Chapter X: Part 10

This admixture of organizations along a front of about 1.5 km. might
have been prevented by the commander. Toward 6 P. M., a similar
situation existed on the Roten Berg and at the south end of the
Giefert Wald--39²⁄₃ companies belonging to the 12th, 39th, 40th, 48th
and 74th Infantry Regiments were scattered along a front of 1600
m. It is true, the peculiar situation existing on the German side,
operated against a simultaneous employment of the several bodies and
a mixing of units was unavoidable, but it would undoubtedly have
been possible to prevent such a complete dissolution of all units,
by François’ Brigade taking up a more suitable formation before
the action commenced. The mistake made here was repeated over and
over again in the other preliminary combats of the campaign, and
invariably led to the same result.[238]

[238] Consult _Erste Gefechtsentwicklung des XI. Armeekorps bei
Wörth_, KUNZ, _Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, 13, p. 10, et seq.

The failure of the attacks made by the British brigades at
=Magersfontain= and =Paardeberg= may be traced to the lack of
sufficient reinforcements. At Magersfontain, the four battalions
of the Highland Brigade were deployed on a front of 3000 m. and at
Paardeberg on a front of 4000 m.

In deciding how many men are required to occupy or attack a position, the principal point to be considered is the effect of fire. The modern long range magazine rifle will, no doubt, enable us to defend a position with a smaller force than was possible in the past with the older less improved weapons. However, combats last longer nowadays, and the shock action of Frederick the Great’s tactics is no longer practicable. The fight is carried on at longer ranges, and the tremendously costly decisive moments of the past are of rarer occurrence. As a consequence, the casualties of the whole force engaged are smaller, although, owing to unfavorable conditions, certain organizations may suffer losses quite as great as those incurred in the battles of Frederick the Great and Napoleon.[239] Instead of the sanguinary hand-to-hand fight with cold steel, we now have a prolonged fire fight carried on by a firing line which requires to be constantly fed by troops held in rear, who have to be sheltered as much as possible from hostile fire until the moment of their employment. This fire fight is frequently decided by psychological factors and without the troops suffering material losses.

[239] At Wörth, the 1st Turco Regiment lost the enormous total of
93.1%, and twelve other French regiments suffered a loss of over 50%.
To be sure, the losses sustained during the retreat are included
in this total. At Albuera (16th May, 1811), the 57th Regiment
(British) and the Füsilier Brigade lost 70%; in four hours the army
of Beresford lost 25%, and of the British infantry, which originally
numbered 7000 men, only 1800 remained.

“The duration of the combat under modern conditions,” writes General Négrier,[240] “leads to a considerable mental exhaustion of the troops which is apparent in nervous lassitude. This explains the impotency of leader and troops the day after a defeat and even after a victory. This lassitude is still greater on the day of the battle. While it is true that this has always been the case, the nervous exhaustion has grown in an inconceivable manner, its intensity increasing at the same rate as the invisibility of the opponent. _The invisibility of the enemy directly affects the morale of the soldier, the sources of his energy and courage. The soldier who cannot see his enemy is inclined to see him everywhere. It is but a step from this impression to hesitancy and then to fear._ The inertia of the troops for whole days at Magersfontain, Colenso, and Paardeberg, frequently more than 800 m. from the enemy, was not caused by their losses, but by the moral depression produced within the effective zone of rifle fire. Another factor, which governs the modern combat at short ranges, the _impossibility of the commander making his influence felt in lines which are seriously engaged_, is of still greater importance. _The influence of the officers who lead these lines is also limited. They are scarcely able to direct the three or four men nearest them._ The combat depends upon the individual fighters, and there never has been a time when the personal efficiency of the individual soldier has had a greater significance.” We should not forget that this change occurred during a period in which we no longer fight our battles with professional soldiers of long service, but, on the contrary, with peace cadres of our conscript armies raised to war strength by Reservists.

[240] _Revue des deux mondes_, June number, 1902.

Another factor to be considered is the fighting quality of the opponent. In an action against an enemy who is a match for us, the necessity for distribution in depth is, of course, greater than when fighting against poor troops.

General v. Werder could with impunity oppose the newly raised levies
of the French Republic on the =Lisaine= with 1.12 men per meter of
front. The victory was won by this very extraordinary extension of
front, which, if employed in the face of the Imperial army, would
have led to defeat.[241]

[241] KUNZ, _Entscheidungskämpfe des Korps Werder_, II, p. 11.

_Considerations of importance in deciding upon the extent of front to be covered by a force, similar conditions on both sides being presumed, are_--

1. _Whether it is compelled to fight an independent action alone_;

2. _Whether it is fighting, from the preparatory to the decisive stage of the combat, as part of a larger body, with at least one, or perhaps both flanks secured_;

3. _Whether it has been selected to make the decisive attack against an enemy already shaken by other troops_.

In the last mentioned case a sudden effect, a short, powerful blow, is required, and the maximum frontage of all the units employed on the same line is admissible. But even a force advancing to the final assault can by no means dispense with distribution in depth; supports and reserves are needed to carry forward the firing line when it has been checked, to cover its flanks, and to carry on the pursuit (second line).

The frontage of an organization whose flanks are secure and which is acting as a part of a larger force, depends upon other troops; considerable extension of front is admissible provided the firing line is constantly maintained at a strength which will enable it to gain a superiority of fire over the enemy. “While an organization which has only one flank protected, is less restricted as regards frontage, it will have to provide for distribution in depth on the exposed flank. In this case, it is a good plan to move the units held in rear toward the particular flank (echeloning). Interval and distance increase with the size of this echelon.” (Par. 290 German I. D. R.). The German Infantry Drill Regulations (par. 397) further emphasize the fact that, when well-trained infantry employs its rifles to good advantage in defense, it is very strong in front; that it can hold a position with a comparatively small force; and that, in this case, it has only one weak spot, the flank, which it must seek to protect by distribution in depth. This view is fully borne out by the recent events in South Africa and in Manchuria. Under favorable conditions (deliberate defense), a battalion fighting as part of a larger force may put all of its companies into the first line, a front of 200 m. being assigned to each. The battalion can thus defend a front of 800 m. The only restriction is the requirement that the battalion commander must be able, at all times, to direct the course of the combat.

An organization acting alone which has to fight an action independently from beginning to end under varying conditions, cannot employ all of its available strength in the first line at one time. A distribution into three parts, viz., firing line, supports, and reserve, is therefore required. During the preparatory stage, the firing line should be as weak as possible, while, for sustaining and deciding the action, the reserve should be as strong as possible. As a rule, this distribution will not come into existence until the combat has begun; it must disappear again, during the subsequent course of the fight, through reinforcement of the troops that initiated the action, thus resulting in an increase of the combat front.

While the frontage is thus increased, an equal density along the entire attacking line is not produced. This is due to the fact that one will endeavor to increase the distribution in depth only at the point where the decision is sought (offensive wings), while one will seek to obtain results by a generous expenditure of ammunition at points where the enemy is only to be contained. When a broad front has to be held with a weak force, it is a good plan to post the troops in groups. Of the attack as well as of the defense it may be said, that the skillful combination of the offensive and defensive advantages of a piece of ground is a sign of good leadership. (Austerlitz). Frequently, however, after an action is over, the assault that penetrated a line is called the main attack, and the one that failed, a demonstration. An organization fighting alone will generally begin an action by deploying on a narrow front; it will protect its flanks by distribution in depth; and, finally, mass troops at the decisive point in readiness to make the assault. The force making an assault in attack or a counter-attack in defense cannot be strong enough.

Another factor that must be considered in deciding upon the frontage is the task which a force is to perform, _i.e._, whether it is to make an attack or to stand on the defensive; whether it is to fight a delaying action or is to withdraw. The object of distribution in depth is to keep the firing line constantly at the same strength; this requires stronger reinforcements in attack (owing to the greater losses), than in defense, and leads, consequently, to a contraction of the front.

The number of troops which will be required to hold a given piece of ground must be determined separately in each case. The strength of the fighting line depends upon the effect of the hostile fire. Military history tells us how many troops the leader sent into action in order to gain the victory, but it seldom gives us a clue as to the number of troops that might have sufficed in the particular case.

In deploying from route column in a rencontre, the leading battalion may be fully engaged by the time the next one arrives on the battlefield. In such cases, the tactical situation may require the employment of longer firing lines than would be deemed proper for the size of the command when making a more serious attack. (Par. 357 German I. D. R.). The assailant should then endeavor to throw the enemy, who is likewise advancing, on the defensive. The situation is similar to that in which an advance guard has to cover the main body’s debouchment from a defile.

At =Nachod=, five Prussian battalions, which had only two companies
in reserve, fought on a front of 2500 m. from 8 A. M. until noon.

The conduct of the advance guard of the 8th Infantry Division
at =Beaumont= is worthy of imitation. In this case, the support
battalion was deployed and the artillery went into position; strong
detachments were retained in rear of the left wing until the main
body had arrived. Likewise, a proper relation existed between
frontage (4 battalions on a front of 1400 m.) and distribution in
depth. According to the General Staff Account of the Franco-German
war (II, p. 1045), the distribution was as follows:

_First line_: 4th Jäger-Battalion, which was subsequently reinforced
by the IInd Battalion, 96th Infantry and the Ist and IInd Battalions,
86th Infantry.

_Support for the Artillery_: Füsilier Battalion, 96th Infantry.

_Reserve_: IIIrd Battalion, 86th Infantry.

We have already mentioned the deployment of the advance guard at
=Spicheren= (p. 226 supra). In that instance the whole force was
thrown in at once, whereas at =Beaumont= the deployment of the
different units was coördinated and proceeded systematically. An
advance guard should be able to repulse an attack and then assume the
offensive without outside assistance. An example which is not worthy
of imitation is the engagement of the 29th Infantry Brigade at the
=Hallue=. The brigade began the fight, without being compelled to do
so, and deployed its 4530 men on a front of 5000 m. The 30th Infantry
Brigade (4070 men) then entered the fight and deployed on a front
of 3000 m. in prolongation of the line of the 29th Brigade. If the
French had made a decisive attack at this point, the 15th Infantry
Division would not have been able to repulse it.

Distribution in depth, for the purpose of warding off an enveloping movement and for making a counter-attack, is more necessary in defense than in attack; besides, a greater front may be covered in the former case on account of the smaller losses. The following factors in part determine the extent of front to be occupied and the number of troops required to defend it: (1) the strength, natural or artificial, of the position; (2) obstacles in its front; (3) salient angles which can be easily enveloped; (4) the intentions of the commander (_i.e._, whether he contemplates fighting a purely defensive combat or one including offensive action).

=Delaying actions= are usually fought at long and medium ranges as purely passive defensive combats and no provision is made for replacing casualties, the object of the fight being to avoid a decision. Few men should, therefore, be placed in the firing line, but these should be supplied with abundant ammunition. However, as the force desires to avoid a decisive engagement by withdrawing, distribution in depth should be provided to protect the flanks and to facilitate breaking off the action. (Par. 419 German I. D. R.). This requires that distances be great.

=Night attacks=, on account of the element of surprise involved, do not require great distribution in depth; as a rule, the fight is decided in a very short time by the collision of the opposing forces. However, measures must be taken to protect the flanks, to ensure victory, and to give the first line the impetus necessary to carry it forward in case it is checked.

The British attack on the Egyptian position at =Tel el Kebir= (1882)
was made by only 11,000 men on a front of about 6 km. After a short
fight the works were taken.

An attempt will now be made to give some approximate figures for the extent of front that may be occupied in various situations.

Assuming one rifle for every three meters of front occupied, the following might suffice for temporarily defending a line 1000 m. long:

Firing line 300 rifles
Supports (one platoon in rear of each wing) 120 „
Reserve (two companies) 400 „
----------
Total 820 rifles

Thus 0.8 men per meter would be sufficient. This is borne out by the Boer War. With a good field of fire, even a thin firing line, provided with plenty of ammunition, is capable of bringing any attack to a standstill, at least for the time being.

=A defense seeking a decision= requires fighting at short ranges; the firing line must be kept constantly at the same strength; losses of about one-fifth (killed, wounded, and missing) must be reckoned with; and, finally, a reserve, consisting of about a third of the effective strength of the force, is required for making the counter-attack. The firing line is, from the outset, made as dense as possible, and echelons posted on the flanks must oppose any advance against the flanks.

The following would thus suffice for defending a front of 1000 m.:

Firing line 1000 men
Replacement of casualties 200 „
Flank protection (2 companies) 400 „
Reserve 800 „
--------
Total 2400 men

Hence, 2.4 rifles per meter of front would be available for defense.

The defense is decided by a successful counter-attack made by the reserve, whereas the attack requires an additional force to cover and assure the assembling and re-forming of the troops. The greater force is naturally required by the attacker, who must be stronger than the defender at the moment when the assault is made. The following would be required for making an attack on a front of 1000 m.:

Firing line 1200 rifles
Replacement of casualties (¹⁄₂) 600 „
Flank protection 400 „
Reserve 2000 „
-----------
Total 4200 rifles

This would be equivalent to 4.2 rifles per meter of front.

These figures can only serve as a very general guide, of course, and should be considered minima.

The number of troops required for attack or defense must be
determined separately for each individual case. At =Lovtcha=, 25
battalions, 92 guns, and 15 sotnias were not considered too large
a force for attacking 8000 Turks with only 6 guns. At =Gorni
Dubniac=, 3 infantry divisions of the Guard, with 90 guns, attacked
6 weak Turkish battalions having only 4 guns. After the first two
unsuccessful assaults on =Plevna=, the Russians overestimated the
strength of the enemy. Osman Pasha’s force was estimated at 80,000
men, and, consequently, during the September assaults, 90,000 men and
400 guns were deemed necessary to attack barely 40,000 Turks and 60
guns.

From a consideration of the foregoing, it appears that the =maximum frontage= is justifiable, when a force whose flanks are secure, occupies a position prepared for defense, or acts as a reserve and is to bring about a decision which has been prepared by other troops. On the other hand, the =maximum distribution in depth= is necessary for a force acting alone in attack with both flanks exposed. Between these two extremes lie many intermediate degrees, and it is therefore impossible to lay down hard and fast rules for the frontage of an attacking force. The German Infantry Drill Regulations (par. 373) accordingly fix the frontage of a company in attack at 150 m. and that of a brigade of six battalions at 1500 m. It is impossible to give a definite ratio of effective strength to combat frontage. Thus, while in attack a company puts into the line about 1.3 rifles per meter of its front, the brigade employs 4 rifles per meter, and the larger units a proportionally greater number. The necessity for distribution in depth increases with the size of the force and with the number of units composing it.

In a company, for example, a platoon is sufficient to fulfill, within certain limits, all the functions of a reserve, while in a larger force the duties of a reserve are so complex that each task (protecting the flanks, reinforcing the firing line, giving the impetus for the assault, and covering the assembling and re-forming of the attacking force) must be assigned to a separate unit. Moreover, the duration of a combat, and, in conjunction therewith, the necessity of reinforcing the firing line and covering the flanks, increases with the size of the force. During protracted periods of peace, one is too much inclined to underestimate the wastefulness of a battle and the necessity for reinforcing the fighting line; one cannot understand why 5 to 6 men will not suffice, during the course of a combat, for a front wherein only one man can use his rifle. From the foregoing it follows that the frontage does not increase in proportion to the number of men. Thus, an army corps would not occupy a front four times that of a brigade, or twice that of a division. This is best illustrated by doubling or trebling a plane area when both length and breadth have to be equally increased.[242]

[242] See _Taktik_, V, p. 46, et seq.

The maximum frontage to be covered in attack by the firing line of a =company= is fixed at 150 m., in order that the density and fire power of that line may be constantly maintained during a prolonged and costly action. During shorter (_i.e._, rear guard actions), or less costly actions (defense), it is, however, permissible to exceed this limit. The regulations by no means insist upon a literal interpretation of this paragraph, since they mention the deployment of the entire company, when it would certainly occupy a front of about 200 m. There is no disguising the fact, however, that, when extended on a front of 200 m., it is out of the question for the company commander to lead his men.

The regulations do not fix the combat frontage of a =battalion=, as it depends upon the tactical situation, and the battalion commander is at liberty to place one, two, three, or four companies into the first line. The frontage of a battalion would thus be 300 meters when making an independent attack, and not exceeding 600 meters when fighting a purely defensive action as part of a larger force, in other words, a mean frontage of 400 meters.

This is also true of the =regiment=. The combat frontage of a regiment acting alone, will, at the start, seldom exceed that of two battalions deployed abreast. From this we obtain a frontage of 600-800 m. for the regiment when it is acting independently, and a frontage of about 1200 m. when it is fighting a purely defensive action as part of a larger force.

Military history tells us that an army corps consisting of 25 battalions, acting as a part of a larger force in a deliberately planned attack, occupies an average front of 2.5 to 5 km. According to this, the frontage of a brigade would amount to about 800-1000 m., _i.e._, to 6-7.5 rifles per meter of front.

This limit was frequently exceeded during the =Franco-German war=
according to the circumstances under which the brigade went into
action and the commander’s estimate of the situation. If the brigades
had to cover the concentration of the columns in rear, and if the
battalions came into action successively, both brigade and battalion
frontages were frequently very great. The endeavor to close with the
enemy as soon as possible and the desire to bring a large number of
rifles into action, led to enormously increased frontages at the
expense of depth. The brigades which arrived later, entered the line
where other brigades were already engaged, and the result was a
dissolution and admixture of all tactical organizations.

At =Colombey=, the 25th Brigade covered a front of nearly 3 km. with
28 companies, only four or five companies remaining in close order.
Connecting with this brigade on the north, 22 companies, belonging to
two different divisions of the 1st Army Corps, covered a front of 4
km., supported by three or four companies in close order. With such
an overextension of front the offensive or defensive power of a force
is, of course, crippled.

During the battle of =Amiens=, the 3rd Prussian Brigade advanced in
three columns against the heights north of the Luce. On the left, six
companies of the 4th Infantry advanced from Domart, in the center,
four companies from Hangard, and on the right, two companies from
Demnin. A battery and a troop (_Eskadron_) were attached to each
column, and the right column was followed by the 44th Infantry.

The French advanced troops were pushed back without special
difficulty, but at the northern edge of the timber, the
brigade now found itself opposite the French main position
Cachy--Villers-Bretonneux. The attack on this position began at once,
and in a short time the 4th Infantry and two batteries were in action
on the line East corner of the Bois de Hangard--Gentelles (5 km.
long). At the same time, the 44th Infantry with one battery deployed
on a front of about 2000 m. to the right of this line. The right wing
of the 44th Infantry subsequently advanced to attack the trenches
southeast of Villers-Bretonneux and captured them. The enveloped
French left wing withdrew to the village named, and rallied on strong
reserves.

This was the situation when the fight came to a standstill toward 1
o’clock P. M. The brigade fought in a thin line over a mile (four
English miles) long. The reserve only consisted of three companies
of the 4th Infantry, at Gentelles, and four companies of the 44th
Infantry, in rear of the right flank.

A defeat was averted only by the timely interference of other
troops, especially of strong artillery (76 Prussian guns against 24
French).[243]

[243] KUNZ, _Nordarmee_, I, p. 47, et seq.

The frontage of a company is definitely fixed, so as to make it easier for battalion and regimental commanders to designate combat sections; the higher leaders reckon with regimental and brigade fronts. In war, however, the numerical strength varies constantly, and it is therefore advisable not to reckon with companies, but with a corresponding number of rifles (200 on an average). The combat frontages mentioned in drill regulations only give an approximate idea of the extent of front to be covered by organizations which act as part of a larger force in an attack seeking a decision. The extent of front to be covered in other situations, under favorable or unfavorable attack conditions, requires in each case a separate estimate.

In the Boer war, we notice for the first time overextensions of front, which were undoubtedly caused by a desire to avoid the costly frontal attack.

At Magersfontain, on December 11th, 1899, the British division under Lord Methuen (7300 men) covered a front of 12 km.; and during the attack on Pieters Hill, on February 27th, 1900, the troops under General Buller (30,000 men) extended over a front of 11 km.

At Poplar Grove, 7000 Boers with 7 guns fought on a front of 17 km. (0.4 men per meter), while the British deployed 25,000 rifles, 5000 troopers, and 116 guns on a front of 32 km. (0.8 men per meter). In the engagement at Diamond Hill, on June 11th, 1900, the army under Lord Roberts (40,000 men) advanced on a front of 37 km. Such liberties could be taken only in the face of a shaken enemy who had given up all thoughts of the offensive. At Paardeberg, February 18th, 1900, the 6th Division and the Brigade of Highlanders succeeded in getting close to the enemy, but there the attack failed on account of the lack of an impetus from the rear. Even in the Russo-Japanese war the frontages were greater than those to which we are accustomed. The reason for this overextension lies in the fact that a numerically inferior assailant was desirous of vanquishing the defender, and in order to accomplish this purpose, he was obliged to make an extensive use of the spade and to put all rifles into the first line.

===================+=======+=======+======+==========+==========
| | | |Per 10,000|
| Jap. | Russ. |Front-|men.[244] | Per m.
| | | age. |Jap.|Russ.|Jap.|Russ.
-------------------+-------+-------+------+----+-----+----+-----
| | | km. | m. | men.
Liao Yang (West and| | | | | | |
South front) |106,700|150,000| 26 |2600| 1750|3.9 | 5.9
| | | | | | |
Shaho |148,000|257,000| 48 |3330| 1980|3. | 5.
| | | | | | |
Mukden (exclusive | | | | | | |
of Yalu Army) |247,000|336,000| 96 |3960| 2970|2.6 | 3.4
-------------------+-------+-------+------+----+-----+----+-----

[244] According to data given by Lieut. Col. Yoda in the _Journal
of the Officers’ Association_, Tokio.

The realization that troops in fortified positions only require small reinforcements or none at all, very naturally caused frontages to be increased and depth of combat formations to be decreased. Gaps in the attacking line, provided they were kept under observation, proved by no means a disadvantage.[245]

[245] At Mukden, on March 3rd, 1905, there was a gap of 7 km.
between the Japanese IVth and Ist Armies, which was covered by
only one infantry regiment of Reservists, two dismounted cavalry
regiments, and one battalion of artillery. However, the Russians were
fighting on the passive defensive in this case. The insignificant
danger to be apprehended from such gaps is especially emphasised by
the French regulations.

During attacks it frequently appeared that the Japanese lacked the necessary reinforcements.

~INFLUENCE OF VARIOUS RIFLES ON THE DENSITY OF BATTLE FORMATIONS.~[246]

[246] General MINARELLI-FITZGERALD, _Infanteristische Reflexionen_.

========+======+=======+=============+==================+================
Rifle. |Year |Battle.|Belligerents.|Per km. of the |Remarks.
| | | |combat frontage. |
| | | +-----+------+-----+
|of | | |Bat- |Esca- |Field|
|the | | |tal- |drons |guns.|
|Cam- | | |ions |@ 150 | |
|paign.| | |@ 900|troop-| |
| | | |ri- |ers. | |
| | | |fles.| | |
--------+------+-------+-------------+-----+------+-----+----------------
Muzzle | 1815 |Water- |French | 12 | 19 |46 |After Napoleon’s
loaders.| |loo +-------------+-----+------+-----+concentration
| | |British | 10 | 15 |25 |for battle
| | | | | | |toward noon.
+------+-------+-------------+-----+------+-----+----------------
| 1859 |Sol- |French and | 7 | 5 |19 |After the victo-
| |ferino |Sardinians | | | |rious advance of
| | +-------------+-----+------+-----+the Austrian
| | |Austrians | 7 | 2.5 |21 |VIIIth Corps to
| | | | | | |S. Martino.
+------+-------+-------------+-----+------+-----+----------------
| 1866 |Cus- |Austrians | 8 | 2. |17 |
| |tozza | | | | |
--------+ +-------+-------------+-----+------+-----+----------------
Breech | |König- |Prussians | 9.5| 10 |39 |Situation at
loaders | |grätz +-------------+-----+------+-----+noon.
large | | |Austrians | 10 | 8.5 |43 |
caliber.| | |& Saxons | | | |
+------+-------+-------------+-----+------+-----+----------------
| 1870 |Wörth |Germans | 9 | 5 |37 |
| +-------+-------------+-----+------+-----+
| |Grave- |Germans | 11.5| 9 |46 |
| |lotte +-------------+-----+------+-----+
| |St. |French | 8 | 6.5 |32 |
| |Privat | | | | |
--------+------+-------+-------------+-----+------+-----+----------------
Mag. | 1899 |Colen- |British | 1.5| | 4 |Including 1¹⁄₂
rifles | |so 1st | | | | |heavy guns.
of | |battle,| | | | |
small | |Dec. | | | | |
caliber.| |15th | | | | |
+------+-------+ +-----+------+-----+----------------
| 1900 |Colen- | | 2.5| 1.5 | 7.5 |Including 1¹⁄₂
| |so, 2d | | | | |heavy guns.
| |battle,| | | | |
| |Febru- | | | | |
| |ary | | | | |
| |27th | | | | |
--------+---+--+-------+-------------+-----+------+-----+----------------
7.6 mm. | M | 1|Febru- |Russians | 1 | 0.4 | *5 |Total extension
against | u | 9|ary | | | | |from the Liao to
6.5 mm. | k | 0|20th | | | | |Tung-wha-sien.
Mag. | d | 5| | | | | |*Incl. 1 heavy
rifles. | e | .| | | | | |gun.
| n | | | +-----+------+-----+----------------
| | | | | 3 | 0.7 | *5.5|Excl. East and
| | | | | | | |West Det. *Incl.
| | | | | | | |3 heavy guns.
| | | +-------------+-----+------+-----+----------------
| | | |Japanese | 3.5| 0.8 |*15.5|Exclusive of the
| | | | | | | |approaching Vth
| | | | | | | |army. *Incl. 2
| | | | | | | |heavy guns.
| | +-------+------+------+-----+------+-----+-----+----------
| | |March |West |Rus- | 5 | 0.8 |†18 |†Ex- |Excl. of
| | |3d |front.|sians | | | |clu- |Trans-
| | | | | | | | |sive |Baikal
| | | | | | | | |of |Cossack
| | | | | | | | |heavy|Div.
| | | | +------+-----+------+-----+guns.|
| | | | |Japan-| 3.5| 1 |†11.6| |Excl. of
| | | | |ese | | | | |2d Cav.
| | | | | | | | | |Brigade.
| | | +------+------+-----+------+-----+ |
| | | |South |Rus- | 1.7| .5 | †6 | |
| | | |front.|sians | | | | |
| | | | +------+-----+------+-----+ |
| | | | |Japan-| 2.2| .3 | †5.6| |
| | | | |ese | | | | |
| | +-------+------+------+-----+------+-----+ |
| | |March |West |Rus- | 4.6| 0.7 |†15.6| |Excl. of
| | |7th |front.|sians | | | | |Trans-
| | | | | | | | | |Baikal
| | | | | | | | | |Cossack
| | | | | | | | | |Div.
| | | | +------+--- -+------+-----+ |
| | | | |Japan-| 4 | 0.6 |†10.5| |Excl. of
| | | | |ese | | | | |Cav. Div.
--------+---+--+-------+------+------+-----+------+-----+-----+----------

Let us now recapitulate the most important points which have a bearing on combat frontage:

1. The frontage of individual units cannot be definitely fixed, as it depends upon the situation and the purpose of an action.

2. Favorable terrain, cover, and intrenchments permit an extended front to be obstinately defended with a weak force.

3. The frontage does not increase in proportion to the size of the force.

4. An organization (company, battalion, or regiment) fighting as part of a larger force is justified in deploying on a wider front than when acting alone.

The necessity for distribution in depth increases with the size of the force and with the number of units composing it Only the result can decide whether a narrow or a wide frontage was justified in a given case. A commander will endeavor to hold certain parts of the line with a weak force, posted in groups, while, at the decisive point, he will throw in every available man in order to gain the victory.

Provisions of Various Regulations.

=Austria-Hungary.= Frontage depends upon the tactical situation and
the terrain. The frontage of a company acting as part of a larger
force in attack is fixed at about 130-150 paces (97-112 m.). “In
other situations, a greater frontage is, as a rule, permissible.”
The battalion acting as part of a larger force in attack, “is, as
a rule, not to cover a frontage exceeding its own front when in
line”--in peace exercises, 300-400 paces (225-300 m.). With companies
of 200 men, 2 rifles, and in the battalion 2.6 rifles are reckoned
per meter of front. “The increased fighting power of infantry, due
to better fire effect, in general permits a greater frontage to be
covered. This will often be taken advantage of, in order to make
as many troops as possible available for the decisive stage of the
combat. But this frontage should not be so great, that the requisite
power of resistance is weakened, or that tactical coöperation or the
attainment of the object of the combat are impaired.” Further than
this nothing is prescribed.

=France.= Nothing definite is prescribed. The combat is carried on by
groups separated by intervals.

“When _an organisation is acting as part of a larger force_ and has
to advance directly to the front against a well-defined objective,
its commander may from the outset push a strong force into action,
retaining a reserve only in exceptional cases. If one of the flanks
of this force is in the air, it will be advisable to echelon units in
rear of the flank which may be threatened. When _an organisation is
acting alone_, and when both flanks are in the air, a weaker line is
pushed forward and a reserve is retained....”

The enhanced power of firearms permits an extended front to be held,
especially at the commencement of an action. The only restrictions
are those dictated by necessity--always to assure effective control
by the leader and mutual coöperation between the various tactical
units.

This mode of fighting does away with continuous firing lines which no
longer fulfill the requirements of modern battle.

=Belgium.= The frontage of a battalion acting as part of a larger
force in attack is fixed at 300 m.; in defense this is increased.

=Japan.= The provisions of the Japanese regulations are identical
with those of the German regulations of 1889. The frontage of a
company is not given. A battalion may cover a frontage not exceeding
that of three companies. The frontage of a brigade, as a rule, does
not exceed 1500 m. at the initial deployment.

=Russia.= The frontage of a company, unless otherwise specified, is
governed by the object of the action, the terrain, and the effective
strength, and, as a rule, does not exceed 250 paces (180 m.). No
figures are given for the larger units.

=England.= While great stress was laid upon narrow fronts and thin
firing lines prior to the Boer war, opinions swung to the opposite
extreme after that war. During a decisive attack, a battalion in the
first line may employ 125 rifles per 100 yards of front (_i.e._, 90
m.), distributed as firing line, supports, and battalion reserve;
the latter may consist either of one company or of parts of several.
Entire companies are deployed only in exceptional cases, for
instance in terrain devoid of cover where it is difficult to bring
up reinforcements. The size of the reserve depends upon the losses
likely to be suffered by the fighting line. When these losses will
be small in all probability, the reserve may be as strong as the
firing line and the supports combined. In accordance with these
general principles, a battalion may deploy for attack on a front
not exceeding 800 yds. = 720 m. (Formerly 540 m. was prescribed).
A brigade consisting of four battalions will thus be able to cover
either a front of 1400 or one of 2100 m., depending upon the number
of battalions put into the line.

=Italy.= Only general principles are prescribed. “Skill in judging
the proper frontage to be covered by a force is attained in time of
peace by exercises on varied ground and under different situations,
especially when organizations approximately at war strength are used.”

5. COMBAT ORDERS.[247]

[247] V. KIESLING, _Gefechtsbefehle_, Berlin, 1907.

Modern fire effect does not permit a commander to direct the course of an action by despatching adjutants from time to time. This must be borne in mind when issuing a combat order. Such an order can only regulate the launching of the troops into action and prescribe a task as a guide for their subsequent conduct. Since leaders change during the course of the combat, the order must ensure coöperation of the component parts of the force by thoroughly explaining the purpose of the fight. The troops have a right to know what the commander expects of them; it is not sufficient to order them to occupy a certain point--they must be told whether or not they are to defend it. An order which directs troops “to oppose” the enemy, conveys an extremely vague meaning; it should specify instead whether they are “to attack” the enemy, or whether they are “to defend” a position. The subordinate leader’s pertinent question, as to the purpose of the combat, forces the commander to indicate clearly whether he intends to attack, or to stand on the defensive; whether he will fight a delaying action, or avoid a decision by withdrawing. Even the lowest grades must be informed of this decision of the commander. The troops will perform anything that is demanded of them in definite terms. On the other hand, the commander must demand that no subordinate “hide” behind an order and that, on the contrary, he act on his own initiative when an order is not received or the situation changes.

Clearly defined sections of the battlefield (par. 475 German I. D. R.) and definite combat tasks, each complete in itself (par. 293 German I. D. R.), are assigned to the tactical units to be employed in the first line (battalions in case of a regiment; regiments, as a rule, in case of a division). In attack, the order indicates the front upon which each one of the larger units is to deploy and what portion of the hostile position it is to attack. This demarcation defines the extent of the combat sections (par. 371 German I. D. R.), within the limits of which the particular unit must make the most of the accidents of the ground. In carrying out these combat tasks, unity of action is ensured by the mutual coöperation of the tactical units fighting abreast of each other (par. 475 German I. D. R.), and by the designation of a unit upon which the others regulate their movements, without, however, thereby being hampered in their endeavor to advance. (Base unit of combat). Moreover, by employing his reserves, the commander “can shift the decisive point of the action to any place desired, reinforce where he deems it advisable, equalize fluctuations of the combat, and, finally, bring about the decision.”

The first orders--those for putting the troops in motion in the desired direction--are usually verbal; more detailed orders, which are the rule from the brigade on up, are issued subsequently. (Par. 274 German I. D. R.). In most cases, the commander knows quite well what he wants, but only the effort required in expressing in writing what he desires to say, enables him to reproduce his thoughts with the necessary clearness. Even in peace maneuvers, the officer who issued an order and its recipients quite frequently disagree as to its interpretation; the superior remembers only what he desired to say at the particular moment, but not the language in which the order was couched. Written orders minimize the possibility of a misunderstanding. They have the further advantage that the recipient has in his possession a document to which he can always refer in case of doubt.

Orders should not provide for maintaining communication, for protecting flanks, and for keeping up local reconnaissance, since these matters are attended to as a matter of course, every leader being held responsible for making proper dispositions, within the limits of his command, for the performance of these duties. The higher the rank of the commander, the farther he should stay away from the scene of battle. As the commander can exercise an influence on the course of the action only by employing his reserves, he should remain near them, or, at any rate, retain their leader on his staff. If the commander selects a position too close to the point where the first line is engaged, he loses sight of the action in its entirety, and allows himself to be influenced too much by events within his immediate range of vision.[248] The subordinate commander, in selecting his position, has to consider only good observation of the enemy, communication with neighboring units, with the next higher commander, and with his subordinates.

[248] This was true of Sir Redvers Buller at Colenso, and likewise
of Kuropatkin. The latter led in person too much and was completely
lost in the details of minor troop-leading.

At headquarters, the work to be performed must be carefully apportioned among the different members of the staff.

The commander, assisted by an officer of his staff, observes the enemy and his own force, while another officer maintains communication with the neighboring force and with the next higher headquarters (signal flag squads, telephone), and receives and prepares reports. (The scheme described would be appropriate for a brigade staff, for example). It is furthermore desirable to despatch information officers to neighboring troops, and to detail officers from subordinate units to receive orders.

The detailing of adjutants from subordinate units for the purpose of facilitating the issue and despatch of orders of higher headquarters is very properly prohibited by par. 83 German F. S. R.; on the march, this is permissible temporarily only. The battalion supply officers will, however, frequently be utilized as information officers, for, on the day of battle, they would thus be most profitably employed.

In =France= this is regulated by _Agents de liaison_. These are to
keep the commander informed in regard to the special situation, the
action of subordinate units, and the intentions of their commanders.
“The importance of permanent communication between leader and
subordinate increases with the distances separating troops in action;
the leader’s influence on the course of the combat can be ensured
only by these _agents_.

As a general rule, one mounted officer from every infantry unit,
from the battalion up, reports to the next higher commander for the
purpose of maintaining communication. This officer may detail a
cyclist or trooper to accompany him. He is to be prepared to give all
necessary information in regard to his unit, and to keep in touch
with the general situation in order to inform his immediate superior
in regard to it. He communicates with his own unit either by sending
orderlies with messages, or by carrying the orders of the commander
in person.”

6. COMMUNICATION ON THE BATTLEFIELD.

Cyclists and mounted messengers can be employed on the battlefield only when the conditions are exceptionally favorable; even intrenched connecting posts communicating with one another by means of shouts or signals do not absolutely ensure communication in a protracted engagement. Heliographs or signal lamps are valuable only during the approach to the battlefield and in large battles.[249] The same is true of the field telegraph, by means of which, for example, division headquarters may be connected with the headquarters of the corps. In an infantry combat, only the field telephone, wig-wag flags,[250] and signal flags can be used. The employment of telephone and telegraph has the advantage of ensuring greater quiet at headquarters, since the coming and going of messengers is eliminated; on the other hand, the commander is at once informed of every reverse (which may perhaps be only temporary) and will not always be able to resist the temptation of leading subordinate commanders by apron strings. The Japanese made a very extensive use of the various means of communication, but neglected to guard against an interruption of their lines of information by installing signal flag stations. This cannot be dispensed with. In the Japanese army visual signals[251] were not used, and in the Russian army they were not adopted until October 4th, 1904. Thus means of communication did not develop beyond the rudimentary stage in both armies. According to all previous experience, telephone lines, as now operated, are practicable in attack only for the purpose of establishing communication down to brigade headquarters.[252]

[249] See _Taktik_, III, p. 116, et seq.

VON LÖBELL’S _Jahresberichte_ 1906, p. 390: _Employment of
Heliographs and Signal Lamps in Southwest Africa_.

[250] Wig-wag signals have been abolished and Morse signals
prescribed in their stead by Cabinet Orders dated January 16th, 1908.

[251] Sir IAN HAMILTON, _A Staff Officer’s Scrap Book_, I, pp.
173-174, 196, 241 and 323.

[252] The station apparatus furnished by the firm of “Zwietusch” of
Charlottenburg, weighs 5.5 kg. with its battery.

In defensive positions, which are held for a prolonged period,
it is, of course, practicable to establish telephonic connection
with the most advanced line. This was, for example, the case in the
Japanese 10th Division on the morning of March 3rd, 1905 (Mukden).
On this occasion the division commander in rear was informed by
telephone of the presence of wire entanglements in front of the
Russian position, and permission was asked and granted to postpone
the attack.

Until recently, both signal and wig-wag flags were used in Germany.[253] The signal motions are made in an upright position, the Morse code, which is rather difficult to learn, being used. This method of signaling permits communication to be kept up within a radius of 7 km.; moreover, it can be used at night and in combined land and naval operations. The wig-wag signals are easily learned and entirely sufficient for communicating over distances within 3 km.; they also permit information to be despatched rapidly, as abbreviations are employed for certain frequently recurring movements. These signals possess the additional advantage that they can be made by a man while in a prone position.[254] Wig-wag signals are a very effective means of communication and will rarely fail.[255]

[253] _Jahrbücher für Armee und Marine_, June number, 1906, and
March number, 1907.

[254] Signals with wig-wag flags can be made by a man lying flat
on his belly or on his back; this is, however, frequently impossible
with outstretched arms and the sender must be content to make the
signals by grasping the staves of the two flags in the middle, then
placing them in appropriate position relative to each other (for
example in making the letters, d, e, k, l, p, u).

[255] The signals prescribed in par. 11 German I. D. R. are very
effective if made with wig-wag flags; if made with signal flags they
require constant observation, without, however, precluding mistakes.
For example, when given with signal flags, the signal “halt” - “h,
h, h,” (.... .... ....) is frequently confused with the signal “the
assault is about to begin” (... ... ...). This mistake is not so apt
to occur when wig-wag flags are used.

When General Stakelberg, after his right flank had been turned at
Wafangu, sent orders to withdraw to General Gerngross, the commander
on the left flank, it took the officer who carried the order through
this mountainous country, nearly an hour to cover the 5 km. which
separated the two commanders. An order sent by means of wig-wag flags
could have reached the leader in question within a few minutes.

A commander should not exercise a constant influence on his subordinates just because modern means of communication permit him to do so, as this would destroy all initiative and independence. The permanent communication to which we are accustomed in time of peace, and the method of leading produced thereby, do not allow real qualities of leadership and initiative to develop. It is unquestionably not easy for a commander to refrain from interfering when a deployment does not progress with sufficient rapidity or not in accordance with his wishes.[256]

[256] Interference of the Commander-In-Chief of the IIIrd Army
with the deployment of the 1st Bavarian Army Corps at Wörth. KUNZ,
_Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, 15, p. 44, et seq. The impatience
of the commander-in-chief was natural perhaps, but, due to his
interference, the enveloping movement skillfully initiated by General
v. d. Tann, could not be executed.

=Austria-Hungary.= “Infantry telegraph detachments” are assigned
to every infantry division and brigade of mountain troops.[257]
These detachments are charged with the duty of keeping up the
visual signal and telegraph service in field and mountain warfare.
The Morse alphabet is used in visual signaling and in telegraphic
communication. In this the Austrian regulations differ from the
German. The infantry telegraph detachment attached to an infantry
division is divided into three sections, and is equipped with
telephones, wire, heliographs, and signal flags. Each section
consists of 15 men (6 of whom are telegraphers), and is equipped with
24 km. of wire.

[257] _Streffleur_, 1905, April-May number.

=France.= Provisional signal detachments have been formed in some of
the infantry organizations. These detachments are to take care of
visual signal and telephone communication. The telephone sections are
expected to maintain two stations (12 km. wire).

=England.= Each brigade (4 battalions) has one telephone detachment.
Wire (9.6 km.) is carried along on two pack animals.

7. LOCAL RECONNAISSANCE OF THE INFANTRY.

(Pars. 305, 319, 355, 363 and 376 German I. D. R.).

It is a strange fact that, while splendid work was done in strategic reconnaissance in the large maneuvers of recent years, not only in Germany but also in France, the local, tactical reconnaissance was less good and often deficient, so that in consequence thereof surprises were not rare. Frequently a gap occurred in the reconnoitering line when the cavalry in front of the various parts of the army was brushed aside and the stronger cavalry force deprived the weaker of the freedom of choosing its line of retreat. Occasionally, when this happened, cavalry patrols were sent out with orders to report directly to the infantry, or, at any rate, to find the hostile route columns, but this expedient was only partially successful. It must be remembered that troopers cannot ride close enough to the enemy to see anything of importance, and that they frequently are in ignorance of the very things which are of value for the infantry. In addition, the divisional cavalry is entirely too weak to perform all the tasks assigned to it. Therefore infantry and artillery should not rely upon cavalry reconnaissance. The mere fact that infantry has sent out cavalry patrols in a certain direction does not relieve it from the duty of providing for its own reconnaissance.

The greatest obstacle to infantry reconnaissance lies in the fact that its cyclists are confined to good roads; that its mounted officers cannot be withdrawn from their appropriate duties except for short periods; that, as a rule, orderlies are not available for carrying messages; and that, if officers carry messages in person, the reconnaissance is interrupted. Infantry patrols, on account of the slowness of their movements, cannot transmit messages quickly, and, as a result, such messages frequently arrive too late to be of any value. On the other hand, infantry patrols possess an advantage in that, by utilizing cover, they can get close to the enemy without being observed. The need of local reconnaissance is greater now than it was in the past, because troops can no longer change front when deployed, and because those which come under hostile fire while in close order formations may, in a short time, suffer well-nigh annihilating losses.

In the South African war the British infantry was frequently placed
in difficult situations by the suddenly delivered fire of the Boers
(=Magersfontain=, =Colenso=), which induced it to deploy all of its
lines on a wide front at an early moment.