Chapter LIII: Section I: of the report of this conference (1157-PS) deals with the (2)

Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page
│ │ │
│Charter of the International Military │ │
│ Tribunal, Article 6 (a) │ I │ 5
│ │ │
│International Military Tribunal, │ │
│ Indictment Number 1, Sections IV (F) │ │
│ 6; V. │ I │ 27, 29
│ ————— │ │
│Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │
│document indicates that the document was│ │
│received in evidence at the Nurnberg │ │
│trial. A double asterisk (**) before a │ │
│document number indicates that the │ │
│document was referred to during the │ │
│trial but was not formally received in │ │
│evidence, for the reason given in │ │
│parentheses following the description of│ │
│the document. The USA series number, │ │
│given in parentheses following the │ │
│description of the document, is the │ │
│official exhibit number assigned by the │ │
│court. │ │
│ ————— │ │
*444-PS │Original Directive No. 18 from Fuehrer’s│ │
│Headquarters signed by Hitler and │ │
│initialled by Jodl, 12 November 1940, │ │
│concerning plans for prosecution of war │ │
│in Mediterranean Area and occupation of │ │
│Greece. (GB 116) │ III │ 403
│ │ │
*446-PS │Top Secret Fuehrer Order No. 21 signed │ │
│by Hitler and initialled by Jodl, │ │
│Warlimont and Keitel, 18 December 1940, │ │
│concerning the Invasion of Russia (case │ │
│Barbarossa). (USA 31) │ III │ 407
│ │ │
*447-PS │Top Secret Operational Order to Order │ │
│No. 21, signed by Keitel, 13 March 1941,│ │
│concerning Directives for special areas.│ │
│(USA 135) │ III │ 409
│ │ │
*864-PS │Top Secret Note, 20 October 1939, on │ │
│conference between Hitler and Chief OKW │ │
│concerning future relations of Poland to│ │
│Germany, 17 October 1939. (USA 609) │ III │ 619
│ │ │
*865-PS │Correspondence between Keitel, Rosenberg│ │
│and Lammers, April 1941, concerning │ │
│appointment of Jodl and Warlimont as OKW│ │
│representatives with Rosenberg. (USA │ │
│143) │ III │ 621
│ │ │
*872-PS │Memorandum of Discussion between the │ │
│Fuehrer and the OKW, concerning case │ │
│“Barbarossa” and “Sonnenblume” (African │ │
│operation). (USA 134) │ III │ 626
│ │ │
*873-PS │Top secret memorandum of discussion with│ │
│the Chief “L”, 30 April 1941, about the │ │
│invasion of Russia. (USA 137) │ III │ 633
│ │ │
874-PS │Draft letter to Todt, initialled K, J, │ │
│and W, 9 March 1941, concerning │ │
│Deception measures. │ III │ 634
│ │ │
876-PS │Letter from Keitel, 12 May 1941, │ │
│concerning Deception of the enemy. │ III │ 635
│ │ │
886-PS │Fuehrer decree, 13 May 1941, on │ │
│courts-martial and treatment of enemy │ │
│civilians in the district “Barbarossa”, │ │
│signed by Keitel for Hitler, and │ │
│initialled by Jodl. │ III │ 637
│ │ │
*1017-PS │Memorandum entitled “Memorial No. 1 │ │
│regarding USSR”, 2 April 1941, found in │ │
│Rosenberg’s “Russia File”. (USA 142) │ III │ 674
│ │ │
*1019-PS │Appendix to Memorandum No. 2. │ │
│Recommendation as to the personnel for │ │
│the Reich Commissariats in the East and │ │
│for the Political Central Office in │ │
│Berlin, 7 April 1941. (USA 823) │ III │ 681
│ │ │
*1029-PS │Paper entitled “Instructions for a Reich│ │
│Commissar in the Baltic States”, 8 May │ │
│1941, found in Rosenberg’s “Russia │ │
│File”. (USA 145) │ III │ 690
│ │ │
*1030-PS │General instructions for all Reich │ │
│Commissars in the Occupied Eastern │ │
│Territories, 8 May 1941, found in │ │
│Rosenberg file. (USA 144) │ III │ 692
│ │ │
1034-PS │Minutes of discussion concerning │ │
│Construction and Administration, 22 June│ │
│1941. │ III │ 693
│ │ │
*1039-PS │Report concerning preparatory work │ │
│regarding problems in Eastern │ │
│Territories, 28 June 1941, found in │ │
│Rosenberg’s “Russia File”. (USA 146) │ III │ 695
│ │ │
*1058-PS │Excerpt from a speech, 20 June 1941, by │ │
│Rosenberg before people most intimately │ │
│concerned with Eastern Problem, found in│ │
│his “Russia File”. (USA 147) │ III │ 716
│ │ │
1156-PS │Report to Goering from Chief of Office │ │
│for War Mobilization of Economy, 19 │ │
│March 1941. │ III │ 808
│ │ │
*1157-PS │Report on conference, 29 April 1941, │ │
│concerning top secret plan for Economic │ │
│exploitation of Soviet Areas (Oldenburg │ │
│Plan). (USA 141) │ III │ 811
│ │ │
*1229-PS │OKW Directive to the German Intelligence│ │
│Service in the East, signed by Jodl, 6 │ │
│September 1940. (USA 130) │ III │ 849
│ │ │
1316-PS │Top secret note for files on conference │ │
│of 21 March 1941 concerning employment │ │
│of Quartermaster General. │ III │ 908
│ │ │
*1317-PS │Top secret notes taken by Hamann of a │ │
│discussion of the economic exploitation │ │
│of Russia, presided over by General │ │
│Thomas, 28 February 1941. (USA 140) │ III │ 911
│ │ │
*1456-PS │Thomas memorandum 20 June 1941; Keitel │ │
│consulted about resources of USSR. (USA │ │
│148) │ IV │ 21
│ │ │
*1517-PS │Memorandum from Rosenberg concerning │ │
│discussion with the Fuehrer, 14 December│ │
│1941. (USA 824) │ IV │ 55
│ │ │
*1799-PS │Annex 1 to report of Chief of General │ │
│Staff of the Army, 5 December 1940, │ │
│concerning planned operation in the │ │
│East. (USA 131) │ IV │ 374
│ │ │
*1834-PS │Report on conference between Ribbentrop │ │
│and Oshima, 23 February 1941. (USA 129) │ IV │ 469
│ │ │
*2353-PS │Extracts from General Thomas’ Basic │ │
│Facts for History of German War and │ │
│Armament Economy. (USA 35) │ IV │ 1071
│ │ │
*2718-PS │Memorandum “About the result of today’s │ │
│discussion with State Secretaries about │ │
│Barbarossa”, 2 May 1941. (USA 32) │ V │ 378
│ │ │
3014-PS │Affidavit of General Ernst Koestring, │ │
│former German military attache in │ │
│Moscow, concerning planning for the │ │
│attack on the USSR in early August 1940.│ V │ 734
│ │ │
3031-PS │Affidavit of General Warlimont, 21 │ │
│November 1945, stating that first │ │
│directive for campaign against USSR was │ │
│issued in August 1940. │ V │ 740
│ │ │
3032-PS │Affidavit of General Walter Warlimont, │ │
│21 November 1945, stating that the │ │
│projected campaign against USSR was │ │
│first made known to him at conference │ │
│with Jodl, 29 July 1940. │ V │ 741
│ │ │
*3054-PS │“The Nazi Plan”, script of a motion │ │
│picture composed of captured German │ │
│film. (USA 167) │ V │ 801
│ │ │
3579-PS │Memorandum, signed Schnurre, on the │ │
│status of deliveries under │ │
│German-Russian economic agreement, 28 │ │
│September 1940. │ VI │ 276
│ │ │
*C-33 │Entries in Naval War Diary, concerning │ │
│operation “Barbarossa” and “Marita”. │ │
│(USA 133) │ VI │ 846
│ │ │
*C-35 │Entry in Naval War Diary, January 1941, │ │
│p. 401. (USA 132) │ VI │ 852
│ │ │
C-37 │References to operation “Barbarossa” in │ │
│the German Naval War Diary, June 1941. │ VI │ 854
│ │ │
*C-38 │Letter, 13 June 1941, requesting │ │
│decision on action against enemy │ │
│submarines and Order to attack Soviet │ │
│submarines, 15 June 1941. (GB 223) │ VI │ 855
│ │ │
*C-39 │Timetable for Barbarossa, approved by │ │
│Hitler and signed by Keitel. (USA 138) │ VI │ 857
│ │ │
*C-50 │Covering letters and Order of 13 May │ │
│1941, signed by Keitel on ruthless │ │
│treatment of civilians in the USSR for │ │
│offenses committed by them. (USA 554; GB│ │
│162) │ VI │ 871
│ │ │
C-51 │Order signed by Keitel, 27 July 1941, │ │
│for destruction of all copies of Order │ │
│of 13 May 1941 (document C-50) without │ │
│affecting its validity. │ VI │ 875
│ │ │
C-53 │Order signed by Keitel, 20 September │ │
│1940, concerning Military Missions to │ │
│Rumania. │ VI │ 877
│ │ │
C-54 │Fuehrer Order, 23 May 1941, concerning │ │
│military activities in Rumania. │ VI │ 877
│ │ │
*C-77 │Memorandum from Chief of High Command to│ │
│Navy High Command, 18 May 1941. (GB 146)│ VI │ 908
│ │ │
*C-78 │Schmundt’s Order of 9 June 1941, │ │
│convening conference on Barbarossa on 14│ │
│June. (USA 139) │ VI │ 909
│ │ │
C-150 │Letter from Hitler to General Antonescu,│ │
│18 June 1941. │ VI │ 963
│ │ │
*C-170 │File of Russo-German relations found in │ │
│OKM files covering period 25 August 1939│ │
│to 22 June 1941. (USA 136) │ VI │ 977
│ │ │
*L-172 │“The Strategic Position at the Beginning│ │
│of the 5th Year of War”, a lecture │ │
│delivered by Jodl on 7 November 1943 at │ │
│Munich to Reich and Gauleiters. (USA 34)│ VII │ 920
│ │ │
*TC-25 │Non-aggression Treaty between Germany │ │
│and USSR and announcement of 25 │ │
│September 1939 relating to it. (GB 145) │ VIII │ 375
│ │ │
Statement XIV │Hungarian Relations with Germany Before │ │
│and During the War by Nicholas Horthy, │ │
│Jr., Nurnberg, 22 February 1946. │ VIII │ 756
│ │ │
Statement XV │Why Hungary Went to War Against the │ │
│Soviet Union by Nicholas Horthy, Jr., │ │
│Nurnberg, 3 May 1946. │ VIII │ 767

13. COLLABORATION WITH ITALY AND JAPAN AND
AGGRESSIVE WAR AGAINST THE UNITED STATES:
NOVEMBER 1936 TO DECEMBER 1941

In the course of two years, the swastika had been carried forward by force of arms from a tightly controlled and remilitarized Germany to the four corners of Europe. The conspirators then projected the Nazi plan upon a universal screen, involving the old World of Asia and the New World of the United States of America. As a result, the wars of aggression that were planned in Berlin and launched across the frontiers of Poland ended some six years later, almost to the day, in surrender ceremonies aboard a United States battleship riding at anchor in the Bay of Tokyo.

A. _Formal German—Japanese—Italian Alliances._

The first formal alliance between Hitler’s Germany and the Japanese Government was the Anti-Comintern Pact signed in Berlin on 25 November 1936 (_2508-PS_). This agreement, on its face, was directed against the activities of the Communist International. It was subsequently adhered to by Italy on 6 November 1937 (_2506-PS_).

It is an interesting fact—especially in light of the evidence to be presented regarding Ribbentrop’s active participation in collaboration with the Japanese—that Ribbentrop signed the Anti-Comintern Pact for Germany, at Berlin, even though at that time, November 1936, Ribbentrop was not the German Foreign Minister, but simply Hitler’s Special Ambassador Plenipotentiary.

On 27 September 1940, some four years after the Anti-Comintern Pact was signed and one year after the initiation of war in Europe, the German, Italian, and Japanese Governments signed another pact at Berlin—a ten-year military-economic alliance (_2643-PS_). Again Ribbentrop signed for Germany, this time in his capacity as Foreign Minister: This Tripartite Pact pledged Germany, Italy, and Japan to support of, and collaboration with each other in the establishment of a “new order” in Europe and East Asia. The agreement stated, in part:

“The Governments of Germany, Italy, and Japan consider it as a
condition precedent of a lasting peace, that each nation of the
world be given its own proper place. They have therefore decided
to stand together and to cooperate with one another in their
efforts in Greater East Asia and in the regions of Europe,
wherein it is their prime purpose to establish and maintain a
new order of things calculated to promote the prosperity and
welfare of the peoples there. Furthermore, it is the desire of
the three Governments to extend this cooperation to such nations
in other parts of the world as are inclined to give to their
endeavors a direction similar to their own, in order that their
aspirations towards world peace as the ultimate goal may thus be
realized. Accordingly, the Governments of Germany, Italy, and
Japan have agreed as follows:

“Article 1: Japan recognizes and respects the leadership of
Germany and Italy in the establishment of a new order in Europe.

“Article 2: Germany and Italy recognize and respect the
leadership of Japan in the establishment of a new order in
Greater East Asia.

“Article 3: Germany, Italy, and Japan agree to cooperate in
their efforts on the aforesaid basis. They further undertake to
assist one another with all political, economic and military
means, if one of the three Contracting Parties is attacked by a
Power at present not involved in the European war or in the
Chinese-Japanese conflict.”

* * * * * *

“Article 6: The present Pact shall come into force immediately
upon signature and shall remain in force for ten years from the
date of its coming into force.” (_2643-PS_)

The Tripartite Pact of 27 September 1940 thus was a bold announcement to the world that the leaders of Germany, Japan, and Italy had cemented a full military alliance to achieve world domination and to establish the “new order” presaged by the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931, the Italian conquest of Ethiopia in 1935, and the Nazi overflow into Austria early in 1938.

A statement by Cordell Hull, Secretary of State of the United States at the time of the signing of the Tripartite Pact, is relevant in this connection. Mr. Hull declared:

“The reported agreement of alliance does not, in the view of the
Government of the United States, substantially alter a situation
which has existed for several years. Announcement of the
alliance merely makes clear to all a relationship which has long
existed in effect and to which this Government has repeatedly
called attention. That such an agreement has been in process of
conclusion has been well known for some time, and that fact has
been fully taken into account by the Government of United States
in the determining of this country’s policies.” (_2944-PS_)

No attempt is made here to trace the relationships and negotiations leading up to the Tripartite Pact of 27 November 1940. Nevertheless, one example of the type of German-Japanese relationship existing before the formalization of the Tripartite Pact is noteworthy—the record of a conversation of 31 January 1939 between Himmler and General Oshima, Japanese Ambassador at Berlin. This record, which is signed by Himmler in crayon, reads:

“_File Memorandum_

“Today I visited General Oshima. The conversation ranged over
the following subjects:

“1. The Fuehrer speech, which pleased him very much, especially
because it had been spiritually warranted in all its features.

“2. We discussed conclusion of a treaty to consolidate the
triangle Germany/Italy/Japan into an even firmer mold. He also
told me that, together with German counter-espionage (_Abwehr_),
he was undertaking long-range projects aimed at the
disintegration of Russia and emanating from the Caucasus and the
Ukraine. However, this organization was to become effective only
in case of war.

“3. Furthermore he had succeeded up to now to send 10 Russians
with bombs across the Caucasian frontier. These Russians had the
mission to kill Stalin. A number of additional Russians, whom he
had also sent across, had been shot at the frontier.”
(_2195-PS_)

B. _Nazi Encouragement of Aggression by Japan_

The Nazi conspirators, once their military and economic alliance with Japan had been formalized, exhorted the Japanese to aggression against those nations with whom they were at war and against those with whom they contemplated war. In this the Nazi conspirators pursued a course strikingly parallel to that followed in their relationship with the other member of the European Axis. On 10 June 1940, in fulfillment of her alliance with Germany, Italy had carried out her “stab in the back” by declaring war against France and Great Britain. The Nazi conspirators set about to induce similar action by Japan on the other side of the world.

The nations against whom the German-Japanese collaboration was aimed, at various times, were the British Commonwealth of Nations, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the United States of America.

(1) _Exhortations to Attack the British Commonwealth._ At least as early as 23 February 1941 the Nazi conspirators undertook to exploit their alliance with Japan by exhortations to commit aggression against the British Commonwealth. Again the figure of Ribbentrop appears. On that date, 23 February 1941, he held a conference with General Oshima, the Japanese Ambassador to Berlin, at which he urged that the Japanese open hostilities against the British in the Far East as soon as possible. (_1834-PS_)

As can be seen on the cover page of the English translation of the report of that conference, Ribbentrop on 2 March sent copies of an extract of the record of this conference to his various ambassadors and ministers for their “strictly confidential and purely personal information,” with the further note that “these statements are of fundamental significance for orientation in the general political situation facing Germany in early Spring 1941.” The report stated, in part:

“Strictly secret
“Extract

“from the report of the conference of the Reich Foreign Minister
with Ambassador Oshima in Fuschl on 13 February 1941.”

* * * * * *

“After particularly cordial mutual greetings, the RAM [Reich
Foreign Minister] declared that Ambassador Oshima had been
proved right in the policy he had pursued regarding Germany in
the face of the many doubters in Japan. By Germany’s victory in
the west these policies had been fully vindicated. He [the RAM]
regretted that the alliance between Germany and Japan, for which
he had been working with the Ambassador for many years already,
had come into being only after various detours, but public
opinion in Japan had not been ripe for it earlier. The main
thing was, however, that they are together now.

“* * * Now the _German-Japanese alliance_ has been concluded.
Ambassador Oshima is the man who gets credit for it from the
Japanese side. After conclusion of the alliance the question of
its further _development_ now stands in the foreground. How is
the situation in this respect? (_1834-PS_)

Ribbentrop subsequently proceeded to shape the argument for Japanese intervention against the British. First outlining the intended air and U-boat warfare against England, he said:

“* * * Thereby England’s situation would take catastrophic shape
overnight. The landing in England is prepared; its execution,
however, depends on various factors, above all on weather
conditions.”

* * * * * *

“The Fuehrer would beat England wherever he would encounter her.
Besides our strength is not only equal, but superior to a
combined English-American air force at any time. The number of
pilots at our disposal was unlimited. The same was true for our
airplane production capacity. As far as quality is concerned
ours was always superior to the English (to say nothing about
the American) and we were on the way even to enlarge this lead.
On order of the Fuehrer the antiaircraft defense too would be
greatly reinforced. Since the army had been supplied far beyond
its requirements, and enormous reserves had been piled up (the
ammunitions plants have been slowed down because of the immense
stock of material), production would now be concentrated on
submarines, airplanes and antiaircraft guns.

“Every eventuality had been provided for; the war has been won
today militarily, economically and politically. We had the
desire to end the war quickly and to force England to sue for
peace soon. The Fuehrer was vigorous and healthy, fully
convinced of victory and determined to bring the war to a quick
and victorious end. To this end the cooperation with Japan was
of importance. However, Japan in its own interest, should come
in as soon as possible. This would destroy England’s key
position in the Far East. Japan, on the other hand, would thus
secure its position in the Far East, a position which it could
acquire only through war. There were three reasons for quick
action:

“1. Intervention by Japan would mean a decisive blow against the
center of the British Empire (threat to India, cruiser-warfare,
etc.) The effect upon the morale of the British people would be
very serious and this would contribute toward a quick ending of
the war.

“2. A surprising intervention by Japan was bound to keep America
out of the war. America, which at present is not armed as yet
and would hesitate greatly to expose her Navy to any risks West
of Hawaii, could do this even less so in such a case. If Japan
would otherwise respect the American interests, there would not
even be the possibility for Roosevelt to use the argument of
lost prestige to make war plausible to the Americans. It was
very unlikely that America would declare war if it then would
have to stand by helplessly while Japan takes the Philippines
without America being able to do anything about it.

“3. In view of the coming new world order it seems to be in the
interest of Japan also to secure for herself already during the
war the position she wants to hold in the Far East at the time
of a peace treaty. Ambassador Oshima agreed with me entirely and
said that he would do everything to carry through this policy.”
(_1834-PS_)

The subtlety of Ribbentrop’s argument is noteworthy. First he told the Japanese Ambassador that Germany had already practically won the war by herself. Nevertheless, he suggested that the war could be successfully terminated more quickly with Japan’s aid and that the moment was propitious for Japan’s entry. Then, referring to the spoils of conquest, he indicated that Japan would be best advised to pick up by herself during the war the positions she wanted, implying that she would have to earn her share of the booty.

The remainder of Ribbentrop’s argument shows something of the real nature of the German-Japanese alliance:

“The Reich Foreign Minister continued by saying that it was
Japan’s friendship which had enabled Germany to arm after the
Anti-Comintern Pact was concluded. On the other hand, Japan had
been able to penetrate deeply into the English sphere of
interest in China. Germany’s victory on the continent has
brought now, after the conclusion of the Three Power Pact, great
advantages for Japan. France, as a power, was eliminated in the
Far East (Indo-China). England too was considerably weakened;
Japan had been able to close in steadily on Singapore. Thus,
Germany had already contributed enormously to the shaping of the
future fate of the two nations. Due to our geographical
situation we should have to carry the main burden of the final
battle in the future, too. If an unwanted conflict with Russia
should arise we should have to carry the main burden also in
this case. If Germany should ever weaken Japan would find itself
confronted by a world-coalition within a short time. We were all
in the same boat. The fate of both nations was being determined
now for centuries to come. The same was true for Italy. The
interests of the three countries would never intersect. A defeat
of Germany would also mean the end of the Japanese imperialistic
idea. “Ambassador Oshima definitely agreed with these statements
and emphasized the fact that Japan was determined to keep its
imperial position. The Reich Foreign Minister then discussed the
great problems which would arise after the war for the parties
of the Three Power Pact from the shaping of a new order in
Europe and East Asia. The problems arising then would require a
bold solution. Thereby no overcentralization should take place,
but a solution should be found on a basis of parity,
particularly in the economic realm. In regard to this the Reich
Foreign Minister advanced the principle that a free exchange of
trade should take place between the two spheres of interest on a
liberal basis. The European-African hemisphere under the
leadership of Germany and Italy, and the East-Asian sphere of
interest under the leadership of Japan. As he conceived it, for
example, Japan would conduct trade and make trade agreements
directly with the independent states in the European hemisphere,
as heretofore, while Germany and Italy would trade directly and
make trade agreements with the independent countries within the
Japanese orbit of power, such as China, Thailand, Indochina,
etc. Furthermore, as between the two economic spheres, each
should fundamentally grant the other preferences with regard to
third parties. The Ambassador expressed agreement with this
thought.” (_1834-PS_)

The instigation to war by Ribbentrop, the German Foreign Minister, is clear. The participation of the German military representatives in the encouragement and provocation of wars of aggression is shown in a Top Secret order signed by Keitel as Chief of the OKW and entitled “Basic Order No. 24 Regarding Collaboration with Japan” (_C-75_). It is dated 5 March 1941, about a week and a half after Ribbentrop’s conference with Oshima, just discussed. It was distributed in 14 copies to the highest commands of the Army, Navy, and Air Force as well as to the Foreign Office. Two copies of this order, identical except for handwritten notations presumably made by the recipients, were turned up by the prosecution. Document _C-75_ is Copy No. 2 of the order, distributed to the Naval War Staff of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy (the OKM). Copy No. 4, designed for the _Wehrmacht Fuehrungsstab_—the Operations Staff of the High Command of the Armed Forces—was found in the OKW files at Flensburg. The head of this Operations Staff was Jodl.

Basic Order No. 24 was the authoritative Nazi policy on collaboration with Japan (_C-75_). It reads:

“TOP SECRET
“Only by Officer

“Armed Forces High Command (OKW)

Joint Operations Staff, Branch L (I Op.)

No. 44 282/41 Top Secret

“Fuehrer’s Headquarters
5 March 1941
[Various handwritten notations and stamps]
“14 copies
“2nd copy
“Basic Order No. 24
regarding collaboration with Japan

“The Fuehrer has issued the following order regarding
collaboration with Japan:

“1. It must be the _aim_ of the collaboration based on the Three
Power Pact to induce Japan as soon as possible _to take active
measures in the Far East_. Strong British forces will thereby be
tied down, and the center of gravity of the interests of the
United States of America will be diverted to the Pacific.

“The sooner it intervenes, the greater will be the prospects of
success for Japan in view of the still undeveloped preparedness
for war on the part of its adversaries. The “Barbarossa”
operation will create particularly favorable political and
military prerequisites for this. [Marginal note—“slightly
exaggerated”]

“2. _To prepare the way_ for the collaboration it is essential
to strengthen the _Japanese military potential_ with all means
available.

“For this purpose the High Commands of the branches of the Armed
Forces will comply in a comprehensive and generous manner with
Japanese desires for information regarding German war and combat
experience and for assistance in military economics and in
technical matters. Reciprocity is desirable but this factor
should not stand in the way of negotiations. Priority should
naturally be given to those Japanese requests which would have
the most immediate application in waging war.

“In special cases the Fuehrer reserves the decisions to himself.

“3. The _harmonizing of the operational plans of the two
parties_ is the responsibility of the Navy High Command.

“This will be subject to the following guiding principles:

“_a._ The _common aim_ of the conduct of war is to be stressed
as forcing England to the ground quickly and thereby keeping the
United States out of the war. Beyond this Germany has no
political, military, or economic interests in the Far East which
would give occasion for any reservations with regard to Japanese
intentions.

“_b._ The great successes achieved by Germany in _mercantile
warfare_ make it appear particularly suitable to employ strong
Japanese forces for the same purpose. In this connection every
opportunity to support German mercantile warfare must be
exploited.

“_c._ The _raw material situation_ of the _pact powers_ demands
that Japan should acquire possession of those territories which
it needs for the continuation of the war, especially if the
United States intervenes. Rubber shipments must be carried out
even after the entry of Japan into the war, since they are of
vital importance to Germany.

“_d._ The _seizure of Singapore_ as the key British position in
the Far East would mean a decisive success for the entire
conduct of war of the Three Powers.

“In addition, attacks on other systems of bases of British naval
power—extending to those of American naval power only if the
entry of the United States into the war cannot be
prevented—will result in weakening the enemy’s system of power
in that region and also, just like the attack on sea
communications, in tying down substantial forces of all kinds
(Australia).

“A date for the beginning of operational discussions cannot yet
be fixed.

“4. In the _military commissions_ to be formed in accordance
with the _Three Power Pact_, only such questions are to be dealt
with as equally concern the _three_ participating powers. These
will include primarily the problems of _economic warfare_.

“The working out of the details is the responsibility of the
“Main Commission” with the cooperation of the Armed Forces High
Command.

“5. The Japanese must not be given any intimation of the
Barbarossa operation.

“The Chief of the Armed Forces High Command

“Signed in draft: Keitel

“Correctness certified by
JUNGE
Lieutenant Commander” (_C-75_)

It appears from this document that the Nazi conspirators’ cardinal operational principle in their collaboration with Japan was, as early as March 1941, the inducement of Japan to aggression against Singapore and other British Far Eastern bases.

A meeting was held on 18 March 1941, about two weeks after the issuance of Basic Order No. 24 (_C-75_) and was attended by Hitler, Raeder, Keitel, and Jodl. The top secret record of this meeting discloses that Raeder, then Commander in Chief of the Navy, made the following calculations:

“Japan must take steps to seize Singapore as soon as possible,
since the opportunity will never again be as favourable (whole
English Fleet contained; unpreparedness of U. S. A. for war
against Japan; inferiority of U. S. Fleet vis-à-vis the
Japanese). Japan is indeed making preparations for this action,
but according to all declarations made by Japanese officers she
will only carry it out if Germany proceeds to land in England.
Germany must therefore concentrate all her efforts on spurring
Japan to act immediately. If Japan has Singapore all other East
Asiatic questions regarding the U. S. A. and England are thereby
solved (Guam, Philippines, Borneo, Dutch East Indies).

“Japan wishes if possible to avoid war against U. S. A. She can
do so if she determinedly takes Singapore as soon as possible.”
(_C-152_)

The fact clearly appears from these minutes that military staff conferences had already been held with the Japanese to discuss the activation of Japanese military support against the British and to urge their immediate attack on Singapore. Another passage in the record of this meeting establishes this:

“Japan is indeed making preparations for this action, but
according to all declarations made by Japanese officers she will
only carry it out if Germany proceeds to land in England.”
(_C-152_)

Apparently the Nazis were subsequently able to persuade the Japanese to eliminate this condition precedent to their performance under the contract.

Meanwhile, Ribbentrop continued to make further efforts to induce the Japanese to aggression against the British Commonwealth. On 29 March 1941, he met with the Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka, who was then in Berlin. The following is a report of their conversations, found in the German Foreign Office Archives:

“REPORT ON THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE REICH MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (RAM) AND THE JAPANESE FOREIGN MINISTER MATSUOKA IN BERLIN ON 29 MARCH 1941.

“The RAM resumed the preceding conversation with Matsuoka about
the latter’s impending talks with the Russians in Moscow, where
they had left off. He expressed the opinion, that it would
probably be best, in view of the whole situation, not to carry
the discussions with the Russians too far. He did not know how
the situation would develop. One thing, however, was certain,
namely, that Germany would strike immediately, should Russia
ever attack Japan. He was ready to give Matsuoka this positive
assurance, so that Japan could push forward to the South on
Singapore, without fear of possible complications with Russia.
The largest part of the German army was anyway on the Eastern
frontiers of the Reich, and fully prepared to open the attack at
any time. He (the RAM), however, believed that Russia would try
to avoid development leading to war. Should Germany however
enter into a conflict with Russia, the USSR would be finished
off within a few months. In this case, Japan had of course even
less reason to be afraid than ever, if it wants to advance on
Singapore. Consequently, it need not refrain from such an
undertaking because of possible fears of Russia.

“He could not know of course, just how things with Russia would
develop. It was uncertain whether or not Stalin would intensify
his present unfriendly policy against Germany. He (the RAM)
wanted to point out to Matsuoka, in any case, that a conflict
with Russia was anyhow within the realm of possibility. In any
case, Matsuoka could not report to the Japanese Emperor upon his
return, that a conflict between Russia and Germany was
impossible. On the contrary, the situation was such, that such a
conflict, even if it were not probable, would have to be
considered possible.”

* * * * * *

“Next, the RAM turned again to the Singapore question. In view
of the fears expressed by the Japanese of possible attacks by
submarines, based on the Philippines, and of the intervention of
the British Mediterranean and Home fleets, he had again
discussed the situation with General-Admiral Raeder. The latter
had stated that the British Navy during this year would have its
hands so full in the English home waters and in the
Mediterranean, that it would not be able to send even a single
ship to the Far East. General-Admiral Raeder had described the
U. S. submarines as so bad that Japan need not bother about them
at all.

“Matsuoka replied immediately that the Japanese Navy had a very
low estimate of the threat from the British Navy; it also held
the view that, in case of a clash with the American Navy, it
would be able to smash the latter without trouble. However it
was afraid that the Americans would not take up the battle with
their fleet; thus the conflict with the United States might
perhaps be dragged out to five years. This possibility caused
considerable worry in Japan.

“The RAM replied that America could not do anything against
Japan in the case of the capture of Singapore. Perhaps for this
reason alone, Roosevelt would think twice before deciding on
active measures against Japan. For while on one hand he could
not achieve anything against Japan, on the other hand there was
the probability of losing the Philippines to Japan; for the
American president, of course, this would mean a considerable
loss of prestige, and because of the inadequate rearmament, he
would have nothing to offset such a loss.

“In this connection, Matsuoka pointed out, that he was doing
everything to reassure the English about Singapore. He acted as
if Japan had no intention at all regarding this key position of
England in the East. Therefore it might be possible that his
attitude toward the British would appear to be friendly in words
and in acts. However, Germany should not be deceived by that. He
assumed this attitude not only in order to reassure the British,
but also in order to fool the pro-British and pro-American
elements so long, until one day he would suddenly open the
attack on Singapore.

“In this connection, Matsuoka stated that his tactics were based
on the certain assumption that the sudden attack against
Singapore would unite the entire Japanese nation with one blow.
(“Nothing succeeds like success,” the RAM remarked.) He followed
here the example of the words of a famous Japanese statesman,
addressed to the Japanese Navy at the outbreak of the
Russo-Japanese war: “You open fire, then the nation will be
united.” The Japanese need to be shaken up to awaken. After all,
as an Oriental, he believed in fate, which would come, whether
you wanted it or not.”

* * * * * *

“Matsuoka then introduced the subject of German assistance in
the blow against Singapore, a subject which had been broached to
him frequently, and mentioned the proposal of a German written
promise of assistance.

“The RAM replied that he had already discussed these questions
with Ambassador Oshima. He had asked him to procure maps of
Singapore in order that the Fuehrer—who probably must be
considered the greatest expert on military questions at the
present time—could advise Japan on the best method of attack
against Singapore. German experts on aerial warfare, too, would
be at her disposal; they could draw up a report, based on their
European experiences, for the Japanese on the use of divebombers
from airfields in the vicinity against the British fleet in
Singapore. Thus the British fleet would be forced to disappear
from Singapore immediately.

“Matsuoka remarked that Japan was less concerned with the
British fleet, than with the capture of the fortifications.

“The RAM replied that here, too, the Fuehrer had developed new
methods for the German attacks on strongly fortified positions,
such as the Maginot Line and Fort Eben-Emael, which he could
make available to the Japanese.

“Matsuoka replied in this connection that some of the younger,
expert Japanese naval officers, who were close friends of his,
were of the opinion that the Japanese naval forces would need
three months until they could capture Singapore. As a cautious
Foreign Minister, he had doubled this estimate. He believed he
could stave off any danger which threatened from America, for
six months. If, however, the capture of Singapore required still
more time and if the operations would perhaps even drag out for
a year, the situation with America would become extremely
critical and he did not know as yet how to meet it.

“If at all avoidable, he would not touch the Netherland East
Indies, since he was afraid that in case of a Japanese attack on
this area, the oilfields would be set afire. They could be
brought into operation again only after 1 or 2 years.

“The RAM added that Japan would gain decisive influence over the
Netherland East Indies simultaneously with the capture of
Singapore.” (_1877-PS_)

On 5 April, about a week after the conference just noted, Ribbentrop again met with Matsuoka and again pushed the Japanese another step along the road to aggressive war. The notes of this conference, which were also found in German Foreign Office Archives, reveal the following exchange:

“* * * In answer to a remark by Matsuoka, that Japan was now
awakening and, according to the Japanese temperament, would take
action quickly after the previous lengthy deliberation, the
Reich Foreign Minister replied that it was necessary, of course,
to accept a certain risk in this connection, just as the Fuehrer
had done so successfully with the occupation of the Rhineland,
with the proclamation of sovereignty of armament, and with the
resignation from the League of Nations.”

* * * * * *

“The Reich Foreign Minister replied that the new German Reich
would actually be built up on the basis of the ancient
traditions of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation, which
in its time was the only dominant power on the European
Continent.

“In conclusion the Reich Foreign Minister once again summarized
the points he wanted Matsuoka to take back to Japan with him
from his trip:

“1. Germany had already won the war. With the end of this year
the world would realize this. Even England would have to concede
it, if it had not collapsed before then, and America would also
have to resign herself to this fact.

“2. There were no conflicting interests between Japan and
Germany. The future of both countries could be regulated for the
long run on the basis that Japan should predominate in the Far
East, Italy and Germany in Europe and Africa.

“3. Whatever might happen, Germany would win the war. But it
would hasten victory if Japan would enter the war. Such an entry
into the war was undoubtedly more in the interest of Japan than
in that of Germany, for it offered a unique opportunity which
would hardly ever return, for the fulfillment of the national
objectives of Japan, a chance which would make it possible for
her to play a really leading role in East Asia.” (_1882-PS_)

Here again, in the portions just quoted, Ribbentrop is seen pursuing the same tack previously noted: Germany has already won the war for all practical purposes. Japan’s entry will hasten the inevitable end. _And_ Japan had better get the positions she wants _during_ the war. Ribbentrop’s assurances, (_1877-PS_) that Japan likewise had nothing to fear from the Soviet Union if Japan entered the conflict, and his continual references to the weakness of the United States scattered throughout his conversations, were other means used to hurry along the Japanese.

The success of the Nazi methods is shown in a top secret report, dated 24 May 1941, from the German Military Attache in Tokyo to the Intelligence Division of the OKW. The last sentence in paragraph 1, states:

“The preparations for attack on Singapore and Manila stand.”
(_1538-PS_)

The fact appears from this sentence that the German military were keeping in close touch with the Japanese operational plans against Singapore, which the Nazi conspirators had fostered.

(2) _Exhortations to Japanese Aggression Against the U.S.S.R._

The Nazi conspirators also directed their efforts to induce a Japanese “stab in the back” against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Here again Ribbentrop appears as a central figure.

For some months prior to the issuance of Basic Order No. 24 regarding collaboration with Japan (_C-75_), the Nazi conspirators had been preparing “_Fall Barbarossa_”, the plan for attack on the U.S.S.R. Basic Order No. 24 decreed, however, that the Japanese “must not be given any intimation of the Barbarossa operation”. (_C-75_)

In his conference with the Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka on 29 March 1941, almost 3 weeks after the issuance of Basic Order No. 24, Ribbentrop nevertheless hinted at things to come. Ribbentrop assured Matsuoka that the largest part of the German Army was on the Eastern frontiers of the Reich fully prepared to open the attack at any time. Ribbentrop then added that, although he believed that the U.S.S.R. would try to avoid developments leading to war, nevertheless a conflict with the Soviet Union, even if not probable, would have to be considered possible. (_1877-PS_)

Whatever conclusions the Japanese Ambassador drew from these remarks in April 1941 can only be conjectured. Once the Nazis had unleashed their aggression against the U.S.S.R. in June of 1941, the tenor of Ribbentrop’s remarks left no room for doubt. On 10 July 1941, Ribbentrop despatched a coded telegram to Ott, the German Ambassador in Tokyo (_2896-PS_). Pertinent passages in that telegram read as follows:

“Please take this opportunity to thank the Japanese Ambassador
in Moscow for conveying the cable report. It would be convenient
if we could keep on receiving news from Russia this way. In
summing up, I would like to say: I have now, as in the past,
full confidence in the Japanese Policy, and in the Japanese
Foreign Minister, first of all because the present Japanese
government would really act inexcusably toward the future of its
nation if it would not take this unique opportunity to solve the
Russian problem, as well as to secure for all time its expansion
to the South and settle the Chinese matter. Since Russia, as
reported by the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow, is in effect
close to collapse, a report which coincides with our own
observations as far as we are able to judge at the present war
situation, it is simply impossible that Japan does not solve the
matter of Vladivostok and the Siberian area as soon as her
military preparations are completed.”

* * * * * *

“However, I ask you to employ all available means in further
insisting upon Japan’s entry into the war against Russia at the
soonest possible date, as I have mentioned already in my note to
Matsuoka. The sooner this entry is effected, the better it is.
The natural objective still remains that we and Japan join hands
on the Trans-Siberian railroad, before winter starts. After the
collapse of Russia, however, the position of the Three Power
Pact states in the world will be so gigantic, that the question
of England’s collapse or the total destruction of the English
islands, respectively, will only be a matter of time. An America
totally isolated from the rest of the world would then be faced
with our taking possession of the remaining positions of the
British Empire which are important for the Three Power Pact
countries. I have the unshakable conviction that a carrying
through of the new order as desired by us will be a matter of
course, and there would be no insurmountable difficulties if the
countries of the Three Power Pact stand close together and
encounter every action of the Americans with the same weapons. I
ask you to report in the near future as often as possible and in
detail on the political situation there.” (_2896-PS_)

Ott’s reply to this telegram (_2897-PS_), dated 13 July 1941, was as follows:

“Telegram
(Secret Cipher System)
“Tokyo 14 July 1941 0230 hrs.
Arrived 14 July 1941 1120 hrs.
As fast as possible!
“#1217 dated 13.7
for Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Answer to telegram 10, #108 Reichsminister for Foreign Affairs

Arrived Tokyo 12 July 1941

“I am trying with all means to work toward Japan’s entry into
the war against Russia as soon as possible. Especially using
arguments of personal message of Foreign Minister and telegram
cited above, to convince Matsuoka personally, as well as the
Foreign Office, Military elements, Nationalists and friendly
business men. I believe that, according to military
preparations, Japanese participation will soon take place. The
greatest obstacles against which one has to fight thereby is the
disunity among Activist groups which, without unified command,
follows various aims and only slowly adjusts itself to the
changed situation.

Ott.” (_2897-PS_)

On subsequent occasions Ribbentrop repeated his exhortations to induce the Japanese to aggression against the U.S.S.R. Three documents, covering July of 1942 and March and April of 1943, record these exhortations.

The first discussion occurred between Ribbentrop and Oshima, Japanese Ambassador to Berlin, on 9 July 1942. As a matter of background, it may be noted that at that time German armies were sweeping forward in the U.S.S.R. and the fall of Sevastapol had just been announced. The discussion proceeded as follows:

“_Notes concerning the discussion between the Minister for
Foreign Affairs and Ambassador Oshima at Steinort, on 9 July
1942._

“He, the German Foreign Minister, had asked to see the
Ambassador at this time when the situation was as described,
because now a question of fateful importance had arisen
concerning the joint conduct of the war: if Japan felt itself
sufficiently strong militarily, the moment for Japan to attack
Russia was probably now. He thought it possible that, if Japan
attacked Russia now, it would lead to her (Russia’s) final moral
collapse; at least it would hasten the collapse of her present
system. In any case, never again would Japan have such an
opportunity as existed at present, to eliminate once and for all
the Russian colossus in Eastern Asia. He had discussed this
question with the Fuehrer, and the Fuehrer was of the same
opinion, but he wanted to emphasize one point right away: Japan
should attack Russia only if she felt sufficiently strong for
such an undertaking. Under no circumstances should Japanese
operations against Russia be allowed to bog down at the halfway
mark, and we do not want to urge Japan into an action that is
not mutually profitable.” (_2911-PS_)

Ribbentrop and Ambassador Oshima had another conference on 6 March 1943. It is noted, again for background, that the strategic military situation in the broad expanses of the U.S.S.R. had changed somewhat. In the previous month, February 1943, the Soviet Armies had completely defeated the German forces at Stalingrad and inflicted severe losses. To the north and west their winter offensive had recovered large areas from the hands of the invaders. In addition, combined U. S. and British forces had already landed in North Africa. The tone of Ribbentrop’s argument reflects the changed military situation. The familiar Japanese refrain of “so sorry please” likewise appears to have crept in. It is noted, in this regard, that the month of February 1943 had also seen the end of organized Japanese resistance on the island of Guadalcanal. The conference went as follows:

“Ambassador Oshima declared that he had received a telegram from
Tokyo, and he is to report by order of his government to the
Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs (RAM) the following: The
suggestion of the German Government, to attack Russia, was the
subject of a common conference between the Japanese Government
and the Imperial headquarters, during which the question was
discussed in detail and investigated exactly. The result is the
following: the Japanese Government absolutely recognizes the
danger which threatens from Russia, and completely understands
the desire of its German ally that Japan on her part will also
enter the war against Russia. However, it is not possible for
the Japanese Government, considering the present war situation,
to enter into the war. It is rather of the conviction that it
would be in the common interest not to start the war against
Russia now. On the other hand, the Japanese Government would
never disregard the Russian question.

“The Japanese Government has the intention to become aggressive
again in the future on other fronts.

“The RAM brought up the question, after the explanation by the
Ambassador, of how the continued waging of the war is envisaged
in Tokyo. At present, Germany wages the war against the common
enemies, England and America, mostly alone, while Japan mostly
behaves more defensively. However, it would be more correct that
all powers allied in the Three Power Pact would combine their
forces to defeat England and America, but also Russia together.
It is not good when one part must fight alone. One cannot
overstrain the German national strength. He has worried silently
that certain forces work in Tokyo, who are of the opinion and
who propagate it, that Germany would come through the fight
victoriously, and that therefore Japan should consolidate itself
further at first, before it makes further and utmost efforts.”

* * * * * *

“Then the RAM again brought up the question of the attack on
Russia by Japan, and he declared that after all, the fight on
the Burma front as well as in the South is actually more of a
maritime problem, and on all fronts—except those in
China—there are mostly very few ground forces committed.
Therefore the attack on Russia is primarily an army affair, and
he asked himself whether the necessary forces would not be ready
for that”. (_2954-PS_)

Ribbentrop kept on trying. He held another conference with Oshima about three weeks later, on 18 April 1943. The top secret notes of this conference reveal the following:

“The Reichminister for Foreign Affairs then stressed again that
without any doubt this year presented the most favorable
opportunity for Japan, if she felt strong enough and had
sufficient anti-tank weapons at her disposal, to attack Russia,
which certainly would never again be as weak as she is at the
moment.” (_2929-PS_)

(3) _Nazi Preparations and Collaboration with the Japanese Against the United States._ The Nazi preparations and collaboration with the Japanese against the United States present a twofold aspect: one of preparations by the Nazis themselves for attack from across the Atlantic; the other of the fomenting of war in the Pacific.

In the previous discussion of the Nazi exhortations to the Japanese to war against the British Commonwealth and the U.S.S.R., reference has been made to certain documents relating to the United States. Those documents will be taken up again, in their relevant passages, to show their particular application. In the treatment of Ribbentrop’s urging the Japanese to war against the U.S.S.R., documents have been introduced chronicling conferences which took place after the dates of 7 December and 11 December 1941 when the Japanese and German Governments, respectively, initiated and declared aggressive war against the United States. These documents have indicated that Nazi awareness and acceptance of the direction in which their actions were leading, as well as the universal aspects of their conspiracy and of their alliance with the Japanese.