Chapter XX: Part 20

In the battle of =Beaune la Rolande=, some of the companies of the
56th Infantry near Romainville had expended all their ammunition. In
the 38th Brigade, only the Ist Battalion, 57th Infantry, was able
to replenish its ammunition directly from the ammunition wagons
near Romainville. The defenders of Beaune did not receive such
assistance however, as only one ammunition wagon was brought up (by
the Füsilier-Battalion, 16th Infantry), toward the close of the
battle, for the units engaged there. The ammunition it contained was
distributed among the men, but was not used. Organizations belonging
to the IIIrd Army Corps turned over some of their ammunition, but,
in general, the brigade had to rely practically on the ammunition
carried by the men, for all the ammunition wagons had driven off at
the beginning of the battle. Consequently, this battle was fought
almost exclusively with the ammunition carried by the men--about
80 rounds per rifle. As the French attack was not simultaneously
directed against the whole front of Beaune, lulls occurred in the
fight, which enabled the officers to send a supply of ammunition
to the most seriously threatened points of the line. In a well
disciplined organization, it is not difficult to send ammunition
promptly to the most seriously threatened points by simply passing
it along the line. This was actually done at Beaune la Rolande. In
consequence of this redistribution, at some points in the cemetery,
men fired as many as 200 rounds each, but others fired only 40 or
less; the result, however, was the same, for the ammunition was
almost exclusively supplied from that carried by the men--80 rounds
per rifle. Moreover, a great many cartridges, and even unopened
packages of ammunition, were found, on November 29th, in the position
occupied by the 38th Brigade.

The following figures give an idea of the amount of ammunition
expended at =St. Privat= by the 2nd Regiment of the Guard. On August
19th, the Ist Battalion required 27,340, the IInd Battalion 17,820,
and the Füsilier-Battalion 7,870 rounds to replenish their ammunition
supply. When the heavy losses suffered by this regiment are taken
into account, the average expenditure of ammunition cannot be
considered excessive.[501]

[501] _Geschichte des 2. Garde-Regiments zu Fusz_, p. 250.

At 10:30 P. M., on August 18th, the Rifle Battalion of the Guard
managed to supply each one of its men with 20 rounds of ammunition,
without drawing upon the contents of the ammunition wagons, which
were left intact.[502]

[502] _Geschichte des Gardeschützen Bataillons_, p. 121.

The expenditure of ammunition on the French side was considerably
greater in all the battles. At =Champigny=, every French infantry
soldier carried 118 rounds of ammunition, which did not prove
sufficient, however, to meet the demand. In the French Army of the
Rhine, the average expenditure of ammunition from August 6th to 31st
was 30 rounds, and in the fights of August 16th and 18th, 13 to 27
rounds per rifle. In individual cases, the expenditure of ammunition
was far in excess of these figures. The men of Grenier’s Division,
against which the attack of the 38th Brigade was directed, claim
that they fired as many as 150 rounds apiece, on August 16th. In
the evening, at the close of the battle, the commanding general
of the IVth Army Corps reported a shortage of ammunition.[503]
Shortage of ammunition caused Marshal Bazaine to fall back to Metz
on August 17th. Notwithstanding the proximity of the fortress of
Metz, the French VIth Corps was unable to replenish its supply of
ammunition before it was attacked by the Prussian Guard. Detailed
information available in regard to the ammunition expended by the
25th Infantry (French)[504] shows that each man had only 30 instead
of 90 cartridges. (This was the regiment attacked by the Franz and
3rd Guard Regiments, who lost 2,160 men--9% hits). The statement made
in the history of the 2nd Guard Regiment (p. 233), that every French
soldier had 300 rounds of ammunition available on August 18th, cannot
be substantiated by French records.

[503] HÖNIG, _Taktik der Zukunft_, p. 159.

[504] PAQUIÉ, _Le tir en terrain varié_, p. 39.

The expenditure of ammunition in the =Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78=,
amounted to 33 rounds per rifle and carbine on the Russian side.
The following detailed statements in regard to the expenditure
of ammunition are available. In the engagement at =Aiaslar=, on
August 23rd, 1877, the Sofia Regiment expended 94 rounds, and at
=Karahassankioi=, the 140th Infantry expended 155 rounds per man.
On December 28th, 1877, the 13th Rifle Battalion expended 122
rounds per man. In this connection, it may be remarked that the
Russian infantryman of that day carried 60 rounds of ammunition in
his cartridge boxes. The ammunition carts carried 55 additional
rounds per man, and the ammunition parks 62. If, as prescribed by
the regulations at that time, only one ammunition wagon followed an
organization into action, each infantryman had 78 rounds available,
and each man of a rifle battalion 106 rounds.

In front of =Plevna=, on July 20th, 1877, the Russians expended in
six hours all the ammunition carried by the men and by the ammunition
carts. On July 30th, during the second assault on =Plevna=, they
expended in four hours all the ammunition carried by the men.[505]
In the engagement at =Lovtcha=, the 3rd Rifle Brigade only fired
during the pursuit. The brigade commander explained afterwards that
his ammunition had run short nevertheless. During the advance, the
ammunition wagons did not follow in rear of the organizations to
which they belonged, and no provision had been made for bringing up
the necessary ammunition.[506]

[505] Details given in the German translation of the Russian _Gen.
St. W._ (Vienna), III, pp. 330-331.

[506] KUROPATKIN-KRAHMER, _Kritische Rückblicke auf den
Russisch-Türkischen Krieg_, I, p. 88.

On September 1st, 1877, the regiments which made the fruitless attack
on the =Omar Bey Tabia=, expended the following ammunition:

63rd Infantry[507] 55,296 rounds, or 21 per rifle
119th „ [507] 99,744 „ „ 43 „ „
64th „ 24,650 „ „ 10 „ „
115th „ 45,360 „ „ 24 „ „

[507] These two regiments were only engaged from 1 to 1¹⁄₂ hours.

In the Kasan Regiment (No. 64), which had expended less ammunition
than any of the others on this day, the ammunition began to run short
at the moment when the successful and decisive counter-attack of the
Turks commenced. The same misfortune befell other organizations,
after the fire fight had lasted but a comparatively short time, as
apparently they had neglected to remove the cartridges from the dead
and wounded.

During the assault on =Scheinovo=, on January 9th, 1878, each man of
the 11th Rifle Battalion fired 120 rounds in four hours. This is an
average of 2 rounds per man, per minute.

The Turks took more advantage of the rapidity of fire of their rifles
than did the Russians.[508] It is said that at =Gorni Dubniac=, each
man had 800-900 rounds of ammunition available, and it is a fact,
that the force of 3,570 men garrisoning the group of works placed
3,533 Russians out of action, in a fight lasting 9¹⁄₂ hours, while
the Turkish losses in killed and wounded only amounted to 1,280
men. During the attack, some Turks managed to fire more than 100
rounds apiece. Kuropatkin found 120 empty cartridge shells beside
a dead Turkish soldier.[509] In the engagement at =Tashkessen=
(31st December, 1877),[510] which lasted eight hours, the Prisrend
Battalion expended 292, the Tuzla Battalion 275, and a Rifle
Battalion 263 rounds per man (30 rounds per man, per hour).

[508] Each Turkish battalion was followed into action by 30 pack
mules carrying 60,000 rounds of ammunition, and each man carried from
100 to 120 rounds on his person.

[509] KUROPATKIN-KRAHMER, _Kritische Rückblicke auf den
Russisch-Türkischen Krieg_, I, p. 170.

[510] BAKER, _War in Bulgaria_, II, p. 160.

There is very little information available in regard to the
expenditure of ammunition during the =Russo-Japanese war=. The
Russian infantryman carried 120 rounds of ammunition, the 8
one-horse ammunition carts carried 6,600 rounds per company, and
the 2 two-horse ammunition wagons of the battalions 14,400 rounds
each. Assuming the strength of a company as 200, this would give 210
rounds per man. In the engagement at =Hamatan= (=Yalu=), several
Russian organizations ran entirely out of ammunition. A number of
rifle companies (the 6th Company, 11th Infantry, and the 2nd, 3rd
and 4th, 12th Infantry), were able to replenish their supply without
difficulty from the ammunition wagons. The following is taken from a
thoroughly reliable report published in the _Kölnische Zeitung_ of
September 24th, 1905:

During the battle of =Liao Yang=, which lasted six days, the 138th
Infantry fired 99,460, and the 139th Infantry 96,040 rounds. On
September 1st, the 137th Infantry expended 189,000 rounds, in other
words, nearly twice as much in one day as either of the other
regiments expended in six. This excessive expenditure of ammunition
was due to the very severe attacks which this regiment had to
withstand on that day. These attacks were repeated on the next day
and the regiment expended 169,000 rounds of ammunition. From October
13th to 18th, at =Linshinpu=, the 139th Infantry expended 351,800
rounds. During this engagement the Japanese succeeded in getting
within 10 m. of the Russian lines. Thirty bodies were picked up at
15 paces, and 580 bodies from 100 to 150 paces from the Russian
position. The 139th Infantry lost 54 men killed, and 6 officers and
250 men wounded. Major V. Tettau[511] states that during the battle
of =Liao Yang= (30th August, 1904), the 36th Infantry expended
416,800 rounds of ammunition, and the 34th Infantry (two battalions),
250,000 rounds, or for 4,200 Russian rifles an average of not less
than 160 rounds per rifle.

[511] _Achtzehn Monate mit Russlands Heeren in der Mandschurei._

The Japanese infantryman carried 120 rounds, and each company had, in
addition, one two-wheeled ammunition cart carrying 16,000 rounds of
ammunition. When packs were removed, each man carried a bag in which
were packed three days’ rations, and from 200 to 250 cartridges. The
Japanese infantry invariably followed the principle that each man
should be supplied with as much ammunition as possible before going
into action. In the engagement at =Kinchau= (26th November, 1904),
the 1st Infantry Division expended 64, the 3rd 54, and the 4th 143
rounds per man of the original effective strength.[512]

[512] _Streffleur_, _Einzelschriften_, I. p. 224.

Although, according to the examples cited, 100 to 150 rounds of ammunition per man will in general suffice in battle, cases may arise where troops could fire a greater number of rounds to good advantage. This must be taken into account when determining the number of rounds with which the infantryman should be supplied--on his person and in the ammunition wagons. Moreover, it must be remembered that the supply can be replenished without difficulty from the ammunition columns after a battle, so long as it is still possible to assign a separate road to each army corps. When this is no longer practicable, the ammunition columns will encounter almost insurmountable difficulties in supplying the infantry with ammunition.

AMMUNITION SUPPLY OF THE PRINCIPAL ARMIES OF THE WORLD.

========++=======+=====+=======+============+======+=======++
~Coun- || Year | Cal-| Weight| System |Weight| Weight||
try.~ || of |iber.|of car-| of loading | of | of ||
|| con- | |tridge.| | clip.| clip ||
|| struc-| | | | |filled.||
|| tion. | | | | | ||
|| | mm. | g. | | g. | g. ||
--------++-------+-----+-------+------------+------+-------++
~GER- || 1905 | 7.9 | 27.19 |Mag. in rear| 7 | 126 ||
MANY~ || S. | | |of barrel, | | ||
|| | | |loaded with | | ||
|| | | |clip holding| | ||
|| | | |5 car- | | ||
|| | | |tridges. | | ||
--------++-------+-----+-------+------------+------+-------++
~AUS- || 1895 | 8. | 28.35 |Mag. in rear|Frame | 158.25||
TRIA~ || | | |of barrel, | 16.5 | ||
|| | | |loaded with | | ||
|| | | |frame | | ||
|| | | |holding 5 | | ||
|| | | |cartridges. | | ||
--------++-------+-----+-------+------------+------+-------++
~ITALY~ || 1891 | 6.5 | 22. |Mag. in rear| 12 | 138 ||
||Car- | | |of barrel, | | ||
||can- | | |loaded with | | ||
||Mann- | | |frame | | ||
||licher.| | |holding 6 | | ||
|| | | |cartridges. | | ||
--------++-------+-----+-------+------------+------+-------++
~ENG- || 1908 | 7.71| 27.5 |Mag. in rear| Clip | 150 ||
LAND~ ||Lee- | | |of barrel, | 12.5 | ||
||En- | | |loaded with | | ||
||field. | | |clip holding| | ||
|| | | |5 car- | | ||
|| | | |tridges. | | ||
|| | | |[514] | | ||
--------++-------+-----+-------+------------+------+-------++
~FRANCE~|| 1886- | 8. | 29. |Mag. under | -- | -- ||
|| 98, | | |barrel, car-| | ||
||1905 D | | |tridges | | ||
||Lebel. | | |loaded | | ||
|| | | |singly. | | ||
--------++-------+-----+-------+------------+------+-------++
~RUSSIA~|| 1891 | 7.62| 25.812|Mag. in rear| 9.6 | 137 ||
[516] ||(Three | | |of barrel, | | ||
||line | | |loaded with | | ||
||rifle).| | |clip holding| | ||
|| | | |5 car- | | ||
|| | | |tridges. | | ||
--------++-------+-----+-------+------------+------+-------++
~JAPAN~ || 1897 | 6.50| 22.4 |Mag. in rear| 8.5 | 120 ||
[516] ||Arisaka| | |of barrel, | | ||
||(Meidji| | |loaded with | | ||
|| 80). | | |clip holding| | ||
|| | | |5 car- | | ||
|| | | |tridges. | | ||
--------++-------+-----+-------+------------+------+-------++

========++==================++===========++=================++
~Coun- || Number of rounds || Ammunition|| Number of rounds||
try.~ || carried by a man.|| wagons. || carried by ammu-||
|| || || nition wagons. ||
|| || || No. ||
|| Weight|| || per rifle.||
|| No. kg. || ||No. [513]||
--------++------------+-----++-----------++-----------+-----++
~GER- || 150 | ||4 Company || 14,400 | 77 ||
MANY~ ||N. C. O. 45| ||ammunition || | ||
||Trum- |4.5 ||wagons. || | ||
||peter 90| || || | ||
||Drummer 30| || || | ||
--------++------------+-----++-----------++-----------+-----++
~AUS- || 120 | ||4 Company || 9,450 | 47.2||
TRIA~ ||N. C. O. 40| 4.31||ammunition || | ||
|| | ||wagons. || | ||
--------++------------+-----++-----------++-----------+-----++
~ITALY~ || 162 | ||Infantry of the line, | ||
||Sergt. and |3.736||in field train | 24 ||
||Trum- | ||Alpini, on pack animals | ||
||peter 126| ||and on carts |244 ||
||Inf. | || | ||
||Pioneers 108| || | ||
--------++------------+-----++------------------------+-----++
~ENG- || 115 |3.48 ||8 Pack animals |250 ||
LAND~ || | ||8 Ammunition wagons | ||
--------++------------+-----++-----------++-----------+-----++
~FRANCE~|| 120 | ||4 Company || 16,384 | 82 ||
||N. C. O. 56|3.48 ||ammunition || or | ||
|| | ||wagons. || 19,000 | ||
|| | || || [515] | ||
--------++------------+-----++-----------++-----------+-----++
~RUSSIA~|| 120 |3.33 ||24 am. ||In each of | ||
[516] || | ||carts: ||the 8 1- | ||
|| | ||Ist ||horse carts| ||
|| | ||echelon, 8 || 6000 |=36 ||
|| | ||1-horse ||In each of | ||
|| | ||carts ||the 16 2- | ||
|| | ||IInd ||horse carts| ||
|| | ||echelon, 16|| 14,400 |=30 ||
|| | ||2-horse || | -- ||
|| | ||carts || | 66 ||
--------++------------+-----++-----------++-----------+-----++
~JAPAN~ || 120 |2.9 ||Each com- || 16,000 | 80 ||
[516] || | ||pany has || | ||
|| | ||one cart. || | ||
--------++------------+-----++-----------++-----------+-----++

========++===============++=============+===========
~Coun- ||Reserve supply.|| Supply | Supply
try.~ || || available | available
|| || in a | in an
|| || division. |army corps.
--------++---------------++-------------+-----------
~GER- ||Each of the 34 || 150 | 150
MANY~ ||am. wagons of || 77 | 77
||the 4 inf. am. || --- | 144
||columns of an || 227 | ---
||army corps, || | 361
||carries 23,000 || |
||rounds or 144 || |
||per rifle. || |
--------++---------------++-------------+-----------
~AUS- ||Each division ||16 battalions|3 divisions
TRIA~ ||has one div. ||of 800 rifles| 224
||am. park of 30 ||each. | 18
||am. wagons, || 120 | ---
||which carry || 47.2 |about 242
||769,500 rounds || 57 |
||or 57 per || ----- |
||rifle. || 224. |
||The corps am. || |
||park same || |
||strength as a || |
||div. park. || |
--------++---------------++------+------+-----------
~ITALY~ ||In the 3rd sec-||Line: | Alpi-|Inf. of the
||tion of the am.|| | ni: |line:
||column, 40 || 162 | 162 | 162
||rounds per || 24 | 244 | 24
||rifle; || 40 | 90 | 40
||In the Arty. || --- | --- | 45
||park of the || 226 | 496 | ---
||army corps, 45 || | | 271
||rounds per || | |
||rifle; || | |
||In the Alpini || | |
||am. column, 90 || | |
||rounds per || | |
||rifle. || | |
--------++---------------++------+------+-----------
~ENG- ||In the division|| 115 |400 rounds
LAND~ ||am. column, 125|| 250 |per 1,000
||rounds per || 125 |rifles.
||rifle. || --- |
--------++---------------++-------------+-----------
~FRANCE~||In the corps || 120 | 110
||am. park: || 82 | ---
||Ist || --- | 312
||echelon 44.2|| 202 |
||IInd || |
||echelon 66.2|| |
--------++---------------++-------------+-----------
~RUSSIA~||In the light || 120 | 267
[516] ||Arty. park 81|| 66 | 164
||In the reserve || 81 | ---
||park 164|| --- | 431
|| ---|| 267 |
|| 245|| |
--------++---------------++-------------+-----------
~JAPAN~ || -- || -- | --
[516] || || |
--------++---------------++-------------+-----------

By way of comparison with the above, the following table shows the
number of rounds to 3 kg. of the ammunition for the several rifles
specified:

{ Prussian smooth-bore infantry musket 85 rounds
Paper Shells { Prussian rifled infantry musket (new model) 55 „
{ Prussian needle gun M/41-69 78 „
{ French chassepot rifle M/66 90 „

{ Infantry rifle M/71 69 „
Metal Shells { Swiss rifle, M/67, 69/71, 81 98 „
{ Rifle, M/98 with loading clips 103 „

The cartridges are carried as follows by the soldier:

=Germany=: =45= rounds in each of the two cartridge boxes in front,
and =60= in the knapsack;

=Austria=: =20= rounds in each of the two cartridge boxes in front,
and =60= in the knapsack;

=Russia=: =30= rounds in each of the two cartridge boxes attached to
the waist belt, in a breast cartridge box, and in a reserve
cartridge box attached to the knapsack;

=France=: =120= rounds, in three cartridge boxes, two in front, and
one behind;

=England=: In eight pockets attached to the waist belt, each holding
=15= rounds (in addition each soldier carries a shoulder
belt holding =50= rounds);

=Japan=: =30= rounds in each of the cartridge boxes in front, and
=60= rounds in the cartridge box behind.

2. REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE SUPPLY OF AMMUNITION IN THE VARIOUS ARMIES.

GERMANY.

(Pars. 479-482 F.S.R.)

On the march, it is best to assemble all the company ammunition wagons of the battalions, as this renders supervision easier, and enables the battalion commander to regulate the replenishment of ammunition. Companies acting alone, as well as those forming the support of an advance guard, are followed by their ammunition wagons. It does not seem desirable to unite the ammunition wagons of a regiment or of a brigade on account of the distance separating the different battalions. During the march to the battlefield, the ammunition should be taken out of the knapsacks, and the contents of the ammunition wagons distributed among the men. The men carry this extra ammunition in their haversacks and in their coat and trousers’ pockets, etc.

The two-horse company ammunition wagon, Model 1897, has a width of
track of 1.53 m., and, when empty, weighs 450 kg. Compared with the
ammunition wagon Model C, 1887, which was originally designed to
carry ammunition in boxes, it is lighter by 75 kg., and can be turned
within a shorter radius. The wagon body is provided with double doors
in front and in rear. The interior is divided into four compartments
(to be emptied separately), each capable of holding 16 bundles of
cartridges placed on end. Each bundle contains 15 packages of 15
cartridges in clips each. Each bundle of 225 cartridges weighs 7.25
kg.

As three bundles of cartridges are to be carried by one man,
according to the Field Service Regulations (par. 480), 1
non-commissioned officer and 21 men are detailed to unload the
ammunition wagon. The unloading is managed as follows: Four men take
post on each side of the wagon, two handing out the bundles to the
other two, who lay them on the ground. The remaining men place the
bundles in piles of three in such a manner that the carrying loops of
two in each pile can be interlaced and held together by a stick or a
bayonet. An ammunition wagon can be emptied in this manner in four
minutes. The two ammunition bundles tied together are slung over the
left shoulder, the rifle is slung over the right shoulder, and the
third bundle is carried in the right hand. In this way, a man can
carry 21.8 kg.

Each man is issued 60 to 75 cartridges from the ammunition wagon. These weigh from 1.8 to 2.4 kg. When issued too soon, this additional burden causes considerable inconvenience, and consequently reduces the marching power of the men. The leader must also decide what shall be done with the ammunition in case it has been issued prematurely, and the troops fail to get into action. As soon as the ammunition wagons are emptied, they are sent to the rear in charge of the mounted wagonmaster, and refilled from the ammunition columns. When refilled, they rejoin their proper organizations. If requested, ammunition must be issued to any body of troops.

On the battlefield, ammunition wagons, unless they have been emptied, follow the movements of the several companies and take up a position under cover, indicated by the wagonmaster, as close as possible to the firing line--never more than 800 m. in rear of it. In urgent cases, this must be done without regard to losses. The firing line is supplied with ammunition, when practicable, by the reinforcements sent forward. When the firing line is about to run short of ammunition, this fact is communicated to the troops in rear by repeatedly making the signal “m”. This signal, when made to the front by the troops in rear, signifies, “ammunition is coming up at once.”

In exceptional cases, when ammunition must be sent to the firing line by individual men, the latter should invariably be detailed from troops in rear which have not as yet been engaged. These men must endeavor to reach the firing line by rushes or by crawling, and must then remain with that line.

It is the duty of the battalion commander to see that the ammunition taken from the ammunition wagons is promptly replaced. The higher commanders would do well to provide a reserve supply of ammunition, until the arrival of the ammunition columns, by assembling the ammunition wagons of the troops held in reserve. (Par. 482 F. S. R.). It will also be advisable to assign some of the ammunition wagons of the troops held in reserve to the organizations who will, in all probability, expend a large amount of ammunition.

The ammunition should be removed from the dead and wounded. If this is done by the men of an advancing skirmish line, there is danger that the forward movement will be retarded, and that some of the men will take advantage of this opportunity to make themselves “scarce.” Officers and men should endeavor to replenish ammunition at every opportunity, without awaiting specific orders to that effect, and, in general, see that not only the prescribed number of rounds, but, on the contrary, as much ammunition as possible is on hand in the organization.

When the force is to stand on the defensive, especially if the position to be occupied has been prepared for defense, ammunition should be deposited all along the firing line. (Cartridge boxes or other utensils may be used as receptacles). It is advisable to use first the cartridges carried in caps, haversacks, coat and trousers’ pockets. The contents of the right cartridge box are saved for decisive moments when great rapidity of fire is essential. In replenishing ammunition, the right cartridge box is filled first, then the left, and the surplus is accommodated in haversack, coat and trousers’ pockets.

AUSTRIA.

(Par. 70 Regulations of 1903).

The regulations are extremely thorough and deserve special attention.
If an engagement is imminent, each private receives 20 additional
rounds before leaving the bivouac or reserve position, and each
non-commissioned officer 100 rounds from the company ammunition
wagon, so that the latter is about half emptied.[517] This brings
the total amount carried by each soldier up to 140 rounds, and
increases the load of the privates by 0.71 kg., and that of the
non-commissioned officers by about 4 kg. When troops go into action,
the ammunition wagons are assembled and accompany the battalion
reserve, taking as much advantage of cover as possible, so that the
attention of the enemy may not be drawn to them. After the battalion
reserve has been absorbed by the firing line, the ammunition wagons
accompany the regimental reserve. When exposed to artillery fire, the
wagons maintain intervals of twenty paces from one another. They are
either placed under the orders of the battalion adjutant, or of the
senior supply officer present with them, as may be directed by the
battalion commander.

[517] The company ammunition wagon carries 9,450 rounds of
ammunition, packed in seven compartments. It consists of a body and a
limber, has a width of track of 1.13 m., and is supplied with eight
sacks which serve to carry ammunition to the troops. During the day
its position is indicated by a red flag, and at night by a green
lantern.

In attack, it will, as a rule, only be possible to replenish
ammunition until troops get within about 1,000 paces (750 m.) of the
enemy. From this point on, however, it will be extremely difficult to
supply ammunition. Every lull in the fight must be taken advantage
of to replenish ammunition. The firing line receives a fresh supply
of ammunition through reinforcements or through small detachments
under non-commissioned officers sent forward from the reserves. These
detachments, after distributing the ammunition they have brought
up, remain with the firing line. The companies engaged in the fire
fight later take advantage of every opportunity to replenish and to
redistribute ammunition.

In defense, all the ammunition wagons may be emptied before the
action begins, and sent to the rear to be refilled. The ammunition
should be deposited in the vicinity of the firing line. The
subsequent replenishment of the supply should be managed as in an
attack. If ammunition is very urgently needed by the firing line,
and when no other remedy suggests itself, a part of the ammunition
of the reserves may be turned over to the firing line. Special
detachments should be detailed to remove the ammunition from the
dead and wounded. Wounded men who are able to walk to the dressing
station, turn over their ammunition to their comrades.

If another organization requests to be furnished ammunition, the
entire amount required, or a part thereof, depending upon the urgency
of the case and the amount available, should be turned over to it.

RUSSIA.[518]

[518] In each battalion, the ammunition wagon of the 2nd company
carries 108 explosive cartridges, weighing 200 g. each, and that of
the 3rd company carries 48 fuzes.

The ammunition carried in the cartridge boxes of the men may prove
insufficient during an action. On open ground the ammunition
wagons, assembled by regiment, accompany the regimental reserve,
and in covered terrain, they are assembled by battalion, and follow
the battalion reserve. When practicable, their position is to be
indicated during the day by red flags placed on their flank, and at
night by green lanterns. In defense, an adequate supply of ammunition
should be deposited in rear of the firing line, or should be at
once distributed among the men. In attack, the ammunition supply of
the firing line and of the supports is to be replenished when they
enter ranges under 700 m. The best means of preventing shortage of
ammunition is to husband it at long ranges. Ammunition wagons are not
to be emptied and their contents distributed before an action begins;
on the contrary, the ammunition is to be issued during the fight, one
wagon after another being emptied. Ammunition may be sent forward
from the reserve to the firing line, the men who carry it remaining
with that line. On the other hand--and this seems to be the method
most frequently employed--men from the firing line may be sent to
the rear for ammunition. The men of the reserves at once turn over
one-half of their cartridges to these men, who are then assembled and
sent forward under the command of a non-commissioned officer. The
ammunition is carried forward in sacks--so-called “bashlicks.”

FRANCE.

Each company has one ammunition wagon, which is a part of the combat
train (_train de combat_), and carries 16,384 Lebel cartridges, and
36 intrenching tools. It can carry 19,000 rounds of the new “D”
ammunition,[519] So long as any ammunition remains in the ammunition
wagons, they remain under all circumstances with their battalion.
They are assembled in battalion groups on the left flank of their
battalion. When the battalion is broken up for advance, flank,
rear guard, or outpost work, they remain with the main body of the
battalion. When the companies are separated for a protracted period,
the battalion commander decides whether or not the ammunition
wagons should accompany their respective companies. The ammunition
in the wagons is, as a general rule, to be distributed before the
commencement of an action. If this is impossible when the force
is taken by surprise, the commander of the group of ammunition
wagons must bring them up as close as possible under cover, and
the battalion commander must supervise the distribution of the
ammunition. In quarters and on the march, the ammunition is to be
replenished by taking the ammunition from the sick, from the men
detailed away, or from the supply carried by the baggage wagon.[520]
The ammunition in the baggage wagon is only to be used when all these
other sources are exhausted. When an encounter with the enemy may
be expected, and only a short march is anticipated, the ammunition
carried in the baggage wagons may be distributed before starting.

[519] The company ammunition wagon Model 1893 weighs 287 kg.
when empty, and 770 kg. when filled. It carries 14,400 rounds of
ammunition (net capacity 48%) or 66 rounds per rifle.

[520] The baggage wagon weighs 450 kg. when empty, and 1054 kg.
when loaded. It carries 36 intrenching tools, and a tool chest. Its
net capacity is 45%. Forty knapsacks may be transported on this wagon
in lieu of the ammunition.

Any further replenishment of ammunition is to be ordered by the
division commander. The empty company ammunition wagons are assembled
in regimental groups and follow at least 1,000 m. in rear of the
regimental reserve. At each halt, the wagon train is to prepare for
defense. The regimental commander is to regulate the distribution of
the ammunition sent forward by the ammunition columns.

When this distribution cannot be made for some reason or other, the
wagons, assembled in groups of four, follow their battalions. It is
the duty of the battalion commander to keep the firing line supplied
with ammunition. The contents of the company ammunition wagons are
not to be replenished from the ammunition columns during an action.
The ammunition is to be removed from the dead and wounded.

The source of the ammunition supply is the corps ammunition park,
which is divided into three echelons, as follows:

1st echelon consists of two infantry ammunition columns and marches
at the head of the combat train of the troops engaged;

IInd echelon consists of three infantry ammunition columns;

IIIrd echelon carries artillery ammunition only.

Two infantry ammunition columns of the 1st echelon, which, as a
rule, constitutes the “ammunition supply center” at the commencement
of an action, march at the head of the combat train (_train de
combat_). A half-filled infantry ammunition column must at all times
be available at this “ammunition supply center.” Ammunition wagons
of the infantry ammunition column are sent forward at the request
of the division commander to the position taken up by the company
ammunition wagons. The latter are generally posted not more than
1,000 m. in the rear of the fighting line, and parts of each infantry
ammunition column (usually one ammunition wagon for each battalion)
are posted by an officer not more than 1,500 m. in rear of these.
The empty company ammunition wagons are not refilled, the ammunition
being sent forward directly from the ammunition columns. As soon as
the infantry ammunition columns are informed which organizations they
are to supply, they send out non-commissioned officers to locate the
ammunition wagons of those organizations and establish communication
with them. The commander of the ammunition column directs where empty
ammunition wagons are to assemble. In emergencies, wagons of the
infantry ammunition column may also drive close up to the fighting
line. In this case, empty wagons assemble near the groups of company
ammunition wagons, and from there they are sent back in trains to the
ammunition column to which they belong.

Every opportunity, such as a lull in the fight, or an abatement of
the hostile fire, etc., must be utilized to distribute the ammunition
of the company wagons or of the ammunition column.

It is prohibited to send wagons or men to the rear for the purpose of
bringing up ammunition on the battlefield. All men sent forward with
ammunition should remain in the firing line.

ENGLAND.

The British infantryman is usually provided with 115, and each
machine gun with 3,500 rounds of ammunition. Each battalion is, in
addition, provided with 8 pack animals, each carrying two ammunition
chests containing 4,400 cartridges (77 kg.), and with 8 ammunition
wagons.

On the march, the pack animals and half of the ammunition wagons
follow immediately in rear of the battalion. The (16) remaining
wagons form a reserve ammunition column at the disposal of the
brigade commander, and march at the tail of the brigade. When an
engagement is anticipated, 50 additional rounds (1.3 kg.) may be
issued to each man before leaving camp. During an action, one pack
animal and two ammunition wagons follow each half-battalion. Empty
company ammunition wagons are refilled from the brigade reserve
ammunition column. When the wagons of the latter are empty, they are
replaced by filled wagons from the ammunition column. The teams are
not transferred with the wagons, but remain with the organization to
which they belong.

Ammunition wagons are expected to approach to within about 900
m. of the firing line, and pack animals to within 450 m. One
non-commissioned officer and two or three privates are to be detailed
from each company to bring up ammunition. Each man is to carry a sack
containing 600 cartridges (16 kg.). That this method of supplying
ammunition is practicable under fire is shown by the distinguished
conduct lists for =Paardeberg=, where men were praised or decorated
for endurance and fearlessness in bringing up ammunition. (See p. 371
supra). The men who bring up ammunition may be kept in the firing
line when the ground is devoid of cover.

The division ammunition columns, although they carry both infantry
and artillery ammunition, constitute an integral part of the
artillery battalions.

ITALY.

When an encounter with the enemy is anticipated, the ammunition
wagons are to be emptied, the men detailed to carry ammunition are
to remove their packs, and each one of them is to carry ammunition
weighing about 7.5 kg.

The packs are to be removed only in case of urgent necessity.
When this is ordered, however, the soldier first removes all the
cartridges and the emergency ration from his pack. The ammunition
knapsacks, which are always to be taken along, are, however, carried
in turn by all the soldiers of the company.

The advancing units that are in need of ammunition, may demand it
from troops ordered to remain behind. They take along their own
ammunition carriers. The latter, assembled in a squad, distribute the
ammunition along the firing line, and remain with that line. In the
first lull that occurs, they assemble again as a squad and take part
as such in the action.

The empty ammunition knapsacks belonging to organizations in reserve
are to be refilled as rapidly as possible from the ammunition wagons
sent forward from the ammunition park to the fighting line.

The ammunition of the dead and wounded is to be removed ind
distributed among the remaining men. During pauses in the fire, the
ammunition is to be equalized in all organizations engaged in the
fire fight.

The ammunition wagons of the echelons in rear are to approach the
fighting line as far as the available cover permits. Their position
is to be indicated by flags. The ammunition carriers are to come to
these wagons to refill the empty ammunition knapsacks.

3. WHAT DEDUCTIONS MAY BE MADE FROM THE REGULATIONS OF THE VARIOUS ARMIES.

1. The contents of the ammunition wagons should be distributed at the commencement of an action. This should not be done too early as the packing and unpacking of ammunition takes time, and as the soldier will not march so well when loaded down at the wrong time with 60 to 75 additional cartridges (1.8 to 2.4 kg.), unequally distributed in haversack and pockets. It is also a good plan to issue as many rounds of ammunition to the non-commissioned officers as to the men. During a fight this ammunition can then be distributed to the men.

2. As soon as the ammunition wagons have been refilled from the ammunition columns, which have been brought up, they should at once endeavor to rejoin their battalions and should then follow as close as possible in rear of the latter. The expenditure of ammunition will never be equally distributed along the line; therefore, if the battalion commander retains all four ammunition wagons directly under his own orders, he will be better able to equalize the supply of ammunition than would be the case if each ammunition wagon, as soon as it is refilled, were to follow its own company, which, in many cases, it will scarcely find again.

3. It is the duty of the commander to assign a few ammunition wagons belonging to organizations held in reserve to bodies of troops which will in all probability need a greater quantity of ammunition.

4. The organization must be in possession of an adequate supply of ammunition on entering the zone of effective fire, i.e., at a distance of 600 m. from the enemy. The sending of individual men to the rear for the purpose of bringing up ammunition will only be practicable in rare cases. As a rule, the violence of the hostile fire will make this impossible. Only the best men can be sent back. It is asking too much to expect them to cross twice the zone swept by hostile fire. Moreover, the best men are needed in the firing line to encourage the weaker element, and to replace disabled squad leaders. Under no circumstances should the firing line be withdrawn to get ammunition from the ammunition wagons, as an attack made unexpectedly by the enemy might find the position unoccupied and thus cause its loss.[521] It is a general principle that ammunition must be sent forward from the rear.

[521] Examples: The loss of the park at Coulmiers (HELVIG, _Das 1.
bayerische Armeekorps_, p. 202). The engagement at Daix on January
21st, 1871 (_Geschichte des Regiments Nr. 61_, p. 174). KUNZ,
_Loigny-Poupry_, p. 77.

5. The ammunition can be removed from the dead and wounded only in defense, or in attack when the forward movement has come to a standstill. In an advance, it cannot be done without retarding the movement and without affording individual men an excuse to remain behind.

6. The bringing up of ammunition by individual men, left to their own devises, is not to be recommended, as it facilitates “shirking”; moreover, if one of the men is disabled, the ammunition he carries will never reach the firing line. Ammunition should either be sent to the firing line with each support, or it should be carried by detachments sent forward in thin skirmish lines under the command of non-commissioned officers. These detachments should remain with the firing line.

7. Whether or not signals for informing the troops in rear of a shortage of ammunition in the firing line will fulfill the expectations entertained for them, can only be determined by the test of war.

INDEX.

A.

ACCELERATED FIRE, effect of 162

ACCELERATED TIME, in various armies (tables) 54

ACCURACY, effect of, in collective fire 169

ACTION
Breaking off an 441
Conduct and duties of the leaders in 399
Containing 445
Delaying 445

ADJUSTMENT, artillery fire 319

ADVANCE
Crawling--see Crawling
Fire while in motion 92, 93
Firing line in attack 366
Formations suitable for, through timber 332
Impulse from the rear 95
Infantry under artillery fire 321
Rushes--see Rushes
Skirmish line 76

ADVANCE BY CRAWLING--see Crawling

ADVANCE BY RUSHES--see Rushes

ADVANCE GUARD.
Battalion, formation for attack 212
Conduct in a rencontre 334
Conduct of, France 454
Italy 451

ADVANCED POSITIONS 413
Austria 450
Danger of fight being decided in 414
England 462
Examples of 412
Example of attack on 348
Japan 465
Russia 413

ADVANCED TROOPS 349

AGENTS DE LIAISON 245

AIM, points of 165

AIMING POSITION, warding off cavalry 307

ALPINI 22, 24

ALTITUDE, effect of, on ranges 145

AMMUNITION
Expenditure and supply of 468
Franco-German War 468
Russo-Japanese War 473
Russo-Turkish War 472
Expenditure of, during advance by rushes 90
How carried by soldier in various armies 476
Knapsacks 483
Machine guns 261
Austria 288
England 290
Switzerland 284
Germany 273
Rate of fire versus waste of 161
Shortage of, examples 469
Supply and distribution in action 400
Supply, Austria 475, 479
Deductions from various regulations 483
Defense 400
England 475, 482
France 475, 480
Germany 475, 476
Italy 475, 483
Japan 475
Russia 475, 480
Various armies (table) 475
Wagon--see Ammunition Wagons,
Weight of, in various armies (table) 40

AMMUNITION CARTS--see Ammunition Wagons

AMMUNITION KNAPSACKS 483

AMMUNITION WAGONS 72
Austria 479
England 482
France 480
Germany 477
Italy 483
Russia 480

APPLICATORY METHOD OF INSTRUCTION 10, 11

APPLIED TACTICS 12, 13

ARBITRATION, Courts of 3

ARMY CORPS, frontage in attack 236

ARTILLERY,
Adjustment of fire 319
Cavalry charge supported by 313
Combat of infantry against 316
Combat of machine guns against 297
Combination fuses 113
Coöperation with infantry 351, 354
Effect of fire (France) 123, 124, 321
Field guns, in various armies 111
Fire at successive ranges 321
Fire diverted by advancing infantry 327
Fire effect of French 4-gun battery 321
Fire effect of (French data) 123, 124
Fire for effect 320
Howitzer, heavy field 118
Light field 116
Infantry screen 327
Line, distance from infantry line in defense 415
Losses, Franco-German War 20
Percentage of 188
Under infantry fire 326, 327
Percussion shell (Model 96) 115
Percussion shrapnel 111
Positions in defense 414
Preparatory action (France) in attack 454
Progressive fire 320
Searching fire 321
Shields, protection afforded by 324
Shrapnel 112, 113
Effect of (table) 114, 122
Sweeping fire 321
Time required for adjusting the fire 119
Time shell (Model 96) 116
(Model 98) 118
Time shrapnel 112, 113
Unlimbering under infantry fire 326
Zone fire 320

ASSAULT 373
Austria 449
Conduct of the 374
Decision to make an 373
England 462
Examples 376
Fire support 379
Fire while in motion 381
France 457
Guidons 355
Italy 452
Japan 464
Moment for making the 374
Pursuit after successful 385
Successful, conduct after 385
Trumpet signal, fix bayonet 377
Unsuccessful, conduct after 386

ASSAULTING DISTANCE 385, 424

ASSEMBLY FORMATIONS 42
France (_carré de division_) 454

ATTACK 329
Abridged 330
Advance of the firing line 366
Advance guard, conduct of the--in a rencontre 334
Advanced troops 349
Assault 352, 373, 374, 399
Assaulting distance 385, 424
Austria 448
Brigade, frontage of a, in 399
Column 44, 45
Comparison with defense 329
Conditions upon which success depends 345
Conduct of the 365
Coöperation of infantry and artillery 351, 352, 354
Decision to assault 373
Deliberately planned, comparison with rencontre 334, 338
Deployment, initial 366
Distances 368
Of supports from firing line 99
Duration of the 351
England 459
Envelopment 356
Examples
Boer War 340
Russo-Japanese War 340, 345
Fire fight 368
Fixing bayonets 372
Formation for, of a battalion 211, 212, 213
France 453
Advance in mass formation 455
Group attack 255
Preparatory attack formation 455
Frontage 234
Army corps 236
Battalion 236
Brigade 235, 236, 399
Company 96, 235, 236
Gaps in the line 239
General rules for use of intrenching tools 393
Higher troop leading, duties 366
Holding 357, 445
Intrenching tools, use of 387
Infantry against dismounted cavalry 313
Italy 451
Japan 463
I. Army 342
Influences determining tactics in Russo-Japanese War 341
Launching the enveloping force 359
Lessons of the Boer War 340
Russo-Japanese War 340
Local reconnaissance in 347
Machine guns in 365
Methods of forming a battalion for (plates) 215, 216
Minor troop leading, duties 365
Moment for making the assault 374
Normal attack 203, 204, 205
Number of men required 234
On an enemy deployed for defense 340
Orders, issue of, in rencontre 36
Over plain devoid of cover 255
Point of 355
Position of commander in 399
Preparation by infantry and artillery (France) 454
Preparation of the 346
Preparatory position, advance into 350
Provisions of various regulations in re use of spade in 392
Pure frontal 357
Range finding instruments, employment in 146
Reconnaissance 346
In force 347
Rencontre 333
Compared with deliberately planned attack 338
Conduct of main body in a 336
Reserve, strength of 395
Reserves, employment of 394
Rules for the advance under fire 367
Sand bag cover 344, 390
Secondary 357
Separation of holding and flank attacks 361
Signal (fix bayonet) 377
Spade, use of, in 387, 392, 449, 457, 465, 466
Successful, conduct after 385
Superiority of fire, necessity of 370, 371
Supports, advance of 368
Distance from firing line 99
Surprise 330
Switzerland 466
Time for opening fire, general rules 155
Troop leading, duties of 365, 366
United, examples illustrating necessity of a 402
Unsuccessful, conduct after 386

ATTACK ON A POSITION PREPARED FOR DEFENSE
Austria 448
Japan 464
Switzerland 466

AUSTRIA
Advanced positions 450
Advanced troops 349
Ammunition, how carried by soldier 476
Ammunition supply 475
Regulations in re 479
Assault 449
Attack 448
Attack on a position prepared for defense 448
Battalion, formations of the 69, 72
Column of platoons, how formed 49
(plate) 62
Company, strength of (table) 35
Coöperation of infantry and artillery 354
Counter-attack 438, 450
Crawling 449
Defense 450
Seeking a decision 450
Development for action 208
Envelopment 362, 449
Fire control and fire discipline 135
Fire, kinds of 159
Time for opening 153
While in motion, experiments with 92
Firing line, method of reinforcing the 96
Position, choice of 370
Frontage 241
Front and facing distance 48
Infantry combat 448-450
Infantry versus cavalry 314
Intrenching tool equipment (table) 39
Kinds of fire 449
Load carried by a soldier 40
Machine gun 288
Ammunition supply 288
And infantry, relative fire effect of 267
Fire, kinds of 263
Formations 288
Organization 288
Pace, length and number per minute (table) 54
Ranges, ascertaining 144
Reinforcing the firing line, method of 96
Rencontre 339, 448
Rushes 90, 449
Skirmish line, formation of 80
Superiority of fire 371
Supply of ammunition 475, 479
Telegraph detachments 248
Use of spade in attack 392, 449

B.

BASE UNIT 218
Advantages and disadvantages 218, 219
Of combat, designation of 244

BATTALION
Acting alone, formation for attack 212
Advance guard, formation for attack 212
Attack formation, France 457
Austrian, formation of the 69, 72
Broad column (with plates) 67, 68
Commander, duties in action 400
Post in action 400
Deep column (with plates) 67, 68
Depth on the march 72
English, formation of the 71
Formation, in a containing action 213
Forming for attack 211
French, formation of the (with plates) 70
Frontage in attack and defense 236
German, formation of the 67, 68
Group intrenchments 417
Historical development 36
Intrenching tool equipment (table) 39
Intrenchments for a 419, 421
Italian, formation of the 70
Japanese, formation of the 70
Method of forming for attack (plates) 215, 216
Movements of the 67
Normal formation 67
Organization of the 36, 37
Part of a larger force, formation in attack 213
In defense 213
Route column, formation 72
Provisions of various regulations 73
Russian, formations of the 69
Swiss, formations of the 71

BATTALION COMMANDER
Duties in action 400
Post in action 400

BATTLE UNIT 34

BAYONET FENCING 134

BAYONET FIGHTS 382

BEATEN ZONE 179
Definition 179
Depth at various angles of slope--General Paquié’s rule for
determining 183
Formulae for computing depth of 180
Increase and diminution of (table) 181

BELGIUM
Fire control and fire direction 135
Frontage 242
Front and facing distance 48

BREAKING OFF AN ACTION 441

BRIGADE 37
Attack formation of a French 454
Cavalry, strength of 311
Combat formation 74
Development for action (with plate) 216, 217
Formations 73, 74
Frontage in attack 235, 236, 399
Importance 37, 38
Movements 73, 74
Three-unit organization 218

BROAD COLUMN (with plate) 67

C.

CADENCE 53, 54

CAVALRY
Charge of French Cuirassiers of the Guard at Vionville 311
Charge supported by artillery 313
Charges 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 308, 309, 310, 311, 313
Combat of infantry against 301
Provisions of various regulations 314, 315
Combat of machine guns against 296
Dismounted, infantry attack against 313
Losses
Charge of French cavalry at Vionville 312
Franco-German War 20
Percentage of 188
Massed employment 313
Moral effect of a charge 306
Regiment, strength of German 273
Relative strength as compared to infantry 311

CHANGE OF DIRECTION, how executed 219

CHANGE OF FRONT
Examples of 220, 221
How executed 219

CHASSEURS ALPINS 22

CLEARING THE FOREGROUND 421

CLOSE COLUMN, definition 47

CLOSE ORDER
Battalion 67
Brigade 73
Company 56
Compared with extended order 102
Regiment 73

CLOSE ORDER FORMATIONS,
Effect of fire on 102, 103
Value of 103, 104

COLLECTIVE FIRE 169

COLOR, position of the 68

COLT MACHINE GUN 261

COLUMN
Attack in 44, 45
Battalion in route 72
Broad (with plate) 67
Close, definition of 47
Comparison with line 42-45
Deep (with plates) 67, 68
Dimensions of broad and deep (plate) 69
Double 71
French double (plate) 70
Open, definition of 47
Route (machine gun battery) 273, 274
Section (machine gun battery) 273, 274

COLUMN OF FOURS 58
How formed (plate) 58
And squads compared 59

COLUMN OF PLATOONS 61
How formed 49
Machine gun battery 273, 274
(plate) 62
Vulnerability of 186, 187

COLUMN OF SQUADS 57
Employment of 59
(plates) 57

COLUMN OF TWOS 56

COLUMNS, line of company, France (plate) 70

COMBAT
Conduct and duties of the leaders 399
Drill, importance of 105
Duration of 178
Frontage--see Frontage.
Infantry 448-467
Austria 448-450
France 453-459
Italy 451-453
Japan 463-465
Japanese, Characteristics of 341
Russia 466
Switzerland 466-467
Versus artillery 316
Versus cavalry 301
Versus machine guns 268
Machine Guns 296, 297
Versus artillery 297
Versus cavalry 296
Orders 243, 244
Necessity for written 244
Patrols 80, 250
Sections 257
Assignment of 243
Division of a position into 411
Tasks, assignment of 243
Train (machine guns) 270
Unit 34

COMBAT DRILL, importance of 105

COMBAT FRONTAGE--see Frontage

COMBAT ORDERS 243
Items that should not appear in 244
Written, necessity for 244

COMBAT PATROLS 250

COMBAT SECTIONS 257
Division of a position into 411

COMBAT TRAIN, machine gun 270

COMBAT UNIT 34

COMBINED SIGHTS, use of 166

COMMANDER
Battalion, post of, in action 400
Company, post of, in action 400
Conduct in action 399
Interference with subordinates 401
Post of, in action 399
Post of, in rencontre 398
Regimental, post of, in action 400
Selection of a position during combat 244

COMMANDS 41
Fire 166

COMMUNICATING TRENCHES 421

COMMUNICATION
With neighboring troops and next higher headquarters 245
On the battlefield 246

COMPANY 34
Ammunition wagons 72, 477, 479, 480, 482, 483
Austrian, in column of platoons (plate) 62
Columns of the 56
Commander, duties in action 400
Post in action 400
Dimensions of the 3 and 4 platoon company (plate) 52
Division into platoons, sections, squads 46-53
3 or 4 platoons 48, 53
Formation of the 46, 47
French 4-rank formation (with plates) 65, 66
In line (plate) 49
Frontage in attack 235
Attack and defense 96
Defense and rear guard actions 236
German,
In column of platoons (plate) 62
In column of squads (plate) 57
In company column (plate) 60
In line (plate) 47
In route column (plate) 57
Movements in line and column 56
Non-commissioned officers, posts of, in various armies 47
Organization of the 34, 35
Range finders, post of 46, 47
Russian, in column of platoons (plate) 62
Strength of the 24, 35
In the various armies (table) 35

COMPANY AMMUNITION WAGONS 72, 477, 479, 480, 482, 483

COMPANY COLUMN (with plates) 60
Value of 186, 187

COMPANY COMMANDER,
Duties in action 400
Post in action 400

CONCENTRATED FIRE, machine guns 263

CONCENTRATION
For action 205
French, into _carré de division_, in attack 454

CONE OF DISPERSION, machine gun fire 264

CONE OF MISSES, Wolozkoi’s theory of the constant 173

CONTAINING ACTIONS 445
Delaying action and holding attack compared 445

COÖPERATION
Formation of a battalion in 213
Infantry and artillery 351, 352, 354
Difficulties of 354
Provisions of various regulations 354