Chapter XVI: Part 16

If the assault is to succeed, it is essential however, that, while the attacker covers the last 100-150 m., the defender be compelled to keep under cover. _This can only be accomplished by employing fire while in motion._

This fire is practicable because the defender, who has been overwhelmed in the fire fight, has sought shelter in his works; it is advantageous, as it is only to compel the enemy to keep under cover. It would unquestionably be a mistake, and not justifiable in any case, to employ fire while in motion, when these conditions are not fulfilled, when the enemy is not completely subdued and is perhaps waiting under cover, ready to meet the assailant’s assault. Supporting the infantry assault with fire has, moreover, the additional advantage of preventing the defender from bringing up his reserves.

The following is taken from a private letter of Sir Ian Hamilton,
perhaps the foremost British infantry tactician, who had the good
fortune, at Elandslaagte and Doornkop, of leading his command close
up to the enemy: “It is my opinion that no matter what regulations
are promulgated in time of peace, the men will fire during the
assault. You may rest assured that nothing will prevent their doing
this. One would do well, therefore, to reckon with this factor from
the very start. The greatest danger is always that the men will throw
themselves down instead of continuing the advance. And, if the men
have once thrown themselves down during the assault, they will rise
only for the purpose of retreating.”[402]

[402] In _Ausbildung der Infanterie für den Angriff_, p. 63,
Colonel VON DER GOLTZ makes the following statement in regard to an
experiment: “As the line gradually drew closer to the defender’s
position, the desire of the individual men to get into the hostile
position as quickly as possible, became more and more apparent; the
prone position for firing was abandoned for the kneeling position,
finally for the standing position, and, quite naturally, fire while
in motion resulted in the end. Fire while in motion is authorized
by the regulations and is, in this case, certainly permissible. Its
employment in this case may be traced to the very proper desire of
not allowing the enemy, who has been held down this long, to raise
himself above his parapet. This fire while in motion should not be
confused with the fire while in motion formerly employed by long
skirmish lines at long ranges, and condemned at that time. The
latter had for its object not the keeping down of an enemy already
overwhelmed, but, on the contrary, was intended to overpower an
unshaken opponent.”

=Russia.= The attacking force approaches the enemy so close (35 m.)
that the troops are enabled to throw themselves upon him. The point
at which the hostile position is to be penetrated is designated and
the men form in rear of their platoon leader. The reserves move at a
run or by crawling close up to the firing line. If the assault is
begun at a greater distance than 35 m. from the hostile position,
fire while in motion is employed, “in order that the enemy may not
regain his senses and may be prevented from rising above his parapet.”

During an unexpected encounter at night, on unfavorable terrain (Swiep-Wald at Königgrätz), as well as during obstinate fights for the possession of fortifications (the Grivica Work at Plevna, Scheinovo), bayonet combats are unavoidable, provided both forces are equally determined. During the fight for the possession of Servigny, on the evening of August 31st, 1870, serious hand to hand fighting occurred in the narrow village streets.[403] The Russo-Japanese war also proved beyond the shadow of a doubt that determined troops will maintain their positions until they are thrown out of them by cold steel.[404]

[403] KUNZ, _Noisseville_, p. 51. See p. 134 supra. Fieldmarshal
MOLTKE makes the following observations in regard to the bayonet
fights of the campaign of 1859: “General Niel credits his victory at
Solferino to the use of the bayonet. The question as to how often the
advance to hand to hand conflict is carried out, may be left open. As
a rule, it is employed only when it may be presumed that the enemy
will not await the onslaught.” In his memoranda of 1865, in regard
to the influence of improved fire arms on tactics, he states: “If
the bayonet fights, so often mentioned in French accounts of the
campaign of 1859, were stripped of their dramatic splendor, and if
the simple prosaic truth could be ascertained, by far the greater
number of these reports would be corrected in so far as to state that
the opponent, shaken by more or less heavy losses, avoided the actual
collision.”

[404] Examples: The attack on Tempel Hill on October 11th, In
_Angriffsverfahren der Japaner_, VON LÜTTWITZ.--The capture of
works No. 17 and No. 18 by the 2nd Division, on March 1st, 1905
(Mukden).--Description by an eyewitness of a bayonet fight. Sir IAN
HAMILTON, _A Staff Officer’s Scrap Book_, p. 252.--A bayonet fight
occurred in the day time, in the open, when the 11th Rifle Regiment
broke through the line at Hamatan during the battle on the Yalu,
(see _Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften_, 39-40, p. 131), and in
Bernaul’s Regiment, during the engagement at Datshishiao, on July
24th, 1904.

The defender will never retire simultaneously all along the line; frequently isolated groups and then entire units will leave his line when the superiority of the attacker’s fire becomes effective. Officers, non-commissioned officers and capable privates will endeavor to keep the weak-kneed from running away.[405]

[405] At Villepion, Captain von Hoffmann made a wavering section
hold its position by springing toward them, revolver in hand, and
yelling: “I’ll shoot the first man who gets up! my revolver will
hit too, whether Chassepot bullets will hit you is a question.”
_Geschichte des Bayerischen Leibregiments_.

If the assault is not made at this moment, the crisis may pass, but a determined rush by the attacker will, as a rule, bring about the decision. The threat of a bayonet attack usually decides those who have remained in the position, to make no further resistance. The attacker must make use of the moral factors in an assault, hence the importance of running, cheering, and accompanying the advance of all bodies in close order by the beating of drums and the sounding of trumpets.[406]

[406] One must read KUNZ, _Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, 13, pp.
80, 116, 123 and 156, in order to appreciate what an electrifying
influence the beating of drums may have even on retreating lines.

“The French were unable to withstand an energetic attack, when
undertaken in anything like sufficient strength and accompanied by
cheers and beating drums.” BOGUSLAWSKI.

“Suddenly some soldier shouted: ‘Columns! Columns!’ Captain von
Wobeser rose to see what was going on, but at the same moment his men
rushed back and made straight for the Bois.”--“The mere launching of
the attack from the direction of =Point du Jour= sufficed to induce
the well concealed force of about 400 men, which held the gravel
pits, likewise to beat a retreat that very much resembled a rout.”
HÖNIG.

In time of peace there should be instilled in the soldier the conviction that, with the bayonet, he is a match for any opponent; that, in bayonet fighting, no other infantry is the equal of his own. The soldier should not be taught to shrink from the bayonet attack, but to seek it. If the infantry is deprived of the _arme blanche_, if the impossibility of bayonet fighting is preached, and the soldier is never given an opportunity in time of peace of defending himself, man to man, with his weapon in bayonet fencing, an infantry will be developed, which is unsuitable for attack and which, moreover, lacks a most essential quality, viz., the moral power to reach the enemy’s position.

“The rarity of bayonet fights does not prove the uselessness of the bayonet, but shows that opponents will rarely be found who are equally capable of making use of it. Indeed, the bayonet cannot be abolished for the reason, if for no other, that it is the sole and exclusive embodiment of that will power which alone, both in war and in every-day life, attains its object, whereas reason only tends to facilitate the attainment of the object.

“Let us assume that there exists an army which bases success in battle on fire action, and takes for granted that the enemy will not be able to get near enough to make a bayonet attack. If this army were to encounter another army which, without undervaluing the effect of fire, remembers the bayonet at the proper time, it would be filled with the most dreadful dismay when the enemy actually assails it with the bayonet. With modern rifles, bullets are unquestionably a good substitute for the bayonet at close quarters, but this is true only of troops who do not fear annihilation, _i.e._, troops trained to use the bayonet and capable of closing with the enemy after firing. If this is not the case, such firing at close quarters is a pure waste of ammunition, since men who are afraid to close with the enemy, if necessary at such a moment, will usually fire into the air.

“If the soldier has been taught, however, to annihilate the enemy from a distance and from behind cover, he will naturally prefer this mode of inflicting losses, since he runs very little risk of getting hurt, and will, moreover, acquire an aversion for exposing himself to danger, _i.e._, he will shrink from bayonet work. Hence, if we attach too much importance to marksmanship, we produce a more or less trained soldier, who may possibly be a very good shot at long ranges, but who is not especially inclined to take his chances in a bayonet fight. Incidentally, target practice develops the mentality of the man, but does not improve his morale.” DRAGOMIROV.

Of every 100 wounds, the following percentages were produced by cutting weapons:

Campaign of 1859 1.67%
Campaign of 1864 4.0 %
Campaign of 1866 (Prussians) 5.4 %
St. Privat (Germans) 1.0 %
Russo-Turkish war 0.9 %

In time of peace the assaulting distance is to be about 150 m. During the Franco-German war, the assault against Elsaszhausen (battle of Wörth) was launched at about 300 m.[407] and that against St. Hubert at 100-200 m. from the enemy.[408] The 107th Infantry, after charging over a distance of more than 500 paces, captured a hedge which was held by the French north of St. Privat, and, in the assault against the northern outskirts of the village, a distance of 300 paces had to be covered.[409] In the attack on Le Bourget, on October 30th, 1870, the center column halted when 600 m. from the village; “then began a wild, headlong assault against its outskirts.”[410] The Japanese frequently had occasion to cross similar stretches at a run, but there were also instances where their assaulting troops had only to cover a few meters (1st Division at Kinchau, 20 m.).

[407] _Gen. St. W._, I, p. 267.

[408] HÖNIG, _Vierundzwanzig Stunden Moltkescher Strategie_, p. 127.

[409] _Gen. St. W._, II, p. 804.

[410] KUNZ, _Le Bourget_, p. 21.

=If the attacker succeeds in carrying the position=, he will be at a disadvantage for the moment; his troops will be in confusion and exhausted, and a large number of officers will be gone. If the defender, reinforced by fresh reserves, takes advantage of this moment, he may be able to turn the tide of the battle. The inclination of the men to pursue the enemy with the bayonet, instead of halting and making the most of the fire power of their rifles, is noticeable in all battles. The attacker will have to take steps to restrain his victorious infantry, and, as soon as opportunity offers, to pursue the enemy with fire. Under cover of this fire fresh troops or quickly assembled detachments should advance on the flanks in pursuit of the enemy. There is a wide difference between a wild, headlong rush after the enemy and a systematic pursuit. Infantry that rushes headlong to the front after penetrating a position must be brought back at any cost, unless it can enter a second position simultaneously with the enemy.[411]

[411] The conduct of the 47th Infantry Brigade after the capture
of Ste. Marie aux Chênes. _Der 18. August_, p. 184. The second line
of the position at Düppel was carried by the pursuing victors at the
first rush. _Gen. St. W._, 1864, II, p. 539.

In addition to pursuing the enemy with fire, the attacker should re-form his troops without regard to their original arrangement (if the enemy gives him time enough, the original organizations should be re-formed), occupy the position, replenish ammunition, and remove the prisoners. It is a mistake to mass more rifles in the captured position than can be employed to advantage, as the enemy will in all probability direct a heavy fire upon it. As soon as the fight has been decided, the echelons in rear should be halted, so that they can be employed as occasion demands. The leaders of these units will often have to act independently in such a case. (Par. 350 German I. D. R.). Preparations should be made to the end that hostile counter-attacks may be at once repulsed. These rules are particularly important when the position that has been carried is not the main position but only an advanced post.[412] These measures must be taken independently by all leaders who participated in the assault, without waiting for orders from superior authority. The pursuit should be begun as soon as possible with formed bodies of troops (if practicable, while the enemy is being pursued by fire), in order to interfere with his re-forming, to prevent his taking up route column, and to overrun his rallying positions. The battle of Beaumont consisted of a whole series of such pursuing actions. The arrival of night should by no means be used as an excuse for discontinuing the pursuit, for night above all else is the mightiest ally of a bold victor.[413]

[412] See _Taktik_, V, p. 359, et seq. See also the measures taken
after the capture of St. Privat. _Der 18. August_, p. 533. The
situation in Fröschweiler; KUNZ. _Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_,
17. pp. 109 and 153. As in peace, the signals, ‘the whole force
assemble,’ and ‘the whole force halt,’ was sounded everywhere. How
little the infantry was inclined to pursue is shown by the conduct
of the 94th and the 32nd Infantry Regiments. _Ibid._, pp. 87-90. The
10th Company of the 32nd Infantry marched fully two miles to the rear
to a bivouac which they had left in the morning.

[413] See _Taktik_, V. p. 436.

=If the attack fails=, it will be the duty of the commander to arrest the flight of the skirmishers who are rushing to the rear under hostile fire. It will be impossible, however, to halt these men while they are exposed to the most effective fire of the enemy. Only when the nearest cover is reached can there be any question of halting. (Par. 327 German I. D. R.). When cover is not available near at hand, the exhaustion of the troops will soon stop the flight, or the leaders may be able to face them again to the front, as soon as the hostile fire abates. However, the retreating troops will have placed quite a distance between themselves and the enemy before this can be done, and the latter, unmolested by fire from the attacker, will be able to take full advantage of the technical qualities of his rifle, unless the attacker’s artillery or cavalry prevent his doing so. No matter where the retreating troops come to a halt and face to the front, there they must stay, and, if the hostile fire permits, intrench.

The perseverance of the Prussian Guard 600-800 m. in front of
=St. Privat=,[414] and of the British Brigade of Highlanders at
=Magersfontain=, immediately in front of the Boer position, on
December 11th, 1899, is worthy of imitation.

[414] The distance at which the first attack came to a standstill
is variously given as 300 (3rd Guard Regiment and IInd Battalion of
the 1st Guard Regiment) and 800-900 paces (2nd Guard Regiment). See
_History of the 3rd Guard Regiment_, pp. 276, 279 and 280; that of
the _1st Guard Regiment_, p. 165; that of the _2nd Guard Regiment_,
p. 232. “Headed by a few of the officers who still remained,
the depleted lines clung to the slope; with iron endurance and
self-sacrifice they maintained the dearly bought positions.” _Gen.
St. W._, II, p. 872.

The assault on =Gorni Dubniac= came to a standstill at very short
range, and a part of the skirmishers of the Moscow and Pavlov
Regiments maintained their positions 50 m., the remaining Russian
skirmishers 320 m., from the trench.[415]

[415] PUSYREWSKI, _Die russische Garde_, p. 126.

11. THE USE OF THE SPADE IN ATTACK.

(Pars. 157, 313, 339, 380 and 381 German I. D. R.).

In every attack there are situations in which it may be advantageous to use intrenching tools--

1. In fortifying rallying positions.

The Japanese, whose mode of waging war was very cautious, fortified the initial positions from which their attacks were made, in order that they might have rallying positions in case of defeat.[416]

[416] On July 19th, 1904, the 12th Infantry Division (Ist Army)
had pushed back Russian troops at Shaotao and at once fortified a
position 2700 m. from the new Russian position at Yushuling. From
this position the 12th Division advanced, on July 31st, as a Russian
attack had not taken place. The extended fortifications facing the
Russian Shaho position were made with the same end in view. The war
in the Far East was one of positions, since neither army possessed
sufficient freedom of action. See p. 341, et seq., supra.

2. In intrenching after making an advance under cover of darkness to within effective range of the enemy for the purpose of opening fire at daybreak. In this case, the advancing force is, as a rule, instructed to advance until it comes under hostile fire and then to intrench.[417]

[417] During the attack on Paardeberg, on February 27th, 1900, the
Canadians were ordered to advance before daybreak from their trenches
located 500 m. from the Boer position, and to throw themselves down
and to intrench as soon as they were fired upon. This was done
when the force was 100 m. from the enemy. _Kriegsgeschichtliche
Einzelschriften_, 33, p. 60.

The Japanese 45th Infantry, in its advance under cover of darkness
against Oerrshikiatsi (Shaho) was first fired upon at a range of 1000
m., whereupon the men threw themselves down and intrenched; when the
hostile fire abated, the regiment advanced again, and when the enemy
resumed his fire, it intrenched. A third advance brought the regiment
within 500 m. of the defender’s position and it was able to make the
assault during the forenoon of October 12th, 1904.

3. In intrenching an echelon posted to cover advancing infantry.

4. In fortifying a captured position. The want of intrenching tools in quickly putting captured positions in a state of defense, so often felt during the Franco-German war and the Russo-Turkish war, has now been removed by the introduction of portable tools.[418] The necessity of quickly preparing captured positions for defense presented itself in a number of instances.

[418] Examples: The French in St. Privat. The Germans and later
the French in Noisseville. on September 1st, 1870. Villepion,
on December 1st, 1870 (HÖNIG, _Volkskrieg_, III, p. 257; KUNZ,
_Loigny_, p. 49): Les Granges, on January 11th, 1871 (_Geschichte des
Regiments Nr. 20_. p. 297). Fortifying the position on the second
ridge of the Green Hills in front of Plevna, on September 10th, 1877
(KUROPATKIN-KRAHMER, II, p. 178). Tempel Hill (Terrayama), on October
11th, 1904. In the last mentioned case three offensive returns were
repulsed from the captured position, which had been prepared for
defense. The fights for the possession of the village of Linchinpu
(on the right bank of the Shaho, north of the railway), captured
on October 14th, were still more obstinate; the position had to be
prepared for defense under hostile artillery fire. (VON TETTAU,
_Achtzehn Monate mit Russlands Heeren in der Mandschurei_, II, p.
136).

5. In holding ground that has been gained in an attack when further advance is impossible, that is, in situations such as confronted the infantry of the Guard on August 18th when its first attack came to a standstill. During the attack on Gorni Dubniac, in the Russo-Turkish war, the Russian Guard intrenched when a further advance became impossible. During the attack on Telish, which occurred a few days later, specific orders were issued for the troops to intrench when 1000-2000 m. from the Turkish works.[419]

[419] PUSYREWSKI, _Die russische Garde_, p. 166.

As a result of the lessons gained in the Russo-Turkish war, general instructions were issued to the Russian infantry on the subject of intrenching in attack. According to these instructions, the spade was to be used in attack in the following cases: In fortifying a captured position, as a protection against a possible offensive return of the defender; in holding supporting points necessary to a continuation of the attack; and in placing rallying positions in a state of defense. The order directing troops to intrench was to be given, in all cases, by the supreme commander. The following procedure was to be observed: “Every man equipped with a spade and who is not sheltered by some feature of the terrain, places his rifle on the ground and, lying on his left side, begins to excavate a hole parallel to his body. This hole should be as long as the distance from his left elbow to his knee, as wide as the length of the spade-handle, and as deep as the width of the blade of the spade. The excavated earth and sod he places in front of his head, which he endeavors to protect as quickly as possible. When this work is completed, he rolls over into the excavated hole, and, lying on his right side, repeats the operation. When he has obtained sufficient cover, he hands his spade to the other man of the file, who proceeds in a similar fashion.”

The Japanese, on account of their numerical inferiority, found it necessary to get along with few supports and reserves, and therefore made use of the spade in terrain devoid of cover, or utilized sand bags,[420] which were carried along. In this manner, they laboriously worked their way to within assaulting distance of the enemy. In many instances, this necessitated whole days of fighting when an envelopment was impossible. Sand bags were an advantage when the ground was frozen or when the sod was not thick.

[420] See p. 344 supra. Frequently the bags, which could be tied
with a string, were filled near the place where they were to be used.
The advance was considerably retarded by carrying along sand bags.
During the attack on Yuputz, on March 1st, 1905, by the 8th Infantry
Division of the IInd Army, the first sand bag cover was constructed
700 m. and the last 250 m. from the village.

_Results of Russian experiments._ The sand bag employed was made
of coarse linen of grayish green color and when filled and tied,
was approximately 50 cm. long (width of a man’s shoulders), 30-35
cm. wide, and 30-35 cm. high. The filled sand bag weighed 14-20
kg., depending upon the filling material (sand or broken stone).
When filled with sand or broken stone, the sand bag stopped all
projectiles, while, when filled with earth, even two bags placed in
rear of each other did not afford sufficient protection. The sand
bags were scarcely discernible with the naked eye at 400 m. They were
not an easy target to hit, and, even at 300 m., it was difficult to
aim at them.

The men had a distinct aversion against constructing shelter trenches
while lying down. During the war they could be made to intrench only
by great exertions on the part of the officers. The reason for this
is obvious; digging with the small spade while in a prone position
is uncomfortable. The skirmisher considers it much more profitable
to fire than to puzzle out how he can best stir up the soil with the
small spade while in a prone position. Moreover, he knows that at any
moment he may have to make a rush to the front.

The beautiful idea that these trenches were to be used and widened
by the reserves, was usually not carried out. The reserves preferred
to make longer rushes and to take advantage of folds of the ground
rather than occupy themselves with intrenching under hostile fire.

At ranges from 2000-1000 m., single men made short rushes, only 30-40
m. long, as the filled sand bag constituted a considerable load.
Before a man ran forward, he slung his rifle, grasped the sand bag
with one hand at the tied end, with the other at a loop specially
provided for that purpose; then he jumped up, ran forward 30-40 m.,
as rapidly as he could in a crouching position, placed the sand bag
on the ground, and threw himself down behind it. Under effective
hostile fire, at 1000-550 m. (during our peace maneuvers at 420-280
m.), the men then crawl forward, utilizing the sand bag as cover.
The men would rather crawl a greater distance with the sand bag than
intrench while lying down.

From the position of the enemy, the skirmishers lying behind grayish
green sand bags could not be recognized with the naked eye at
2000-1000 m. It is reported that both officers and men were at first
very much disinclined toward making these experiments, but that they
changed their views after one or two exercises, and the principal
apprehension, that of increasing the weight of the field equipment,
disappeared because of the undeniable advantages of the sand bag.

Such cover constructed by the assailant has no greater value than natural cover found on the ground over which the attack is made; it affords protection during halts and induces retreating skirmishers to face to the front again at an earlier moment than would otherwise be the case.

“It should not be forgotten, however, that time gained is of greater benefit to the defender than to the assailant. Moreover, the great difficulty of inducing a firing line which has made a lodgment under hostile fire, to advance from its laboriously constructed cover, admonishes us to be cautious in employing the spade during an attack. The construction of cover ought never to impair the desire for making an impetuous attack, or destroy the offensive spirit.” (Par. 313 German I. D. R.).

When a body of troops intrenches during an attack, it must detach half of its force to keep up the attack; this cannot be offset by an increased rate of fire, even if squad leaders, range finders, and musicians, take part in the fight, as the men offer a taller target while intrenching, and as the newly turned earth facilitates the enemy’s aim. A superiority of fire that has been gained may thereby be lost. However, when the defender’s troops have been so shaken that the assailant can detach half of his rifles with impunity, the latter need not remain lying on the ground, but can advance, in most cases, closer to the enemy’s position. The use of the spade is, therefore, proper only when ground that has been gained is to be held, and when the enemy’s fire permits intrenching.

=Russia.= In instructions issued by General Kuropatkin, the following
statement in regard to the Japanese infantry appears: “It advances in
widely deployed lines. The firing line advances by short, alternating
rushes, the men then throwing themselves down and intrenching. In
spite of our extraordinarily violent fire, the firing line continues
to advance by alternate rushes, leaves its half completed shelter
trenches and begins to dig new ones. The supports then advance by
alternate rushes, occupy the first line of trenches and complete
them. When the firing line advances from the second line of trenches,
they are occupied by the supports, while the reserves move up into
the first line of trenches. In this manner, the advance is continued
by successive rushes. From this, it is apparent that the infantryman
in the firing line must act on his own initiative in selecting a
point for intrenching.”

=Japan.= In a number of cases, the Japanese conducted an attack in
the manner described. At Liao Yang, on September 1st, 1904, shelter
trenches were dug at 750 and at 530 m. from the Russian position.
The advance beyond this was so managed that the men intrenched after
every rush, finally arriving, in the course of the day, within 300
m. of the enemy. An assault made from this position on the afternoon
of the 2nd was repulsed. The whole Japanese line again faced to the
front on arriving in the shelter trenches which they had dug 300 m.
from the hostile position. The Japanese now perfected their weak
intrenchments and were even able to repulse two counter-attacks
made by the Russians. This was certainly an exceptional case, and,
besides, it involved an attack on a fortified position.

The German Manual of Field Engineering (No. 46) recommends that the
man, when lying on his left side, construct in the first place a
parapet 30 cm. high, as head cover and rifle rest. This produces pits
50 cm. wide, 60 cm. long, and 40 cm. deep, usually deeper in front
than in rear, which makes aiming uncomfortable.

=France.= According to the _Instruction pratique sur les travaux de
campagne_ (24th October, 1906), the men are to improve available
cover; where natural cover is wanting, artificial cover is to
be constructed when the hostile fire compels a halt or the men
are forced to halt to regain their breath. At short ranges, the
skirmishers dig individual pits. It is desirable for the soldier to
use his knapsack as cover while working, and to leave it in position
later also, to get better head cover.

=England.= Although the troops are not equipped with portable
intrenching tools, it is prescribed that captured positions be
fortified; in open country, when the hostile fire is too hot, this is
to be done at night.

The suggestion of creating cover for skirmishers by using the
pits produced by short shell salvos, is a singular one. Detailed
experiments have been made in =Austria=.[421] In instructions issued
by the commander of the XIth Corps, it was recommended that, when
exposed to moderate hostile fire, the soldier should hug the ground
as closely as possible while at work. The intrenching proceeded
most rapidly when the soldier first excavated the ground in front
and threw it forward. But in order to do this, the man has to push
himself backward during the work and must throw the earth some
distance. The parapet is low, but affords sufficient protection.

[421] _Streffleur_, 1906, III, p. 387.

The task is greater when the soldier lies first on his left, then on
his right side, removes earth from a borrow pit at his right and then
from one on his left, and piles it up in front. As the skirmisher
lies on the natural surface of the ground during this operation, he
naturally constructs a higher parapet.

The following general rules governing the use of the spade in attack may be laid down:

1. An invariable use of the spade in attack must be unhesitatingly condemned. The best means of gaining the superiority of fire, and the best protection against hostile fire, is our own fire.

2. It must not be left to the soldier’s discretion, as to whether or not he shall intrench. The order for intrenching should in every case emanate from the supreme commander.

3. As a rule, the spade should be used in those phases of combat that partake more of a defensive character, in particular--

(a) To protect artillery and prepare rallying positions during the preparatory stage of the action;

(b) To shelter troops detailed to contain the enemy while enveloping movements are in progress;

(c) To shelter troops that are to keep down the hostile fire by their own delivered from enfilading or commanding positions;

(d) To maintain a strip of ground or a supporting point that has just been gained, whether this has been captured from the enemy or whether the attack has come to a standstill at that point and a pause in the fighting occurs.

4. An attack with the aid of the spade from trench to trench is advisable only in exceptional cases, when the attack is a purely frontal one and is made over ground devoid of cover.

12. THE EMPLOYMENT OF RESERVES.[422]

(Pars. 294, 295, 366, 388, 393, 427 and 436 German I. D. R.).

[422] _Taktik_, V. p. 334, et seq.

The infantry attack may be characterized as a fire fight. It would seem desirable to surround the enemy’s zone of approach, or the position one wishes to attack, from the very outset with a dense, continuous line of rifles, and to overcome the resistance of the enemy in the earliest phases of the combat by means of an overwhelming volume of fire from as many rifles as possible. The impediments that stand in the way of carrying out this idea lie in the terrain, the ignorance of the enemy’s position, and in human nature. The defender can be driven from his position only by an attack; the impulse for an advance must be given by fresh troops; and the success gained by the firing line must be clinched by a retained assaulting force. The necessity of having a formed body of troops available, until the fight is in full swing, to meet unforeseen contingencies, further requires that a reserve be provided. Organizations should not be broken up any more than is absolutely necessary. The number of troops which the commander will retain for the time being, will depend upon the amount of information he has in regard to the situation. During an attack the reserve is frequently not designated until a preparatory position is taken up. In attack about ¹⁄₄-¹⁄₃, and in defense ¹⁄₆-¹⁄₂ of the whole force is put in the reserve, depending upon whether the ensuing action is to be a purely defensive one or the decision is sought.

The reserve enables the commander to “shift the center of gravity of the fight to the point desired by him, to reinforce his line where he considers proper, to equalize fluctuations of the combat, and, finally, to bring about the decision.” (Par. 294 German I. D. R.). As the combat progresses, the commander must decide whether the situation is such as to compel him to employ the reserves to cover his retreat,[423] or whether it is proper for him to put in his last troops for the purpose of gaining the victory. If the reserve has been put in and the attack fails (or, as at Wörth, the defender succumbs after putting in all the reserves) defeat is certain; but it would be a mistake not to employ the reserve, to keep it in readiness to cover a possible retreat, if its intervention can yet bring about a favorable termination of the combat.

[423] See deliberations of General v. d. Tann at Coulmiers. HELVIG,
_Das erste bayerische Armeekorps_, p. 203.

The employment of the reserves by the Russians at =Plevna=, on
September 11th, 1877: The general reserve consisted of nine
battalions and was too weak to make an impression at one point;
fifteen battalions were detailed to cover the lines of communication
and the artillery (which was not at all in danger). Forty battalions
that did not enter the fight were scattered all over the battlefield,
no one being able to account for their presence.[424] When Skobeleff
had effected a lodgment in the Turkish position, every available
man should have been sent to this point. Although there were 9
battalions, 30 guns, and 4 troops (_Eskadrons_) available, only
the Schuja Regiment (1300 men), which had suffered heavy losses in
previous actions, was despatched to the point in question, and that
more for the purpose of covering the retreat than to make the most of
the success that had been gained.

[424] In the Franco-German war, the same thing happened on the
German side. _Der 18. August_, p. 221.

In contrast to the Japanese commanders, who promptly launched all
their troops, the Russian commanders were inclined to despatch
numerous detachments, to organize provisional units, while completely
ignoring existing organizations (this had, indeed, also the
advantage that a suitable leader could be found for carrying a
special mission into execution), and to form strong reserves by
details from any and all imaginable units. These reserves were
frequently not used at all.[425]

[425] On July 31st, 1904, when, in pursuance of orders from General
Headquarters, a regiment and a battery was to be despatched to
Mistshenko’s Cavalry Division, 15 km. away, a provisional regiment
of two battalions was formed, without apparent reason, for the
purpose from the 139th and 140th Infantry Regiments. In regard to the
inclination of the Russians to form detachments, see LÖFFLER, I, pp.
11, 27, 53 and 54.

On March 5th, 1905, the commanding general of the Xth Army Corps
(Zerpitzki) had available one brigade of his 31st Division, one
regiment of his 9th Division, one regiment of the VIIIth Corps, three
Rifle regiments of the mixed Rifle Corps, the 5th Rifle Brigade, and
one regiment of the Vth Siberian Army Corps.[426]

[426] See V. TETTAU, _Achtzehn Monate mit Russlands Heeren in der
Mandschurei_, II, p. 483.

On October 15th, in the battle on the =Shaho=, the general reserve
of the army consisted of 32 battalions belonging to five different
divisions and five different army corps. In his order for the battle,
Kuropatkin laid particular stress on the necessity of forming
reserves (Army Orders dated August 15th, 1904): “Keeping back more
than half of the force in reserve is the best guarantee for success.”
On December 27th, 1904, he made a similar statement.

The reserves are created to be used; every available man must participate in the decisive stage of the combat. If the enemy yields before the reserve is launched, so much the better; if he does not give way, all the troops that are at hand must be put in. The main thing is to gain the victory; scruples may be indulged in afterwards. A defeated commander who leaves the battlefield with troops that are still partially intact, has not made the most of the means at his disposal for combat, provided the situation was such that the launching of the reserves could have secured the victory. As shown by Hastenbeck (1757), by Idstedt (1850), and by Bapaume, at the moment of the crisis there is no sharp dividing line between victory and defeat, and the reserves may decide the fate of the day. The decision of Archduke Albrecht, during the battle of Custozza (1866), to push his last reserves into the fight was worthy of a great commander.

In contrast with this, =Russia= (1904): “In employing the general
reserve, the commander-in-chief must be even more economical than
the troop leader; he should, when necessary, detail single units to
support this or that section, _but he should in no case use up his
whole reserve before the decision has occurred_.” The failures of
the British in the South African war may likewise be traced in part
to a faulty use of the reserves. Thus, we read in the regulations of
1896: “The reserve should occupy a favorable defensive position in
order to check the enemy in case of defeat; if the attack succeeds,
the reserve should move up into the position and take charge of the
pursuit.”

“Troops that give up a fight are like the swimmer who, after having made the most inconceivable exertions to swim across a broad, deep river, shrinks from the last spurt and drowns, although he need only stretch out his arm to reach the opposite shore.” (DRAGOMIROV).

In employing the reserve, it should be remembered that the whole available force must be launched at the decisive moment at the decisive point, and that the commander ought not to detach portions of the force intended for the decisive blow for tasks of secondary importance.

The launching of L’Estocq’s Corps at =Preussisch-Eylau=, is still a
model worthy of imitation.[427]

[427] LETTOW-VORBECK, _Feldzug von 1806 und 1807_, IV, p. 107.

In the battle of =Vionville=, three battalions and four batteries
were detached from the 20th Infantry Division, which had arrived
during the afternoon, and sent to the right flank to take part in
the action of the 5th Infantry Division, as infantry support seemed
necessary on the right flank. When the head of the division reached
Tronville, the question was discussed, as to whether it was desirable
first to concentrate the division for action, or to throw the leading
battalions into the Tronville forest, where portions of Lehman’s
Brigade were still holding their ground. As an advance of the French
out of the woods would have endangered the left flank of the Prussian
artillery line, three battalions were at once thrown into the forest,
while the six remaining battalions were kept in reserve for the time
being. Subsequently, three more battalions were sent forward to
reinforce the infantry engaged in the forest

“What a decisive blow the 20th Division could have struck, if it had
been employed in one body!” (V. LIEBERT).[428]

[428] _Gen. St. W._, I, p. 595. _Kriegsgeschichtliche
Einzelschriften_, 18, p. 580.--V. SCHERFF, _Kriegslehren_, II,
p. 146.--Essay by V. LIEBERT published in Supplement of the
_Militär-Wochenblatt_, 1895. From the description contained in
the 4th Supplement of the _Militär-Wochenblatt_, 1895, p. 177. It
appears, at any rate, that the support given by the 39th Half-Brigade
was not absolutely necessary. On the right flank as well, a united
employment of the force for the attack of Hill 970 ought to have
been possible; as it was, regiments were cut up in making isolated
assaults, which had no effect whatever on the outcome of the general
action. KUNZ, _Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, 8/9, p. 128, et seq.

The decision is usually brought about by pressure on a flank, but it might become necessary to accomplish this result by launching large masses against some point of the hostile front.[429]

[429] General MINARELLI-FITZGERALD, _Infanteriemassen im Angriff_.
Colonel CSICSERICS VON BACSANY of the Austrian Army, in a brilliant
study entitled _Die Schlacht_ (Vienna, 1908), argues that with the
increased combat frontage of armies, local successes have no longer
the same Influence on the outcome of the battle as of old. Compare,
for example, the envelopment of the Russian left flank at Liao Yang,
and the penetration of the line at Yuhuntun (Mukden), with the effect
produced by the capture of Chlum and St. Privat on the outcome of the
battles of Königgrätz and Gravelotte, respectively.

The difficulties of accomplishing this are best illustrated by the situation of the IIIrd Army Corps on the afternoon of August 18th, 1870, when Prince Frederick Charles yielded to the entreaties of General von Alvensleben and permitted him to advance south of the Bois de la Cusse.[430] Similar situations resulted in the case of the Austrian 1st and VIth Army Corps at Königgrätz, the French IIIrd and IVth Army Corps, on a front of 2.75 km., with the Guards in rear, between Noisseville and Failly, and, finally, the advance of the 1st East Siberian Rifle Division at Wafangu. The French regulations likewise contemplate a decisive attack made by large masses on a narrow front. If these troops which are to clinch the success gained by the fighting line, are deployed on the front laid down in regulations, they will be unable to use their weapons. It isn’t mechanical shock action, but fire effect that decides the battle. In such a mass of troops, only fractional parts will be able to fire, the major portion is crowded together and becomes a dense, defenseless target, exposed to all the psychological impressions produced by crowding human beings into a narrow space.[431]

[430] _Der 18. August_, pp. 484 and 558, sketches 34 and 35.

[431] The successful attacks made by masses of fanatical warriors
in colonial wars are carried out under such peculiar conditions that,
for our purposes, deductions therefrom are not admissible. The defeat
of the two French brigades at Bang-Bo (24th March, 1885), and at
Ki-lua (28th March, 1885). LEHAUCOURT, _Les Expéditions de Tonkin_.
The defeat of the Italians at Adua (1st March. 1896).

A brigade, therefore, should not deploy on a front of 1500 m., _i.e._, put only about ¹⁄₄ of its men in the first line; but no objection can be made if the brigade, in moving to the final decisive assault, at once advances on a front of 2500-3000 m.

13. THE CONDUCT OF THE LEADERS IN ACTION.

The difficulties of troop leading increase as the power of the commander to control and direct all ranks in action by words of command diminishes. In action, therefore, those means must be adopted that will facilitate the transmission of orders. This requires first of all the choice of an appropriate position for the leader.

The beginning of an action should find the leader as far forward as possible; during the advance to the battlefield, with the advance guard (par. 277 German I. D. R.), for neither messages nor reports, nor a map can adequately take the place of personal inspection of the situation of the enemy, of neighboring units, and of the ground. So placed, he can best direct the first deployment, upon which the future course of the action so largely depends, secure advantages by making prompt decisions in face of the enemy, save his own troops from making detours, handle them in accordance with a definite plan, and preclude arbitrary action on the part of the commander of the leading unit.

During the action, the superior commander can influence the course of the fight, his personal example excepted, only by employing his reserves. His place is, therefore, near the reserves, at a point that can be readily found, and never in the firing line.

A company commander should remain where he believes he can best control his company, as a rule, perhaps in the firing line. He provides for the supply and distribution of ammunition that is brought up from the rear, and regulates the coöperation of the platoons. (Pars. 216, 457 and 458 German I. D. R.).

A battalion commander should only in very exceptional cases take post in the firing line; he should nearly always remain with parts of the force that are held back for the time being, but, in any case, where he can effectively supervise his battalion. The choice of a regimental commander’s position is influenced by the same considerations; when his regiment is acting as part of a brigade, he must select his position so as to facilitate the transmission of orders from brigade headquarters. The brigade commander will, as a rule, remain near his reserves, at a point from which he can best overlook the deployment of his brigade.

On account of the fact that extended order fighting predominates, leaders of all grades must be particularly careful to maintain connection between the several parts of their command, with each other, and with adjoining units, and to preserve their influence over their firing lines. Superior commanders should, in addition, see that their troops do not get out of hand, and all subordinate leaders, after carrying out a task assigned them, should endeavor promptly to rejoin their proper commands, or place themselves at the disposal of the commander of troops still engaged with the enemy.

These requirements will be fulfilled, if superior commanders order nothing that they should not and cannot order, and if the officers charged with the execution of the orders coöperate to attain the desired end, and do not abuse the freedom of action allowed them.

While subordinate leaders, up to and including company commanders, are mainly occupied with fire control and fire direction, and should influence the men by their personal example, superior commanders have other tasks, which they must not neglect for the purpose of interfering in the sphere of action of their subordinates. They can influence the fire action only by sending the necessary forces to those portions of the firing line whose fire they wish to augment. An interference on their part with the action of subordinates is permissible only in case of obvious misunderstandings or mistakes, which would cause the combat to take a course other than that intended. The larger the unit commanded by an officer, the greater the latitude that must be allowed him. The leaders should concentrate their attention upon the general execution of their special tasks as part of the whole scheme, rather than upon supervision of details. It is by no means essential for all parts of the force to employ identical means to attain one and the same object. Every leader should bear in mind that _omission or neglect are greater crimes than a mistake made in the choice of means_.

The initiative of leaders of all grades is the foundation of great victories in war, but this initiative must neither jeopardize unity of action nor direct the course of events into channels not intended by the commander.[432]

[432] See _Taktik_, III, p. 174, and V, p. 57, et seq.

The best safeguard against the results of an act of unjustifiable initiative is to ask oneself: “What orders would my superior have to give me, if he were in my place and knew what I know?”

14. UNITED ACTION VERSUS TACTICAL MISSIONS.

Although no one disputes that victory depends upon a superiority of
fire at the decisive point, yet there is a great diversity of opinion
as to how this superiority is to be attained.

General Bronsart von Schellendorff states:[433] “Every battle seeks
to bring about a decisive victory, but this is, after all, invariably
the sum of local victories. Successful battle-tactics consist of
correctly estimating the tactical value of these local successes
and of contriving to gain a victory at the decisive point; in other
words, to manage so that the sum-total of positive factors will be
greater than that of the negative factors.”

[433] _Betrachtungen über die zeitgemäsze Fechtweise der
Infanterie_, 1891, p. 36.

In the opinion of the advocates of this course,[434] unity of action
is attainable by practice and study, but not by set formations. If
unity of action could be ensured in all bodies of troops by means
of study and practice, there would seem to be no reason why the
regulations should lay down still more definite rules to govern the
manner in which an attack should be conducted. The matter is not
so simple, however. Bearing in mind the great latitude that the
regulations allow each individual in choosing the formation which he
deems proper in a given case, it is obvious that many very different
procedures may result. This in itself is no drawback, and to a
certain extent this condition must exist, as the task in hand, the
nature of the country, and the existing situation vary. But, if a
given problem can be correctly solved in several ways, it will also
admit of a decidedly incorrect solution; and it is the more likely
to be solved incorrectly, the less study and practice is indulged in
by a large part of the corps of officers, and the less this class of
officers finds in existing regulations as a guide to conduct. When,
in spite of undeniable progress, we see dispersed attacks and an
unquestionably incorrect conduct in every maneuver, and this with a
corps of officers nearly all of whom are professional soldiers, who
have had the advantage of study and practice, what may we expect
in war, where the corps of officers will be very largely composed
of officers of the Reserve and Landwehr, who have but very limited
opportunities for study and practice, but who, after the very first
battle, may have to command companies.

[434] General VON SCHLICHTING, _Taktische und strategische
Grundsätze der Gegenwart_. See also the essay in the July number of
_Jahrbücher für Armee und Marine_, 1898.

General von Scherff,[435] the chief advocate of “united action,” is
opposed to the “combat with units of command” (_Kommandoeinheiten_)
briefly sketched above. He makes a distinction between battle-tactics
and the tactics of detachment warfare. In his opinion, the sum of
the local successes can by no means gain the victory; that can only
be done by the united launching of adequate forces at the decisive
point. “No weapon in the world will ever alter the fact that five
battalions united in one body have a greater inherent fighting
power than five separate battalions--not to mention twenty separate
companies--always provided that a united body of troops is also
launched as one body.”

[435] _Kriegslehren in Kriegsgeschichtlichen Beispielen der
Neuzeit_, I-IV, _Ein Schlachtenangriff_, 1898.

Examples Illustrating the Necessity of a United Attack.