Chapter XXVI: Part III: provides for penalties. The law is signed, “The Fuehrer and (1)

Reichschancellor, Adolf Hitler; the Reichsminister of War, von Blomberg; the Reichsminister of the Interior, Frick.” At the bottom of it there is this note:

“Note on the law for the defense of the Reich of 21 May 1935.

“The publication of the law for the defense of the Reich of 21
May 1935 will be suspended. The law became effective 21 May
1935.

“The Fuehrer and Reichschancellor, Adolf Hitler.” (_2261-PS_)

Thus, although the publication itself stated the law was made public, and although the law became effective immediately, publication was suspended by Adolf Hitler.

There was also further attached to von Blomberg’s letter a copy of the decision of the Reichscabinet of 21 May 1935 on the Council for the Defense of the Realm. This decree deals largely with organization for economic preparation for the war. This law of May 1935 was the cornerstone of war preparations of the Nazi conspirators, and makes clear the relationship of Schacht to this preparation. (_2261-PS_)

B. _Formulation and Execution of Plans to Invade Austria and Czechoslovakia._

The next phase of aggression was the formulation and execution of plans to attack Austria and Czechoslovakia, in that order.

One of the most striking and revealing of all the captured documents which have come to hand is one which has come to be known as the Hossbach notes of a conference in the Reichs Chancellery on 5 November 1937 from 1615 to 2030 hours (_386-PS_). In the course of that meeting Hitler outlined to those present the possibilities and necessities of expanding their foreign policy, and requested, “That his statements be looked upon in the case of his death as his last will and testament.” The recorder of the minutes of this meeting, Colonel Hossbach, was the Fuehrer’s adjutant. Present at this conspiratorial meeting, among others, were Erich Raeder, Constantin von Neurath, and Hermann Wilhelm Goering. The minutes of this meeting reveal a crystalization towards the end of 1937 in the policy of the Nazi regime (_386-PS_). Austria and Czechoslovakia were to be acquired by force. They would provide “_lebensraum_” (living space) and improve Germany’s military position for further operations. While it is true that actual events unfolded themselves in a somewhat different manner than that outlined at this meeting, in essence the purposes stated at the meeting were carried out. These notes, which destroy any possible doubt concerning the Nazi’s premeditation of their crimes against peace, read as follows:

“Berlin, 10 November 1937. Notes on the conference in the
Reichskanzlei on 5 November 1937 from 1615 to 2030 hours.

“Present: The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor;

“The Reichsminister for War, Generalfeldmarschall v. Blomberg;

“The C-in-C Army, Generaloberst Freiherr v. Fritsch;

“The C-in-C Navy, Generaladmiral Dr. h.c. Raeder;

“The C-in-C Luftwaffe, Generaloberst Goering;

“The Reichsminister for Foreign Affairs, Freiherr v. Neurath;

“Oberst Hossbach [the adjutant who took the minutes].

“The Fuehrer stated initially that the subject matter of today’s
conference was of such high importance, that its detailed
discussion would certainly in other states take place before the
Cabinet in full session. However, he, the Fuehrer, had decided
not to discuss this matter in the larger circle of the Reich
Cabinet, because of its importance. His subsequent statements
were the result of detailed deliberations and of the experiences
of his four and a half years in government; he desired to
explain to those present his fundamental ideas on the
possibilities and necessities of expanding our foreign policy
and in the interests of a far-sighted policy he requested that
his statements be looked upon in the case of his death as his
last will and testament.

“The Fuehrer then stated: The aim of German policy is the
security and the preservation of the nation and its propagation.
This is consequently a problem of space. The German nation
comprises eighty-five million people, which, because of the
number of individuals and the compactness of habitation form a
homogeneous European racial body, the like of which can not be
found in any other country. On the other hand it justifies the
demand for larger living space more than for any other nation.
If there have been no political consequences to meet the demands
of this racial body for living space then that is the result of
historical development spread over several centuries and should
this political condition continue to exist, it will represent
the greatest danger to the preservation of the German nation at
its present high level. An arrest of the deterioration of the
German element in Austria and in Czechoslovakia is just as
little possible as the preservation of the present state in
Germany itself.

“Instead of growth, sterility will be introduced, and as a
consequence, tensions of a social nature will appear after a
number of years, because political and philosophical ideas are
of a permanent nature only as long as they are able to produce
the basis for the realization of the actual claim of existence
of a nation. The German future is therefore dependent
exclusively on the solution of the need for living space. Such a
solution can be sought naturally only for a limited period,
about one to three generations.

“Before touching upon the question of solving the need for
living space, it must be decided whether a solution of the
German position with a good future can be attained, either by
way of an autarchy or by way of an increased share in universal
commerce and industry.

“Autarchy: Execution will be possible only with strict
National-Socialist State policy, which is the basis; assuming
this can be achieved the results are as follows:

“A. In the sphere of raw materials, only limited, but not total
autarchy can be attained:

“1. Wherever coal can be used for the extraction of raw
materials autarchy is feasible.

“2. In the case of ores the position is much more difficult.
Requirements in iron and light metals can be covered by
ourselves. Copper and tin, however, can not.

“3. Cellular materials can be covered by ourselves as long as
sufficient wood supplies exist. A permanent solution is not
possible.

“4. Edible fats—possible.

“B. In the case of foods, the question of an autarchy must be
answered with a definite NO.

“The general increase of living standards, compared with thirty
to forty years ago, brought about a simultaneous increase of the
demand and an increase of personal consumption even among the
producers, the farmers, themselves. The proceeds from the
production increase in agriculture have been used for covering
the increased demand, therefore they represent no absolute
increase in production. A further increase in production by
making greater demands on the soil is not possible because it
already shows signs of deterioration due to the use of
artificial fertilizers, and it is therefore certain that, even
with the greatest possible increase in production, participation
in the world market could not be avoided.

“The considerable expenditure of foreign currency to secure food
by import, even in periods when harvests are good, increases
catastrophically when the harvest is really poor. The
possibility of this catastrophe increases correspondingly to the
increase in population, and the annual 560,000 excess in births
would bring about an increased consumption in bread, because the
child is a greater bread eater than the adult.

“Permanently to counter the difficulties of food supplies by
lowering the standard of living and by rationing is impossible
in a continent which had developed an approximately equivalent
standard of living. As the solving of the unemployment problem
has brought into effect the complete power of consumption, some
small corrections in our agricultural home production will be
possible, but not a wholesale alteration of the standard of food
consumption. Consequently autarchy becomes impossible,
specifically in the sphere of food supplies as well as
generally.

“Participation in world economy. There are limits to this which
we are unable to transgress. The market fluctuations would be an
obstacle to a secure foundation of the German position;
international commercial agreements do not offer any guarantee
for practical execution. It must be considered on principle that
since the World War (1914-18), as industrialization has taken
place in countries which formerly exported food. We live in a
period of economic empires, in which the tendency to colonies
again approaches the condition which originally motivated
colonization; in Japan and Italy economic motives are the basis
of their will to expand, and economic need will also drive
Germany to it. Countries outside the great economic empires have
special difficulties in expanding economically.

“The upward tendency, which has been caused in world economy,
due to armament competition, can never form a permanent basis
for an economic settlement, and this latter is also hampered by
the economic disruption caused by Bolshevism. There is a
pronounced military weakness in those states who base their
existence on export. As our exports and imports are carried out
over those sea lanes which are dominated by Britain, it is more
a question of security of transport than one of foreign
currency, and this explains the great weakness in our food
situation in wartime. The only way out, and one which may appear
imaginary, is the securing of greater living space, an endeavor
which at all times has been the cause of the formation of states
and of movements of nations. It is explicable that this tendency
finds no interest in Geneva and in satisfied states. Should the
security of our food situation be our foremost thought, then the
space required for this can only be sought in Europe, but we
will not copy liberal capitalist policies which rely on
exploiting colonies. It is not a case of conquering people, but
of conquering agriculturally useful space. It would also be more
to the purpose to seek raw material-producing territory in
Europe directly adjoining the Reich and not overseas, and this
solution would have to be brought into effect for one or two
generations. What would be required at a later date over and
above this must be left to subsequent, generations. The
development of great worldwide national bodies is naturally a
slow process and the German people, with its strong racial root
[Volksstamm] has for this purpose the most favorable foundations
in the heart of the European Continent. The history of all
times—Roman Empire, British Empire—has proved that every space
expansion can only be effected by breaking resistance and taking
risks. Even setbacks are unavoidable; neither formerly nor today
has space been found without an owner; the attacker always comes
up against the proprietor.” (_386-PS_)

After this somewhat jumbled discussion of geopolitical economic theory and of the need for expansion and “_Lebensraum_”, Adolf Hitler, in these Hossbach notes, posed a question and proceeded to answer it:

“The question for Germany is where the greatest possible
conquest could be made at lowest cost.

“German politics must reckon with its two hateful enemies,
England and France, to whom a strong German colossus in the
center of Europe would be intolerable. Both these states would
oppose a further reinforcement of Germany, both in Europe and
overseas, and in this opposition they would have the support of
all parties. Both countries would view the building of German
military strong points overseas as a threat to their overseas
communications, as a security measure for German commerce, and
retrospectively a strengthening of the German position in
Europe.

“England is not in a position to cede any of her colonial
possessions to us owing to the resistance which she experiences
in the Dominions. After the loss of prestige which England has
suffered owing to the transfer of Abyssinia to Italian
ownership, a return of East Africa can no longer be expected.
Any resistance on England’s part would at best consist in the
readiness to satisfy our colonial claims by taking away colonies
which at the present moment are not in British hands, for
example, Angola. French favors would probably be of the same
nature.

“A serious discussion regarding the return of colonies to us
could be considered only at a time when England is in a state of
emergency and the German Reich is strong and well armed. The
Fuehrer does not share the opinion that the Empire is
unshakeable.

“Resistance against the Empire is to be found less in conquered
territories than amongst its competitors. The British Empire and
the Roman Empire cannot be compared with one another in regard
to durability; after the Punic Wars the latter did not have a
serious political enemy. Only the dissolving effects which
originated in Christendom, and the signs of age which creep into
all states, made it possible for the Ancient Germans to
subjugate Ancient Rome.

“Alongside the British Empire today a number of States exist
which are stronger than it. The British Mother Country is able
to defend its colonial possession only allied with other states
and not by its own power. How could England alone, for example,
defend Canada against attack by America, or its Far Eastern
interests against an attack by Japan?

“The singling out of the British Crown as the bearer of Empire
unity is in itself an admission that the universal empire cannot
be maintained permanently by power politics. The following are
significant pointers in this respect:

“(a) Ireland’s struggle for independence.

“(b) Constitutional disputes in India where England, by her
half measures, left the door open for Indians at a later date to
utilize the non-fulfillment of constitutional promises as a
weapon against Britain.

“(c) The weakening of the British position in the Far East by
Japan.

“(d) The opposition in the Mediterranean to Italy which—by
virtue of its history, driven by necessity and led by a
genius—expands its power position and must consequently
infringe British interests to an increasing extent. The outcome
of the Abyssinian War is a loss of prestige for Britain which
Italy is endeavoring to increase by stirring up discontent in
the Mohammedan World.

“It must be established in conclusion that the Empire cannot be
held permanently by power politics by 45 million Britons, in
spite of all the solidity of her ideals. The proportion of the
populations in the Empire, compared with that of the Motherland,
is nine to one, and it should act as a warning to us that if we
expand in space, we must not allow the level of our population
to become too low.

“France’s position is more favorable than that of England. The
French Empire is better placed geographically, the population of
its colonial possessions represents a potential military
increase. But France is faced with difficulties of internal
politics. At the present time only 10 per cent approximately of
the nations have parliamentary governments, whereas 90 per cent
of them have totalitarian governments. Nevertheless, we have to
take the following into our political consideration as power
factors:

“Britain, France, Russia and the adjoining smaller states.

“The German question can be solved only by way of force, and
this is never without risk. The battles of Frederick the Great
for Silesia, and Bismarck’s wars against Austria and France had
been a tremendous risk and the speed of Prussian action in 1870
had prevented Austria from participating in the war. If we place
the decision to apply force with risk at the head of the
following expositions, then we are left to reply to the
questions ‘when’ and ‘how’. In this regard we have to decide
upon three different cases.

“Case 1. Period 1943-45: After this we can only expect a change
for the worse. The rearming of the Army, the Navy and the Air
Force, as well as the formation of the Officers’ Corps, are
practically concluded.

“Our material equipment and armaments are modern; with further
delay the danger of their becoming out-of-date will increase. In
particular the secrecy of ‘special weapons’ cannot always be
safeguarded. Enlistment of reserves would be limited to the
current recruiting age groups and an addition from older
untrained groups would be no longer available.

“In comparison with the rearmament, which will have been carried
out at the time by other nations, we shall decrease in relative
power. Should we not act until 1943-45, then, dependent on the
absence of reserves, any year could bring about the food crisis,
for the countering of which we do not possess the necessary
foreign currency. This must be considered as a ‘point of
weakness in the regime.’ Over and above that, the world will
anticipate our action and will increase counter-measures yearly.
Whilst other nations isolate themselves we should be forced on
the offensive.

“What the actual position would be in the years 1943-45 no one
knows today. It is certain, however, that we can wait no longer.

“On the one side the large armed forces, with the necessity for
securing their upkeep, the aging of the Nazi movement and of its
leaders, and on the other side the prospect of a lowering of the
standard of living and a drop in the birth rate, leaves us no
other choice but to act. If the Fuehrer is still living, then it
will be his irrevocable decision to solve the German space
problem no later than 1943-45. The necessity for action before
1943-45 will come under consideration in cases 2 and 3.

“Case 2. Should the social tensions in France lead to an
internal political crisis of such dimensions that it absorbs the
French Army and thus renders it incapable for employment in war
against Germany, then the time for action against Czechoslovakia
has come.

“Case 3. It would be equally possible to act against
Czechoslovakia if France should be so tied up by a war against
another State that it cannot ‘proceed’ against Germany.

“For the improvement of our military political position it must
be our first aim, in every case of entanglement by war, to
conquer Czechoslovakia and Austria, simultaneously, in order to
remove any threat from the flanks in case of a possible advance
Westwards. In the case of a conflict with France it would hardly
be necessary to assume that Czechoslovakia would declare war on
the same day as France. However, Czechoslovakia’s desire to
participate in the war will increase proportionally to the
degree to which we are being weakened. Its actual participation
could make itself felt by an attack on Silesia, either towards
the North or the West.

“Once Czechoslovakia is conquered—and a mutual frontier,
Germany-Hungary is obtained—then a neutral attitude by Poland
in a German-French conflict could more easily be relied upon.
Our agreements with Poland remain valid only as long as
Germany’s strength remains unshakeable; should Germany have any
setbacks then an attack by Poland against East Prussia, perhaps
also against Pomerania, and Silesia, must be taken into account.

“Assuming a development of the situation, which would lead to a
planned attack on our part in the years 1943 to ’45, then the
behaviour of France, England, Poland and Russia would probably
have to be judged in the following manner.

“The Fuehrer believes personally, that in all probability
England and perhaps also France, have already silently written
off Czechoslovakia, and that they have got used to the idea that
this question would one day be cleaned up by Germany. The
difficulties in the British Empire and the prospect of being
entangled in another long-drawn-out European War, were decisive
factors in the nonparticipation of England in a war against
Germany. The British attitude would certainly not remain without
influence on France’s attitude. An attack by France, without
British support, is hardly probable assuming that its offensive
would stagnate along our Western fortifications. Without
England’s support, it would also not be necessary to take into
consideration a march by France through Belgium and Holland, and
this would also not have to be reckoned with by us in case of a
conflict with France, as in every case it would have as a
consequence, the enmity of Great Britain. Naturally we should in
every case, have to bar our frontier during the operation of our
attacks against Czechoslovakia and Austria. It must be taken
into consideration here that Czechoslovakia’s defence measures
will increase in strength from year to year, and that a
consolidation of the inside values of the Austrian Army will
also be effected in the course of years. Although the population
of Czechoslovakia, in the first place is not a thin one, the
embodiment of Czechoslovakia and Austria would nevertheless
constitute the conquest of food for five to six million people,
on the basis that a compulsory emigration of two million from
Czechoslovakia, and of one million from Austria could be carried
out. The annexation of the two States to Germany, militarily and
politically, would constitute a considerable relief, owing to
shorter and better frontiers, the freeing of fighting personnel
for other purposes, and the possibility of reconstituting new
armies up to a strength of about twelve Divisions, representing
a new Division per one million population.

“No opposition to the removal of Czechoslovakia is expected on
the part of Italy; however, it cannot be judged today what would
be her attitude in the Austrian question, since it would depend
largely on whether the Duce were alive at the time or not.

“The measure and speed of our action would decide Poland’s
attitude. Poland will have little inclination to enter the war
against a victorious Germany, with Russia in the rear.

“Military participation by Russia must be countered by the speed
of our operations; it is a question whether this needs to be
taken into consideration at all, in view of Japan’s attitude.

“Should Case 2 occur—paralyzation of France by a Civil
War—then the situation should be utilized _at any time_ for
operations against Czechoslovakia, as Germany’s most dangerous
enemy would be eliminated.

“The Fuehrer sees Case 3 looming near; it could develop from the
existing tensions in the Mediterranean, and should it occur, he
has firmly decided to make use of it any time, perhaps even as
early as 1938.

“Following recent experiences in the course of events of the war
in Spain, the Fuehrer does not see an early end to hostilities
there. Taking into consideration the time required for past
offensives by Franco, a further three years duration of war is
within the bounds of possibility. On the other hand, from the
German point of view, a one hundred per cent victory by Franco
is not desirable; we are more interested in a continuation of
the war and preservation of the tensions in the Mediterranean.
Should Franco be in sole possession of the Spanish Peninsula, it
would mean the end of Italian intervention and the presence of
Italy on the Balearic Isles. As our interests are directed
towards continuing the war in Spain, it must be the task of our
future policy to strengthen Italy in her fight to hold on to the
Balearic Isles. However, a solidification of Italian positions
on the Balearic Isles can not be tolerated either by France or
by England and could lead to a war by France and England against
Italy, in which case Spain, if entirely in white [Franco’s]
hands, could participate on the side of Italy’s enemies. A
subjugation of Italy in such a war appears very unlikely.
Additional raw materials could be brought to Italy via Germany.
The Fuehrer believes that Italy’s military strategy would be to
remain on the defensive against France on the Western frontier
and carry out operations against France from Libya, against the
North African French colonial possessions.

“As a landing of French-British troops on the Italian coast can
be discounted, and as a French offensive via the Alps to Upper
Italy would be extremely difficult, and would probably stagnate
before the strong Italian fortifications, French lines of
communication by the Italian fleet will to a great extent
paralyze the transport of fighting personnel from North Africa
to France, so that at its frontiers with Italy and Germany,
France will have, at its disposal, solely the metropolitan
fighting forces.

“If Germany profits from this war by disposing of the
Czechoslovakian and the Austrian questions, the probability must
be assumed that England—being at war with Italy—would not
decide to commence operations against Germany. Without British
support, a warlike action by France against Germany is not to be
anticipated.

“The date of our attack on Czechoslovakia and Austria must be
made independent of the course of the Italian-French-English war
and would not be simultaneous with the commencement of military
operations by these three States. The Fuehrer was also not
thinking of military agreements with Italy, but in complete
independence and by exploiting this unique favorable
opportunity, he wishes to begin to carry out operations against
Czechoslovakia. The attack on Czechoslovakia would have to take
place with the speed of lightning [_blitzartig schnell_].

“Fieldmarshal von Blomberg and Generaloberst von Fritsch in
giving their estimate on the situation, repeatedly pointed out
that England and France must not appear as our enemies, and they
stated that the war with Italy would not bind the French Army to
such an extent that it would not be in a position to commence
operations on our Western frontier with superior forces.
Generaloberst von Fritsch estimated the French forces which
would presumably be employed on the Alpine frontier against
Italy to be in the region of twenty divisions, so that a strong
French superiority would still remain on our Western frontier.
The French would, according to German reasoning, attempt to
advance into the Rhineland. We should consider the lead which
France has got in mobilization, and quite apart from the very
small value of our then existing fortifications—which was
pointed out particularly by Generalfieldmarshal von
Blomberg—the four motorized divisions which had been laid down
for the West would be more or less incapable of movement. With
regard to our offensive in a Southeasterly direction,
Fieldmarshal von Blomberg drew special attention to the strength
of the Czechoslovakian fortifications, the building of which
had, assumed the character of a Maginot Line and which would
present extreme difficulties to our attack.

“Generaloberst von Fritsch mentioned that it was the purpose of
a study which he had laid on for this winter to investigate the
possibilities of carrying out operations against Czechoslovakia
with special consideration of the conquest of the
Czechoslovakian system of fortifications; the Generaloberst also
stated that owing to the prevailing conditions, he would have to
relinquish his leave abroad, which was to begin on the 10
November. This intention was countermanded by the Fuehrer, who
gave as a reason that the possibility of the conflict was not to
be regarded as being so imminent. In reply to statements by
Generalfieldmarshal von Blomberg and Generaloberst von Fritsch
regarding England and France’s attitude, the Fuehrer repeated
his previous statements and said that he was convinced of
Britain’s nonparticipation and that consequently he did not
believe in military action by France against Germany. Should the
Mediterranean conflict already mentioned, lead to a general
mobilization in Europe, then we should have to commence
operations against Czechoslovakia immediately. If, however, the
powers who are not participating in the war should declare their
disinterestedness, then Germany would, for the time being, have
to side with this attitude.

“In view of the information given by the Fuehrer, Generaloberst
Goering considered it imperative to think of a reduction or
abandonment of our military undertaking in Spain. The Fuehrer
agreed to this, insofar as he believed this decision should be
postponed for a suitable date.

“The second part of the discussion concerned material armament
questions.

“(Signed) Hossbach”. (_386-PS_)

The record of what happened thereafter is well-known to history. The Anschluss with Austria, under military pressure from the Nazis, occurred in March 1938. Pressure on Czechoslovakia resulted in the Munich Pact of September 1938. That Pact was violated, and Czechoslovakia invaded by Germany on 15 March 1939.

Another captured document, a file kept by Colonel Schmundt, Hitler’s adjutant, reveals the truth concerning the deliberateness of the aggressions against Czechoslovakia (_388-PS_). The file was found in a cellar of the Platterhof at Obersalzberg, near Berchtesgaden. It consists of a work-file of originals and duplicates, incidental to the preparations for the annexation of Czechoslovakia. The German title is “_Grundlagen zur Studie Gruen_”, (Basic Principles for “Case Green”), “Green” being a codeword for the aggression against Czechoslovakia. Item No. 2 in this file is dated 22 April 1938. It is a summary, prepared by Schmundt, the adjutant, of a discussion on 21 April 1938 between Hitler and Wilhelm Keitel. This item, like the other items in the file, relates to “Case Green”. This meeting occurred within approximately one month following the successful annexation of Austria. In the carrying out of the conspiracy, it became necessary to revise the “Plan Green”, to take into account changed conditions, as a result of the bloodless success against Austria. Item 2 reads:

“Berlin, 22 April 1938.

“Bases of the Dissertation on _Gruen_.

“Summary of discussion between Fuehrer and General Keitel of 21
April:

“A. Political Aspect.

“1. Strategic surprise attack out of a clear sky without any
cause or possibility of justification has been turned down. As
result would be: hostile world opinion which can lead to a
critical situation. Such a measure is justified only for the
elimination of the _last_ opponent on the mainland.

“2. Action after a time of diplomatic clashes, which gradually
come to a crisis and lead to war.

“3. Lightning-swift action as the result of an incident (for
example, assassination of German ambassador in connection with
an anti-German demonstration.)

“Military Conclusions.

“1. The preparations are to be made for the political
possibilities (2 and 3). Case 2 is the undesired one since
“_Gruen_” will have taken security measures.

“2. The loss of time caused by transporting the bulk of the
divisions by rail—which is unavailable, but should be cut down
as far as possible—must not impede a lightning-swift blow at
the time of the action.

“3. ‘Separate thrusts’ are to be carried out immediately with a
view to penetrating the enemy fortification lines at numerous
points and in a strategically favorable direction. The thrusts
are to be worked out to the smallest detail (knowledge of roads,
composition of the columns according to their individual tasks).
Simultaneous attacks by the Army and Air Force.

“The Air Force is to support the individual columns (for example
divebombers; sealing off installations at penetration points,
hampering the bringing up of reserves, destroying signal
communications traffic, thereby isolating the garrisons.)

“4. Politically, the first four days of military action are the
decisive ones. If there are no effective military successes, a
European crisis will certainly arise. Accomplished Facts must
prove the senselessness of foreign military intervention, draw
Allies into the scheme (division of spoils) and demoralize
‘_Gruen_.’

“Therefore: bridging the time gap between first penetration and
employment of the forces to be brought up, by a determined and
ruthless thrust by a motorized army. (e.g. via Pilsen, Prague.)

“5. If possible, separation of transport movement ‘_Rot_’ from
‘_Gruen_’. [‘_Rot_’ was the code name for their then plan
against the West.] A simultaneous strategic concentration
‘_Rot_’ can lead ‘_Rot_’ to undesired measures. On the other
hand, it must be possible to put ‘_Case Rot_’ into operation at
any time.

“C. Propaganda.

“1. Leaflets on the conduct of Germans in Czechoslovakia
(_Gruenland_.)

“2. Leaflets with threats for intimidation of the Czechs
(_Gruenen_).

[Initialled by Schmundt]” (_388-PS_)

Particular attention should be drawn to paragraph 3 of this document, under the heading “Political Aspect”, which reads as follows:

“Lightning-swift action as the result of an incident (example:
Assassination of German ambassador as an upshot of an
anti-German demonstration).” (_388-PS_)

The document as a whole establishes that the conspirators were planning the creation of an incident to justify to the world their own aggression against Czechoslovakia. It establishes that consideration was being given to assassinating the German ambassador at Prague to create the requisite incident.

C. _Formulation and Execution of the Plan to Invade Poland._

The next phase of the aggression was the formulation and execution of the plan to attack Poland, resulting in the initiation of aggressive war in September 1939. Here again the careful and meticulous record keeping of Hitler’s adjutant, Schmundt, has provided a document in his own handwriting which throws down the mask (_L-79_). The document consists of minutes of a conference held on 23 May 1939. The place of the conference was the Fuehrer’s Study in the New Reich Chancellery. Goering, Raeder and Keitel were present. The subject of the meeting was, “Indoctrination on the political situation and future aims.”

The authenticity and accuracy of Schmundt’s record of the meeting of 23 May 1939 has been admitted by Keitel in a pretrial interrogation. The minutes read as follows:

“Top Secret

“To be transmitted by officer only

“Minutes of a Conference on 23 May 39”

“Place: The Fuehrer’s Study, New Reich Chancellery.

“Adjutant on duty: Lt-Col. (G.S.) Schmundt.

“Present: The Fuehrer, Field-Marshal Goering, Grand-Admiral
Raeder, Col-Gen. von Brauchitsch, Col-Gen. Keitel, Col-Gen.
Milch, Gen. (of Artillery) Halder, Gen. Bodenschatz, Rear-Adml.
Schniewindt, Col. (G.S.) Jeschonnek, Col. (G.S.) Warlimont,
Lt-Col. (G.S.) Schmundt, Capt. Engel (Army), Lieut-Commd.
Albrecht, Capt. v. Below (Army).

“Subject: Indoctrination on the political situation and future
aims.

“The Fuehrer defined as the purpose of the conference:

“1. Analysis of the situation.

“2. Definition of the tasks for the Armed Forces arising from
the situation.

“3. Exposition of the consequences of those tasks.

“4. Ensuring the secrecy of all decisions and work resulting
from these consequences.

“Secrecy is the first essential for success.

“The Fuehrer’s observations are given in systematized form
below.

“Our present situation must be considered from two points of
view:

“1. The actual development of events between 1933 and 1939;

“2. The permanent and unchanging situation in which Germany
lies.

“In the period 1933-1939, progress was made in all fields.

Our military situation improved enormously.

“Our situation with regard to the rest of the world has remained
the same.

“Germany had dropped from the circle of Great Powers. The
balance of power had been effected without the participation of
Germany.

“This equilibrium is disturbed when Germany’s demands for the
necessities of life make themselves felt, and Germany re-emerges
as a Great Power. All demands are regarded as ‘Encroachments’.
The English are more afraid of dangers in the economic sphere
than of the simple threat of force.

“A mass of 80 million people has solved the ideological
problems. So, too, must the economic problems be solved. No
German can evade the creation of the necessary economic
conditions for this. The solution of the problems demands
courage. The principle, by which one evades solving the problem
by adapting oneself to circumstances, is inadmissible.
Circumstances must rather be adapted to aims. This is impossible
without invasion of foreign states or attacks upon foreign
property.

“Living space, in proportion to the magnitude of the state, is
the basis of all power. One may refuse for a time to face the
problem, but finally it is solved one way or the other. The
choice is between advancement or decline. In 15 or 20 years’
time we shall be compelled to find a solution. No German
statesman can evade the question longer than that.

“We are at present in a state of patriotic fervour, which is
shared by two other nations: Italy and Japan.

“The period which lies behind us has indeed been put to good
use. All measures have been taken in the correct sequence and in
harmony with our aims.

“After 6 years, the situation is today as follows:

“The national-political unity of the Germans has been achieved,
apart from minor exceptions. Further successes cannot be
attained without the shedding of blood.

“The demarcation of frontiers is of military importance.

“The Pole is no ‘supplementary enemy’. Poland will always be on
the side of our adversaries. In spite of treaties of friendship,
Poland has always had the secret intention of exploiting every
opportunity to do us harm.

“Danzig is not the subject of the dispute at all. It is a
question of expanding our living space in the East and of
securing our food supplies, of the settlement of the Baltic
problem. Food supplies can be expected only from thinly
populated areas. Over and above the natural fertility,
thorough-going German exploitation will enormously increase the
surplus.

“There is no other possibility for Europe.

“Colonies: Beware of gifts of colonial territory. This does not
solve the food problem. Remember—blockade.

“If fate brings us into conflict with the West, the possession
of extensive areas in the East will be advantageous. Upon record
harvests we shall be able to rely even less in time of war than
in peace.

“The population of non-German areas will perform no military
service, and will be available as a source of labour.

“The Polish problem is inseparable from conflict with the West.

“Poland’s internal power of resistance to Bolshevism is
doubtful. Thus Poland is of doubtful value as a barrier against
Russia.

“It is questionable whether military success in the West can be
achieved by a quick decision, questionable too is the attitude
of Poland.

“The Polish government will not resist pressure from Russia.
Poland sees danger in a German victory in the West, and will
attempt to rob us of the victory.

“There is therefore no question of sparing Poland, and we are
left with the decision:

“_To attack Poland at the first suitable opportunity._ [This
sentence is underscored in the original German text.]

“We cannot expect a repetition of the Czech affair. There will
be war. Our task is to isolate Poland. The success of the
isolation will be decisive.

“Therefore, the Fuehrer must reserve the right to give the final
order to attack. There must be no simultaneous conflict with the
Western Powers [France and England].

“If it is not certain that a German-Polish conflict will not
lead to war in the West, then the fight must be primarily
against England and France.

“Fundamentally therefore: Conflict with Poland—beginning with
an attack on Poland—will only be successful if the Western
Powers keep out of it. If this is impossible, then it will be
better to attack in the West and to settle Poland at the same
time.

“The isolation of Poland is a matter of skillful politics.

“Japan is a weighty problem. Even if at first for various
reasons her collaboration with us appears to be somewhat cool
and restricted, it is nevertheless in Japan’s own interest to
take the initiative in attacking Russia in good time.

“Economic relations with Russia are possible only if political
relations have improved. A cautious trend is apparent in Press
comment. It is not impossible that Russia will show herself to
be disinterested in the destruction of Poland. Should Russia
take steps to oppose us, our relations with Japan may become
closer.

“If there were an alliance of France, England and Russia against
Germany, Italy and Japan, I would be constrained to attack
England and France with a few annihilating blows. The Fuehrer
doubts the possibility of a peaceful settlement with England. We
must prepare ourselves for the conflict. England sees in our
development the foundation of a hegemony which would weaken
England. England is therefore our enemy, and the conflict with
England will be a life-and-death struggle.

“_What will this struggle be like?_ [This sentence is
underscored in the German original.]

“England cannot deal with Germany and subjugate us with a few
powerful blows. It is imperative for England that the war should
be brought as near to the Ruhr basin as possible. French blood
will not be spared (West Wall). The possession of the Ruhr basin
will determine the duration of our resistance.

“The Dutch and Belgium air bases will be occupied by armed
forces. Declarations of neutrality must be ignored. If England
and France intend the war between Germany and Poland to lead to
a conflict, they will support Holland and Belgium in their
neutrality and make them build fortifications in order finally
to force them into cooperation.

“Albeit under protest, Belgium and Holland will yield to
pressure.

“Therefore, if England intends to intervene in the Polish war,
we must occupy Holland with lightning speed. We must aim at
securing a new defense line on Dutch soil up to the Zuider Zee.

“The war with England and France will be a life-and-death
struggle.

“The idea that we can get off cheaply is dangerous; there is no
such possibility. We must burn our boats, and it is no longer a
question of justice or injustice, but of life or death for 80
million human beings.

“_Question: Short or long war?_

“Every country’s armed forces or government must aim at a short
war. The government, however, must also be prepared for a war of
10-15 years’ duration.

“History has always shown that the people have believed that
wars would be short. In 1914, the opinion still prevailed that
it was impossible to finance a long war. Even today this idea
still persists in many minds. But on the contrary, every state
will hold out as long as possible, unless it immediately suffers
some grave weakening (e.g. Ruhr basin). England has similar
weaknesses.

“England knows that to lose a war will mean the end of her world
power.

“_England_ is the driving force against Germany.

“Her strength lies in the following:

“1. The British themselves are proud, courageous, tenacious,
firm in resistance and gifted as organizers. They know how to
exploit every new development. They have the love of adventure
and bravery of the Nordic race. Quality is lowered by dispersal.
The German average is higher.

“2. World power in itself. It has been constant for 300 years.
Extended by the acquisition of allies, this power is not merely
something concrete, but must also be considered as a
psychological force embracing the entire world. Add to this
immeasurable wealth, with consequential financial credit.

“3. Geopolitical safety and protection by strong sea power and a
courageous air force.

“_England’s weakness_:

“If in the World War I we had had two battleships and two
cruisers more, and if the battle of Jutland had begun in the
morning, the British fleet would have been defeated and England
brought to her knees. It would have meant the end of this war.
It was formerly not sufficient to defeat the fleet. Landings had
to be made in order to defeat England. England could provide her
own food supplies. Today that is no longer possible.

“The moment England’s food supply routes are cut, she is forced
to capitulate. The import of food and fuel depends on the
fleet’s protection.

“If the German Air Force attacks English territory, England will
not be forced to capitulate in one day. But if the fleet is
destroyed immediate capitulation will be the result.

“There is no doubt that a surprise attack can lead to a quick
decision. It would be criminal, however, for the government to
rely entirely on the element of surprise.

“Experience has shown that surprise may be nullified by—

“1. Disclosure outside the limit of the military circles
concerned.

“2. Mere chance, which may cause the collapse of the whole
enterprise.

“3. Human failings.

“4. Weather conditions.

“The final date for striking must be fixed well in advance.
Beyond that time, the tension cannot be endured for long. It
must be borne in mind that weather conditions can render any
surprise intervention by Navy and Air Force impossible.

“This must be regarded as a most unfavorable basis of action.

“1. An effort must be made to deal the enemy a significant or
the final decisive blow right at the start. Consideration of
right and wrong or treaties do not enter into the matter. This
will only be possible if we are not involved in a war with
England on account of Poland.

“2. In addition to the surprise attack, preparation for a long
war must be made, while opportunities on the Continent for
England are eliminated.

“The Army will have to hold positions essential to the Navy and
Air Force. If Holland and Belgium are successfully occupied and
held, and if France is also defeated, the fundamental conditions
for a successful war against England will have been secured.

“England can then be blockaded from Western France at close
quarters by the Air Force, while the Navy with its submarines
extend the range of the blockade.

“_Consequences_:

“England will not be able to fight on the Continent:

“Daily attacks by the Air Force and Navy will cut all her
life-lines:

“Germany will not bleed to death on land.

“Such strategy has been shown to be necessary by World War I and
subsequent military operations. World War I is responsible for
the following strategic considerations which are imperative—

“1. With a more powerful Navy at the outbreak of the War, or a
wheeling movement by the Army towards the Channel ports, the end
would have been different.

“2. A country cannot be brought to defeat by an air force. It is
impossible to attack all objectives simultaneously, and the
lapse of time of a few minutes would evoke defense
counter-measures.

“3. The unrestricted use of all resources is essential.

“4. Once the Army, in cooperation with the Air Force and Navy,
has taken the most important positions, industrial production
will cease in flow in to the bottomless pit of the Army’s
battles, and can be diverted to benefit the Air Force and Navy.

“The Army must, therefore, be capable of taking these positions.
Systematic preparation must be made for the attack.

“Study to this end is of the utmost importance.

“The aim will always be to force England to her knees.

“A weapon will only be of decisive importance in winning
battles, so long as the enemy does not possess it.

“This applies to gas, submarines and the Air Force. It would be
true of the latter, for instance, as long as the English Fleet
had no available countermeasures; it will no longer be the case
in 1940 and 1941. Against Poland, for example, tanks will be
effective, as the Polish Army possesses no counter-measures.

“Where straightforward pressure is no longer considered to be
decisive, its place must be taken by the elements of surprise
and by masterly handling. * * *”

* * * * * *

“Purpose:

“1. Study of the entire problem.

“2. Study of the events.

“3. Study of the means needed.

“4. Study of the necessary training.

“Men with great powers of imagination and high technical
training must belong to the staff, as well as officers with
sober sceptic powers of understanding.

“Working principles:

“1. No one is to take part in this who does not have to know of
it.

“2. No one can find out more than he must know.

“3. When must the person in question know it at the very latest?
No one may know anything before it is necessary that he know it.

“On Goering’s question, the Fuehrer decided that:

“_a._ The armed forces determine what shall be built.

“_b._ In the shipbuilding program, nothing is to be changed.

“_c._ The armament programs are to be modeled on the years 1943
or 1944.

[Schmundt certified this text.]” (_L-79_)

These minutes demonstrate that the Nazi conspirators were proceeding in accordance with a plan. They demonstrate the cold-blooded premeditation of the assault on Poland. They demonstrate that the questions concerning Danzig, which the Nazis had agitated with Poland as a political pretext, were not true questions, but were false issues, issues agitated to conceal their motive of aggressive, expansion for food, and _Lebensraum_.

Just one week prior to the launching of the attack on Poland, Hitler made an address to his chief military commanders, at Obersalzberg, on 22 August 1939. [Three reports of this meeting are available: (_L-3_; _798-PS_; and _1014-PS_). The first of the three documents (_L-3_) was obtained through an American newspaperman, and purported to be original minutes of the Obersalzberg meeting, transmitted to the newspaperman by some other person. There was no proof of actual delivery to the intermediary by the person who took the notes. That document (_L-3_) therefore, merely served as an incentive to search for something better. The result was that two other documents (_798-PS_) and (_1014-PS_) were discovered in the OKW files at Flensberg. These two documents indicate that Hitler on that day made two speeches, one apparently in the morning and one in the afternoon. Comparison of those two documents with the first document (_L-3_) led to the conclusion that the first document was a slightly garbled merger of the two speeches, and therefore was not relied upon.]

On this day of 22 August 1939, Hitler addressed the supreme commanders of the three branches of the armed forces, as well as the commanding generals, (_Oberbefehlshabers_) as follows:

“I have called you together to give you a picture of the
political situation, in order that you may have insight into the
individual element on which I base my decision to act, and in
order to strengthen your confidence. After this, we will discuss
military details.

“It was clear to me that a conflict with Poland had to come
sooner or later. I had already made this decision in Spring.
[Apparently this referred to (_L-79_).] But I thought I would
first turn against the West in a few years, and only afterwards
against the East. But the sequence cannot be fixed. One cannot
close one’s eyes even before a threatening situation. I wanted
to establish an acceptable relationship with Poland, in order to
fight first against the West, but this plan which was agreeable
to me could not be executed, since essential points have
changed.

“It became clear to me that Poland would attack us, in case of a
conflict in the West.

“Poland wants access to the sea.

“The further development became obvious after the occupation of
the Memel region, and it became clear to me that under the
circumstances a conflict with Poland could arise at an
unopportune moment.

“I enumerate as reasons for this reflection, first of all, two
personal constitutions, my own personality, and that of
Mussolini. Essentially, it depends on me, my existence, because
of my political activity.

“Furthermore, the fact that probably no one will ever again have
the confidence of the whole German people as I do. There will
probably never again be a man in the future with more authority.
My existence is, therefore, a factor of great value. But I can
be eliminated at any time by a criminal or an idiot.

“The second personal factor is Il Duce. His existence is also
decisive. If something happens to him, Italy’s loyalty to the
alliance will no longer be certain. The basic attitude of the
Italian Court is against the Duce. Above all, the Court sees in
the expansion of the empire a burden. The Duce is the man with
the strongest nerves in Italy.

“The third factor, favorable for us is Franco. We can only ask
benevolent neutrality from Spain, but this depends on Franco’s
personality. He guarantees a certain uniformity and steadiness
of the present system in Spain. We must take into account the
fact that Spain does not as yet have a Fascist Party of our
internal unity.

“On the other side, a negative picture, as far as decisive
personalities are concerned. There is no outstanding personality
in England or France.

“For us it is easy to make decisions. We have nothing to lose:
we can only gain. Our economic situation is such, because of our
restrictions, that we cannot hold out more than a few years.
Goering can confirm this. We have no other choice; we must act.
Our opponents risk much and gain only little. England’s stake in
a war is unimaginably great. Our enemies have men who are below
average. No personalities, no masters, no men of action.

“Besides the personal factor, the political situation is
favorable for us; in the Mediterranean rivalry among Italy,
France, and England; in the Orient tension, which leads to the
alarming of the Mohammedan world.

“The English empire did not emerge from the last war
strengthened. From a maritime point of view, nothing was
achieved: Conflict between England and Ireland, the south
African Union became more independent, concessions had to be
made to India, England is in great danger, unhealthy industries.
A British statesman can look into the future only with concern.

“France’s position has also deteriorated, particularly in the
Mediterranean.

“Further favorable factors for us are these:

“Since Albania, there is an equilibrium of power in the Balkans.
Yugoslavia carries the germ of collapse because of her internal
situation.

“Rumania did not grow stronger. She is liable to attack and
vulnerable. She is threatened by Hungary and Bulgaria. Since
Kemal’s death, Turkey has been ruled by small minds, unsteady
weak men.

“All these fortunate circumstances will no longer prevail in two
to three years. No one knows how long I shall live. Therefore
conflict better now.

“The creation of Greater Germany was a great achievement
politically but militarily it was questionable, since it was
achieved through a bluff of the political leaders. It is
necessary to test the military, if at all possible, not by
general settlement, but by solving individual tasks.