Chapter XLV: Part 3: , which deals in part with “Special Case—Extension Red-Green,” (2)

“Ciano asked how soon, according to the Fuehrer’s view, the
Danzig question must be settled. The Fuehrer answered that this
settlement must be made one way or another by the end of August.
To the question of Ciano’s as to what solution the Fuehrer
proposed, Hitler answered that Poland must give up political
control of Danzig, but that Polish economic interests would
obviously be reserved and that Polish general behavior must
contribute to a general lessening of the tension. He doubted
whether Poland was ready to accept this solution since, up to
the present, the German proposals had been refused. The Fuehrer
had made this proposal personally to Beck at his visit to
Obersalzberg. They were extremely favorable to Poland. In return
for the political surrender of Danzig, under a complete
guarantee of Polish interests and the establishment of a
connection between East Prussia and the Reich, Germany would
have given a frontier guarantee, a 25-year pact of friendship
and the participation of Poland in influence over Slovakia. Beck
had received the proposal with the remark that he was willing to
examine it. The plain refusal of it came only as a result of
English intervention. The general Polish aims could be seen
clearly from the press. They wanted the whole of East Prussia,
and even proposed to advance to Berlin.” (_TC-77_)

The meeting was held over that night, and it continued on the following day:

“The Fuehrer had therefore come to two definite conclusions: (1)
in the event of any further provocation, he would immediately
attack; (2) if Poland did not clearly and plainly state her
political intention, she must be forced to do so.”

* * * * * *

“As matters now stand, Germany and Italy would simply not exist
further in the world through lack of space; not only was there
no more space, but existing space was completely blockaded by
its present possessors; they sat like misers with their heaps of
gold and deluded themselves about their riches. The Western
Democracies were dominated by the desire to rule the world and
would not regard Germany and Italy as their class. This
psychological element of contempt was perhaps the worst thing
about the whole business. It could only be settled by a life and
death struggle which the two Axis partners could meet more
easily because their interests did not clash on any point.

“The Mediterranean was obviously the most ancient domain for
which Italy had a claim to predominance. The Duce himself had
summed up the position to him in the words that Italy already
was the dominant power in the Mediterranean. On the other hand,
the Fuehrer said that Germany must take the old German road
eastwards and that this road was also desirable for economic
reasons, and that Italy had geographical and historical claims
to permanency in the Mediterranean. Bismarck had recognized it
and had said as much in his well-known letter to Mazzini. The
interests of Germany and Italy went in quite different
directions and there never could be a conflict between them.

“Ribbentrop added that if the two problems mentioned in
yesterday’s conversations were settled, Italy and Germany would
have their backs free for work against the West. The Fuehrer
said that Poland must be struck down so that for 50 years she
would be incapable of fighting. In such a case, matters in the
West could be settled.

“Ciano thanked the Fuehrer for his extremely clear explanation
of the situation. He had, on his side, nothing to add and would
give the Duce full details. He asked for more definite
information on one point in order that the Duce might have all
the facts before him. The Duce might indeed have to make no
decision because the Fuehrer believed that the conflict with
Poland could be localized on the basis of long experience.
He—Ciano—quite saw that so far the Fuehrer had always been
right in his judgment of the position. If, however, Mussolini
had no decision to make, he had to take certain measures of
precaution, and therefore Ciano would put the following
question:

“The Fuehrer had mentioned two conditions under which he would
take Poland (1) if Poland were guilty of serious provocation,
and (2) if Poland did not make her political position clear. The
first of these conditions depended on the decision of the
Fuehrer, and German reaction could follow it in a moment. The
second condition required certain decisions as to time. Ciano
therefore asked what was the date by which Poland must have
satisfied Germany about her political condition. He realized
that this date depended upon climatic conditions.

“The Fuehrer answered that the decision of Poland must be made
clear at the latest by the end of August. Since, however, the
decisive part of military operations against Poland could be
carried out within a period of 14 days and the final liquidation
would need another four weeks, it could be finished at the end
of September or the beginning of October. These could be
regarded as the dates. It followed, therefore, that the last
dates on which he could begin to take action was the end of
August.

“Finally, the Fuehrer assured Ciano that since his youth he had
favored German-Italian cooperation, and that no other view was
expressed in his books. He had always thought that Germany and
Italy were naturally suited for collaboration, since there were
no conflicts of interest between them. He was personally
fortunate to live at a time in which, apart from himself, there
was one other statesman who would stand out great and unique in
history; that he could be this man’s friend was for him a matter
of great personal satisfaction, and if the hour of common battle
struck, he would always be found on the side of the Duce.”
(_TC-77_)

(2) _Economic Preparations._ If the military preparations were throughout this period nearing their completion, at the same time the economists had not been idle. A letter dated 25 August 1939, from Funk to the Feuhrer, reads:

“My Fuehrer!

“I thank you sincerely and heartily for your most friendly and
kind wishes on the occasion of my birthday. How happy and how
grateful to you we ought to be for being granted the favor of
experiencing these overwhelmingly great and world-changing times
and taking part in the mighty events of these days.

“The information given to me by Field Marshal Goering, that you,
my Fuehrer, yesterday evening approved in principle the measures
prepared by me for financing the war and for shaping the
relationship between wages and prices and for carrying through
emergency sacrifices, made me deeply happy. I hereby report to
you with all respect that I have succeeded by means of
precautions taken during the last few months, in making the
Reichsbank internally so strong and externally so unassailable,
that even the most serious shocks in the international money and
credit market cannot affect us in the least. In the meantime I
have quite inconspicuously changed into gold all the assets of
the Reichsbank and of the whole of German economy abroad which
it was possible to lay hands on. Under the proposals I have
prepared for a ruthless elimination of all consumption which is
not of vital importance and of all public expenditure and public
works which are not of importance for the war effort, we will be
in a position to cope with all demands on finance and economy,
without any serious shocks. I have considered it my duty as the
General Plenipotentiary for Economy appointed by you to make
this report and solemn promise to you, my Fuehrer.

“Heil my Fuehrer /signed/ Walter Funk.” (_699-PS_)

It is difficult in view of that letter to see how Funk can claim that he did not know of the preparations and of the intentions of the German government to wage war.

(3) _The Obersalzburg Speech._ On 22 August 1939, Hitler addressed his commanders in chief at Obersalzburg. (_1014-PS_). At this date preparations were complete. In the course of his speech Hitler declared:

“Everybody shall have to make a point of it that we were
determined from the beginning to fight the Western powers.”

* * * * * *

“Destruction of Poland in the foreground. The aim is elimination
of living forces, not the arrival at a certain line. Even if war
should break out in the West, the destruction of Poland shall be
the primary objective.”

* * * * * *

“I shall give a propagandistic cause for starting the war—never
mind whether it be plausible or not. The victor shall not be
asked later on whether we told the truth or not. In starting and
making a war, not the Right is what matters but Victory.”

* * * * * *

“It was clear to me that a conflict with Poland had to come
sooner or later. I had already made this decision in spring, but
I thought that I would first turn against the West in a few
years, and only afterwards against the East.” (_1014-PS_)

These passages emphasize the intention of the Nazi government not only to conquer Poland but ultimately, in any event, to wage aggressive war against the Western Democracies.

In another significant passage, Hitler stated:

“We need not be afraid of a blockade. The East will supply us
with grain, cattle, coal, lead and zinc. It is a big arm, which
demands great efforts. I am only afraid that at the last minute
some _Schweinehund_ will make a proposal for mediation.

“The political arm is set farther. A beginning has been made for
the destruction of England’s hegemony. The way is open for the
soldier, after I have made the political preparations.”

* * * * * *

“Goering answers with thanks to the Fuehrer and the assurance
that the armed forces will do their duty.” (_798-PS_)

(4) _Diplomatic Preparations: Provoking the Crisis._ On 23 August 1939, the Danzig Senate passed a decree whereby Gauleiter Forster was appointed head of the State of the Free City of Danzig, a position which did not exist under the statute setting up the constitution of the Free City. (_TC-72 No. 62_). That event was, of course, aimed at stirring up feeling in the Free City at that time.

At the same time, frontier incidents were being manufactured by the Nazi Government with the aid of the SS. The affidavit of General Lahousen (_Affidavit A_) refers to the provision of Polish uniforms to the SS Forces for these purposes, so that dead Poles could be found lying about on the German side of the frontier. Three short reports found in the British Blue Book corroborate this affidavit. They are reports from the British ambassador in Warsaw.

The first of them is dated 26 August, and reads:

“Series of incidents again occurred yesterday on German
frontier.

“Polish patrol met party Germans one kilometre from East
Prussian frontier near Pelta. Germans opened fire. Polish patrol
replied, killing leader, whose body is being returned.

“German bands also crossed Silesian frontier near Szczyglo,
twice near Rybnik and twice elsewhere, firing shots and
attacking blockhouses and customs posts with machine guns and
hand grenades. Poles have protested vigorously to Berlin.

“_Gazeta Polska_, in inspired leader, today says these are more
than incidents. They are clearly prepared acts of aggression of
para-military disciplined detachments supplied with regular
army’s arms, and in one case it was a regular army detachment.
Attacks more or less continuous.

“These incidents did not cause Poland to forsake calm and strong
attitude of defence. Facts spoke for themselves and acts of
aggression came from German side. This was best answer to
ravings of German press.

“Ministry for Foreign Affairs state uniformed German detachment
has since shot Pole across frontier and wounded another.”
(_TC-72 No. 53_)

The next report is dated the same date, 26 August and reads:

“Ministry for Foreign Affairs categorically deny story recounted
by Herr Hitler to French Ambassador that twenty-four Germans
were recently killed at Lodz and eight at Bielsko. Story is
without any foundation whatever.” (_TC-72 No. 54_)

The report of the next day, 27 August, reads as follows:

“So far as I can judge, German allegations of mass ill-treatment
of German minority by Polish authorities are gross exaggeration,
if not complete falsification.

“2. There is no sign of any loss of control of situation by
Polish civil authorities. Warsaw, and so far as I can ascertain,
the rest of Poland is still completely calm.

“3. Such allegations are reminiscent of Nazi propaganda methods
regarding Czechoslovakia last year.

“4. In any case it is purely and simply deliberate German
provocation in accordance with fixed policy that has since March
[when the rest of Czechoslovakia was seized] exacerbated feeling
between the two nationalities. I suppose this has been done with
object (a) creating war spirit in Germany (b) impressing public
opinion abroad (c) provoking either defeatism or apparent
aggression in Poland.

“5. It has signally failed to achieve either of the two latter
objects.

“6. It is noteworthy that Danzig was hardly mentioned by Herr
Hitler.

“7. German treatment of Czech Jews and Polish minority is
apparently negligible factor compared with alleged sufferings of
Germans in Poland where, be it noted, they do not amount to more
than 10 per cent of population in any commune.

“8. In face of these facts it can hardly be doubted that, if
Herr Hitler decided on war, it is for the sole purpose of
destroying Polish independence.

“9. I shall lose no opportunity of impressing on Minister for
Foreign Affairs necessity of doing everything possible to prove
that Herr Hitler’s allegations regarding German minority are
false.” (_TC-72 No. 55_)

Further corroboration of General Lahousen’s affidavit is contained in a memorandum of a conversation between the writer and Keitel. That conversation with Keitel took place on 17 August, and went as follows:

“I reported my conference with Jost to Keitel. He said that he
would not pay any attention to this action, as the Fuehrer had
not informed him, and had only let him know that we were to
furnish Heydrich with Polish uniforms. He agrees that I instruct
the General Staff. He says that he does not think much of
actions of this kind. However, there is nothing else to be done
if they have been ordered by the Fuehrer, that he could not ask
the Fuehrer how he had planned the execution of this special
action. In regard to Dirschau, he has decided that this action
would be executed only by the Army.” (_795-PS_)

That was the position at the end of the third week in August 1939. On 22 August the Russian-German Non-aggression Pact was signed in Moscow. The orders to invade Poland were given immediately after the signing of that treaty, and the H-hour was actually to be in the early morning of 25 of August.

(5) _Pleas for peace._ On the same date, 22 August, news reached England that the German-Russian agreement was being signed. The significance of that pact from a military point of view as to Germany was obvious, and the British government immediately made their position clear in one last hope, that the German government might possibly think better. The Prime Minister wrote to Hitler as follows:

“Your Excellency.

“Your Excellency will have already heard of certain measures
taken by His Majesty’s Government, and announced in the press
and on the wireless this evening.

“These steps have, in the opinion of His Majesty’s Government,
been rendered necessary by the military movements which have
been reported from Germany, and by the fact that apparently the
announcement of a German-Soviet Agreement is taken in some
quarters in Berlin to indicate that intervention by Great
Britain on behalf of Poland is no longer a contingency that need
be reckoned with. No greater mistake could be made. Whatever may
prove to be the nature of the German-Soviet Agreement, it can
not alter Great Britain’s obligation to Poland, which His
Majesty’s Government have stated in public repeatedly and
plainly, and which they are determined to fulfill.

“It has been alleged that, if His Majesty’s Government had made
their position clear in 1914, the great catastrophe would have
been avoided. Whether or not there is any force in that
allegation, His Majesty’s Government are resolved that on this
occasion there shall be no such tragic misunderstanding.

“If the case should arise, they are resolved, and prepared, to
employ without delay all the forces at their command, and it is
impossible to foresee the end of hostilities once engaged. It
would be a dangerous illusion to think that, if war once starts,
it will come to an early end even if a success on any one of the
several fronts on which it will be engaged should have been
secured.” (_TC-72 No. 56_).

The Prime Minister therefore urged the German government to try to solve the difficulty without recourse to the use of force. He suggested that a truce should be declared while direct discussions between the two governments, Polish and German, might take place. Prime Minister Chamberlain concluded:

“At this moment I confess I can see no other way to avoid a
catastrophe that will involve Europe in war. In view of the
grave consequences to humanity, which may follow from the action
of their rulers, I trust that Your Excellency will weigh with
the utmost deliberation the considerations which I have put
before you.” (_TC-72 No. 56_).

On the following day, 23 August, Hitler replied to Prime Minister Chamberlain. He started off by saying that Germany has always sought England’s friendship, and went on to say that Germany, “like every other State, possesses certain definite interests which it is impossible to renounce.” The letter continued as follows:

“Germany was prepared to settle the questions of Danzig, and of
the Corridor by the method of negotiation on the basis of a
proposal of truly unparalleled magnanimity. The allegations
disseminated by England regarding a German mobilization against
Poland, the assertion of aggressive designs towards Roumania,
Hungary, etc., as well as the so-called guarantee declarations,
which were subsequently given, had, however, dispelled Polish
inclination to negotiate on a basis of this kind which would
have been tolerable for Germany also.

“The unconditional assurance given by England to Poland that she
would render assistance to that country in all circumstances
regardless of the causes from which a conflict might spring,
could only be interpreted in that country as an encouragement
thenceforward to unloosen, under cover of such a charter, a wave
of appalling terrorism against the one and a half million German
inhabitants living in Poland.

“The atrocities which then have been taking place in that
country are terrible for the victims, but intolerable for a
great power such as the German Reich, which is expected to
remain a passive onlooker during these happenings. Poland has
been guilty of numerous breaches of her legal obligations
towards the Free City of Danzig, has made demands in the
character of ultimata, and has initiated a process of economic
strangulation.”

* * * * * *

“Germany will not tolerate a continuance of the persecution of
the Germans.”

* * * * * *

“The German Reich government has received information to the
effect that the British government has the intention to carry
out measures of mobilization which, according to the statements
contained in your own letter, are clearly directed against
Germany alone. This is said to be true of France as well. Since
Germany has never had the intention of taking military measures
other than those of a defensive character against England, or
France, and, as has already been emphasized, has never intended,
and does not in the future intend, to attack England, or France,
it follows that this announcement, as confirmed by you, Mr.
Prime Minister, in your own letter, can only refer to a
contemplated act of menace directed against the Reich. I,
therefore, inform your Excellency that in the event of these
military announcements being carried into effect, I shall order
immediate mobilization of the German forces.”

* * * * * *

“The question of the treatment of European problems on a
peaceful basis is not a decision which rests on Germany, but
primarily on those who since the crime committed by the
Versailles dictate have stubbornly and consistently opposed any
peaceful revision. Only after a change of spirit on the part of
the responsible powers can there be any real change in the
relationship between England and Germany. I have all my life
fought for Anglo-German friendship; the attitude adopted by
British diplomacy—at any rate up to the present—has, however,
convinced me of the futility of such an attempt. Should there be
any change in this respect in the future, nobody could be
happier than I.” (_TC-72 No. 60_).

On 25 August the formal Anglo-Polish Agreement of Mutual Assistance was signed in London. Each government undertook to give assistance to the other in the event of aggression against either by any third power. (_TC-73 No. 91_)

A few days later the French Prime Minister Daladier addressed a letter to Hitler, which reads as follows:

“The French ambassador in Berlin has informed me of your
personal communication * * *.

“In the hours in which you speak of the greatest responsibility
which two heads of the governments can possibly take upon
themselves, namely, that of shedding the blood of two great
nations, who long only for peace and work, I feel I owe it to
you personally, and to both our peoples to say that the fate of
peace still rests in your hands.

“You cannot doubt what are my own feelings towards Germany, nor
France’s peaceful feelings towards your nation. No Frenchman has
done more than myself to strengthen between our two nations not
only peace, but also sincere cooperation in their own interests,
as well as in those of Europe and of the whole world. Unless you
credit the French people with a lower sense of honor, than I
credit the German Nation with; you cannot doubt that France
loyally fulfills her obligations towards other powers, such as
Poland, which as I am fully convinced, wants to live in peace
with Germany.

“These two convictions are fully compatible.

“Till now there has been nothing to prevent a peaceful solution
of the international crisis, with all honor and dignity for all
nations, if the same will for peace exists on all sides.

“Together with the good will of France I proclaim that of all
her allies. I take it upon myself to guarantee Poland’s
readiness, which she has always shown to submit to the mutual
application of a method of open settlement, as it can be
imagined between the governments of two sovereign nations. With
the clearest conscience I can assure you that among the
differences which have arisen between Germany and Poland over,
the question of Danzig, there is not one which could not be
submitted to such a method, the purpose of reaching a peaceful
and just solution.

“Moreover, I can declare on my honor that there is nothing in
France’s clear and loyal solidarity with Poland and her allies,
which could in any way prejudice the peaceful attitude of my
country. This solidarity has never prevented us, and does not
prevent us today, from keeping Poland in the same friendly state
of mind.

“In so serious an hour, I sincerely believe that no high-minded
human being could understand it, if a war of destruction was
started without a last attempt being made to reach a peaceful
settlement between Germany and Poland. Your desire for peace
could in all certainty work for this aim, without any prejudice
to German honor. I, who desire good harmony between the French
and the German people, and who am on the other hand bound to
Poland by bonds of friendship, and by a promise, am prepared, as
head of the French government, to do everything an upright man
can do to bring this attempt to a successful conclusion.

“You and I were in the trenches in the last war. You know, as I
do, what horror and condemnation the devastations of that war
have left in the conscience of the peoples; without any regard
to its outcome. The picture I can see in my mind’s eye of your
outstanding role as the leader of the German people on the road
of peace, towards the fulfillment of its task in the common work
of civilization, leads me to ask for a reply to this suggestion.

“If French and German blood should be shed again, as it was shed
25 years ago, in a still longer and more murderous war, then
each of the two nations will fight, believing in its own
victory. But the most certain victors will be—destruction and
barbarity.” (_TC-78_)

On 27 August Hitler replied to M. Daladier’s letter of 26 August. The sense of it was very much the same as that which he wrote to the British Prime Minister in answer to the letter which he had received from him earlier in the week. (_TC-79_)

After the letters from Chamberlain and Daladier, the German Government could no longer be in any doubt as to the position of both the British and French Governments in the event of German aggression against Poland. But the pleas for peace did not end there. On 24 August President Roosevelt wrote to both Hitler and to the President of the Polish Republic (_TC-72 No. 124_). His letter stated in part:

“In the message which I sent to you on the 14th April, I stated
that it appeared to me that the leaders of great nations had it
in their power to liberate their peoples from the disaster that
impended, but that unless the effort were immediately made with
good will on all sides to find a peaceful and constructive
solution to existing controversies, the crisis which the world
was confronting must end in catastrophe. Today that catastrophe
appears to be very near at hand indeed.

“To the message which I sent you last April I have received no
reply, but because my confident belief that the cause of world
peace—which is the cause of humanity itself—rises above all
other considerations, I am again addressing myself to you, with
the hope that the war which impends and the consequent disaster
to all peoples may yet be averted.

“I therefore urge with all earnestness—and I am likewise urging
the President of the Republic of Poland—that the Government of
Germany and Poland agree by common accord to refrain from any
positive act of hostility for a reasonable stipulated period,
and that they agree, likewise by common accord, to solve the
controversies which have arisen between them by one of the three
following methods:

“First, by direct negotiation;

“Second, by the submission of these controversies to an
impartial arbitration in which they can both have confidence; or

“Third, that they agree to the solution of these controversies
through the procedure of conciliation.” (_TC-72 No. 124_).

Hitler’s answer to that letter was the order to his armed forces to invade Poland on the following morning. The reply to Mr. Roosevelt’s letter from the President of the Polish Republic, however, was an acceptance of the offer to settle the differences by any of the peaceful methods suggested. (_TC-72 No. 126_)

On 25 August, no reply having been received from the German Government, President Roosevelt wrote again:

“I have this hour received from the President of Poland a reply
to the message which I addressed to your Excellency and to him
last night.”

The Polish reply is then set out.

“Your Excellency has repeatedly publicly stated that the aims
and objects sought by the German Reich were just and reasonable.

“In his reply to my message the President of Poland has made it
plain that the Polish Government is willing, upon the basis set
forth in my message, to agree to solve the controversy which has
arisen between the Republic of Poland and the German Reich by
direct negotiation or the process of conciliation.

“Countless human lives can yet be saved and hope may still be
restored that the nations of the modern world may even now
construct the foundation for a peaceful and happier
relationship, if you and the Government of the German Reich will
agree to the pacific means of settlement accepted by the
Government of Poland. All the world prays that Germany, too,
will accept.” (_TC-72 No. 127_)

But Germany would not accept those proposals, nor would it pay heed to the Pope’s appeal on the same date, 24 August (_TC-72 No. 139_). It is an appeal in similar terms. There was yet a further appeal from the Pope on 31 August:

“The Pope is unwilling to abandon hope that pending negotiations
may lead to a just pacific solution such as the whole world
continues to pray for.” (_TC-72 No. 141_).

Those negotiations, on the last days of August, to which the Pope referred as “pending negotiations”, were unhappily, completely bogus negotiations insofar as Germany was concerned. They were put forward simply as an endeavor to dissuade England, either by threat or by bribe, from meeting her obligations to Poland. The final German “offers” were no offers in the accepted sense of the word. There was never any intention behind them of entering into discussions, negotiation, arbitration, or any other form of peaceful settlement with Poland. They were merely an attempt to make it easier to seize and conquer Poland than it would likely be if England and France were to observe the obligations they had undertaken.

(6) _Events of the Last Week in August, 1939._ This was the progress of those last negotiations: On 22 August the German-Soviet Pact was signed. On 24 August, orders were given to the German armies to march the following morning. After those orders had been given, the news apparently reached the German Government that the British and Polish Governments had signed a formal pact of nonaggression and of mutual assistance. Up until that time, the position was that the British Prime Minister had made a statement in the House of Commons and a joint communique had been issued, on 6 April, that the two nations would in fact assist one another if either were attacked; but no formal agreement had been signed.

Now, on 24 August, after the orders to march had been given by Hitler, the news came that such a formal document had been signed. The invasion was thereupon postponed for the sole purpose of making one last effort to keep England and France out of the war—not to cancel the war, but solely to keep England and France out of it. On 25 August, having postponed the invasion, Hitler issued a verbal communique to Sir Neville Henderson, the British ambassador in Berlin, which was a mixture of bribe and threat, and with which he hoped to persuade England to keep out.

On 28 August, Sir Neville Henderson handed the British Government’s reply to that communique to Hitler. That reply stressed that the differences ought to be settled by agreement. The British Government put forward the view that Danzig should be guaranteed, and that any agreement reached should be guaranteed by other powers. Whether or not these proposals would have been acceptable or unacceptable to Germany are of no great matter. For once it had been made clear—as it was in the British Government’s reply of 28 August—that England would not be put off assisting Poland in the event of German aggression, the German Government had no concern with further negotiation but was concerned only to afford itself some kind of justification and to prevent itself from appearing too blatantly to turn down all the appeals to reason that were being put forward.

On 29 August, at 7:15 p. m. in the evening, Hitler handed to Sir Neville Henderson the German Government’s answer to the British Government’s reply of the 28th. It seems quite clear that the whole object of this letter was to put forward something which was quite unacceptable. Hitler agreed to enter into direct conversations as suggested by the British Government, but he demanded that those conversations must be based upon the return to the Reich, of Danzig and also of the whole of the Corridor.

It will be recalled that hitherto, even when he had alleged that Poland had renounced the 1934 agreement, Hitler had put forward as his demands the return of Danzig alone, plus the arrangement for an extra-territorial Autobahn and railroad running through the Corridor to East Prussia. That demand was unacceptable at that time. To make quite certain of refusal, Hitler now demanded the whole of the Corridor. There was no question of an Autobahn or railway. The whole territory must become German.

Even so, to make doubly certain that the offer would not be accepted, Hitler stated: “On those terms I am prepared to enter into discussion, but to do so, as the matter is urgent, I expect a plenipotentiary with full powers from the Polish Government to be here in Berlin by midnight tomorrow night, the 30th of August.”

This offer was made at 7:15 p. m. on the evening of the 29th. That offer had to be transmitted, first, to London; and from London to Warsaw; and from Warsaw the Polish Government had to give authority to their Ambassador in Berlin. So that the timing made it quite impossible, if indeed it were possible, to get authority to the Polish Ambassador in Berlin by midnight the following night. It allowed Poland no opportunity for discussing the matters at all. As Sir Neville Henderson described it, the offer amounted to an ultimatum.

At midnight on 30 August, at the time by which the Polish Plenipotentiary was expected to arrive, Sir Neville Henderson handed a further message to Ribbentrop in reply to the message that had been handed to him the previous evening. Ribbentrop read out in German a two- or three-page document which purported to be the German proposal to be discussed at the discussions between them and the Polish Government. He read it out quickly in German. He refused to hand a copy of it to the British Ambassador. He passed no copy of it at all to the Polish Ambassador. So that there was no kind of possible chance of the Poles ever having before them the proposals which Germany was so graciously and magnanimously offering to discuss.

On the following day, 31 August, Mr. Lipski, the Polish Ambassador, saw Ribbentrop, and could get no further than to be asked whether he came with full powers. When he replied that he did not, Ribbentrop said that he would put the position before the Fuehrer. But, in actual fact, it was much too late to put any position to the Fuehrer by that time, because on 31 August Hitler had already issued his Directive No. 1 for the conduct of war, in which he laid down H-Hour as being a quarter to five the following morning, 1 September. And on the evening of 31 August, at 9 o’clock, the German radio broadcast the proposals which Ribbentrop had read out to Sir Neville Henderson the night before, saying that these were the proposals which had been made for discussion, but that as no Polish Plenipotentiary had arrived to discuss them, the German Government assumed that they were turned down. That broadcast at 9 o’clock on the evening of 31 August was the first that the Poles had ever heard of the proposal, and it was the first that the British Government or its representatives in Berlin knew about them, other than what had been heard when Ribbentrop had read them out and refused to give a written copy on the evening of the 30th.

After that broadcast, at 9:15—perhaps while the broadcast was still in its course—a copy of those proposals was handed to Sir Neville Henderson for the first time.

This summary of events during that last week of August 1939 is based upon the contents of several documents which will now be alluded to.

In a pre-trial interrogation on 29 August 1945, Goering was asked the question:

“When the negotiations of the Polish Foreign Minister in London
brought about the Anglo-Polish Treaty at the end of March or the
beginning of April, was it not fairly obvious that a peaceful
solution was impossible?” (_TC-90_)

This was Goering’s answer:

“Yes, it seemed impossible according to my conviction, but not
according to the convictions of the Fuehrer. When it was
mentioned to the Fuehrer that England had given her guarantee to
Poland, he said that England was also guaranteeing Rumania, but
then when the Russians took Bessarabia nothing happened, and
this made a big impression on him. I made a mistake here. At
this time Poland only had the promise of a guarantee. The
guarantee itself was only given shortly before the beginning of
the war. On the day when England gave her official guarantee to
Poland the Fuehrer called me on the telephone and told me that
he had stopped the planned invasion of Poland. I asked him then
whether this was just temporary or for good. He said, ‘No, I
will have to see whether we can eliminate British intervention.’
So then I asked him, ‘Do you think that it will be any different
within four or five days?’ At this same time—I don’t know
whether you know about that, Colonel—I was in connection with
Lord Halifax by a special courier outside the regular diplomatic
channels to do everything to stop war with England. After the
guarantee I held an English declaration of war inevitable. I
already told him in the Spring of 1939 after occupying
Czechoslovakia, I told him that from now on if he tried to solve
the Polish question he would have to count on the enmity of
England. 1939, that is after the Protectorate.” (_TC-90_)

The interrogation of Goering proceeded as follows:

“Question: ‘Is it not a fact that preparations for the campaign
against Poland were originally supposed to have been completed
by the end of August 1939?’

“Answer: ‘Yes.’

“Question: ‘And that the final issuance of the order for the
campaign against Poland came some time between the 15th and 20th
of August 1939 after the signing of the treaty with Soviet
Russia.’ [The dates obviously are wrong].

“Answer: ‘Yes, that is true.’

“Question: ‘Is it not also a fact that the start of the campaign
was ordered for the 25th of August, but on the 24th of August in
the afternoon it was postponed until September the 1st in order
to await the results of new diplomatic maneuvers with the
English Ambassador?’

“Answer: ‘Yes.’” (_TC-90_)

In this interrogation Goering purported not to have wanted war with England. It will be recalled, however, that after the speech of Hitler on 22 August to his commanders-in-chief, Goering got up and thanked the Fuehrer for his exhortation and assured him that the armed forces would play their part. (_798-PS_)

Hitler’s verbal communique, as it is called in the British Blue Book, which he handed to Sir Neville Henderson on 25 August, after he had heard of the signing of the Anglo-Polish agreement, in an endeavor to keep England from aiding Poland, commences by stating Hitler’s desire to make one more effort to prevent war. In the second paragraph he asserts again that Poland’s provocations were unbearable:

“Germany was in all circumstances determined to abolish these
Macedonian conditions on her eastern frontier and, what is more,
to do so in the interests of quiet and order, but also in the
interests of European peace.

“The problem of Danzig and the Corridor must be solved. The
British Prime Minister had made a speech which was not in the
least calculated to induce any change in the German attitude. At
the most, the result of this speech could be a bloody and
incalculable war between Germany and England. Such a war would
be bloodier than that of 1914 to 1918. In contrast to the last
war, Germany would no longer have to fight on two fronts.
Agreement with Russia was unconditional and signified a change
in foreign policy of the Reich which would last a very long
time. Russia and Germany would never again take up arms against
each other. Apart from this, the agreements reached with Russia
would also render Germany secure economically for the longest
period of war.” (_TC-72 No. 68_)

Then comes the bribe.

“The Fuehrer declared the German-Polish problem must be solved
and will be solved. He is however prepared and determined after
the solution of this problem to approach England once more with
a large, comprehensive offer. He is a man of great decisions,
and in this case also he will be capable of being great in his
action. And then magnanimously he accepts the British Empire and
is ready to pledge himself personally for its continued
existence and to place the power of the German Reich at its
disposal on condition that his colonial demands, which are
limited, should be negotiated by peaceful means. * * *” (_TC-72
No. 68_)

Again Hitler stressed irrevocable determination never to enter into war with Russia. He concluded as follows:

“If the British Government would consider these ideas a blessing
for Germany and also for the British empire, a peace might
result. If it rejects these ideas there will be war. In no case
will Great Britain emerge stronger; the last war proved it. The
Fuehrer repeats that he himself is a man of ad infinitum
decisions by which he is bound, and that this is his last
offer.” (_TC-72 No. 68_)

The British Government was not of course aware of the real object that lay behind that message, and, taking it at its face value, wrote back oh 28 August saying that they were prepared to enter into discussions. They agreed with Hitler that the differences must be settled, as follows:

“In the opinion of His Majesty’s Government a reasonable
solution of the differences between Germany and Poland could and
should be effected by agreement between the two countries on
lines which would include the safeguarding of Poland’s essential
interests, and they recall that in his speech of the 28th of
April the German Chancellor recognized the importance of these
interests to Poland.

“But as was stated by the Prime Minister in his letter to the
German Chancellor of the 22nd of August, His Majesty’s
Government consider it essential for the success of the
discussions which would precede the agreement that it should be
understood beforehand that any settlement arrived at would be
guaranteed by other powers. His Majesty’s Government would be
ready if desired to make their contribution to the effective
operation of such a guarantee.”

* * * * * *

“His Majesty’s Government have said enough to make their own
attitude plain in the particular matters at issue between
Germany and Poland. They trust that the German Chancellor will
not think that, because His Majesty’s Government are scrupulous
concerning their obligations to Poland, they are not anxious to
use all their influence to assist the achievement of a solution
which may commend itself both to Germany and to Poland.” (_TC-72
No. 74_)

That reply knocked the German hopes on the head. The Nazis had failed despite their tricks and their bribes to dissuade England from observing her obligations to Poland, and it was now only a matter of getting out of their embarrassment as quickly as possible and saving face as much as possible.

In his interview with Hitler, Sir Neville Henderson emphasized the British attitude that they were determined in any event to meet their obligations to Poland. The interview concluded as follows:

“In the end I asked him two straight questions: Was he willing
to negotiate direct with the Poles? and Was he ready to discuss
the question of any exchange of population? He replied in the
affirmative as regards the latter. There I have no doubt that he
was thinking at the same time of a rectification of frontiers.
As regards to the first, he said he could not give me an answer
until after he had given the reply of His Majesty’s Government
the careful consideration which such a document deserved. In
this connection he turned to Ribbentrop and said, ‘We must
summon Field Marshal Goering to discuss it with him.’” (_TC-72
No. 75_)

The German reply, as outlined before, was handed to Sir Neville Henderson at 7.15 P. M. on 29 August. The reply sets out the suggestion submitted by the British Government in a previous note, and goes on to say that the German Government is prepared to enter into discussion on the basis that the whole of the Corridor as well as Danzig shall be returned to the Reich. The reply continues:

“The demands of the German Government are in conformity with the
revision of the Versailles Treaty in regard to this territory
which has always been recognized as being necessary; viz.,
return of Danzig and the Corridor to Germany, the safeguarding
of the existence of the German national group in the territories
remaining to Poland.” (_TC-72 No. 78_)

It is only just now, as I emphasized before, that the right to the Corridor has been “recognized” for so long. On 28 April, Hitler demands consisted only of Danzig, the Autobahn, and the railway. But now Hitler’s aim was to manufacture justification and to put forth proposals which under no circumstances could either Poland or Great Britain accept. The note states:

“The British Government attach importance to two considerations:
(1) that the existing danger of an imminent explosion should be
eliminated as quickly as possible by direct negotiation, and (2)
that the existence of the Polish State, in the form in which it
would then continue to exist, should be adequately safeguarded
in the economic and political sphere by means of international
guarantees.

“On this subject, the German Government makes the following
declaration:

“Though skeptical as to the prospects of a successful outcome,
they are nevertheless prepared to accept the English proposal
and to enter into direct discussions. They do so, as has already
been emphasized, solely as the result of the impression made
upon them by the written statement received from the British
Government that they too desire a pact of friendship in
accordance with the general lines indicated to the British
Ambassador.”

* * * * * *

“For the rest, in making these proposals the German Government
have never had any intention of touching Poland’s vital
interests of questioning the existence of an independent Polish
State. The German Government, accordingly, in these
circumstances agree to accept the British Government’s offer of
their good offices in securing the despatch to Berlin of a
Polish Emissary with full powers. They count on the arrival of
this Emissary on Wednesday, the 30th August, 1939.

“The German Government will immediately draw up proposals for a
solution acceptable to themselves and will, if possible, place
these at the disposal of the British Government before the
arrival of the Polish negotiators.” (_TC-72 No. 78_)

That was at 7:15 in the evening of 29 August. As previously explained, insufficient time was allowed for the Polish Emissary to reach Berlin by midnight the following night.

Sir Neville Henderson’s account of his interview on the evening of 29 August summarizes what took place then:

“I remarked that this phrase sounded like an ultimatum, but
after some heated remarks both Herr Hitler and Herr von
Ribbentrop assured me that it was only intended to stress
urgency of the moment when the two fully mobilized armies were
standing face to face.” (_TC-72 No. 79_)

Again the British Government replied and Sir Neville Henderson handed this reply to Ribbentrop at the famous meeting on midnight of 30 August, at the time the Polish Emissary had been expected. The reply stated that the British Government reciprocated the desire for improved relations. It stressed again that it cannot sacrifice its interest to other friends in order to obtain an improvement in the situation. It understood that the German Government accepts the condition that the settlement should be subject to international guarantee. The British Government makes a reservation as to the demands that the Germans put forward in their last letter, and is informing the Polish Government immediately. Lastly, the British understand that the German Government is drawing up the proposals. (_TC-72 No. 89_)

Sir Neville Henderson gave this account of that interview at midnight on 30 August:

“I told Herr von Ribbentrop this evening that His Majesty’s
Government found it difficult to advise Polish Government to
accept procedure adumbrated in German reply, and suggested that
he should adopt normal contact, i.e., that when German proposals
were ready to invite Polish Ambassador to call and to hand him
proposals for transmission to his Government with a view to
immediate opening of negotiations. I added that if basis
afforded prospect of settlement His Majesty’s Government could
be counted upon to do their best in Warsaw to temporize
negotiations.

“Herr von Ribbentrop’s reply was to produce a lengthy document
which he read out in German aloud at top speed. Imagining that
he would eventually hand it to me I did not attempt to follow
too closely the sixteen or more articles which it contained.
Though I cannot therefore guarantee accuracy the main points
were: * * *”

* * * * * *

“When I asked Herr von Ribbentrop for text of these proposals in
accordance with undertaking the German reply of yesterday, he
asserted that it was now too late as Polish representative had
not arrived in Berlin by midnight.

“I observed that to treat matter in this way meant that request
for Polish representative to arrive in Berlin on 30th August
constituted in fact, an ultimatum in spite of what he and Herr
Hitler had assured me yesterday. This he denied, saying that
idea of an ultimatum was figment of my imagination. Why then I
asked could he not adopt normal procedure and give me copy of
proposals and ask Polish Ambassador to call on him, just as Herr
Hitler had summoned me a few days ago, and hand them to him for
communication to Polish Government. In the most violent terms
Herr von Ribbentrop said that he would never ask the Ambassador
to visit him. He hinted that if Polish Ambassador asked him for
interview it might be different. I said that I would naturally
inform my Government so at once. Whereupon he said while those
were his personal views he would bring all that I had said to
Herr Hitler’s notice. It was for Chancellor to decide.

“We parted on that note, but I must tell you that Herr von
Ribbentrop’s demeanor during an unpleasant interview was aping
Herr Hitler at his worst. He inveighed incidentally against
Polish mobilization, but I retorted that it was hardly
surprising since Germany had also mobilized as Herr Hitler
himself had admitted to me yesterday.” (_TC-72 No. 92_)

Henderson of course did not know at that time that Germany had also given the orders to attack Poland some days before. On the following day, 31 August, at 6:30 in the evening, M. Lipski, the Polish Ambassador, had an interview with Ribbentrop. This is M. Lipski’s account of the conversation:

“I carried out my instructions. M. von Ribbentrop asked if I had
special plenipotentiary powers to undertake negotiations. I said
no. He then asked whether I had been informed that on London’s
suggestion the German Government had expressed their readiness
to negotiate directly with a delegate of the Polish Government,
furnished with the requisite full powers, who was to have
arrived on the preceding day, August 30. I replied that I had no
direct information on the subject. In conclusion M. von
Ribbentrop repeated that he had thought I would be empowered to
negotiate. He would communicate my demarche to the Chancellor.”
(_TC-73 No. 112_)

But it was too late. The orders had already been given on that day to the German Army to invade. A “Most Secret order” signed by Hitler, described as his “Direction No. 1 for the conduct of the war,” dated 31 August 1939, reads in part:

“Now that all the political possibilities of disposing by
peaceful means of a situation of the Eastern Frontier which is
intolerable for Germany are exhausted, I have determined on a
solution by force.

“The attack on Poland is to be carried out in accordance with
the preparations made for ‘_Fall Weiss_’, with the alterations
which result, where the Army is concerned, from the fact that it
has in the meantime almost completed its dispositions.

“Allotment of tasks and the operational target remain unchanged.

“Date of attack—1 September 1939

“Time of attack—04:45 [inserted in red pencil]

“This time also applies to the operation at Gdynia, Bay of
Danzig and the Dirschau Bridge.

“In the West it is important that the responsibility for the
opening of hostilities should rest unequivocally with England
and France. At first purely local action should be taken against
insignificant frontier violations.” (_C-126_)

That evening, 31 August, at nine o’clock, the German radio broadcast the terms of the German proposals about which they were willing to enter into discussions with the Polish Government. The proposals were set out at length. By this time, neither Sir Neville Henderson nor the Polish Government nor their Ambassador had yet been given their written copy of them. This is a document which seems difficult to explain other than as an exhibition or an example of hypocrisy. The second paragraph states:

“Further, the German Government pointed out that they felt able
to make the basic points regarding the offer of an understanding
available to the British Government by the time the Polish
negotiator arrived in Berlin.”