Chapter V (3)

The Nazi conspirators’ diplomatic preparation for war is described in a second affidavit of George S. Messersmith (_2385-PS_), which may be summarized as follows: In 1933 the Nazis openly acknowledged the ambition to expand the territorial borders of the Reich to include Austria and Czechoslovakia. As for the other countries of Southeast Europe, the professed objective was stated at that time not in terms of territorial acquisition but rather in terms of political and economic control. And the stated objectives were not limited to Southeast Europe, for important Nazis even in 1933 were stating their desire for the Ukraine as the granary of Germany.

When they came to power, the Nazis had two principal objectives. They wanted to establish their power in Germany. And they wanted to rearm and establish Germany’s armed power. They wanted peace until they were ready. But they wanted to acquire the ability to carry out their program in Europe by force if necessary, although preferably by a threat of force. They accordingly embarked upon their vast rearmament program. It proceeded very rapidly. Goering and General Milch often said to Messersmith or in his presence that the Nazis were concentrating on air power in their rearmament, as the weapon of terror most likely to give Germany a dominant position and the weapon which could be developed most rapidly.

In addition to material preparation for war, there was preparation for war in the psychological sense. Throughout Germany youth of all ages could be observed in military exercises and field maneuvers.

Moreover, as Mr. Messersmith also observes,

“Military preparation and psychological preparation were coupled
with _diplomatic_ preparation designed to so disunite and
isolate their intended victims as to render them defenseless
against German aggression.” (_2385-PS_)

In 1933 the difficulties facing Germany in the political and diplomatic field loomed large. France was the dominant military power on the continent. She had woven a system of mutual assistance in the West and in the East. The Locarno Pact of 1928, supplemented by the Franco-Belgian alliance, guaranteed the territorial status quo in the West. Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania were allied in the Little Entente and each in turn was united with France by mutual assistance pacts. Since 1922, France and Poland had likewise been allied against external aggression. Italy had made plain her special interest in Austrian independence.

Nazi Germany launched a vigorous diplomatic campaign to break up the existing alliances and understandings, to create divisions among the members of the Little Entente and the other Eastern European powers.

Specifically, Nazi Germany countered these alliances with promises of economic gain for cooperating with Germans. To some of these countries she offered extravagant promises of territorial and economic rewards. She offered Carinthia, in Austria, to Yugoslavia. She offered part of Czechoslovakia to Hungary and part of Poland. She offered Yugoslav territory to Hungary at the same time that she was offering land in Hungary to Yugoslavia.

As Mr. Messersmith states in his affidavit:

“Austria and Czechoslovakia were the first on the German program
of aggression. As early as 1934, Germany began to woo neighbors
of these countries with promises of a share in the loot. To
Yugoslavia in particular they offered Carinthia. Concerning the
Yugoslav reaction, I reported at the time:

‘* * * The major factor in the internal situation in the
last week has been the increase in tension with respect
to the Austrian Nazi refugees in Yugoslavia. * * * There
is very little doubt but that Goering, when he made his
trip to various capitals in Southeastern Europe about
six months ago, told the Yugoslavs that they would get a
part of Carinthia, when a National Socialist Government
came into power in Austria. * * * The Nazi seed sown in
Yugoslavia has been sufficient to cause trouble and
there are undoubtedly a good many people there who look
with a great deal of benevolence on those Nazi refugees
who went to Yugoslavia in the days following July 25.’

“Germany made like promises of territorial gains to Hungary and
to Poland in order to gain their cooperation or at least their
acquiescence in the proposed dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. As
I learned from my diplomatic colleagues in Vienna, von Papen and
von Mackensen in Vienna and in Budapest in 1935, were spreading
the idea of division of Czechoslovakia, in which division
Germany was to get Bohemia, Hungary to get Slovakia, and Poland
the rest. This did not deceive any of these countries for they
knew that the intention of Nazi Germany was to take all.

“The Nazi German Government did not hesitate to make
inconsistent promises when it suited its immediate objectives. I
recall the Yugoslav Minister in Vienna saying to me in 1934 or
1935, that Germany had made promises to Hungary of Yugoslav
territory while at the same time promising to Yugoslavs portions
of Hungarian territory. The Hungarian Minister in Vienna later
gave me the same information.

“I should emphasize here in this statement that the men who made
these promises were not only the died-in-the-wool Nazis but more
conservative Germans who already had begun to willingly lend
themselves to the Nazi program. In an official despatch to the
Department of State from Vienna dated October 10, 1935, I wrote
as follows:

‘* * * Europe will not get away from the myth that
Neurath, Papen and Mackensen are not dangerous people
and that they are “diplomats of the old school.” They
are in fact servile instruments of the regime and just
because the outside world looks upon them as harmless,
they are able to work more effectively. They are able to
sow discord just because they propagate the myth that
they are not in sympathy with the regime.’” (_2385-PS_)

In other words, Nazi Germany was able to promote these divisions and increase its own aggressive strength by using as its agents in making these promises men who on outward appearances were merely conservative diplomats. It is true that Nazis openly scoffed at any notion of international obligations. It is true that the real trump in Germany’s hand was its rearmament and more than that its willingness to go to war. And yet the attitude of the various countries was not influenced by those considerations alone. Schuschnigg laid great stress upon, and was willing to go to some lengths to obtain, an assurance of independence. All these countries found it possible to believe apparently substantial personages, like von Neurath, for example. They were led to rely on the assurances given, which seemed more impressive since the diplomats making them were represented as men who were not Nazis and would not stoop to go along with the base designs of the Nazis.

Germany’s approach toward Great Britain and France was in terms of limited expansion as the price of peace. They signed a naval limitations treaty with England and discussed a Locarno Air Pact. In the case of both France and England, they limited their statement of intentions and harped on fears of Communism and war.

In making these various promises, Germany was untroubled by notions of the sanctity of international obligations. High-ranking Nazis, including Goering, Frick, and Frank, openly stated to Mr. Messersmith that Germany would observe her international undertakings only so long as it suited Germany’s interests to do so. As Mr. Messersmith states in his affidavit:

“High-ranking Nazis with whom I had to maintain official
contact, particularly men such as Goering, Goebbels, Ley, Frick,
Frank, Darré and others, repeatedly scoffed at my position as to
the binding character of treaties and openly stated to me that
Germany would observe her international undertakings only so
long as it suited Germany’s interests to do so. Although these
statements were openly made to me as they were, I am sure, made
to others, these Nazi leaders were not really disclosing any
secret for on many occasions they expressed the same ideas
publicly.” (_2385-PS_)

France and Italy worked actively in Southeastern Europe to counter Germany’s moves. France made attempts to promote an East Locarno Pact and to foster an economic accord between Austria and the other Danubian powers. Italy’s effort was to organize an economic bloc of Austria, Hungary, and Italy.

But Germany foiled these efforts by redoubling its promises of loot, by continuing its armament, and by another significant stratagem. The Nazis stirred up internal dissensions to disunite and weaken their intended victims. They supported the Austrian Nazis and the Henlein Party in Czechoslovakia. They probed what Goebbels called the “sore spots.” In Yugoslavia they played on the differences between the Croats and the Serbs, and in particular played on the fear of the restoration of the Hapsburgs in Austria, a fear which was very real in Yugoslavia. In Hungary, Poland, and Rumania they stirred up other fears and hatreds. These measures had considerable effect in preventing these countries from joining any which were opposed to German designs.

The Nazis consolidated their power in Germany very quickly. The German people became increasingly imbued with the Nazi military spirit. Within Germany, resistance to the Nazis disappeared. Army officers, including many who originally aided the Nazis with the limited objective of restoring the German Army, increasingly became imbued with aggressive designs as they saw how remarkably their power was growing.

The power of Nazi Germany outside the borders of the Reich increased correspondingly. Other countries feared its military might. Important political leaders in Yugoslavia, in Hungary, and in Poland became convinced that the Nazi regime would gain its ends and that the best course was to play along with Germany. These countries became apathetic toward the development of Anschluss with Austria and cooperative toward the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. Mr. Messersmith’s despatches from Europe to the State Department, setting out the developments in these countries, are included in his second affidavit. (_2385-PS_)

As for Italy, Germany’s initial objective was to sow discord between Yugoslavia and Italy, by promising Yugoslavia Italian territory, particularly Trieste. This was to prevent France from reaching agreement with them and to block an East Locarno Pact. As Mr. Messersmith states:

“While Italy openly opposed efforts at Anschluss with Austria in
1934, Italian ambitions in Abyssinia provided Germany with the
opportunity to sow discord between Italy and France and England,
and to win Italy over to acceptance of Germany’s program in
exchange for German support of Italy’s plans in Abyssinia.”
(_2385-PS_)

That paved the way for the Austro-German declaration of 11 July 1936. And in the Fall of 1936, Germany extended the hand of friendship and common purpose to Italy in an alliance—the Rome-Berlin Axis. This, together with Germany’s alliance with Japan, put increasing pressure on England and increased the relative strength of Germany.

And so, by means of careful preparation in the diplomatic field, among others, the Nazi conspirators had woven a position for themselves so that they could seriously consider plans for war and outline a timetable. That timetable was developed in the conference with Hitler in the Reichschancellery on 5 November 1937. (_386-PS_)

C. _Crystallization of the Plan to Wage Aggressive War in Europe and to Seize Austria and Czechoslovakia._

At the meeting of the conspirators in the Reichschancellery on 5 November 1937, the Fuehrer insisted that Germany should have more space in Europe (_386-PS_). It was concluded that the space required must be taken by force, three different cases were outlined as possibilities, and it was decided that the problem would have to be solved before the period 1943 to 1945. The nature of a war in the near future was envisaged, specifically against Austria and Czechoslovakia. Hitler said that for the improvement of Germany’s military political position the first aim of the Nazis in every case of entanglement by war must be to conquer Czechoslovakia and Austria simultaneously, in order to remove any threat from the flanks in case of a possible advance Westwards. Hitler then calculated that the conquest of Czechoslovakia and Austria would constitute the conquest of food for from five to six million people, assuming that the comprehensive emigration of one million from Austria could be carried out. He further pointed out that the annexation of the two states to Germany would constitute a considerable relief, both militarily and politically, since they would provide shorter and better frontiers, would free fighting personnel for other purposes, and would make possible the reconstitution of new armies. (_386-PS_)

The minutes of this meeting reveal a crystallization in the policy of the Nazi conspirators. It had always been their aim to acquire Austria. At the outset a revolutionary Putsch was attempted, using the personnel of the Austrian Nazis, but that failed. The next period was one of surface recognition of the independence of Austria and the use of devious means to strengthen the position of the Nazis internally in Austria. Now, however, it became clear that the need for Austria, in the light of the larger aggressive purposes of the Nazi conspirators, was sufficiently great to warrant the use of force in order to obtain Austria with the desired speed. The Nazis were, in fact, able to secure Austria, after having weakened it internally and removed from it the support of other nations, merely by setting the German military machine in motion and making a threat of force. The German armies were able to cross the border and secure the country without the necessity of firing a shot. Careful planning for war and the readiness to use war as an instrument of political action made it possible in the end for the Nazis to master Austria without having to fight for it.

The German High Command had previously considered preparations against Austria. On 24 June 1937 the Reich Minister for War and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, General von Blomberg, issued a Top Secret Directive (_C-175_). The importance of this directive, establishing a unified preparation of the Armed Forces for war, is indicated by the fact that the carbon copy received by the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy was one of only four copies. This directive from General von Blomberg stated that the general political situation indicated that Germany need not consider an attack from any side, and also that Germany did not intend to unleash a European war. It then stated, in point 1:

“Nevertheless the politically fluid world situation, which does
not preclude surprising incidents, demands a continuous
preparedness for war of the German Armed Forces.

“_a._ to counter attacks at any time

“_b._ to enable the military exploitation of politically
favorable opportunities should they occur.” (_C-175_)

The directive then indicated that there would be certain preparations of a general nature for war.

“2. The preparations of a general nature include:

“_a._ The permanent preparedness for mobilization of the
German Armed Forces, even before the completion of
rearmament and full preparedness for war.

“_b._ The further working on ‘Mobilization without
public announcement’ in order to put the Armed Forces in
a position to begin a war suddenly and by surprise both
as regards strength and time.” (_C-175_)

The directive finally indicated, in Part 3, that there might be special preparation for war in Austria:

“Armed intervention in Austria in the event of her restoring the
Monarchy.

“The object of this operation will be to compel Austria by armed
force to give up a restoration.

“Making use of the domestic political divisions of the Austrian
people, the march in will be made in the general direction of
Vienna and will break any resistance.” (_C-175_)

This plan is indicated in the document as having been superseded by new and more detailed plans following the meeting of November 5, 1937.

The plans of the conspirators were further revealed in two conversations held by William Bullitt, United States Ambassador to France with Schacht and with Goering in November, 1937. Both Schacht and Goering told Bullitt that Germany was determined to annex Austria. Goering further added that there could be no final solution of the Sudeten-German question other than inclusion in the Reich. (_L-151_)

D. _Pressure and Threats Resulting in Further Concessions: Berchtesgaden, 12 February 1938._

Chancellor Schuschnigg states in an affidavit (_2995-PS_) that in 1938 von Papen suggested to him that he should meet Hitler at Berchtesgaden. After several discussions Schuschnigg agreed to go, provided three conditions were met:

(1) He must be invited by Hitler.

(2) He must be previously informed of the precise agenda and assured
that the agreement of 11 July 1936 would be maintained.

(3) There was to be an agreement in advance that the communique to be published at the end of the meeting would affirm the 11 July 1936 agreement.

Von Papen brought back word from Hitler inviting Schuschnigg and agreeing with these conditions, particularly the maintenance of the July 1936 treaty. (_2995-PS_)

The official German communique of this conference between Hitler and Schuschnigg at Obersalzberg on 12 February 1938 was calm (_2461-PS_). The communique stated that the unofficial meeting was caused by the mutual desire to clarify by personal conversations the questions relating to the relationship between the German Reich and Austria. The communique listed, as among those present, Schuschnigg and his Foreign Minister Schmidt, Hitler and his Foreign Minister Ribbentrop, and von Papen. The communique concluded: “Both statesmen are convinced that the measures taken by them constitute at the same time an effective contribution toward the peaceful development of the European situation.” (_2461-PS_). A similar communique was issued by the Austrian Government.

In fact, as a result of the conference great concessions were obtained by the German Government from Austria. The principal concessions are contained in the official Austrian communique dated 16 February 1938 (_2464-PS_). The communique announced a reorganization of the Austrian Cabinet, including the appointment of Seyss-Inquart to the position of Minister of Security and Interior. In addition, announcement was made of a general political amnesty to Nazis convicted of crimes. (_2464-PS_)

Two days later, on 18 February 1938, another concession was divulged in the official German and Austrian communique concerning the equal rights of Austrian National Socialists in Austria (_2469-PS_). The communique announced that pursuant to the Berchtesgaden conference, the Austrian National Socialists would be taken into the Fatherland Front, the single legal political party of Austria.

Schuschnigg’s affidavit on his Berchtesgaden visit on February 12, 1938 (_2995-PS_) points out that considerable pressure was brought to bear on him at the Berghof. Several Generals—Keitel, Sperrle, and Reichenau, names which were omitted from the formal communique later issued—were present on his arrival. The conference started with a two-hour conference between Schuschnigg and Hitler alone. Hitler made no precise demands but attacked Schuschnigg violently. In the words of the affidavit:

“I furthermore state and affirm that, immediately after arriving
at the Berghof, I commenced a conference with Hitler. Hitler and
I were alone for two hours. Hitler attacked in a violent manner
the politics of Austria, both of the past and present. He
furthermore informed me that he, Hitler, had ‘decided to bring
the Austrian question to a solution so-or-so, even if he had to
immediately use military force.’ At no time during the first two
hours of our conversation did Hitler ever make any precise
demands or requests of me, but spent the whole of the two hours
accusing me and menacing me as a traitor to Austrian politics.
Especially he informed me that, according to his knowledge,
Austria could no longer reckon with any assistance from other
European Powers, and that Austria now stood alone in the world.
He furthermore added—‘Schuschnigg, you now have the chance to
put your name alongside the names of other famous German
leaders, such as Goering, Hess, Frick, Epp, Goebbels, and
others.’ * * * “. (_2995-PS_)

After Hitler’s violent threats, Schuschnigg had discussions of a calmer nature with von Ribbentrop and von Papen. They talked soothingly and comfortingly to Schuschnigg but reached the same conclusion, that he should yield to German demands, which in practical effect meant Nazi control of the Government of Austria.

“I furthermore state and affirm that I was next called before
Joachim von Ribbentrop with my Secretary for Foreign Affairs,
Guido Schmidt, and, in the presence of Franz von Papen,
Ribbentrop exhibited to me a typewritten draft containing the
conditions and demands made by Hitler upon me and Austria. He
furthermore added that Hitler has informed me, Ribbentrop, ‘that
these demands that I now offer to you are the final demands of
the Fuehrer and that he, Hitler, is not prepared to further
discuss them’. He further stated that, ‘you must accept the
whole of these demands herein contained’. Ribbentrop then
advised me to accept the demands at once. I protested, and
referred him to my previous agreements with von Papen, made
prior to coming to Berchtesgaden, and made it clear to
Ribbentrop that I was not prepared to be confronted with such
unreasonable demands as he had then and there placed before me.
Von Papen, still present, apologized and informed me that he,
von Papen, was entirely surprised and not at all informed about
the aims of the Fuehrer, as here laid down. He further stated,
and informed me, that he, von Papen, could only offer his advice
and that he should now accede to, and sign, these demands. He
furthermore informed me that I could be assured that Hitler
would take care that, if I signed these demands and acceded to
them, that from that time on Germany would remain loyal to this
Agreement and that there would be no further difficulties for
Austria.” (_2995-PS_)

Finally, after obtaining some minor concessions from Ribbentrop, Schuschnigg met with Hitler again. This time Hitler not only put pressure upon Schuschnigg, but also, upon learning that the approval of President Miklas of Austria was necessary, indicated clearly to Schuschnigg that military action would follow if Miklas did not approve the agreement. In the words of Schuschnigg’s affidavit:

“I further state and say, that I then went before Hitler again.
Hitler was very excited and informed me that he would make a
final test with Austria, and stated further: ‘that you must
fulfill the conditions of the demands made by me on you within
three days, or else I will order the march into Austria.’ I
replied: ‘I am not able to take over the obligation to fulfill
your demands, for I am only the Chancellor of Austria, and that
obligation you attempt to place upon me is the duty only of the
Federal President, Miklas; I am only able to sign the draft and,
when I arrive in Vienna, to present it to the Federal
President’. Hitler then flung open the door and yelled ‘Keitel’.
At the same time, Hitler asked me to wait outside. Keitel then
came in to Hitler. After twenty minutes or more I was again
called before Hitler and, when before him, he, Hitler, informed
me as follows: ‘For the first time in my life, I have changed my
mind. You must sign the demands that I have made upon you, then
report them to the Federal President, Miklas, and within three
days from now Austria must fulfill the Agreement, otherwise
things will take their natural course’. I then agreed to sign
the demands and, while waiting in Hitler’s private room, he,
Hitler, in an entirely changed mood, said to Franz von Papen,
who was also present, ‘Herr von Papen, through your assistance I
was appointed Chancellor of Germany and thus the Reich was saved
from the abyss of communism. I will never forget that’. Papen
replied: ‘_Jawohl, Mein Fuehrer_’.

“I furthermore say and affirm that I, in the presence of
Ribbentrop, Guido Schmidt, von Papen, and Hitler, signed the
demands, and retained a copy for the Austrian Government. “I
further state and affirm that, on the way back to Vienna from
Berchtesgaden, Franz von Papen accompanied me and my party.
Between the Berghof and Berchtesgaden, von Papen informed me as
follows: ‘Now, you have your own impression of how excited the
Fuehrer can get, but that happens very seldom, and I am
convinced that the next time you meet him, you will have an
amicable conversation with him.’” (_2995-PS_)

The pressure put on Schuschnigg at Berchtesgaden is also disclosed in von Papen’s notes on his last meeting with Schuschnigg, on 26 February 1938, the last two paragraphs of which read:

“I then introduced into the conversation the widespread opinion
that he had acted under ‘brutal pressure’ in Berchtesgaden. I
myself had been present and been able to state that he had
always and at every point had complete freedom of decision. The
Chancellor replied he had actually been under considerable moral
pressure, he could not deny that. He had made notes on the talk
which bore that out. I reminded him that despite this talk he
had not seen his way clear to make any concessions, and I asked
him whether without the pressure he would have been ready to
make the concessions he made late in the evening. He answered:
‘To be honest, no!’ It appears to me of importance to record
this statement.” (_1544-PS_)

For diplomatic purposes von Papen, who had been at Berchtesgaden, kept up the pretense that there had been no pressure. But General Jodl, writing the account of current events for his diary, was more candid. This hand-written diary discloses not only the pressure at Berchtesgaden but also the fact that for some days thereafter, General Keitel and Admiral Canaris worked out a scheme for shamming military pressure, in order to coerce President Miklas into ratifying the agreement. And so the Nazi conspirators kept up the military pressure, with threats of invasion, for some days after the Berchtesgaden conference, in order to produce the desired effect on Miklas. (_1780-PS_)

The following entries, for Feb. 11-Feb. 14 were made in Jodl’s diary:

“_11 February_:

“In the evening and on 12 February General K. with General V.
Reichenau and Sperrle at the Obersalzberg. Schuschnigg together
with G. Schmidt are again being put under heaviest political and
military pressure. At 2300 hours Schuschnigg signs protocol.

“_13 February_:

“In the afternoon General K. asks Admiral C. and myself to come
to his apartment. He tells us that the Fuehrer’s order is to the
effect that military pressure by shamming military action should
be kept up until the 15th. Proposals for these deceptive
maneuvers are drafted and submitted to the Fuehrer by telephone
for approval.

“_14 February_:

“At 2:40 o’clock the agreement of the Fuehrer arrives. Canaris
went to Munich to the Counter-Intelligence office VII and
initiates the different measures.

“The effect is quick and strong. In Austria the impression is
created that Germany is undertaking serious military
preparations.” (_1780-PS_)

The proposals for deceptive maneuvers mentioned by Jodl were
signed by Keitel. Underneath his signature appeared a pencilled
note that the Fuehrer approved the proposals. Among the rumors
which Keitel proposed for the intimidation of Austria were the
following:

“1. To take no real preparatory measures in the Army or
Luftwaffe. No troop movements or redeployments.

“2. Spread false, but quite credible news, which may lead to the
conclusion of military preparations against Austria.

“_a._ through V-men (V-Maenner) in Austria,

“_b._ through our customs personnel (staff) at the
frontier,

“_c._ through travelling agents.

“3. Such news could be:

“_a._ Furloughs are supposed to have been barred in the
Sector of the VII A.K.

“_b._ (Rolling Stock) is being assembled in Munich,
Augsburg, and Regensburg.

“_c._ Major General Muff, the Military Attache in Vienna
has been called for a conference to Berlin. (As a matter
of fact, this is the case).

“_d._ The Police Stations located at the frontier of
Austria, have called up reinforcements.

“_e._ Custom officials report about the imminent
maneuvers of the Mountain Brigade (_Gebirgsbrigade_) in
the region of Freilassing, Reichenhall and
Berchtesgaden.” (_1775-PS_)

The pattern of intimidation and rumor was effective, for in due course, as is shown in the communiques already referred to, President Miklas ratified the Berchtesgaden agreement, which foreshadowed a National Socialist Austria.

E. _Events Culminating in the German Invasion on 12 March 1938._

(1) _The Plebiscite._ The day after his appointment as Minister of the Interior, Seyss-Inquart flew to Berlin for a conference with Hitler. (_2484-PS_)

On 9 March 1938, three weeks after Seyss-Inquart had been put in charge of the police, Schuschnigg announced that he would hold a plebiscite throughout Austria on the following Sunday, 13 March 1938. The question was: “Are you for an independent and social, a Christian, German and united Austria?” A “yes” answer to this question was clearly compatible with the agreement made by the German Government on 11 July 1936, and carried forward at Berchtesgaden on 12 February 1938. Moreover, for a long while the Nazis had been demanding a plebiscite on the question of Anschluss. But the Nazis apparently appreciated the likelihood of a strong “yes” vote on the question put by Schuschnigg, and they could not tolerate the possibility of such a vote of confidence in the Schuschnigg Government. They took this occasion to overturn the Austrian Government.

Although the Plebiscite was not announced until the evening of 9 March, the Nazi Organization received word about it earlier in the day. It was determined by the Nazis that they had to ask Hitler what to do about the situation, and that they would prepare a letter of protest against the Plebiscite from Seyss-Inquart to Schuschnigg, and that pending Hitler’s approval, Seyss-Inquart would pretend to negotiate with Schuschnigg about details of the plebiscite.

In the words of Gauleiter Rainer’s report to Reichscommissioner Buerckel:

“The _Landesleitung_ received word about the planned plebiscite
through illegal information services, on 9 March 1938 at 10 a.
m. At the session which was called immediately afterwards,
Seyss-Inquart explained that he had known about this for only a
few hours, but that he could not talk about it because he had
given his word to keep silent on this subject. But during the
talks he made us understand that the illegal information we
received was based on truth, and that in view of the new
situation, he had been cooperating with the _Landesleitung_ from
the very first moment. Klausner, Jury, Rainer, Globocnik and
Seyss-Inquart were present at the first talks which were held at
10 a. m. There it was decided that first, the Fuehrer had to be
informed immediately; secondly, the opportunity for the Fuehrer
to intervene must be given to him by way of an official
declaration made by Minister Seyss-Inquart to Schuschnigg; and
thirdly, Seyss-Inquart must negotiate with the government until
clear instructions and orders were received from the Fuehrer.
Seyss-Inquart and Rainer together composed a letter to
Schuschnigg, and only one copy of it was brought to the Fuehrer
by Globocnik, who flew to him on the afternoon of 9 March 1938.”
(_812-PS_)

(2) _Germany’s Preparation for the Use of Force._ When news of the Plebiscite reached Berlin, it started a tremendous amount of activity. Hitler was determined not to tolerate the plebiscite. Accordingly, he called his military advisers and ordered preparation for the march into Austria. He made diplomatic preparations by explaining in a letter to Mussolini the reasons why he was going to march into Austria. In the absence of von Ribbentrop, who was temporarily detained in London, von Neurath took over the affairs of the Foreign Office again.

The terse and somewhat disconnected notes in General Jodl’s diary give a vivid account of the activity in Berlin. The entry for the 10th of March 1938 reads:

“By surprise and without consulting his ministers, Schuschnigg
ordered a plebiscite for Sunday, 13, March, which should bring
strong majority for the Legitimists in the absence of plan or
preparation.

“Fuehrer is determined not to tolerate it. The same night, March
9 to 10, he calls for Goering. General v. Reichenau is called
back from Cairo Olympic Committee. General v. Schebert is
ordered to come, as well as Minister Glaise Horstenau, who is
with the District leader (_Gauleiter_) Buerckel in the
Palatinate. General Keitel communicates the facts at 1:45. He
drives to the Reichskanzlei at 10 o’clock. I follow at 10:15,
according to the wish of General v. Viebahn, to give him the old
draft.

“Prepare case Otto.

“1300 hours: General K informs Chief of Operational Staff (and)
Admiral Canaris. Ribbentrop is being detained in London. Neurath
takes over the Foreign Office.

“Fuehrer wants to transmit ultimatum to the Austrian Cabinet. A
personal letter is dispatched to Mussolini and the reasons are
developed which force the Fuehrer to take action.

“1830 hours: Mobilization order is given to the Command of the
8th Army (Corps Area 3) 7th and 13th Army Corps; without reserve
Army.” (_1780-PS_)

In a directive of the Supreme High Command of the Armed Forces, dated 11 March 1938 and initialed by Jodl and Keitel, Hitler stated his mixed political and military intentions:

“1. If these measures prove unsuccessful, I intend to invade
Austria with armed forces to establish constitutional conditions
and to prevent further outrages against the pro-German
population.

* * * * * *

“4. The forces of the Army and Air Force detailed for this
operation must be ready for invasion and/or ready for action on
the 12th of March 1938 at the latest from 1200 hours.

“I reserve the right to give permission for crossing and flying
over the frontier, and to decide the actual moment for invasion.

“5. The behavior of the troops must give the impression that we
do not want to wage war against our Austrian brothers. It is in
our interest that the whole operation shall be carried out
without any violence but in the form of a peaceful entry
welcomed by the population. Therefore any provocation is to be
avoided. If, however, resistance is offered it must be broken
ruthlessly by force of arms.” (_C-102_)

An implementing directive of 11 March 1938 issued by Jodl provided further:

“If Czechoslovakian troops or militia units are encountered in
Austria, they are to be regarded as hostile.

“The Italians are everywhere to be treated as friends especially
as Mussolini has declared himself uninterested in the solution
of the Austrian Question”. (_C-103_)

The military preparations for invasion were complete.

(3) _The Events of 11 March in Austria._ The events of 11 March 1938 in Austria are available in three separate accounts. Although these accounts differ in some minor details, they afford each other almost complete corroboration with regard to the way in which the German Government deprived Austria of its sovereignty.

The first account is contained in a third affidavit executed by Schuschnigg (_2996-PS_). Schuschnigg first states that he had been discussing the plebiscite with Seyss-Inquart, and that Seyss-Inquart had made some procedural objections but in general indicated his general willingness to support the plebiscite. Schuschnigg went to bed on March 10 thinking the plebiscite would be a success. But on the morning of March 11 he was told that traffic from Germany had stopped, and that German Army forces were moving to the border. After 10 a. m. Seyss-Inquart came to Schuschnigg’s office with Glaise-Horstenau. Glaise-Horstenau had just come from Berlin and reported that Hitler was in a rage. (_2996-PS_)

Schuschnigg’s affidavit then relates the three ultimatums presented by the German Government:

“Seyss-Inquart was then and there called to the telephone and,
upon his return, read to me from a scrap of paper which he held
in his hand, the contents of a telephone call which he alleged
was just then received by him from Goering in Berlin. The
contents as he read it to me was as follows: ‘The Chancellor
must revoke the proposed plebiscite within the time of one hour,
and after three or four weeks, Austria must oblige herself to
carry out a plebiscite concerning the Anschluss according to the
SAAR status, otherwise the German Army is ordered to pass the
Austrian frontier’.

“I further state and say that after informing the Federal
President of this demand made on Austria by Germany, we decided
to recall the Plebiscite, and thereupon I informed Seyss-Inquart
and Glaise-Horstenau of our intentions.

“Seyss-Inquart said that he would go to the telephone and inform
Goering in Berlin concerning the decision of the Austrian
Government, at that time made. In a few minutes, he,
Seyss-Inquart, returned to my office, and informed me further,
as follows:

‘I have had a telephone conversation with Goering, and
Goering has ordered me to inform the Federal Chancellor
Schuschnigg, as follows:

‘“The situation can only be saved for Austria when
Schuschnigg resigns as the Chancellor of Austria within
two hours and Seyss-Inquart is appointed as the new
Chief of the Austrian Government; if Seyss-Inquart does
not inform me, Goering, within two hours, I, Goering,
will suppose that you are hindered from doing so”’.

“I then reported to the Federal President the new developments,
and, after some conversation with him and other members of the
Government, I decided to resign. The Federal President
reluctantly accepted my resignation at 3:30 p. m. on the
afternoon of the 11th of March 1938. He expressed himself
unwilling to appoint Seyss-Inquart as the Federal Chancellor—he
therefore asked me to continue my duties as caretaker Chancellor
until he had decided who would succeed me as Federal Chancellor.
I accepted and remained as ‘caretaker Chancellor’ from 3:30 p.
m., 11 March 1938 until about 11:30 p. m. the same night, when
Seyss-Inquart was appointed to the position of Federal
Chancellor.

“I further state and say that at about 3:30 p. m. on the
afternoon of 11 March 1938, the Foreign Office of the Austrian
Government contacted the Embassy of Germany in Vienna, to
ascertain if the demands that had been then and there made by
Goering on Austria were the official demands of the German
Government. The Military Attache of Germany in Vienna, one
Lieutenant General Muff, came before the Austrian Federal
President, and repeated the contents of the German ultimatums
that had previously been delivered to us by Seyss-Inquart.

“I furthermore state and say, that the Federal President, at
about 7:30 or 8:00 o’clock p. m. on the night of 11 March 1938
ordered me, as caretaker Chancellor, to broadcast the events of
the day and to protest against the demands made on Austria
during that day by Germany. Furthermore, to inform the world
that Austria had been forced to give in to those demands of
Germany through superior force * * *.” (_2996-PS_)

The report from Gauleiter Rainer to Reichscommissioner Buerckel also discusses the events of March 11. In general, Rainer’s report corroborates Schuschnigg’s affidavit. (_812-PS_)

Another document recalls vividly the events of 11 March 1938. This document, which was found in a building of the courtyard of the German Air Ministry, is a binder containing typed transcripts of some 27 telephone conversations, held in Goering’s office in the Air Ministry on 11 March 1938 and up to 14 March 1938. Most of the conversations were conducted by Goering, although at least one was held by Hitler (_2949-PS_). (For purposes of convenience these telephone calls are marked with an identifying letter, running from A through Z and then beginning again with AA).

The first group of conversations took place between Field Marshal Goering, who was identified as F., and Seyss-Inquart, who was identified as S. The transcript is in part, in the language of these two persons and is in part a summary of the actual conversations. At 2:45 p. m. the following conversation occurred:

“F: How do you do, doctor. My brother-in-law, is he with you?

“S: No.

“Thereupon the conversation took approximately the following
turn:

“F: How are things with you? Have you resigned, or do you have
any news?

“S. The Chancellor has cancelled the elections for Sunday, and
therefore he has put S. and the other gentlemen in a difficult
situation. Besides having called off the elections, extensive
precautionary measures are being ordered, among others curfew at
8 p. m.

“F: Replied that in his opinion the measures taken by Chancellor
Schuschnigg were not satisfactory in any respect. At this moment
he could not commit himself officially. F. will take a clear
stand very shortly. In calling off the elections, he could see a
postponement only, not a change of the present situation which
had been brought about by the behavior of the Chancellor
Schuschnigg in breaking the Berchtesgaden agreement.

“Thereupon a conversation took place between F. and the Fuehrer.
Afterwards F. phoned again S. This conversation was held at
15:05.

“F: Told S. that Berlin did not agree whatsoever with the
decision made by Chancellor Schuschnigg since he did not enjoy
any more the confidence of our government because he had broken
the Berchtesgaden agreement, and therefore further confidence in
his future actions did not exist. Consequently, the National
Minister, S. and the others, are being requested to immediately
hand in their resignation to the Chancellor, and also to ask the
Chancellor to resign. F. added that if after a period of one
hour no report had come through the assumption would be made
that S. would no more be in the position to phone. That would
mean that the gentlemen had handed in their resignations. S. was
then told to send the telegram to the Fuehrer as agreed upon. As
a matter of course, an immediate commission by the Federal
President for S. to form a new cabinet would follow
Schuschnigg’s resignation.” (_2949-PS, Part A_)

Thus Goering told Seyss-Inquart that it was not enough for Schuschnigg to cancel the election. And twenty minutes later he telephoned Seyss-Inquart to state that Schuschnigg must resign. When informed at about an hour later that Schuschnigg had resigned, he pointed out that in addition it was necessary to have Seyss-Inquart at the head of the Cabinet.

An hour later Goering phoned Dombrowski at the German Embassy in Vienna. He was concerned that the Nazi Party and all its formations should be legalized promptly:

“Goering: Now to go on. The Party has definitely been legalized?

“Dombrowski: But that is * * * it isn’t necessary to even
discuss that.

“Goering: With all of its organizations.

“Dombrowski: With all of its organizations within this country.

“Goering: In uniform?

“Dombrowski: In uniform.

“Goering: Good.

“Dombrowski: calls attention to the fact that the SA and SS have
already been on duty for one-half hour which means everything is
all right.” (_2949-PS, Part C_)

In addition Goering stated that the Cabinet must be formed by 7:30 p. m., and he transmitted instructions, to be delivered to Seyss-Inquart, as to who should be appointed to the cabinet:

“Goering: Yes, and by 7:30 he also must talk with the Fuehrer
and as to the Cabinet, Keppler will bring you the names. One
thing I have forgotten, Fishbeck must have the Department of
Economy and Commerce.

“Dombrowski: That’s understood.

“Goering: Kaltenbrunner is to have the Department of Security
and Bahr is to have the armed forces. The Austrian Army is to be
taken by Seyss-Inquart himself and you know all about the
Justice Department.

“Dombrowski: Yes, yes.

“Goering: Give me the name.

“Dombrowski: Well, your brother-in-law. Isn’t that right?

“Goering: Yes?

“Dombrowski: Yes.

“Goering: That’s right and then also Fishbeck.” (_2949-PS, Part
C_)

About twenty minutes later, at 5:26 p. m., Goering received the news that Miklas was refusing to appoint Seyss-Inquart as Chancellor. He issued instructions for an ultimatum to be delivered to Miklas. The telephone conversation between Goering and Seyss-Inquart went as follows:

“G: Now remember the following: You go immediately together with
Lt. General Muff and tell the Federal President that if the
conditions which are known to you are not accepted immediately,
the troops who are already stationed at and advancing to the
frontier will march in tonight along the whole line, and Austria
will cease to exist. Lt. General Muff should go with you and
demand to be admitted for conference immediately. Please, do
inform us immediately about Miklas’ position. Tell him, there is
no time now for any joke. Just through the false report we
received before action was delayed, but now the situation is
that tonight the invasion will begin from all the corners of
Austria. The invasion will be stopped and the troops will be
held at the border only if we are informed by 7:30 that Miklas
has entrusted you with the Federal Chancellorship. (There
follows a sentence which is broken up) M. does not matter
whatever it might be, the immediate restoration of the Party
with all its organizations (again interruption) and then call
out all the National Socialists all over the country. They
should now be in the streets. So remember, report must be given
till 7:30. Lt. General Muff is supposed to come along with you.
I shall inform him immediately. If Miklas could not understand
it in 4 hours, we shall make him understand it now in 4
minutes.” (_2949-PS, Part E_)

An hour later, at 6:28 p. m. Goering had an extensively interrupted telephone conversation with Keppler and Muff and Seyss-Inquart. When told that Miklas had refused to appoint Seyss-Inquart, Goering replied:

“Goering: Well, then Seyss-Inquart has to dismiss him; just go
upstairs again and just tell him plainly that SI shall call on
the National Socialists guard, and in 5 minutes the troops will
march in by my order”. (_2949-PS, Part H_)

After an interruption, Seyss-Inquart came to the telephone and informed Goering that Miklas was still sticking to his old viewpoint, although a new person had gone in to talk to him and there might be definite word in about ten minutes. The conversation proceeded as follows:

“G: Listen, so I shall wait a few more minutes, till he comes
back, then you inform me via Blitz conversation in the Reich
Chancellery—as usually, but it has to be done fast. I hardly
can justify it as a matter of fact. I am not entitled to do so;
if it cannot be done, then you have to take over the power; all
right?

“S. But if he threatens?

“G. Yes.

“S. Well, I see, then we shall be ready (_antreten_).

“G. Call me via Blitz.” (_2949-PS, Part H_)

It is plain that Goering and Seyss-Inquart had agreed on a plan for Seyss-Inquart to take over power if Miklas remained obdurate. The plan involved both the use of the National Socialist forces in Austria and invasion by German troops.

Later that night, at about 8:00 o’clock, Goering and Seyss-Inquart had another conversation. This was after the ultimatum had expired. Seyss-Inquart informed Goering that Miklas was still refusing to name Seyss-Inquart as Chancellor. The conversation then proceeded as follows:

“G: O.K. I shall give the order to march in and then you make
sure that you get the power. Notify the leading people about the
following which I shall tell you now! Everyone who offers
resistance or organizes resistance, will immediately be
subjected to our court-martial, the court-martial of our
invading troops. Is that clear?

“S: Yes.

“G: Including leading personalities, it doesn’t make any
difference.

“S: Yes, they have given the order, not to offer any resistance.

“G: Yes, it does not matter: The Federal President did not
authorize you, and that also can be considered as resistance.

“S: Yes.

“G: Well, now you are officially authorized.

“S: Yes.

“G: Well, good luck, Heil Hitler.” (_2349-PS, Part I_)

Another historical event—the famous telegram which Seyss-Inquart sent to the German Government requesting it to send troops into Austria to help put down disorder—was discussed over the telephone. A conversation held at 8:48 between Goering and Keppler proceeded as follows:

“G: Well, I do not know yet. Listen: The main thing is, that
Inquart takes over all powers of the Government, that he keeps
the radio stations occupied.

“K: Well, we represent the Government now.

“G: Yes, that’s it. You are the Government. Listen carefully:
The following telegram should be sent here by Seyss-Inquart.
Take the notes:

‘The provisional Austrian Government which after the
dismissal of the Schuschnigg Government, consider it its
task to establish peace and order in Austria, sends to
the German Government the urgent request, to support it
in its task and to help it to prevent bloodshed. For
this purpose it asks the German Government to send
German troops as soon as possible’.

“K: Well, SA and SS are marching through the streets, but
everything is quiet. Everything has collapsed with the
professional groups (?)” (_2949-PS, Part L_)

And a few minutes later the conversation continued as follows:

“G: Then our troops will cross the border today.

“K: Yes.

“G: Well, and he should send the telegram as soon as possible.

“K: Will send the telegram to SI in the office of the Federal
Chancery.

“G: Please, show him, the text of the telegram and do tell him
that we are asking him—well, he does not even have to send the
telegram—all he needs to do is to say: agreed.

“K: Yes.

“G: Either call me at the Fuehrer’s or at my place. Well, good
luck. Heil Hitler!” (_2949-PS, Part L_)

It will be recalled that in the first conversation (Part A), held at 3:05 p. m., Goering had requested Seyss-Inquart to send the telegram agreed upon. But now the matter was so urgent that Goering dictated the exact wording of the telegram over the telephone.

And an hour later, at 9:54 p. m., a conversation between Dr. Dietrich in Berlin and Keppler in Vienna went as follows:

“D: I need the telegram urgently.

“K: Tell the General Field Marshal that Seyss-Inquart agrees.

“D: This is marvelous. Thank you.

“K: Listen to the radio. News will be given.

“D: Where?

“K: From Vienna.

“D: So Seyss-Inquart agrees?

“K: _Jawohl!_” (_2949-PS, Part M_)

(4) _The Order to Invade Austria._ Communications with Austria were now suspended. But the German military machine had been set in motion. A Directive, dated 11 March 1938 at 2045 hours, from Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, initialled by General Jodl and signed by Hitler, ordered the invasion of Austria because of its failure to comply with the German ultimatum. The directive reads:

“Re: Operation Otto

“_Directive No. 2_

“1. The demands of the German ultimatum to the Austrian
government have not been fulfilled.

“2. The Austrian Armed Forces have been ordered to withdraw in
front of the entry of German troops and to avoid fighting.

“The Austrian Government has ceased to function of its own
accord.

“3. To avoid further bloodshed in Austrian towns, the entry of
the German Armed Forces into Austria will commence, according to
directive No. 1, at daybreak on 12.3.

“I expect the set objectives to be reached by exerting all
forces to the full, as quickly as possible.

(signed) ADOLF HITLER” (_C-182_)

(5) _Communications with Rome—Avoidance of Disaster._ But at the very time that Hitler and Goering had embarked on this military undertaking, they still had a question mark in their minds—Italy. Italy had massed forces on the Italian-Austrian border on the occasion of the 25 July 1934 putsch. Italy had traditionally been the political protector of Austria.

At 10:25 p. m. that evening, however, Hitler heard from Prince Philip of Hessen, his Ambassador at Rome, that he had just returned from the Palazzo Venezia, and Mussolini had accepted the whole affair in a very-friendly manner. The telephone conversation went thus:

“Hesen: I have just come back from Palazzo Venezia. The Duce accepted the whole thing in a very-friendly manner. He sends you his regards. He had been informed from Austria, Schuschnigg gave him the news. He had then said it would be a complete impossibility. It would be a bluff, such a thing could not be done. So he was told that it was unfortunately arranged thus and it could not be changed any more. Then Mussolini said that Austria would be immaterial to him.

“Fuehrer: Then, please, tell Mussolini, I will never forget him for this.

“H: Yes.

“F: Never, never, never, whatever happens. I am still ready to make a quite different agreement with him.

“H: Yes, I told him that, too.

“F: As soon as the Austrian affair has been settled, I shall be ready to go with him through thick and thin, nothing matters.

“H: Yes, my Fuehrer.

“F: Listen, I shall make any agreement—I am no longer in fear of the terrible position which would have existed militarily in case we had gotten into a conflict. You may tell him that I do thank him ever so much, never, never shall I forget that.

“H: Yes, my Fuehrer.

“F: I will never forget it, whatever will happen. If he should ever need any help or be in any danger, he can be convinced that I shall stick to him whatever might happen, even if the whole world were against him.

“H: Yes, my Fuehrer.” (_2949-PS, Part N_)

It will be recalled that Jodl referred in his diary (_1780-PS_) to the letter which Hitler sent to Mussolini. In this letter, dated 11 March 1938, after stating that Austria had been declining into anarchy, Hitler wrote: “I have decided to reestablish order in my Fatherland, order and tranquility, and to give to the popular will the possibility of settling its own fate in unmistakable fashion openly and by its own decision.” He stated that this was only an act of self-defense, that he had no hostile intentions toward Italy. (_2510-PS_)

After the invasion, when in Linz, Austria, Hitler communicated his gratitude to Mussolini once more, this time by telegraph: “Mussolini, I will never forget you for this.” (_2467-PS_)

(6) _The Appointment of Seyss-Inquart as Chancellor._ Late in the evening of March 11, President Miklas appointed Seyss-Inquart as Chancellor. The radio announcement of Seyss-Inquart’s appointment was made at 11:15 p. m. (_2465-PS_)

(7) _Later Communications with London—Misleading Explanations._ On Sunday, 13 March 1938, the day after the invasion, Goering, who had been left in charge of the Reich by Hitler, telephoned Ribbentrop in London. Their conversation disclosed the way in which the Nazis soothed and misled other nations: