Chapter IV: Part 4

In the brigade, when assembled or deployed, the regiments may be placed abreast of each other, on the same line, or in rear of each other, _i.e._, in line or in echelon. When the regiments are formed side by side, two adjacent independent sections are created, each commanded by a regimental commander; this insures better supervision, better control, and a more energetic conduct of the action, since the first line can be reinforced by troops belonging to the same organization. This formation, moreover, facilitates tactical combinations. It may, however, be a disadvantage that the first line is not subject to the orders of a single commander; that it is difficult to employ the reserve battalions in one body; and that the brigade commander can influence the action only by withdrawing units from the regiments for the purpose of forming a reserve.[83] The echelon formation, each echelon consisting of a regiment, is frequently used in rencontres, because troops are thrown into action directly from route column. The regimental commanders then become leaders of echelons, the first line cannot be reinforced by its own troops, and the organizations of different regiments finally become mixed. The echelon formation is proper only when the second line is intended to be used independently abreast of the first in the course of the action; for example, on a flank, for the purpose of making or warding off a flank attack.[84] When part of a larger force, the most suitable combat formation for troops is usually the one in which the regiments are formed side by side.

[83] For historical reference as to the importance of the brigade
in action, see essay published in _Jahrbücher für Armee und Marine_
(August and September numbers 1877) entitled: _Die Infanterie Brigade
in ihrer Entwickelung aus der Brigade von 1812_. In regard to the
employment of regiments in line or in echelon, see Memoir by General
von Moltke on the tactical lessons gained in the campaign of 1866.
MOLTKE, _Taktisch-strategische Aufsätze_, p. 99, et seq.

[84] The fight of François’ Brigade at Spicheren. _Gen. St. W._ I,
p. 310, et seq. The formation, side by side, of the six battalions
of the IIIrd Army Corps in the attack on the hill at Forbach
(Spicheren) would have been inappropriate and would have disrupted
all organizations.

The disadvantages of the echelon formation, when taken up from route column, can be obviated by deploying the second regiment in rear of a flank of the first. It should be kept intact in that position until the decisive moment, although the state of the fight may, at the outset, invite a more rapid extension of front.

9. EXTENDED ORDER.

Combats are begun and carried out in extended order. The defender can be induced to disclose his dispositions, to occupy his position, and to open fire, only by the advance upon him of a skirmish line. The deployment of a thin firing line will frequently suffice to furnish the commander of the attacking force with a clue to the strength of the force holding the hostile position. In close country, skirmishers are pushed forward primarily to guard against surprise the force which sends them out, but when thrown forward only a few hundred meters in open country, such skirmishers are unable to furnish protection. The strength and density of a firing line (by means of which the fight is sustained) depend upon marksmanship, upon the purpose of the action, and upon the terrain. The poorer the marksmanship or the weapon, or the more unfavorable the field of fire, the greater the number of skirmishers needed (_i.e._, the denser the firing line).[85] If the enemy is merely to be kept at a distance, less skirmishers (_i.e._, a thinner firing line furnished with plenty of ammunition) will be required, than if the action is to be carried to a decisive conclusion.

[85] The Boers with their superior weapons and better marksmanship,
and further because they never cared to become involved in a fight at
close quarters, found thin firing lines sufficient.

Cohesion and order are best maintained, and the least time is lost in action, if efficient, dense firing lines are led forward as units up to the moment of opening fire. (Pars. 169, 321, 334 and 413 German I. D. R.). But on open terrain such dense firing lines would begin to suffer too great a loss at ranges at which they could not reply to the fire. Nothing remains then but to cover the available front with a very thin firing line, followed at irregular distances by thin skirmish lines which ploy for the purpose of utilizing cover or for opening fire. Skirmish lines of this description will hardly justify the opponent’s expenditure of ammunition, as he can only cover broad spaces with volley fire. On the other hand, these skirmish lines are in themselves too weak to facilitate the approach of the following echelons by their fire. Besides, it must not be overlooked that the soldier, separated by a considerable interval from his comrades in line during the advance, and withdrawn from the influence of his officers, succumbs more easily to temporary spells of weakness and is more apt to remain behind than the skirmisher in a dense firing line. The advance in several successive, thin skirmish lines is therefore only an expedient. In each case the leaders will have to decide whether, in view of the close proximity of the enemy, a united advance with dense, powerful skirmish lines is possible or advisable (for instance, when entering at once upon the decisive stage of the action). Before opening fire the firing lines must be sufficiently reinforced. (Par. 334 German I. D. R.).

This advance in thin skirmish lines stood the test both in the Boer war and in the Russo-Japanese war,[86] but we must not forget that thin skirmish lines are only maneuver formations in an attack that is to be pushed home, and that the mistake made by the British of attempting to make an attack with such weak skirmish lines should not be imitated. The Japanese also used this formation after they had once opened fire with a dense skirmish line.[87]

[86] Four battalions of the 6th Division advanced at Paardeberg on
February 18th, 1900, on a front of 2000 m. with 800-1000 rifles, in
two lines of equal strength and separated by a distance of 300 m.,
the remainder following at 400 m. Three battalions of the Highland
Brigade even advanced on a front of 4000 m. See my lecture: _Lehren
des Burenkrieges_. _Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften_, 33, pp. 43
and 67.

For the Japanese procedure see V. LÜTTWITZ, _Angriffsverfahren der
Japaner_, pp. 44 and 66. BRONSART VON SCHELLENDORFF, _Sechs Monate
beim japanischen Feldheer_, p. 217.

[87] In regard to the advance of the 6th Reserve Regiment
against Husanta-Kantsy at Mukden, on March 5th, 1905, BRONSART VON
SCHELLENDORFF (_Angriffsverfahren der Japaner_, p. 225), says: “Some
500-600 m. from the Russian position, individual men sprang out of
the shelter trench at intervals of 10-25 paces, rushed forward for
about 30 m., or perhaps farther, where they threw themselves down and
fired. This procedure was repeated until a new skirmish line, with
the men approximately 3 paces apart, had been formed about 100-150
m. in front of the trench mentioned. The rest of the men, who until
this moment had remained in the trench, now rushed forward in groups
of 5-10 men for distances of 30 m., for the purpose of reaching the
advanced line.”

It might be well to mention here that thin and dense skirmish lines, when under fire, lose an equal number of men in proportion to their strength, provided the front occupied by them is the same.

RESULTS OF A FIRING TEST AGAINST THIN AND DENSE SKIRMISH LINES.

FIRE AT WILL, FREEHAND FROM A PRONE POSITION.
============+===========+=======+======+====+=======+========+=======
| | | | | Hits. | Figures|
| Range & | | | +---+---+ hit. |
Target. | Elevation:|No. of |No. of|Time| | +---+----+Figures
| m. |rifles.|shots.|min.| | % | | % |missed.
------------+-----------+-------+------+----+---+---+---+----+-------
180 head | 680 | 166 | 1268 | 5 | 54| 4 | 49| 27 | 131
targets |Elevation | | | | | | | |
placed at |used: first| | | | | | | |
intervals of|600 then | | | | | | | |
1-2 paces. |700 m. | | | | | | | |
------------+-----------+-------+------+----+---+---+---+----+-------
90 head | 680 | 166 | 850 | 5 | 35| 4 | 27| 30 | 63
targets |Elevation | | | | | | | |
placed at |used: first| | | | | | | |
intervals of|600 then | | | | | | | |
3-4 paces. |700 m. | | | | | | | |
------------+-----------+-------+------+----+---+---+---+----+-------

The superior effect of fire on the dense skirmish line, as expressed by the greater number of hits, and in consequence thereof, by the gradually growing number of figures hit, is apparent. It is worthy of note and at first glance strange that, presupposing the two lines considered occupy an equal front, the percentage of figures hit is the same. The explanation of this lies in the fact that in correctly distributed fire any specified front space is equally covered with hits so that it is immaterial for the relative proportion of figures hit whether an equal number of figures is removed or added. While, however, the dense skirmish line still has 131 effectives, the weaker line has only 63 left. The casualties are therefore far more perceptible in the smaller force.

(a) The Formation of the Skirmish Line.

Skirmish line with intervals of two paces between the men is formed at the command, “As Skirmishers.” (Pars. 142 and 174-180 German I. D. R.). The skirmish line may be deployed from any formation, in any direction, either with or without first changing front. (Par. 177 German I. D. R.). A greater interval than two paces must be specifically ordered. Squad leaders hasten in front of their squads and form the framework of the skirmish line. The men follow their squad leaders absolutely. When the terrain requires it, squad leaders may increase or diminish intervals without command. In other armies (for instance, in those of Italy, France, and England) the desire to keep the skirmishers under control as long as possible, has led to advancing the platoons designated for the firing line at first in close order, the deployment being made only when the state of the action requires it. In France, the intervals between files may be increased, or a single rank line may be formed before the force is deployed as skirmishers. During an advance it will often happen that intervals are increased or diminished in accordance with the peculiarities of the terrain. The advance is continued until the command or signal “Halt” is given. If line of skirmishers is to be formed when marching to the rear, the command is first faced to the front and then deployed on the line then occupied. (Rallying position, par. 180 German I. D. R.). On varied ground, deployments will be made under cover whenever possible in order to allow of an immediate advance in skirmish line from that point. The number of platoons to be deployed depends upon the tactical situation. When three deployed platoons are formed abreast, it is difficult for the company commander to control them; but this formation is an appropriate one if a company is surprised or enters immediately into decisive action, or in cases where the battalion acting alone requires complete units in reserve for additional tasks. (Pars. 462, 463 and 469 German I. D. R.). When the battalion is engaged as part of a larger force, it is a good plan to occupy all the available front space at once with skirmishers and to maintain the intensity of fire of the firing line by constantly reinforcing it. The losses are less in this case than when the men crowd together in groups. (Italy).

Platoon and squad leaders are posted on the side of their commands facing the enemy while advancing; in moving to the rear, squad leaders are posted on the side away from the enemy, their duty being to maintain the march direction, and the platoon commanders remain in rear of their platoons (_i.e._, on the side toward the enemy). Russia is the only country where the leaders of a firing line are posted in the rear. In Austria one non-commissioned officer in each platoon is designated to march in rear of the advancing firing line for the purpose of supervising the skirmishers. As this non-commissioned officer is to prevent straggling, he should be selected with great care.

The platoon commander indicates the march direction to the leader of the base squad, and, accompanied by the range finders and the musicians, moves to a point at least ten paces in front of the line of his squad leaders, as a rule, opposite the center of his platoon; but he is not restricted to this position. He must possess mobility if he desires to lead his platoon skillfully on varied ground, if he expects to avoid interfering with neighboring platoons, and if he wishes to observe the enemy at the same time. The musician keeps the company commander constantly in view. (Par. 221 German I. D. R.). The range finders observe the battlefield, estimate the range to any targets appearing in view, without being specifically told to do so, communicate the range found to the platoon commander (this should not be done by shouting, as misunderstandings might result therefrom), and observe the effect of the fire. (Par. 173 German I. D. R.).

Whenever the flanks of a skirmish line are not protected by other troops or by natural obstacles, a few men under a prudent leader should always be sent out as combat patrols to the flank, or better still, to the right or left front. The patrol should under no circumstances lose connection with the command which it is to protect, but, on the other hand, should not stick so close to it that the file on the exposed flank is in a position to see as much as the combat patrol itself. As a report from a combat patrol frequently arrives too late, or cannot be made at all on account of hostile fire, signals should be agreed upon and the leader of the squad on the exposed flank of the line should keep the combat patrol constantly in view. Signal flags may also be employed advantageously in such cases.

The =Austrian= deployment is similar to the German, the intervals
between skirmishers being about two paces. In =Italy= the skirmishers
are posted at intervals of 1.5 m. (_catena ordinaria_), but this
interval may be increased by order up to three paces (_catena rada_).
The interval between squads in extended order is 4-5 paces to
facilitate volley fire by squad. The =French= deployment is similar
to the German. An intermediate extended order formation is that in
which an advance is made in line, the files at extended intervals. In
=England= skirmishers are placed at intervals of 5-15 paces during
the initial deployment. At short ranges where the decision is sought,
one rifle per 2-3 yards of front (1.8-2.7 m.) is the rule, one rifle
per yard of front (0.90 m.) being the maximum. In =Russia= and
=Japan= the intervals are as ordered. In =Switzerland= skirmishers
are posted at intervals of 1-2 paces; when a greater front is to be
covered the intervals between squads are increased. The length of the
rushes depends on the ground, the effect of fire, and the endurance
of the men. In exceptional cases an advance by rushes, by squads or
single men, is authorized.

(b) Movements in Skirmish Line.

Fire action requires steady breathing, and, on this account, all movements to the position at which the fire fight is to be taken up, should be made, as long as possible, in a free swinging stride. A careful observation of alignment or of intervals cannot be insisted upon. Cover found within the allotted front should be utilized by ploying, but this must neither interfere with the harmonious advance of the entire force nor cause a loss of the march direction. Considerations of cover for individual men should not interfere with the spontaneous progress of the movement. Orderly movements in long skirmish lines are best made by designating a certain element as the _base_, whose leader is far in advance of it; all neighboring leaders maintain their intervals from, and endeavor to remain approximately on line with him. This has the advantage of relieving the commander of the whole line from looking after these details and leaves him free to concentrate all his attention on the enemy. Minor changes of the march direction are executed by inclining to the right or left or by designating a new objective. More extended movements by the flank, within range of hostile fire, are possible only under cover. Changes of direction are executed like a gradual front into line, in which a temporary echeloning of the elements, or one which can be adjusted by degrees, is unavoidable. (Par. 185 German I. D. R.).

In the absence of cover, an advance in quick time will be possible only at long ranges unless the hostile fire can be kept down by fire from enfilading or commanding positions. Skirmish lines advancing without fire support over ground devoid of cover, begin to suffer appreciable losses at 1000 m. The more effective the hostile fire, the more pressing the necessity of diminishing, as far as this is possible, the periods of time during which the skirmishers present their whole bodies as targets to the enemy. This leads in itself[88] to an =advance by rushes=, since the whole distance separating the advancing line from the enemy cannot be covered in one rush. Double time may be employed by a skirmish line when it becomes necessary to reinforce an advancing firing line quickly, to forestall the enemy in reaching a certain point, or in moving under fire, from the covered fire position occupied, to another position. It is impossible to prescribe definitely and for all cases at what ranges the advance by rushes should be taken up and when fire should be opened in advancing by rushes, since it depends upon the intensity of the hostile fire.

[88] KUNZ, _Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, 14, pp. 40, 48 and 77.

The assailant will, in the first place, endeavor to advance without firing, in order to reach those ranges quickly at which his fire will begin to be effective against the well-covered targets of the defender. The skirmishers advance in strong detachments, by rushes of the greatest possible length, taking short breathing spells at each halt. Very soon, however, the hostile fire makes this advance impossible. A fire fight of variable duration must first make a further advance possible by silencing the fire of the defender. In a serious infantry engagement every step forward must be purchased by the fire of the attacking infantry. The attacker will, in exceptional cases only, continue his advance in long lines, although this must appear desirable to him, for almost invariably only a part of his force will still be able to gain ground to the front when supported by the fire of neighboring detachments. Favorable local conditions, insignificant losses, and, above all, the personality of the commander will embue a force with the determination to advance.

Time Required for Making a Rush. Strength of the Force Making the Rush.

The squad requires 5-6, the platoon at war strength about 10-15 seconds preparation for making a rush.

To cover 80 m., requires 26-30 seconds;
„ „ 40 „ „ 17-20 „
„ „ 25 „ „ 10-15 „

While the attacker covers a distance of 80 m., the defender, if in readiness, can fire 4-5 shots. This proves very clearly that, in order to be able to make such a rush, a certain superiority of fire is absolutely essential. These figures change radically as soon as the troops are seriously engaged with the enemy and come under his fire at short ranges. At short ranges, aside from the size of the target offered, attempts to advance by rushes with entire companies must very soon cease of their own accord.

The character of the terrain and the fire of the enemy play a decisive role here.

The strength of the force making the rush is intimately connected with the length of the rushes. A small, isolated force would run the risk of being fired on by its own neighboring detachments. Besides, confidence and moral courage are difficult to find in a small force. It is difficult to carry forward long lines as units. The use of long lines necessitates, as a rule, an almost complete cessation of fire, and, in addition, mutual fire support suffers. Long lines should therefore be employed only when the attacker possesses a very marked superiority of fire. In practice it has been found advantageous to make the rush with the smallest fraction led by an officer, _i.e._, with a platoon.

The following appropriate statement appears in _Taktische Rückblicke
auf 1866_: “In the danger zone which suddenly surrounds and startles
him in war, the soldier feels, in the first place, a desire to have
someone assure him that the seemingly critical situation in which
he finds himself, is as it should be. His eye is naturally directed
upon his officers. If the officer’s quiet glance reminds him that
here, as in peace time, the first duty is obedience, and if he sees
the officer subsequently advance fearlessly and vigorously, he will,
as a rule, not worry about the why and wherefor. It is this faithful
attachment to the person of his officer, rather than ambition and
patriotism, which inspires the soldier to highest efforts. Those
who suppose that all our soldiers are heroes simply because they
are products of a courageous race, are very much mistaken. This
would indeed be an invincible army, requiring no tactical advice,
if its soldiers would do nothing in action but their simple duty
voluntarily.”

The severest test of discipline is for a skirmish line to rise and rush forward under an effective hostile fire. This movement had best be executed with precision and energy even during peace exercises. The formation and manner of execution must become second nature to the soldier, like a movement of the manual of arms, which he retains during his entire military service, and a knowledge of which he brings with him when called to the colors during mobilization. The example set by advancing leaders and the arrival of reinforcements, which move forward through the firing line, have been found to be the most effective means of carrying a skirmish line forward.

The critical moment occurs when the men rise and prepare to rush forward, for an unsubdued enemy will be desirous to prevent, by increasing his fire, any attempt to advance. The fire support afforded by neighboring detachments would seem to have a conditional value only; for, being themselves under fire, the skirmishers of these detachments cannot be expected to divert their fire from the opponent previously fired upon, to an enemy by whom they themselves are not threatened. In oblique fire, the rifles, on account of their short barrel, interfere with neighboring ones, and, in addition, expose the men advancing on the flanks to the danger of being hit by the fire of their comrades. The fire support is, therefore, restricted to hindering the hostile skirmishers directly opposite from firing on the advancing unit. When the terrain is favorable, infantry and machine guns should not hesitate to fire over the heads of their own skirmishers. The coöperation of artillery will, in any case, be of great value, and infantry will have to select those moments for advancing when the defender is driven under cover by the hail of shot.

The advance by rushes, consuming time and energy, is an expedient to which the enemy compels us to resort as the only means of gaining ground to the front. The firm determination to close with the enemy and the ever-increasing difficulty of inducing the men to advance from cover, require that long rushes be made. Short rushes are neither consonant with the nature of the attack, nor with the desire to close with the enemy. “Many halts during an advance are fatal to the offensive.” (HÖNIG). The powers of endurance of the men, the character of the ground, and the hostile fire, as well as the support afforded by infantry and artillery fire, influence the length of the rush. If the leader has already caused the skirmishers to rise, it is best to let them run forward so long as the physical powers of the men and the hostile fire permit. The only danger is that the men will throw themselves down prematurely, and without orders. It is rather an advantage that during the rapid advance, increasing both muscular and nervous activity, the men do not think of danger and have no time to pay attention to their fallen comrades. One fact is, however, worthy of special attention: If we train a soldier to make long rushes in time of peace, he will be able to make them in time of war, and it is easier for a leader to decrease than to increase the length of rushes in the field.

The short rushes are considered advantageous because they take the enemy by surprise, in consequence of which he is not in a condition to direct his fire on the advancing unit. Rushes should be made with startling suddenness. They should not be made in step at double time, but, on the contrary, as rapidly as possible (by rushing); by the time the enemy directs his fire on them, the skirmishers should already have thrown themselves down. Stragglers should also throw themselves down, when the men in the lead drop down behind cover, and should then endeavor to reach the firing line by crawling.

The enemy will concentrate his fire on the unit which advanced first. The fire of this unit will at the start be rather weak, getting stronger gradually. If this unit is left in its advanced position for some time there is danger of its being thrown back; all neighboring units must therefore endeavor to rejoin it as soon as possible.

The greater the superiority of our fire, _i.e._, the marksmanship which compels the enemy to keep under cover, the greater the length of the rushes and the rapidity with which they follow upon each other.

Short rushes with small units occur quite naturally, because the platoon leader no longer succeeds in inducing his whole platoon to rise, since his influence extends only to the men nearest him, and because the flank squads at first remain behind and only gradually try to rejoin the leading skirmishers. If only a part of the skirmishers have jumped up, it is quite natural for them not to make a long rush, but to throw themselves down before reaching the new position, because of the feeling that they have been abandoned by their comrades and the fear of running into their field of fire. Thus, in spite of the best intentions of the leader, the short rush by small units occurs. In time of peace, however, we should retain the long rush by platoons and not endeavor to give human weaknesses the force of regulations.

When once compelled to employ short rushes the following question presents itself: Is the advantage of such a small gain of ground worth the trouble of inducing the soldier to rise for making an advance by rushes? Would it, therefore, not be more profitable to =crawl forward=? A man crawling on his belly presents a vulnerable surface of approximately the size of a breast plate 50 cm. high. In an advance made by a large unit, or over covered terrain (fields of standing grain) crawling would be difficult (difficulty of maintaining the direction of march and reduction of the rate of advance); it would also be difficult to get men to advance to the charge after they have crawled along in this fashion for some time. The supervision of a unit crawling forward would also be exceedingly difficult. The following results were obtained in experiments made under favorable conditions: A distance of 500 m. was covered by crawling in about 10 minutes; crawling tired the men, increased the activity of the lungs to such an extent that deliberate aiming and firing was out of the question and the motion produced a noticeable swelling of arms, hands and knees.[89] The Boers occasionally used the following method: One man crept forward once or twice his own length, raising his body slightly, while the man next to him fired; then they exchanged roles and this procedure was repeated uninterruptedly. In any case, troops ought to be able to execute both the advance by rushes and the advance by crawling with or without firing. On terrain devoid of cover a skirmish line will frequently be able to advance only by crawling.

[89] During the engagement at Paardeberg (18th February, 1900), the
fighting line of the British 9th Infantry Division was reinforced
by troops crawling up into the line, and carried forward to within
450 m. of the enemy’s position. An isolated assault was subsequently
repulsed by the Boers.

Procedure: The man throws himself on the ground at full length, head
resting upon the bent left arm, right hand grasping the small of
the rifle-stock. The man moves forward by alternately bending and
straightening the right leg. When the right leg is straightened the
body slides forward without rising in the least from the ground, and
the head also remains in position resting on the left arm. The head
is raised only when the man fires his piece, the butt of which is
placed against the shoulder. Crawling on all fours is very tiring,
the man offers a larger target, and, in addition, is not immediately
ready for firing.

In this manner the Boers succeeded in shooting the enemy out of
his position. The firing line, while keeping up an incessant fire,
slowly but steadily advanced. The advance of this uncanny crawling
line is said to have produced an especially disquieting and
paralyzing impression on the immovable defender, who was tied to his
position, because of his inability to inflict perceptible losses
on these small, prone targets, and because, moreover, he himself
was continually under a galling fire. As no assault was made, no
opportunity was offered the defender for using his rifles against
targets the height of a man. The British infantrymen were, however,
insufficiently trained in handling their weapons independently. As
to rise and to retreat meant annihilation, the determination to
resist weakened gradually during the long fire fight, and, in order
to escape from this seemingly unendurable situation, which grew
more and more acute with every minute, and which paralyzed every
energetic decision, one avenue of escape only seemed open, that of
surrender.[90]

[90] Engagement at Nicholson’s Neck, October 29th, 1900.
_Vierteljahrshefte_, 1905, pp. 145 and 149.

One who fought on the Boer side writes as follows: “After we had
crept up, in this manner, constantly firing and crawling, to within
about 300 m. of the enemy, we saw many white handkerchiefs waving
over in his lines, as a signal of surrender. As we placed little
credence in these signs of surrender, however, on account of many a
bad experience, we continued the advance by crawling. But, as soon as
we saw that most of the men in the enemy’s ranks were throwing away
their weapons, we rose to make the British prisoners. When we came up
with them, I noticed that a great many of the men were weeping like
children. Later, when I voiced my astonishment over the morale of
their troops to some English officers, they stated that it was due to
the uncanny manner of our advance.

“These officers stated, moreover, that the sight of danger
approaching ever closer without their being able to ward it off
effectively, caused great depression and alarm among their troops;
for the Boers, utilizing every available rock in crawling over the
plain, presented such an unfavorable target that the British fire had
had very little effect, while they themselves had been constantly
exposed to the Boer fire. All this, they claimed, had contributed to
unnerve their troops.”[91]

[91] _Supplement No. 8 to Militär-Wochenblatt_, 1900. _Spionskop_,
in _Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften_, 34/35, p. 59.

=Lessons of the Boer War=: “The rushes * * * were of variable length, according to the intensity of the hostile fire; they varied from 30 to 80 m. According to the opinion of many British officers it was exceedingly difficult to induce skirmishers to rise and rush forward under hostile fire; but that once upon their feet, it became necessary to push the attack forward as far as possible regardless of the increased losses entailed by the longer rushes.”[92]

[92] _Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften_, 33, p. 69.

One who fought on the Boer side reports as follows in regard to the British advance by rushes: “The men rose gradually and hesitatingly. This gave the attentively watching enemy time to pour a well directed fire upon the last men who arose. Thus even short rushes made by long lines became generally too costly to be executed. Smaller groups, on the other hand, were able to move with startling rapidity. * * * Every sudden interruption of the firing that might attract the enemy’s attention should therefore be carefully avoided, but, as a rule, this is possible only when the advancing units are small.”

The British Regulations of 1896 prescribe rushes of 30-40 m., and those published immediately after the war (1902) prescribe rushes of 70-90 m., but the rush is to continue only while the surprise of the enemy lasts.

Russo-Japanese War.

In the Japanese army, the 5th Infantry Division employed short, and very short, rushes by preference, while other divisions of the 1st Army as a rule preferred long rushes. From an English work we obtain the following data in regard to the length of rushes and the expenditure of ammunition per rifle during halts between consecutive rushes in the engagement on the Shiliho on October 12th, 1904, at ranges beginning with 1,000 m.

From the table it appears that after gaining the superiority of fire, beginning with the fifth rush, at about 625 m. from the enemy, the length of the rushes increased; the last 400 m. were covered in one rush as the enemy withdrew from his position.

1st rush 132 m., about 30 rounds of ammunition per rifle
2nd „ 58 „ „ 15 „ „ „ „ „
3rd „ 63 „ „ 15 „ „ „ „ „
4th „ 61 „ „ 15 „ „ „ „ „
5th „ 75 „ „ 15 „ „ „ „ „
6th „ 151 „ „ 5 „ „ „ „ „
7th „ 400 „
-----------------------------------------------
940 m., about 95 rounds of ammunition per rifle

If we assume that three shots per minute were fired from each rifle, it follows that the attack consumed approximately 40-45 minutes.

Provisions of the Various Regulations Relative to the Advance by Rushes.

=Germany.= (Pars. 188, 189 and 337 I. D. R.). To advance by rushes,
the following commands are given: (Such) =Platoon (section, squad)
Rush!... Rise!... March! March!= At the command =Rush!= the
skirmishers finish loading, lock pieces, close cartridge boxes, and
prepare to rise. Skirmishers lying prone take the piece in the left
hand, lean on the right, and draw the right knee as close to the body
as possible without thereby raising the body from the ground. After
a brief pause, during which these preparations are made, the platoon
commander jumps up and at the same time commands: =Rise!... March!
March!= At this command the skirmishers jump up and rush forward. The
length of the rush will rarely exceed 80 m. (Par. 337 German I. D.
R.). While rushes should, as a rule, be as long as possible, short
rushes, which are designed to leave the enemy no time for firing,
should also be practiced. The principal thing is that skirmishers
rise promptly and simultaneously and that they rush forward rapidly.
The rush is terminated by the command “_Position_”; the sight
setting is changed when necessary and fire opened without further
preliminaries. Frequently the new firing position may be indicated
before the rush is made.

=Austria.= Rushes are as a rule made by platoons. “The length of the
rushes depends upon the character of the ground and the tactical
situation, as well as upon the physical condition of the men. They
serve as an expedient for reaching the next firing position.”

=France.= Rushes are made, without fixed rules, from cover to cover
(_par bonds successifs_).

=England.= (Regulations dated 1896): Originally the regulations
prescribed rushes 30-40 m. long, but, as a matter of fact, their
length was actually increased to 60 and 100 m. during the first
engagements of the South African war, in cases where the fire of the
enemy was not especially heavy. The regulations of 1905, recently
published, state: “Rushes over open ground should not exceed 80-100
yards (_i.e._, 70-90 m.) and will, in fact, rarely reach this length.
At decisive ranges, _i.e._, under 540 m., they should be short enough
to afford the enemy no opportunity to pour a well-directed fire on
the skirmishers. When cover is available the advance is made from
cover to cover.” At another place the regulations state: “On open
ground and within effective range, long lines of skirmishers, rising
simultaneously, will suffer heavy losses even when making short
rushes; the sudden movement of smaller units may take the enemy
unawares, so that for a time at least well aimed fire is avoided. The
rush is continued only while the surprise of the enemy lasts. The
shorter the range, the smaller the advancing units will have to be,
and the shorter the length of the rushes.”

All preparations for a rush must be made as unostentatiously as
possible. The units following in rear should, whenever possible,
advance beyond the leading unit which is lying down and firing. When
an advance by rushes in units is impossible, individuals may run or
crawl forward.

=Italy.= Long rushes, at least with platoons, otherwise with
companies, are used as a rule, so long as the hostile fire permits.
When the intensity of the hostile fire increases, or after the
organizations have become mixed, rushes can no longer be made by
entire units but only by squads or like fractions. These leave the
main line and endeavor to reach the next cover at a rapid run, or if
cover be lacking, throw themselves down in order to open fire again
at the shorter range thus gained. As a rule, the leading echelons
open fire at once from their new positions so as to facilitate the
advance of the others, unless special circumstances make it advisable
to delay the firing until all the other units have reached a good
position and are able to direct an effective fire upon the enemy.

=Japan.= Rushes are made according to German pattern, their maximum
length being 100, their minimum 30-40 m. Rushes are not made by units
smaller than a platoon.

=Russia.= Rushes are made by individual men, by groups, by sections,
and by platoons. The length of the rushes is not indicated. When
sections advance by rushes the platoon commander indicates the
section which is to advance first, and also the order in which the
others are to follow. The Russian regulations are the only ones which
prescribe a “movement to the rear by rushes,” at a run.

Frequently, when the men are very much fatigued, when advancing over plowed ground and through extensive grain fields, an advance by rushes will be impossible. Whether =fire while in motion= ought to be employed in this case should be determined. A preliminary condition for its employment is, however, that the enemy’s fire has been subdued or that he has been forced under cover. To advance against an unshaken enemy with fire while in motion must lead to the annihilation of the attacking force. While the defender scores only 12.8% hits against advancing skirmishers at 700 m., the attacker scores only 1.6% to 3.5% hits against head and breast targets. With such a discrepancy in fire effect, the attack, if employing fire while in motion, is bound to collapse, unless it has already gained a superiority of fire prior to the advance. It is unfortunate that fire while in motion is frequently employed when inappropriate during drills. The danger of men wounding each other and of the advance hesitating because the officers are not in front of the line is not to be underestimated. On the other hand, the advantages of eliminating the difficulties of inducing the men to rise, of the troops leaving their losses behind, of stragglers being more easily detected, and of keeping the entire hostile line under fire, cannot be denied. In war this method of advance will frequently result without orders while advancing to the charge after the defender has been driven under cover. (In Russia this mode of advance is prescribed).

During experiments in field firing, held in Austria by a force
advancing from 1,400 to 600 paces, with an expenditure of an equal
number of rounds of ammunition in each experiment, the following
results were obtained:

Regulation attack: Fire while in motion:
Time 26 min. 28 seconds 18 min. 40 seconds
Fire pauses 12 „ 18 „ 7 „ 40 „

Attacker against the defender:
Percentage of hits 7 16.7
Defender against the attacker:
Percentage of hits 9.2 33.

Percentage of hits obtained during the execution of the attack from
1,400 to 100 paces:

Attacker 22.7 20.
Defender 32.2 51.2

There is no model advance within the zone of effective infantry fire. All expedients, whether they be sneaking or crawling, long or short rushes, or fire while in motion, are of equal value, if the force, kept well in hand by the leader, is thereby brought closer to the enemy. Every opportunity to gain a foot of ground to the front, offered by flanking fire or fire directed at the enemy over the heads of the advancing force, must be utilized. The effect of our own artillery fire should also be attentively followed with a view to advancing when the hostile skirmishers have sought refuge under cover to escape our shrapnel.

Examples of the Employment of Fire While in Motion.

The successful attack made by the 1st Turco Regiment at =Wörth=.[93]

[93] V. BOGUSLAWSKI, _Geschichte des Regiments Nr. 50_, p. 212.

This attack was made against disordered and exhausted troops which
lacked officers and reserves. The attack was finally repulsed by
Prussian artillery and the IInd Battalion of the 58th Infantry.

The attempted sortie of the Turks on December 10th, 1877.[94]

[94] Springer, VI, p. 204.

The attack, made in superior force and supported by artillery, was
successful in that the Russian intrenchments and rifle pits were
taken. With the arrival of Russian reinforcements, which advanced
against front and flank of the Turks, the situation was reversed.

The attack made by Vinoy’s Corps on September 30th, 1870, against the
VIth Army Corps in =l’Hay= and =Chevilly=: “The defender’s coolness
and confidence in victory grew with this ineffective fire of the
attack, and finally the dead were piled up in heaps by the steady
volleys delivered by him at short ranges (300-400 paces).”[95]

[95] V. SCHLICHTING, _Taktische und strategische Grundsätze_, 1, p.
71.

Examples of the Employment of Rushes.

1. Attack on =Le Bourget=, on October 30th, 1870.[96]

[96] HOHENLOHE, _Briefe über Infanterie_, p. 80.

KUNZ, _Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, 10, p. 43.

Two battalions of the _Kaiser Franz_ Guard Grenadier Regiment had
to advance from Dugny against the enemy in the northwest edge of Le
Bourget over 1,500 m. of very open terrain, covered only with high
potato crops. The battalions were formed in two lines with two
companies entirely deployed in the first line, and the battalion
reserves in rear of the center of the line with files at extended
intervals. The second line was formed similarly. The two companies
in the firing line advanced at first without firing, by rushes of
about 300 m. each, made by alternate companies, each moving forward
beyond the point where the other had halted. When effective range
was reached one company opened rapid fire while the other moved
forward by long rushes. The companies in rear followed in a similar
manner. The tall potato bushes partly concealed the lines while lying
down. In this manner the two battalions reached the outskirts of the
village almost without being checked, the defender having withdrawn
to the interior of the village.

The losses of the two battalions, while advancing by rushes, were
insignificant.

The regimental commander, bearing in mind the lessons gained at St.
Privat, had drilled the regiment beforehand in this mode of attack.

2. Attack on Redout No. 2, at =Scheinovo=, on January 9th, 1878.

The attack by Skobeleff’s Division, consisting of four battalions
(_Drushines_) of Bulgarians, and the _Ugla_, _Vladimir_, and _Kasan_
Regiments, was to be made under cover of the fire of two rifle
battalions armed with Berdan rifles, and of a provisional battalion
of the _Ugla_ Regiment armed with captured Turkish rifles. The only
artillery available consisted of a mountain battery, while the Turks
were able to bring twenty guns into action.

The Turkish rifle fire began at about 1,000-1,200 m., but the Russian
firing lines continued the advance with shouldered arms. Only when
the losses increased noticeably did they advance by rushes, _without
firing_, from 750 to about 500 m. where they opened fire. The rushes
were made by the entire firing line; the supports, with files at
extended intervals, did not follow until the firing line had thrown
itself down.

After the firing had lasted for some time, the Ugla Regiment, from
the reserve, was formed in three lines, each consisting of one
battalion, each battalion again into two lines with 350 m. distance
between lines (total depth of the column about 1,800 m.). From 900
m. on, the advance was made by rushes, the entire force inclining
to the right front. While covered by the fire of the skirmishers of
the firing line in front, the length of the rushes was 100-150 m.
At 250 m. from the enemy, the leading line, extending the line of
the Bulgarian and Rifle Battalions, was able to open fire and, after
about thirty minutes, when it was clearly apparent that the Turks
were evacuating the work, the regiment began the assault, which was
successful.

Of the troops in the first line, the 11th Rifle Battalion lost 11
officers and 422 men; the 9th Rifle Battalion, 5 officers and 269
men; the original strength of each being about 800 men. Expenditure
of ammunition: 11th Rifle Battalion, 120 rounds per rifle.

The Ugla Regiment, which advanced in close order after the defender’s
fire had been silenced, lost only nine officers and 391 men. The
Kasan Regiment, which followed the Ugla Regiment, participated in the
assault on the second Turkish position. The Turkish fire had abated
to such an extent that the battalions were able to advance in rear of
one another, each in two lines with distances of only 35 m. between
lines; the intervals between companies were 15 m., and those between
files were extended. Losses: four officers and 76 men. Expenditure of
ammunition: 12 rounds per rifle.[97]

[97] KUROPATKIN-KRAHMER, _Kritische Rückblicke auf den
Russich-Türkischen Krieg_, III, pp. 168-186.

In contrast with these examples of long rushes, almost every obstinate engagement with an unshaken enemy showed that “every step forward” had to be literally gained by the impulse imparted by the arrival of small, fresh detachments, that the rushes often faltered after only 20-30 paces, and that frequently nothing remained but to work forward individually. (See pp. 76 and 87 _supra_.)

The frontal attacks made at =Wörth=, at the Roten Berg at
=Spicheren=, opposite =Flavigny=, on August 16th, 1870, and opposite
the gravel pits of =Point du Jour=, on August 18th, 1870, etc.

In the Russo-Turkish war, the engagement at the mills north of
=Lovtcha=, the fight for the possession of the Green Hill ridges
south of =Plevna=, and the fight during the advance from the west
and southwest against the large work of =Gorni Dubniac=, show how
rushes, repeatedly attempted at short ranges, faltered after only a
few paces. “On a signal given by Ljapunov, which was to be repeated
by all the officers, the men were to rush forward immediately. Just
before the movement began, the Turks opened the usual incessant
fire, and the simultaneous advance of so many squads was of course
absolutely impossible. The rushes were, therefore, always made by
groups of 2-3 men. These groups would rise, one in this company, one
in that, run forward a few steps, and then throw themselves down
again.”[98]

[98] PUSYREWSKI, _Die russische Garde im Kriege, 1877-78_, p. 127.

The attacks on =Railway Hill= and on =Hart’s Hill= (February 1900),
on the =Tugela=, show an endeavor to advance at first by long rushes,
then by rushes gradually diminishing in length, the infantry finally
working itself forward by twos and threes for the purpose of reaching
the last firing position from which the final assault could be
made.[99]

[99] _Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften_, 34/35, pp. 129, 139.
_The Times History of the War in South Africa_, III, p. 539.

(c) Reinforcing the Firing Line.

If the fire power of the firing line is to be maintained after heavy losses, or the intensity of its fire is to be augmented, or when it finally is to receive the impulse for making a further advance, it must be reinforced. (Pars. 226, 227 and 341 German I. D. R.). This may be done by prolonging the line (platoons abreast at well defined intervals), or, when space is lacking and after losses have occurred, by putting men in the intervals (_i.e._, increasing the density of the line and filling it up). When the firing line is prolonged, tactical units are not broken up, and this facilitates fire control. Whenever practicable, the firing line should be reinforced by prolonging it, although the other method, that of placing men in the intervals and gaps of the firing line, is more frequently used and more practical because the arrival of fresh men and the replacement of incapacitated officers occasioned thereby renews the strength of the firing line (replenishment of ammunition). The breaking up of platoons is unavoidable, and on that account platoon and squad leaders should be trained in time of peace to form new units at once so that control is not lost. In order to prevent the mixing of units, so far as this is possible, and to keep the firing line filled up with skirmishers, even during an engagement entailing heavy losses, it is indispensable that the fighting front should be limited, that of a company in attack to 150, in defense to about 200 m. The unit designated to reinforce the firing line endeavors to approach that line under cover, forms skirmish line at any rate before leaving the last cover and advances by rushes, or, if directly in rear of the firing line and under a heavy fire, even by crawling.

=Austria.= Both modes of reinforcing the firing line, that of
prolonging it, and that of filling the intervals and gaps, are used.
When prolonging the line the reinforcement may remain abreast of the
firing line. During an attack efforts should, however, be made to
advance beyond the firing line--“to overreach it.” The other method,
that of filling up the line, is in attack, as a rule, to be used for
the purpose of carrying the line forward, the rush to be made as soon
as the reinforcement reaches the firing line. Signals are prescribed
for prolonging the line without advancing beyond it, for reinforcing
that line and advancing beyond it, and for filling it up and carrying
it forward in a rush.

(d) Closing Up. Assembling. Re-Forming.

(Pars. 211-214 and 230-232 German I. D. R.).

The most effective method of preventing a mixing of organizations in action is for all units constantly to endeavor to close in toward their leaders, filling gaps as soon as casualties have occurred. Squads which have sustained heavy losses unite with adjoining ones under a common leader. This closing in can, as a rule, be executed only while in motion. It must be effected gradually and the intervals ordered should be maintained. Crowding of every description increases losses and causes dangerous gaps along the entire front.

If in the course of an engagement, the purpose of the action and the situation make it no longer desirable to retain an extended order formation, each leader, from the squad leader upward, must assemble his unit at once and place himself and it at the disposal of the commander of the next higher unit. Formed bodies must be created quickly and held well in hand by their leaders, without awaiting specific orders to that effect.

The troops must be assembled very quietly and always facing the enemy.

The original organizations are not re-formed until the command “Fall in” is given. (Pars. 214 and 232 German I. D. R.).

10. SUPPORTS.

(Pars. 222-228 and 341 German I. D. R.).

The limited front assigned to an organization necessitates, in the first place, a division into firing line and retained fractions. At the decisive stage of a fight every available man must, without question, be in the first line.