Chapter XVIII: Part 18

The enemy must be prevented from gaining the superiority of fire. This should be accomplished by concentrating the fire from a large number of rifles upon the parts of the enemy’s force in motion. The defender should make the most of the advantage which his preparedness gives him. The attacker’s firing line with its supports forms the target. A departure from this rule is in order, in the case of a French assailant, as the latter places the bulk of his force in the reserves and not in the firing line. It will frequently be practicable for the defender to discontinue his fire and to take cover when the assailant lies down and fires; but, while under cover, everything should be prepared for resuming the fire when the enemy rises to continue his advance (p. 156 supra).

If it has been found impossible to prevent the enemy from reaching the extreme limit of short ranges, the commander must decide whether to continue the fight until a decision is reached, or whether to break off the action.

When the opponent has entered the zone of short ranges, it will be too late for the defender to retire, unless the terrain in rear of the position is especially favorable, or other troops can take a hand in the fight to cover the withdrawal. The onrushing assailant is received with accelerated fire; the defender fixes bayonets, determined to risk a fight at close quarters. “The defender who does not fix bayonets is already casting furtive glances towards the best line of retreat.”

While repulsing an assault, it would be a good plan for the defender to step upon the rear wall of the trench so that the latter would become an obstacle for the attacker. But this scheme can only be employed when the troops are completely in hand.

While the fire of the defender is increased to the utmost intensity by the entrance into the fight of all the supports, the general reserve, which now takes a hand in the fight, seeks to bring about the decision by advancing to attack. On arriving close enough to assault, the attack reaches its most critical stage, and even a counter-attack made by a comparatively small force may turn the scale in favor of the defense.

5. THE COUNTER-ATTACK.[459]

[459] See F.C. V. H. _Zum Studium der Taktik_, p. 418 et seq.

In large engagements, the great power of resistance possessed by well posted bodies of troops will often determine the commander of the force on the defensive to contain the enemy at one point with a strong defensive position, while at the same time assuming the offensive at another. (This was planned, but not carried out, at Dresden, in 1813, and at Troyes, early in February, 1814; carried out with success, in Lee’s operations around Richmond, during the latter part of June, 1862, and on the Lisaine in 1871; and miscarried on the Shaho, because Kuropatkin made his decision dependent upon reports in regard to the position of hostile reserves, which were non-existent in reality). Whether the offensive should be assumed while the enemy is still in the act of deploying,[460] or whether one must be satisfied with assuming the offensive at the last moment, is best determined by the relative strength of the opposing forces. When battle-fronts are short this may still be advantageous, but when the lines are long, a counter-attack can affect only a small part of the assailant’s line, while the major portion thereof successfully pushes the attack home. Then the position and the day will be lost anyway, in spite of a local success.

[460] Roszbach, 1758; Austerlitz. 1805 (_Schlachterfolg_, p. 28);
Salamanca, 1812.

The initial measures taken assure freedom of action to the defense, but the commander must not await exhaustive messages. Prompt action is necessary, either for throwing back the advanced troops of the assailant, or for striking a blow at the hostile flank. In the latter case, it is an advantage if only weak reserves are struck, but hostile forces making a turning movement may also be encountered, and the commander will have to decide whether to deploy quickly and assail the enemy, or whether to take his chances in a rencontre.[461]

[461] The advance of Memerby’s Brigade during the battle of
Noisseville. KUNZ, _Noisseville_, p. 41.

Even a success gained at a tactically unfavorable point will make itself felt, if it is won early enough and if the most is made of it. As a rule, tactical considerations determine where the commander should launch his reserves for the counter-attack.

The counter-attack here meant is an act of the commander of the whole force; in bodies of troops acting as part of a larger force and in numerically inferior forces, the warding off of the flank attack remains almost always the only remedy.

“The general reserve should be posted at the point from which it can best move forward, counter to the probable direction of the hostile attack, while, at the same time, making the most of the features of the ground. When only one flank is secure, the general reserve is, as a rule, placed in echelon in rear of the unprotected wing. When both flanks are in the air, nothing remains but to place sufficient reserves in readiness in rear of one flank to ward off a hostile envelopment, while retaining as strong a force as possible in rear of the other for the purpose of bringing about the decision. The echeloned general reserve must have room for development, whether this be for warding off a hostile envelopment or for making a counter-attack.” (Par. 410 German I. D. R.).

The general reserve should be posted in rear of the center of the position only when the front is short and the situation is not as yet cleared up. In this position it will frequently be exposed to the fire directed against the first line, and its entry into action will usually involve a loss of time. When adequate information is available of the measures taken by the opponent, or the nature of the ground compels him to direct his decisive attack against a wing, this alone determines the position of the general reserve.

Since the counter-attack is to take the enemy by surprise, the position of the general reserve must be concealed, and precautions must be taken to keep hostile patrols in the dark, as long as possible, in regard to its actual location. The ground over which the general reserve is to advance should be free from obstacles, so that the counter-attack can be made rapidly and with uniformity.

Since the assailant will almost invariably endeavor to direct his attack against a flank, the general reserve of the defender should be posted at such a distance in rear of the threatened wing that the troops composing it will be sheltered to some extent from hostile fire. In order that the fully deployed general reserve, when making a counter-attack, may clear with its inner flank the outer flank of the line holding the position, and not get into the latter’s zone of fire, a sufficient interval must be left between the two. This interval should increase with the size of the reserve. As a rule, the counter-attack should be launched so as to produce the decision when the assailant has arrived within assaulting distance of the defender. This requires that the general reserve and the line holding the position be separated by an interval of at least 200 m. In addition, the counter-attack must be so made that it will actually strike the assailant in flank; and this it cannot do unless the general reserve is posted sufficiently far to a flank. The center of the reserve should be launched so as to strike not only the flank of the enemy’s firing line, but that of his supports as well. If the general reserve is posted too near the first line, there is danger of it being enveloped together with the first line, and committed to purely defensive action (refusing a flank). On the other hand, if it is posted too far to a flank, its timely entry into action is not absolutely assured; the assailant may turn against it, cut it off from the defensive position, and defeat it in detail. The farther the general reserve is off to a flank, the more effectively will it strike the enemy in flank, but it will be correspondingly more difficult to conceal it. The necessity of pushing the general reserve far to a flank decreases, as the scope of the attacker’s envelopment of the defensive line increases. It may frequently be to the defender’s advantage to induce the assailant to make a far-reaching envelopment, provided the line defending the position is not placed in an unfavorable tactical situation by so doing. Since the attacker will probably have detachments echeloned in rear of his flank, the troops entrusted with the counter-attack must similarly have an echelon in rear of their exposed flank in order to protect themselves against a flank attack.

It is impossible to lay down a fixed, normal strength for the reserve. This depends upon the strength of the position, and the degree of resistance the intrenchments are capable of rendering; but, in any case, the force intended for local defense should be strong enough to compel the enemy to deploy completely, and prevent his carrying the defenses before the counter-attack is made. Large quantities of ammunition and intrenchments capable of rendering effective resistance must compensate for the shortage of men in warding off the enemy, in order that the general reserve may be made as strong as possible. The question, as to how thinly the position must be occupied, and how strong the general reserve may be made, can only be answered in each particular case. If the attack made by the general reserve is to produce any effect, it must not be undertaken with too small a force, as it could then be checked by weak detachments.

While the general reserve lies in waiting for the enemy, it may either--

1. Remain in a preparatory position, in one or more groups, and deploy during its forward movement; or

2. Take up the attack formation from the start.

The first method has the advantage, when the space required is small, of permitting the general reserve to be concealed, and allows changes to be made in the direction of march and in the dispositions.

The second, although it enables the reserve to advance promptly to the counter-attack, is rarely suitable, as the reserve in combat formation is not so easily concealed, as it is more difficult to make changes in the dispositions and the direction of march, and as this formation seems only practicable for making an advance in one direction--straight to the front.

It is of the utmost importance to know when the counter-attack should be launched. In warding off the enemy by purely frontal action, no special disadvantages result from prematurely launching the general reserve; if it enters the action too late, it will still be able to throw back the assailant who has penetrated into the position. With the counter-attack it is different; it must take place when the opponent is under the most effective fire at short range. If the counter-attack is made prematurely, especially when the reserves and flank echelons of the attacker have not as yet been used up, the latter, while, indeed, exposed to the most violent fire of the defender, will be able to take counter-measures. In that case, two entirely independent actions may result, and the counter-attack made by the general reserve may be checked by the retained echelons of the attacker and repulsed by their fire. When launched prematurely, the counter-attack will not always repulse the hostile attack; and when launched too late, it may perhaps still bring about the decision, or avert a defeat, but it will never produce decisive results.

A counter-attack made after the attacker has penetrated into the position, and while he is endeavoring to dislodge the garrisons of such supporting points as still offer resistance, reckons with the fact that the hitherto victorious assailant, exhausted and in confusion, will not be a match for a well aimed blow delivered by a considerable number of troops. However, a defender will scarcely contemplate such an employment of his general reserve; for him the important thing is to repulse the attack in front of and not within the position. Although military history presents comparatively numerous instances of such _retours offensifs_, this may be explained by the fact that the counter-attack was launched too late. The weakness of the assailant is but momentary, and the most must be made of this by advancing against him promptly by the shortest line. But if the assailant has had time to re-form and to bring up his batteries, it will usually be too late to make a counter-attack.

Aymard’s Division (French), which had penetrated into =Servigny=
under cover of darkness, but had made no attempt to occupy the town
systematically or to re-form the disordered troops, was driven out
again by a counter-attack made by only eleven Prussian companies.[462]

[462] KUNZ, _Noisseville_, p. 52. _Das Wald- und Ortsgefecht_, p.
181.

The numerous counter-attacks made by the French during the battle
of =Wörth= (for example the counter-attack made by Maire’s Brigade)
pushed too far forward into the zone of the German artillery
fire, and did not have the expected success. The well-led French
counter-attack made by about 1200 men from the south edge of
the =Niederwald=, was discontinued at a timely moment.[463] The
well-directed counter-attack made by the 1st Turco Regiment at
=Wörth=, after the capture of =Elsaszhausen=, was successful and is
especially instructive.[464] The attack made by General de Sonis for
the purpose of retaking =Loigny= was undertaken too late and with
inadequate forces.[465] The same is true of the counter-attack made
by the 3rd Bavarian Division on =Zella= (4th July, 1866).

[463] KUNZ, _Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, XIII, pp. 75 and 159.

[464] _Ibid._, XVI, p. 187, et seq.

[465] HÖNIG, _Volkskrieg_, IV, p. 124.

The French regulations recommend a unique procedure, which may be successful when employed against an opponent not prepared to meet it. “Under certain circumstances, counter-attacks may be combined with retreat maneuvers. The advanced troops should bring the enemy to a standstill with their fire and compel him to deploy. Then they should break off the action without becoming involved in a fight at close quarters. In this manner, the attacker is drawn onto terrain reconnoitered beforehand, where fresh troops, hidden up to the last moment, attack him impetuously under favorable conditions at a time when he is tired and worn out by a long movement.”

The most difficult thing about a counter-attack is to seize the right moment for launching it. As it is impossible to foretell how long it will take the enemy to arrive within assaulting distance, no rule can be laid down as to the proper moment for launching the counter-attack. The best plan would be to screen the movements of the reserve, and, as the attacking troops approach, to bring it gradually up to the point from which it is to move forward. A commander requires wide practical experience and great force of character to judge the situation calmly and dispassionately, while fully aware that launching the counter-attack either too soon or too late may prejudice the result. There is always danger that the suggestions which reach him from various quarters may cause him to take half-measures. The stronger the general reserve and the weaker the force holding the defenses, the more numerous and urgent will be the requests for support; and he will not find it easy to resist the temptation to grant these requests and accordingly weaken the general reserve, which is intended for offensive action.

We must now consider the question as to whether the counter-attack should rely on fire action alone, or should resort to the bayonet as well. The unexpected advance of a large body of troops against a flank of the enemy will rarely fail to produce an effect. If the enemy does not yield to fire, it is obvious that an assault will have to be made. A counter-attack made unexpectedly is, as a rule, successful at the start; but, if its commander follows up this initial success when not supported by strong reserves, a reverse may take place resulting in the defeat of the defender’s entire force.

A counter-attack made by three companies (9th, 10th, and 11th) of the
3rd Bavarian Infantry Regiment brought relief to the two batteries
which had gone into action near =Goury= (battle of =Loigny=). The
Ist and IInd Battalions, 3rd Infantry, the Ist and IInd Battalions,
12th Infantry, and the 7th Jäger-Battalion joined in this attack, and
when the batteries finally followed, the force succeeded in throwing
back the French battalions immediately opposing it. The twenty-one
companies now made the mistake of attacking =Ecuillon=, which they
occupied. The attacking force had traversed about 2000 m., and as
there were no reserves and flank echelons, the Bavarians were obliged
to give way before an assault made by seven fresh battalions against
their unprotected left flank. The mistake of pushing forward too far,
and the lack of supports in rear of the exposed flank, was bound to
exact a penalty, as soon as the French were in a position to advance
on their own account.[466]

[466] HÖNIG, _Volkskrieg_, IV, p. 43.

A very instructive episode occurred on August 26th, 1904, near
=Tsinortun=. Toward noon the Japanese Guard and the 10th Division
advanced through fields of tall kaoliang for the purpose of
enveloping the right wing of the IIIrd Siberian Army Corps. The
commanding general, Lieutenant-General Iwanov, directed the reserve
(apparently parts of the 3rd East-Siberian Rifle Division) to make a
counter-attack against the left flank of the Japanese. The Russian
counter-attack was taken in flank by a brigade of the Guard, which
followed in rear of the Japanese attacking force, and had to retire.
The decision was then brought about by the counter-attack made by the
140th Infantry, which unexpectedly appeared on the left flank of the
Japanese. The engagement at Tsinortun is moreover of special interest
as regards the Japanese method of attack.[467]

[467] LÖFFLER, _Allgemeine Lage_, I, pp. 68 and 69. V. HOEN, _Der
russisch-japanische Krieg_, in _Organ des militär-wissenschaftlichen
Vereins_, p. 166. NIESSEL, _Enseignements tactiques_, p. 158.

So far we have only considered the counter-attack made against the flank of an attacker, and against the front of an enemy who has victoriously penetrated into a position. The success of a counter-attack against the enemy’s flank depends primarily on moral factors; besides, after protracted fighting, supports and reserves in rear of the flank are frequently lacking, so that the attacker cannot quickly form an adequate firing front towards a flank.[468]

[468] Examples of successful counter-attacks against an enemy’s
flank: Battle of Loigny, on December 2nd, 1870; the counter-attack
made by 21 companies of the 4th Brigade at Goury (HÖNIG,
_Volkskrieg_, IV, p. 55), and that made by the Ist Battalion,
10th Infantry, and the Ist and IIIrd Battalions, 13th Infantry,
at Goury (_ibid._, p. 41); the flank attack made by Kottwitz’
Brigade (_ibid._, p. 82, and p. 220 supra); the flank attack made
by the garrison of Fougeu on the attacking columns of General
Sonis: the brilliant flank attack made by the IIIrd Battalion, 90th
Infantry, during the battle of Orleans, on December 4th, 1870 (KUNZ,
_Orleans_, p. 148); and the counter-attack made by General Bataille
on the Stiring Wald during the battle of Spicheren. The last-named
counter-attack is a good model, both as regards conception and
execution. (_Wald- und Ortsgefecht_, pp. 93 and 96).

Theoretically, a frontal counter-attack, _i.e._, one made straight to the front from a position, while the assailant is advancing to the assault on a broad front, ought to offer the least chances of success, but military history proves the contrary in those cases where the defender awaited the proper moment. This moment arrives when the defender clearly perceives that the enormous losses suffered by the attacker begin to impair the morale of his remaining men. This becomes apparent through a slackening in the attack, through an uncertainty of movement, and, finally, through hesitation, the latter being usually preceded by wavering.[469]

[469] “The defender will only be able to make a frontal
counter-attack from his position when he has repulsed the assault and
has made the most of fire action, or when it is important to drive
away the enemy who has been brought to a standstill in front of the
defender’s position. A premature counter-attack may lead to the loss
of the position.” (Par. 414 German I. D. R.).

The moral effect of a determined counter-attack with cold steel during the closing moments of an attack will undoubtedly be great. Meckel says[470]: “Here likewise, it is of the greatest importance to bring up the supports promptly, so as to increase the volume of fire to the utmost and to produce that superiority which quite naturally resolves itself into an offensive movement. The defender who does not fix bayonets is already casting furtive glances towards the best line of retreat.”

[470] _Lehre von der Truppenführung_.

This “superiority” caused the French to advance from the wood of
=Elsaszhausen= against the skirmishers of the XIth Army Corps
appearing at the northern edge of the =Niederwald=. The success they
met with at the start induced the French to continue their advance,
and when a reverse occurred subsequently, the wood of Elsaszhausen
was taken by the Hessians without difficulty.[471]

[471] KUNZ, _Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, XIII, p. 121, et seq.

Although such counter-attacks, directed against the strong firing line of the attacker and unsupported by the defender’s fire, were frequently successful in war, this was due to the moral effect produced on the attacker by the sudden and unexpected onset of a long line of infantry. Troops thus unexpectedly attacked, and, in addition, deprived of the support of their own artillery, almost invariably lost their heads. However, if the attacker is prepared for such an event, remains cool, meets the counter-attack of the defender with a powerful fire at short ranges, and brings up his supports, in order to follow up the effect of his fire with an offensive movement, there can be no doubt as to the result.[472]

[472] The battles of Soor and Kesselsdorf are interesting examples
of this. (_Kriege Friedrichs des Groszen_, II, pp. 75 and 234).
In both cases the defender’s frontal counter-attack forced the
assailant to face about; but at Soor a second line of infantry, and
at Kesselsdorf a charge made by the Bonin Dragoons finally turned the
scale in favor of the assailant.

Such a counter-attack, however, is only possible when the defender still has strong, intact reserves at his disposal, which he has kept in readiness in the closest proximity to the firing line until the decisive moment. An organization acting as part of a larger force, and whose flanks are secure, as a rule has no choice but to make a frontal counter-attack, unless offensive action is to be dispensed with altogether.

Short frontal counter-attacks from a position were made successfully
by the British in the battles at the opening of the 19th Century.
(In these counter-attacks, the British fired a volley and then
advanced to the assault). Such successful counter-attacks were made
during the battles of =Vimiero=, =Maida=, =Busaco=, and especially
=Waterloo=.[473]

[473] At Waterloo, the counter-attack made by Picton’s Division and
the British Guards repulsed the French attack. VON OLLECH, _Feldzug
von 1815_, pp. 230 and 247. See also note p. 151 supra.

At =Beaumont=, the 66th Infantry made a counter-attack when the
French had approached within 40 m. The 66th had already begun to
waver, here and there, when its energetic and unexpected advance
caused the French to retire.[474]

[474] HOPFFGARTEN-HEIDLER, _Beaumont_, p. 53.

In the battles of the =Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78=, frontal
counter-attacks were successfully made in several instances.

In the engagement at =Kazeljevo= (5th September, 1877), the frontal
counter-attack made by the Russians, who were numerically far
inferior, saved them from defeat, as all their lines of retreat were
obstructed by their trains, which had gone astray.[475]

[475] SPRINGER, _Der russisch-türkische Krieg_, III, p. 171.

The most instructive fight in this connection is the engagement of
=Gorni Bugarov= (1st January, 1878). General Weljaminov’s detachment,
which consisted of the Pensa and the Tambov Infantry Regiments,
occupied a flank position on the southern foothills of the Balkans,
on the road leading from =Orchanie= to =Sofia=. The Russians allowed
the Turks to approach to very short range before they opened fire,
which was immediately followed by a counter-attack all along the
line. This seems to have been the result of the initiative of the
several battalion commanders. The Turks (15 battalions) faced about
and retired on Sofia. The Russian infantry was led back to its first
position.[476]

[476] _Ibid._, VII, p. 134.

On the same day, the attack made by the Preobrajenski Regiment
of the Russian Guard at =Tashkessen= was repulsed by the frontal
counter-attack made by a weak force of Turkish infantry.[477]

[477] BAKER-PASHA, _War in Bulgaria_, II, p. 57.

During the Russo-Japanese war such frontal counter-attacks were very frequently made. When undertaken with inadequate numbers, they were invariably repulsed by the fire of the Japanese, especially when the latter found cover in previously constructed trenches.

Provisions of Various Regulations.

=Austria-Hungary.= If a counter-attack is contemplated, the commander
should resist every temptation to employ parts of the general reserve
for other purposes than for carrying out that attack. In this case,
the general reserve should be placed in readiness so that, while the
opponent advances within the decisive zone, it can quickly deploy
and carry out the counter-attack with determination by directing a
powerful fire against the flank of the enemy. Freedom of movement
on one flank is absolutely essential to the execution of the
counter-attack. Local frontal counter-attacks are to be avoided; the
enemy is to be annihilated by fire.

When it is not contemplated to make a counter-attack with the general
reserve, the latter is to be employed either for directly reinforcing
the troops in one of the sections, or for engaging the hostile troops
making an enveloping attack on the position.

=France.= The regulations make a distinction between counter-attack
(_contre attaque_) and offensive return (_retour offensif_). A
counter-attack is made by the reserve before the enemy penetrates
into the energetically defended supporting points. In contrast
herewith, every attempt to retake a captured position is called an
offensive return.

A counter-attack with troops of the second line is to be made as soon
as the assailant presses the fighting line too closely. A powerful
and suddenly executed counter-attack, supported by the fire of the
first line, will, at the very least, check the enemy until the
fighting line has had time to recover.

Occasionally, it may be advantageous not to await the crisis, but
to force the assailant to deploy by directing a heavy fire upon
him, then to break off the action, inducing the enemy to press
on, in order to draw him, by this means, onto previously selected
and reconnoitered terrain, where he is suddenly attacked in flank
by fresh troops. Military history shows that this very procedure
has frequently been successful. “If the attacker presses forward
too hastily and if he threatens to carry the defender’s position,
fresh troops, which have been assembled in a place sheltered from
view, attack him energetically, while the troops already engaged
increase the intensity of their fire. This powerful and energetic
counter-attack produces confusion in the enemy’s ranks and compels
him to retire, or at least to discontinue his forward movement until
he has had time to recover.”

“The same activity, the same determination to maneuver, must
prevail everywhere. Every mistake and every weakness of the enemy
must be quickly perceived and promptly utilized. The troops in the
counter-attack should move forward without hesitation and regardless
of the cost When such a forward movement has to be discontinued, the
commander must decide where it shall cease. The efforts of all should
be directed toward one object, that of tiring and demoralizing the
enemy by constant counter-attacks, until the moment arrives when the
commander must order the offensive to be assumed.”

=England.= The counter-attack may be made either by the garrison
of the firing trenches, as a frontal counter movement, or by the
general reserve, accompanied by artillery and cavalry, as a decisive
counter-attack. The moment when the attacker has used up his
reserves and is about to assault is generally considered as the most
propitious for making the counter-attack.

=Japan.= The Japanese entertain the same views as the Germans.
“The better the position, the location and construction of the
intrenchments, and the distribution of troops, the greater the
number of men that can be saved in garrisoning the position, and the
stronger the general reserve available for an offensive movement. By
this means the chances of victory are increased. * * * Frequently
there is danger that the defender will be committed to purely passive
defense, and that freedom of action will be lost. Therefore, when the
proper moment arrives, the decisive counter-attack should be made.”

XII. THE RETREAT.

(Par. 426 German I. D. R.).

A retreat under effective hostile fire means annihilation; only the presence of cover immediately in rear of the fighting line should induce a commander to come to the weighty decision of reaching it by running. (Russia). On account of the great range of modern weapons, defeated troops, on open ground, cannot escape from fire by running.[478] No rules can be laid down in regulations as to the conduct of a retreat after a defeat. As a rule, further resistance is no longer possible; neither is it practicable to leave some troops in position to cover the retreat. The defeated force must retire in a direction perpendicular to the front of the enemy,[479] and cannot re-form until the fire of the opponent ceases or at least abates. (Par. 428 German I. D. R.). Artillery which is moved to the rear at a timely moment, and all available cavalry should cover the retreat of the infantry, so as to prevent the hostile cavalry from making the most of its opportunities for effective action.

[478] Furthermore, the danger of panic should not be
underestimated. See KUNZ, _Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, XIII, p.
49, and XVI. p. 243, in regard to the panic created in a skirmish
line near the Bruch Mühle west of Gunstett (Wörth). This skirmish
line was running to the rear toward a rallying position and the panic
was produced by the command “To the rear. Double Time! March! March!”
The panic was nipped in the bud by the energetic action of a mounted
field officer. Major v. Below.

[479] The 57th Infantry, whose right flank had been enveloped and
roughly handled by a counter-attack made by the French, retired to
its left rear through the fragments of the 16th Infantry. This caused
the two regiments to change places. (The attack made by the 38th
Brigade at Mars-la-Tour). _Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften_, 25,
p. 35.

To order a retreat at the right moment requires military instinct; rules cannot be laid down in regard to it.

“Troops which, while engaged with the enemy, are either withdrawn by order or defeated, can no longer choose their line of retreat. If the enemy pursues, they must retire perpendicularly to their former front, without changing formation, and need a force on which they can rally in order to prepare for renewed resistance. From this it follows that a systematic retreat can only be carried out when the force still has some distribution in depth. It would be wrong however, for a force intended for decisive action to retain a reserve for covering the retreat instead of employing it for the purpose of gaining the victory.”

To break off the action by systematically relieving the troops engaged with the enemy,[480] is only possible if the force still has reserves available, if cavalry and artillery are in a position to take a hand in the fight, or if the troops that have been withdrawn are sheltered from the enemy’s fire by features of the ground--all of which depends in many cases on chance.

[480] _Taktik_, V, p. 344.

It is much more difficult to break off an action in defense than in attack, as in the former case, the assailant approaches closer with every moment. This brings up the question, as to whether it would not be better for the defender to hold out until darkness sets in than expose his troops to the incalculable results of a retreat under fire. When the assailant has once entered the zone of short ranges, the defender will no longer be able to effect a systematic retreat. If the defender has used up all his reserves, the withdrawal should be begun at the point where the enemy is not pressing his attack, or where he has been unable to gain a superiority of fire. When a withdrawal is made, the whole local front should retire at once and simultaneously; it would be a mistake to reduce gradually the strength of the units engaged, for this would only give the enemy an opportunity to annihilate completely the remaining parts. If a company cannot maintain its position, a platoon certainly could not do so.

As soon as the commander decides to break off the action, the reserve, if one is still available, should be sent to the rear to take up a rallying position, which should be so situated that it can make its influence felt as soon as the main position is evacuated. As every defeated force, or one that is withdrawn by order, retires straight to the rear, the rallying position, in order to allow the troops holding it to fire effectively, must be located as far as possible to a flank of the line of retreat. If the outer flank of the position can be advanced, fire may be opened at an earlier moment, but this will only be practicable in minor engagements. The distance of the rallying position from the main defensive position should be such as to compel the enemy to advance again under fire, and prevent his carrying both the main defensive position and the rallying position at one rush. On the other hand, the rallying position should not be so far to the rear that the retreating troops may be annihilated before they enter its effective zone. However, as the troops in the rallying position are also to effect a withdrawal, it is not a good plan for them to engage the enemy from the start at too short a range. “It is most desirable when artillery and machine guns supported by cavalry suffice for this purpose, while the infantry uninterruptedly continues its retreat. The mounted arms follow later at an increased gait.” (Par. 429 German I. D. R.).

The rallying position should be occupied in time, so that all dispositions for holding it can be made calmly and without precipitation. A powerful fire at mid and long ranges is requisite to prevent the enemy from reaching decisive ranges. The firing line should, therefore, be strong and the supports weak. If a reserve is still available, it is at once sent back into a second rallying position, to cover the withdrawal of the troops occupying the first rallying position. A free field of fire down to the shortest ranges is not necessary. If the position is on elevated ground, the firing line should be posted so far in rear of the crest that, while its fire can still sweep the ground at mid ranges, and perhaps at the extreme limit of short ranges, the skirmishers, on retiring, will be sheltered as soon as possible. Fire should be opened as soon as possible, in order to retard the enemy’s advance.

The troops holding a rallying position should delay the enemy’s advance long enough to give the retiring force ample time and room to re-form, so that it can effect its retreat in good order. When this has been accomplished, the troops occupying the rallying position retire, unless there is hope that fresh troops may bring about a change in the state of affairs. As a rule, a second rallying position will be necessary, but it would be a mistake to halt in every seemingly favorable position. When a retreat has once been decided upon, it is generally necessary to get away from the enemy as quickly as possible.

“The commander must conduct the combat attending a retreat according to a well-ordered plan. He must indicate where the rallying position is to be, what troops are to occupy it, and assign march directions to the different columns. Only after he has given these orders and has assured himself that they will be executed, does he leave the battlefield, in order to meet his troops soon thereafter with new orders.[481] The rest is the business of subordinate leaders.” (Par. 432 German I. D. R.). The latter remain with their organizations for the purpose of maintaining order and cohesion. (Par. 297 German I. D. R.). Adjutants and officers detailed to receive orders should be sent to the rear ahead of the troops.[482]

[481] This sentence in our regulations, not to be found in those of
other armies, was necessary to absolve a superior commander from all
blame for leaving his troops and the battlefield. V. SCHLICHTING, I,
p. 115. See _Taktik_, V, p. 350.

[482] For the conduct of a retreat, see _Taktik_, V, p. 373, et seq.

XIII. CONTAINING ACTIONS.

THE DELAYING ACTION AND THE HOLDING ATTACK.

Since the attacker will invariably seek to overpower the defender, and the latter will endeavor to prevent this by force of arms, it is obvious that an enemy can be “delayed” or “held” only when he permits this to be done. It is difficult to conduct a delaying action or a holding attack, because our training, which is based on offensive action, causes subordinate leaders to follow up every little advantage. In delaying actions, the defensive, and in holding attacks, the offensive intention predominates. The latter may consist of merely threatening the enemy with an attack, or of seriously engaging him. (Par. 392 German I. D. R.). Both the delaying action and the holding attack aim at deceiving the enemy.[483] Accordingly, the characteristic features of these combats are great frontage, large expenditure of ammunition, and long range fire, but, at the same time, few rifles, in order to deceive the enemy as to the strength of our force. In both combats, troops require considerable distribution in depth. The object of a delaying action is to gain time until the troops in rear can deploy, neighboring columns can come up, or a turning movement can become effective. (Par. 417 German I. D. R.). Troops fighting a delaying action require considerable distribution in depth so that they can effect a withdrawal. Distribution in depth is still more necessary in a holding attack,[484] in order that the troops may be able to repulse a counter-attack made by the enemy, or, by attacking him energetically, prevent his withdrawing. A force fighting a delaying action should keep its supports far to the rear, while a force charged with holding the enemy should keep them in close proximity. By properly employing his artillery, the commander can best exercise an influence on the course of the combat. (Par. 419 German I. D. R.). Since a delaying action is to be fought at long ranges, a field of fire is only required at those ranges; defiladed spaces in the foreground may frequently be a positive advantage. The fire fight is kept up only so long as it is necessary to keep the enemy at a distance. In a holding attack, it will not be proper to keep up a continuous fire; the violent fire breaking forth from time to time must teach the defender that a force is lying in waiting opposite him, ready to rush forward at a moment’s notice.

[483] This is still more pronounced In demonstrations. (_Taktik_,
V, p. 11). “Feints are to deceive the enemy as to our intentions,
but they may consist of offensive action. The regulations do not lay
down specific rules either for them or for other more rare methods
of combat; accordingly, their conduct will vary with the situation.”
(Par. 420, German I. D. R.).

[484] _Taktik_, V, p. 161.

The object of threatening with an attack may frequently be accomplished by engaging the enemy with several detachments which are separated by intervals. (Par. 288 German I. D. R.). The negative object of preventing the enemy from withdrawing may be accomplished with a weak force; the positive object of compelling the enemy to use up his reserves in the early stages of the fight and at a less decisive point, requires that lie be engaged with a stronger force. A determined commander will not allow himself to be held by demonstrations. The manner in which the Vth Army Corps forced the French to bring up their reserves into the first line at Wörth, is worthy of imitation.

The size of the group charged with holding the enemy depends upon the extent of front to be covered and the probable duration of the combat. The conduct of such a force will vary considerably, depending upon the distance to the point where the decisive action is to be fought. When the holding force is close to this point, it should engage the enemy energetically.

=England.= The holding attack is to deceive the enemy as to the
direction in which the main attack will be made, and, when the
crisis of the action approaches, prevent his withdrawing troops from
those parts of his front which are only threatened and opposing the
decisive attack with nearly his entire force. Accordingly, the troops
making the holding attack should act vigorously, as soon as the
attack develops, and be in readiness to transform their demonstration
instantly into a real attack.

XIV. THE INFANTRY COMBAT ACCORDING TO VARIOUS DRILL REGULATIONS.

THE AUSTRIAN DRILL REGULATIONS OF 1903.[485]

[485] The various provisions of the German and Austrian Infantry
Drill Regulations are skillfully compared by Major-General
REGENSPURSKY V. REGENY, Austrian Army, in an article entitled _Die
taktischen Lehren des Exerzierreglements für die k. k. Fusztruppen
vom Jahre 1903. Ein Vergleich mit dem deutschen Reglement 1906_.
(_Militär-Wochenblatt_, 1906, Nos. 7 and 8).

ATTACK.

Both the rencontre and the attack on a position prepared for defense
are considered. The regulations in regard to the rencontre have been
revised, so as to permit a commander to launch the battalions of his
main body directly from route column, or to concentrate his main body
farther to the rear, while his advance guard stands on the defensive.
The =attack on a position prepared for defense=, even after the
attacker’s artillery has succeeded in paving the way for its
infantry, consists of a laborious advance from one firing position
to another. The question as to whether an attack is feasible without
the support of artillery fire, is answered to the effect that it
will, as a rule, be a difficult undertaking, unless the artillery has
sufficiently silenced the batteries of the defender. The regulations
divide the attack into two clearly defined phases, viz., the advance
to the decisive firing position (the main firing position), and the
decisive action.

The provisions of the regulations coincide very nearly with the views
considered sound in Germany, and therefore an attempt will here
merely be made to point out several differences. The combat formation
necessary for the decisive stage of the action is taken up during
the preparatory stage, so that, when the forward movement commences,
the troops need only move straight to the front. (Par. 568). In a
division, by appropriately combining “tactical units”, echelons are
formed, whose strength depends upon the purpose of the combat, the
information of the enemy, and the relation of the division to other
bodies of troops. (Pars. 533, 540 and 541). Rules for the employment
of thin or dense firing lines are not given. “The attacker should
advance impetuously to the point where he can employ his rifles
effectively,” (Par. 582).

“In an attack, everything should be done to get within effective
range of the opponent before fire is opened by the whole line.” (Par.
323). When acting as part of a larger force, a platoon may open
fire independently, if it suddenly encounters the enemy or if it
finds a good opportunity for firing which the company commander has
overlooked. (Par. 338). Unless the battalion commander has reserved
to himself the right of designating the moment for opening fire, the
company commanders direct when fire shall be opened, and conduct the
fire fight at mid and short ranges. At long ranges, the battalion
commander designates the companies that are to fire.

=Kinds of fire.= Fire at will and volley fire are employed. As a
rule, volleys are only used when the troops are in close order, but
may also be used in skirmish line to test the range. According to
par. 331, the rate of fire may be accelerated, and in pars. 327 and
686, fire surprises are authorized.

When exposed to effective fire, the firing line is to =advance by
rushes=. These are to be made by alternate units moving forward,
supported by the fire of those remaining behind. Rushes are only in
exceptional cases to be made by units smaller than a platoon. “The
length of the rushes depends upon the character of the ground and
the tactical situation, as well as upon the physical condition of
the men. They serve as an expedient for reaching the next firing
position.” (Par. 313).

Movements under effective hostile fire may sometimes be made by
=crawling=. This is considered especially useful in rectifying
alignments. (Par. 196).

For =envelopment=, see p. 362 supra.

For the =use of the spade in attack=, see p. 393 supra.

=Assault.= “The close approach of a long firing line to an enemy who
occupies a good position, may well pass as a proof of the assailant’s
superiority. Nevertheless, this does not, under all circumstances,
furnish assurance that a forward movement for the purpose of
penetrating the hostile position will now succeed; a premature
assault may still result in disaster.

“As long as the conduct of the opponent does not show clear
indications that his fire power is crippled, nothing remains for
the attacker but to continue the fight for the superiority of
fire. In doing this, the commander should not hesitate to put in
his last man if necessary. The assault--in case the enemy still
offers resistance--should not be made until the attack has been
pushed sufficiently close to the enemy’s position, and the power of
resistance of the enemy is palpably broken.

“It is immaterial what formations are taken up for this closing act
of the combat, as it should be the natural culmination of a situation
strained to the utmost. The troops must understand that there is no
longer any chance to go back; that on the contrary, at this moment,
honor and salvation lie wholly in moving to the front.

“When the assault has once begun, the hostile position should be
carried in one rush. Any hesitation or halting, at this critical
stage of the action, may nullify the previous success, and must
therefore be quickly overcome by the reserves, if any are still
available, taking a hand in the fight.” (Pars. 590-592).

The decision to assault may emanate either from the firing line, from
the commander of the whole force, or from the commander of one of the
units. If the decision emanates from the firing line, all the troops
are to conform to the movement of that line. The following provision,
which applies even to a company acting alone, differs from the German
regulations, viz., “During the assault, a part of the assailant’s
force should, whenever practicable, continue its fire and direct it
upon any hostile reserves that may appear.”

DEFENSE.

The regulations governing the =defense seeking a decision= differ
but little from the views entertained in Germany. The actual work
of preparing a position for defense is not to commence until the
direction in which the enemy is going to make his attack is known.
The assailant is to be prevented, as far as possible, from obtaining
information of the position and the measures taken for strengthening
it. This is to be accomplished by pushing small detachments to the
front to hamper the enemy’s advance.

In the past, =advanced positions= were decidedly opposed by the
Austrians, but at present their use is recommended in cases where
time is to be gained or the enemy is to be deceived, or where
fire from such positions would inflict considerable losses on the
enemy. However, the regulations seek to obviate the danger of the
principal fight taking place in the advanced position instead of in
the main position, by adding: “But such a measure should not cause
the commander to swerve from the firm determination to carry out his
original intention.”

The tremendously increased fire power of infantry is to make it
possible to hold the front with a comparatively weak force, while
the remaining troops are concentrated as a reserve with which the
actual decision is to be brought about. The commander should resist
every temptation to use the general reserve for other purposes than
for carrying out the =counter-attack=, which should be ordered when
the assailant is under the most effective fire of the position. The
general reserve should then be quickly deployed and should make its
attack with determination, by directing a violent fire against the
flank of the enemy. Local frontal counter-attacks are to be avoided.
The garrison is only charged with the task of annihilating the enemy
with its fire, which should be increased to the utmost intensity.

THE ITALIAN DRILL REGULATIONS OF 1903 AND 1906.[486]

[486] Major-General MIKULICZ RADECKI, Austrian Army, _Das neue
Exerzierreglement der italienischen Infanterie_, Vienna, 1906. V.
GRÄVENITZ, _Die neueren taktischen Vorschriften für das italienische
Heer_, in _Vierteljahrsheft_, 1905, I, p. 90, et seq. _Der
Infanteriekampf in der oberitalienischen Tiefebene_, in _Streffleur_,
1907, October and November numbers (also obtainable in special
pamphlet form).

P. RATH, _Der Kampf in der italienischen Kultur_, in _Militärische
Welt_, 1907, January-February number.

ATTACK.

The peculiar character of the probable Italian theater of war in
Upper Italy, with its numerous forests of tall timber, and its many
defiles, causes special attention to be paid to the offensive.[487]
The regulations emphasize the necessity of the coöperation of
infantry and artillery.

[487] Unless otherwise ordered, the advance guard advances against
the hostile forces which it encounters in its march, whether its
action be to determine, as quickly as possible, the strength of the
opponent and to save its main body from an unnecessary delay, or
whether it be to deceive the opponent as to the location of its own
forces, or, in certain cases, to make the most of a surprise. (Par.
37).

Although the platoons intended for the firing line are brought up
in close order formation, the actual combat formation is not taken
up until the situation makes this necessary; but, in any case, the
leading element is to enter the zone of hostile fire in a deployed
formation. To neutralize the mixing of units as much as possible
as the action progresses, the firing line is formed into groups
separated by intervals of 4-5 paces, although this increases the
casualties. These intervals may be increased, when required, to 10
paces. (Intervals between skirmishers in the firing line are usually
at least 15 cm., otherwise 3 paces). The firing line is to advance
until increased casualties force it to open fire.

=Kinds of fire.= Only fire at will is employed. (This is also used
when the troops are in close order and formed in four ranks). The
battalion commander in the first line directs that fire be opened, as
soon as it is certain that a good effect can be produced. When two
targets appear, the fire is to be directed upon the one promising the
best results (_i.e._, not necessarily the one that is tactically most
important). “In order that the intensity of the fire may correspond
to the requirements of the tactical situation existing at the moment,
officers, by reason of their tactical training, should be able to
state approximately how many rounds are necessary to produce the
desired effect, the range, degree of visibility and character of the
target, the nature of the terrain and of their position, as well as
the physical condition and morale of their men being given. From
these estimates may be deduced how many rifles must be employed in
order to bring about a decisive result in the shortest possible time.”

The =advance by rushes= may be made either at a walk or at a run, but
the regulations do not prescribe in detail how it shall be conducted.
The following points are considered especially important: The time
for making a rush, its length, and whether it should be made by
a whole unit simultaneously or in echelon. All this depends upon
various circumstances, which the leader, alter due consideration
of the terrain and the hostile fire, as well as of the physical
condition and morale of his men, is to judge in each particular case.
In doing this, he is to bear in mind that the rush must be made as
unobserved by the enemy as possible, so that the latter cannot direct
his lire upon the advancing unit.