Chapter XIV: Part 14

Both forces are marching toward each other, and the collision occurs frequently at a point not intended by either; as every minute brings the heads of the two columns closer together no time is to be lost. The commander who desires to wait until he can come to a decision consonant with the results of the reconnaissance will arrive too late. The tactical situation in its entirety determines whether or not an attack should be made. If we do not take advantage of the fleeting moment the enemy will surely do so, and, as a rule, he will not be any better prepared for action than we are. Frequently the deployment from route column is not made because the commander desires it, but because it is necessary in order to avert a crisis in the leading line. The commander who is acting under hostile pressure should endeavor to regain the upper hand as quickly as possible so that he can dispose of the troops of the main body with a definite object in view. In a rencontre, the advantage rests almost invariably with the commander who quickly sizes up the situation, attacks promptly, and succeeds in throwing the opponent on the defensive. A bold, impetuous attack, which would lead to disaster in the presence of an opponent already deployed, may, in this case, be productive of victory. The direction in which the attack is made is of less importance than a prompt decision on the part of the commander and the simultaneous launching of the whole force in a definite direction. We must take the terrain as we find it. In covered terrain, the effect of the surprise will be increased still more, while in open country, the preparatory stage of the combat will soon lose that character, because the side which has an advantage as regards terrain will make use of it, and the conviction will force itself upon the opponent that victory cannot be gained by an impetuous attack alone. It will be easy for a commander to come to a decision as to the action to be taken if he is conscious of his own strength or fears that the enemy desires to avoid an attack. (The commanders of the advanced troops of the IIIrd Army Corps at Vionville). _The rencontre increases the difficulties of troop leading, but makes the attack easier for the troops._

* * * * *

The difference between a deliberately planned attack and a rencontre is most clearly apparent in the conduct of the advance guard. Its task is to secure the prospective artillery position and to create favorable conditions for the combat of the main body. This requires that ground be gained to the front so as to enable the main body to deploy while moving forward. In addition, the advance guard should seize and hold important points, without, however, anticipating the intentions of the commander of the whole force. It is moreover desirable for the advance guard to interfere with the hostile deployment. Points lying on the flanks or in advance of the artillery position, especially if they command the latter, should be quickly seized; when necessary, the advance guard must fight for their possession. Its commander should quickly pick out the points that are important for this purpose; he should, by no means, be satisfied always to begin the fight where the point of the advance guard happens to be. Under certain circumstances the main body will have to concentrate for action farther to the rear so as to hasten the deployment and to take advantage of favorable terrain. When the enemy has an undeniable start in deployment, the commander may decide to let the opponent advance to the attack, and then bring about the decision by simultaneously launching his main body. Only thus can one in the long run avoid fighting superior numbers with an inferior force. (Par. 360 German I. D. R.). It is much easier to decide whether this or that point is of importance, than to answer the question as to whether the strength of the advance guard will suffice for the task of taking it. The reports of the cavalry in regard to the enemy’s strength and the composition and formation of his columns, will scarcely furnish an adequate basis for a pertinent answer to this question. Moreover, one will usually not be able to tell, until after the action has commenced, how far the hostile deployment has progressed. But, in any case, long hostile firing lines demand caution. However, a start in deployment is not indicated by the combat frontage alone. A factor of far greater importance is which force has been most successful in making preparations for going into action by developing its main body and by having artillery near at hand. It is artillery that clears up the situation. When an infantry division encounters a hostile force deployed on a front of 400-600 m., this does not necessarily mean that the entire division must systematically concentrate for action, as this would cause a considerable loss of time, thus giving the enemy a great advantage. _The general situation and the mission of a force are of greater importance for the commander’s decision, than the state of readiness for action of the opposing forces._

_Issue of orders._ See _Taktik_, V, p. 197.

The advance guard must be promptly informed of the intentions of the commander (_i.e._, whether he intends to attack, to concentrate for attack farther to the rear, or to let the enemy attack[338]) and of the location of the prospective artillery position. The attack order should be withheld until the combat of the advance guard has sufficiently cleared the situation, but a development of the force should be ordered at once.

[338] Par. 350 German I. D. R.

The advanced detachments should endeavor to gain a start in deployment over the enemy and cover the advancing artillery in front and flank, by quickly deploying strong firing lines and pushing machine guns to the front. After they have done this, they should promptly advance to the attack. Through this, our firing line, while in the act of deploying, runs the serious risk of suddenly encountering, at short range, the fire of superior hostile troops, at a time when all the troops approaching the field are still too far distant to increase its fire power.[339] Whether the quickly formed firing lines should at once move forward to the attack in a rencontre, depends upon the impressions received by the commander. His dispositions should be such as to compel the enemy to disclose his available forces at an early moment. Every fighting line is so sensitive to fire simultaneously delivered against its front and flank, that an attempt to turn the hostile position will instantly force the enemy to take counter-measures. If the enemy is unable to keep pace with us in deploying a firing line, if he is unable to deploy skirmish lines as dense as ours, this state of affairs should induce our commander to proceed to the attack; if the reverse state of affairs exists, he should await the arrival of reinforcements. But in order to obtain this insight into the existing situation the troops must get close to the enemy. Such an insight into the hostile dispositions cannot be gained at long range. The extent of a hostile position may perhaps be determined at long range with the best field glasses, but the strength and power of resistance of the enemy can never be gauged in this manner. If one threatens to push an attack home, however, the enemy will be compelled to show his hand. When opposed by an enemy whose strength is unknown, it will unquestionably be necessary to approach to the extreme limit of short ranges. From here the dispositions of the enemy may be clearly recognized, and, in addition, at 600-800 m., a firing line that has made a lodgment in some feature of the terrain will not as yet be exposed to annihilating losses. Misconceptions are scarcely to be avoided in such a situation. One must trust to luck and take some risks. On the other hand, the training of the infantry should afford the assurance that it will not give up the position it has once reached; it should firmly hold the ground gained, and persevere.[340]

[339] This induces the British _Infantry Training_ to prescribe
that in a rencontre a concentration for attack should invariably be
ordered.

[340] Military history furnishes a multitude of examples of
the fact that a force can persevere in spite of the most galling
fire (St. Privat. Gorni Dubniac). A reverse does not occur, as a
rule, until the advent of unforeseen circumstances. The Brigade of
Highlanders held out for hours at Magersfontain, and an insignificant
change of front on the right flank subsequently caused the whole line
to retire. See _Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften_, 32, p. 74.

When infantry is compelled to go into action, the necessity of occupying important supporting points and of gaining ground for the concentration for action, requires a broad front to be covered. (Par. 357 German I. D. R.). The artillery, which will arrive soon thereafter, will then bring relief to the infantry in critical situations.

In every rencontre there comes a moment when the fight is at a standstill. At this moment an attentive observer may notice that, although it is impossible to push the attack home without further reinforcements, the space in which the concentration for action is to take place, is secured against a hostile attack, or that the enemy has been deprived of the initiative and has been thrown on the defensive. This is the moment in which the commander regains the initiative and in which, by means of an _attack order_, he can dispose of the troops of the main body as he sees fit. _The “rencontre” differs from the “deliberately planned attack,” in that, in the latter, the concentration for action can proceed smoothly as desired by the commander, while in a rencontre the opponent, for the time being, dictates the course of action. Therefore the commander should make efforts to free himself from this restraint, i.e., he should endeavor to launch his troops in a manner not influenced by the dispositions of the enemy._

The degree of control which a commander retains over the course of the combat depends upon the promptness with which he gains a general idea of the situation. For this, if for no other reason, he should be as near the head of the column as possible while on the march. The troops sent first into action, supported by the artillery, must put every available man into the fight, in order to repulse attacks made by the enemy and to enable the commander to launch the main body as an entity. In any case, the battalions of the main body should not be successively thrown into the fight as soon as they arrive, for the purpose of overcoming a temporary crisis, or for relieving the advance guard from a dilemma. The machine gun batteries, whose employment was particularly important during the preparatory stage of the fight, should be withdrawn as early as possible so as to be available as a reserve in the hands of the commander.

In bringing the main body into action, deployments by the flank should be avoided. The deployment should be initiated by subordinate units (in an infantry division, by regiments) moving out of the route column and toward the objective points determined by the purpose of the combat.[341]

[341] General VON SCHLICHTING holds a different view in his work
_Taktische und strategische Grundsätze_, I, p. 106. “In a rencontre,
the piece on the board of the battlefield can be moved only when the
next one is clear of the march column and ready for action. Further
action is then not only permissible but imperative.”

Provisions of Various Regulations.

In all the regulations, those of Germany excepted, the rencontre is
treated with marked reserve.

=Austria.= “When a collision occurs with an opponent who is likewise
in the act of advancing--_rencontre_--the different parts of the
force and their subdivisions must make strenuous efforts to advance
in the designated direction. In a rencontre, it will be proper to
concentrate the main forces, prior to making the attack, only in case
it becomes apparent during the preparatory stage of the action that
the enemy has gained a visible start in deployment. The endeavor
to forestall the enemy, and the necessity of promptly reinforcing
the troops already engaged, will often curtail or preclude the
preparatory concentration of the main body in a rencontre, and force
the commander to permit at least parts of his approaching troops to
go directly into action.” If conditions are eminently favorable for
the enemy at the point where the collision occurs, it may sometimes
be more desirable to stand provisionally on the defensive with the
advance guard until other troops come up.

“Under such circumstances, it may even be advisable to withdraw the
troops covering the march; but in that event, the relation of the
force to neighboring columns should be considered.”

=France.= The commander should decide promptly whether to attack, to
stand on the defensive, or to avoid an engagement for the time being.
The regulations do not provide for employing the troops directly
from route column. The advance guard is frequently thrown on its own
resources; it is often forced to fight on a very broad front, and
to place all of its troops into action at the very beginning of an
engagement for the purpose of seizing and holding supporting points
necessary for the subsequent deployment.

Examples.

1. The deployment for action of the 5th Infantry Division from the
defile of Gorze, against the French Division Vergé, at the battle of
=Vionville= (16th August, 1870), is especially instructive.[342]

[342] _Gen. St. W._, I, p. 549. VON SCHERFF, _Kriegslehren_, II,
p. 50. KUNZ, _Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, 8-9, p. 32, et seq.
_Taktik_, V, p. 210.

2. The engagement of the 2nd Bavarian Division at =La Thibaudine=
(=Beaumont=). The French concentration for action had progressed
farther than that of the Bavarians. The reconnaissance by the cavalry
was insufficient.[343]

[343] HOPFFGARTEN-HEIDLER, _Beaumont_, p. 90.

3. The fight of Mondel’s Brigade at =Trautenau=.[344] Likewise the
fight of the Vth Army Corps at =Nachod= on June 27th, 1866.

[344] _Taktik_, V, p. 206. STROBL, _Trautenau_, p. 8, et seq.
KÜHNE, _Kritische Wanderungen_, 3, p. 16.

X. THE ATTACK ON AN ENEMY DEPLOYED FOR DEFENSE.

1. LESSONS OF WAR.

During the =Boer War= (1899-1902), the British infantry always
attacked positions prepared for defense. Aside from the superannuated
fire tactics and deficient marksmanship training of the British,
their failures in the early engagements of the war may generally be
traced to the following causes:--

1. Insufficient reconnaissance. This caused British detachments to be
surprised, in a number of cases, by fire at short range. (Brigade of
the Guards at =Modder River=). In many instances, the British forces
were even surprised by fire while in close order formations. (Hart’s
Brigade at =Colenso=).

2. Pure frontal attacks, in which equal forces were frequently pitted
against each other. (=Modder River=, =Magersfontain=, =Colenso=).

3. Insufficient protection of the flanks by echelons against fire
surprises carried out by small detachments.

4. Insufficient coöperation of the artillery and infantry.

5. Isolated attacks made by brigades (consisting of 4 battalions).
The employment of several brigades simultaneously for concerted
action was a rare exception.

6. Insufficient support of the firing line. A timely reinforcement of
an organization that had already been shaken never did occur.

7. Hesitating use of reserves in the crisis of the fight. At
=Magersfontain= only 8¹⁄₂ battalions out of 13, and at =Colenso=
only 6 battalions out of 16¹⁄₂, had been seriously engaged. When
=Spionskop= was evacuated, 11 battalions had not as yet been engaged.
The attacks were begun, but not pushed home.

The Infantry Attack in the Russo-Japanese War.

The combat tactics of the Russian infantry[345] (Russian I. D. R.
of 1903) were based on shock action, narrow frontage, and deep
formations. The bayonet training preached by Dragomirov was the
result of the belief in decisive psychological impressions and the
consciousness that the Russian fire tactics, based upon volley fire,
were inadequate to annihilate a well concealed defender. Thus, the
endeavor to cross blades with the opponent as quickly as possible,
led to a headlong rush to the front, without creating the preliminary
conditions necessary for pushing the attack home. The hesitation of
the higher commanders to throw in every available man at the decisive
stage, and the tendency, reaching down to the lowest grades, of
creating detachments and separate missions, contrasted unfavorably
with this splendid offensive spirit.

[345] “The Russian infantry is embued with a mixture of defensive
spirit and instinct for hand to hand fighting.” COUNT MARENZI.

The Japanese infantry was trained according to the letter and spirit
of the German regulations of 1889. It had fought shy of unhealthy
tendencies after the Boer war, cultivated the independence and
initiative of all leaders, and recognized the necessity of night
combats and of using the spade. In addition, the way for success was
carefully, almost cautiously, prepared by the commander-in-chief, who
left nothing to chance. It is easy for subordinate leaders to be bold
and daring, when they know that the commander-in-chief has neglected
nothing to ensure victory. The principal characteristics of the
Japanese combats were--

1. The cautious advance, frequently under cover of darkness;

2. The systematic preparation of the attack by the coöperation of
infantry and artillery, and the determined advance along the whole
front;

3. The attempt to induce the enemy to launch infantry at a point
where the decisive attack was not to take place;[346]

[346] The advance of the Vth Army at Mukden.

4. The sudden launching of the decisive attack;

5. The prompt preparation of every captured position for defense;

6. The absence of pursuit.

The fights at =Wafangu=,[347] as well as the attack made by the Guard
and the 12th Division at the =Yalu=[348] proceeded entirely according
to German pattern.

[347] _Einzelschriften über den Russisch-Japanischen Krieg_,
Vienna, 1906, I, p. 226. The envelopment of the Russian right flank
by the Japanese 19th Brigade is especially instructive.

[348] _Ibid._, I, p. 79, et seq. _Kriegsgeschichtliche
Einzelschriften_, 39-40, p. 123, et seq. Consult also VON LÜTTWITZ,
_Angriffsverfahren der Japaner_, p. 2.

A change took place in the tactical methods of the Japanese when the
Russian artillery--whose ballistic properties were superior to those
of its antagonist--brought a greater number of guns into the field,
and when, in addition, the Japanese infantry became numerically
inferior in the battles after Liao Yang.[349]

[349] The statements in regard to the strength of the opposing
forces are still very contradictory. At Liao Yang 120,000 Japanese
confronted 150,000 Russians; at Mukden the Russians had perhaps
10,000 rifles, 300 field guns, and 100 heavy pieces of ordnance more
than the Japanese.

The task set commanders of armies and leaders of troops by the
government, had to be met by a continuance of the offensive.[350]
The peculiar character of the theater of war made it difficult to
maneuver the enemy out of his strong positions; so at best nothing
remained for the Japanese--unless they wished to renounce the
offensive entirely--but to conquer the enemy by attacking him in
front. Since the advantages of the attack--superior numbers and the
freedom of choosing the point of attack--were thus dissipated, the
victory had to be gained by making use of defensive expedients. As
the demoralizing and retarding effect produced by fire increased
more rapidly than the morale of the assailant, nothing remained but
to intrench and to take advantage of the cover afforded by darkness
as in fortress warfare. Moreover, the inferior forces available
precluded deep formations and necessitated an immediate development
of the entire force in one line. Thus the desire to push forward
resolved itself into an advance along a broad front. Favored by the
purely passive conduct of the Russians, this led to an envelopment of
their flanks and a pressure on their line of retreat. The Japanese
were able to overcome the constantly growing power of resistance
of the Russian defense, because, while strictly adhering to the
offensive, they availed themselves of defensive expedients although
their movements were retarded thereby.

[350] C. H. _Über das innere Wesen der japanischen und
neuzeitlichen Offensive. Streffleur_, 1907, October number.

The conduct of the attack was, of course, considerably influenced
by the character of the terrain. The 1st Army, fighting in hilly
country, perhaps remained true longer to regulation formations and
long rushes than the other Japanese forces, but was finally obliged
to resort to a wide extension of closed bodies. The IInd and IVth
Armies were differently situated, as the attack over open plains fell
to their lot.

Speaking generally, the following details may be given in regard
to the method of attack of the Ist Japanese Army:[351] Units were
pushed into action abreast; objective points were assigned to each;
and certain lines or points, according to which they had to maintain
touch, were indicated to subordinate units. To avoid a surprise, if
for no other reason, thin firing lines were formed at the outset, and
in a serious attack whole companies, in dense firing lines capable of
developing a strong fire, were at once thrown in; these advanced to
mid ranges in order to open fire, as a rule, under 1000 m. The Ist
army had a special _penchant_ for making rushes of 80-100 m.,[352]
usually by entire companies; the assault was, in many instances,
begun as far as 300 m. from the hostile position, and then pushed
home; supports and reserves followed in extended formation, but
assembled promptly on reaching cover. The infantry was disinclined
to intrench during an advance, but never neglected to fortify
quickly a captured position. In the combats of the Ist Army we will
find the best lessons applicable to our conditions.

[351] _Streffleur_, 1907, January number.

[352] This is not true of the 4th Guard Regiment. See VON LÜTTWITZ,
_Angriffsverfahren der Japaner_, p. 24: Rushes of 50 m. were made
“as the men otherwise got out of breath and shot badly.” An advance
was made by squads and crawling was tabooed. The new Japanese Drill
Regulations warn against making rushes less than 30-40 m. long. On
the other hand, according to the opinion of von Lüttwitz, the length
of rushes will seldom exceed 100 m.

Examples.

1. The engagement of the Guard Division at =Yangtsuling= on July
31st, 1904.[353]

[353] GERTSCH, I, pp. 92 and 100 (Good maps). SIR IAN HAMILTON, _A
Staff Officer’s Scrap Book_, I, p. 313. _Urteile und Beobachtungen
von Mitkämpfern_, I, p. 57.

2. The attack made on October 11th, 1904, by the 15th Infantry
Brigade (2nd Infantry Division) against =Temple Hill= (=Terrayama=),
which was held by 4-6 companies.[354]

[354] BRONSART V. SCHELLENDORFF, _Beim japanischen Feldheer_, p.
132.--VON LÜTTWITZ, _Angriffsverfahren der Japaner_, p. 23.

Fire was opened at 900 m.; long rushes were used and firing line and
supports were deployed; after a brief but violent fire action at 500
m., the hostile position was reached in a single rush and carried.

The artillery, to be sure, supported this attack with accelerated
fire.

3. The attack made by the 4th Guard Regiment on October 12th, 1904,
against a height south of =Huaku= (battle on the =Shaho=).[355]

[355] _Ibid._, p. 24.

4. The attack made by the 3rd Brigade (2nd Infantry Division) under
General Matsanuga, on October 12th, 1904 (long rushes), against the
heights south of =Shotasko= (battle on the =Shaho=).

_Outline Sketch of the Formation of the 3rd Brigade._

Frontage about 2000 m.

4. Infantry: 29. Infantry:

5. and 6. 4. and 2. 12. and 11. Cos. 10. and 2. Cos.
--------- --------- ----------- ----------
7. and 8. 1. and 3. Cos. 9. and 3. Cos.

Brigade Reserve:

9. and 10. Cos. 11. and 12._ Cos.
--------------- -----------------
4. Infantry. 29. Infantry.

Troops in the act of coming up, but not employed:

1. and 4. Cos. II. Bn.
-------------- and -------------
29. Infantry. 29. Infantry.

First line: Eight companies (apparently entirely deployed). Interval
between skirmishers 3 paces; between companies 40 paces.

The first halt (lasting seven minutes) was made at 1500 m. and
the distance to 800 m. was then covered at a rapid run. The men
that could not keep up, halted to recover their breath and then
followed independently. At 800 m., the line opened a lively fire at
will, which lasted for two minutes, and then advanced by rushes
by companies (first the right, then the left companies of the
battalions). During this advance the supports (2 battalions) were
absorbed by the firing line. At the same time the brigade reserve
approached closer to the firing line (the original distance between
reserve and firing line, before the advance began, was 300 m.). The
last halt for firing was made at 250 m., from the enemy’s position,
and the latter was then carried in one rush. The losses amounted only
to 235 men.[356]

[356] VON LÜTTWITZ, _Angriffsverfahren der Japaner_, p. 24. SIR IAN
HAMILTON, _A Staff Officer’s Scrap Book_, II. Consult the same work
on the unsuccessful pursuing action fought by the 3rd Brigade at the
Chosenrei Pass.

* * * * *

In the IInd and IVth Armies, who fought, as a rule, on terrain
devoid of cover, a far more cautious method of attack was produced.
The distinguishing features of this mode of attack were thin firing
lines (skirmishers at intervals of 5-10 paces) increasing only very
gradually in density, and great frontage (a company 250, a battalion
800, and a brigade 2000-3000 m.).[357] This caused the attack to
falter in many instances as soon as it had come within 400 m. of the
hostile position, whereupon nothing remained but for the line to
intrench and to work forward slowly from one position to another.

[357] VON LÜTTWITZ, _Angriffsverfahren der Japaner_, p. 47.

Examples.

1. The engagement of the 3rd Infantry Division on October 12th, 1904,
at =Shiliho= (battle on the =Shaho=).[358]

[358] _Ibid._, p. 26.

2. The engagement of the 5th Infantry Division, from March 6th to
9th, north of =Madiapu= (battle of =Mukden=). This division required
three days to work forward from 1100 m. to within assaulting
distance of the enemy’s position. Cover for men standing upright was
constructed at 1100, 950, 530, 390, 300, 200, 160 and 125 m., that
under 300 m. being built of sand bags.[359]

[359] _Ibid._, p. 52. The attack order of the 5th Infantry
Division, in _Urteile und Beobachtungen von Mitkämpfern_, I, p. 121.

3. The combats of the 10th Division on March 3rd and 10th, 1904
(battle of =Mukden=).[360]

[360] BRONSART VON SCHELLENDORFF, _Beim japanischen Feldheer_, pp.
217, et seq., 225, et seq., 242 and 244, et seq. On the use of sand
bags, consult _ibid._, pp. 236 and 292.

Confidential British instructions dealing with the tactical lessons
of the =Russo-Japanese war=, make the following deductions:
“* * * * The above shows the great importance of local reconnaissance
by infantry, of which considerably more must be demanded than has been
done up to the present time in European armies. It shows, moreover,
the advantages of thin firing lines during the preparatory stage of
the action, and the insignificant effect produced by shrapnel and
long range fire on such lines in which it is desirable to advance,
without halting on the way, to within 1000 yards of the enemy. The
necessity of gaining a superiority of fire before advancing to the
assault, and the necessity of an increased supply of ammunition, are
confirmed anew. It is further demonstrated that the bayonet of the
infantryman is still capable of playing an important role in battle.”

2. THE CONDITIONS UPON WHICH SUCCESS DEPENDS.

The Russo-Japanese war confirms the opinion that the issue of combat is but little influenced by the formations taken up; that _esprit_ and the determination to conquer are of far greater importance than any formation. The most difficult task that infantry can be called upon to perform consists of successfully pushing home an attack over open ground commanded by hostile fire. “It would be wrong,” said Fieldmarshal Moltke, “were one to attempt to lay down in regulations that a force should not advance over a plain against an enemy under cover. _But every superior commander ought to consider what such an operation portends._” Heavy losses are unavoidable in a destructive fire fight lasting for hours.[361] The attack will not succeed so long as the enemy commands the plain with his fire. The commander of the attacking force must find ways and means to wrest this command from the enemy. All of the battles of recent campaigns have demonstrated that an attack is bound to succeed if it is thoroughly prepared by infantry and artillery fire, is undertaken by adequate forces, and is pushed with determination close to the enemy; and that such an attack is, in fact, superior to the defensive. The success of an attack on a position prepared for defense might depend upon the following preliminary conditions:

(a) Careful reconnaissance, for the purpose of determining the most favorable direction for the attack.

(b) Occupation of the foreground of the hostile position. When the foreground is entirely open, an advance must be made under cover of darkness up to the medium ranges.

(c) Preparation of the infantry attack by the closest coöperation of infantry and artillery.

(d) Timely determination of the point at which the decisive attack is to be made.

(e) Careful utilization of the terrain during the advance, so as to allow of delaying the opening of fire until the force is as close as possible to the enemy.

(f) Suitable disposition, distribution in depth, and deployment of a strong force for the purpose of bringing about a superiority of infantry fire. The organization detailed to make the attack must have its entire effective strength available for accomplishing its proper task, and not be compelled to detach parts for guarding its flanks.

(g) Ensuring concerted and simultaneous action on the part of the attacking forces. As the enemy has given up any idea of assuming the offensive, at least for the time being, the attacker should not allow the advantage to escape him of choosing time and direction of the attack.

[361] General VON SCHLICHTING, in his work _Taktische und
strategische Grundsätze_, maintains the opinion--in contrast to
General VON SCHERFF--that open terrain commanded by hostile fire is
impassable for infantry. At any rate, military history has yet to
furnish proof of this.

3. PREPARATION OF THE ATTACK.

Reconnaissance. Preparatory Position.

“If the enemy decides to stand on the defensive, he renounces the initiative for the time being. The attacker will then have time to reconnoiter the hostile position and to weigh all the circumstances that favor the attack. He should not limit himself to reconnaissance by the cavalry and to observation through field glasses. Mounted officers’ and infantry officers’ patrols should supplement this reconnaissance, and complete the information gained as the enemy is approached.” (Pars. 362 and 363 German I. D. R.).

The local reconnaissance (see p. 248 supra) should be conducted with all possible care; timely directions should be given in regard to it during the approach to the battlefield;[362] the activity of the reconnoitering bodies should continually increase as the enemy is approached; and the work itself should be divided in a systematic manner. Excessive thoroughness may retard reconnaissance work to such an extent, on short winter days especially, that success may be jeopardized. (Par. 305 German I. D. R.). As a result freedom of action will be lost and the energy of the attack weakened. It would be wholly wrong to postpone the decision for making the attack until something definite is known of the strength and dispositions of the enemy. These matters are almost never cleared up until after the battle. The decision as to whether or not an attack should be made is determined primarily by the general situation. (Par. 355 German I. D. R.). The latter may force a commander to advance promptly without permitting him to await the results of the reconnaissance. The character of the terrain and the preparation the enemy is known to have made, determine whether the commander ought to attack at once, whether he ought to utilize the cover of darkness for the advance of the attacking troops, or whether he ought to attempt to maneuver the defender out of his position.

[362] According to experience the reconnaissance work generally
flags during a halt, although that is the very time when an increased
activity is desirable. The reconnaissance work in the IXth Corps on
August 18th, 1870, from the arrival at Caulre until the advance guard
opened the fight, is particularly instructive. _Der 18. August_, pp.
124, et seq. and 215.

The information required as a basis for this decision will, as a rule, not be obtainable without a fight. In spite of all the objections arrayed against reconnaissances in force, they cannot be avoided, if it is desired to gain prompt and certain insight into the enemy’s situation. It cannot be expected that the defender will passively permit the assailant to gain an insight into his dispositions. A feint will accomplish nothing; the enemy must be seriously engaged, so that he will show his hand.[363] Yet in spite of these combats, misapprehensions are not precluded.

[363] It was the intention of the Japanese commander-in-chief, on
October 10th, 1904 (battle on the Shaho), to attack the Russian army
before it had completed its concentration for battle. The advance
guards of the Reserve Division and of the 5th Division encountered
advanced Russian detachments at Kushutsy (Xth Army Corps), and at
Wulitaisy (XVIIth Army Corps), whose weakness was, however, not
recognized. In the belief that the Russian main position had been
encountered, the advance on the hostile position was ordered for the
night 10/11th October, the attack to take place at daybreak on the
11th. 9th Supplement to the _Militär-Wochenblatt_, 1906, p. 327.

It is quite natural that isolated detachments, in their endeavor to gain an insight into the hostile dispositions, may find themselves suddenly within short range of the enemy. In such a situation, the detachment should maintain its position, as its fire will frequently facilitate the approach of the other attacking troops. Almost every one of the more serious engagements furnishes examples illustrating this feature.[364]

[364] The perseverance of Nambu’s Brigade on March 7th, in the
“three houses” (Yuhuntun near Mukden). _Vierteljahrshefte_, 1907,
p. 78. The perseverance of the troops in the Palungshan works,
captured on August 22nd, 1904, by being enveloped on both flanks.
(Port Arthur). _Streffleur_, _Einzelschriften_, 4, pp. 81 and 91.
The perseverance of parts of the IInd Battalion of the 3rd Guard
Regiment in the engagement at Towan (31st July, 1904). _Urteile und
Beobachtungen von Mitkämpfern_, I, p. 60.

In order to guard the reconnoitering troops from being driven back, if for no other reason, it is advisable to place in readiness an adequate force of artillery. As the artillery is protected by shields, it can take up the fight even against superior artillery with better chances of succeeding than in the past.

If the commander has decided to attack and has determined against what part of the hostile position the main attack is to be made, the foreground of the hostile position is at once occupied, and the enemy’s advanced troops forced back, so as to prevent the defender from gaining an insight into the dispositions of the assailant.

The assailant should launch as few troops as possible for initiating the action. They should avoid engaging prematurely in a fire fight with the infantry of the hostile main position, even if the terrain would permit a covered approach to short range. If the advanced troops allow themselves to be enticed into doing this, they expose themselves to the danger of suffering a defeat, and oblige the commander of the whole force to launch for their relief troops that were intended for the main attack.[365]

[365] “It is a general principle to push as close as the terrain
permits to the enemy’s position with advance troops for the purpose
of opening fire.”

Insufficient information in regard to the enemy and undue precipitation in issuing orders may place advanced troops in such an unfavorable situation. If the defender allows himself to be tricked into assuming the offensive for the purpose of driving off harassing detachments, so much the better for the assailant, for the latter’s artillery will then find an opportunity to fire on the enemy.[366]

[366] The French regulations hint at this. Look up the advance of
French infantry during the combats around Ste. Marie aux Chênes. _Der
18. August_, pp. 174 and 179.

=Austria.= “Under certain circumstances, the covering troops will
have to be reinforced at an early moment in order that a strong line
may be formed opposite the enemy, but, in many cases, they will
nevertheless still abstain from advancing into the zone of effective
fire.” The Austrians usually employ strong covering bodies. The
Germans desire to ensure simultaneous action on the part of all the
troops in opening the combat.

At =Spicheren= the commander of the 14th Infantry Division, under
the erroneous assumption that the heights of Spicheren were only
occupied by troops covering the entraining at Forbach, issued orders
to General von François to drive away the hostile artillery. All of
Frossard’s Corps, however, was in position on the heights on which
the artillery was posted.[367]

[367] _Gen. St. W._, I, p. 310.

At 10 A. M., on August 6th, 1870, the commanding general of the Vth
Army Corps issued orders to the advance guard to cross the Sauer with
four battalions at =Wörth= and =Spachbach= (1500 m. apart) and to
occupy Wörth and the heights beyond, where the entire corps of Mac
Mahon was in position.[368]

[368] _Gen. St. W._, I, p. 320.

The advance of the attacking troops, under cover of the advance guard, into a preparatory position, is made in such a manner that units are opposite their objectives when the subsequent forward movement against the enemy is begun.[369] This frequently requires a rearrangement of the forces so that even an assailant who is numerically inferior may be superior at the decisive point. A simultaneous attack from the front and flanks requires reserves everywhere and is opposed to the economical employment of the forces; it may easily lead to failure, and is justifiable only when the assailant is greatly superior in numbers or morale.

[369] The deployment of the 1st Infantry Brigade of the Guard, near
Ste. Marie aux Chênes, against St. Privat. _Der 18. August_ p. 408.

A premature deployment impairs the leader’s influence on the course of the combat and makes it difficult to change the direction of the attack. Route columns, taking advantage of all available cover, will, therefore, be retained as long as possible, and only subordinate units permitted to march directly toward their proper objectives, until the hostile fire compels a more extended deployment (development). The preparatory position is taken up in the last sheltered area in front of the hostile position, provided that that area is large enough to accommodate the attacking force when deployed for action, and to shield it from the observation and the fire of the enemy.

In country generally devoid of cover, infantry will have to be placed in a preparatory position when three kilometers or more from the enemy, even when the latter’s artillery will in all probability be neutralized by our own.

“In order to ensure the concerted advance of the various units into the preparatory position, it is advisable, especially in close country, to have them move from one covered position to another. If this is done, units whose march was favored by the nature of the ground, will not arrive prematurely within dangerous proximity of the enemy, while others who had farther to go, or whose advance was difficult, are still a considerable distance to the rear. The leader should make his dispositions so that no loss of time will result from this advance from one covered position to another.” (Par. 369 German I. D. R.).

Where large forces are concerned, the attack on a position carefully prepared for defense will consume several days, the assailant placing his artillery in position on the first day and reconnoitering under cover of infantry, which is pushed to the front.[370] The troops of the first line are pushed forward far enough before daylight so that they can intrench under cover of darkness and open fire at dawn. This will be more difficult to accomplish when covering troops or advanced positions are located in front of the hostile position. If the assailant has succeeded, on the previous day, in driving these troops back upon the main position, an advance to within effective range may be made during the night in order that the fire fight may be opened on the succeeding day. Although the chance of taking the enemy by surprise is eliminated in such a case, the advantage of having diminished the distance that will have to be crossed under fire remains.[371]

[370] The attack on fortified positions is discussed in detail
in _Taktik_, V, p. 237, et seq., as It depends upon the closest
cooperation of field artillery, foot artillery, infantry and pioneers.

[371] The engagement at Belmont, on Nov. 22nd, 1899, furnishes an
interesting example of unforeseen friction. The advance, in this
instance, was made during the night from a point 8 km. from the enemy.

It is difficult to find shelter for the rearward echelons, which must be kept in readiness in very close proximity to the leading line. These rear echelons must either be intrenched or at least sheltered by masks. General actions should be avoided at night.

4. THE COÖPERATION OF INFANTRY AND ARTILLERY IN BATTLE.

Upon completion of the concentration for action (development), the infantry has to advance within the zone of effective infantry fire. In doing this the infantry must either pass by or through the artillery which is already engaged.[372]

[372] See p. 316, et seq.

During the Russo-Japanese war, the effect of shrapnel, in spite of the mediocre matériel and the lack of shields, forced the artillery of both belligerents to seek shelter on the reverse slope of heights. When this was neglected and when batteries went into position in the open, within effective range, they were quickly silenced. The fear of shrapnel caused both sides to advance cautiously, to relinquish all close order formations at an early moment, and to employ the spade extensively. This alone was evidence of the fact that the artillery had accomplished a good deal. Moreover, it was not altogether accident that the first few of the larger Japanese night attacks occurred coincidentally with the appearance of Russian artillery matériel, which was superior both as regards numbers and power. The new German I. D. R. (par. 444), in contrast with the previous edition (II, par. 82). prescribe that the infantry attack should not be postponed until a superiority of fire has been gained. Thus, the regulations draw logical conclusions from the modern armament and seek to avoid useless bombardments of hostile positions (such, for instance, as the Russians indulged in at Plevna and the British in South Africa).

“_The principal duty of field artillery is to support the infantry in the most effective manner. Its duties are inseparably connected with those of the infantry. It should, on principle, always fight the targets that are most dangerous for its infantry._” (Par. 364 German F. A. D. R.).

The German Field Artillery Drill Regulations prescribe that the guns should fire over the heads of the advancing infantry (par. 375), and that single batteries should accompany the infantry attack to within close range of the enemy (par. 471). When an assault is to be made, the infantry expects the artillery to direct its fire against the point of attack until immediately before the assault begins.

“But our infantry should never be obliged to dispense with the support of artillery. The gun shields afford considerable protection, even at the short ranges. _At the decisive moment the artillery should not shrink even from the heaviest infantry fire._” (Par. 369 German F. A. D. R.).

“In selecting an objective, it is essential for the artillery to consider whether, by fighting it, the infantry will be effectively supported. Whether the hostile infantry or artillery is chosen as an objective will depend upon the situation. As a rule, the hostile artillery will be the proper objective for our artillery during the preparatory stage of the action. As the distance between the opposing infantry forces decreases, it will become more and more necessary for the artillery to devote itself to the hostile infantry.” (Par. 432 German F. A. D. R.).

If the artillery is equipped with shielded guns, it can devote itself for some time to the most important target without regard to the hostile artillery, contenting itself with merely occupying the latter’s attention. (Par. 469 German F. A. D. R.). To silence artillery in a concealed position requires curved fire and a good deal of ammunition; but, on the other hand, artillery so posted cannot fire upon advancing skirmishers.[373] Therefore, the advancing skirmishers of the assailant should force the hostile artillery to leave its cover and to expose itself to the attacker’s artillery. (Pars. 330 and 496 German F. A. D. R.).

[373] This is partly due to the fact that fire cannot be adjusted
quickly enough, and that it is difficult to follow moving targets.
Besides, when the targets are small and numerous, they are difficult
to hit.

The result of this procedure will be that the artillery of both sides will engage each other’s attention with only a small part of their guns, and concentrate the remainder on the hostile infantry. It is obvious that the infantry will very soon demand of its artillery in definite terms that it should first annihilate the hostile artillery before the infantry can think of continuing the attack.

The provisions of the German regulations in regard to the fusion of activities of infantry and artillery mark an entirely new departure. The commencement of the infantry attack is accordingly no longer dependent upon the result of the artillery combat; on the contrary, both combats are of equal importance and proceed along parallel lines; the only danger is that the infantry may make a headlong rush to the front before a superiority of fire has been gained.

Confidential British instructions, dealing with the lessons learned
by the Japanese in Manchuria, contain the following: “Intrenched
artillery can be permanently silenced only under very exceptional
circumstances, as it will withdraw its personnel temporarily, as
soon as the hostile fire becomes too hot, and resume its fire again
when that of the enemy abates. The infantry attack should therefore
be launched without awaiting the result of the artillery combat, but
the infantry must insist upon the artillery completely engaging the
attention of the hostile guns during the advance. Another reason for
not awaiting the outcome of the artillery combat, lies in the great
frontage of battle lines. The unsuccessful attack made by a division
will then frequently cause the neighboring unit to make an immediate
attack.”

=Austria= (1904). “The artillery must be given an opportunity and the
necessary time for effectively preparing the infantry attack. So long
as the artillery engaged with the hostile batteries has not achieved
a noticeable success, or is not at least neutralizing the hostile
artillery, the infantry attack remains a difficult undertaking.”

=France.= The artillery during the preparatory stage of an action:
The artillery should endeavor to silence the hostile artillery as
quickly as possible, without employing more guns than are absolutely
necessary. The commander should give the order for the attack only
when the preparation is considered sufficient.

=England.= The regulations emphasize the necessity of pushing
infantry forward, and of supporting that infantry energetically, so
as to compel the defender to expose himself. “As soon as the hostile
batteries have been sufficiently silenced, or the infantry advances
to the attack, the fire is directed upon the point of attack in order
to prepare and to cover the assault.”

=Italy.= The regulations state that artillery is a supporting arm
for infantry. “If the hostile artillery discloses its position from
the start by employing direct fire against the assailant’s artillery
or infantry, the attacker’s batteries endeavor to silence it or to
draw its fire upon themselves, in order to facilitate the deployment
of their own infantry. If, on the other hand, the hostile artillery
remains concealed for the purpose of saving its fire for the infantry
when the latter offers a favorable target upon arriving within
effective range, then it would seem advisable for the artillery of
the assailant not to open fire at all, or to open fire only with
enough guns to cope with the available targets. The assailant’s
artillery brings the fire of all its batteries into play when the
defender’s artillery is compelled to come into action in order to
support its own infantry against the advance of the attacker’s
infantry.”

The difficulties of providing for coöperation between infantry and artillery are due to the impossibility of distinguishing at all times with certainty between friend and foe (assaulting guidons),[374] since the elimination of powder smoke and the adoption of neutral tinted uniforms; and, further, to the circumstance that, while we have a signal for increasing the range of the artillery (g.g.g.), we have none for indicating that the fire is to be concentrated upon certain points. “Uninterrupted communication with the fighting line in front must be provided for. For this purpose officers, who report by signal or by telephone, should be sent forward. These officers are primarily to ascertain how close their own firing line is to the enemy, in order that the artillery may keep up its fire as long as possible.” (Par. 376 German F. A. D. R.). In England, it has been suggested to indicate the point upon which fire is to be concentrated, by the colored ball of smoke of a special projectile. It requires strict attention on the part of the infantry to make its work harmonize with that of the artillery. Every opportunity, for example, when the hostile infantry is forced under cover by a burst of fire, should be utilized for advancing. This is particularly emphasized in France. The defender is to be blinded by a hailstorm of fragments. “Every rafale of the artillery will either cause the most advanced line to make a rush, or the troops of the rear line to come up to the firing line in order to reinforce it or to carry it forward as much as possible. Thus the rafale becomes a veritable shield for the infantry (_véritable bouclier de l’infanterie_).” LANGLOIS.

[374] During the attack on the Waterberg, on August 11th, 1904, the
various units were ordered to carry, on their outer flanks, flags
attached to long poles. These flags were white in Estorffs, red in
v.d. Heyde’s, blue in Müller’s, and green in Deimling’s detachment.

5. THE POINT OF ATTACK.[375]

[375] See _Taktik_, V, p. 138.

The reconnoitering troops are charged with the duty of ascertaining the parts of the hostile position which can be approached under cover, which are weaker than the others (frequently true of the flanks),[376] or which can be enfiladed. The attack will usually be directed against the weakest point in the hostile position, or that on which the greatest volume of fire can be concentrated from enfilading or commanding positions. At all other points of the battlefield, the assailant will endeavor to deceive the opponent, with weak forces, as to his true intentions, but, at the decisive point, he should launch superior numbers. The French regulations contend that such weak points will only become apparent during the course of the fight, and therefore separate the troops into a preparatory and a decisive combat group.

[376] Example: The right flank of the French position at Wörth, and
at Roncourt (St. Privat).

The desire to strike the weakest point in the enemy’s line causes the decisive blow to be directed against a flank, and the numerical superiority requisite for gaining the superiority of fire, leads to

6. ENVELOPMENT.

(Pars. 392-396 German I. D. R.).

The desire of the attacker to put a superior number of rifles into the fight, in order to gain a superiority of fire more quickly, naturally leads to an extension of the firing line and to an overlapping of the defender’s line. The advantage of overlapping the enemy’s line lies in the fact that part of the line attacked is exposed to both frontal and oblique fire. The effect of this oblique fire is increased by bending the wing of the attacking line toward the enemy. If the attacking line succeeds in pushing its firing line so far forward that not only the hostile wing but also the hostile flank is struck, an envelopment is brought about with the result that the lines of fire of the assailant cross each other within the hostile position. If the defender refuses a wing, portions of his line may be enfiladed. This will cause such heavy losses that the defender will begin to succumb first at the salient point of his line. A further advantage is gained by a pressure on the enemy’s line of retreat.

Pure frontal attacks offer little prospect of success;[377] they may perhaps force the enemy back, but they cannot annihilate him.