on the bank of the Vallières brook.
“Although the General Staff account of the war is silent on this
subject, we are justified in assuming that only the presence of the
brigade commander, who had learned a lesson from the second local
assault, prevented the Füsilier Battalion of the 13th Infantry from
making a fourth isolated effort. After re-forming the organizations,
the new attack, which was made with indomitable spirit, proceeded
more in connection with that of three other battalions advancing on
the same line, and this united advance was closely followed by a
second echelon consisting of the last battalion of the brigade (the
IInd Battalion of the 13th Infantry), which had arrived just in time.
The result was that the enemy was completely routed.”[436]

[436] _Gen. St. W._, I, p. 470. VON SCHERFF, _Kriegslehren_, I, p.
41, et seq.

2. At the Gorze-Rezonville road, on August 16th, 1870, the isolated
attacks made against Hill 970 by eight battalions, belonging to three
different brigades, likewise accomplished nothing, whereas, had a
higher commander been present, a united attack launched by him would
undoubtedly have been successful.[437]

[437] _Gen. St. W._, I, p. 631. VON SCHERFF, _Kriegslehren_, II, p.
271. KUNZ, _Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, 8/9, p. 128, et seq.

3. The well executed attack made against the hill west of the suburb
of =St. Martin=, on January 19th, 1871, by six battalions of the 29th
Infantry Brigade shows the importance of the united launching of a
large body of massed infantry. The engagement of the 16th Infantry
Division, in particular the attack made on =Grugies= (battle of =St.
Quentin=) is the antithesis of the above-mentioned attack. Although
the situation did not necessitate the simultaneous launching of the
available forces, the brigade attacked in driblets. The attack made
by these fractions, launched one after another, was not able to
bring about a decision. In the first place, at about 11 A. M., three
companies (5th, 6th, and 7th of the 69th Infantry), soon afterwards
supported by the 8th Company of the 29th Infantry, and the 8th
Company of the 69th Infantry, attacked the French position at the
railway embankment and cut. The Prussian troops fought with great
gallantry, the 5th, 6th and 7th Companies of the 69th Infantry making
four attacks, and the other two companies, three. Although these
five companies succeeded in gaining temporary successes, they lacked
a common commander, and were supported from the rear only when they
were thrown back after fighting for three-quarters of an hour.

About noon, the four companies of the Ist Battalion, 29th Infantry,
were brought up, but did not engage until the first line had been
forced back and the 5th, 6th, and 7th Companies of the 69th Infantry,
at any rate, were out of action for the time being. Incidentally,
it may be mentioned that the Ist Battalion of the 29th Infantry
attacked in three groups, the strongest of which consisted of 2-l/2
companies, the weakest of only half a company. Only the strongest
of these groups scored a success, and the Ist Battalion of the 29th
Infantry was completely routed after a bloody fight. The 9th and 10th
Companies, 29th Infantry, did not arrive on the battlefield until
after the companies of the Ist Battalion of this regiment, whose
heroic fight cannot be sufficiently praised, had ceased to exist as
tactical units.

At 12:30 P. M., the 3rd and 4th Companies of the 70th Infantry
were brought up and threw back the French, but were in their turn
defeated. At this moment the 10th and 11th Companies of the 40th
Infantry arrived; these companies were also able to advance, but
their success was a temporary one only.

At 1:30 P. M., the IInd Battalion of the 40th Infantry appeared,
threw the French back, but was soon attacked by superior forces and
suffered the same fate as its predecessors.

At 2:30 P. M., the Füsilier Battalion of the 70th Infantry and the
9th and 12th Companies of the 40th Infantry were brought forward, but
only the former engaged seriously at once--again without success.
A little while later, the 9th and 12th Companies, 40th Infantry,
advanced energetically. At about 3:30 P. M., the French made a very
strong counter-attack; all that had been gained seemed about to
be lost again, when the decision was finally brought about by the
vigorous action of the 41st Infantry and a charge made by Reserve
Dragoons.

The capture of Grugies, of the sugar mill, and, a little later, of
Gauchy, now followed.

The resistance of the French was broken. General von Barnekow
had thus, apparently, gained his object; but at what a price? In
this engagement, the launching of troops in driblets may be very
accurately followed:

1. At 11 A. M., five companies were launched in two separate groups
(5th, 6th, and 7th Companies, 69th Infantry--8th Company, 29th
Infantry and 8th Company, 69th Infantry);

2. Toward noon, four fresh companies (1st Battalion, 29th Infantry)
were also launched in separate groups;

3. A little later, two fresh companies were put in (9th and 10th
Companies, 29th Infantry);

4. At 12:30 P. M., two fresh companies were launched (3rd and 4th
Companies, 70th Infantry);

5. A little later, the 10th and 11th Companies, 40th Infantry, were
pushed in;

6. About 1:30 P. M., the IInd Battalion, 40th Infantry, was brought
up;

7. About 2:30 P. M., the Füsilier Battalion, 70th Infantry, and the
9th and 12th Companies, 40th Infantry, advanced.

Thus, between 11 A. M. and 2:30 P. M., General von Barnekow gradually
drew into the fight twenty-five companies, in seven different
detachments, from the reserve formed by the 16th Infantry Division
at Essigny le Grand. Besides, the troops generally did not appear on
the battlefield until the energy of the troops already engaged was
exhausted.[438]

[438] KUNZ, _Nordarmee_, II, pp. 135 and 212.

Moreover, the retreat of the several detachments was not a voluntary
one, for the French, thanks to their great superiority, generally
forced them to retire. This engagement thus presents a series of
partial successes, which became reverses, however, in a very short
time.

_Launching reinforcements in driblets increased the numbers required
beyond all reasonable bounds, produced heavy losses, and involved
the weak reinforcements, which arrived successively, in disaster,
without turning the tide of the battle. Decisive victories can only
be brought about by simultaneously launching masses._

“The system of close order battalion tactics was no longer
practicable under Chassepot fire, and everyone promptly went to the
opposite extreme of extended order, company column tactics, with
which all were sufficiently familiar, since it had been carefully
practiced in minor field exercises in time of peace.” (The attack
made by the 26th Infantry Brigade against =Schlosz Aubigny=, August
14th, 1870[439])

[439] _Gen. St. W._, I, p. 466; VON SCHERFF, _Kriegslehren_, I, p.
16; VON MALACHOWSKI, _Scharfe Taktik und Revue-Taktik_, p. 18. This
example is the more instructive, as both advocates of these opposing
views show how, in their opinion, the attack should have been made.
The same attack is, moreover, treated in _Militär-Wochenblatt_,
1901, Numbers 41 and 42, under the title _Selbständigkeit und
Auftragsverfahren_.

There is always danger that unity of action will be sacrificed by the
continued assignment of individual tasks; that the leader will not
be able to count with confidence on the initiative of subordinate
leaders restoring this unity, and “that, in the end, no higher
commander will any longer have the assurance that his wishes will
be carried out.” The battles around Metz during August, 1870, show
a tendency on the part of the infantry to leave behind, in reserve
and in rallying positions, parts of the troops launched to perform a
certain combat task, “to detach parts to maintain communication (very
often not at all endangered) with neighboring detachments”, and to
despatch others to a distance to cover a flank, or to make a wide
turning movement for the purpose of enveloping the enemy’s flank.

To prevent a battle from degenerating into a number of disconnected,
local combats, and to ensure that the enemy will be actually
subjected to the fire of as many rifles as the supreme commander
intended, General von Scherff proposes that the battle formation,
consisting of several echelons separated by fixed distances, be taken
up outside of the zone of hostile fire, and that these echelons
then advance simultaneously and as uninterruptedly as possible upon
the enemy. In this movement the terrain is to be taken advantage of
only so far as the orders permit. In view of the flat trajectory of
the modern rifle, he concedes that fire while in motion, formerly
considered permissible by him at long and medium ranges, may be
replaced by an advance by rushes of the firing line, alternating
with firing in a prone position, the ammunition to be expended at
each halt being fixed by the officer charged with fire direction.
He moreover considers it necessary to have a main firing position,
located approximately at the outer limit of short ranges, for the
purpose of gaining the superiority of fire. Base units must be
designated in order to prevent weak detachments from encountering the
enemy single-handed. Moreover, he intends to keep the advance going
by increasing the fire, and by detailed and definite orders providing
for the constant reinforcement of the firing line by men of the
steadily following supports and reserves. Further, since according to
his proposal, a halt by the rear echelons of an attack that has once
been launched, is excluded on principle, it follows of necessity,
that, for the fire effect of the firing line at the really decisive
ranges, there can remain only a very brief period of time, measurable
in minutes, which is amply sufficient, in his opinion, for the object
to be accomplished.

It is charged that General von Scherff’s proposal[440] (see p. 205
supra) favors a set scheme for conducting every fight. This is not
true; there is quite a difference between “more definitely regulating
the conduct of an attack”, aimed at by the author of _Kriegslehren_,
and the formulation of a normal procedure.

[440] The 10th Supplement of the _Internationale Revue_ 1900, gives
General von Scherff’s ideas on the infantry attack. See also his
_Reglementarische Studien_, p. 58, and _Ein Schlachtenangriff_, p.
102. _Vergleichender Rückblick auf die neueste Tagesliteratur über
den Infanterieangriff_, 1906.

“Where a number of individuals are to coöperate for the purpose of
performing a certain task, the nature of the case requires that
each one be able to picture to himself beforehand the nature of the
task, so that his share in it will appear clear and definite. Each
one must know what he is to do, when and where he should engage,
what his role is to be, etc. etc., or the result will be hopeless
confusion.”--“The drill regulations must supply this picture and the
drill-ground is the place where its general forms should be impressed
upon every individual participating in the performance of a task.”
Experience has taught us that this image of the drill-ground becomes
distorted in war through influences which have almost never permitted
it to appear on the battlefield in its true form. The initiative of
subordinate leaders should overcome the obstacles which stand in the
way of a realization of this ideal image.

=The system of tactical missions= reckons with the sum-total of local
successes, assigns tasks to the different units of command, and
leaves to the latter the choice of the means, without restricting
their independence. The course of the combat can be influenced only
by the action of retained forces, and it is sought to produce united
action by acquainting all leaders with the object of the combat, they
in turn endeavoring to attain this object even though they do so in
different ways.

=The system of united action= seeks to ensure victory by
simultaneously placing in readiness all the forces intended for
the general combat, by an orderly concentration for action, and by
launching the troops at one and the same time, without, however,
requiring all parts of the force to employ the same formations. This
system dictates to the leader the number of troops he should launch.
Since in action everything is ordered as necessity therefor arises,
the result is that the leader loses sight of the general action in
view of the great number of separate orders that must be issued.

In the system of tactical missions, there is danger of arbitrary
action on the part of subordinates, and of dispersion; moreover,
it is not always easy to deploy strong firing lines, and there is
an increased tendency to overestimate the value of cover and, in
consequence, to overstep the assigned frontage.

The system of united action is open to the objection that initiative
of the individual disappears and that the rules laid down in drill
regulations degenerate into a pattern devoid of all spirit.

In =Austria= (1906), Captain Wachtel[441] suggests that, when a
decision is not sought, an attack in groups be made, and that, when a
decision is sought, a united attack be made. In =Switzerland=, Major
Sonderegger[442] advocates a procedure based on that of General von
Scherff.

[441] _Gruppen- und Einheitsangriff_.

[442] _Der ungebremste Infanterieangriff_, 1906.

The initiative of the individual should carry the troops over
difficulties occasioned by the terrain or the enemy. Such checks
occur most frequently from the time a force enters the zone of
effective hostile fire until the assault has been decided upon. In
the author’s opinion, the individualized attack is a concession made,
at the expense of united action, for the purpose of making the attack
succeed at all.

XI. THE DEFENSE.[443]

[443] _Taktik_, V, p. 308. HOPPENSTEDT, _Taktisches Handbuch für
den Infanterieoffizier_, p. 30.

The invariable guiding principle in defense is to make the most profitable use of fire. This principle governs in the selection of a position and in strengthening it artificially.

The defender’s object may be--

1. =Temporary occupation= of a piece of ground;

2. =Purely passive defense=, outpost, rear guard, and delaying actions;

3. =Offensive-defensive action=, _i.e._, to bring about a decision by combining the offensive with the defensive.

In fortress warfare, situations may arise which may make it necessary to hold a piece of ground obstinately, without it being possible to assume the offensive. In the French, Russian, and Italian regulations, only the offensive-defensive is considered. The Italians see in the defensive nothing but a preparation for the offensive; the Russians seek to shake the enemy with fire in defense, so that they can subsequently assume the offensive.

The defensive is dependent upon the terrain, and is subject to the condition that the locality where the tactical situation requires a stand to be made offers a position favorable for employing fire to good advantage, and that the opponent actually attacks where the defender expects him. The employment of the defensive is restricted by its dependence on the ground and on the measures of the enemy. Its employment may frequently be explained by the fact that one of the contending parties allows itself to be checked to such an extent by the initiative of the other that it can only offer a passive resistance. Such passive resistance may here and there score a success by chance (Plevna, St. Privat), but, as a rule, only the assailant reaps a benefit from such situations.

1. THE PASSIVE DEFENSE

seeks to avoid a decision, and must therefore endeavor, by opening fire at an early moment, to prevent the enemy from reaching short ranges. (See p. 147 supra). It is not absolutely necessary to have a clear field of fire or strong reserves, but the latter, kept a considerable distance in rear, must be strong enough to enable the force to disengage itself from the enemy.

Since only a temporary resistance is to be made, it is permissible for the force to cover a greater front. The defender should endeavor to compensate for his numerical inferiority by expending a large amount of ammunition and by employing machine guns. It is an advantage to have obstacles in front of the position and cover in rear of it, because the former retard the enemy’s advance and the latter shelters the troops from his fire in case of a retreat.

2. THE DEFENSE SEEKING A DECISION.[444]

[444] During the attack on the large work at Gorni Dubniac, the
Finnland Regiment was unable to advance from its last position, only
70-100 paces distant from the enemy, over the foreground swept by
grazing fire. Several attempted assaults were repulsed.

Decisive results can only be obtained at short and medium ranges. Long range fire may, indeed, inflict losses on the enemy and delay his advance, but it cannot repulse him. (See p. 148 supra).

It is not sufficient merely to ward off the attack with fire; the offensive must be assumed. When this is not done, the assailant can repair his losses and try another attack. When the defender has repulsed the enemy, he should follow up this success with an attack. However, as he will rarely be able to do this with the force at his disposal, fresh troops will be required. (Beaune la Rolande, Lisaine). The change from the tactical defensive to the offensive offers the same difficulties as the corresponding strategical move; but, in the former case, there is present, in addition, the element of danger and the difficulty of perceiving the right moment.[445]

[445] _Taktik_, V, p. 320. Compare this with Benedeck’s hesitation
at Königgrätz.

A position is of value only when it compels the enemy to attack, directs his movements into definite channels, and induces him to make wide turning movements, which cause him to lose time and produce favorable conditions for the assumption of the offensive on the part of the defender. Every position that enables the defender to use all his weapons, and does not deter the enemy from making an attack, is suitable for this purpose.

“By placing our troops in an unassailable position, we actually refuse battle and force the enemy to seek the decision in another manner. * * * A defensive position approaches its ideal to the extent that its strength is hidden and opportunity is offered of surprising the enemy by our tactical combinations. One should endeavor to conceal the advantages which one intends to derive from the formation of the ground, just as one hides from the enemy the bulk of one’s troops and their actual position. This is, indeed, only practicable to a certain extent, and requires perhaps a peculiar and little used method of treatment.”[446]

[446] CLAUSEWITZ, _On War_, VI, 12 (_Militär-Klassiker_, p.
364). The Boers were masters of the art of concealing defensive
positions. At Colenso, on the Modder River, and at Magersfontain,
their positions were located in places where neither the British
artillerists nor the reconnoitering detachments suspected them to be.

Modern firearms make the defense so strong in front that it suffices to hold this part of the position with a weak force supplied with plenty of ammunition, and provided with weak supports, at a few points, to replace losses. As these supports have a definite task to perform, they are posted as near the first line as the available cover permits, in order to cut down the distance to be traversed by them under fire. When practicable, they are intrenched within the firing line itself. As it is advisable to supply these troops with a great deal of ammunition, some of the ammunition wagons belonging to the battalions held in reserve may be turned over to them. The general reserve intended for offensive action should be kept far in rear of the line. When kept too close to the first line, the defender will be unable to move it to any point desired, after the direction of the attack becomes apparent. The defender should examine his position from the point of view of the attacker, and ask himself, “_With how weak a force may I occupy the position and still obtain the frontal strength described in the regulations, and how strong can I make the general reserve so as to bring about a decision?_”

At some parts of the position, an attack will have good prospects of succeeding, at others it would encounter difficulties, and, finally, at others it could not possibly succeed. While many troops are needed in the first-mentioned portions (sections), comparatively few troops will suffice to hold those sections which are less favorable for the attacker (on account of their free field of fire, obstacles, and the absence of artillery positions in which the attacker can place his guns). This leads to a division of the defensive position into sections, each forming a separate unit of command (battalion or company) and, when necessary, detailing its own reserve (section reserve). When the frontage of the sections, as determined by the above-mentioned examination of the position, is considerable, or when obstacles lie within the position, a further subdivision may become necessary. This does not imply that the position must be held in equal strength all along the line; portions of the line that are very difficult to attack need only be kept under observation. Gaps in the defensive line are, as a rule, of very little value to the assailant, as the defender will frequently be able to sweep the space in front of them from a flank. “In order to keep all parts of the foreground under observation, and to prevent portions of the hostile force from escaping the defender’s fire, a division of the foreground corresponding to the division into sections must be made when necessary.” (Par. 403 German I. D. R.).

Weak points, _i.e._, points against which the assailant can suddenly mass superior forces at short range, or in the defense of which a coöperation of infantry and artillery is impossible, must be specially strengthened: by obstacles; provision for flanking the hostile advance; and preparation of supporting points in rear of the position. In addition, such weak points must be occupied with a strong garrison, by employing two firing lines, one above the other; reserves; and machine guns.

Enclosed farm yards (Point du Jour, on August 18th, 1870), and small patches of timber, are best not occupied at all; they are far more valuable as sham defenses in that they draw the fire of the assailant. At any rate, it is a question whether, at the last moment, when the hostile assault must be warded off, it will be possible to occupy such points.

As a general rule, only a single defensive position, consisting of an infantry and an artillery line, is selected.

The Russians invariably posted strong advanced detachments in front
of their main defensive positions. As a result, the most serious
fights usually occurred in the positions taken up by these advanced
troops.[447] At =Haicheng=, for example, a strong main position had
been prepared, in which a stand was to be made. In spite of this,
the IInd Siberian Corps was left in a strongly fortified advanced
position west of =Simutcheng=. This corps, in its turn, fortified two
lines of advanced positions far in its front.

[447] LÖFFLER, _Russisch-japanischer Krieg_, I, p. 109. See
_Taktik_, V, p. 305, in regard to the numerous positions in the
valley of the Shaho.

“Thus, on July 31, 1904, only seven battalions of this corps finally
fought at =Daputsi= and =Liadapu=. When they were thrown back by
superior forces, the mistake was made of bringing up fresh troops
to regain the position captured by the enemy. These troops arrived
too late and had to make a difficult attack on the Japanese, who
had already occupied the captured position. Naturally their frontal
attack accomplished nothing.

“The force thus suffered a defeat needlessly, and, although the
defensive had been decided upon, a lot of men were sacrificed in an
attempt to retake an advanced position that had been captured by the
enemy. The corps evacuated its strong position without a fight when
its line of retreat was endangered by Mistshenko’s being forced back.
The Russians likewise evacuated their main position at Haicheng when
news was received that strong hostile forces were advancing against
the left flank of the position.”[448]

[448] See _Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften_, 41/42, p. 49.

As a rule, it is not advisable to occupy =advanced positions=,[449] _i.e._, positions lying within effective range of the main position. Supporting points immediately in front of the main position, projecting from it like caponiers, and flanking the ground over which the assailant will have to make his attack, must not be confounded with these advanced positions. St. Hubert and St. Marie aux Chênes, on the battlefield of Gravelotte are good examples of both classes of positions. In order to gain time, a commander may sometimes find it advantageous to occupy and temporarily defend advanced positions lying still farther to the front. (Lisaine, and Shaho). In doing this, favorable terrain (Chavannes on the Lisaine) and skillful leadership are essential.

[449] _Taktik_, V, p. 270, et seq. No objection can be made to
the contemplated construction of advanced positions in front of
the Shaho position, as the Russians desired to gain time for the
offensive movement to be made by their left wing. The uncertainty
and hesitation produced by the constant changes in orders, and the
excessive reinforcement of the advanced detachments, which allowed
themselves to be led into making a stubborn defense, was fatal.

In =France= and =Russia= much is expected of advanced positions.
In =England= particular importance is attached to them when they
draw the enemy in a direction facilitating the conduct of a
counter-attack. The British consider that supporting points lying in
front of the position had best be left unoccupied, unless they can be
supported by artillery fire from the main position.

“Smokeless powder and the great range of modern firearms will
frequently make reconnaissance so difficult that it will be possible
to gain an approximate idea of the enemy’s strength only by a fight.
For this reason, in situations similar to that existing west of
Belfort, in January 1871, advanced detachments, whose mission it is
to deceive the enemy as to the defender’s strength, and to compel
him to deploy, will have a greater justification now than at that
time. Nowadays, such detachments may cover a considerable front
without danger, especially when they are plentifully supplied with
ammunition. This will make it still more easy to deceive the enemy,
and a skillful defender will know how to make the most of it.”[450]

[450] _Studien zur Kriegsgeschichte und Taktik_, II, p. 237.

Advanced positions[451] are apt to mask the fire from the main position, and fights for their possession may easily lead to the defeat of the troops holding them. The danger of the fight taking place and being decided in the advanced position must be reckoned with. (Battles of Ligny and on the Hallue). On the other hand, it may be advantageous to employ scouting detachments, cyclists, and machine guns, and to construct dummy intrenchments in front of the main position. (Par. 407 German I. D. R.). The French, more than anyone else, are convinced of the advantages to be derived from an employment of advanced positions (for example in deceiving the enemy as to the location of the main position). In a deliberately planned concentration and advance into action, such positions are, however, so effectively enveloped that they do not come into play at all and fall an easy prey to the enemy. However, we do not wish to deny their occasional usefulness in cases where it is necessary to gain time for concentration and for strengthening the main position. In fights for their possession, an idea may frequently be gained of the intentions and dispositions of the assailant. Moreover, they offer opportunities for surprising the enemy with fire, and induce him to make premature attacks and to mass his troops in the ones he has captured.

[451] Par. 21 German _Manual of Field Engineering_: “Their use is
principally restricted to special cases in fortress warfare.”

Next to a free field of fire (clearing the foreground, and ascertaining ranges), the determining factors in selecting a position are elbow room in and in rear of the position, supporting points for the flanks, and cover. The natural cover available on the ground is made use of as best suits the purpose of the action.

The line in which the artillery intends to fight the decisive action constitutes the “framework” of the position. Although artillery will rarely be able to perform all its tasks in a single position, its first position is selected with due regard to the position of the hostile artillery. The most important position is that from which the hostile infantry attack is to be repulsed. This should be selected far enough in front of the artillery to enable the latter to fire over it, and to deprive the assailant’s artillery of the opportunity of hitting the defender’s infantry and artillery at one and the same time. (Par. 401 German I. D. R.). A distance of 600 m. between infantry and artillery is considered sufficient for this purpose. In view of the protection afforded by gun shields against infantry fire, it is scarcely necessary to post skirmish lines in advance of the artillery. But, where the infantry line is not continuous in front of the artillery, troops should be posted, so as to protect the artillery personnel from being annoyed by hostile patrols. It will seldom be possible for a commander to do justice to the requirements of both arms; in every compromise, one or the other arm is only too apt to be placed at a disadvantage. The needs of the infantry, whose choice of a position is more restricted, take precedence. While infantry can govern its action by that of the artillery during the preparatory stage of an attack, this is impossible in defense, as the infantry is obliged to carry the fight through to its logical conclusion in the position in which it is begun.[452]

[452] As the artillery is less restricted in the choice of
positions, and as the final outcome of the fight depends, after all,
on the outcome of the infantry action, the demands of the infantry,
contrary to par. 292 German I. D. R., must be considered in the first
place.

3. FORTIFYING THE POSITION.[453]

[453] Germany: _Manual of Field Engineering_, 1905. France:
_Instruction pratique sur les travaux de campagne_ (December 24th,
1906). England: _Manual of Military Engineering_, 1905. Russia:
_Mitteilungen vom Ingenieur Comité_, No. 41 (1906). The Austrian and
Italian regulations are undergoing revision.

The apprehensions formerly entertained in regard to prematurely fortifying a position, and which are still shared by the French regulations, are no longer to be found in the new regulations. The construction of field fortifications requires time, if they are to be of value, and if they are to give leaders and troops the assurance that they can be defended by the minimum number of men.[454] Even intrenchments that have been constructed in vain will frequently prove useful in deceiving the enemy. In many cases, it will be necessary to be prepared to meet a hostile attack made from several directions. This contingency should be taken into account by at least preparing for the work beforehand.

[454] At 10 A. M., on August 18th, 1870. General Canrobert received
orders to place St. Privat in a state of defense. At 11 A. M., the
first reports of the approach of the Prussian Guard were received,
and at 4 P. M., Ste. Marie aux Chênes was in German hands. Hence,
only five hours were available for these preparations for defense.

“If the situation turns out to be different than was expected, the intrenchments already constructed should not influence the decisions of the commander. On the other hand, the consideration that the works might be built unnecessarily must not cause their construction to be omitted altogether.” (Par. 311 German I. D. R.).

In the preface to the French regulations, it is emphasized that
intrenching a position ought neither to impair the spirit of the
offensive nor hamper the movement to the front. “Intrenchments are
a means to an end, but not the end itself. They should only be used
when no violence is done thereby to the tactical situation, and one
should never hesitate, for a single moment, to abandon them, if the
situation requires, or to construct others, at another place, if it
becomes necessary.” The men should therefore be trained in handling
the portable intrenching tools, until they can use them skillfully in
any position of the body.

“The use of intrenchments may also be abused. To remain inertly
in a place is just as fatal as to advance without making use of
cover. When temporary halts are made, the commander for the time
being, often placed in that position by chance (_chef du moment,
chef d’unité ou chef de groupe éventuel_), indicates whether or not
intrenchments are to be constructed.”

Battle intrenchments are to protect the soldier against hostile
fire, without hampering him in using his rifle. “They are one of
the factors which ensure economy in men, in that they save a body
of troops from suffering unnecessary losses. But their importance
always recedes before the general requirements of an action, and they
should never in any way interfere with the advance of troops; on the
contrary, intrenchments are to make it possible to bring troops
within effective range of the enemy, without impairing their physical
condition or their morale.”

Intrenchments enable a commander to save troops, which he can use offensively at the decisive point. They do not fulfill the object for which they were intended, when they make it easier for the enemy to pick out the position. “Works which cannot be perceived from the foreground even through powerful field glasses, afford the most effective protection against artillery fire.” Trenches should therefore be deep, have a low parapet, and be properly masked.

The commander indicates when work is to begin. Every unit must intrench the portion of the defensive line which it is to defend; working parties, specially detailed from troops not intended for the immediate defense of the position, can be counted on only when extensive works are to be constructed.

Continuous lines of trenches are seldom built; it suffices to construct a line of works with intervals, _i.e._, battalion groups, the intervals being simply held by a weak force.

These battalion groups (par. 24 German Manual of Field Engineering) are constructed without regard to any fixed form, as the tactical employment of the companies requires. They consist of firing trenches (flanks refused and echelons in rear of the wings), provided with splinter proofs, and adequate cover trenches, so that all the men, if possible, will be sheltered from artillery fire.

The aim is, first of all, to construct inconspicuous standing firing trenches. These should have low parapets and be provided with numerous traverses to restrict the effect of high explosive shell. In order that these traverses may not betray the location of the position, they should not rise above the parapet.[455]

[455] These traverses afford very little shelter against enfilading
fire; it is advisable to keep sand bags in readiness as a protection
in case such fire is received.

Deep, narrow trenches afford the best protection against artillery fire (the trench should be about 0.60 m. wide at the bottom). Narrow trenches are especially difficult to pick out from a balloon. In constructing trenches having no parapet at all, special precautions must be taken in order that their location may not be betrayed by the scattered earth or by their rear wall, which will be visible when they are located on the slope facing the enemy. When the trenches are to be held for some time, provision must be made for the construction of splinter proofs,[456] other overhead cover, and loopholes of observation.

[456] These lie about 0.50 m. below the natural surface of the
ground and accommodate 5-6 men: they are separated from each other by
an earth wall 1 m. thick.

Numerous light splinter proofs are generally to be preferred to a few larger and stronger ones, as they afford sufficient protection against shrapnel bullets and fragments. They may be protected against direct hits from field guns, or other guns having a flat trajectory, by sloping their roofs to the rear at an angle as nearly as possible coincident with the angle of fall of those projectiles.

Since field intrenchments are incapable of furnishing protection against direct hits from guns having a curved trajectory, this object must be attained by skillfully distributing splinter proofs along the front. These should be inconspicuous and should not take up too much room. The comfort of the troops in the trenches should also be provided for by constructing kitchens, latrines, drainage ditches, and dressing stations.

In addition, field magazines for storing ammunition should be built, and alarm arrangements made. Moreover, covered communication should be provided along the line and to the rear. The front and gaps in the line may be very effectively flanked by fire from skillfully constructed refused wings.

In constructing a battalion group of intrenchments, provision will have to be made, in addition, for the following:

1. =Observation of the foreground=, “for the purpose of reconnaissance and security, as well as for noting the effect of one’s own fire.” In order that observers may not betray the location of the position, it is recommended that they be posted at inconspicuous points affording a sufficiently extended view, and screened from the observation of the enemy. When they have to be posted in the defensive line, the terreplein is either lowered in places, so that they can just look over the parapet, or special observation stations are constructed. Provision must be made for communication between the several parts of the line and with the next higher headquarters.

2. =Clearing the foreground.= As a rule, it will be practicable to employ for this work troops not needed in digging trenches. As time is lacking in field warfare for extensive work, such as cutting down embankments and removing dead angles, one will have to be content with trampling down or burning standing grain, removing objects which the enemy might use as aiming points, and cutting clearings through woods. It is not advisable to demolish stone walls and houses, as the debris is difficult to remove and affords cover to the enemy.

3. =Dummy intrenchments and masks.=[457] These are to deceive the assailant as to the position and extent of the defensive works. They should not be located in the same fire swept zone as the defensive works themselves, and at a distance should look like real fortifications. Masks are to screen defensive works or troops, without restricting the fire of the latter. Natural features are best suited for this purpose, but may be replaced or supplemented by artificial masks.

[457] _Taktik_, V, p. 291. At Magersfontain, the Boers constructed
dummy trenches on the crest, while the trenches actually held by them
were located at the foot of the slope. The result is well known.

In many cases, it will suffice to place a few skirmishers behind a parapet that has been hastily thrown up with a plow.

4. =Cover trenches and communicating trenches.= These constitute a considerable portion of the defensive works. Communicating trenches may be either covered ways or zigzags, and connect the cover trenches with the firing trenches. Sortie steps should be provided in order to facilitate a prompt advance from the trenches. In many cases, it is impossible to avoid placing firing and cover trenches so close to each other that the enemy’s shells can strike both simultaneously.

5. =Obstacles.= These need only be constructed when two forces confront each other for a protracted period. The purpose of obstacles is to hold the enemy where he will be exposed to the most deadly fire; retard his advance; compel him to confine his movements to certain avenues of approach (this is especially valuable in night combats); and eliminate dead angles in front of the position. The presence of extensive obstacles forces the enemy to advance systematically. As a rule, they can only be removed by pioneers. They should not be located too near the position, as they are apt to be damaged by artillery fire directed at the position, and interfere with the defender’s fire. When they are too far in front of the position, the defender will not be able to guard them and prevent their destruction. In general, they should not be more than 200 m. from the position. It is better to construct several lines of small obstacles than a single line of large ones. The requirement that obstacles must not interfere with the defender’s fire, must not afford the enemy an opportunity to approach under cover, and must remain intact under hostile artillery fire, is best met by marshy ground and by wire entanglements. Obstacles should be provided with a slight glacis in order to prevent artillery fire from destroying them prematurely. When wire entanglements are too high, they are easily seen at a distance, and, although they are little damaged by artillery fire, the attacker can make preparations to remove them.

Russian Views.

A defensive position consists of an advanced position, a fighting
line with firing trenches and batteries, supporting points in rear,
and, finally, a fourth line, which serves as a rallying position.
The key to a position, which lay formerly in the line of supporting
points, lies at present in the firing trenches in which supporting
points must be provided. (Colonel Golenkin advocates the use of
semi-circular works as supporting points, and Lieutenant-Colonel
Mordovin large closed works). “These semi-circular works are in
a sense the anchors by means of which the firing line clings to
the position which it has occupied.” It does not matter if the
enemy penetrates the first line and captures one or two of these
supporting points, for others remain on either side; the latter and
the second line of supporting points then form a new though somewhat
indented defensive line. As the attacking force which has penetrated
into the position, is hemmed in on both sides, it will hardly be able
to sustain the counter-attack made by the defender’s reserves, and
its temporary success will turn into defeat. But, in order that this
may be accomplished, a second line of supporting points is absolutely
essential. Large closed works of high command, but a smaller number
than is employed in the first line, are recommended for this purpose.
According to Russian opinions, several lines of fortifications are
essential in order to check an enemy who has penetrated the first
line, and to facilitate the defender’s final retreat in case of
necessity.

Particular importance is attached to advanced positions, to positions
for the reserves, echeloned to the right and left rear of the flanks,
and, finally, to rallying positions. Advanced positions are either
to serve “reconnaissance purposes,” by forcing the enemy to an early
deployment, or to do duty as “caponiers” from which a flanking fire
may be brought to bear on the foreground.

Advanced positions, doing duty as “caponiers,” are invariably to
consist of closed works, those serving “reconnaissance purposes” of
open works. The latter are to be defended “to the last ditch,” and
are not to be evacuated until the enemy approaches to about 400 m. or
less, but the garrison is not to allow itself to become involved in a
bayonet fight.

In contrast with this distribution in depth--2 km., in the model
given--Lieutenant-Colonel Jabel, whose views are based on the same
experiences, advocates the use of only one line of fortifications. He
states: “The length of the battles, which sometimes lasted two weeks,
as well as the terrible intensity of fire in general and artillery
fire in particular, produced such an absolute nervous exhaustion that
the decisive action could be fought only in a single line. With its
capture, further fighting had only small prospects of success * * *”
“When firing trenches have been constructed at the points where the
best effect can be obtained from long and short range fire, they
should not be evacuated prematurely, but held, in order to make the
most of this fire effect, until the enemy arrives close enough to use
his bayonets. If the troops holding the trenches retire immediately
before the bayonet fight, their retreat invariably becomes a rout,
and, in any case, entails tremendous losses, for, after leaving
their trenches, they will be helpless and exposed in the open to the
hostile fire.”

4. THE CONDUCT OF THE DEFENSE.

In his _Tactical Handbook_, Major Hoppenstedt suggests a method, well meriting attention, for decreasing the effect of artillery fire on a defensive position. He believes that dummy intrenchments, not too conspicuously located, partially, but not skillfully masked and occupied, will deceive the attacker’s artillery for some time, at any rate, until the advanced troops of the attacker induce the defenders to man their parapet and expose themselves to shrapnel fire. The “defense should be conducted in such a manner that the garrison of the main position will not need to expose itself to the enemy’s artillery fire as soon as his advanced troops appear.” Major Hoppenstedt believes that this can be attained, in hill positions, by conducting the fire fight, at long and medium ranges, from positions in rear, the defender moving up into the main position, specially prepared for this purpose, when the attacker disappears in the defiladed spaces in front of it. The objection to this method is that it necessitates too large a force to hold the position.

“In a protracted, obstinate fight, the defender’s trenches,
exposed to the combined hostile infantry and artillery fire, will
finally become filled with dead and wounded, and it will rarely
be practicable to remove them. The arrival of reinforcements will
increase the confusion and the losses, and the fighting energy of the
troops will decrease with tremendous rapidity. This is one of the
greatest disadvantages of the defense as compared with the attack and
its constantly moving lines.

“In such cases, which will be typical at points where the attacker
intends to penetrate the line, it may be a real act of salvation for
the defender’s firing line to rush to the front.

“In fighting at short ranges, especially just before the assailant
makes his assault, such a rush to the front on the part of the
defender’s line, may be a good move for another reason. As is well
known, the attacker’s artillery must change targets when its infantry
arrives within a certain distance of the defender’s position. The
Germans (par. 446 I. D. R.) fix this point at 300 m. from the enemy,
and the French, whose guns have a flatter trajectory, fix it at 500
m. In attacking a hill position, when the fire is well observed, the
distance of this point from the position will be considerably greater.

“But, no matter where the actual location of this point may be,
skillful infantry will start its assault very close to the point
fixed by the regulations, and never beyond it, so as to avoid
interfering with the fire of its artillery. Under such circumstances,
it may be a skillful move for a defender who is still full of fight,
to decrease the distance which separates him from the hostile
infantry, in order that, by so doing, he may escape from the hostile
artillery fire and from the smoke which obscures his vision. If he
finds cover farther to the front, so much the better, for he will
then have that much of an advantage over the attacker.”

The weakness of most defensive positions lies in the danger of a sudden attack being directed against a flank. The assailant will endeavor to avoid making an attack against the front of a position prepared for defense, when such an attack has small chances of succeeding, and seek the decision by attacking a flank, where conditions are, to a certain extent at least, equalized. The danger of a flank attack increases with the length of the defensive line. It is by no means a good move to prolong the threatened wing (French VIth Army Corps at St. Privat) for the purpose of warding off an envelopment. The power of extension is bound to reach a limit sooner or later, and the wing attacked will then be so weak and attenuated that it will not be capable of offering serious resistance.

To ward off an employment by refusing a flank likewise promises little success. The enemy’s superiority of fire will make itself felt, first of all, at the salient thus formed (see p. 357 supra), and his convergent artillery and infantry fire, which may even enfilade parts of the line, will paralyze all tactical movements of the defender at this point.

By prolonging the line and by refusing a flank, we only postpone the decision a little while, but cannot effectively cope with an envelopment. This must be accomplished in a different manner.

The best scheme would be to flank the enemy’s enveloping force by posting an echelon in a suitable position, or to bring about a decision by employing the reserve offensively. However, for carrying out these measures, more time is required than for merely refusing a flank. Time may be gained by making an extensive reconnaissance on the flanks with strong detachments, and by occupying supporting points lying on the flanks, which the enemy would have to take before he could think of attacking the main position.

* * * * *

In employing machine guns in defense, it should be borne in mind that they are unsuited for carrying on protracted fire fights, and that the mobility of the machine gun batteries cannot be utilized when, from the very start, they are assigned a section to defend.

In general, it will be advisable in defense to keep the machine guns at first with the reserve, and to employ them, when necessary, to reinforce the defensive line at threatened points, to prevent envelopment, to repulse an assault, or to participate in an offensive movement.

This does not preclude their coming into action at the very opening of an engagement, for instance, where it is necessary to command important avenues of approach.

When a withdrawal under cover is assured, it will also be possible to post machine gun batteries in such a manner, in front or on a flank of the main position, that they can bring a sudden fire to bear on the area in which the opponent will in all probability post his artillery.

Machine gun fire may sometimes be employed to sweep defiladed spaces in front of the defensive line.

* * * * *

If the direction of the hostile attack is known, the occupation of the position should not be longer deferred. It is always risky to occupy the position in the face of hostile batteries, especially as the fire of the defender’s guns is masked by the skirmishers moving forward. If the defender can manage to give the attacker the impression that the position is still unoccupied, perhaps thereby inducing him to advance less cautiously, and then surprise him with fire, a depressing moral effect far exceeding the material success may be counted upon.[458] The firing line should be made so strong that the fire fight will have a chance of succeeding. A gradual launching of the troops should not be decided upon, as the losses are comparatively insignificant in defense, and as it is important to develop a heavy fire so as to make it difficult for the enemy to gain the fire superiority. The principles governing the moment for opening fire have already been discussed (pp. 147 and 154 supra).

[458] Engagement at Modder River, on November 28th, 1899.
Engagement at Colenso, on December 15th, 1899.