Chapter XLIX: Part 3: , which deals in part with “Special Case—Extension Red-Green,” (6)

At the time this statement was made, however, the Western Campaign was still in progress and so any action in the East necessarily had to be postponed for the time being. On 22 June 1940, however, the Franco-German armistice was signed at Compiegne and the campaign in the West, with the exception of the war against Britain, came to an end. The view that Germany’s key to political and economic dominance lay in the elimination of the U.S.S.R. as a political factor, and in the acquisition of _lebensraum_ at her expense, had long been basic in Nazi ideology. This idea had never been completely forgotten, even while the war in the West was in progress. Now, flushed with the recent success of their arms and yet keenly conscious of both their failure to defeat Britain and the needs of their armies for food and raw materials, the Nazi conspirators began serious consideration of the means for achieving their traditional ambition by conquering the Soviet Union. The situation in which Germany now found herself made such action appear both desirable and practicable.

As early as August of 1940, General Thomas received a hint from Goering that planning for a campaign against the Soviet Union was already under way. Thomas at that time was the Chief of the _Wirtschaft Rustung Amt_, or Office for Economy and Armaments, of the OKW (_Wi Rue Amt_). General Thomas tells about receiving this information from Goering in his draft of a work entitled “Basic Facts For a History of German War and Armaments Economy,” which he prepared during the Summer of 1944 (_2353-PS_). On pages 313 to 315 of this work, Thomas discusses the Russo-German trade agreement of 1939 and relates that, since the Soviets were delivering quickly and well under this agreement and were requesting war materials in return, there was much pressure in Germany until early 1940 for increased delivery on the part of the Germans. However, at page 315 he has the following to say about the change of heart expressed by the German leaders in August of 1940:

“On August 14, the Chief of Wi Rue, during a conference with
Reichmarshal Goering, was informed, that the Fuehrer desired
punctual delivery to the Russians only till spring 1941. Later
on we would have no further interest in completely satisfying
the Russian demands. This allusion moved the Chief of Wi Rue to
give priority to matters concerning Russian War Economy.”
(_2353-PS_)

This statement will be referred to again later in the discussion of preparations for the economic exploitation of Soviet territory. At that time too, evidence will be presented that in November of 1940 Goering categorically informed Thomas that a campaign was planned against the U.S.S.R.

Preparations for so large an undertaking as an invasion of the Soviet Union necessarily entailed, even this many months in advance of the date of execution, certain activity in the East in the way of construction projects and strengthening of forces. Such activity could not be expected to pass unnoticed by the Soviet intelligence service. Counter-intelligence measures were obviously called for. In an OKW directive signed by Jodl and issued to the Counter-Intelligence Service Abroad on 6 September 1940, such measures were ordered (_1229-PS_). This directive pointed out that the activity in the East must not be permitted to create the impression in the Soviet Union that an offensive was being prepared and outlined the line for the counter-intelligence people to take to disguise this fact. The text of the directive indicates, by necessary implication, the extent of the preparations already underway. It provides:

“The Eastern territory will be manned stronger in the weeks to
come. By the end of October the status shown on the enclosed map
is supposed to be reached.

“These regroupings must not create the impression in Russia that
we are preparing an offensive in the East. On the other hand,
Russia will realize that strong and highly trained German troops
are stationed in the Gouvernement, in the Eastern provinces, and
in the Protekterat; she should draw the conclusion that we can
at any time protect our interests—especially on the
Balkan—with strong forces against Russian seizure.

“For the work of our own intelligence service as well as for the
answer to questions of the Russian intelligence service, the
following directives apply:

“1. The respective total strength of the German troops in the
East is to be veiled as far as possible by giving news about a
frequent change of the army units there. This change is to be
explained by movements into training camps, regroupings.

“2. The impression is to be created that the center of the
massing of troops is in the Southern part of the Gouvernement,
in the Protekterat and in Austria, and that the massing in the
North is relatively unimportant.

“3. When it comes to the equipment situation of the units,
especially of the armored divisions, things are to be
exaggerated, if necessary.

“4. By suitable news the impression to be created that the
_antiaircraft protection_ in the East has been increased
considerably after the end of the campaign in the West and that
it continues to be increased with captured French material on
all important targets.

“5. Concerning improvements on _railroads_, _roads_,
_airdromes_, _etc._, it is to be stated that the work is kept
within normal limits, is needed for the improvement of the newly
won Eastern territories, and serves primarily economical
traffic.

“The supreme command of the Army (OKH) decides to what extent
correct details, i.e., numbers of regiments, manning of
garrisons, etc., will be made available to the defense for
purposes of counter espionage.

“The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces,

By order of
/signed/ Jodl.” (_1229-PS_)

Early in November 1940 Hitler reiterated his previous orders and called for a continuation of preparations, promising further and more definite instructions as soon as this preliminary work produced a general outline of the army’s operational plans. This order was contained in a Top Secret directive from the Fuehrer’s Headquarters No. 18, dated 12 November 1940, signed by Hitler and initialed by Jodl (_444-PS_). The directive begins by saying that:

“The preparatory measures of Supreme Headquarters for the
prosecution of the war in the near future are to be made along
the following lines.” (_444-PS_)

It then outlines plans for the various theaters and the policy regarding relations with other countries and says regarding the U.S.S.R.:

“* * * 5. _Russia_

“Political discussions have been initiated with the aim of
clarifying Russia’s attitude for the time being. Irrespective of
the results of these discussions, all preparations for the East
which have already been verbally ordered will be continued.

“Instructions on this will follow, as soon as the general
outline of the Army’s operational plans has been submitted to,
and approved by me.” (_444-PS_)

On 5 December 1940 the Chief of the General Staff of the Army, at that time General Halder, reported to the Fuehrer concerning the progress of the plans for the coming operation against the U.S.S.R. A report of this conference with Hitler is set forth in a folder containing many documents, all labelled annexes and all bearing on _Fall Barbarossa_ (_1799-PS_). This folder was discovered with the War Diary of the _Wehrmacht Fuehrungsstab_ and was apparently an inclosure to that Diary. Annex No. 1, dated 5 December 1940, indicates the state which planning for this aggression had reached six and a half months before it occurred:

“Report to the Fuehrer on 5 December 1940.

“The Chief of the General Staff of the Army then reports about
the planned operation in the East. He expanded at first on the
geographic fundamentals. The main war industrial centers are in
the Ukraine, in Moscow and in Leningrad.”

* * * * * *

“The Fuehrer declares that he is agreed with the discussed
operational plans and adds the following: The most important
goal is to prevent that the Russians should withdraw on a closed
front. The eastward advance should be combined until the Russian
air force will be unable to attack the territory of the German
Reich and, on the other hand, the German air force will be
enabled to conduct raids to destroy Russian war industrial
territories. In this way we should be able to achieve the
annihilation of the Russian army and to prevent its
regeneration.

“The first commitment of the forces should take place in such a
way to make the annihilation of strong enemy units possible.”

* * * * * *

“It is essential that the Russians should not take up positions
in the rear again. The number of 130-140 Divisions as planned
for the entire operation is sufficient.” (_1799-PS_)

B. _Plan Barbarossa._

By 18 December 1940 the general outline of the army’s operational plans having been submitted to Hitler, the basic strategical directive to the High Commands of the Army, Navy, and Air Forces for _Barbarossa_—Directive No. 21—was issued (_446-PS_). This directive marks the first time the plan to invade the U.S.S.R. was specifically referred to in an order, although the order was classified Top Secret. It also marked the first use of the code word _Barbarossa_ to denote the operation against the Soviet Union. One of the most significant passages in that directive is the opening sentence:

“The German Armed Forces must be prepared to crush Soviet Russia
in a quick campaign even before the end of the war against
England. (Case Barbarossa).” (_446-PS_)

The directive continues:

“Preparations requiring more time to start are—if this has not
yet been done—to begin presently and are to be completed not
later than 15 May 1941.”

* * * * * *

“Great caution has to be exercised that the intention of an
attack will not be recognized.” (_446-PS_)

The directive then outlined the broad strategy on which the intended invasion was to proceed and the parts which the Army, Navy, and Air Forces were to play therein, and called for oral reports to Hitler by the Commanders-in-Chief. The directive concluded as follows:

“V. I am expecting the reports of the Commanders-in-Chief on
their further plans based on this letter of instructions.

“The preparations planned by all branches of the Armed Forces
are to be reported to me through the High Command, also in
regard to their time.” (_446-PS_)

The directive is signed by Hitler and initialled by Jodl, Keitel, Warlimont, and one illegible signature.

It is perfectly clear both from the contents of the order itself as well as from its history, which has been outlined, that this directive was no mere staff planning exercise. It was an order to prepare for an act of aggression which was intended to occur and which actually did occur. The various services which received the order understood it as an order to prepare for action and did not view it as a hypothetical staff problem. This is plain from the detailed planning and preparation which they immediately undertook in order to implement the general scheme set forth in the basic directive.

C. _Military Planning and Preparation for the Implementation of Barbarossa._

The Naval War Diary for 30 January 1941 indicates the early compliance of the OKM with that part of Directive No. 21 (_446-PS_) which ordered progress in preparation to be reported to Hitler through the High Command of the Armed Forces. This entry in the War Diary contains a substantial amount of technical information concerning the Navy’s part in the coming campaign and the manner in which it was preparing itself to play that part (_C-35_). The following passage shows that the Navy was actively preparing for the attack at this early date:

“_30 January 1941_

7. Talk by Ia about the plans and preparations for the
“Barbarossa” case to be submitted to the High Command of the
Armed Forces”. (_C-35_)

”Ia” is, in this case, the abbreviation for a deputy head of the Operations Division of the Naval War Staff.) Then follows a list of the Navy’s objectives in the war against Russia. Under the latter, many tasks for the Navy are listed, one of which is sufficiently typical to give an idea of all:

“II. _Objectives of War Against Russia._

* * * * * *

_d._ To harass the Russian fleet by surprise blows as:

“1. Lightning-like commitments at the outbreak of the war of air
force units against strong points and combat vessels in the
Baltic, Black Sea, and Ice Sea.” (_C-35_)

This document indicates the detailed thinking and planning which was being carried out to implement _Barbarossa_ almost six months before the operation actually got underway. It is but another piece in the mosaic of evidence which demonstrates beyond question of doubt that the invasion of the Soviet Union was undeniably a premeditated attack.

Similarly, the Naval War Diary for the month of February contains at least several references to the planning and preparation for the coming campaign (_C-33_). The entry for 19 February 1941 is typical:

“In regard to the impending operation ‘Barbarossa’ for which all
S-Boats in the Baltic will be needed, a transfer of some can
only be considered after conclusion of the Barbarossa
operations.” (_C-33_)

On 3 February 1941 the Fuehrer held a conference to assess the progress thus far made in the planning for _Barbarossa_. The conference also discussed the plans for _Sonnenblume_, which was the code name for the North African Operation. Attending this conference were, in addition to Hitler, the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, Keitel; the Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, Jodl; the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, von Brauchitsch; the Chief of the Army General Staff, Halder; as well as several others including, Colonel Schmundt, Hitler’s Adjutant (_872-PS_). During the course of this conference, the Chief of the Army General Staff gave a long report about enemy strength as compared with German strength, and about the general overall operational plans for the invasion. This report was punctuated at various intervals by comments from the Fuehrer. An extract from this report, although written in a semishorthand form, is at least sufficiently clear to disclose that elaborate timetables had already been set up for the deployment of troops, as well as for industrial operations:

“_The intended time period_ was discussed with a plan.

1st Deployment Staffel (_Aufmarschstaffel_)

2nd “ “ “

transfer now, Front—Germany—East from the middle of March will
give up 3 divisions for reinforcement in the West. Army groups
and Army High Commands are being withdrawn from the West. There
are already considerable reinforcements though still in the rear
area. From now on, Attila [the code word for the operation for
the occupation of unoccupied France] can be carried out only
under difficulties. Industrial traffic is hampered by transport
movements. From the middle of April, Hungary will be approached
about the march through. Three deployment staffels from the
middle of April. Felix is now no longer possible as the main
part of the artillery is being entrained. [Felix is the code
word for the occupation of Canary Islands, North Africa and
Gibraltar.]

“_In industry_ the full capacity timetable is in force. No more
camouflage.

“From 25.IV-15.V, 4 staffels to withdraw considerable forces
from the West. (Seeloewe [Seeloewe was the code word for the
planned operation against England] can no longer be carried
out). The strategic concentration in the East is quite
recognizable.

“The full capacity timetable remains. 8 Marita [Marita was the
code word for the action against Greece] divisions complete the
picture of the disposition of forces on the plan.

“_C-in-C Army_ requested that he no longer have to employ 5
control divisions for this, but might hold them ready as
reserves for commanders in the West.

“_Fuehrer_ When Barbarossa commences, the world will hold its
breath and make no comment.” (_872-PS_)

This much, when read with the conference conclusions, is sufficient to show that the Army as well as the Navy regarded _Barbarossa_ as an action directive and were far along with their preparations even as early as February 1941—almost five months prior to 22 June, the date when the attack was actually launched. The conference report summarized the conclusions of the conference, insofar as they affected _Barbarossa_, as follows:

“_Conclusions_:

“1. _Barbarossa_

“_a._ The Fuehrer on the whole was in agreement with the
operational plan. When it is being carried out, it must
be remembered that the _main aim_ is to gain possession
of the Baltic States and Leningrad.

“_b._ The Fuehrer desires that the operation map and the
plan of the disposition of forces be sent to him as soon
as possible.

“_c._ Agreements with neighbouring states, who are
taking part, may not be concluded until there is no
longer any necessity for camouflage. The exception is
Roumania with regard to the reinforcing of the Moldaw.

“_d._ It must, at all costs, be possible to carry out
Attila (auxiliary measure).

“_e._ The strategic concentration for Barbarossa will be
camouflaged as a feint for Seeloewe and the subsidiary
measure Marita.” (_872-PS_)

As the plans for the invasion became more detailed, involved, and complete, more and more agencies outside the Armed Forces had to be brought into the picture, let in on the secret, and assigned their respective parts. For example, early in March, 1941, Keitel drafted a letter to be sent to Reich Minister Todt, then Reich Minister of Armaments and Munitions and head of the organization Todt. In this letter Keitel explained the principles on which the camouflage for the operation was based and requested that the organization Todt follow the same line (_874-PS_). This letter illustrates the elaborate deceit with which the Nazi conspirators sought to hide the preparations for their treacherous attack:

“_Top Secret_
“The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.
“Hq. of the Fuehrer 9 March 41
DRAFT

“Honorable Reich Minister! (TODT)

“For the missions which the Fuehrer has assigned to the Armed
Forces in the East, extensive measures for the diversion and
deception of friend and foe are necessary prerequisites for the
success of the operations.

“The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces has issued guiding
rules for the deception in accordance with more detailed
directives of the Fuehrer. These rules aim essentially at
continuing preparations for the attack against England in an
increasing degree. Simultaneously the actual preparations for
deployment in the East should be represented as a diversionary
maneuvre to divert from plans which are being pursued for an
attack against England. In order to insure success for these
measures, it is indispensable that these same principles are
being also followed on the part of the Organization Todt.

“K. J. W.”
[Initials of
Keitel, Jodl and Warlimont] (_874-PS_)

On 13 March 1941 Keitel signed an operational supplement to Fuehrer Order #21 (_446-PS_), which was issued in the form of “Directives for Special Areas” (_447-PS_). This detailed operational order, which was issued more than three months in advance of the attack, indicates how complete were the plans on practically every phase of the operation.