Chapter VII: Part 7

The British infantry, armed with a long range rifle equipped with an excellent rear sight arrangement, allowed itself to be enticed, by the long range fire of the Boers, into opening fire at 1200 and 1300 m. (Guard at Modder River) and even at 1600 and 1700 m. (6th Division at Paardeberg) against an enemy whose position was not discernible even through the most powerful glasses. The losses were small and not to be compared with those which our Guard suffered without firing, during their advance on St. Privat. The advance of the Gordon Highlanders at Doornkop (29th May, 1900) to within short range of the hostile position, without firing a shot, although they themselves were under fire from 2000 m. on, was splendid.[143]

[143] _The Times History of the War in South Africa_, IV, p. 141.

Since the assailant presents larger targets than the defender, and the latter can make preparations for firing, ascertain ranges, construct rifle-rests, and replenish ammunition without difficulty, it is proper in defense to open fire at long ranges, especially in delaying actions, for then fighting at short ranges is to be avoided in any case. It is absolutely correct for the defender to make the most of the advantages above mentioned. While everything is orderly and in readiness in the defender’s firing line, the attacker’s line is still in the process of forming. Should the defender wait until the hostile firing line has systematically deployed and has made a lodgment within short range of his position, or should he produce losses and create confusion in its ranks by suddenly opening fire?

The employment of long range fire on the defensive is justified when sufficient ammunition is available, when artillery is not present, and when the hostile infantry pursues the tactics of advancing to short range without firing. “Infantry should never attempt to take the place of artillery at long ranges or compete with the fire of that arm.” If it is important for the attacker to reach the extreme limit of mid ranges with as little firing as possible, the defender should in the first place fire on him with artillery, and, when this does not suffice or is not available, with infantry, so as to prevent him from accomplishing his object.

At mid ranges the efficacy of the defender’s fire is so great, when directed upon an infantry line advancing without fire support, that it becomes an important factor. At ranges from 1000 to 600 m., 8 to 25% hits can be counted on when the fire is directed against advancing skirmishers; and even assuming an error of ¹⁄₈ in the estimated range, 3 to 12% hits may still be expected. (Par. 623, p. 196, German I. F. R.).

If the attacker is unable to hide from the defender’s fire by using cover, his losses will increase until they become unbearable; his attack will hesitate, and he will commence firing. Fresh troops are necessary to carry the attacking line forward anew. The success of the defense is assured, if the defender is able to prevent the attacking force from getting within short range of the position. The defender’s chance of making a successful counter-attack disappears, however, as soon as the attacking force makes a lodgment within short range of the position; for the closer the defender is pressed, the closer will he be tied to his position. While the superiority of fire enjoyed by the defender at mid ranges allows him perfect freedom of action, at short ranges the attacker’s fire imposes conditions upon the defense which make the growing power of the attack sensibly felt. The moment the defender begins firing, however, he becomes at once a favorable target for the artillery of the attacking force. The defender frequently betrays his position prematurely by opening fire.

The _moral effect_ of withholding the fire (_fire surprise_) is very great.[144] A strong fire will be actually annihilating if suddenly directed upon the enemy at short ranges, especially if he is still in unsuitable formations, owing to his ignorance of the defender’s position. (Example: The British brigade under Hart at Colenso, 15th Dec., 1899, and the Highland Brigade at Magersfontain, 11th Dec., 1899) or if the morale of his troops is questionable.[145] What good troops should do in such a situation (employ rapid fire and then advance to the assault) is shown by the conduct of the IInd Battalion of the 20th Infantry at Coulomiers.[146] Steady nerves and iron discipline are, however, prerequisites for the execution of a fire surprise by the defender.

[144] Marshal BUGEAUD gives a very graphic description of the moral
effect of fire in his _Aperçus sur quelques détails de guerre_,
based upon his experiences in the fights with the British in the
Peninsula: “The men began to get excited when still 1,000 m. from
the enemy; they talked to each other; the march became more and more
hurried; and disorder appeared here and there in the columns. The
British remained quietly at order arms; their calm demeanor was not
without effect upon our young soldiers. We approached closer, the
men shouting: ‘_Vive l’empéreur! En avant, à la baionette!_’ Shakos
were raised upon the points of bayonets; the march became a double
time; the ranks became mixed; the excitement caused confusion here
and there; and a few shots were fired from the column. The British
continued to stand immovable, and seemed to pay no attention to us
even when only 300 paces separated the two forces.

“The contrast was apparent. Everyone felt that he would have to
deal with an opponent tried in battle; that the fire so long withheld
by the enemy would surely be annihilating. Our fighting ardor cooled;
the moral power which calmness, even when only apparent, exercises
over confusion, which seeks to drown itself in noise, made itself
felt in our ranks. At this moment, when the highest tension had been
reached, the British line raised its rifles--an indescribable feeling
rooted many of our men to the spot--and began to fire. The volleys,
coolly delivered against a narrow front, plowed through our ranks; we
wavered, decimated though we were, in order to recover; then three
overpowering cheers from the opponents’ line, which rushed forward to
the bayonet attack, and everybody turned to seek safety in disorderly
flight.”

[145] The defense of the cemetery at Beaune la Rolande. HÖNIG,
_Volkskrieg_, pp. 157 to 212.

[146] Dec. 15th, 1870. _Geschichte des Regiments Nr. 20_, p. 246.
KORTZFLEISCH, _Feldzug gegen den Loir_, p. 81.

Long range fire was employed with success on the defensive by the French at St. Privat (the Germans suffered the most serious losses at ranges from 1200 to 1000 m.) and by the Turks at Plevna. At 1500 m. the Russian losses were such that they were obliged to begin advancing by rushes. The losses decreased as the enemy’s position was approached. The long range fire had produced a retarding but by no means an annihilating effect. On the other hand, the fire of the defender, at extremely short ranges, had a telling effect at Beaune la Rolande; in the defense of Chagey on the Lisaine;[147] in the defense of Shipka Pass (200 to 300 paces) by the Russians, and in the engagement at Gorni Bugarov (1st Jan., 1878). Whenever the attacker enters the short range zone while still in unsuitable formations, his losses increase until they become annihilating. (Example: The bayonet attacks made by the Austrians at Nachod and Trautenau).[148]

[147] KUNZ, _Entscheidungskämpfe des Korps Werder_, II, pp. 53, 93
and 143. The village was situated in a valley and had only a limited
field of fire.

[148] KÜHNE, _Kritische Wanderungen_, I, pp. 73 and 139; III, pp.
86 and 113. As regards flatness of trajectory and accuracy, the power
of the needle gun (_Zündnadelgewehr_) at point blank range (280 m.)
corresponds to the effect of rifle model ’98 at approximately 800 to
900 m. At Nachod the regiments named below suffered in two hours the
losses given:

Loss, men;
Strength; prisoners
Regiment. men. included. Prisoners. Percentage.
20th Infantry 2,500 722 165 28.8%
60th Infantry 2,500 685 185 27.4%

Provisions of Various Regulations.

=Austria.= “_In attack, everything must be done to get as close as
possible to the enemy before fire is opened._” In each fire position
the fire should be delivered with steadiness and without haste.

In _defense_, fire is to be opened as soon as appropriate targets
appear within effective range. Sometimes--especially in minor
operations--it may be advantageous to let the enemy come up close and
then open fire on him suddenly.

A decisive fire effect can only be counted on when the targets are
situated within effective range. Ineffective fire is a waste of
ammunition which impairs the morale of one’s own troops and raises
that of the enemy. For firing at long ranges it is necessary to
consider whether a sufficient amount of ammunition is available. Long
range fire should, in any case, be used only when the size of the
target makes an adequate fire effect probable, and when the range is
known, or can be ascertained with accuracy. In long range fire the
use of small units, each expending a large amount of ammunition, is
as a rule to be recommended. The _distribution_ and _concentration_
of fire should be regulated by the officer charged with fire
direction.

“_Effective fire, delivered suddenly, especially when taking an
enemy in flank or in reverse, even when delivered only by relatively
small forces, shakes the morale of the enemy in the most effective
manner._” (Fire surprise). “Under certain circumstances, but
especially when the enemy has used up all, or nearly all, of his
reserves, comparatively small detachments, skillfully led, can
contribute materially to success, or even bring about the decision,
if they are able to get on the enemy’s flank or rear and open
fire on him suddenly at short range.” Such fire surprises should
be attempted when the conditions essential for their success are
present.[149]

[149] In minor operations this would be a proper place for the
employment of large scouting detachments, the importance of which
decreases with the size of the contending forces. Such tasks can,
however, be just as well performed by a well-trained body of infantry.

=France.= In _attack_, fire is opened as late as possible, at any
rate not until the losses make it necessary to discontinue the
forward movement. Fire is the only means which makes a further
advance possible.

In _defense_, long range fire may be used under certain
circumstances. “Sudden and violent rafales delivered at short range
take the attacker by surprise if, all at once, he loses a great many
men.”

=England= (1905). _Attack._ Infantry is to advance as close as
possible to the enemy before opening fire; small losses must be
endured. Fire is decisive under 540 m. (600 yds.). Artillery and
infantry should support each other. Attention is called to the
support afforded advancing skirmishers by the fire of infantry units
and machine guns held in rear. The British are thus the first to
prescribe “fire of position.” Their Firing Regulations require that
“fire of position” be practiced by company at a range of 900 m. The
company forms line of skirmishers (2-pace intervals) while movable
disappearing targets are placed opposite it. The fire is to increase
in intensity when the attacking infantry advances over level ground
or finds obstacles; it is discontinued when cover is reached. “Fire
of position” is not without danger, but seems to be practicable
occasionally. Aside from its employment in “fire of position,”
long range fire is to be used in attack in the following cases: In
enveloping movements for the purpose of enfilading the enemy’s line;
when favorable targets present themselves; in containing actions or
in feints; in concentrated collective fire; and finally in pursuit.
_Defense_: Fire is to be opened at 1000 m. on skirmishers, but it
may be advantageous to withhold it until the hostile line comes
within short range. This will give good results when the enemy is in
ignorance of the defender’s position, or when the attack is made by
poorly disciplined troops. Continued long range fire tires the eye
and the hand.

=Italy.= In _attack_, the firing line is to reach the extreme limit
of short range (500 m.) with as little firing as possible; to
open fire before this with a part of the advancing force is only
permissible when necessary to carry the line forward. _Defense._ As
soon as the defender has a chance of obtaining some fire effect,
he should open fire to prevent the attacking infantry from getting
within short range. Fire at long (up to 1800 m.) and at mid ranges
(up to 1000 m.) may also be used for this purpose. The battalion
commander determines when fire is to be opened.

From what has been said in the preceding pages as to the time when infantry should open fire, we may deduce the following =General Rules=:--

It is permissible to open fire at an early moment only in exceptional cases when the situation requires it; good preparation, which assures the efficacy of fire and a high moral effect from the very beginning, is of greater importance.

(a) IN ATTACK.

The attacker should advance without firing to ranges at which an adequate fire effect against the low targets presented by the defender may be expected. To open fire at an earlier moment is permissible only when the defender’s fire is so strong that effective ranges cannot be reached without firing. Long range fire is only a means to an end. In a pursuit long range fire will, however, be employed for the purpose of annoying the enemy.

(b) IN DEFENSE.[150]

[150] In Manchuria the Russians, when on the defensive, opened fire
on favorable targets at 1,500 m.; on skirmish lines at 1,000 m.

Fire may be opened at long ranges when sufficient ammunition is available, only when the object is to gain time, and in decisive actions, when the enemy presents favorable targets and we have no artillery. Unless other reasons prevent, fire is opened as soon as targets are clearly discernible and easily brought into line with the sights. It is advisable to withhold the fire when the hostile artillery is superior, when the opponent’s troops are of poor quality, and when it is impossible to surprise the enemy with our fire while he is in unsuitable formations. In defense, as in attack, the decision must be sought by the employment of rapid fire at short range.

7. PAUSES IN THE FIRE.[151]

[151] A Russian company commander contributes the following in
_Mitteilungen der Infanterie Schieszschulen_: “On Sept. 3rd, 1904,
the fire in one of the trenches at Liao Yang lasted throughout
the entire day. The men were finally completely exhausted; their
shoulders, hands and fingers stiff. They had to be given some rest,
and something to eat and drink. Then the fire was resumed, only to
die down again. The fire of the skirmishers was not very effective,
as they were completely exhausted and used up.”

=Swiss.= Firing Regulations p. 44: “It may be advantageous in defense
to fire on the attacker only until he himself opens fire, and then
to remain under cover until he resumes his forward movement. A
prompt resumption of the fire by the defender must, however, be
assured.”

=France.= “The fire should cease when the hostile infantry halts and
takes to cover; its volume is increased as soon as the assailant
resumes his forward movement, or when he shows himself in dense
formations on open ground.”

The efficacy of fire depends upon its accuracy, its direction with reference to the target, and its volume. In the past, pauses in the fire were necessary to allow the powder smoke to clear away; at present they are of advantage because they give the men a breathing spell; rest eyes and nerves; enable ammunition to be distributed, and allow preparations to be made for concerted action. In making use of such pauses good cover, good observation of the enemy and instant readiness for resuming the fire are essential. In a serious engagement the men either maintain a vigorous, animated fire or they rest. If the advancing enemy takes to cover, the fire must cease, only to be resumed with full vigor when favorable targets appear. The attacker (like the British in South Africa advancing against the Boers) will in many cases--especially at the beginning of a campaign--be deceived into believing that the defender has withdrawn; should the attacker now advance, the defender, by suddenly resuming his fire, will surprise him to such an extent that he may be repulsed.[152] Pauses in the fire are a practical expedient for maintaining fire discipline and enable the leader to keep his troops in hand. An organization is capable of performing its duty well, so long as it obeys the command “cease firing.” It might be well at this point to determine when the defender should _change his rear sight elevations_ if the attacker advances by rushes. At mid ranges it might be advisable to stop firing, so as to present no target to the enemy when his line throws itself down after a rush, and to utilize this interruption for changing the rear sight elevation. When this is done during a forward rush of the enemy, the rapidity of fire will suffer at the most favorable moment for bringing an effective fire to bear upon the enemy.

[152] Compare HÖNIG, _Vierundzwanzig Stunden Moltkescher
Strategie_, p. 145, relative to the various opinions entertained in
the staffs of Generals v. Göben and Steinmetz in regard to the pause
in the fire of the French at Point du Jour. _Der 18. August_, pp.
269, 271 and 352.

8. KINDS OF FIRE.

In the days of slow loading rifles of limited range, the importance of the _volley_ was due to the fact that it enabled the leader to develop the greatest volume of fire in tactically favorable moments, or, in other words, when large targets were visible for a short time. Modern combat is conducted under different conditions. When black powder was used the volley had the advantage of permitting the powder smoke to clear away during the pauses. This advantage has now also disappeared.

In the Russo-Japanese war, the Japanese used “fire at will” almost exclusively. Volleys were used by them only at long ranges; by troops held in rear and, after an assault, to get the men in hand. These views are not changed in the new regulations, but immediately after firing a volley the men are to re-load without command. Rapid fire is retained. The Russians placed their faith principally in volley fire,[153] but were soon forced to resort to fire at will. The Russian regulations recommended volley fire up to the decisive firing position, not so much because of a belief in the superior efficacy of this kind of fire, but out of distrust of the individual training of their men; certainly an admission of the deficiency of that kind of training in their army. It was feared that fire at will would impair fire discipline and cause waste of ammunition, and it was believed that the immediate influence of superiors could not be dispensed with. Even the new provisional regulations have not discarded volley fire, which may be employed by section or by platoon. Fire at will may be divided into slow fire (one shot from each squad) and lively fire with counted cartridges.

[153] At Nicholson’s Neck (24th Oct., 1899) the British leaders
ordered their men, who were firing at will on the Boers advancing
from cover to cover (“_Boer Attack_”) to discontinue that fire, and
to use volleys only. But the enemy consistently avoided presenting
large targets to the British volley fire.

_Germany._ _Volleys_ (pars. 106-108 German I. F. R.) are to be employed by platoons or companies when in close order; in skirmish line (par. 193 German I. F. R.) only when the enemy is surprised or the organization is to be kept firmly in hand. Volleys, however, can be used only when the troops themselves are not exposed to an effective fire. An organization will be able to ascertain the range by means of trial volleys only in exceptional cases.

“_The highest attainable rate of fire_--the word rapid fire has been elided--is to be used in attack during the preparation for the assault; in defense to repulse a hostile assault; in warding off a cavalry charge; in all combat situations in which a sudden or immediate collision with the enemy occurs; and, finally, in pursuit.” (Par. 208 German I. F. R.).

_Fire at will_ is used both in extended and close order.

=Volley Fire and Fire at Will. Bursts of Fire (Rafales).= “_Il
n’y a de feu practicable devant l’ennemi que celui à volonté._”
NAPOLEON.[154]

[154] “Fire at will is the only kind of fire practicable when
engaged with the enemy.” NAPOLEON.

“It may be objected that one frequently reads in military history
of effective volleys. The explanation of this is that many of the
so-called volleys mentioned in accounts were volleys only in name. In
a few instances the defender endeavored to fire volleys, but usually
their effect was insignificant.” V. BOGUSLAWSKI.

“Fire at will was forbidden. Volley fire was used only by direction
of the commanders of the battalion sections of the line. The order
to fire volleys quickly ran along the trenches. For a few minutes
a certain amount of unrest was noticeable among the men, which, if
allowed to continue, might have degenerated into confusion and later
perhaps into disorderly flight.

“The first volley was not quite successful. It was ragged--some
men even firing a second time without waiting for the command, an
example likely to be followed by the others. The force was on the
point of getting out of hand. Volleys fired by neighboring sections
drowned the voice of the commander. In such situations only personal
experience and resourcefulness can tell a company commander what
to do. We recommend a course which has always been attended with
success in practice. Let the officer commanding a section jump upon
the parapet and from there give the order ‘cease firing.’ Then, if
the enemy’s fire permits, and his own heart is stout enough, let him
order the next volley from his position on the parapet. When once the
force is again under control, the volleys will be as good as if the
enemy were not so close.” KUROPATKIN-KRAHMER _Kritische Rückblicke
auf den Russisch-Türkischen Krieg_, II, pp. 304 and 310.

In his _Comments on Drill Regulations_ (16th Nov., 1840) Prince
WILLIAM, subsequently Emperor WILLIAM I. of Germany, says:

“I am personally opposed to volleys by battalion. I am of the opinion
that in war volleys and file fire will seldom be used. Should this
fire be used, however, no one will be able to stop file firing after
volley firing, even though not ordered, _because in my opinion it
is impossible to combat human nature_, which finds more security in
rapid loading and firing than in awaiting the commands....”

_Russian experiences in Manchuria._ “At first _volleys_ by formed
bodies of troops were attempted, but later fire at will was used.
In the latter, the men were forbidden to hurry, were instructed to
bring their pieces down to the ‘ready,’ and, whenever it was possible
to see the enemy--who was advancing by rushes--to change their rear
sight elevations at the whistle signal of their commander.... When at
a distance from the enemy the men remained cool and fired faultless
volleys. When the enemy came closer the volleys deteriorated. The
Russians used only fire at will at ranges under 800 paces. This
enabled the men to fire on individual hostile skirmishers and to
place the boldest out of action.” SOLOVIEV.

=Austria.= _Volleys_ are employed, as a rule, only by bodies in close
order, for the purpose of finding the range, and for firing upon
targets which appear suddenly at long range and which will probably
be visible for only a short time. Fire at will is the principal kind
of fire used, the rate of fire being increased or decreased by the
men according to the existing situation. When necessary, the leaders
should regulate the fire; but this should only be done in exceptional
cases as the men are apt to increase rather than diminish the rate of
fire (“Rapid fire”).

The _maximum rate of fire_ is to be employed: “In _attack_, for
the purpose of gaining a superiority of fire at short range; in
_defense_, for the purpose of warding off an impending assault. It
is moreover to be used to inflict the greatest possible losses on a
defeated enemy as long as he is within effective range; and, finally,
in fire surprises, repulse of cavalry attacks, and in rencontres with
the enemy.”

=France.= The French _Lebel_ rifle has a cylindrical magazine
situated under the stock and has a capacity of eight cartridges
which have to be loaded singly. As a rule, _fire with counted
cartridges_ is employed (_feu à cartouches comptées_) for the purpose
of obtaining a “burst of fire” (_rafale_). The _rafale_ consists of
firmly controlled, concentrated, collective fire. Fire at will (_feu
à volonté_) is also used, eight rounds per minute being fired at the
short ranges. The rapidity of this fire at will may be increased up
to 12 rounds per minute by employing the cartridges in the magazine
(_feu à répétition_). One minute is required to fill the magazine.
Volleys are to be employed in night combats and when it becomes
necessary to control the men. In exceptional cases individual men are
directed to fire.

=England and Switzerland.= The only fire employed is fire at will.
The rapidity of this fire varies according to the nature of the
target and the range.

=Italy.= Fire at will (in close order in two or four ranks).

=Japan and Russia.= (See p. 157, supra).

The Rate of Fire.

As regards its rate, fire may be divided into three classes, viz., _slow fire_, _accelerated fire_, and _rapid fire_. The command “fire more slowly” (or more rapidly) serves only the purpose of diminishing (or increasing) the rate of fire.

The rate of fire depends upon the purpose of action, the character of the target, and the available ammunition. Unfavorable illumination and the difficulty of clearly distinguishing the target at long ranges will reduce the rate of fire. The aiming position (_i.e._, whether the rifle is fired from a prone position or from a rest) also affects the rate of fire. A well trained company at peace strength will, moreover, be able to fire more rapidly than one on a war footing.

Hurried firing should unquestionably be condemned. The rapidity with which our rifles can be loaded enables us to produce the maximum fire effect in the minimum time against narrow targets. _The desire of the soldier to make every shot a hit, carefully inculcated in time of peace, will of itself regulate the rate of fire._ As the rate of fire depends upon the distinctness with which the target can be seen, it will naturally increase as the range decreases, thus generally corresponding to the requirements of the tactical situation. Moreover, as it is easier to aim at tall targets than at head targets, this also exercises either an accelerating or a retarding effect, as the case may be. Lieutenant-General Rohne has done a great deal to bring about a correct appreciation of the rate of fire. He states: “The opposition to an increased rate of fire is perhaps due to the belief that it is invariably coupled with a reduction in accuracy. This is not the case, however, and even if it were true to a certain extent, it need not necessarily be harmful. To be sure, when a high rate of fire is solely due to the excitement of the skirmishers, it is unquestionably to be condemned because no attempt is made at aiming; but when it is the product of systematic peace training, it need not necessarily preclude good aiming. It is entirely consistent with a high rate of fire to load and point quickly, to keep the target constantly in view, and, at the same time, to aim accurately and to pull the trigger without flinching.

“The leader who reduces the rapidity of fire in battle in order to save ammunition, wastes lives and time, both more valuable than ammunition. Disabled soldiers are more difficult to replace than ammunition, and lost time cannot be replaced at all.”[155]

[155] _Schieszlehre für die Infanterie_, 2nd Edition.

A high rate of fire need by no means be synonymous with waste of ammunition. Ammunition would unquestionably be wasted if fire were delivered for hours at the same high rate. It is very probable, however, that in the battles of the future the fire will be moderate for some time, or, better still, cease entirely, only to break forth like a thunderstorm over the enemy when opportunity offers or necessity demands. The slower the troops fire the longer they will present a target to the enemy. The coolness shown in firing individual shots at the commencement of an action will disappear owing to the impression produced by losses. This is apparent even in field firing. Lieutenant-General Rohne arrives at the following average results:

Ranges up to 400 m. 5 rounds per minute;
„ from 400- 700 „ 4-5 „ „ „
„ „ 700-1000 „ 3-4 „ „ „
„ „ 1000-1300 „ 2-3 „ „ „
„ „ 1300-1500 „ 1-4 „ „ „
„ over 1500 „ 1 „ „ „

Troops going into action for the first time are inclined to fire entirely too fast, due to their desire to overcome their nervousness. Veteran troops seek to attain the same result, not through rapidity of fire, but through accuracy. Only the determination to make hits is calculated to overcome nervousness. Wherever this determination is lacking, wild firing (fire panic), which is in any case difficult to prevent, will surely result. Fire delivered hurriedly during unexpected rencontres is almost invariably ineffective.[156] For this reason most of the firing regulations have eliminated the command “Rapid Fire,” which is only calculated to produce confusion.

[156] At Beaumont the 9th Company of the 27th Infantry, after a
long advance at double time, encountered the flank of a hostile
battalion. The men became excited, raised the leaves of their rear
sights, and opened rapid fire, which had no effect whatever, as the
range was only 200 paces. _Geschichte des Regiments, Nr. 27_, p. 95.

The Italian Firing Regulations contain the following statement in regard to the effect of accelerated fire (see p. 140 supra).[157]

[157] Consult also _Schieszversuche der k. u. k. Armeeschieszschule
seit dem Jahre 1900_, Vienna, 1905. ROHNE, _Schieszlehre für die
Infanterie_, 2nd Edition, p. 132.

1. _When the appropriate elevation is used_, two-thirds of the percentage of hits obtained by firing 5-6 rounds from each rifle per minute, may be expected when firing at the rate of 12-14 rounds per minute.

2. _When the elevation selected is too great or too small by 100 m._, rapid fire produces almost the _same percentage_ of hits as ordinary fire at will.

3. _When the elevation selected is in error by 200 m._, rapid fire produces almost _twice as great a percentage_ of hits as fire at will.

From the above it follows that, when the appropriate elevation is not used, accelerated fire will inflict greater losses upon the enemy than ordinary fire at will in the same length of time. Within equal periods of time the actual number of hits will be greater in animated fire at will than in slow fire; but in the latter the percentage of hits will be higher.

Of all the different kinds of fire, the _volley_ is best adapted to meet the requirement of keeping the troops in hand, of concentrating the fire, and thereby producing great moral effect. Volleys are of value to troops in ambush, in repulsing cavalry attacks, and in preventing premature firing against the wishes of the commander. They should be used against staffs which would be able to seek cover or spread out when exposed to fire at will.

As the men are, however, not equally skilled in loading their pieces, the rate of fire is very little increased by the use of volleys. The command “Fire” can only be given when the pieces of the entire unit are directed upon the target. The length of the pause between preliminary command and command of execution varies, depending upon the distinctness with which the target can be seen, the range, and the aiming position. When the fire is delivered from a prone position it will be difficult to determine when the command of execution should properly be given. Moreover, as fire from a standing or kneeling position will be the exception, this has contributed to eliminate volley firing on the battlefield, because the troops lack coolness--mental as well as physical--which is indispensable in every volley.

The material and moral effect of a volley is doubtless very considerable, but who could possibly make his voice heard when a deployed platoon of sixty men is firing? How about the efficacy of the fire when the men revert of their own accord from volleys to fire at will, which they will do when their officers are either killed or wounded and they themselves are exposed to fire?[158]

[158] During the advance on Flavigny (Vionville), the support of
the 10th Company, 12th Infantry, was to move into the firing line for
the purpose of firing volleys. “The volley was by no means a good
one, however, and the men at once took up rapid fire. Lieutenant
C---- jumped in front of the men to stop the firing, but was shot in
the leg and crawled back. The rapid fire continued along the entire
line.” _Geschichte des Regiments, Nr. 12_, p. 454.

During the war between Servia and Bulgaria the Servians always
opened the infantry combat with volleys, but after casualties had
occurred among the officers under the heavy fire of the enemy, the
steady volley fire soon degenerated into wild, hurried fire at will,
which produced no effect whatever.

If we use squad volleys (Russia), we approximate fire at will without any of its advantages, besides which, commands, given by so many leaders, tend to confuse the men. Moreover, it is very difficult to handle the platoon, to stop firing, to change target, and to initiate movements. Volley firing is therefore confined to the preparatory stage of combat and to rare moments in which the troops firing are not themselves under effective fire. In the defense of fortified positions many opportunities will be found for the employment of volley fire. The use of trial volleys for the purpose of testing the rear sight elevation will be confined to a few favorable cases, and it may be remarked that animated fire at will concentrated on some definite point produces the same results.

The French, who retained volleys longer than the other powers (to keep the men in hand, to regulate the expenditure of ammunition, and to direct a concentrated collective fire upon the most important target according to the will of the leader), found a substitute in the fire with counted cartridges,[159] the “burst of fire” (rafale).[160] This was also adopted by their artillery. In Germany, the importance of the sudden effect produced by these “bursts of fire” is recognized, but the same object is sought to be attained by training alone; while in Russia, fire with counted cartridges has been adopted, not for the purpose of obtaining rafale fire effect, but for keeping the men in hand. Rafale fire has the disadvantage that pauses in the fire are regulated formally, and that these pauses occur frequently at the very moment when a favorable target is still visible. Will the individual soldier remain cool in the excitement of battle and carefully count the three or five cartridges which he is to fire? In defense, rafale fire is proper, because the skirmisher in the defensive line is completely hidden during the pauses, while the attacker presents favorable targets only temporarily, thus justifying an increased expenditure of ammunition. In attack, suitable targets are rarely available for rafale fire, and a substitute for this fire must be sought in well directed, steadily delivered fire at will, interrupted by rushes to the front. During an attack, rafale fire might degenerate into wild, uncontrolled fire at will, the rapidity of which decreases only when the ammunition runs short. The employment of this class of fire might sometimes be advisable in action when it becomes necessary to hold the enemy, that is, in defensive situations. In this connection, one who is thoroughly familiar with the French army aptly says: “Rafale fire may be likened to the wild passes made by a man, backed up against a wall, for the purpose of warding off an adversary who is able to decide the controversy with one well-aimed blow.”

[159] Temporarily adopted in Germany also.

[160] Par. 194.1 of the _French Infantry Drill Regulations_ of
Dec. 3rd, 1904, states: “The moral effect produced upon an opponent
by the fire is much more considerable when the fire is concentrated
and delivered suddenly and unexpectedly.” Par. 194.4 states: “The
efficacy of the fire, due to its intensity, is augmented when the
enemy is taken by surprise,” etc. Par. 195.1 states: “The fire is, as
a rule, delivered by ‘rafales,’ which are short, sudden and violent;
and, in exceptional cases, by volleys.”

9. REAR SIGHT ELEVATIONS AND POINTS OF AIM.

In Switzerland and Italy the employment of a single rear sight elevation, less than the actual range, is preferred, even when the range is not accurately known. The French regulations are silent on this subject. In Germany one rear sight elevation is used, as a general rule, up to 1,000 m.; beyond that range combined sights may be used in which the two rear sight elevations differ from each other by 100 or 50 m.[161]

[161] See ROHNE, _Schieszlehre für die Infanterie_, p. 93, et seq.

In view of the greater dispersion of fire in action, the author
recommends the selection of either one elevation only, or, at the
longer ranges, the employment of combined sights, in which the
elevations differ from each other by 200 m. In peace time the use
of combined sights, by well-trained marksmen, in which rear sight
elevations differ by only 50 m. would, indeed, be sufficient to
increase the number of hits, but on the battlefield the favorable
conditions found on the target range are lacking.

“Rapidly approaching or receding targets are followed by making proper sight corrections, rear sight elevations being less than the range when the fire is delivered against advancing targets and greater than the range when the fire is delivered against receding targets. At short ranges the same result may be obtained by aiming lower or higher. It should be noted that, when firing on cavalry making a mounted attack, the danger space is continuous when the sights are raised to 700 m.” (Par. 192 German I. F. R.). As a general rule, the proper aiming point is the lowest line of the target. When it becomes necessary to aim at the center, to one side of or below a target, its dimensions will serve as a guide. A change in the rear sight elevation is necessary at medium and long ranges to raise or lower the sheaf of fire; at short ranges it is practicable to point higher only when the target is tall. When the velocity of a side wind cannot be estimated, it is advisable to distribute the fire over a broader front. At short ranges the selection of an aiming point may, under favorable circumstances, be left to the discretion of the individual skirmishers.

10. COMMANDS.

In recounting the several commands to be given for firing, the regulations take into consideration the logical sequence of the tasks devolving upon the skirmisher. Thus the first command draws the skirmisher’s attention to the target; the second indicates the range; the third directs him to open fire.

11. THE OBSERVATION OF THE FIRE.

The actions of the enemy are usually the only reliable indication of the location of the sheaf of fire directed against him; the observed strike of bullets is seldom so good an indication. It is especially difficult to judge of the distribution of projectiles from their strike in front and in rear of the target. Suggestions from the subordinate leaders, whose view of the target is generally restricted, are often more confusing than valuable.

12. THE EFFECT OF FIRE.

COMPARISON BETWEEN LOSSES PRODUCED BY INFANTRY AND ARTILLERY FIRE.

In 1866 the Austrian artillery inflicted 16% of our losses. In 1870-71 the French artillery inflicted 8% of our losses. Up to the battle of Liao Yang the 1st Japanese Army suffered the following losses:

===========+===========================+========================
| PERCENTAGES. | WOUNDS.
+----------+-------+--------+--------+-------+-------
| Small | Art’y |Cutting |Serious.|Slight.| Very
|arms fire.| fire. |weapons.| | |slight.
-----------+----------+-------+--------+--------+-------+-------
Guard Div. | 88.42 | 11.50 | 0.08 | 32.17 | 62.49 | 5.34
2d Div. | 89.43 | 7.91 | 2.30 | 44.05 | 54.89 | 1.06
12th Div. | 80.52 | 14.48 | 2.09 | 39.12 | 46.36 | 14.52
-----------+----------+-------+--------+--------+-------+-------
Average | 86.12 | 11.30 | 2.09 | 38.45 | 54.58 | 6.97
-----------+----------+-------+--------+--------+-------+-------

The figures given above under the captions “serious” (including killed), “slight,” and “very slight” wounds have, of course, only a relative value. The following figures express the average losses of Russians and Japanese:

Losses through rifle fire 85.9%
Losses through artillery fire 11.4%
Losses through cutting weapons 3.2%

Modern fire tactics count upon a prolonged fire for the purpose of gradually exhausting the enemy, and upon rapid fire, suddenly delivered, for annihilating him.

While a statement of the percentage of hits[162] throws some light upon the effect of the fire of an organization, under normal conditions, the number of figures placed out of action affords a standard of comparison by means of which tactical success may be measured, and aids in deciding how to distribute the fire. Differences in fire effect on like targets are best determined by comparing the number of figures hit per minute by 100 marksmen, as a great number of hits is presupposed, which is not the case when the percentage of hits is taken.

[162] In this connection the following works have been consulted:
_Das Gefechtsmäszige Abteilungsschieszen der Infanterie_, 4th
Edition (1905), by Lieutenant-General ROHNE, and _Schieszlehre
für die Infanterie_, 2nd Edition (1906), by the same author;
also _Militär-Wochenblatt_ No. 46 of 1900. To be sure, absolute
trustworthiness cannot be claimed for the figures given, for the
conditions of firing in action are variable; but, as obtained by
Lieutenant-General Rohne, they serve as an excellent standard of
comparison, and, when their relative value is considered, as a basis
for tactical deductions.

(a) Influence of Training.

Individual skill in marksmanship is of decisive importance when firing at targets of appropriate size at the short ranges. A good marksman, firing at will, may (not _must_) expect a hit from each round fired, at any target within 250 m., at a single kneeling opponent within 350 m., at a kneeling file within 500 m., and at a standing file within 600 m. At ranges beyond this, influences, due to the imperfections of the rifle, make themselves felt; and these influences grow to such an extent that the best marksmanship training is unable to eliminate them. A considerable number of rifles must fire in order to produce an effect; for, as some of the pieces fire short and others over, the hits are thus distributed over a greater area. But even here skill in marksmanship is apparent in that the cone of dispersion of the excellent shots produces a shot group of small diameter, that of the poorer shots one of very large diameter. Lieutenant-General Rohne computed (_Schieszlehre für die Infanterie_, p. 84) that when firing rifle model ’98 with the appropriate elevation at a target 1 m. high, the marksmen named in the following table would obtain the number of hits given at the ranges indicated:

=======+========================================
| NUMBER OF HITS OBTAINED BY
+---------------+------------+-----------
Range.|Excellent shots| Fair shots | Poor shots
| Out of 100 rounds fired.
-------+---------------+------------+-----------
1000 m.| 27. | 17.6 | 8.9
1500 m.| 14.2 | 9.7 | 4.8
-------+---------------+------------+-----------

This ratio changes, however, very seriously to the disadvantage of the excellent marksmen when the appropriate elevation is not used. The figure given below, in which the curves of hits are traced, shows that even poor shots may obtain better results in this case.

From this may be deduced the great importance of quickly and accurately ascertaining the range. The excellent ballistic qualities of our rifle and our thorough marksmanship training can assert themselves fully only when the range has been accurately determined. At ranges over 800 m. too great an accuracy in collective fire may be actually detrimental. In this case individual accuracy matters little; the important thing is to direct the densest portion of the sheaf of fire, with some degree of accuracy, on a target the range to which is known only in a general way. The importance of training soldiers in precise marksmanship is ethical rather than practical, for a good target shot need not necessarily be a battle marksman. For the latter a cool head is of more value than all the marksmanship skill of the target range.

(b) Influence of the Error in Estimating the Range.

At short ranges an error of estimation is offset by the flatness of the trajectory. Lieutenant-General Rohne used a probable error in estimation of ¹⁄₈ (12.5%) of the range in his computations. The Swiss Firing Regulations of 1905 count on an error of 100 m. at 500 m., 200 m. at 500 to 1,000 m., 300 m. at ranges over 1,000 m., and the average is taken to be ¹⁄₅ of the range, or 20%. For measurements with range finding instruments see p. 146, supra.

In the following table, the number of hits per 100 rounds fired, at a target 1 m. high, by the marksmen named, is shown under--

“a” When the fire is controlled and the appropriate elevation is used;

“b” When each skirmisher has selected the elevation corresponding to his estimate of the range. In this case it is presumed, however, that the ranges are generally estimated correctly. (ROHNE, _Schieszlehre für die Infanterie_, 2nd Edition, p. 102).

======+================+===============+===============
Range.|Excellent shots.| Fair shots. | Poor shots.
+-------+--------+-------+-------+-------+-------
m. | a | b | a | b | a | b
------+-------+--------+-------+-------+-------+-------
400 | 65.1 | 58.5 | 50.4 | 47.8 | 26.6 | 26.4
600 | 46.6 | 32.9 | 32.9 | 26.6 | 16.9 | 15.8
800 | 35.2 | 15.5 | 23.3 | 13.9 | 11.8 | 9.7
1000 | 27. | 7.5 | 17.6 | 7. | 8.9 | 5.9
1200 | 20.5 | 4. | 13.6 | 3.9 | 6.8 | 3.5
1400 | 16.1 | 2.4 | 10.8 | 2.4 | 5.4 | 2.2
1600 | 12.5 | 1.5 | 8.7 | 1.5 | 4.4 | 1.4
------+-------+--------+-------+-------+-------+-------

The above table shows that when the elevation selected is in error, the number of hits decreases more rapidly the greater the skill of the marksman; and that an error in estimation is of less importance than marksmanship only at ranges under 800 m.

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN “a” AND “b.”

======+================+===============+===============
Range.|Excellent shots.| Fair shots. | Poor shots.
m. | | |
------+----------------+---------------+---------------
400 | 6.6 | 2.6 | 0.4
600 | 13.7 | 6.3 | 1.1
800 | 19.8 | 9.4 | 2.1
1000 | 19.5 | 10.6 | 3.0
1200 | 16.4 | 9.7 | 3.3
1400 | 13.3 | 8.4 | 3.2
1600 | 11. | 7.2 | 2.
------+----------------+---------------+---------------

(c) Fire Effect as Regards Time. Number of Rounds to be Expended.

The greater the losses inflicted within a short period of time in a limited space, the greater the moral effect of the fire. It should therefore be the aim of the officer charged with fire direction to bring about a decisive effect within the shortest possible time. The leaders must bear in mind from the beginning of the fire fight that the ammunition carried is limited and that the expenditure of a certain amount is equivalent to a loss of power, and this is permissible only where commensurate results would be achieved. When once a decision has been formed to fire on a target, the ammunition necessary to accomplish the object of the fight must be expended without stinting, since ineffective fire impairs the morale of one’s own troops and raises that of the enemy.

When the enemy is approximately equal to us in numbers, and is deployed in line at one man per meter of front, presenting breast targets only, the number of rounds per rifle, given in round figures in the following table, will be required to place about one-third of the enemy’s force out of action:[163]

At a range of 300 m. 3 rounds,
„ „ „ „ 400 „ 5 „
„ „ „ „ 500 „ 6 „
„ „ „ „ 600 „ 7.5 „
„ „ „ „ 700 „ 10 „
„ „ „ „ 800 „ 13 „
„ „ „ „ 900 „ 16 „
„ „ „ „ 1000 „ 25 „
„ „ „ „ 1100 „ 45 „
„ „ „ „ 1200 „ 50 „
„ „ „ „ 1300 „ 57 „
„ „ „ „ 1400 „ 63 „
„ „ „ „ 1500 „ 72 „
„ „ „ „ 1600 „ 80 „

[163] According to ROHNE, _Schieszlehre für die Infanterie_, 2nd
Edition, p. 214.

In the above table it is assumed that an error of estimation of 7.5% was made and that at ranges over 1000 m. two elevations were used. Against head targets, approximately twice the number of rounds indicated above must be expended; and against exposed skirmishers, visible at full height, about half of the number of rounds given. The efficacy is increased when the fire comes from a flank. The following data are taken from an extended firing test: At 600-700 m., 200 skirmishers, firing 5000 rounds against 200 body targets, obtained 4.3% hits and placed 43% of the figures out of action; under the enfilading fire delivered by one platoon, the percentage of hits rose to 10.5%, and the number of incapacitated figures to 80%.

(d) Additional Influences Affecting Accuracy of Fire.

Errors in setting the sight, in pointing, aiming, and pulling the trigger, increase the area of the beaten zone at the expense of fire effect on the actual target selected. When we consider the excitement of men in action, and the numerous sources of error in setting the sights, in pointing and firing, it is clear that we have to reckon with the =effect of misses= on the field of battle more than with the really well aimed and well delivered collective fire of a considerable number of marksmen. Lieutenant Colonel Wolozkoi, late of the Russian Army,[164] attempted to obtain an approximate standard of measurement for the errors in firing made by marksmen. He bases his deductions upon the opinion that the efficacy of rifle fire in action depends entirely upon the mental and physical condition of the individual soldier at the moment; that in serious engagements this condition is such that accurate aiming cannot be expected; and finally that every skirmisher, according to the degree of his excitement or fatigue, will fire his piece at varying angles of elevation. He argues that this produces a rigid cone of dispersion, whose limits correspond to certain extreme angles of error, and whose axis (center trajectory) corresponds to a mean angle of error; that, for each class of rifles, the depth of the resulting beaten zone is constant; and that the depth of this zone increases with the range corresponding to the angles of error. It follows that the depth of this beaten zone is greater in modern rifles than in those of older pattern.

[164] _Das Gewehrfeuer im Gefecht_, 1883.

He believes that peace training will have fulfilled its mission if the skirmisher, while firing, holds his piece in the position to which he has become habituated through years of practice. This position can be none other than that in which the piece is horizontal.

Although the theory of the =Rigid, Constant Cone of Misses=, is not tenable in this form, because there will always be a reasonably compact core of hits (the dimensions of which depend upon the conditions indicated in the firing regulations) at the center of the cone of fire, the views of Colonel Wolozkoi have, nevertheless, a certain value for us, and find application in large, hotly contested battles, especially when the firing line has been exposed to the material and moral influences of hostile fire for a considerable length of time. At the commencement of every combat we can, at any rate, count on “aimed fire”; but instead of reckoning at all times with a 75% core of hits, 100 m. in diameter, we must become used to reckoning with a 30 and 40% core of hits, of the same diameter, produced by greater dispersion of the bullets.