Chapter XIX: Part 19

The rushes are to be made first by those parts of the firing line
which are favored by the terrain and which have gained a superiority
of fire over the hostile troops immediately opposed to them. Units
which could only advance by rushes at the cost of considerable and
useless losses, are to wait until the neighboring units have pushed
ahead, support these with their fire, and then advance in turn under
cover of the fire of the others.

As a general rule, so long as the hostile fire permits, rushes are
to be made by entire companies, or at least by whole platoons. The
length of the rushes and whether they are made at a walk or at a run,
depends upon the nature of the terrain. Upon completing a rush, fire
is to be opened at once.

When the intensity of the hostile fire increases, or after the
organizations have become mixed, rushes can no longer be made by
entire units but only by squads or like fractions. These leave the
firing line and endeavor to reach the next cover at a rapid run.
or, if cover be lacking, throw themselves down in order to open
fire again at the shorter range thus gained. As a rule, the leading
echelons open fire at once from their new positions, so as to
facilitate the advance of the others, unless special circumstances
make it advisable to delay the firing until all the other units have
reached a good position and are able to direct an effective fire upon
the enemy.

At short ranges, in covered terrain, or on ground swept by hostile
fire, the best way to avoid losses is to advance in small groups
consisting of several skirmishers. During each rush, the adjoining
flanks of neighboring units cease firing, so as not to injure the men
of the advancing unit. Platoon and company commanders hurry ahead,
while squad leaders see that all of the men move forward.

Standing crops frequently enable the echelons in rear to follow the
firing line in closer order, and may even permit supports, which are
to carry that line forward, to come up in that formation.

The =assault= is to be made either in close or extended order to the
tune of the Royal March and with loud cheers.

The regulations assume, however, that the superiority of fire, gained
by the mutual coöperation of infantry and artillery and by the
participation of the reserves, will induce the opponent to retreat.
When engaged with an obstinate opponent, who remains in his position,
only a part of the leading line is to be launched against certain
sections (_tratti_) of the defensive position, while other parts, by
means of rapid fire, prevent the enemy from supporting the threatened
sections. In conjunction with this frequently emphasized scheme of
penetrating several specially important sections of the hostile
position, the regulations express the view--by no means generally
considered sound-that the capture of several judiciously chosen
points will force the enemy to retreat.

The assault is, as a rule, to be made by order of the commander of
the whole force. The short burst of rapid fire preceding the assault
is suddenly terminated by the command “attention” (_attenti_), and
at the command “to the assault” (_per l’assalto_), the men throw
themselves with loud cheers, accompanied by the sounding of trumpets
and the beating of drums, upon the enemy. When a unit has already
gotten so close to the enemy that further waiting would be useless,
it advances to the assault, after getting permission therefor, or,
otherwise, on its own responsibility. All the rest of the troops are
to join in this movement.

DEFENSE.

So long as it is not definitely known in which direction the enemy
will approach, the position is to be occupied with as weak a force as
possible. The decision is to be brought about by a =counter-attack=.
Long range fire is only considered proper on broad stretches of open
terrain devoid of cover; and, in general, fire is not to be opened
until the enemy arrives at short ranges. As soon as fire is opened,
all the supports are to be in the firing line. A counter-attack is
undertaken by the first line only in exceptional cases.

THE FRENCH DRILL REGULATIONS OF 1904.

ATTACK.

Both the French and the German regulations show a decided preference
for the offensive, and both have eliminated all rules which might
produce normal formations. There is an unmistakable inclination
towards shock tactics in the French regulations, although the term
“shock troops” has been replaced by “maneuvering troops”. “The
forward movement alone is decisive and irresistible.... The fire is
the element that executes”. The habit of looking upon the German army
as a probable opponent leads the French to provide for reconnaissance
with mixed detachments. The regulations do not touch upon the tactics
of the rencontre, and prescribe a more cautious conduct for the
advance guard than the German regulations.[488] The advance guard
is to occupy supporting points, under cover of which the main body
can deploy, and to complete the reconnaissance by its fight. The
necessity of infantry detachments completing the reconnaissance made
by the cavalry is particularly emphasized.

[488] See pars. 354, 356, 357 and 366 German I. D. R.

Another difference between the two regulations considered lies in the
manner of making use of the cover afforded by the ground. The danger
of going too far in this direction is guarded against in the German
regulations by assigning combat sections to the various units. The
French regulations prescribe a group formation of the several combat
elements, and a concentration at favorable points, while the plain
devoid of cover is left unoccupied. The center of gravity of a French
attack does not lie in the firing line--the fight for the superiority
of fire is not mentioned--but in maneuvering troops cautiously led
after the firing line. The defender is to be engaged all along the
line and, when the weak points of his position are recognized, the
commander-in-chief is to give the order for the assault.

This division of a force into a fire and a shock group causes the
French to prefer the echelon formation on general principles. A
brigade is formed as follows, for example: Two battalions of the 1st
regiment in the first line, which is followed at 400 m. by the third
battalion (_troupe d’entrainement_); the 2nd regiment follows at a
like distance as a reserve.

The regulations divide the attack into the artillery and the
infantry preparation (_préparation_), the decisive action (_l’action
décisive_), and the completion (_l’achèvement_).

=The artillery in the preparatory action.= The artillery is to
endeavor to silence the hostile artillery as quickly as possible,
without, however, expending more ammunition than is absolutely
necessary.... The commander is not to give the order for the attack
until the preparation is considered sufficient.

The troops are led forward over the terrain in a particularly careful
manner (see p. 208 supra), and are then concentrated in a sheltered
and protected place. Twelve mounted men (Reservists) are attached
to every infantry regiment for reconnaissance purposes. The manner
in which the French utilize the ground is typical. In this, widely
separated parts of the force may unexpectedly encounter a strong
hostile firing line, and may be defeated in detail.

The official regulations are supplemented by special regulations
issued in March 1907 for the army maneuvers by General Lacroix,
formerly commanding the VIIth Army Corps, and at present Vice
President of the Supreme War Council.

=Assembly.= The division is assembled in division square (_carré de
division_), in which the brigades are in line or in echelon, the
regiments in line of double columns or in line of company columns,
abreast or in echelon. If a frontal attack is to be made, in which
successive lines are pushed forward without any attempt to envelop
(in other words a pure frontal attack), the division is concentrated
with the brigades abreast, their regiments in echelon. If a flank
attack is to be made, in which the leading brigade must be protected
by an echelon and a reserve ready for any eventuality, the division
is concentrated with the brigades in echelon, their regiments
abreast. The artillery is posted in section column near a road in
rear of the _carré_. The pioneer company is divided into four parts,
corresponding to the four heads of columns of the assembled troops,
for the purpose of removing obstacles and cutting passages during the
forward movement. The cavalry is pushed forward and the assembled
force is protected in all directions by outposts of infantry and
cavalry.

=Preparations for the advance in mass formation.= During the
concentration, mounted officers reconnoiter the covering features of
the terrain which are to be utilized during the advance of the massed
division, and later these officers act as guides.

Preparatory attack formation.

=A. Pure frontal attack.= The leading regiment in each brigade is to
have two battalions in the firing line and supports, the third to
be echeloned in the rear of the outer flank. All of the battalions
are to be protected by infantry patrols and by a small detachment of
cavalry. The second regiment is to have one battalion echeloned in
rear of the inner flank of the leading regiment, and the divisional
cavalry is to be held in rear of the division, in readiness to
advance to the right or the left.

=B. Flank attack.= The two regiments of the leading brigade are to
furnish their own firing lines, supports, and reserves. The third
regiment is to be echeloned 500 m. in rear of the others, and the
fourth regiment is to form the general reserve. The cavalry is to
reconnoiter on the outer flank. In this case, as well as in a pure
frontal attack, the artillery is to take up a position from which it
can support the attack. Drummers, trumpeters, and bands, are to march
with the general reserve. The regulations state that it is absolutely
essential for infantry units to be sheltered from hostile observation
during their forward movement, and that they must remain under
control of their leaders up to the last moment. Troops are not to
deploy until they enter terrain swept by the enemy’s fire. (According
to the decision of umpires at peace maneuvers, this would be at 5000
m.). It should be borne in mind that deployed troops cannot move by a
flank, but only straight to the front.

The forward movement, in which the terrain will invariably cause
lateral displacements of troops, is made from cover to cover, when
necessary, from one supporting point to another. No hard and fast
rules or normal formations are prescribed for this advance.

The advance is to be made as long as possible without firing a shot.
When this is no longer practicable, recourse is to be had to fire, as
the only means of making a further advance possible.

=Kinds of fire.= Fire at will (_feu à volonté_), principally used at
short ranges, for the purpose of retarding the enemy’s advance; fire
with counted cartridges (_feu à cartouches comptées_), the number
being given (this is the fire usually employed); magazine fire (_feu
à répétition_); and the fire of specially designated marksmen. Volley
fire has been again prescribed. “Bursts of fire” (_rafales_) are
typical of French fire tactics. (See p. 164 supra).

After fire has been opened, the advance is to be made by rushes, but
the regulations do not prescribe how these shall be made.

The regulations contain a very realistic description of the infantry
combat with its fluctuations, isolated attacks, and reverses. They
emphasize that all must be animated by a desire to carry forward, by
means of reinforcements, any troops that may have been checked. At
the point where an advance is absolutely impossible, as many hostile
troops as possible are to be held fast by an energetic fire fight,
while the troops in the decisive attack engage the enemy and advance
impetuously.

A series of attacks is to be made from the various covering features
all along the line. These, made with the impetuosity inculcated
by the regulations, are very apt to fail prematurely. This is
particularly likely to happen because some of the troops will fall
behind, while others are able to push ahead more rapidly. These
attacks are to destroy the power of resistance of the enemy and to
exhaust him physically. The leading units are to cover with their
fire the advance of those who are less favored by the terrain.[489]
During peace maneuvers, the fight now comes to a standstill at a
range of 600 to 800 m.

[489] According to DENCAUSSE, in _Journal des Sciences Militaires_,
1906, and November-December number 1907, the infantry should endeavor
to approach within 700-800 m. of the enemy’s position without firing
a shot.

The supports (_renforts_) follow in a similar manner, ready to move
up into the firing line at the first signal to that effect, or
independently in case the situation requires it. Their entry into
action is in a general way determined by the commander of the whole
force. They are to augment the fire power of the firing line or
to carry it forward. The efforts of all are to be directed toward
constantly keeping up the advance.

At some points, the troops, when reinforced by their supports,
will be able to attack some of the enemy’s supporting points,
and to effect a lodgment on the ground captured. At other points
the attacking group will be too weak to push the attack home. In
such a case, the troops are to effect a lodgment on the terrain
(_s’accrochent sur le sol_) in rear of the nearest cover, as close
as possible to the enemy’s position, and are to maintain themselves
there until artillery or neighboring troops can support them. The
fire of these troops is to give the enemy the impression that an
attack is to be made here also. “No matter how successful these
usually protracted fights may be. troops must be launched in a
decisive attack at some points. The infantry should endeavor to
compensate for its numerical inferiority by skillfully utilizing the
ground and intrenchments, by great activity, and, above all else, by
invincible pertinacity. The supporting point will thus become the
center of the fight of a separate combat group.”

The commander should endeavor to maintain cohesion, and to equalize
fluctuations in the combat by controlling the activity of the
artillery and by putting in fresh troops. During this group combat,
the commander must decide where the retained troops should be
launched for the assault. The selection of a point of attack is
essentially the personal task of the commander and is an index of
character and of eye for the value of ground, neither of which can be
regulated by fixed rules. The regulations do not believe that close
order formations can be dispensed with in launching the assaulting
troops. Troops in close order, utilizing the ground to the best
advantage, so as to suffer but slight losses from hostile fire, are
to be brought up to the fighting line in a flexible echelon formation
in order to give to that line, as _troupes d’assaut_, the impetus for
the assault.

According to Thomas de Colligny,[490] formerly general staff officer
of the 9th Infantry Division, a battalion designated to make an
assault should form in four lines, each consisting of one company;
the distance between lines being 150 m., and the front covered
likewise 150 m. Each of the three leading lines should be formed
in line of platoons in columns of route at deploying intervals
sufficient to allow single rank line to be formed, and the fourth
line in a similar formation with 10-pace intervals between platoons.
When one of the lines is checked, the next succeeding one is to carry
it forward. If the French believe such close order formations to be
indispensable, they will be compelled to make a more extensive use of
cover.

[490] _Conseils à mon bataillon_, p. 107.

Colonel Dencausse is the exponent of a suggestion made by General
Bonnal. The latter forms a division for attack as follows: One
regiment, on a front of 600 m., as the advanced line (_avant ligne_),
in rear of that, the assaulting troops (_troupes d’assaut_). First
line: one regiment, its twelve company columns abreast; second line:
one regiment, its three battalions in double column at extended
intervals, 300 m. in rear of the first line; third line: the fourth
regiment, its battalions in route column abreast of each other, 300
m. in rear of the second line. While, during our peace maneuvers, we
continue to fire on the enemy’s firing line in the expectation that
his supports and reserve will in the end enter our zone of fire, it
might be advisable, when confronted by a French opponent, to direct
our fire on his reserves as soon as these become visible.

=Envelopment.= This is occasionally mentioned in the regulations
(for example in pars. 290, 301 and 302). However, the Field Service
Regulations, in discussing the attack, whose phases may vary in
length depending upon the intentions of the commander, state that the
attacker “may assail a wing or a flank of the enemy with superior
forces for the purpose of annihilating him.”

For the =use of the spade in attack=, see p. 392 supra.

DEFENSE.

The French defense is characterized by group fortifications, advanced
positions, and advanced posts[491] (intended to prevent hostile
reconnaissance), and numerous counter-attacks.

[491] These frequently consist of detachments of all arms
(_détachements de couverture ou de contact_). General BONNAL.
(_Deutsche Revue_, December number, 1907) says: “The French
regulation--in contrast to the German--provide in defense for
detachments of all arms, which are pushed forward for the purpose
of compelling the enemy to show his dispositions, and to draw him
on in a direction favorable for the defender. Both systems have
their advantages and disadvantages, and we, for our part, are of the
opinion that in sending out advanced detachments one must exercise
great care in order that these may not be defeated in detail, for
this is invariably detrimental to the whole force.”

For defense, a force is divided into the firing line with its
supports, and the maneuvering troops (general reserve) intended
for offensive action. In addition to calling attention to the
necessity of overwhelming with fire the hostile troops advancing over
open ground, the regulations recommend that the fire be withheld
occasionally and that the enemy be allowed to run into the greatly
accelerated fire which is unexpectedly directed upon him. The fire is
to be discontinued as soon as the enemy takes to cover, and is to be
increased to the utmost intensity when he moves in dense formation
over open ground. The supports are to be used to augment the fire
power of the firing line.

=Counter-attack.= General Lacroix states: “The frontal attack is
met by the offensive return (_retour offensif_), the flank attack
by the counter-attack. In order to prepare for this, the commander
should ride ahead to examine the ground, and to consider what
counter-measures he should take. The artillery can render the most
effective assistance by registering its fire upon the points at which
the enemy will probably advance, and by preventing him from leaving
his position. If the attack is successful, the local reserve advances
beyond the firing line, which has entered the hostile position, and
fires upon the retreating enemy. The general reserve now becomes the
local reserve, and the former firing line re-forms and becomes the
general reserve.”

The regulations make a distinction between counter-attack
(_contre attaque_) and offensive return (_retour offensif_). A
=counter-attack= is made by the reserve before the enemy penetrates
into the energetically defended supporting points. In contrast
herewith, every attempt to retake a captured position is called an
=offensive return=. (For details see p. 439 supra).

Occasionally, it may be advantageous not to await the crisis, but
to force the assailant to deploy by directing a heavy fire upon
him. then to break off the action, inducing the enemy to press on,
in order to draw him, by this means, onto previously selected and
reconnoitered terrain, where he is suddenly attacked in flank by
fresh troops. Military history shows that this very procedure has
frequently been successful.

“The same activity, the same determination to maneuver, must
prevail everywhere. Every mistake and every weakness of the enemy
must be quickly perceived and promptly utilized. The troops in the
counter-attack should move forward without hesitation and regardless
of the cost. When such a forward movement has to be discontinued, the
commander must decide where it shall cease. The efforts of all should
be directed toward one object, that of tiring and demoralizing the
enemy by constant counter-attacks, until the moment arrives when the
commander must order the offensive to be assumed.”

THE BRITISH DRILL REGULATIONS OF 1905.[492]

[492] _Infantry Training._ _Combined
Training_.--_Vierteljahrshefte_, 1906, III, _The Development of the
Tactical Views in the British Army after the Boer War_.

ATTACK.

The regulations do not mention the rencontre. A normal offensive
battle consists of “an advance from point to point. Every lodgment
made in a new firing position weakens the enemy’s strength in his
main position, and paves the way for a further advance; every advance
must be thoroughly prepared and systematically carried out.”

In the following, the attack made by a brigade of four battalions
is used as a basis. While the commander reconnoiters under the
protection of his advance guard, the troops are concentrated in a
“preparatory formation”, the battalions in one or more lines of
“quarter columns” (column of companies). As soon as the commander
has decided which flank of the enemy he will envelop, against which
portion of the enemy’s line he will launch his decisive attack,
he assembles his subordinate commanders to receive the orders.
According to the regulations, it will rarely be possible to issue
orders while the troops are still in march. The orders are, as a
general rule, to be given in writing, and are to be supplemented
by verbal instructions, in which the commander calls attention
to the peculiarities of the terrain, especially where a hostile
counter-attack is possible. In exceptional cases, the brigade
commander designates the position to be taken up by the machine
guns, and gives directions to them in regard to supporting the
advance by long range fire. A base battalion is to be designated.
When the enemy’s position is visible, a point of attack is assigned
to every unit. When this is not practicable, the base battalion is
led forward by officers familiar with the ground, or it is given
a compass direction. Every leader is to provide independently for
reconnaissance and for communication by signal flags and also by
telephone; a mounted signal corps man accompanies the brigade
commander.

Every unit is formed in three lines for attack.

The =first line=, consisting of scouts and skirmishers with supports,
is made as weak as possible; without supports rarely more than
one-fourth of the whole force.

The =second line=, the reserves of the firing line, is under the
orders of the appropriate battalion commanders, and is to reinforce
the firing line, protect the Hanks, and deliver long range fire. The
second line is to fill up the firing line to the maximum density,
_i.e._, to one man per yard of front (0.9 m.).

The =third line=, the general reserve, is to assure the success of
the attack. It is to be made as strong as possible, seldom less than
one-fourth of the whole force.[493] “The general reserve is directly
under the orders of the commander of the whole force. It enables
him to meet the varying contingencies of an engagement or to ward
off counter-attacks. If the attack succeeds, the general reserve
pushes forward rapidly to take up the pursuit; if the attack fails,
it serves as a rallying force, but before the commander decides
to leave behind even a part of it, he should consider whether, by
launching all the troops at his disposal, he could break down the
resistance of the defender. The commander can only exercise an
influence on the course of the action by means of a reserve. If he
keeps in his own hands a strong reserve, he will have it in his power
to take advantage of any mistake the enemy may commit, to restore
the battle should the leading troops meet with a serious check, to
meet a counter-attack in force, or, in case of need, to provide the
additional strength required to drive the attack home.”

[493] According to the old regulations, a part of the general
reserve had to remain in rear in rallying positions. (See p. 397
supra).

In contrast with these provisions, we find, strangely enough, under
the heading “Brigade”, the hint that, when advancing to the assault,
it is advisable to keep back a portion of the reserve in a rallying
position. Even a battalion commander is invariably to retain at least
half a company at his disposal. The British were not without reason
censured because their flank attacks were ineffective in South Africa
on account of the lack of energy of the frontal groups, and their
new regulations accordingly contain detailed rules for the conduct
of the “holding attack”. The troops holding the enemy in front are
to threaten him for the time being. This is to be accomplished by
wide extension, and by deceiving the enemy by occasional bursts of
lire (_rafales_), by employing machine guns, by retaining supports
far in rear, and by retraining, for the time being, from advancing to
decisive ranges. But the troops are to be ready to join in the main
attack when the latter advances. The regulations state that, in order
to deceive the enemy effectually, adequate forces will have to be
launched and that the commander will have to act vigorously. (See p.
447 supra).

Fixed rules for the front to be covered by a unit in action are no
longer given. A unit fighting alone may cover considerably more
front than when acting as part of a larger force. In a decisive
attack, a battalion in the first line may put 125 rifles on every 100
yards (90 m.) of front; these are distributed between firing line,
supports, and battalion reserve; the latter may consist of one or
more companies. Entire companies are only deployed in exceptional
cases, for example on open ground, where it is difficult to bring
up the supports. The size of the reserve depends upon the losses to
be anticipated in the firing line; when these will be small, in all
probability, the reserve may be made as strong as the firing line
plus supports. In attack, a battalion may accordingly deploy on a
front not exceeding 800 yards (formerly 540 m. was prescribed). A
brigade of four battalions may deploy on a front of 1400-2100 m.,
depending upon the number of battalions engaged.

When the force arrives within 4 or 5 km. of the enemy, the battalions
are formed in two lines of companies. Each company in the first
line is preceded by a platoon in close order, and this is in turn
protected by scouts. As soon as these scouts can advance no farther,
they lie down and await the arrival of the fighting line. The latter
advances under cover of the supporting fire of infantry, machine
guns, and artillery. Fire of position is considered necessary. Fire
at will is from now on used. This is to vary in intensity according
to the character of the target, and the range. It is to increase to
special violence when the attacking infantry advances over level
ground or encounters obstacles. The fire is to be discontinued when
the advancing skirmishers reach cover. The firing line is to advance
as close to the enemy as it can without suffering excessive losses.
Fire is to be opened when the hostile fire makes this necessary, but
small losses are to be borne.

After the fire fight is once begun, it is to be conducted with
more rifles than the enemy has in action. “Battles are only won by
controlled fire directed upon targets at decisive ranges” (according
to the regulations, at ranges under 540 m.). Within the zone of
effective fire, all the troops are to deploy. In consequence of
this, skirmishers, who endeavor to work forward independently, are
scattered all over the terrain over which the attack is being made.
At the initial deployment, the interval between skirmishers is to
be about 5-15 paces; at short ranges, at points where the decision
is sought, there is to be at least one rifle for every two or three
yards of front (1.80-2.70 m. = 2¹⁄₂-3¹⁄₂ paces). Another paragraph
of the regulations prescribes that the maximum density is to be one
rifle per yard of front. The British views, when compared to those
entertained by them immediately after the South African war, have
undergone a noticeable change, especially as regards the frontage of
a firing line; dense firing lines, possessing strong fire power, are
at present deemed essential to a decisive fight, while the fire of
widely extended lines is considered ineffective. The intervals may
vary considerably, but the regulations state that it should be borne
in mind that the difficulties of conducting a fight are increased and
the fire power reduced when too great a front is covered; moreover,
that in covered terrain, and when counter-attacks may be anticipated,
an overextension is actually dangerous. Because of the necessity of
moving in thin skirmish lines, it is considered essential that the
men be trained to act independently, to continue the fight even in a
difficult situation, and to do everything in their power to carry
out the original intentions of the commander.

=Rushes= over open ground are not to exceed 80-100 yards (72-92
m.) in length; as a rule they are to be shorter. According to an
example given in the Firing Regulations, rushes are to be 25 yards
(22 m.) long, at ranges from 650-500 yards (580-450 m.). A rush is
to be continued while the enemy’s surprise lasts and he finds no
opportunity to deliver aimed fire. In covered terrain, the rushes are
to be made from one covering feature to another.

“On open ground and within effective range, long lines of
skirmishers, rising simultaneously, will suffer heavy losses even
when making short rushes; the sudden movement of smaller units may
take the enemy unawares, so that for a time at least well aimed fire
is avoided. The rush is continued only while the surprise of the
enemy lasts. The shorter the range, the smaller the advancing unit
will have to be, and the shorter the length of the rushes.”

The dispositions for a rush are to be made as unostentatiously as
possible. The rearward detachments, which follow by rushes, are to
advance, if possible, beyond the group already firing. When squads
are unable to advance by rushes, the men may crawl forward singly.

The regulations state that, when in close order, units of the
strength of company columns (80-100 men, 4 platoons, in column of
platoons at full distances), having a front of 10-12 files, suffer
comparatively small losses when exposed to long range fire (1800-1200
m.). The troops are to deploy before reaching effective ranges
(1200-600 m.), as they will otherwise suffer serious losses. At
decisive ranges the firing line is to be filled up to its maximum
density.

The whole force, a small part excepted, is to be launched in the
=assault=; a sudden and unexpected advance of the assaulting troops
is considered particularly important. The order for the assault is
to be given by the commander of the whole force, but the manner of
conducting it is left to company commanders.

When the attack would be too costly by day, however, the troops are
to intrench, wait until it is dark, and then advance to assaulting
distance, where they again intrench (machine guns, and even single
field guns are to be taken along). The assault is to be made, after a
brief but violent fire fight, at the first streak of dawn.

DEFENSE.

In defense, a force is divided into the fighting line with supports,
and the reserve. The latter furnishes the outposts and the garrisons
for the advanced positions (so-called temporary positions). The
object of =advanced positions= is to mislead, deceive, and check
the enemy. They are to be evacuated before the troops in them
become seriously engaged. It is not considered necessary for the
=main position= to consist of a continuous line of trenches; every
platoon and even every squad may have its own trench. The principal
requirements are good field of fire and mutual support by oblique or
enfilade fire.

The strength of the garrison is to be governed by the size of the
field of fire and the character of the works. The regulations state
that, under favorable conditions, a few men can defend a broad
front, but that, when the attack is favored by the terrain, a strong
garrison is required. Firing trenches, unless they are to serve as
dummy intrenchments, are not to be constructed so as to stand out
against the horizon. The importance of masking firing trenches, and
of constructing overhead cover is emphasized; special cover trenches
for the supports may be constructed in rear of the crest.

Against skirmishers, fire is to be opened at 1000 m., but it is also
considered desirable to withhold the fire until they get within short
range. It is believed that this will be attended by success when the
assailant is ignorant of the position of the defender or makes his
attack with poorly disciplined troops. Continuous long range firing
tires the eye and the hand. The decision is to be brought about by a
=counter-attack= made by the general reserve. Local counter-attacks
by section reserves are also recommended. The tendency of the
British to make the section reserves very strong has been frequently
observed. The final stage of the combat consists, as in Wellington’s
day, of a counter-attack all along the line. As soon as the opponent
has arrived within assaulting distance, the troops holding the
position are to fix bayonets and, after delivering magazine fire, are
to make a short frontal counter-attack.

THE JAPANESE DRILL REGULATIONS OF 1907.

ATTACK.

The Japanese views coincide almost exactly with the German, but take
their peculiar theater of war into consideration.

=Kinds of fire.= Fire at will, volley fire, and rapid fire are used.

=Rushes= are not to exceed 100 m. in length, as a rule, but the
regulations admonish leaders to “guard against the mistake of making
rushes that are too short. When rushes are shorter than 30-40 m.,
their value will be insignificant, as a rule.” Leaders are likewise
to avoid sending forward units smaller than a platoon, in order that
the advance may not be too much retarded and the difficulties of
leading increased.

The regulations particularly emphasize that it will rarely be
possible “to shoot an enemy out of his position”, and that, on this
account, the decision will, as a rule, be brought about by the
assault with cold steel. They further state that, when the enemy can
be kept down by artillery fire, the advance of the infantry will
be easy; that, as it is difficult to obtain a timely effect from
artillery fire directed upon an enemy who takes advantage of cover or
who occupies a fortified position, the infantry cannot wait for the
successful termination of the artillery combat, but, on the contrary,
should advance while that combat is in progress, for only by so doing
can it count upon the effective coöperation of its artillery. But,
nevertheless, infantry is to make the attack independently, even if
it has to dispense entirely with the coöperation of the artillery.

The regulations consider the rencontre and the attack on a position
prepared for defense.

=Rencontre.= The regulations prescribe that in a rencontre the
advance guard should make a vigorous but, at the same time,
deliberate attack; that the commander should promptly decide what
to do, even if the situation is not entirely clear; and that, when
practicable, the main body should be launched as an entity. A fight
against a superior enemy is only to be avoided, for the time being,
in case the latter has gained a start in deployment.

=Attack on a position prepared for defense.= The commander frames
his plan of attack according to the results of the reconnaissance,
and leads his troops forward provisionally into a preparatory
position, where he assigns deployment spaces and, if practicable,
combat sections to the different units. In order that they may
utilize the covering features of the ground to the best advantage,
the different units are to avoid advancing abreast. On account of
the difficulties attending an advance over ground swept by hostile
fire, it is considered desirable for the troops to take advantage
of the cover afforded by darkness. In order that, in such a case,
serious lateral displacements of the troops may be avoided, the
fighting line is to be sent forward the day before to endeavor to
drive back the troops posted in front of the enemy’s main position.
The regulations state that, when an attack is contemplated to be
made during daylight against a strong position prepared for defense,
there is no alternative but to approach the assaulting position by
intrenching successive attack positions, but that, when circumstances
permit, an attempt must be made to advance under cover of darkness to
the enemy’s position. In the latter case, the assaulting position is
to be designated during the day, after a thorough reconnaissance, and
detailed preparations are to be made for the advance. As soon as the
troops arrive during the night in the selected position, they are to
construct cover quickly, and to intrench. When the ground is so hard
that intrenching tools cannot be used without difficulty, recourse is
to be had to the sand bags that are carried along. The men engaged in
digging trenches are at all times to be ready for action.

The regulations state that whether a force which has occupied an
assaulting position should make the =assault= immediately at dawn or
should first prepare it by fire, will depend on circumstances; and
that, if attempted at dawn, the success of the assault will depend
on the suddenness and rapidity with which it is carried out. The
reconnaissance of the position and the work of removing obstacles is
to be completed, if possible, during the night, so that avenues of
approach will be open for the assaulting troops.

If the reconnaissance has gained all the necessary information, and
if the preparations are completed, the assault may be made before the
night is over. The regulations say that, when an assault is made at
night, the distance to be covered should be very short; and that it
will depend on circumstances whether the assault is made suddenly,
directly from the last firing position, or whether it is carried
out upon the completion of works of approach. When necessary the
assaulting bodies are to carry along hand grenades and demolition
tools, the latter being selected in conformity with the results of
the reconnaissance.

The regulations state that to have captured a position does not
suffice; that only the pursuit and dispersion of the enemy makes the
victory complete. The troops that have penetrated into the hostile
position are to continue the advance until they again find a field
of fire, whereupon they are to fire upon the retreating enemy. The
troops which do not take part in this fire are to re-form quickly,
secure the captured position, take requisite measures for security,
and make preparations to meet any hostile counter-attack. Troops are
not to be assembled in large bodies at points exposed to hostile
artillery fire. As soon as the enemy has gotten out of range, all the
troops are promptly to resume the forward movement, and are to pursue
him vigorously so far as due regard for cohesion and order permits.

=Intrenching tools= are to be used in attacks on fortified positions,
and in strengthening ground captured from the enemy.

DEFENSE.

In defense, the Japanese regulations, like the German, provide
for economical occupation of the front (group fortifications) and
a general reserve, which is to be used offensively or to protect
the flanks. Dummy intrenchments, patrols, and outposts are to make
it difficult for the enemy to gain information of the defensive
position. The Japanese views in regard to =advanced positions= are
not so pronounced as the German, for, while their regulations mention
the combat of the outposts pushed forward from the position, the
danger of advanced positions is not especially emphasized.

The training of the soldier is to be such that even after he has
fired away all of his ammunition, he will still defend his position
with the bayonet.

Nothing is said in regard to the distance of the infantry position
from that of the artillery. If information is received that the
attacker has made a lodgment during the night in the assaulting
position, small detachments are to advance and prevent him from
strengthening his position.

THE RUSSIAN DRILL REGULATIONS OF 1907.

The present regulations only treat of the formal matters of training
and combat.

THE SWISS DRILL REGULATIONS OF 1908.

ATTACK.

There is considerable similarity between the Swiss and the German
regulations. The keynote is the offensive. The purpose of the
combat and the condition of the troops are to govern the commander
in deciding whether to stand on the defensive or to attack. The
regulations state that decisive results are only offered by the
attack; that considerations of a presumable hostile superiority and
other apparently unfavorable conditions should not diminish the
energy of the attack; and that the decision to launch the troops
should never be made dependent upon the receipt of reports in regard
to the enemy.

The offensive is invariably to be assumed, unless the situation
or the mission compel the force to stand on the defensive. The
regulations state that, in attack, success does not rest alone upon
superiority of fire and superiority of numbers; but that an impetuous
advance and an unswerving determination to win are of just as much
importance. The conduct of the Swiss attack varies, depending upon
whether it is made in a rencontre or on a position prepared for
defense.

The views entertained in regard to the =rencontre= coincide with
the German views. The regulations say that the result of the
reconnaissance should not be awaited, because success depends largely
upon prompt action. The commander may launch parts of his main body
in succession, as soon as they arrive, when the force is operating
in close country, when it is necessary to gain ground quickly on
debouching from a defile, or when the enemy makes an impetuous
advance. The commander is to direct all his efforts toward throwing
the enemy upon the defensive, and then to launch the main body as an
entity.

The Swiss regulations, similar to those of the Japanese, only
discuss the =attack on a fortified position=; various modifications
of the attack, depending upon the preparations made by the enemy,
are authorized. Advantage is to be taken of the cover afforded by
darkness, and an extensive use is to be made of =intrenching tools=.
The regulations state that an assault by day only has a chance of
succeeding when the defender is completely subdued, and when only
insignificant obstacles and defenses are encountered. When this is
not the case, the day is to be used for making preparations for the
attack, and the night for executing it.

DEFENSE.

The regulations consider the involuntary defense in a rencontre; the
deliberately prepared defense seeking a decision and contemplating
an assumption of the offensive; the defense for the purpose of
gaining time; and the occupation of a position in readiness, when the
direction in which the hostile attack will be made is still in doubt,
or when the commander intends to assail the enemy while the latter
is in the act of deploying. In the =defense seeking a decision=,
advanced positions are not to be used, because it is believed that
the employment of detachments of troops in front of the defensive
position will weaken the latter, and a hostile enveloping attack will
soon force the advanced troops to fall back upon the main position.
The regulations point out that if the advanced troops are supported
by fire from the main position, the latter will be prematurely
disclosed to the assailant. The employment of advanced troops is,
however, considered justifiable to hold defiles, to deceive the
enemy, or to support the cavalry.

The works of a position are not to be continuous, but are to be
constructed in groups. Infantry positions over which artillery is to
fire are not to be less than 500 m. in front of the latter.

XV. THE EXPENDITURE AND SUPPLY OF AMMUNITION.[494]

[494] Lieutenant-Colonel KOVARIK, _Versuch eines kriegsbrauchbaren
Systems für den Munitionsersatz im Infanteriekampf_, Berlin, 1903.

1. HISTORICAL SKETCH.

The question of ammunition supply in action is of vital importance to the infantry. To solve it correctly means to assure the success of the infantry in fire action. The first question that needs consideration is, whether the experiences of past wars show that the ammunition at present carried by the infantry is sufficient, under all circumstances, even when ammunition columns cannot reach the battlefield in time because all the roads are choked with troops.

For our purpose, it is sufficient to go back as far as the
=Franco-German war=, in which breechloaders were used for the
first time against breechloaders. Every German soldier carried 80
cartridges, and the 6-horse battalion ammunition wagons carried 20
additional rounds per man.[495]

[495] Historical data given by D. GÜNTHER in _Die Entwickelung der
Feuertaktik der Infanterie_, 1902.

When one considers the total number of cartridges expended during any
campaign, it seems impossible that a shortage of ammunition could
ever have taken place. In the =Franco-German war=, the expenditure
of ammunition in the Ist Bavarian Army Corps amounted to 4,163,000
rounds (166 per rifle); in the IInd Army Corps, 1,105,600 rounds (44
per rifle); and in the Saxon Army Corps, 1,450,000 rounds (about
58 per rifle). The compilation of a table, showing the amount of
ammunition expended in the Prussian army, was begun, but was soon
discontinued, as it was found that the necessary data were lacking,
the only information available being the record of the number of
rounds issued by the reserve ammunition parks. The troops sent to
the field army from the depot battalions, must have brought with
them in each case a very considerable amount of ammunition, as each
man carried 80 rounds, but no records are available to show how
much ammunition was forwarded in this way. Furthermore, there is no
record of the number of rounds actually expended and of the amount
of ammunition lost or left on the dead and wounded. It is well known,
that in the long periods, during which no engagement had taken place,
an enormous amount of ammunition was lost on marches and in bivouacs.
This applies likewise to battlefields. The commander of an ammunition
column had his men pick up 22,000 rounds of needle gun ammunition in
unbroken packages on the battlefield of =Hühnerwasser=.

A shortage of ammunition first manifested itself where the troops,
on removing their knapsacks, had neglected to take out the tin boxes
filled with ammunition (for example in the 12th Jäger-Battalion at
=Sedan=),[496] or where the ammunition wagons had been sent to the
rear with the field train (for example in the 50th Infantry, on
January 19th, 1871, in the battle at =Mont Valérien=, and in the 38th
Brigade, at the battle of =Beaune la Rolande=).[497]

[496] _Gen. St. W._, II, p. 1175.

[497] HÖNIG, _Volkskrieg_, II, p. 259.

The regimental histories contain only a few statements in regard
to the amount of ammunition expended in the various engagements.
Moreover, these statements are only approximations and, as a rule,
cannot lay claim to trustworthiness.

The amount of ammunition expended in the opening battles of the war
was very small, due to the training and fighting methods of the
Prussian infantry, and to the support it received from the artillery.
Moreover, the short range of the rifle prohibited long range firing.

“In order to hold its own against the intensity and long range of
the hostile fire, the German infantry was compelled to fire more
rapidly and at longer ranges than it had intended. In addition, the
difficulties of fire control and fire direction were frequently
increased on account of the tremendous loss of leaders. Under these
circumstances, so much ammunition was expended that, among the troops
fighting in the first line, the ammunition carried by the men was
no more than enough. This explains why it not infrequently happened
that the fighting efficiency of the infantry was impaired by a lack
of ammunition. The first general shortage of ammunition occurred
at the battle of =Mars-la-Tour= in the infantry of the IIIrd Army
Corps.”[498]

[498] _Gen. St. W._, V, p. 1460.

On August 16th, at the battle of =Vionville=, the Prussian IIIrd Army
Corps, whose effective strength was 21,050 rifles, expended 720,486
cartridges, which corresponds to only 34.5 rounds per rifle; yet,
in spite of this, the ammunition ran short. During the lull in the
battle at noon, by removing the cartridges from the dead and wounded,
each man in the 35th Infantry[499] was again supplied with about 200
rounds of ammunition, which were then expended in the course of the
afternoon, so that toward evening another shortage occurred.

[499] _Geschichte des Regiments Nr. 35_, p. 32.

The following figures in regard to the expenditure of ammunition
during the battle of =Vionville= are taken from _Kriegsgeschichtliche
Beispiele_, 8 and 9, by Major KUNZ:

IInd Bn. Leib Regt. 12,749 rounds for 850 rifles, or 15 per rifle.
Ist Bn. 40th Inf. 35,000 „ „ 450 „ „ 78 „ „
IInd Bn. 40th Inf. 6,650 „ „ 350 „ „ 19 „ „
IIIrd Bn. 40th Inf. 4,520 „ „ 300 „ „ 15 „ „

A very annoying shortage of ammunition occurred in those parts of the
Leib Regiment which were with the 72nd and 40th Infantry Regiments in
front of the wood. The retained echelons in the wood had sufficient
ammunition, but the troops in front lacked the means wherewith to
inform the retained units of the shortage. In the 11th and 72nd
Infantry Regiments a serious shortage of ammunition occurred after
they had been engaged but a short time. (In a little less than two
hours, the 72nd Infantry suffered the following percentage of losses:
Ist Battalion, 53.2%; Füsilier Battalion, 48.2%).[500]

[500] For data in regard to the expenditure of ammunition at
Beaumont, see HOPFFGARTEN-HEIDLER, _Beaumont_, p. 184.

The defense of the stone wall at =Buzanval= by the 50th Infantry
(German), on January 19th, 1871, was one of the most obstinate
defensive fights of the war. The numerical superiority of the enemy
at this point was overwhelming and his troops were excellent,
nevertheless the regiment maintained the same splendid fire
discipline it had already exhibited at Lundby. The fight lasted nine
hours. In his history of the regiment (p. 350), Lieutenant-General v.
Boguslawski says:

“The number of cartridges fired can no longer be accurately
determined. Only the war diary of the IInd Battalion contains a note
showing that 14,206 rounds were expended. As the 5th Company did not
fire at all, and the 7th Company was only partially engaged, by far
the greater portion of the ammunition must have been expended by the
6th and 8th Companies.” The IInd Battalion, like the rest, has no
record showing what ammunition was supplied to it during the battle.
To cite an example: The 12th Company received about 3,000 rounds of
ammunition during the fight. As the strength of this company was 180
men in round numbers, each man received 17 additional cartridges.
He therefore had 97 rounds available, including the ammunition
originally supplied him.

“Now, as each man still had an average of 5 cartridges on going into
billets, he must have expended 92 rounds. From this we may assume
that during the nine hours’ fight, he fired a little more than ten
rounds per hour.”