Chapter XII: Part 12

The range finders, without special orders to that effect, measure
the range to targets as they appear, or to fixed points, and call
it out to the battery commander. The battery commander designates
the target, the range, and the kind of fire to be used. The platoon
commanders assign a section of the target to each of their guns,
designate the elevation that is to be used, and supervise the service
of the guns; they are especially held responsible that the fire
is directed upon the proper target. Platoon commanders constantly
observe through their field glasses the strike of the bullets and
the enemy. The commander of the gun carriages is charged with their
supervision; he constantly sends forward ammunition, and, when
necessary, men and matériel, into the firing position. When the
detached guns change position, he follows the movement under cover
with the gun carriages, bringing them as close to the firing position
as possible.

After machine gun batteries had been employed at maneuvers as an
auxiliary arm of the cavalry, they did especially good work in the
fights in Southwest Africa,[292] where they were not opposed by
artillery.

[292] _Militär-Wochenblatt_, 1904, Nos. 136, 139 and 140.

Through their ability to follow a skirmish line into the densest
thickets, they were a valuable support to the infantry in the close
country in which the African fights took place, where artillery of
necessity had to fail owing to absence of a clear field of view. It
was demonstrated, however, that the machine gun squads became so
engrossed in the work of serving their guns that supporting troops
had to guard them against surprise.

In the engagement at the =Waterberg=, the machine guns did splendid
work in meeting, with an effective volley fire, the sudden, energetic
attacks made by the Hereros against the flank and rear of the
Germans. In two critical moments, during the attack against the left
flank of the advance guard, and during the attack made with a yell
against the right and rear of headquarters, it was principally due
to the machine guns that the enemy, who had come within short range,
was repulsed. Participants of this fight believed that the Hereros
did not dare to make a real attack when machine guns went into action
against them. It had been impossible to avoid using single machine
guns. Just as the enemy was making an attack upon the 11th Company,
machine gun No. 3 (2nd Machine Gun Battery), which had done splendid
work, broke down. This was the only case of jamming that occurred.
Although exposed to a galling hostile fire, the gun commander managed
to change barrels in 30 seconds, and then to resume the firing. The
2nd Machine Gun Battery expended 20,775 rounds of ammunition; the
expenditure of the different guns varied between 7350 and 120 rounds,
according to the part taken by them in the action. The ammunition
supply was certain and steady; no shortage of ammunition, not even a
temporary one, occurred anywhere.

7. MACHINE GUNS IN OTHER COUNTRIES.

=Switzerland.= In 1892 Switzerland began to organize four mounted
Maxim machine gun companies, which were assigned to the weak
cavalry brigades (consisting of six troops[293]) on account of the
defensive role of the Swiss cavalry and the lack of batteries of
horse artillery. Three machine gun companies were assigned to the
fortifications on the St. Gotthard and one to St. Moritz for the
purpose of augmenting the fire of the advanced positions belonging to
those fortifications, and to cover the approaches thereto.

[293] Eskadrons.

A Maxim machine gun company consists of 6 officers, 105
non-commissioned officers and privates, 99 horses (24 pack horses
and 24 draft horses), 8 guns mounted on tripods, and 7 vehicles (two
of these are two-horse supply and baggage wagons, one four-horse
field forge with field kitchen, 4 two-horse ammunition wagons, each
carrying 15,520 rounds of ammunition). The guns and the ammunition
are carried on pack animals. A packed gun horse carries a load of 108
kg. inclusive of 5 kg. of oats. An ammunition horse carries a load
of 123 kg. inclusive of 5 kg. of oats and 8 ammunition boxes (each
holding 250 rounds, or a total of 2000 rounds weighing 90.5 kg.). A
machine gun company of eight guns is divided into four platoons, each
consisting of two guns and four ammunition horses, and the combat
train, consisting of four ammunition wagons and the field kitchen.
Every gun is commanded by a “gun chief,” and two of the five men
belonging to the gun squad are horse holders. After the command
“halt” has been given, 1-1¹⁄₂ minutes are required to get the gun
ready for firing. The company carries 5940 rounds of ammunition for
each gun.

Machine Gun and Ammunition Horse.

Gun Commander and Gun Ready to Fire.]

Route column from line is formed by the guns moving successively
in the proper direction, the two ammunition pack animals following
directly in rear of the gun to which they belong. The company takes
up a road space of 150 m. For movements off the road the company may
move in “mass,” or with the platoons in “combat formation.” When
in “mass” the platoons, each in route column, are abreast, with
intervals of 10-20 paces between them. When the platoons are in
“combat formation,” the two guns of each are placed abreast at equal
intervals.

The three machine gun companies assigned to the line of
fortifications consist of two to three platoons, each of four guns.
A platoon consists of 2 officers and 60 non-commissioned officers
and privates. The men are armed with rifles and equipped with alpine
sticks. “Gun carriers” (_Waffenwarte_) carry the gun basket, which
weighs 33 kg. The weight of the water in the jacket is only 1 kg.
“Ammunition carriers” (_Munitionswarte_) carry the ammunition in
specially constructed frames, each man carrying 500 rounds.

Kinds of fire: “_Fire by a single gun_” is employed at the opening of
an action to drive away patrols and reconnoitering officers, when it
is not desired to betray the presence of machine guns to the enemy.

“_Volley fire_” is the usual fire employed by machine guns and
corresponds to the volley fire of infantry. After the target and the
elevation have been designated, the platoon commander directs that
fire he opened by calling the name of the gun pointer who is to fire.
A pause is made after every series of 20-30 shots, which is used to
make necessary corrections.

As soon as the proper elevation has been determined, “_rapid fire_”
is opened. In this the _guns of a platoon fire alternately_. The fire
is delivered in series of 100 rounds, and the time during which one
of the guns is not firing is utilized by the non-commissioned officer
with it to examine and oil the mechanism.

The “_fire at will_” (continuous fire) of the machine guns
corresponds to the magazine fire of the infantry. _All the guns fire
simultaneously_ series of 50 to 100 rounds, interrupting the fire for
a moment at the end of each series for the purpose of examining and
oiling the mechanism; then they resume the fire with a new series of
50 to 100 rounds. On account of the great expenditure of ammunition
entailed, and also in order to prevent the premature deterioration
of the matériel, fire at will is used in exceptional cases only, for
example, when danger is imminent, or when favorable opportunities
offer.

“_Progressive fire_” may be employed against narrow, deep targets,
when the range could not be accurately determined. It may also be
employed for searching an area 100-200 m. deep.

=Austria= has begun to organize _cavalry and mountain machine gun
batteries_ consisting of four guns each. The machine gun Model 7
(_Schwarzlose_), with pack animal equipment, has been adopted. The
gun horse carries 500, and each of the two ammunition horses, 1500
rounds of ammunition. During mobilization two ammunition horses
are to be added for each gun. Mountain machine gun batteries are
similarly organized; each ammunition horse carries 2000 rounds of
ammunition. On the gun itself, and on the gun frame, 44 belts, each
holding 250 rounds, or a total of 11,000 rounds, are carried.[294]

[294] The Schwarzlose machine gun weighs 18 kg. exclusive of frame
and the water in the jacket. (The Maxim weighs 28 kg.).

The formations employed by the cavalry machine gun batteries are the
order in line (at close intervals), the combat order, and the route
column.

The mountain machine gun batteries, carrying guns and ammunition
upon pack horses, are equipped with tripod and basket mounts. These
machine gun batteries combine the system of mounting and carrying
employed by the Swiss cavalry and mountain machine gun companies.
Three pack animals are employed to transport each gun with its
ammunition. The gun squad consists of three men. Officers and
non-commissioned officers are mounted; the other men of the battery
are not. Unpacking the guns, posting them, and getting them in
readiness for firing, is managed in a similar manner as in the Swiss
machine gun companies.

The gun adopted for _infantry machine gun batteries_ is the light and
simple Schwarzlose machine gun, Model 7.

Springs Parts of breech Screws & Pins Weights
Maxim 14 35 52 27.5 kg.
Schwarzlose 1 11 13 17.5 „

Tripod mounts and pack animal transportation are necessary in view
of Austrian theaters of war. The batteries consist of four machine
guns.

“The great length of modern battle fronts, and the gaps and local
combats along the latter, would seem to make a distribution of
machine guns along the entire front desirable. Attention is thereby
directed to organizing the machine guns to be employed with the
infantry as ‘Regimental Machine Guns.’ Such an organization would
best ensure the training of this new arm for the infantry combat and
the prompt attainment of an understanding of its employment.

“In the cavalry, the difficulties of organizing, training, and
employing machine guns are considerably greater than in the infantry.
These difficulties are best overcome by organizing the machine guns
assigned to cavalry into independent batteries, and placing them at
the disposal of the higher cavalry commanders.

“In determining upon the size of the machine gun batteries attached
to infantry, an attempt should be made to combine minimum size with
adequate fire effect and maximum mobility. Two machine guns would
seem to be almost the maximum number that should be posted at one
point in an infantry action. From a tactical point of view, it is,
moreover, undesirable to post a greater number at one point, because
gun shields, steam, etc. would frequently form too prominent a
target, for the hostile artillery to forego firing on it promptly and
with telling effect.

“In connection with the desire for more than two machine guns in each
infantry and Jäger organization--about two guns per battalion--the
tremendous increase in ammunition trains should be considered. It
would also be well to bear in mind that we have, as a matter of fact,
not even become accustomed to the numerous ammunition columns of our
rapid fire artillery.

“In the cavalry, the necessity of dividing a machine gun battery
for the purpose of assigning the parts thereof to brigades, and
of assigning machine guns to reconnaissance and other independent
detachments, must be reckoned with. When we bear in mind that single
machine guns are to be used only in exceptional cases, the machine
gun battery intended for the cavalry cannot well be made smaller than
four guns.”[295]

[295] _Streffleur_, January, 1908, p. 114, et seq.

=England.= During the =Boer war= 1-2 machine guns mounted on a high
carriage were assigned to each of the British battalions. These guns
were unsuited to employment in an infantry combat and were quickly
silenced. The campaign demonstrated that these guns could frequently
not be used, and that they stood idle in rear of the line. They were
not combined into detachments for the purpose of supporting the
attack, as should have been done, until the engagement at =Pieters
Hill= (27th Febr., 1900). On account of the long range at which these
guns came into action, the effect of their fire was indeed very
small, but, nevertheless, its moral effect impaired the steadiness
of the Boer aim. Since the great fire power of these guns can be
brought into play only when several of them are employed together,
it is not a good plan to assign single guns to cavalry regiments for
the purpose of supporting the dismounted line in action. Only the
commander of the entire force, and not each battalion commander,
is able to judge where the employment of machine guns would be
advantageous. The proposal to assign machine guns to the artillery
was not followed, as it was justly feared that the machine guns would
then be assigned tasks to which they were not adapted.

At the present time, each battalion has a machine gun platoon
consisting of two guns. Both guns with their tripods, and a portion
of the ammunition, are transported on one wagon drawn by two horses.
They are in addition equipped with a two-horse ammunition cart. The
complement consists of 1 non-commissioned officer, 15 privates, 1
saddle horse, and 4 draft horses.

Each battalion of mounted infantry has a machine gun platoon which is
similarly organized. Each of the four vehicles of this platoon is,
however, drawn by four horses. In addition, this platoon is equipped
with six machine gun pack saddles for transporting the guns on pack
animals. The complement consists of 1 officer, 1 first sergeant, 23
privates, 16 saddle horses, and 16 draft animals.

The machine gun platoon of a cavalry regiment consists of only
one gun, which is carried on a four-horse wagon, and a four-horse
ammunition wagon. The platoon is equipped with three pack saddles.
The complement consists of 1 officer, 1 non-commissioned officer, 13
privates, 11 saddle horses, and 8 draft horses.

The following ammunition is carried by the British machine gun
platoons:

======================+========+==========+==========+========
| | In the | In the |
|With the|ammunition| Division | Total
| organ- | column |ammunition| No.
|ization.| of the | column. |rounds.
| |F. A. Bns.| |
----------------------+--------+----------+----------+--------
Infantry M. G. P. | 11,500 | 10,000 | 10,000 | 31,500
Mtd. Infantry M. G. P.| 19,500 | 10,000 | 10,000 | 39,500
Cavalry M. G. P | 19,500 | 10,000 | 10,000 | 39,500
----------------------+--------+----------+----------+--------

=Japan= and =France= seem to have decided to follow the British in
assigning machine gun platoons to regiments. In =Japan=, soon after
the outbreak of the =Russo-Japanese war=, the Guard, the 1st, 2nd,
3rd, 4th and 6th Divisions, and the two independent cavalry brigades,
had machine gun batteries consisting of 6 guns each. During the
winter 1904-5, 320 machine guns were gradually placed in position,
singly and by platoons, in the fortifications on the Shaho.

=Russia.= At the outbreak of the =Russo-Japanese war=, a machine gun
company was assigned to the 1st, 3rd and 5th East Siberian Rifle
Brigades. This company consisted of 5 officers, 85 combatants, 13
non-combatants, 10 saddle horses, 29 draft horses, and eight guns.
The latter were mounted on high carriages, and were protected by
steel shields. Of the ammunition, 1350 rounds, in belts holding 450
rounds each, were carried on each gun carriage, and 4500 rounds
on each of the six two-wheeled ammunition carts. The field train
consisted of nine one-horse carts. The loss of the machine gun
company at the =Yalu= was probably due to the fact that the guns,
mounted on high carriages, were quickly deprived of their mobility
in their second position, after they had, from their first position,
effectively flanked the advance of the Japanese infantry. Immediately
after this first lesson, the high wheeled carriage was apparently
abolished, and the tripod adopted. On September 26th, 1904, the
machine gun companies were reorganized. There were (old) wheeled,
and (newly-organized) so-called “mountain machine gun companies,”
the latter having pack animal transportation. These companies were
assigned to infantry and Rifle divisions and were designated by the
numbers of their divisions.

On December 12th, 1906, the machine gun organization was again
changed, because it was asserted that the assignment of machine gun
companies to divisions hampered the division commander; that the
employment of 8 guns at one point was injudicious; and that so large
a machine gun battery actually induced a scattering of the guns.
Infantry, Reserve, and Rifle regiments are each assigned a machine
gun organization consisting of 4 guns, mounted on tripods, equipped
with 6 mm. steel shields, with pack animal transportation.

Complement: 3 officers, 7 non-commissioned officers, 46 privates,
7 non-combatants, 10 saddle horses, 21 pack and draft horses (8 of
these for carrying ammunition), 4 ammunition carts, and 5 train
wagons. The personnel is drawn from a regiment in which the men to be
detailed for machine gun duty are trained.

According to an officer who commanded a machine gun company in the
battle of =Liao Yang=[296], his company went into position on August
30th, on the right flank of its division behind an earth embankment
at the south edge of the village of Gutsealing, and 300 m. from the
railroad running in a southwesterly direction. This position was
taken up with the object of preventing the envelopment of the right
flank of the division. Sufficient time was available for cutting
down the kaoliang crop for 650 m. Beyond this range the kaoliang
fields continued for several hundred meters. Directly in front of
the position of the company there was a hill, upon which several
mounted men showed themselves toward 10 A. M. As soon as fire was
opened on them, they threw themselves down in a field covered
with tall kaoliang. When these mounted men had reached a fairly
open space, about 900 m. from the machine gun company, they could
be clearly seen. In rear of them was observed a mountain battery
of artillery, which endeavored to go into position on the hill
mentioned, apparently with a view of directing a flanking fire on
the Russian skirmishers farther to the front than the machine guns.
Fire was opened at once, without first bracketing the target, the
first gun firing at 1200 paces (about 850 m.), and each succeeding
gun increasing the range by 25 paces, thus covering with fire a space
150 m. deep. Immediately after fire was opened on it, the mountain
battery attempted to escape to the right, but succumbed to the fire
of the machine guns. The latter had fired about 1¹⁄₂ minutes, and had
expended 6000 rounds of ammunition. About noon, hostile (Japanese)
skirmishers attempted to cross the railroad embankment, one by one,
apparently with a view of flanking the machine guns. The latter
opened fire on the Japanese, combined sights, and, for a short
period, rapid fire with sweeping being resorted to. The movement
made by the Japanese was discontinued; an advance made by groups
against the front of the machine guns got only as far as the edge of
the cleared kaoliang field. In the open, the skirmishers were unable
to advance a single step; every attempt, on their part, to rise,
was prevented. Whether it would have been possible to advance by
crawling, while keeping up a constant fire, can, of course, not be
determined now.

[296] _Russian Invalid_, October 1904.

At nightfall the Japanese again advanced in the kaoliang field and
annoyed the machine gun company throughout the night with rifle fire.
At daybreak they were again driven back by a continued fire from
the machine guns. The Japanese skirmishers remained in readiness,
however, in the kaoliang field, and fired on any target that offered.
When their fire became more and more galling, the machine gun
commander decided to send forward a non-commissioned officer and 15
men (Reservists and horse holders, armed with rifle and bayonet) to
drive them out. The undertaking was successful. It was found that
this continuous annoying fire had been kept up by only 1 officer and
24 men.

At 3 P. M., several Japanese assembled at the railway bridge; a
signal detachment also appeared. The fire at will of the infantry,
directed on this body of men, had no effect whatever; but after
two machine guns, one using an elevation of 1025, the other one of
1075 m., had fired on that point for a short time, the Japanese
disappeared. At 5 P. M., the machine guns succeeded in repulsing an
enveloping movement made against their right flank. This movement was
betrayed only by the motion of the kaoliang stalks. Toward 7 P. M.,
the Japanese directed artillery fire upon the machine guns, which
suffered considerable losses, although the personnel was protected by
an earth parapet and had ceased to work the guns. This fire did not
cease until nightfall, and, at 9 P. M., the position was evacuated
by order. An attack made by the Japanese during the night found the
machine guns gone. During the two days of the fight the company had
lost 30% of its personnel, and had fired 26,000 rounds of ammunition,
or only about 3200 rounds per gun during two days. The superiority
of the fire of these machine guns over that of the Japanese skirmish
line can perhaps only be explained by the small numbers of the latter.

In the defensive position on the =Shaho= and at =Mukden=, machine
guns were employed in favorable positions, behind sandbag parapets
and under splinter proof roofs. According to Lieutenant-Colonel
ANISINOW, good results were obtained against skirmishers up to 1050
m., against closed bodies of infantry and against troops of cavalry
(_Eskadrons_) up to 1400 m.; against batteries of artillery, halted
in the open, staffs, and columns, the fire was sufficiently effective
up to 1960 m.

8. THE EMPLOYMENT OF MACHINE GUN BATTERIES.

Machine guns will never be able to replace artillery at long ranges; on the other hand, they will often find an opportunity to support other arms with their fire at medium and short ranges.

It has been asserted that machine guns do not always follow the movements of the firing lines in action, that the commander of a force is not always able to find a good position for them; and the question raised whether the space taken up by the machine guns and their ammunition wagons in a column could not be more profitably filled by companies of infantry or by a portion of an ammunition column of corresponding length. To be sure, machine guns are a special arm; the justification of their existence lies in the combination of constant readiness for firing with highly developed mobility, so that, held back under direct control of the commander of a force, they give him the means wherewith to produce within a short time a sudden effect, in the nature of a surprise. This is the very purpose for which machine guns were created. They are not intended for prolonged fire action, not for accompanying an infantry skirmish line in an advance by rushes, and, least of all, for fighting well covered firing lines. In addition, the fact that machine guns make it possible to concentrate fire quickly on any space, whereby the moral effect is considerably increased, ought not to be underestimated. It would seem to be advisable to employ machine guns in conjunction with infantry when it is impossible to develop a powerful fire on account of the conformation of the ground, but when such fire is desirable for commanding approaches or defiles; further, when fire alone suffices for delaying the enemy (for example, in rear guard actions). In this case the guns may either be pushed far to the front, or may be used in defensive positions, which can then be held by a few men during the pauses in the fight.[297] Although machine gun fire may perhaps be relatively less accurate than that of a body of infantry, the value of pouring a large mass of projectiles on the enemy within a brief space of time should not be underestimated.[298]

[297] At the Austrian Musketry School it was found that it was
not easy for a body of troops to fire on targets illuminated by the
shaft of a search light; few men possessed the requisite eyesight to
make this possible. It would no doubt be practicable, however, to
attach such men to the machine guns posted in a defensive position. A
considerable increase in fire effect could thus be obtained.

[298] Platoon volleys, directed for one minute on figures advancing
from 1200-1100 paces, resulted in 5, fire at will, in 1¹⁄₂, and
machine gun fire, in 3% hits. The three kinds of fire, when directed
against 30 prone skirmishers, resulted, in one minute, in 13, 18, and
10% hits, respectively.

Whether machine guns are distributed by platoons, or are employed as a unit under control of superior leaders, will depend upon whether it is contemplated to employ them in a purely defensive way for the purpose of reinforcing the several weak points, or offensively in fire surprises or in covering the flanks. The distribution by platoons has the undeniable disadvantage that single guns will frequently not find an opportunity to fire; that the difficulty of ammunition supply is increased; and that the combined employment of the several platoons will produce friction that cannot be easily avoided. On the other hand, in machine gun batteries of three platoons each, an employment by platoons is easy. Although a distribution by platoons is permissible in a passive defense, the employment of the guns by battery (company) against the flanks of the attacker permits the mobility and fire power of the arm to be utilized to better advantage. While a distribution of machine guns by platoons--if we except colonial and mountain warfare--is, indeed, cheaper, it generally leads to a useless frittering away of fighting units.[299]

[299] Lieutenant ULRICH (retired), who participated in the fighting
in Manchuria, voices the same opinion in _Jahrbücher_, March number,
p. 285:

“The opinion has been quite prevalent that the organization of
strong machine gun units is one of the most important requirements of
modern battle.”

Machine guns will be able to bring all their powers into play to the best advantage at the beginning of a rencontre, when, from their position as far forward as possible in the column, they are pushed to the front to occupy important points and to compel the enemy to deploy his infantry. The commander should, however, endeavor to withdraw the machine guns from the fight as soon as his own infantry has deployed, in order to avoid involving the guns in a protracted fire fight necessitating an expenditure of a great amount of ammunition and in which the accuracy of their fire would gradually suffer.[300] The proper sphere of machine guns lies in their employment as a separate arm, whether they are posted so as to flank an enemy, or are kept at the disposal of the commander as an ever ready reserve, which is pushed forward to keep the point to be attacked under fire, to meet a counter-attack, or--and to this use they are best adapted--to participate in the pursuit. Their employment is also proper in rear guard actions, since they are able to remain in position longer, for example, than rear guard infantry, whose energies are paralyzed by the thought of getting away from the enemy in time. Machine guns are much more independent than infantry on account of their ability to withdraw at an increased gait. On account of their greater staying power and the greater intensity of their fire, they increase the delay which the enemy suffers, as well as the start gained by their own force; they moreover enable their own force to get away from the enemy and to escape pursuit.

[300] This applies particularly to machine guns which have air
cooled barrels. After four minutes of continuous fire, part of
the projectiles, and after seven minutes all of the projectiles
fired from a Hotchkiss machine gun go over the target (platoon).
_Kriegstechnische Zeitschrift_, January number, 1907.

In employing machine guns in defense, it must be borne in mind that the guns are not adapted to carry on protracted fire actions; and that the advantage of the mobility of machine gun batteries cannot be properly utilized if they have been assigned, from the outset, a definite section to defend. As a rule, it will be advisable, in defense, to keep the machine guns at first with the reserve, and to employ them later, as necessity requires, even by platoons, to reinforce the defensive line at threatened points, or, by battery (company), to prevent an envelopment, or to participate in offensive movements. This does not preclude the employment of machine guns during the preparatory stage of the engagement, for example, to command important approaches. When a covered withdrawal of the guns is assured, it will also be possible to post machine gun batteries in such a manner in front of, or to a flank of the main defensive position, that they can suddenly sweep with their fire the ground on which the opponent will probably place his artillery. Flanking machine gun fire can sometimes be employed for sweeping dead angles.

The provisions of the Austrian machine gun regulations correspond in the main to those of the German Army. In Austria special stress is laid upon the use of machine guns with cavalry, while in Germany they are in addition a mobile reserve. Machine gun batteries accomplish the principal objects which cavalry expects to attain by the assignment of infantry,[301] viz., relief from fighting on foot, great fire power, and mobility. Even in reconnaissance duty, machine guns will be employed to break down the resistance of the enemy in occupied localities and to augment the resistance of their own force in such places. During an advance, machine guns should go into position at an early moment in order to cover as effectively as possible the approach and the deployment for attack. It is advisable to post the guns of a machine gun battery together, so as not to have numerous lines of fire interfere with the movements of the cavalry; this is especially emphasized by the Austrian regulations. Machine gun batteries, like horse batteries (artillery), remain with the cavalry divisions during a battle.

[301] In regard to the employment of machine guns in the maneuvers
of 1905, see _Streffleur_, 1906, May number.

German machine guns are especially adapted for resisting cavalry, while guns transported upon pack animals are entirely helpless on the march and when going into position, and require the support of the other arms. German machine guns, whether on their wheeled carriages or on their sleds, are capable of warding off cavalry. The fire of the guns should be distributed over the entire front of the mounted attacking line. Special attention should be paid to lines following the first attacking line, to the flanks of the guns themselves, and to covering the carriages when they are not with the guns. Machine guns are able to advance on open ground without regard to cavalry, so long as the latter is not supported by artillery or infantry, or is not so superior in force that it can attack simultaneously from several directions, or in several lines.

In action against artillery it should be borne in mind that artillery possesses an unquestioned superiority of fire at the longer ranges; at ranges at which machine guns are able to fire at all, they must seek to find protection under cover, or by distributing the guns. Artillery is very susceptible to flanking fire. When that arm is to be engaged, the machine gun sleds should be brought as close as possible to the hostile batteries. In this case it is, moreover, advisable to have large intervals between the machine gun platoons. The great mobility of the machine gun battery, when limbered, will sometimes enable it to take up a position from which it can flank the enemy. In distributing machine gun fire it would be well always to assign the same task to two guns. It is not a good plan to have all the machine guns sweep the entire front of a firing battery (artillery).

The opinions in regard to machine gun employment in field
warfare--mountain and fortress warfare are not considered
here--differ considerably. In =England= machine guns are attached to
battalions, and Japan of late leans toward this mode of employment.
In =Switzerland= machine guns serve in addition as a substitute for
horse batteries, which their army lacks.

The =English= view is obviously affected by their experience in
colonial wars.

The following are given as the duties of machine guns _in attack_:

1. The machine gun is above all to be employed at long ranges. In
open country it will seldom be possible for the gun to reach a
position in the first line, where, moreover, the gun would offer too
good a target. Covered terrain should be taken advantage of to get
the gun close to the enemy. The advance of infantry may be supported
at long ranges by machine gun fire (fire of position).

2. The delivery of volley fire against any point of the hostile
position.

3. The warding off of counter-attacks or attacks made by cavalry.

4. The utilization of flanking positions.

5. The support of cavalry during delaying actions (ammunition being
in this case a substitute for men) although the fire effect against
low targets is very small.

6. The holding of captured positions.

_In defense_ the isolated employment of machine guns at a distance
from the organization is prohibited and their use against extended
skirmish lines cautioned against. Machine guns are well adapted for
protecting flanks and can be kept back as a reserve to prevent the
advance of hostile reinforcements, to support counter-attacks, to
direct fire against deep and dense targets, and, finally, to support
the firing line in action at short range.

_In defense_ the principal duties of machine guns will consist of--

1. Sweeping obstacles and commanding terrain which is specially
favorable for the attack; flanking of salients.

2. Reinforcing weak points.

3. Firing on advancing hostile reinforcements.

The cavalry regulations, contrary to those of the infantry, also
permit a massed employment of machine guns when ordered by brigade or
division commanders.

“As a rule, it will not be advisable to open fire on isolated mounted
men or small groups of approximately platoon strength, as this would
betray the position prematurely. In action, machine guns may be
employed in conjunction with dismounted skirmishers for the purpose
of forming a supporting point for movements, a rallying position, or
for protecting a flank. Finally, during an attack, machine guns may
support the fire of the horse battery, on the outer flank of which
they go into position, to serve as support, or to facilitate by their
fire a withdrawal.”

These official regulations are not entirely in accord with the views
entertained in the army. The combined use of the machine guns of
a brigade, such as quite naturally resulted in the engagement at
=Pieters Hill=, is advocated by many. At the longer ranges, machine
gun companies are to fire on favorable targets, discontinuing their
fire when their object has been accomplished. In addition they are to
cover the advance or withdrawal of the infantry; to fire on certain
points of the hostile position; to act against the enemy’s flanks in
pursuit; and, in defense, posted in pairs, they are to flank salient
angles and make it difficult for the enemy to approach the obstacles.

In =Switzerland= machine guns are considered an auxiliary arm. “Our
field army should be capable of accepting and sustaining battle in
the mountains and on highland plateaus without necessitating the
creation of numerous special detachments for that purpose. Machine
gun companies should be a tool which can be used in the mountains and
on highland plateaus, and which can be turned over for use to any
organization.”

The platoon is the firing unit; the company commander posts his
platoons at large intervals and regulates their mutual coöperation.
Fire, suddenly delivered from various points, frequently rather
far distant from each other, is considered to have a particularly
demoralizing effect; the scattered posting of the platoons makes it
difficult for the enemy to combat effectively the individual platoons
which are skillfully concealed on the terrain. “The indefinable,
uncanny and confusing aspect of their appearance enhances the effect
of the fire surprise.” The defensive character is here especially
clearly marked, for cavalry which counts in the first place on the
offensive will prefer a combined employment of machine guns, so as
not to be hampered in its movements by the various lines of fire. On
the march, machine guns are posted as far forward as possible in the
column; single platoons may also be attached to troops (_Eskadrons_)
of advance guard cavalry, and, in exceptional cases only, to troops
(_Eskadrons_) of reconnoitering cavalry. Machine guns, supported by
weak cavalry detachments, may be pushed forward to occupy defiles;
moreover, the machine gun company assigned to a cavalry brigade may
be sent into action either as a whole unit, or it may be divided from
the start or during the course of the fight. This machine gun company
may also be attached to regiments, troops (_Eskadrons_) or platoons
of cavalry charged with special missions, in which case it is, as a
rule, broken up into platoons. The premature detaching of machine gun
units is especially cautioned against. “The mobility of the machine
gun unit is such that it is not at all dangerous to hold them back
until the last moment before sending them to the actually threatened
point.”

The regulations deem a special support necessary for the machine
gun batteries when they are sent on independent missions. Single
guns are not to be so used. Machine guns, distributed by platoons,
invest cavalry dismounted for fire action with a special power
of resistance. It will frequently be advantageous to occupy the
enemy in front with weakly supported machine gun batteries, while
maneuvering with the main body of the mounted force so as to gain the
enemy’s weak point, and attacking him there with fire or a charge.
In a cavalry fight Maxim machine gun marksmen, by timely, hold,
and energetic action, will very often be able to create favorable
conditions for their own troops, facilitate the selection of a point
of attack, and retard and interfere with the hostile deployment.

The following statements taken from the regulations for the _Service
and Training of_ =Swiss= _cavalry_ (1904) are of interest:

“Machine guns invest pursuing cavalry with tremendous power.--Their
violent fire, suddenly breaking forth, especially when quickly
delivered at the flanks of the retreating mass, must have an
annihilating effect and convert the retreat into a rout.

“In a retreat, Maxim gun marksmen with their guns can quickly occupy
rallying positions (when possible, flanking), which, thanks to their
mobility, they are capable of holding longer than other arms. Thereby
they facilitate for the other troops the critical breaking off of the
engagement.

“The retreat will proceed with greater steadiness and time will be
gained for organizing resistance and for making that resistance more
obstinate.

“When, during the crisis of battle, every available man joins in the
fight, machine guns may take a hand in it, even when the terrain is
unfavorable for the employment of cavalry, by gaining the flanks at a
rapid gait, turning and firing upon the hostile flank or the hostile
masses launched for the counter-attack.

“It would be incorrect, however, at such a moment, simply to throw
the machine guns into the fighting line or to a flank. By doing this
the mobility of the guns would not be utilized, and they would lose
their character of a mounted arm.

“The assignment of machine guns to cavalry augments the fighting
power and independence of the latter and increases to the utmost its
desire to go ahead, its enterprise and bold initiative. With the aid
of machine guns, our militia cavalry, even when opposed by better
drilled cavalry, can go into battle calmly on our terrain, with the
firm conviction of defeating it.

“But a cavalry leader should never shrink from sacrificing his
machine guns when the object to be attained requires it, and when no
other means remain to save the force. _These weapons should never be
more to him than a welcome and powerful aid toward the fulfillment of
his mission. Cavalry which degenerates into a mere support for its
machine guns has ceased to be cavalry._”

VII. INFANTRY VERSUS CAVALRY.[302]

(Par. 451 German I. D. R.).

[302] _Taktik_, II, p. 137: _Die Attacke der Kavallerie auf
Infanterie_. For examples from military history consult the splendid
works of Major KUNZ, especially _Die deutsche Reiterei_, and
_Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, 5.

The individual infantryman whose rifle is loaded and who knows how to use his bayonet is more than a match for the individual mounted man even on open ground; and, if he remains cool, retains his presence of mind, and uses his rifle properly while keeping the opponent constantly in view, he is even superior to several mounted men. Infantry which retains its steadiness has nothing to fear even when outnumbered by cavalry. Its main strength lies in steadily delivered fire, while cavalry relies on the possibility of making an unexpected rapid charge, on quickly covering great distances, and on the moral effect which its irresistible onslaught undoubtedly produces upon infantry. So long as there is a possibility of surprise and misunderstanding, of infantry allowing itself to become discouraged, and of the individual soldier being exposed to hunger and hardships, so long will cavalry that is energetically led be able to gain brilliant victories. Tactics would look differently upon the possibility of making a mounted charge during a battle if one or two German cavalry divisions had been on the Japanese side during the pursuit after Mukden. “If we demand of infantry that it close with the enemy after it has suffered tremendous losses, why should we not demand the same of cavalry whose mobility is disproportionately greater.” (_Skobeleff’s Order for the Day, June 15th, 1882_). The less the world believes in a victory of cavalry, the greater the certainty of such success. The troops should be accustomed in time of peace to the sight of charging cavalry. The recommendation made by the late General Dragomirov of the Russian army is, at any rate, worthy of consideration.[303] He proposed that cavalry ride at full speed through infantry lines deployed with three paces between files. Some infantrymen are, indeed, bound to be injured in such charges, but the wounds produced are not likely to be serious. Infantry accustomed to such charges will not lose its steadiness so easily in action as when it comes in contact with cavalry for the first time on the battlefield.

[303] _Vorbereitung der Truppen für den Kampf_, I, p. 55.

The success of the charge made by Captain Bechtoltsheim of the
Austrian army at =Custozza= with three platoons of Sicilian Uhlans,
may be ascribed principally to the fact that the Italian infantry
was not accustomed to field service and lacked training. This small
force of cavalry broke entirely through Pisa’s deployed Brigade
(Italian) and struck the route column of Forli’s Brigade, throwing
it into complete panic, so that of five battalions only one remained
intact. The three platoons of cavalry, which numbered about 100
sabers, lost 2 officers, 84 men, and 73 horses killed and wounded.
The charge made by three troops (_Eskadrons_) of the Dragoons of the
Guard at =Mars-la-Tour=, to facilitate the retreat of the defeated
38th Brigade, and that made by two platoons of the 7th Hussars at
=Sapignies= were likewise successful.

Any formation that permits effective firing is suitable for warding off cavalry. Skirmish lines through which a cavalry charge passes suffer losses that scarcely deserve mention. The fight is not hopeless even when the hostile troopers halt within the ranks of the infantry. When cavalry has charged through a skirmish line, the latter should be careful not to face about to fire at the troopers,[304] as that would give a second cavalry line an opportunity to approach and strike it unawares.

[304] “The French firing lines through which the cavalry had
charged (evening attack made by Rauch’s Brigade in the direction
of Rezonville on August 16th, 1870) fired after the Hussars, while
the French Infantry units in rear fired in the opposite direction.
The result was a frightful cross-fire, which, while undoubtedly
disastrous for the Hussars, certainly must have worked havoc among
the French.” KUNZ, _Reiterei_, p. 153.

The supports in rear of the first line form the objective of the cavalry after it has charged through the firing line. These supports must therefore open fire on the cavalry regardless of the skirmishers in front.

The flanks of a firing line can be bent back only when that line is not exposed to hostile infantry fire. The threatened wing should never be bent forward since that interferes with the fire of adjacent units. The task of repulsing an attack directed against a flank had best be left to the supports in rear of the flanks. The German Cavalry Drill Regulations (par. 349) state, that toward the end of a fight the bulk of the supports and reserves will have been absorbed by the firing line; that the fire that such a line could direct toward a flank would be insignificant; and that at any rate a _new_ firing line could not be formed within a short time; and, therefore, that a charge against its flank would be advantageous. This statement should be a warning for us always to retain echelons or machine guns in rear of the flanks. The most critical situation for infantry is that in which it is charged by cavalry while retiring defeated under hostile fire with no supports available to repulse the attack. A halt means annihilation; it must be left to each individual to save himself as best he can.

During the battle of =Scheinovo=, three companies of the 11th Russian
Rifle Regiment made an unsuccessful attack and had to retreat under
the pursuing fire of the Turks, while Turkish cavalry began to
charge their left flank. When only 200-300 m. from the Turks, the
4th Company, which was most seriously threatened, halted and formed
square as if on the parade ground. During this maneuver, all the
officers and many non-commissioned officers were either killed or
wounded. The heavy losses of the battalion (50%) may, in the main, be
ascribed to this halt under the most violent fire of the enemy.[305]

[305] KUROPATKIN-KRAHMER, _Kritische Rückblicke auf den
Russisch-Türkischen Krieg_, I, p. 166.

When the cavalry charge comes more from the front, however, the hostile infantry and artillery will have to stop firing, and it may then be possible to rally or re-form the defeated force, provided the men will heed their leaders.

Units in close order can deploy quickly toward the front or flank for the purpose of firing. However, they will be able to fire in close order only when not themselves subjected to hostile fire. The front and flanks of a body of infantry in proper formation are equally strong, but, in this connection, it should be borne in mind that a deployment toward a flank, for the purpose of firing, always takes time and is apt to impair the steadiness of the men.[306]

[306] General VON SCHERFF (_Kriegslehren_, II, p. 263) believes
that a frontal charge made by cavalry of sufficient strength has
better chances of succeeding than a charge in deep formation against
a flank. In a frontal charge, the suddenly appearing cavalry is
exposed “only to the fire at will of individual skirmishers whose
continuous front masks the fire of units in rear.” In the other case
(charge against a flank) the cavalry receives not only the fire of
the closed bodies first encountered, but also that of the supports
firing through the gaps between these groups. The frontal attacks
executed with superb gallantry by the French cavalry at Sedan rather
prove the opposite.

If time admits, a position may be looked for near obstacles, such as ditches, hedges, swampy ground, etc., which impede the hostile cavalry. It is not necessary, however, for the infantry to occupy the obstacle itself; in fact, it is better to take up a position some distance away. The shortness of our rifles obliges us to form the firing unit at right angles to the line of advance of the approaching cavalry, and to avoid aiming obliquely. The provision contained in a number of drill regulations, including the French, that the bodies in close order (supports, reserves) should be formed in echelon, is objectionable, as this is apt to lead to their firing on one another (as the French infantry did in repulsing the charge made by Bredow’s Brigade and the Dragoons of the Guard at Vionville). The deployment from “broad” and “deep” column to meet a sudden cavalry charge can, as a rule, be ordered directly by company commanders on the caution of the battalion commander, the method of meeting the attack being promptly decided upon. The main thing is to be in instant readiness for firing and to protect the flanks by means of echelons.

In a deployment from “deep column,” the measures taken by the
commanders of the rear companies must conform to those of the leading
companies. To meet a cavalry charge coming from the right front, for
example, the following scheme would be appropriate:

_The 1st Company_ forms left front into line so that its front is at
right angles to the line of advance of the cavalry;

_The 2nd Company_ forms as a support in rear of the left flank of the
first company;

_The 3rd Company_ forms right front into line, and prolongs the line
of the first company;

_The 4th Company_ also forms right front into line, or is held in
readiness as a support in rear of the right flank. In this way the
approaching cavalry can be met by the fire of from six to eight
platoons.

It is a very simple matter to ward off a cavalry charge directed against the flank of a marching column (form line by wheeling by squads). When the cavalry charge is directed against the head or the tail of a column, as recommended by the German Cavalry Drill Regulations (par. 350), there will not be time enough, as a rule, for the entire company or battalion to form line. It will suffice to let the leading elements form line, the rear elements moving out of the column and forming in rear of the flanks as supports.

Successful resistance does not depend upon the formation taken up; in fact the latter is of importance only when it increases the feeling of security. The morale of an organization is of more importance than the formation taken up. A proud confidence in victory and morale are the only factors which decide success, and the training of infantry should be such as to develop these qualities.

Cavalry will in many cases consider that it has gained a success if it causes infantry to discontinue a movement, or to take up formations which interfere with the highest development of its fire, or which offer favorable targets to the hostile infantry and artillery. This is especially the case where infantry is in the act of beginning an assault, when the slightest hesitation may jeopardize success. If cavalry actually begins to charge at this moment, only the bodies immediately threatened halt at the signal “attention,”[307] and face the cavalry; the remainder continue the march.

[307] The German army is the only one that employs an appropriate
signal for this purpose. The attack made by the 28th Infantry Brigade
against the wood of Bor at Königgrätz is very instructive in this
connection. HÖNIG, _Taktik der Zukunft_, p. 56. At the signal,
“cavalry,” the threatened portions of the brigade halted and formed
square. Fortunately the Saxons had already begun to retire from the
edge of the wood. A stray hostile troop (_Eskadron_) had caused all
the trouble.

The sudden appearance of a line of charging cavalry produces such a tremendous psychological effect on troops not immediately threatened, that they either watch the attack passively, or else too many of them take a hand in repulsing it. This moment, in which the attention of the troops is so completely riveted on the cavalry, is seldom utilized for the purpose of gaining ground to the front, or for effecting a withdrawal.[308] It needs but little imagination to picture to one’s self the success which the French army could have gained at Waterloo if infantry masses had followed on the heels of Ney’s cavalry squadrons. In the battle of Vionville the German infantry fired at the most incredible angles at the charging French Guard cavalry. While Bredow’s Brigade was making its charge during the same battle, part of the infantry of the 6th Division stopped firing on the French skirmishers, to follow with intense interest the cavalry charge that was taking place on a totally different part of the battlefield. This conduct, as natural as incorrect, suggests the advisability of profiting by such moments of the enemy’s inattention for the purpose of executing a movement or holding him with our own fire. It also seems absolutely necessary to support with rifle fire the charge made by one’s own cavalry, or at any rate to prevent the hostile infantry from firing undisturbed on our troopers.