Chapter XIII: Part 13

[308] “Every leader should carefully watch the progress of a
cavalry charge, and, as soon as he observes that friendly cavalry has
succeeded in penetrating the hostile line or that the enemy is shaken
and directs all of his fire against the charging cavalry, he should
immediately advance to the attack and be upon the enemy with the
bayonet before the latter recovers his senses. Such an attack will
not have been made in vain, even if the cavalry has been repulsed.”
General GURKO’S comments on the maneuvers of 1893.

Prince FREDERICK CHARLES, in his _Winke für die Offiziere der unter
Meinen Befehlen ins Feld rückenden Truppen_ (1870), also demands that
the infantry should quickly follow up cavalry attacks.

There are other reasons, however, why a sharp lookout should be kept during a hostile cavalry charge. All cavalry drill regulations recognize that a charge has greater chances of succeeding when it is made in deep formation, in successive lines, or simultaneously from several directions. The fire of the infantry is distributed, and, unless a good lookout is kept, a part of the cavalry, scarcely or not at all molested by fire, may perhaps succeed in driving the attack home. This will be the case when infantry allows itself to be enticed into developing a heavy fire in a direction from which only a feint is made, while the main attack comes from another, or from several other directions. Well led infantry will, therefore, never employ more rifles in repulsing cavalry than are absolutely necessary, while the mere threat of a cavalry charge will induce badly led infantry to develop an excessive volume of fire.

On open terrain, when the approaching cavalry is visible at a considerable distance, and when the infantry itself is exposed to effective fire, the prone aiming position is to be preferred. The men lying flat on the ground are not so easily wounded by the hostile troopers, and the horses will generally avoid stepping on them, besides which, the danger space is greater than when the men fire standing. In rolling or close country, where cavalry cannot be seen by men lying down, the aiming position kneeling or standing should properly be assumed. The losses inflicted by hostile fire must then be endured. Horses and riders are more apt to lose dash when charging an upright human wall that is spouting fire, than when charging a kneeling or prone opponent who scarcely offers an obstacle to the charge. What is of greater importance, however, is that men standing upright can more easily execute a change of front, fire on passing cavalry, and use their bayonets in case the cavalry actually penetrates their line. The British and Italian regulations very properly prescribe that the front rank of a body of infantry in close order should kneel in such cases.

As the success of infantry depends to a great extent upon the steadiness with which it receives the cavalry, it would seem to be advantageous to withhold the fire until the cavalry gets within short range.[309] General Dragomirov says in his forcible manner, “It is not the bullet which has been fired, but the bullet which is still in the rifle-barrel, and reserved for short range, that harms charging cavalry.” If infantry in line was able to repulse a cavalry charge in the past at 40 paces, with smoothbore muskets and at the first volley,[310] the chances of doing this with modern rifles would be still greater, if the “stopping power” of the 8 mm. projectiles were absolutely certain at short ranges. As this is not the case, it is necessary to open fire at an earlier moment.[311] If infantry does not fire until cavalry gets within very short range, it will have to reckon with the fact that even wounded horses will still be able to carry their riders into its ranks. However, for purposes of instruction in time of peace, it is proper to open fire late. If an infantry unit is trained in time of peace always to open fire at the medium ranges on charging cavalry, the unexpected appearance of hostile cavalry at short ranges in actual war, is more likely to bring disorder into the ranks of such a unit, than if it is trained in time of peace to reserve its fire until the cavalry has come within short range.

[309] “The best preparation against rapidly executed mounted
charges is for all commanders to keep their eyes open, quickly and
coolly to size up the situation, and to act with determination. All
precipitation or haste would be disastrous, for it would communicate
itself to the troops. Infantry has never yet fired too late upon
cavalry.” Feldzeugmeister V. WÄLDSTATTEN.

[310] At Sedan, the 5th Company of the 46th Infantry fired only at
140 and 80 paces, and repulsed the charge. _Geschichte des Regiments
Nr. 46_, p. 186. In the same battle the 9th and 12th Companies of the
87th Infantry repulsed a charge at 60 paces. _Gen. St. W._, II, p.
1217.

[311] The _France Militaire_ contains the following statement
in regard to the effect produced on horses by bullets from the
French Lebel rifle in the engagements near Casablanca in 1907:
“Many officers serving in the field observed that the small caliber
bullets stopped horses only when a foot had been shattered or when
a vital organ had been hit. _At Casablanca, horses that had been
hit by several bullets continued to gallop for a long while._ This
is a remarkable phenomenon, for the gentlemen of theory count as
out of action every horse that has been hit by a projectile. This
is entirely incorrect. _Many wounded horses carry their riders into
the melée and do not die until the day after the fight._ This was
observed on the French as well as on the Moroccan side.

“Troopers charging full tilt, with the firm determination of
penetrating the hostile line, are not stopped so easily. In the first
place, they would have to be hit, and that, in itself, is not such
an easy matter. This is still more difficult for the infantry, if it
knows the dash of the hostile troopers. Let us cultivate the dash of
our cavalrymen, even if unreal situations are thereby produced in our
peace exercises. If, on the other hand, we teach our troopers in time
of peace to turn tail in the face of imaginary projectiles, we are
training our cavalry for panic in time of war.”

At =Garcia Hernandez= (1812), a French square was broken by a
wounded horse falling down within the ranks of the infantry. This
is, however, only true of closed bodies of infantry formed in two
ranks. Horses will frequently break through a skirmish line--whether
or not the horses are wounded is immaterial. Men are wounded in such
an event in exceptional cases only, and the wounds produced are
generally insignificant.

The following episode shows the effect produced on cavalry when it
attacks unshaken infantry which is in good formation and reserves its
fire. During the retreat after the battle of =Jena=, on October 28th,
1806, the Grenadier Battalion _Prinz August_, threatened by hostile
cavalry, did not feel equal to continue its march to Prenzlau and
attempted to cross the Ucker farther down. In the expectation that
a cavalry charge would be made, square was formed and the officers
were told not to fire until the cavalry had approached to within 20
paces. “Meantime, the French cavalry--the brigade which had crossed
at Golmitz as well as the remainder of Beaumont’s Division, under
its commander, in all nine regiments--approached. The first charge
was made by nine troops (_Eskadrons_) under the division commander.
They approached at a gallop. When the expected fire did not come, the
dragoons gradually reined in their horses, so that finally they were
going no faster than a slow trot. At 30 paces the command “Fire” was
given in the infantry and quite a number of troopers fell, the rest
galloping by the square on both sides. Eight subsequent charges were
repulsed in a similar manner.”[312]

[312] VON LETTOW-VORBECK, _Der Krieg von 1806-7_, II, p. 279. The
charge of the 5th Lancers at Beaumont forms a counterpart of the
above. KUNZ, _Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, 5, p. 18.

We have moreover to consider, in this connection, the strength of the infantry, the formation of the cavalry, and whether the latter charges from several directions or in several successive lines. A small force of infantry, especially when it may anticipate attacks from several directions, must open fire sooner than a strong infantry force which has to contend with an attack coming from one direction only. In the first mentioned case, an attempt must be made to meet quickly, one by one, the attacks which follow each other at intervals.

It is quite a different matter when the infantry itself is not directly threatened, but can take a hand in repulsing a cavalry charge made on another unit; then it is advisable to open fire at an early moment in order to break the momentum of the charge at long range. (11th Jäger-Battalion at Wörth; 8th Company of the 46th Infantry at Sedan).

This in part determines the rear sight elevation that should be used. The sights should not be changed on the battlefield, although this has been done on the drill ground by well trained soldiers without impairing the continuity or accuracy of the fire. According to the table of ordinates of the trajectory (par. 23 German I. F. R.), a bullet fired when the sight is set at 700 m. and aim is taken at the feet of the horse, does not rise above the height of a mounted trooper throughout that entire distance. The bullets may pass entirely over the target however, when the men take too full a sight in the excitement of battle, or when, in rolling country or terrain covered with grass or crops, they cannot see the bottom of the target and aim above that line. It is better, therefore, to aim at the breast of the horse, with sights set at 600 m., and to fire as soon as the target gets within 800 m. On account of the excitement attending every cavalry charge, it is not advisable to change sights.

It is a good plan to fire one volley first and then to employ fire at will. It is not easy for infantry, while awaiting the onrushing mass of cavalry, to reserve its fire until, in the opinion of the leader, the first shot may be fired. But this waiting is of great importance to prevent the fire from becoming wild and ineffective. Since the elimination of powder smoke, there is no reason why other volleys should be fired after the first, for in the excitement of the fight the volley cannot produce a moral effect. The horses certainly find the rattling of fire at will more unpleasant than the sudden crack of a volley. The advantage of the volley, of permitting a unit to be kept better in hand, may be an important factor under certain circumstances however. The volley should, as a rule, be used by supports that are not exposed to fire. (8th Company of the 32nd Infantry at Wörth; the 1st and 2nd Companies of the 83rd Infantry, and the 5th Company of Jägers at Sedan).

Since the principal object of the fire is to destroy the cohesion of the charge, and as cavalry always closes toward the center while charging, no special importance need be attached to the distribution of the fire.

As regards relative numerical strength, a platoon of infantry consisting of 60 rifles (firing 360-500 rounds per minute), should be a match for 1-3 troops (_Eskadrons_), and a company of infantry, under favorable conditions, may be able to deal with a cavalry brigade.[313] Cavalry can become dangerous for infantry only when the infantry is surprised, finds no opportunity to fire, loses its steadiness and morale, or attempts to reach cover by running.

[313] A German cavalry brigade consists of eight troops
(_Eskadrons_). _Translator_.

The Charge of the French Cuirassiers of the Guard at Vionville.

At half past 12 on the afternoon of August 16th, 1870, the companies
of the 10th Prussian Infantry Brigade were advancing east of Flavigny
towards the Metz--Mars-la-Tour _chaussee_. As French infantry was
not on the spot to put a stop to this movement, the 3rd Lancers and
the Guard Cuirassier Regiment received orders to attack. The former
regiment went to the rear, as no definite objective (?) had been
assigned to it.

The Guard Cuirassier Regiment was formed in two lines, 150 m.
distance between them, with two troops (_Eskadrons_) in each line, a
fifth troop (_Eskadron_) following as a reserve. Although hampered
in its movements and thrown into disorder by abandoned baggage
wagons and other camp litter that covered the ground, the regiment
nevertheless made the charge with superb gallantry.

The charge struck the 6th and 7th Companies of the 52nd Infantry,
under Captain Hildebrand. These companies, rifles in hand and their
leader in front, awaited the French cavalry, which came into view
at a distance of 1200 m. The first echelon (6th and 4th Troops) was
received with rapid fire at 250 paces. On the right, the 6th Troop
(_Eskadron_) approached to within 60-80 paces of the Prussians,
but a part then turned to the rear while a few troopers turned to
the left. It is said, that of the leaders only one officer and one
non-commissioned officer remained in the saddle, and that only
twenty cuirassiers were rallied after the charge. The left troop
(_Eskadron_) missed its objective completely. The Prussian rear rank
faced about and fired on some French troopers who attempted to make
an attack from the rear and who now also received fire from other
units of Prussian infantry.

During the charge, the distance between the first and second lines
had become greater than at first ordered. When the first line broke
in two, the second was still some 300 m. distant from the Prussian
infantry and suffered some losses, probably from stray shots, which
did not stop the movement however, as the fire soon ceased. German
accounts, to be sure, do not mention that the second line could
not be seen on account of the powder smoke, and that the fire was
discontinued to let the smoke clear away. When the French line was
100 m. away it received the command _chargez_ and the Prussian
infantry again resumed its rapid fire, which shattered the attack,
the leading troopers breaking down in a ditch about 10 paces in
front of the Prussian line. The third line, its cohesion impaired
and its advance hampered by fallen horses and riders, was just as
little able to reach the Prussian companies. The right wing of the
Cuirassiers raced around the left flank of the companies of the 52nd
Infantry and encountered the Füsilier Battalion of the 12th Infantry,
deployed in a single firing line, dense in the center. Some parts
of this battalion formed squares. The charge was definitely stopped
by the fire of this battalion. An attempt to rally the Cuirassiers
was prevented by Prussian cavalry which now moved out. The French
regiment, which had begun its attack with 575 sabers, had lost 22
officers, 208 men (36.2% of its strength), and 243 horses. According
to Dick de Lonlay,[314] after this charge, the regiment was able to
form only 4 troops (_Eskadrons_) of 62 troopers each, instead of 5
troops (_Eskadrons_) of 115 troopers each, which would mean a loss
of 248 men. The first line had suffered the heaviest losses; in
the 4th troop (_Eskadron_), which had lost all of its officers and
non-commissioned officers, only 18 men were left.

[314] _Français et Allemands_, III, p. 84. KUNZ,
_Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, 5, p. 11. The French _Gen. St. W._,
II, pp. 301-309, gives the losses as 18 officers, 170 men, and 208
horses.

A charge has a better chance of succeeding if it is prepared by artillery fire.

During the attack made by two troops (_Eskadrons_) of Landwehr
Hussars against the 1st Battalion _Gyulai_ at =Tobitschau=, an
Austrian square was broken by shells before the cavalry penetrated
it. During the attack of Bredow’s Brigade at =Vionville=, the
artillery was able to send its last shells against the enemy
immediately past the right flank of the cavalry brigade.

The employment of cavalry in masses, contemplated in all armies, compels us to consider the case when infantry must advance over open ground in the face of hostile cavalry. Special units must then be designated, who, by means of long range fire, repulse the cavalry or keep it at a distance. At Minden (1759), Anglo-Hanoverian infantry succeeded in driving the hostile cavalry from the field, and at Vauxchamps and Etoges (14th February, 1814), Prussian infantry succeeded in breaking through the French cavalry. It will be easy to do the same thing with modern weapons, so long as cavalry is not very superior in numbers, and is not supported by infantry, machine guns, or artillery.

Infantry attacking dismounted cavalry should endeavor to bring long range fire to bear on the led horses or threaten them by a flank attack. For infantry to prolong the action at long and medium ranges is only playing into the hands of the cavalry, and besides, the better marksmanship of the infantry is bound to make itself felt at short ranges. When the infantry has once gotten to within 700 paces (560 m.) of the dismounted cavalry, it is very doubtful whether the latter will still be able to mount; at the very least, it will be difficult for it to do so (par. 362 German C. D. R.), even though the withdrawal can be effected under cover, or when fresh troops take a hand in the fight.

Provisions of Various Regulations.

=England.= The possibility of a successful cavalry charge is almost
universally contested. When necessary, the skirmishers that are
immediately threatened close in toward the center. Bayonets are to be
fixed. An opportunity for successful employment of cavalry is offered
when infantry has fired away all of its ammunition; when it is forced
to retire; and when the approach of the cavalry is facilitated by
dust, fog, or heavy rain.

=Austria.= _Brave and steady infantry has nothing to fear from
cavalry charges, so long as it retains its steadiness, presence of
mind, and morale, and delivers its fire steadily and with good aim at
short range._

When fighting cavalry, movements and changes of formation should be
ordered only when sufficient time is available, and then only for the
purpose of bringing a sufficient number of rifles into action and
for better utilizing the terrain. When a cavalry charge is suddenly
made from a short distance, it is better to remain in a narrow
formation than to deploy hastily, provided the fire is delivered with
steadiness. As cavalry frequently attacks only for the purpose of
forcing the infantry to discontinue its advance, or to induce it to
take up a close order formation, all units not immediately threatened
by the attack should continue their movement or remain in their
positions.

When a force has to cover long stretches under conditions which make
it probable that a cavalry attack will be made, the battalions,
companies, or platoons should be so grouped that they can quickly
meet the cavalry attack in any direction, and can mutually support
each other in warding it off. Staffs and vehicles should place
themselves within the protected area thus formed.

The threatened units turn in the appropriate direction, properly
utilizing cover and obstacles while so doing, and, when necessary,
fix bayonets. Only such a part of the force is designated to fire as
seems necessary for warding off the attack; the other parts continue
to carry out the task assigned them. The commander retains a part of
his force in readiness for warding off unexpected attacks.

“When exposed to hostile fire while warding off a cavalry charge, the
men should assume the position offering the smallest target.

“If a platoon is _directly attacked_ by cavalry, it will only in rare
cases be advisable to open fire at ranges beyond 600 paces (450 m.);
_frequently it will be a good plan, however, to let the cavalry come
up close_. When the platoon participates in warding off a cavalry
attack made against another unit, it may open fire at longer ranges.

“Fire at will is the principal kind of fire to be used in warding off
cavalry.”

=France.= Infantry, no matter in what formation it may happen to be,
has nothing to fear from hostile cavalry, even if the latter is in
superior numbers, provided the infantry remains cool, well in hand,
and makes good use of its fire.

When cavalry surprises infantry, the effect is as great as of old.
Infantry should therefore carefully protect itself in all situations
of combat, especially during critical moments.

If cavalry is reported, infantry can guard against all contingencies
by echeloning. It should not allow itself to be diverted from its
task so long as the cavalry does not begin an attack.

Any disposition that enables infantry to change front quickly to meet
a charge, and to deliver a strong fire, is calculated to stop even
the boldest cavalry.

When fighting dismounted cavalry, it is considered desirable for
the infantry to advance quickly to medium and short ranges for the
purpose of firing upon the cavalry as it mounts.

=Russia.= Nothing prescribed.

=Japan.= Infantry which, while engaged with the enemy, is forced to
discontinue its movement or to change its formation for the purpose
of warding off hostile cavalry, has already suffered a partial
defeat. Only those fractions that are absolutely necessary for
repulsing the cavalry should take up the fight against it.

VIII. INFANTRY VERSUS ARTILLERY.

1. THE PASSAGE OF INFANTRY THROUGH ARTILLERY LINES.

The artillery of a mobilized German army corps with its twenty-four batteries takes up approximately 2500 m. of the front of about 4000 m. available for the corps. When the ground is unfavorable, the front available for the other arms may be still further reduced. All remedies suggested for reducing the frontage required by artillery offer no real solution of the difficulty; in fact, they have resulting drawbacks, such as the reduction to ten paces of the interval between guns, and the posting of artillery in two lines, one in rear of the other. On account of these drawbacks, a commander will avail himself of these remedies only in case of the most urgent necessity. The question as to how infantry can best pass through these long artillery lines is therefore of especial interest. While artillery will generally seek commanding positions and avoid covered terrain, infantry will make use of depressions and cover as the natural routes of advance for passing by batteries in action and for deploying subsequently in front of them. In this case the solution of the problem is simple. The difficulties are disproportionately greater when terrain impassable for artillery is lacking. Nothing could be more desirable for hostile artillery which has adjusted its fire upon our batteries, than for the intervals between our guns to become suddenly filled with infantry, whereupon our artillery, until now under fire, would have to cease firing so as not to endanger our infantry. This pause in the fire will be more noticeable, when our artillery has not yet succeeded in gaining a superiority of fire over the hostile guns; and its length will depend upon the depth of the infantry formation. In this case the infantry cannot avoid heavy losses as it must cross the fire-swept space in rear of the guns, and soon thereafter must enter the zone of the opponent’s actual “fire for effect,” besides losing for the time being the support of its own artillery fire. It is obvious that for infantry to advance in deployed lines through artillery in action, condemns the latter to long silence, and even exposes it to the danger of being placed altogether out of action. Infantry can pass through artillery lines at certain points only, its passage being subject to an agreement between the infantry and artillery commanders. It is advisable to have those batteries cease firing whose fire has the least influence on the course of the artillery combat. It is, however, of the utmost importance that the fire of all hostile batteries which possibly could fire on our infantry, be kept down by the increased fire of our artillery. In this manner, we may perhaps be able to draw the fire of the hostile artillery away from those points at which our infantry is to pass through our artillery line. This is especially important. It will also be advantageous to designate successively, different points in the artillery line for the passage of infantry. This should be done for two reasons: first, in order that a favorable target whose re-appearance the hostile batteries could await with loaded guns, may not be presented to the enemy at one point for a prolonged period; second, in order that movements by the flank on the part of the infantry may be obviated. The column of squads would be a suitable formation in which two battalions of infantry could simultaneously pass through the line of guns approximately within the space occupied by one battery. These battalions should then at once deploy, executing front into line toward their respective outer flanks. The guns can resume firing only when their infantry has reached a point 3-400 m. in front of them. The artillery will be able to resume its fire earlier when it is posted in rear of a crest, and for this reason such points should be selected for the passage of infantry.

2. THE ADVANCE UNDER ARTILLERY FIRE.[315]

[315] A lecture delivered by Major C. E. D. BUDWORTH, R.A., at
the Royal Artillery Institution, on December 3, 1908, entitled,
_Infantry Formations in the Attack: from an Artilleryman’s Point of
View_, contains some interesting information. The lecture mentioned
appeared in _The Journal of the Royal Artillery_ for February, 1909.
_Translator_.

In almost every attack, infantry will be obliged to advance for considerable distances under artillery fire without being able to take advantage of cover. It should guard against being surprised by artillery fire while in an unsuitable formation.

In the first place, everything that facilitates the enemy’s adjustment and observation of fire should be avoided. (See p. 119 supra). To this end, infantry should not remain unnecessarily long near objects that are clearly visible at a great distance. If it is noticed that the enemy is beginning to adjust his fire on some prominent feature of the terrain, that point should be passed as quickly as possible; the same is true of a plain in the enemy’s zone of fire. Narrow columns, separated by intervals of 50 m., their heads not on the same line, are advantageous. This formation prevents shrapnel from simultaneously striking two columns, and makes it difficult for the enemy to judge the relative position of the smoke from the burst of his shrapnel with respect to the target. This increases the difficulties of the enemy’s observation of fire, as it is not easy for him to determine whether his shots go over or fall short. A shallow echelon formation (about 50 m. deep, as used in Russia, for example) is valueless for reducing losses, owing to the depth of the beaten zone of modern projectiles.

The narrowest possible front should be presented to the enemy when within his zone of fire.

It is moreover desirable to make the further observation of fire difficult for the hostile artillery, and to diminish the effect of his projectiles at the target (see p. 120 supra) by taking up suitable formations. Broad, shallow formations were suitable against the shell fire of the past. However, they had the great drawback of considerably facilitating the observation of shots falling short or going over, as the smoke from the burst hid the target in the first case, and as the target appeared silhouetted against the smoke from the burst in the second. The cone of dispersion of the modern base charge shrapnel combines comparatively small lateral spread with great effect in depth. The effect of a well-placed shrapnel may be confined to one target, and that of projectiles bursting in the intervals reduced by taking up a formation in which narrow columns (columns of squads) are separated by wide intervals (up to 50 m.).

The range is determined or verified by bracketing; that is, by enclosing the target between shots which, fired at a known difference of range, strike respectively, short of and beyond the target. In France this is done either by battery salvo or by piece. In the former case, the French distribute the fire equally over the entire space which they wish to cover with fire; hence, they do not direct it upon the individual columns, especially when they employ indirect laying, their favorite mode of procedure. It is in this kind of fire especially that narrow columns, separated by wide intervals, are a great advantage, because it is pure accident if a projectile falls so that its burst can be observed. Moreover, when the columns are not abreast of each other, the observations of bursts may be contradictory. Thus, in one salvo, “over” and “short” bursts may be obtained, especially if several bursts could not be reliably observed, and the salvo will have to be repeated. When a projectile bursts “short,” immediately in front of the 1st company, for example, it may be assumed that the next projectile will be fired at a range increased by 100-200 m. The 1st company should therefore move to the front at double time, the 2nd and 3rd likewise, while the 4th executes platoons front into line and takes to cover in anticipation of an “over” shot. The “over” meant for the 1st company will then be the signal for the 4th company to rush forward. _The following general rule may be given: A projectile bursting “over” or just “short” of the target requires that the force fired upon move quickly; a projectile bursting far “short” of the target requires that cover be taken._ The platoon and squad leaders of the attacking force should not betray its presence by standing upright; the force should disappear absolutely without leaving a trace.

A force cannot, in the long run, prevent artillery from effecting an adjustment of fire upon it; all it can do is to postpone the beginning of the fire for effect.

Fire for effect is of three kinds:

1. “Progressive fire” (_tir progressif_).[316] In this fire, after establishing a bracket (as a rule, one of 200 m.), every piece fires two rounds at each of four ranges, viz., at a range 100 m. less than the short limit of the bracket, at both ranges of the bracket, and at a range 100 m. greater than the long limit of the bracket. For example, if a bracket has been established for the target at 3000 and 3200 m., the battery would fire at 2900, 3000, 3200, and 3300 m.

[316] Called “Zone Fire” in our field artillery. _Translator_.

2. “Sweeping” (_fauchage_) is employed when it is desired to cover a broader zone. In this every gun fires three rounds at each of the ranges designated. The first round is fired with the line of sight directed on the right portion of the target (or on the aiming point). Before firing each of the succeeding rounds, the direction of the piece is changed to the left by three turns of the traversing handwheel. At the next range this process is reversed, the direction of the piece being changed to the right by three turns of the traversing handwheel after each round. At 2500 m., for example, a battery can cover, in this manner, a space twice the width of its own front.

3. “Fire at successive ranges” (searching fire). In this fire salvos or volleys are delivered at the target at a number of ranges to be designated by the battery commander.[317]

[317] The Belgian Drill Regulations (1907) give the following
details in regard to the fire effect of a French four gun battery: In
“progressive fire” (_tir progressif_), 32 rounds cover a space 100
m. wide and 400 m. deep (1 fragment covers 6 sq. m.). When direct
laying is employed, one fragment covers 2 sq. m. In “progressive fire
with sweeping” (_tir progressif avec fauchage_), 48 shrapnel cover a
space 200 m. wide and 400 m. deep, each fragment covering 8 sq. m.
Depending upon the range, 1¹⁄₂ to 5 minutes are required to secure
adjustment. (See p. 119 supra).

During the Russo-Japanese war, all close order formations proved unsuitable under artillery fire, except when the terrain afforded cover. The Japanese infantry recognized very soon that the best protection against artillery fire lay in constant motion (irregular rushes made by small units) and in wide extension. The following procedure, employed at Yoshirei on July 31st, 1904, seems worthy of imitation:[318] The several platoons of the companies followed each other in deployed lines at distances of 200-300 m. When they had to cross open ground in order to reach a designated line, the platoons sought to advance by squads, whose men were deployed at intervals of 5-10 paces and who moved at a rapid gait interrupted by breathing spells. The men invariably assembled when cover was reached. The losses were insignificant. The Russians also made use of a similar procedure after their first disastrous experiences. In many instances the platoons ran forward in single rank. “Change of gait and direction, as well as the use of loose irregular skirmish lines make it difficult for the artillery to hit anything.” (Par. 450 German I. D. R.).

[318] SIR IAN HAMILTON, _A Staff Officer’s Scrap Book_, I, p. 337.

Formations used by Infantry during the Russo-Japanese War when under Artillery Fire.

A platoon in route column forms four columns of files.]

A company in column of platoons, each in line of skirmishers with the men 2-4 m. apart.

(It would be better to use sections instead of platoons).]

The ranks of the sections in each platoon of the company following each other at a distance of 100 m.

This formation was taken up from company column (German).]

These formations made it possible to advance at a walk to within 3000 m. of a hostile position; beyond that an advance by rushes had to be resorted to, in which the attacking force avoided showing itself simultaneously in long lines. The simplest scheme might be to move forward in column of sections, each section in skirmish line. Formation “a” is well adapted for quickly crossing fire swept places, and when there is hope of re-forming the column subsequently. Formation “c” is suitable for quickly deploying from company column. However, the last-named formation no longer guarantees a proper leading of the company, and quite naturally does not absolutely prevent losses. After the Japanese 5th Brigade (Nambu) had taken possession of Yuhuntun[319] and the three houses during the night of March 6/7, 1905, the following dispositions for attack were made by the Russians about noon on the 7th: On the right, the 5th and 10th Rifle Regiments, in five lines, each consisting of one battalion (total depth of the formation 600 m.); in the center, the 123rd Infantry (Koslov) of which the companies of three battalions were deployed in single rank lines, each consisting of one company, with the men at intervals of from 3 to 5 paces, the companies in rear of each other at distances of 100 paces; the IVth Battalion, similarly formed, was posted in echelon to the left rear. The 124th Infantry advanced on the left flank. The Koslov Regiment, advancing without hesitation in quick time and at attention, was fired on by three Japanese batteries while it was moving from 4000 to 2000 m. The regiment lost about 600 men. This loss is insignificant when the size of the target (about 600 m. wide and 1000 m. deep) is considered. The Japanese did not care to become involved in a serious infantry action and therefore evacuated the place. It would have been better to advance by rushes with smaller units, as the terrain afforded no cover whatever. Whenever the Japanese had sufficient time, they crossed such plains singly, one by one, and then assembled under cover for the attack.

[319] V. TETTAU, _Achtzehn Monate mit Russlands Heeren in der
Mandschurei_, II, p. 334.

SPAITS, _Mit Kasaken_, p. 310.

Col. CSICSERICS V. BACSANY, _Unser neues Feldgeschütz_, 1907, pp.
17 and 21.

3. FIRING ON ARTILLERY IN POSITION

was in the past a pet fire problem. The effect of frontal fire on artillery whose guns are protected by shields is so small that the expenditure of ammunition is not justifiable.[320] The gap between the steel shields of the French field gun is not large enough to exert a noticeable influence. Steel shields, 3 mm. thick, afford protection against steel jacketed bullets fired at or beyond 300 m.; against “S” and “D” projectiles they afford protection, it is said, beyond 500 m. only. Machine guns directing continuous fire on a point may obtain better results. According to firing tests 3 mm. armor plate can be pierced up to 1000 m. only by special projectiles (solid steel projectiles and those having a steel core), the adoption of which is precluded on practical grounds (variations in sectional density, and difficulty of manufacture).[321] For this reason, it is better to leave the task of destroying shielded batteries, even when they are in the open, to one’s own artillery, than to attack them with infantry. The fire effect of the infantry is not noticeably increased when delivered obliquely against the front of the battery. (Par. 184 German I. D. R.). In Germany the gun commander and cannoneer No. 3, who is posted at the trail, are then especially endangered; but in order to flank the guns effectively and to reach in rear of the shields with its fire, the infantry must move to a flank a distance at least equal to ¹⁄₃ of the range, and even then the fire effect is very small. The effect may even be entirely nullified when the flanking fire is delivered from the side on which the caisson bodies are posted. In this case it suffices to push forward the caisson body to protect the personnel. It is a good plan for infantry to direct its fire on the limbers and the reserve. And again, infantry should not let any opportunity pass to fire on artillery in motion or in the act of limbering or unlimbering within effective range. Guns moved by hand into positions from which direct laying can be employed for the purpose of warding off the infantry attack, offer particularly favorable targets. Infantry that is to capture artillery must approach its objective by means of irregular rushes made by small groups, and increase its fire to the utmost intensity when the limbers are brought up to the guns. The effect of artillery fire is small under 200 m., in the absence of canister.[322]

[320] Even prior to the adoption of shields it was demonstrated
that infantry was unable to destroy the matériel of batteries
so as to render them immobile; it could only interfere with the
_personnel_, but could not demolish the batteries.

[321] _Mitteilungen über Gegenstände des Artillerie und
Geniewesens_, 1907, No. 5.

[322] The capture of the Smolenski Artillery Battalion on October
14th, 1904 (Shaho). _Artilleristische Monatshefte_ for March, 1908.

Field Howitzer.

Field Gun.]

The disaster which overtook Trautmann’s Battery at St. Hubert, during the battle of Gravelotte, demonstrates how difficult it is to unlimber on open ground when under effective infantry and artillery fire; but, if five limbers with their teams had not stampeded, perhaps it might have been possible after a while, for the battery to reopen fire. Hasse’s Battery, also at St. Hubert, was rendered incapable of moving in a short time, but, in spite of the greatest difficulties, managed to continue its fire for about two hours, though with only a part of the guns. Gnügge’s Battery managed to unlimber under cover of a garden wall at St. Hubert and to maintain itself there under enfilading infantry fire till the end of the battle. Trautmann’s Battery lost 17 men and 37 horses; Hasse’s Battery, 38 men and 77 horses; and Gnügge’s Battery, 15 men and 40 horses.[323]

[323] HOFFBAUER, _Deutsche Artillerie_, III, p. 227.

Unlimbering under uninterrupted hostile fire at short range will always produce conditions similar to those in Trautmann’s Battery, and in the two British batteries of Colonel Long at Colenso.[324] These two batteries did not cease firing because they had suffered too heavily, but only because they had expended all their limber ammunition and the caissons were unable to come up. It was impossible for these batteries to limber up under the hostile fire. It was likewise impossible to destroy a battery, though without protecting shields, even when great quantities of ammunition were expended.

[324] _Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften_, 32, p. 43.

At the battle of Beaumont, the artillery of the 7th Infantry Division suffered heavy losses. “Although the first caisson sections were up and the men with them were detailed to assist in working the guns, the gun squads in both batteries had dwindled down to 2 or 3 men each by 1 P. M., _i.e._, within half an hour.” Immediately after the French attack had been repulsed, one of these batteries was able to accompany the advancing infantry, however, while the other (the 4th Light Battery) could not move its guns until an hour later, as it had lost 29 men and 34 horses.[325] This example proves again that when artillery has once managed to go into position and to open fire, it cannot be annihilated by infantry alone, and therefore need not fear to take up a more than temporary position in the first line.

[325] HOFFBAUER, _Deutsche Artillerie_, 8, pp. 44 and 210.

HOPFFGARTEN-HEIDLER, _Beaumont_, p. 40.

The best way for artillery to protect itself against annoyance from hostile infantry fire is to push forward an infantry screen, even if only a weak one. In the days when batteries had no shields, this screen enabled artillery to devote its entire attention to the principal target without regard to hostile infantry. At the present time, especially in positions in rear of a crest and in long artillery lines, the principal object of such a screen is to prevent hostile patrols from molesting the artillery. Small detachments posted at wide intervals are sufficient for this purpose. The flanks and rear are now as in the past the vulnerable points and are most exposed to daring, sudden attacks, even if only made by weak hostile detachments. (Par. 448 German I. D. R.).

At the battle of =Vionville=,[326] about 5 P. M., four horse and
seven field batteries of the IIIrd Army Corps were engaged near
=Flavigny= with ten French batteries. After this artillery duel had
lasted half an hour, French Guard Infantry advanced to the attack.
This was repulsed by artillery fire at a range of 800 m., but the
fire of the artillery was diverted from its proper objective by the
advance of this infantry. Similarly, at =St. Privat=, two batteries
of the Guard Artillery had to direct their fire on French skirmishers.

[326] _Gen St. W._, I, p. 557.

IX. THE ATTACK.

The defense may repulse the enemy, but only the attack can annihilate him. The decision as to whether the force is to attack or stand on the defensive depends upon the tactical situation and the will of the commander, and not upon numerical superiority, of which one is not aware, as a rule, until after the battle.[327] Determined attacks, again and again repeated, in spite of all failures, are the surest means of gaining victory and of preventing the enemy from becoming aware of his superiority. Only pressing reasons (marked hostile superiority, necessity for awaiting approaching reinforcements, or the failure of an attack), and never favorable terrain conditions, should determine a commander to stand on the defensive. In defense the eventual assumption of the offensive is kept constantly in view. A commander who voluntarily stands on the defensive for the purpose of letting the opponent attack, and then attacks him in turn, reaps only the disadvantages and never the advantages of both the offensive and the defensive.

[327] See _Taktik_, V, p. 121, et seq.

The attack may take various forms, depending upon whether the dispositions have to be made under hostile fire (surprise and rencontre), or whether the enemy has renounced the initiative and awaits the attack in a deployed formation, or in a position prepared for defense (deliberately planned attack). In the last case the attack requires more careful preparation and in many instances even necessitates the employment of special auxiliaries (such as guns capable of high angle fire, and engineer trains). However, the advance of a strong firing line to within assaulting distance of the enemy, and the uninterrupted fight for the superiority of fire, are common to all attacks.

Aside from the attack against an enemy in position and the rencontre there is an attack formation more closely resembling the rencontre in character, which may be called the _abridged attack_.[328] This attack formation is used in forestalling the enemy in occupying important points, in preventing enveloping movements, in carrying out flank attacks, in surprising the enemy, in warding off a hostile surprise, in relieving the pressure on a neighboring force, etc. It is moreover appropriate where the conformation of the ground or the time of day prohibit a use of the rifle.

[328] _Abgekürzter Angriff_.

The first stages of the fight of the 6th Infantry Division at
=Vionville= are of this character. The fire fight was relegated to
the background in view of the constant movement to the front. The
situation prohibited our properly taking advantage of our superior
marksmanship.--The attack on the railroad cut of =Nuits=, during the
late afternoon of December 18th, 1870, progressed similarly.[329]

[329] KUNZ, _Gefecht von Nuits_, p. 19, et seq.

1. THE SURPRISE.[330]

[330] See _Taktik_, V, p. 190.

Insufficient reconnaissance may place a force in a situation where it will be obliged to go into action directly from route column or from a formation unsuitable for combat, against an enemy who unexpectedly opens a lively fire at short range, thus increasing the moral effect of the surprise by actually inflicting losses. The force which is taken by surprise will without doubt overrate the seriousness of the situation and will be inclined to overestimate the strength and morale of the opposing force. This must be taken into account in coming to a decision.

Above all else, it is important to develop, as promptly as possible, a fire effect at least equivalent to that of the enemy, to let the troops regain confidence, and to secure the initiative. A bold decision is best calculated to extricate a force from such a critical situation.[331] It is of little use to deploy, take cover, and open fire, when the enemy is well concealed; a decision to retire is still less to be approved, because at short ranges it is bound to lead to a complete annihilation of the force. As a rule, a defeat can only be averted, in such a case, by assuming the offensive and thus repulsing the enemy. The decision for attacking directly from route column (or, when the enemy is still at a distance, at least for deploying toward the front) is the more justifiable, since an enemy who prepares an ambuscade for us is, as a rule, conscious of his inferiority in numbers, morale, and training, and resorts to deceit because he does not dare to meet us in the open. Therefore, overwhelm the enemy with fire and then charge him with the bayonet. An impetuous advance may perhaps intimidate him, and our losses will be less, at any rate, than if we turn our backs on him and await our fate in what is at best but a poor position, as it is taken up, as a rule, during the first moment of panic. However, even if a force that is taken by surprise cannot avert disaster by making a determined counter-attack, it can at least save its honor and morale. This is equally true of the rencontre on the battlefield.

[331] “No matter how unexpectedly the enemy may appear, you should
never forget that he may be annihilated either with the bayonet or
with fire. The choice between the two is not a difficult one, and the
formation to be adopted is of secondary importance. When the enemy
is at close quarters, always use the bayonet; if he is still at a
distance, fire on him, and then use the bayonet.” DRAGOMIROV.

Examples of Surprises.

The surprise at =Baalon= on September 17th, 1870.[332] The surprise
at =Vouziers= on December 15th, 1870.[333] The conduct of the French
infantry when surprised in its camp at =Beaumont=.

[332] CARDINAL VON WIDDERN, _Krieg an den rückwärtigen
Verbindungen_, I, p. 149.

[333] _Ibid._, II, p. 125.

During the battle of =Noisseville= there occurred an unusually
instructive episode, the disastrous results of which could have been
easily avoided if the mounted officers on duty with the force had
been sent out to reconnoiter. Six companies of the 44th Infantry
(Prussian) were advancing from =Flanville= against =Montoy=. On
the French side, the 62nd Infantry was likewise advancing against
Flanville and had arrived at Montoy when the 44th Infantry (Prussian)
very unexpectedly appeared on its left flank. The French regimental
commander decided to attack at once. “The Prussian detachments
advancing south of Montoy were about to scale the west slope of
the ravine near there, when, at very short range, they suddenly
encountered the rapid fire of a dense French skirmish line, which was
immediately followed by the counter-attack, consisting of columns
in close order. At the same moment, the left flank of the Prussians
was attacked from the south, and other hostile columns advanced from
the park through the west entrance of the village. The Prussian
skirmish lines were repulsed in an instant, and thrown into complete
confusion. The hostile fire had an annihilating effect on account of
the short range, and the situation was at once completely reversed.
The Prussians sought in vain to gain a firm foothold in the eastern
outskirts of the village of Montoy. Their losses were heavy. The four
companies (3rd, 9th, 11th and 12th) of the 44th Infantry numbered
in all 18 officers and 840 men; they lost 7 officers and 480 men,
of which number 1 officer and 82 men (all unharmed) were taken
prisoners. The 9th Company suffered least; but the 3rd, 11th and
12th Companies (44th Infantry) lost in all 55.5% of their effective
strength, the 3rd Company even losing 67%.”[334]

[334] KUNZ, _Noisseville_, p. 32, et seq.

This surprise could without doubt have been avoided. If the 44th
Infantry had sent mounted men ahead, it would have been in a position
to let the French walk into its fire. Soon after this occurrence,
the French infantry also unexpectedly received flanking fire from
Flanville, which forced it to abandon the pursuit after suffering
some losses.

When two forces unexpectedly collide in close country, the advantage rests decidedly with the one that opens fire and advances to the charge first. This onslaught with cold steel should become second nature to the troops. In traversing close country, a force should be in a formation that enables it to develop an adequate fire and to make a charge in compact formation. A line formation is entirely unsuitable, as a rule, on account of the difficulties of the terrain to be overcome, and in a skirmish line the officers cannot properly control the men.

For passing through thinly scattered timber without underbrush,[335] company column is a suitable formation, and for dense woods platoons advancing either abreast or echeloned, each platoon in line of squads in columns of files. If the platoons or sections were to advance in single file, the columns would be too long, and it would be next to impossible to maintain the intervals. The six or eight small columns of files of a platoon are, on the other hand, close enough together to keep each other in view; besides, they are easily and quickly deployed for firing and charging, and can meander through the woods more readily than an organization in close order. Moreover, the leaders can exercise better control over the men than in skirmish line, which invariably bunches up at the places that are most easily passed, while connection is not maintained at all at other points and march direction and cohesion is lost. (See the passage of the Bois de Givodeau during the battle of Beaumont).[336]

[335] See _Taktik_, VI, p. 117, et seq.

[336] See _Taktik_, VI, p. 125, with sketch. HOPFFGARTEN-HEIDLER,
_Beaumont_, p. 112, et seq.

Examples: The conduct of the infantry of the IXth Army Corps in
passing through the Niederwald of Wörth, may serve as a model. KUNZ,
_Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, 13, p. 108, et seq.

Engagement of La Landrière on January 11th, 1871. _Geschichte des
Regiments Nr. 20_, p. 292.

_Wald- und Ortsgefecht_, p. 109.

2. THE RENCONTRE.[337]

(Pars. 315-317 and 352-361 German I. D. R.).

[337] See also _Taktik_, V, p. 192, et seq.

“Uncertainty and haziness of the situation are the rule in war. During marches in campaign the opponents will frequently not gain detailed information of each other until they come into actual contact. Thus the rencontre develops out of a collision of route columns.” (Par. 352 German I. D. R.).