Chapter XXXVIII: Part II (2)

After Hitler had remilitarized the Rhineland and had repudiated the Locarno Pact, England and France sought to reestablish the position of security for Belgium which Hitler’s action had threatened. They, therefore, themselves gave to Belgium on the 24th April 1937, a specific guarantee that they would maintain in respect of Belgium, undertakings of assistance which they had entered into with her both under the Locarno Pact and the Covenant of the League of Nations. On the 13th October 1937 the German Government also made a declaration assuring Belgium of its intention to recognize the inviolability and integrity of that country.

It is, perhaps, convenient to deal with the remaining assurances as we review the evidence which is available as to the preparations and intentions of the German Government prior to their invasion of Belgium on the 10th May 1940.

As in the case of Poland, as in the case of Norway and Denmark, so also here the dates speak for themselves.

As early as August 1938 steps were being made to utilize the Low Countries as defense bases for decisive action in the West in the event of France and England opposing Germany in its aggression upon Czechoslovakia.

In an air force letter dated 25th August 1938 which deals with the action to be taken if England and France should interfere in the operation against Czechoslovakia, it is stated:

“It is not expected for the moment that other States will
intervene against Germany. The Dutch and the Belgian area
assumes in this connection much more importance for the
prevention of the war in Western Europe than during the world
war. This mainly is an advance base for the air war.” (_375-PS_)

In the last paragraph of that order it is stated “Belgium and the Netherlands when in German hands represent an extraordinary advantage in the prosecution of the air war against Great Britain as well as against France.” (_375-PS_)

That was in August 1938. Eight months later (on the 28th April 1939) Hitler is declaring again, “I was pleased that a number of European states availed themselves of this declaration by the German Government to express and emphasize their desire to have absolute neutrality.”

A month later, on the 23d May, 1939, Hitler held the conference in the Reich Chancellery, to which we have already referred. The Minutes of that meeting report Hitler as saying:

“The Dutch and Belgian air bases must be occupied by armed
force. Declarations of neutrality must be ignored. If England
and France enter the war between Germany and Poland they will
support Holland and Belgium in their neutrality. * * *
Therefore, if England intends to intervene in the Polish war, we
must occupy Holland with lightning speed. We must aim at
securing new defense lines on Dutch soil up to the Zuyder Zee”.
(_L-79_)

Even after that he was to give his solemn declarations that he would observe Belgian neutrality. On the 26th August 1939 when the crisis in regard to Danzig and Poland was reaching its climax, declarations assuring the Governments concerned of the intention to respect their neutrality were handed by the German Ambassadors to the King of the Belgians, the Queen of the Netherlands, and to the Government of the Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg in the most solemn form. But to the Army—“If Holland and Belgium are successfully occupied and held”—it was said—“a successful war against England will be secured.”

On the 1st September Poland was invaded, and two days later England and France came into the War against Germany in pursuance of the treaty obligation already referred to. On the 6th October Hitler renewed his assurances of friendship to Belgium and Holland. But on the 9th October, before any kind of accusation had been made by the German Government of breaches of neutrality by Belgium, the Netherlands, or Luxembourg, Hitler issued a directive for the conduct of the war.

In that directive he stated:

“1. If it becomes evident in the near future that England and
France acting under her leadership, are not disposed to end the
war, I am determined to take firm and offensive action without
letting much time elapse.

“2. A long waiting period results not only in the ending of the
advantage to the Western Powers, of Belgium and perhaps also of
Dutch neutrality, but also strengthens the military power of our
enemies to an increasing degree, causes confidence of the
neutrals in German final victory to wane, and does not help to
bring Italy to our aid as brothers-in-arms.

“3. I therefore issue the following orders for the further
conduct of military operations:

“(_a_) Preparations should be made for offensive action on the
Northern flank of the Western front crossing the area of
Luxembourg, Belgium and Holland. This attack must be carried out
as soon and as forcefully as possible.

“(_b_) The object of this attack is to defeat as many strong
sections of the French Fighting Army as possible, and her ally
and partner in the fighting, and at the same time to acquire as
great an area of Holland, Belgium and Northern France as
possible, to use as a base offering good prospects for waging
aerial and sea warfare against England and to provide ample
coverage for the vital district of the Ruhr.”

Nothing could state more clearly or more definitely the object behind the invasion of these countries than that document.

On the 15th October 1939 Keitel wrote a most secret letter concerning _Fall Gelb_, which was the code name for the operation against the Low Countries. In it he stated:

“The protection of the Ruhr area by moving A/C reporting service
and the air defense as far forward as possible in the area of
Holland is significant for the whole conduct of the war. The
more Dutch territory we occupy the more effective can the
defense of the Ruhr area be made. This point of view must
determine the choice of objectives of the army even if the army
and navy are not directly interested in such territorial gain.
It must be the object of the army’s preparations, therefore, to
occupy on receipt of a special order the territory of Holland in
the first instance in the area of the Grebbe-Marse line. It will
depend on the military and political attitude of the Dutch as
well as on the effectiveness of their flooding, whether objects
can and must be further extended.” (_C-62_)

The operation had apparently been planned to take place at the beginning of November. We have in our possession a series of 17 letters dated from 7th November until the 9th May postponing almost from day to day the D-day of the operation, so that by the beginning of November all the major plans and preparations had been made. (_C-72_)

On the 10th January 1940 a German aeroplane force landed in Belgium. In it was found the remains of a half-burnt operation order setting out considerable details of the Belgian landing grounds that were to be captured (_TC-58_). Many other documents have been found which illustrate the planning and preparation for this invasion in the latter half of 1939 and early 1940, but they carry the matter no further, and they show no more clearly than the evidence to which I have already referred, the plans and intention of the German Governments and its armed forces.

On the 10th May 1940 at about 0500 hours in the morning the German invasion of Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg began.

Once more the forces of aggression marched on. Treaties, assurances, the rights of Sovereign States meant nothing. Brutal force, covered by as great an element of surprise as the Nazis could secure, was to seize that which was deemed necessary for striking the mortal blow against England, the main Enemy. The only fault of these unhappy countries was that they stood in the path of the German invader. But that was enough.

On the 6th April 1941 German armed forces invaded Greece and Yugoslavia. Again the blow was struck without warning and with the cowardice and deceit which the World now fully expected from the self-styled “_Herrenvolk_”. It was a breach of the Hague Convention of 1899. It was a breach of the Pact of Paris of 1928. It was a breach of a specific assurance given by Hitler on the 6th October 1939.

“Immediately after the completion of the Anschluss”, he said, “I informed Yugoslavia that, from now on, the frontier with this country will also be an unalterable one and that we only desire to live in Peace and Friendship with her”. (_TC-43_)

But the plan for aggression against Yugoslavia had, of course, been in hand well before that. In the aggressive action eastward towards the Ukraine and the Soviet territories security of the Southern flank and the lines of communication had already been considered.

The history of events leading up to the invasion of Yugoslavia by Germany is well known. At 3 o’clock on the morning of the 28th October 1940 a 3-hour ultimatum had been presented by the Italian Government to the Greek Government and the presentation of this ultimatum was followed by the aerial bombardment of Greek provincial towns and the advance of Italian troops into Greek territory. The Greeks, not prepared for such an assault, were at first forced to withdraw. Later the Italian advance was first checked, then driven towards the Albanian frontier, and by the end of 1940 the Italian Army had suffered severe reverses at Greek hands.

Of German intentions there is the evidence of what occurred when, on 12th August 1939, Hitler held his meeting with Ciano.

You will remember Hitler said:

“Generally speaking, the best thing to happen would be for the
neutrals to be liquidated one after the other. This process
could be carried out more easily if on every occasion one
partner of the Axis covered the other while it was dealing with
an uncertain neutral. Italy might well regard Yugoslavia as a
neutral of this kind.” (_TC-77_)

Later again on the second day of the conversation, 13th August, he said:

“In general, however, from success by one of the Axis partners
not only strategical but also psychological strengthening of the
other partner and also of the whole Axis would ensue. Italy
carried through a number of successful operations in Abyssinia,
Spain and Albania and each time against the wishes of the
Democratic Entente. These individual actions have not only
strengthened Italian local interests but have also reinforced
her general position. The same was the case with German action
in Austria and Czechoslovakia. * * * The strengthening of the
Axis by these individual operations was of the greatest
importance for the unavoidable clash with the Western Powers.”

Once again we see the same procedure being followed. That meeting had taken place on the 12/13th August, 1939. Less than two months later, on 6 October 1939 Hitler was giving his assurance to Yugoslavia that Germany only desired to live in peace and friendship with the Yugoslav State, the liquidation of which by his Axis partner he had himself suggested.

On the 28th October 1940 the Italians presented a 3 hour ultimatum to Greece and commenced war against her. Eventually the advance was checked, then driven back, and the Italians suffered considerable reverses at Greek hands.

We have an undated letter from Hitler to Mussolini which must have been written about the time of the Italian aggression against Greece. (_2762-PS_)

“Permit me at the beginning of this letter to assure you that
within the last 14 days my heart and my thoughts have been more
than ever with you. Moreover, Duce, be assured of my
determination to do everything on your behalf which might ease
the present situation for you. * * * When I asked you to receive
me in Florence, I undertook the trip in the hope of being able
to express my views prior to the beginning of the threatening
conflict with Greece, about which I had only received general
information. First, I wanted to request you to postpone the
action, if possible until a more favorable time of year, at all
events, however, until after the American presidential election.
But in any case, however, I wanted to request you, Duce, not to
undertake this action without a previous lightning-like
occupation of Crete and, for this purpose, I also wanted to
submit to you some practical suggestions in regard to the
employment of a German parachute division and a further airborne
division. * * * Yugoslavia must become disinterested, if
possible, however from our point of view interested in
cooperating in the liquidation of the Greek question. Without
assurances from Yugoslavia, it is useless to risk any successful
operation in the Balkans. * * * Unfortunately I must stress the
fact that waging war in the Balkans before March is impossible.
Hence it would also serve to make any threatening influence upon
Yugoslavia of no purpose, since the Serbian General Staff is
well aware of the fact that no practical action could follow
such a threat before March. Here Yugoslavia must, if at all
possible, be won over by other means and other ways.”

On the 12th November in his Top Secret Order No. 18 Hitler ordered the OKH to make preparations to occupy Greece and Bulgaria if necessary. Approximately 10 divisions were to be used in order to prevent Turkish intervention. To shorten the time the German divisions in Rumania were to be increased.

On the 13th December 1940 Hitler issued an order to OKW, OKL, OKH, OKM and General Staff on the operation Marita, which was the invasion of Greece. In that order it is stated that the invasion of Greece is planned and is to commence as soon as the weather becomes advantageous. Further orders were issued on the 13th December and 11th January. (_448-PS_; _1541-PS_)

On the 28th January Hitler saw Mussolini. Jodl, Keitel, and Ribbentrop were present at the meeting and it is from Jodl’s notes of what took place that we know that Hitler stated that one of the purposes of German troop concentrations in Rumania was for use in his plan for the operation against Greece.

On the 1st March 1941 German troops entered Bulgaria and moved towards the Greek frontier. In the face of this threat of an attack on Greece by German as well as Italian forces British forces were landed in Greece on the 3d March in accordance with the declaration which had been given by the British Government on the 13th April 1939 that Great Britain would feel bound to give Greece and Rumania respectively all the support in her power in the event of either country becoming the victim of aggression and resisting such aggression. Already the Italian aggression had made this pledge operative.

On the 25th March 1941 Yugoslavia joined the 3-Power Pact which had already been signed by Germany, Italy, and Japan. The preamble of the Pact stated that the 3 Powers would stand side by side and work together.

On the same day Ribbentrop wrote two notes to the Yugoslav Prime Minister; assuring him of Germany’s full intention to respect the sovereignty and independence of his country. That declaration was yet another example of the treachery employed by German diplomacy. We have seen already the preparations that had been made. We have seen Hitler’s efforts to tempt the Italians into an aggression against Yugoslavia. We have seen in January his orders for his own preparation to invade Yugoslavia and Greece and now on the 25th March he is signing a pact with that country and his Foreign Minister is writing assurances of respect for her sovereignty and territorial integrity.

As a result of the signing of that Pact the anti-Nazi element in Yugoslavia immediately accomplished a coup d’état and established a new Government. Thereupon the decision was taken to invade immediately and on the 27th March, two days after the 3-Power Pact had been signed by Yugoslavia, Hitler issued instructions that Yugoslavia was to be invaded and used as a base for the continuance of the combined German and Italian offensive against Greece. (_C-127_)

Following this, further deployment and other instructions for the action Marita were issued by Von Brauchitsch on the 30th March 1941. (_R-95_)

It is stated that “the orders issued with regard to the operation against Greece remain valid so far as not affected by this order. On the 5th April, weather permitting, the Air Forces are to attack troops in Yugoslavia, while simultaneously the attack of the 12th Army begins against both Yugoslavia and Greece” (_R-95_). As we now know, the invasion actually commenced in the early hours of the 6th April.

Treaties, Pacts, Assurances—obligations of any kind—are brushed aside and ignored wherever the aggressive interests of Germany are concerned.

I turn now to the last act of aggression in Europe with which these Nazi conspirators are charged—the attack upon Russia. In August 1939 Germany although undoubtedly intending to attack Russia at some convenient opportunity, sufficiently deceived the Russian Government to secure a pact of nonaggression between them. It followed, therefore, that when Belgium and the Low Countries were occupied and France collapsed in June 1940, England—although with the inestimably valuable moral and economic support of the United States of America—was left alone as the sole representative of Democracy in the face of the forces of aggression. Only the British Empire stood between Germany and the achievement of her aim to dominate the Western world. Only the British Empire—only England as its citadel. But it was enough. The first, and possibly the decisive, military defeat which the enemy sustained was in the campaign against England, and that defeat had a profound influence on the future course of the war. On the 16th July 1940 Hitler issued to Keitel and Jodl a Directive for the invasion of England. It started off by stating—and Englishmen will be forever proud of it—that

“Since England, despite her militarily hopeless situation, shows
no signs of willingness to come to terms, I have decided to
prepare a landing operation against England and if necessary to
carry it out. The aim is * * * to eliminate the English homeland
as a base for the carrying on of the war against Germany. The
preparations for the entire operation must be completed by
mid-August.” (_442-PS_)

But the first essential condition for that plan was “that the English Air Force must morally and actually be so far overcome that it does not any longer show any considerable aggressive force against the German attack.” (_442-PS_)

The German Air Force made the most strenuous efforts to realize that condition, but, in one of the most splendid pages of our history, it was decisively defeated. And although the bombardment of England’s towns and villages was continued throughout that dark winter of 1940-41 the enemy decided in the end that England was not to be subjugated by these means, and accordingly Germany turned back to the East, the first major aim achieved.

On the 22d June 1941, German Armed Forces invaded Russia—without warning, without declaration of war. It was a breach of the Hague Conventions; it was a violation of the Pact of Paris of 1928: it was in flagrant contradiction of the Treaty of nonaggression which Germany and Russia had signed on the 23d August 1939.

But that Treaty, perhaps more blatantly than any other, was made without any intention of being observed and only for the purpose of assisting the German Government to carry out their aggressive plans against the Western democracies before eventually turning east in their own good time.

Hitler himself in referring to the Agreement said agreements were only to be kept as long as they served a purpose. Ribbentrop was more explicit. In an interview with the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin on 23d February 1941 he made it clear that the object of the Agreement had merely been to avoid a two-front war. (_1834-PS_)

In contrast to what Hitler and Ribbentrop were planning within the councils of Germany, we know what they were saying to the rest of the world.

On the 19th July Hitler spoke in the Reichstag:

“In these circumstances I consider it proper to negotiate as a
first priority a sober definition of interests with Russia. It
would be made clear once and for all what Germany believes she
must regard as her sphere of interest to safeguard her future
and, on the other hand, what Russia considers important for her
existence.

“From the clear delineation of the sphere of interest on either
side, there followed the new regulation of Russo-German
relations. Any hope that now at the end of the term of the
agreement a new Russo-German tension could arise is childish.
Germany has taken no step which would lead her outside her
sphere of interest, nor has Russia. But England’s hope, to
achieve an amelioration of her own position through the
engineering of some new European crisis, is, in so far as it is
concerned with Russo-German relations, an illusion.

“British statesmen perceive everything somewhat slowly, but they
too will learn to understand this in course of time.”

Yet it was not many months after that that the arrangements for attacking Russia were put in hand. Raeder gives us the probable reasons for this sudden decision in a note to Admiral Assmann.

“The fear that control of the air over the Channel in the Autumn
of 1940 could no longer be attained, a realization which the
Fuehrer no doubt gained earlier than the Naval War Staff, who
were not so fully informed of the true results of air raids on
England (our own losses), surely caused the Fuehrer, as far back
as August and September, to consider whether, even prior to
victory in the West, an Eastern campaign would be feasible with
the object of first eliminating our last serious opponent on the
continent. The Fuehrer did not openly express this fear,
however, until well into September.”

He may not have told the Navy of his intentions until later in September, but by the beginning of that month he had undoubtedly spoken of them to Jodl.

Dated 6th September 1940 we have a directive of the OKW signed by Jodl: “Directions are given for the occupation forces in the east to be increased in the following weeks. For security reasons this should not create the impression in Russia that Germany is preparing for an Eastern offensive.” Directives are given to the German Intelligence Service pertaining to the answering of questions by the Russian Intelligence Service. “The total strength of the German troops in the East to be camouflaged by frequent changes in this area. The impression is to be created that the bulk of the troops in the south have moved whilst the occupation in the north is only very small.” (_1229-PS_)

Thus we see the beginning of the operations.

On the 12th November 1940 Hitler issued a directive signed by Jodl in which he stated that the political task to determine the attitude of Russia had begun, but without reference to the result of preparations against the East, which had been ordered orally before it could be carried out.

On the same day Molotov visited Berlin. At the conclusion of conversations between himself and the German Government a communique was issued in the following terms:

“The exchange of ideas took place in an atmosphere of mutual
trust and led to a mutual understanding on all important
questions interesting Germany and the Soviet Union.”

It is not to be supposed that the USSR would have taken part in those conversations or agreed to that communique if it had been realized that on the very day orders were being given for preparations to be made for the invasion of Russia and that the order for the operation “Barbarossa” was in preparation. Four days later that order was issued—“The German armed forces have to be ready to defeat Soviet Russia in a swift campaign before the end of the War against Great Britain” (_446-PS_). And later in the same instruction,

“All orders which shall be issued by the High Commanders in
accordance with this instruction have to be clothed in such
terms that they may be taken as measures of precaution in case
Russia should change her present attitude towards ourselves.”
(_446-PS_)

Keeping up the pretense of friendliness, on the 10th January, 1941—after the Plan Barbarossa for the invasion of Russia had been decided upon—the German-Russo frontier treaty was signed. On the 3d February 1941 Hitler held a conference, attended by Keitel and Jodl, at which it was provided that the whole operation was to be camouflaged as if it was part of the preparations for the “Seelowe” as the plan for invasion of England was called. By March 1941 the plans were sufficiently advanced to include provision for dividing the Russian territory into 9 separate States to be administered under Reich Commissars under the general control of Rosenberg. At the same time detailed plans for the economic exploitation of the country were made under the supervision of Goering, to whom the responsibility was delegated by Hitler. You will hear something of the details of these plans. It is significant that on the 2d May 1941 a conference of the State Secretaries on the Plan Barbarossa noted:

“1. The war can only be continued if all armed forces are fed
out of Russia in the third year of the war.

“2. There is no doubt that as a result many millions of people
will be starved to death if we take out of the country the
things necessary for us.”

But this apparently created no concern. The plan Oldenberg, as the scheme for economic organization was called, went on. By the 1st May the D date of the operation was fixed. By the 1st June preparations were virtually complete and an elaborate time table was issued. It was estimated that although there would be heavy frontier battles, lasting perhaps 4 weeks, after that no serious opposition was to be expected.

On the 22d June at 3.30 in the morning the German Armies marched again. As Hitler said in his Proclamation:

“I have decided to give the fate of the German People and of the
Reich and of Europe again into the hands of our soldiers.”

The usual false pretexts were of course given. Ribbentrop stated on the 28th June that the step was taken because of the threatening of the German frontiers by the Red Army. It was untrue and Ribbentrop knew it was untrue. On the 7th June his Ambassador in Moscow was reporting to him that “All observations show that Stalin and Molotov who are alone responsible for Russian foreign policy are doing everything to avoid a conflict with Germany”. The staff records which you will see make it clear that the Russians were making no military preparations and that they were continuing their deliveries under the Trade Agreement to the very last day. The truth was, of course, that the elimination of Russia as a political opponent and the incorporation of the Russian territory in the German _Lebensraum_ had long been one of the cardinal features of Nazi policy, subordinated latterly for what Jodl called diplomatic reasons.

And so, on the 22d June, the Nazi armies were flung against the Power with which Hitler had so recently sworn friendship and Germany embarked on that last act of aggression which, after long and bitter fighting, was eventually to result in Germany’s own collapse.