Chapter V: Part 5

Italy. Supports are not to be used when they cannot be maintained at a less distance from the firing line than that separating the latter from the enemy.

It is the duty of supports to reinforce and extend the firing line, to cover the flanks (par. 222 German I. D. R.), to act as a reserve, and, in case of necessity, as a rallying force upon which the firing line can fall back. The presence of supports increases confidence in attack, and the power of resistance in defense. Supports enable a leader to influence the action, to give a firing line that has been checked the impetus necessary to carry it forward, and to affect the action by sending reinforcements to points where he wishes to gain an advantage. The support follows that part of the firing line which, in all probability, will need its assistance; if part of the same organization as the firing line, it follows in rear of the center, otherwise in rear of a wing. In a company advancing alone over covered terrain, it will sometimes be necessary to place small supports in rear of both flanks. Firing lines can perhaps advance for some time under hostile fire, whether they move by twos, by squads, or by platoons, but the power necessary for pushing home the attack must be imparted to them from the rear; otherwise the energy of the attack will spend itself. The necessity of having supports in rear of the firing line is clearly illustrated in the very instructive engagement at Wagon Hill in front of Ladysmith (6th January 1900). In this fight all attempts to push the firing line forward failed, and the necessary impetus for the decisive advance was not given until fresh supports were fed into the firing line.[100]

[100] _The Times History of the War in South Africa_, III, p. 200.

In hilly country the supports can fire over the heads of the skirmishers in front of them without neglecting their proper functions. (Switzerland and England). Such opportunities should not be overlooked, as they increase the volume of fire.

Distances depend upon the object to be attained by the action and upon the terrain.

When a decision is sought, distances should be decreased in the course of the action. When this is the case, the leaders of all grades should be animated by but one desire, that of being in front in order to participate in gaining the victory. The duration of the crisis of an action is usually brief, and in a very few rapidly passing moments the leader must decide what to do with the troops remaining available.

When an immediate decision is not sought, it is advisable to increase distances in order to keep the echelons held back in rear from coming under fire. In any case, the distance between supports and firing line should be less than the distance between firing line and enemy. In an attack, supports should be close enough to the firing line to prevent, by timely interference, a retrograde movement of the latter. On the defensive, on account of the difficulty of bringing up supports for the purpose of repulsing an assault, they will usually be placed a short distance immediately in rear of or within the firing line (intrenched) at the points where they are to be employed.

During an attack, whenever the lines in rear cannot be kept out of hostile fire, care must nevertheless be taken that two echelons be not simultaneously struck by a cone of infantry fire or by one and the same shrapnel. The distance between echelons is therefore increased to more than 300 m., and should not be reduced until the decisive stage of the combat approaches.

In open country, supports held too close to the firing line will soon cease to exist as such. When kept in close order, their losses would be so great that the boldest men would join the firing line and the less courageous would hunt cover. Everything depends upon the manner in which supports are led forward, especially during that part of the advance immediately preceding their junction with the firing line. In this lies the whole art of fighting in deep formations. Covered terrain permits distances to be reduced. The commander should be particularly careful not to let this advantage escape him, since on such terrain it is more frequently necessary promptly to reinforce the firing line.

The commander of the support must constantly observe the movements and successes of the firing line in order that he may be able to reinforce it in the most advantageous manner. Whenever he is obliged to split up his command during a movement to the front, he should endeavor to reunite it at the first opportunity.

The support should closely adapt its movements to those of the firing line. When a part of the firing line makes a rush, the support halts for the moment, and then runs forward to the next cover, simultaneously with the next advancing unit of the firing line, and covered by the fire of the skirmishers in front. “To make a rush at the same time as the firing line was impossible, because, as soon as the latter rose, the Turks opened a murderous fire. Whenever the firing line threw itself down and returned the fire, that of the enemy became noticeably weaker.”[101]

[101] _Report of Lieutenant Borsov_, in KUROPATKIN-KRAHMER,
_Kritische Rückblicke auf den Russisch-Türkischen Krieg_, III, p. 183.

The supports follow the firing line in single or double rank, in column of twos or squads, in skirmish line or in line of squads, in quick time or by rushes; it may also be advisable to deviate temporarily from the direction of advance. Columns having a narrow front, so long as they are not open to attack from a flank, are able to withstand long range infantry fire. (Par. 224 German I. D. R.). On coming to a halt, it is advisable to return to close order formation; at any rate, the leader must get his command again entirely under control.

Supports in Rear of the Firing Line or Not?

Up to a few years ago (1894), the French battalion was divided into firing line and companies of the second line. The Japanese, also, often placed entire companies in the firing line, which could not be quickly enough reinforced by the companies of the second line, because these were held too far in rear. At any rate, supports are of advantage during the first deployment before the situation is clear.

The following arguments are advanced against the employment of supports:

1. _The supports following the firing line suffer losses, without, as a rule, being able to participate in the action._ This argument is not well founded, since the criticism made with reference to supports is equally applicable to companies in the second line. That supports threw themselves into the firing line in the Franco-German war, in the belief that they were needlessly suffering losses, was due to the fact that they followed the firing line too closely.

Supports following the firing line closely (250-300 m.) can reach the firing line quickly and can easily find cover on account of the small angle of fall of modern bullets. Besides, the knowledge that supports are immediately in rear, the moral factor, should not be underestimated.

2. _The supports may be commanded by inexperienced leaders, who will not always act with the good judgment the situation demands and will fail to seize the right moment for advancing._ (This can perhaps never be avoided).

3. _Pushing the supports into the firing line tends to mix units, makes control more difficult, and impairs the efficacy of fire._ These criticisms are not applicable to a company, for it is in any case impossible for the company commander to control the fire; this is the business of platoon commanders.

The advantages of supports are, that they increase the number of targets offered the hostile artillery; that, by reason of their small size, they can utilize every accident of the ground; that they can be kept close enough to the firing line to reinforce it in case of sudden emergency; and that they allow companies in the second line to be kept farther to the rear. A battalion, when part of a larger force, need not keep formed bodies as supports; but a few platoons, following the firing line in close order on the flanks, are an advantage. The drawbacks of the _petits paquets_ would appear only if every company were to preserve a support up to the decisive stage of the action.

11. COMPARISON BETWEEN CLOSE AND EXTENDED ORDER.

In =close order= the men are placed so close together that they can be led by word of command and directly influenced by their officers. The position of the individual soldier is fixed; the men on either side of him interfere with his utilizing cover or his weapon. On terrain devoid of cover, close order formations present such large targets to infantry fire, that their employment, when exposed to the unsubdued fire of the enemy, is impossible and must lead to annihilation. Thus the hostile fire compels the most extended deployment.[102]

[102] Even during the Franco-German war it was impossible to employ
close order formations in the first line, when opposed by an unshaken
enemy, although this was still prescribed by the regulations.
Whenever this was attempted tremendous losses resulted. In the battle
of Vionville the 5th and 8th Companies of the 35th Füsilier-Regiment,
formed into a half-battalion, and following the other companies of
the battalion, which were pushed forward as the first line, suffered
in five minutes a loss of 9 officers and 150 men (out of a total of
about 400 men) from infantry fire at 1000 to 1200 m. “The impression
produced was so overpowering that the commands for extending and
deploying could not be executed at all and that the half-battalion
had to be withdrawn in rear of the cemetery where it was assembled by
the three officers still remaining.” _Geschichte des Regiments Nr.
35_, p. 23.

In cases where troops appeared in close order each losses were not
at all exceptional.

On August 18th, 1870, the Füsilier-Battalion of the 85th Infantry,
advancing from Vernéville, at first in double column, then in
half-battalion column, to within 400 paces of the enemy, lost 12
officers, 32 non-commissioned officers, and 437 men killed and
wounded (52%) in 20 minutes by the cross-fire of hostile artillery
and mitrailleuse batteries. At 800 paces from the enemy the fragments
of the battalion were assembled in three platoons. _Gen. St. W._, II,
p. 724. _Der 18. August_, p. 152.

The success of the bayonet attack made by the 9th Company of the
29th Infantry at St. Quentin may be explained by the inferiority of
the opponent. _Geschichte des Regiments Nr. 29_, p. 499.

In =extended order= the soldier’s position is not definitely fixed; he is not required to keep his body in a prescribed position, nor is he expected to handle his rifle by the numbers as in the manual. Instead, judgment, agility, courage, confidence in himself, skill in handling his weapon and in taking full advantage of the accidents of the ground, as well as unremitting attention to his leader, are demanded of the skirmisher.

The difficulties of troop leading are, moreover, increased by the noise and other disorganizing influences of the fight, especially in broken or wooded country. Whether an organization is thoroughly trained and disciplined is best shown in extended order fighting, for, as the direct control of the leader on his command decreases, the demands made on the initiative of the individual soldier increase out of all proportion. It is at any rate more practical to develop this initiative than to try to prevent the disorganizing effect of combat by restricting the personal freedom of the individual soldier.

In order to keep troops well in hand and to deploy them quickly in any direction, it is requisite that close order formations be retained as long as the terrain and the hostile fire permit. After an action, in order to make a renewed employment of the troops possible, they must be assembled in close order without regard to the previously existing organization.

In night combats, in actions against cavalry not supported by other arms, in putting down rebellions, and frequently in colonial wars[103] as well, the importance of close order formations increases when the troops show a disposition to get out of hand.

[103] The British _Infantry Training_ contains special regulations
governing “savage warfare,” in which close order battalion formations
are explicitly given the preference (order in echelon, square).

In extended order, infantry can most easily surmount obstacles, cross difficult terrain, and take the fullest advantage of the accidents of the ground, as cover against hostile fire and as rifle rests. In extended order, infantry is, moreover, able to develop its fire power most effectively, while at the same time offering the smallest possible targets to the hostile projectiles. Thus the _skirmish line_ is the principal combat formation of infantry; by means of it a combat is initiated and carried through to the end.

Close order is best adapted for establishing discipline in the simplest and most rapid manner by means of drill. At Jena the Prussian battalions were not defeated because of their drill, but because they were poorly led. What function drill had fulfilled at that time is pretty well illustrated by the heavy losses sustained by the Prussian infantry and by the fact that, although placed in a situation to which they were entirely unaccustomed, the troops retained their steadiness. No properly led army has been able to dispense with drill in developing its discipline. In the days of linear and column tactics the ultimate object of training was the leading of battalions in close order, in magnificent array, against the enemy. By means of drill a passive discipline was to be created in which intelligence played no part whatever. We know with what energy the army of the First Napoleon was drilled according to the wholly superannuated regulations of linear tactics in the camp at Boulogne and during the brief pauses between campaigns. A well drilled organization has ever, when well led, proved equal to the occasion.[104] The electrifying word of command is an important factor in assisting an organization accustomed to it to overcome difficult situations. No leader will voluntarily dispense with this aid. When Austrian shells struck the company of Count Finkenstein during the advance against the Shipwald, that officer halted his command, brought it to shoulder arms and did not continue the movement until order had been completely restored.

[104] Compare herewith _Der 18. August_, p. 463, in regard to the
importance of discipline in the execution of the attack on St. Privat.

General v. Blume considers drill and skirmish training two distinct methods by means of which efficient soldiers may be created. To quote: “In this connection the most perfect results would undoubtedly be attained by efficient drill and thorough skirmish training.” Where both these methods cannot be coördinated, training in extended order fighting should take precedence. General v. d. Goltz raises the objection that this might perhaps produce skirmishers, but not soldiers, _i.e._, _men whose devotion to duty surpasses their fear of death_. General v. d. Goltz is right in demanding combat drill. In this term he includes the painstaking execution of all those accomplishments which the skirmisher needs in action and which he should be able to use correctly and quickly without lengthy deliberation. To this category belong rapid loading and setting of the sight, good pointing in any position, accurate aiming, cool firing, quick locking of the piece, prompt jumping up for the advance, taking advantage of accidents of the ground in lying down for the purpose of heightening the fire effect, crawling forward with or without firing, etc., etc. Since all these things must be practiced individually, and since many of them do not permit of simultaneous execution by an entire unit, we usually speak of combat training instead of combat drill, without, however, intending any other meaning.

“Drill is always mechanical. The instructor can make the skirmisher load quickly and carefully, can cause him to take the position of aim, just as he drills the correct execution of present arms and the rise preparatory to advancing by rushes. Training is directed at the mentality of the man, it makes him independent and allows him to exercise initiative, even when he is no longer directly under his superior officers’ influence, and when, in a critical hour, he is no longer able to follow their example.

“Drill and training are both justified, each in its appropriate sphere; the scope of both is closely defined and neither one could be dispensed with. ‘Drill’ assists in creating the ‘soldier,’ because it develops the characteristics which must be required of a ‘soldier’: Endurance in surmounting hardships and dangers, unquestioning subordination of his will to that of the leader, tenacity and trustworthiness, skill in handling his weapon and in utilizing the ground. The addition of training will, of course, increase the value of this ‘soldier’ very considerably.

“Training alone will never attain this object. To arouse and develop the man’s intellect may make him a good skirmisher, a skillful member of a patrol, but for battle he remains incomplete, since his awakened mental powers have not been made available by the disciplining drill. His energies are not governed by a higher will. Nothing can give us the assurance that he may not fail at the most decisive moment. He is no soldier.”[105]

[105] V. D. GOLTZ, _Zur Gefechtsausbildung_, p. 26.

The French, for reasons inherent in their character, discard this drill and seek to replace it by developing the moral factors: “Moral powers are the mightiest pillars of success. Honor and patriotism fill troops with the noblest devotion. The spirit of self-sacrifice and the determination to win ensure success; discipline and steadiness guarantee the influence of the leaders and the coöperation of all the elements.”[106]

[106] _Introduction to the French Infantry Drill Regulations_.

“However, when necessity demands the creation of new
organizations--whether militia, volunteers, or _gardes mobiles_,--it
is a great mistake to expect everything from moral factors; even
though hatred of the enemy, enthusiasm for the fatherland, the
republic or for glory, rise to the highest pitch. ‘Victory or
death’ is the watchword when marching out--but neither is quickly
attainable; weeks and months of the severest hardships, exhausting
marches, wet and hungry bivouacs must first be endured. Very soon the
intoxication of enthusiasm is gone and reality weighs heavily on the
sobered men. Finally the enemy is confronted. But he is not to be
annihilated at once by a rapid assault--not at all; the advance is
made very slowly and the highest enthusiasm is given ample time to
evaporate during the many hours in which death is constantly faced.”
LAYMAN.

For enthusiasm, we would substitute faithful, unselfish performance of duty, and unquestioning subordination of the will of the individual to that of the leader. To be sure, on days of success enthusiasm will suffice, but not when everything around us begins to waver and to yield. The importance of drill, which cannot be replaced by anything else, does not become apparent until all enthusiasm disappears, until the leader becomes conscious of the specter of panic which stalks by the side of enthusiasm.

“Discipline,” says Archduke John in his well-known work _Drill or Training_, “must not be confounded with the snappy drill of troops, and can, moreover, not be attained by means of it. The straightjacket has never yet cured one insane person; the soul cannot be disciplined through the body. One must work from the inside and not from the outside. It is of little value if the outer annular rings of a tree are beautiful and regular; it will rot and die in spite of its deceptive appearance; if its heart is not healthy, the first storm may bring it down. The inner man must look beautiful; firmness and steadiness are needed within; the marching tread of feet on the drill ground plain are of no moment; the beat of the heart filled with the spirit of self-sacrifice is the important factor.”

It is well known that Emperor William I. changed the title of the brochure _Drill or Training_, written by Archduke John, to _Drill and Training_. Training necessitates a good corps of instructors and a great deal of time, whereas drill will accomplish in a shorter time results which are not so enduring. It is again presupposed that the recruits are willing to be trained, otherwise all efforts are unavailing. The question whether the individual man can be influenced sufficiently in a two years’ service period to overcome even sentiments inimical to the state, instilled in him by friends or relatives, can only be answered by the next war. To answer this question at the present time would be premature; but one thing is certain: the sharp word of command, the whole influence of a well-organized body of troops, will sweep along even the reluctant in the hour of danger.

The importance of the tactical formations which at one time constituted minor tactics has doubtlessly decreased; unfavorable formations, in so far as they increase or reduce losses, increase or restrict one’s fire effect, can be offset by the fighting efficiency of the soldier and by proper leading. The unfortunate termination of the battle of Jena for the Prussian arms, as already mentioned, bears no relation to drill as such. The formations in themselves were not at fault, for linear tactics scored the greatest successes in the Peninsular war and at Waterloo; and at the Katzbach, Prussian battalions of Borke’s Brigade in line overran the French columns. Within certain limits, numerical inferiority and lack of fighting efficiency can be offset by leadership. But numbers and fighting efficiency will always remain the decisive factors for success.

The victory of Spicheren was due primarily to the troops and not to leadership. This is likewise true of Wörth. The lion’s share in the victory of Vionville is certainly due to the fighting efficiency of the gallant Brandenburgers. Finally, at St. Privat, the crisis produced by the commanders was successfully overcome only by the tenacity of the troops, who maintained their positions for hours under the most destructive hostile fire.

Increased demands must at present be made upon the combat training of the soldier. The combat requires enterprising, self-sacrificing, cold-blooded men who are imbued with the spirit of the reckless offensive. “The combat requires thinking leaders, _trained to rely upon themselves_, and _skirmishers having initiative_.” (Par. 2 German I. D. R.). “Judgment, self-confidence and boldness must be aroused and continually developed in the young soldier.” (Par. 144 German I. D. R.). “The aim of all exercises should be to develop the soldier into a self-thinking and conscientiously working skirmisher.” (Par. 158 German I. D. R.). “All training should be directed toward producing self-reliance in leaders and in the individual skirmisher.” (Par. 251 German I. D. R.). “The infantry must nourish the desire for taking the offensive; its actions must be guided by the one thought, _forward, at the enemy, no matter what the cost_.” (Par. 265 German I. D. R.). “The continuous desire to press forward and the endeavor to surpass all other units must animate all parts of the attacking force.” (Par. 327 German I. D. R.). “It should be a point of honor with skirmishers not to allow the supports to overtake them earlier than the moment of penetrating the enemy’s position.” (Par. 348 German I. D. R.). “Those who fall must be left behind. These sacrifices should not lead to an abatement of the pursuit any more than the losses sustained in the previous fight caused the renunciation of the purpose of the combat.” (Par. 424 German I. D. R.). “A commander who is ever willing to shoulder responsibility will not shrink from throwing troops into the fight _regardless of consequences_ even when the outcome of the battle is doubtful.” (Par. 304 German I. D. R.).

If love of life and fear of death are overcome in a soldier by discipline, in an officer this must be brought about by a higher sense of duty and honor. On the battlefield the desire to live does not appear in a cultured person, as a rule, in its ordinary, undisguised form; it makes itself felt rather in the shape of tactical scruples, whether the leader would be justified in leading his subordinates to certain death, whether it would not be his duty to preserve the force entrusted to him for more important duty in the service of the fatherland, instead of sacrificing it uselessly. If, in addition, an officer has been allowed, in time of peace, to criticise, from the start, an order of his superior with reference to its feasibility, it may easily happen in the stern reality of actual war that a subordinate leader, neither especially courageous nor ambitious, succumbs to the seductive whisperings of his senses on the approach of danger and sees in caution the better part of valor. It is always suspicious if troops have become accustomed to consider insignificant losses, common to colonial wars, accompanied by great physical exertions, as indications of good leadership.[107] Great victories are, as a rule, invariably accompanied by great losses.

[107] In this connection and in regard to the British losses in
South Africa, see my lecture: _Die Lehren des Burenkrieges_ (1904),
p. 8, et seq. The behavior of Sir Redvers Buller at Colenso and
Spionskop is interesting. See _The Times History of the War in South
Africa_, III, pp. 234, 236, 297, 318.

III. THE POWER OF FIREARMS AND EXPEDIENTS FOR MINIMIZING LOSSES.

A. THE POWER OF FIELD ARTILLERY.

1. THE FIELD GUN.

The field artillery of all the states that need be considered is armed with a rapid-fire gun provided with shields and capable under peace conditions of firing as many as twenty shots per minute. Its caliber varies from 7.5 to 8.38 cm. (Germany, 7.7; France, 7.5; Russia, 7.62, and England, 8.38 cm., the last-named being an 18 pdr.). The German gun fires shrapnel weighing 6.85 kg. (the Russian, 6.5, and the French 7.25 kg.) and high explosive shell of approximately the same weight, with an initial velocity of 465 m. (the Russian 588 and the French 530 m.). The projectiles are burst through the action of combination fuzes (in Germany graduated to 5000, in France and Russia to 5500 m.). The projectiles have a maximum range of 8000 m., when percussion fuze is used. Canister has been replaced by shrapnel, which bursts approximately 200 m. in front of the gun when the fuze is set at zero. The German field artillery is also equipped with a light field howitzer, cal. 10.5 cm., which fires shrapnel weighing 12.8 kg. (time fuze ranging from 300 to 5600 m.) and shell weighing 15.7 kg. (time fuze ranging from 500 to 5600 m.). The Germans use heavy field howitzers (cal. 14.91 cm., firing shell that has an extreme range of 6870 m.) in the heavy artillery of the field army. France uses the 15.5 cm. Rimailho howitzer, England a 12.7 cm. howitzer and another long piece of 12 cm. caliber.

=Percussion shrapnel= is used for defense at short range, and in fire for adjustment; its effect depends upon the range and the nature of the ground. It is effective against troops lodged in tall timber. Masks, branches of trees, etc., frequently cause the premature burst of the projectiles.[108]

[108] Engagement of Azay (6th January, 1871). _Geschichte des
Regiments Nr. 20_. HOFFBAUER, _Deutsche Artillerie_, I, pp. 16 and
49. _Taktik_, VI, p. 42.

Percussion shrapnel is effective only when bursting immediately in front of the target (5-25 m. in front of it, depending upon the range). However, even in this case, the bullets often pass over low targets, such as skirmishers lying down, and low parapets afford sufficient protection. An adequate effect can be obtained only when the fire is directed on vertical targets. Soft ground, newly ploughed fields, terrain covered with snow or underbrush, small folds of the ground, or a rising slope, diminish the fire effect. When the angle of fall is 10 degrees or more (with the German piece at ranges of 3300 m. and over) half of the bullets penetrate the ground, the remainder ricochet and pass on at a greatly reduced velocity. The explosive or incendiary effect of shrapnel is insignificant owing to the smallness of the bursting charge. However, some incendiary effect is possible if the projectile strikes an easily inflammable target.[109]

[109] Consult _Taktik_, VI, p. 45, in regard to the incendiary
effect of projectiles.

=Time shrapnel= (used in Germany up to 5000 m.) is fairly independent of the terrain, the burst being easily observed since the bullets are embedded in a “smoke-producing composition.” The extreme range at which this projectile can be employed is fixed by the facility of observing the fire and by the remaining velocity of the shrapnel bullets, both of which diminish as the range increases. Field guns, model ’96, may be effectively employed up to a range of 4000 m.; under 3000 m. their fire is so annihilating that decisive results are produced in a short time. (Par. 630 German F. S. R.). The use of the combination fuze, on account of its certainty of burst, either by time or percussion, permits the trajectory to be accurately determined in every case. This fuze also makes it possible to employ shrapnel against rapidly advancing targets, and in warding off a sudden attack at short range. The French Regulations give the width of the beaten zone of a single shrapnel as 20, that of two from the same piece as 25 m. The maximum depth of the beaten zone is 300 m. The angle of the cone of dispersion of the German shrapnel, model ’96, is 16 degrees at 2000 m. German shrapnel (model ’91) fired at a line of infantry did not strike lines following 250 m. in rear of the first, whereas in case of base charge shrapnel these lines would be safe only at 350-400 m. from the first line. The German shrapnel gives very good results when set to burst 30 to 150 m. in front of the target, the height of burst being regulated accordingly (approximately ¹⁄₃ of the whole number of hundreds of meters of the range). At ranges under 1500 m., an adequate fire effect may, however, be expected even when the fuze is set to burst the projectile 300 m. in front of the target. (Par. 30 German F. A. F. R.).

Shrapnel is most effective against skirmishers lying down from 1000 to 3000 m. when burst 28 to 22 m. short, and against standing skirmishers at the same ranges when burst 56 to 45 m. short. The two tables given below, borrowed from the work of Lieutenant-General Rohne on artillery tactics,[110] give an idea of the effect of a single time shrapnel, and of the effect per minute of shrapnel fire after adjusting upon the target:

======================+=======================================
|When firing at the targets named (1
|skirmisher per m.) with time shrapnel,
TARGETS. |mod. ’96, set to burst 50 m. short, the
|following _hits per shrapnel_ may be
|expected after the adjustment has been
|effected:
----------------------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------
| 500 m.|1000 m.|2000 m.|3000 m.|4000 m.
----------------------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------
Skirmishers standing | 18.4 | 14.2 | 12.0 | 11.0 | 10.4
Skirmishers kneeling | 10.6 | 8.2 | 6.9 | 6.3 | 5.8
Skirmishers lying down| 6.4 | 4.9 | 4.1 | 3.8 | 3.5
Head targets | 3.5 | 2.7 | 2.3 | 2.1 | 1.9
----------------------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------

======================+=======================================
|When firing at the targets named
TARGETS. |(skirmish line with 1 skirmisher per
|m.), under service conditions, with time
|shrapnel, mod. ’96, set to burst 50-100
|m. short, the following hits per minute
|may be expected on an average:
----------------------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------
| 500 m.|1000 m.|2000 m.|3000 m.|4000 m.
----------------------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------
Skirmishers standing | 364 | 202 | 109 | 46 | 14
Skirmishers kneeling | 210 | 117 | 63 | 27 | 8
Skirmishers lying down| 126 | 70 | 38 | 16 | 5
Head targets | 70 | 39 | 21 | 9 | 3
----------------------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------

[110] ROHNE, _Die Taktik der Feldartillerie_, Berlin, 2nd Edition,
p. 9.

More than 80% of the men struck by fragments and bullets from shrapnel bursting within 100 m. are disabled. The penetration of shrapnel bullets is so great, at ranges under 2000 m., that when they strike bones or vital organs of horses, they produce instant incapacity for action. This is especially true when the interval of burst is less than 100 m. The effect of shrapnel directed against batteries provided with shields is insignificant. Time shrapnel is the principal projectile employed by artillery against animate objects, provided these are not located immediately in rear of parapets, within tall timber, or under bomb-proofs. This projectile is ineffective against such cover on account of the flatness of the trajectory and the sensitiveness of the fuze.

Shrapnel is to be supplemented by =shell= filled with explosive charge, model ’88, which has a great explosive effect at extreme ranges and in tall timber. (See pars. 159-160 German F. A. F. R., in regard to action against shielded batteries).

Percussion shell, on account of its very sensitive fuze, bursts on
penetrating the shield, while percussion shrapnel goes entirely
through the shield and bursts about ¹⁄₂ m. in rear of it.

Targets located immediately in rear of parapets or under light splinter proofs may be reached with time shell burst directly over or close in front of them. The depth of the beaten zone of this projectile is small, seldom exceeding 50 m., even when the fire is directed against targets in the open. About 75% of all the fragments are capable of inflicting disabling wounds when the interval of burst is short. The peculiar character of the projectile necessitates a very careful adjustment in range and in height of burst. The French _obus allongé_, a high explosive percussion shell (melinite charge; angle of the cone of dispersion exceeds 100 degrees) is employed only for the destruction of material objects.[111]

[111] When firing on animate objects, the beaten zone of this
projectile does not exceed a space 50 m. wide and 20 m. deep, but the
concussion of the explosion will undoubtedly be felt at a greater
distance. The explosive effect of the projectile is equivalent to
that of 30 kg. of powder. The explosion of the projectile produces a
cone-shaped crater having a diameter of 2 and a depth of 0.50 m. Ten
melinite shells per running meter are required to destroy a parapet 3
m. thick and 2.30 m. high.

The French projectile, on account of the fuze used, bursts only after it has pierced thin walls or shields.

2. THE LIGHT FIELD HOWITZER.

The realization that the power of resistance of a defender lodged in deep trenches, could not be broken by the fire of guns having a flat trajectory, led to the re-adoption of a gun capable of high angle fire, which had been eliminated from the field artillery upon the advent of rifled cannon.[112]

[112] After March, 1859, the artillery of a mobilized Prussian
army corps consisted of three horse batteries, each armed with six
6-pounder guns and two 7-pounder howitzers; six foot batteries, each
armed with eight 12-pounder guns; and three foot batteries, each
armed with eight 7-pounder howitzers. Thus the artillery of an army
corps numbered 30 howitzers and 66 guns.

For both flat trajectory and high angle fire, the light field howitzer, model ’98, employs shrapnel weighing 12.8 kg. (500 jacketed bullets, @ 10 g.; time fuze graduated from 300 to 5600 m.) and shell weighing 15.7 kg. (0.37 kg. explosive charge, model ’88; time fuze graduated from 500 to 5600 m.). As delay action fuzes are used, it is possible to utilize to the fullest extent the power of penetration of the projectile before it bursts.

A single shrapnel from a light field howitzer produces a greater number of hits, when the point of burst is favorably situated, than one fired from a field gun. However, the projectiles fired from the latter have a deeper beaten zone on account of the flatter trajectory of the piece, and a greater penetration owing to their greater remaining velocity. The German Artillery Firing Regulations (par. 30) consider the effect of both projectiles “very good” and of equal value at the principal ranges, when burst at a moderate distance (30 to 150 m.) from the target. The effect of shrapnel from the field gun and from the light field howitzer is considered adequate at ranges under 1500 m., when bursts are regulated to occur within 300 and 200 m., respectively, in front of the target. The superiority of the shrapnel fired from a field gun is due to the greater penetration of the jacketed bullets (a result of greater velocity of the projectile itself at the point of burst). But in this connection it is to be borne in mind that the effect of single shots only is here considered. The shrapnel fire of the field gun is considerably superior to that of the howitzer. This is due to the fact that the howitzer fires more slowly than the field gun and must expend twice the weight of ammunition to produce the same results. If, in addition, it is remembered that the field battery carries approximately 2¹⁄₂ times as many shrapnel as the light field howitzer battery, it is obvious that the fire of the former will be 2¹⁄₂ times as effective, against targets in the open, as that of the latter.

The superiority of the heavier projectile asserts itself when it becomes necessary to destroy material objects.

The shell fired from pieces having a flat trajectory is employed against troops immediately behind cover. The shell is burst immediately in front of, over, or in rear of the target, which is thus struck by splinters from above. The more nearly perpendicular the splinters strike the target, and the greater their number and weight, the greater will be the effect produced. The angle of the cone of dispersion is about 200 degrees; with appropriate points of burst, fragments weighing 15 g. (80%) incapacitate for action. In curved fire, at ranges beyond 2100 m., shell with delay action fuze is capable of penetrating the splinter proof cover usually employed in the field. At ranges under 2100 m. its angle of fall is too small to make an adequate effect certain.

3. THE HEAVY FIELD HOWITZER.

The heavy field howitzer employs shell weighing 39.5 kg., containing an explosive charge of 0.85 g., and fitted with a percussion fuze either with or without delay action. This shell is designed to penetrate the roofs of splinter proofs. An earth covering 5-6 m. thick is necessary to afford protection against these projectiles. At 3000 m. a 15 cm. shell produces a crater 1 m. deep and 2.4 to 3.6 m. in diameter, _i.e._, 2 cu. m. (in made ground this crater is three times this size). The heavy field howitzer is a very effective weapon against shielded batteries. A single shell, owing to its lateral explosive effect, is capable of placing a whole battery temporarily out of action.

4. EXPEDIENTS FOR MINIMIZING THE EFFECT OF FIRE.

Movements of infantry under artillery fire are unavoidable when firing lines are to be reinforced and when troops intended for the decisive attack are to be pushed closer to the enemy. Formations calculated to minimize the effect of the hostile fire must be taken up in time, since it is not always possible to make use of cover. The efficacy of the fire depends upon the accurate determination of the range and height of burst (fire for adjustment) and upon the careful observation of the subsequent fire (fire for effect).[113] The effect of this fire is considerably increased when the opponent’s infantry, against whom the fire is directed, takes up unsuitable formations (particularly broad line formations). Infantry has frequently found it advantageous to advance in small detachments moving rapidly at irregular intervals in extended order.

[113] The color of uniforms exerts considerable influence on
observation. According to experiments made in France, colors rank
as follows as regards visibility: white (invisible at night), light
blue, alizarine red, green, dark brown, gray, or yellowish brown.
_Schweizer Zeitschrift für Artillerie und Genie_, 1896, I, p. 39. The
following colors protect against heat, in the order named (in reverse
order against cold): white, red, orange, yellow, green, blue, violet,
black. The position of gray in the list depends upon the amount of
white or black mixed with it.

(a) Increasing the Difficulties in the Adjustment of the Hostile Fire.

A battery requires about 0.8 minutes (5 to 6 rounds with percussion fuze) to secure adjustment at ranges up to 750 m. The time required for securing adjustment at the longer ranges is as follows:

At 800-1500 m., on low infantry targets, 1.5 min., 6-9 rounds with
perc. fuze;
At 1700-2250 m., on low infantry targets, 3.7 min., 11 rounds with
perc. fuze;
At 2000-3000 m., on artillery targets, 4.6 min., 11 rounds with
perc. fuze;

Narrow columns moving to their right or left front are very unfavorable targets for artillery, as it is very difficult for a battery commander to determine the relative position of bursts on the flank of a column with respect to the leading element thereof. Such shots are frequently considered as over. Numerous small columns, which make it difficult to designate a target, increase the time required by the hostile artillery to secure adjustment.

Troops should not be posted in the vicinity of conspicuous objects, as, for example, trees, visible at a great distance.[114] Intrenchments that have just been thrown up should be made to look as nearly as possible like the surrounding country by covering them with snow, sod, or brush. It is made more difficult for the hostile artillery to secure adjustment, if our infantry changes position to the front or to a flank, if it moves rapidly or advances by rushes.

[114] The cutting down of a poplar at Königgrätz decreased the
effect of the Austrian artillery fire, which, previous to this, had
caused rather serious losses. _Geschichte des Regiments, Nr. 2_, p.
36. A similar effect was produced by tearing down a house at Lovtcha.
KUROPATKIN-KRAHMER, _Kritische Rückblicke auf den Russisch-Türkischen
Krieg_, I, p. 59.

It is easy, as a rule, for the artillery to adjust its fire upon masks, but difficult to determine the distance between mask and target. It is an advantage when masks are situated obliquely to a position. As masks (rows of trees) may cause the premature burst of projectiles having percussion fuzes, they should be at least 200 m. from the troops they are to =screen=.[115] When so situated they frequently afford better protection than actual intrenchments.

[115] Fight of some Prussian batteries against a French battery
masked by chaussee trees at Weiszenburg. See HOFFBAUER, _Deutsche
Artillerie_, I, pp. 13 and 49. The 4th Light and the 4th Heavy
Batteries of the 10th Field Artillery (German) were able to
maintain their position east of Mars-la-Tour, under the fire of
superior hostile artillery, because they were screened by the trees
and the embankment of the chaussee thirty paces in their front.
_Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschrift_, 25, p. 18.

The sustained bombardment of Schlosz Ladonchamps (situated on
the Moselle flats north of Metz) with 12 cm. guns, which fired 200
shots per day from Oct. 9th to 10th, and 100 per day from Oct. 11th
to 16th, 1870, was unsuccessful, because the percussion shells
were ineffective. This will not be changed in the future by the
adoption of high-explosive shells. According to DICK DE LONLAY,
the garrison of the castle and its park lost only 5-10 men per day
during this time. The defensibility of the castle was not impaired,
although projectiles finally fell into the building itself during
the sustained bombardment. According to the same author (IV, p. 556)
1,022 shells fell into the park and castle of Ladonchamps on October
7th, but only ten men were placed out of action.

(b) Minimizing the Effect of Fire.

Formations that increase the effect of artillery fire, as for example lines and columns, and positions in which a flank is refused, should be avoided. It is a good plan to increase the number of targets and to employ narrow columns (column of twos) that are not too deep. Supports must be far enough in rear (300-400 m.) to prevent two targets being struck by one and the same shrapnel.

Of the close order formations used in the Russo-Japanese war, platoons or sections in columns of squads or twos,[116] separated by a maximum interval of 50 paces, were indeed found more suitable under fire than line formations, but the losses were nevertheless very serious except where cover screened the advancing troops from view or afforded them actual protection.

[116] The advance against Beaumont and the height of Chancy during
the battle of Beaumont. HOPFFGARTEN-HEIDLER, _Beaumont_, pp. 124 and
238. _Geschichte des Regiments, Nr. 93_, II, p. 97. At Gravelotte
this formation was employed with advantage by the _Königin_ Regiment
during its advance on Amanweiler, and later in the campaign during
the assault on Le Bourget. _Geschichte des Regiments Königin_, pp. 9
and 132.

During the Franco-German war, line of platoons in columns of twos was found advantageous on several occasions.[117] This formation has the following disadvantages, however: it is very susceptible to flanking fire; the influence of the officers is principally restricted to the leading elements; intervals are easily lost and on that account it becomes more difficult to form line. It would seem to be better, therefore, to advance in line of platoons (or sections) in columns of squads, or, under flanking fire, in line of squads in columns of twos or files. In the last-named formation the intervals between squads are easily lost, however, and the company then becomes a dense skirmish line of from four to six ranks. To echelon the platoons slightly has very little value on account of the depth of the beaten zone of modern shrapnel.

[117] This formation is also well adapted for passing through
woods. _Taktik_, VI, p. 108.

In attacks made during the latter part of the Russo-Japanese war, both belligerents finally made use of thin successive skirmish lines for advancing; these lines followed each other at 200-300 m. and united again on reaching cover.

5. THE RESULTS OBTAINED BY ARTILLERY AGAINST VARIOUS TARGETS.

_Germany._ According to computations made by Lieutenant-General Rohne,[118] the following hits may be expected from every time shrapnel, model ’96, when burst an average of 50 m. short of the targets named:

=====+=========+=========+======+=================
Range|Standing.|Kneeling.|Prone.| Intrenched
m. | | | |Skirmishers.[119]
-----+---------+---------+------+-----------------
500| 18.4 | 10.6 | 6.4 | 3.5
1000| 14.2 | 8.2 | 4.9 | 2.4
2000| 12. | 6.9 | 4.1 | 2.3
3000| 11. | 6.3 | 3.8 | 2.1
4000| 10. | 5.8 | 3.5 | 1.9
-----+---------+---------+------+-----------------

[118] _Die Taktik der Feldartillerie_, p. 9 _et seq._

[119] One skirmish figure per meter.

The number of hits per minute obtained by a battery firing 50 shots at 500 m., 30 at 1000 m., 20 at 2000 m., 10 at 3000 m., and 4 at 4000 m., is as follows:

=====+=========+=========+======+=================
Range|Standing.|Kneeling.|Prone.| Intrenched
m. | | | |Skirmishers.[120]
-----+---------+---------+------+-----------------
500| 364 | 210 | 126 | 70
1000| 202 | 117 | 70 | 39
2000| 109 | 63 | 38 | 21
3000| 46 | 27 | 16 | 9
4000| 14 | 8 | 5 | 3
-----+---------+---------+------+-----------------

[120] One skirmish figure per meter.

_France._[121] According to the French Field Artillery Regulations (footnote to par. 277), a gun firing time shrapnel covers effectively a front of 25 m., and a battery of four pieces, a front of 100 m. This intensity of fire, which is obtained when each piece fires one shot with proper corrector and range settings (the battery four shots) Aubrat calls “_Density 4_.” When _rafale_ fire (two shots per piece) is employed against a front of 100 m., with proper corrector setting, density 8 is obtained. When the front exceeds 100 m., the deflection of the pieces must be changed between successive shots (_tir avec fauchage_). To obtain density 8 against a front of 150 m., each piece must fire three shots, as prescribed in the regulations. When progressive fire (_tir progressif_) is employed, four different ranges are given, of which only one can be considered effective. When not sweeping, in this fire, each piece fires two shots, thus also obtaining a density of 8. A density of 1 always corresponds, therefore, to one round, fired, with proper corrector and range settings, against a front of 100 m. When a battery (four pieces) fires one salvo against a target having a front of 50 m., density 8 is obtained; by firing two salvos, density 16 is obtained.

[121] The following is taken from Lieutenant-General ROHNE’S essay
on the work of Squadron Commander AUBRAT, _Les exercices de service
en campagne_. The essay mentioned appeared in the December, 1907,
number of _Artilleristische Monatsschriften_.

The _Commission d’études pratiques du tir_ has made a thorough investigation into the effect produced by shrapnel fire. The following table gives a general idea of the effect to be expected when firing against service targets (_i.e._, the percentage of figures one may expect to hit when employing fire of varying density):

==============================================+=======================
| DENSITY.
TARGETS. +-----+-----+-----+-----
| 4 | 8 | 16 | 32
----------------------------------------------+-----+-----+-----+-----
| % | % | % | %
Infantry skirmishers standing in the open, or | | | |
a single rank line | 25 | 40 | 65 |----
| | | |
Skirmishers lying down; gun crews under fire | | | |
but protected by shields of the French type. | | | |
Space between shields and ground not closed | 7.5| 15 | 25 | 40
| | | |
Infantry lying down behind knapsacks; gun | | | |
crews protected by shields. Space between | | | |
shields and ground not closed | ----| 7.5 | 15 | 25
| | | |
Infantry lying down behind their knapsacks, | | | |
but not firing; gun crews protected by | | | |
shields. Space between shields and ground | | | |
closed so that bullets cannot pass through | ----| 0-2 | ----|----
----------------------------------------------+-----+-----+-----+-----

A skirmish line 100 m. long, and lying down, would suffer a loss of 15% irrespective of its strength, from progressive fire (_tir progressif_; 32 rounds, density 8). If the interval between skirmishers in the open amounts to 1¹⁄₂ paces, for instance, the front would contain 62 skirmishers, and the resulting loss would amount to 9 men. If the men have placed their knapsacks in front of them, the loss would be reduced by half. A line of skirmishers of the same length and strength as the one considered above, would suffer a loss of 40%, or 25 men, when standing up or advancing. About 1¹⁄₂ minutes are required to fire one _tir progressif_, after adjustment has been secured. The same effect could be obtained in about 20 seconds by firing a _rafale_ of eight rounds, provided the battery has accurately adjusted its fire.

6. THE EFFECT OF SHRAPNEL BULLETS ON ANIMATE TARGETS.[122]

[122] BIRCHER, Colonel and Corps Surgeon of the Swiss IInd Army
Corps, _Die Wirkung der Artillerie Geschosse_, Aarau, 1899. KÜTTNER,
_Kriegschirurgische Erfahrungen aus dem südafrikanischen Kriege
1900_. Tübingen, 1900. HILDEBRAND, _Die Verwundungen durch die
modernen Kriegsfeuerwaffen_. I (1905). BOHNE, _Über die Wirkung des
Schrapnelschusses_, in _Militär-Wochenblatt_, No. 74, 1902.

The wounds produced by shrapnel bullets are similar to those caused by the lead bullets of the infantry weapons of the past. When the bullet strikes normally to the surface, it produces a wound circular at the point of impact and considerably enlarged at the point of exit; bones are frequently shattered; and the most serious effect is the introduction of foreign substances, such as pieces of cloth, particles of earth or sand, or of the material in which the bullet is embedded.

The effect of shrapnel bullets on animate targets depends upon the striking energy of the bullets (expressed by kgm.) and on their density, those of smaller cross-section having the greater penetration. The closer the point of burst is to the target, the greater the velocity, and, naturally, the effect.

Opinions differ as to the amount of “striking energy” necessary to put animate targets out of action. In France, an energy of at least 4.8 kgm. is considered necessary to disable human beings, and for horses an average of 19 kgm., while in Germany, an average energy of 8 kgm. is deemed sufficient. The 10 g. hardened lead bullet, having a diameter of 12.3 mm., retains this energy until its remaining velocity is only 120 m. At ranges up to 1500 m., over 80% of the men struck by fragments and bullets from shrapnel, bursting within 300 m. (and beyond this range from shrapnel bursting within 150 m.) are put out of action. (Par. 30 German F. A. F. R.). In comparison, artillery projectiles produce a greater number of fatal wounds than infantry projectiles.