Chapter V (2)

These terroristic activities of the Nazis in Austria continued until July 25, 1934. On that day members of the NSDAP attempted a revolutionary putsch and killed Chancellor Dollfuss. A message from Mr. Hadow, of the British Legation in Vienna, to Sir John Simon contains details of the putsch (_2985-PS_). The official version of events given verbally by the Austrian Government to the diplomatic Corps, as set forth in this document, stated that approximately a hundred men attempting the putsch seized the Federal Chancellery. Chancellor Dollfuss was wounded in trying to escape, being shot twice at close quarters. The Radio Building in the center of the town was overwhelmed, and the announcer was compelled to broadcast the news that Dollfuss had resigned and Doctor Rintelen had taken his place as Chancellor.

Although the putsch failed, the insurgents kept control of the Chancellery Building and agreed to give it up only after they had a safe-conduct to the German border. The insurgents contacted the German Minister, Dr. Rieth, by telephone, and subsequently had private negotiations with him in the building. At about 7:00 p. m. they yielded the building, but Chancellor Dollfuss died about 6:00 p. m., not having had the services of a doctor.

The German Government denied all complicity in the putsch and assassination. Hitler removed Dr. Rieth as Minister on the ground that he had offered a safe-conduct to the rebels without making inquiry of the German Government, and had thus without any reason dragged the German Reich into an internal Austrian affair. This statement appears in the letter which Hitler sent to Franz von Papen on the 26th day of July 1934. (_2799-PS_)

Although the German Government denied any knowledge or complicity in this putsch, there is ample basis for the conclusion that the German Nazis bear responsibility for the events. Light is shed on this matter in the extensive record of the trial of the Austrian Nazi, Planetta, and others who were convicted for the murder, and in the Austrian Brown Book issued after July 25. Mr. Messersmith’s affidavit offers further evidence:

“The events of the Putsch of July 25, 1934, are too well known
for me to repeat them in this statement. I need say here only
that there can be no doubt that the Putsch was ordered and
organized by the Nazi officials from Germany through their
organization in Austria made up of German Nazis and Austrian
Nazis. Dr. Rieth, the German Minister in Vienna, was fully
familiar with all that was going to happen and that was being
planned. The German Legation was located directly across the
street from the British Legation and the Austrian secret police
kept close watch on the persons who entered the German Legation.
The British had their own secret service in Vienna at the time
and they also kept a discreet surveillance over people entering
the German Legation. I was told by both British and Austrian
officials that a number of the men who were later found guilty
by the Austrian Courts of having been implicated in the Putsch
had frequented the German Legation. In addition, I personally
followed very closely the activities of Dr. Rieth and I never
doubted on the basis of all my information that Dr. Rieth was in
close touch and constant touch with the Nazi agents in Austria;
these agents being both German and Austrian. Dr. Rieth could not
have been unfamiliar with the Putsch and the details in
connection therewith. I recall too very definitely from my
conversations with the highest officials of the Austrian
Government after the Putsch, their informing me that Dr. Rieth
had been in touch with von Rintelen, who it had been planned by
the Nazis was to succeed Chancellor Dollfuss had the Putsch been
successful.

“It may be that Dr. Rieth was himself not personally sympathetic
with the plans for the Putsch but there is no question that he
was fully familiar with all these plans and must have given his
assent thereto and connived therein.

“As this Putsch was so important and was a definite attempt to
overthrow the Austrian Government and resulted in the murder of
the Chancellor of Austria, I took occasion to verify at the time
for myself various other items of evidence indicating that the
Putsch was not only made with the knowledge of the German
Government but engineered by it. I found and verified that
almost a month before the Putsch, Goebbels told Signor Cerruti,
the Italian Ambassador in Berlin, that there would be a Nazi
Government in Vienna in a month.” (_1760-PS_)

Mr. William Dodd, Ambassador of the United States to Germany, published in 1941 his Diary, covering the years 1933-1938 (_2832-PS_). The diary contains an entry for July 26, 1934, which makes the following observations. First, Ambassador Dodd noted that in February, 1934, Ernst Hanfstaengl had advised him that he had brought what was virtually an order from Mussolini to Hitler to leave Austria alone and to dismiss and silence Theodor Habicht, the German agent in Munich who had been agitating for annexation of Austria. On 18 June, in Venice, Hitler was reported to have promised Mussolini to leave Austria alone.

Mr. Dodd further states:

“On Monday, July 23, after repeated bombings in Austria by
Nazis, a boat loaded with explosives was seized on Lake
Constance by the Swiss police. It was a shipment of German bombs
and shells to Austria from some arms plant. That looked ominous
to me, but events of the kind had been so common that I did not
report it to Washington.

“Today evidence came to my desk that last night, as late as
eleven o’clock, the government issued formal statements to the
newspapers rejoicing at the fall of Dollfuss and proclaiming the
Greater Germany that must follow. The German Minister in Vienna
had actually helped to form the new Cabinet. He had, as we now
know, exacted a promise that the gang of Austrian Nazi murderers
should be allowed to go into Germany undisturbed. But it was
realized about 12 o’clock that, although Dollfuss was dead, the
loyal Austrians had surrounded the government palace and
prevented the organization of a new Nazi regime. They held the
murderers prisoners. The German Propaganda Ministry therefore
forbade publication of the news sent out an hour before and
tried to collect all the releases that had been distributed. A
copy was brought to me today by a friend.

“All the German papers this morning lamented the cruel murder
and declared that it was simply an attack of discontented
Austrians, not Nazis. News from Bavaria shows that thousands of
Austrian Nazis living for a year in Bavaria on German support
had been active for ten days before, some getting across the
border contrary to law, all drilling and making ready to return
to Austria. The German propagandist Habicht was still making
radio speeches about the necessity of annexing the ancient realm
of the Hapsburgs to the Third Reich, in spite of all the
promises of Hitler to silence him. But now that the drive has
failed and the assassins are in prison in Vienna, the German
Government denounces all who say there was any support from
Berlin.

“I think it will be clear one day that millions of dollars and
many arms have been pouring into Austria since the spring of
1933. Once more the whole world is condemning the Hitler regime.
No people in all modern history has been quite so unpopular as
Nazi Germany. This stroke completes the picture. I expect to
read a series of bitter denunciations in the American papers
when they arrive about ten days from now.” (_2832-PS_)

In connection with the German Government’s denial of any connection with the putsch and the murder of Dollfuss, the letter of appointment which Hitler wrote to Vice-Chancellor von Papen on 26 July 1934 is significant. This letter appears in a standard German reference work, _Dokumente der Deutschen Politik, II, Page 83_ (_2799-PS_). (In considering the letter the report wide-spread at the time should be recalled, that von Papen narrowly missed being purged on 30 June, 1944, along with Ernst Roehm and others.) The letter reads as follows:

“26 July 1934

“Dear Mr. von Papen

“As a result of the events in Vienna I am compelled to suggest
to the Reichs President the removal of the German Minister to
Vienna, Dr. Rieth, from his post, because he, at the suggestion
of Austrian Federal Ministers and the Austrian rebels
respectively consented to an agreement made by both these
parties concerning the safe conduct and retreat of the rebels to
Germany without making inquiry of the German Reich Government.
Thus the Minister has dragged the German Reich into an internal
Austrian affair without any reason.

“The assassination of the Austrian Federal Chancellor which was
strictly condemned and regretted by the German Government has
made the situation in Europe, already fluid, more acute, without
any fault of ours. Therefore, it is my desire to bring about if
possible an easing of the general situation, and especially to
direct the relations with the German Austrian State, which have
been so strained for a long time, again into normal and friendly
channels.

“For this reason, I request you, dear Mr. von Papen, to take
over this important task, just because you have possessed and
continue to possess my most complete and unlimited confidence
ever since we have worked together in the Cabinet—

“Therefore, I have suggested to the Reichs President that you,
upon leaving the Reich-Cabinet and upon release from the office
of Commissioner for the Saar, be called on special mission to
the post of the German Minister in Vienna for a limited period
of time. In this position you will be directly subordinated to
me.

“Thanking you once more for all that you have at one time done
for the coordination of the Government of the National
Revolution and since then together with us for Germany, I
remain,

Yours, very sincerely,
Adolf Hitler.”
(_2799-PS_)

Four years later, on July 25, 1938, after the Anschluss with Austria, German officials no longer expressed regrets over the death of Dollfuss. They were eager and willing to reveal what the world already knew—that they were identified with and sponsors of the murder of the former Chancellor. A dispatch from the American Consul General in Vienna to the Secretary of State, dated July 26, 1938, relates to the Nazis’ celebration of the murder of Dollfuss, held on July 24 and July 25, 1938, four years after the event. It states:

“The two high points of the celebration were the memorial
assembly on the 24th at Klagenfurt, capital of the province of
Carinthia, where in 1934 the Vienna Nazi revolt found its widest
response, and the march on the 25th to the former Federal
Chancellery in Vienna by the surviving members of the S.S.
Standarte 89, which made the attack on the Chancellery in
1934—a reconstruction of the crime, so to say.

“The assembled thousands at Klagenfurt were addressed by the
Fuehrer’s deputy, Rudolf Hess, in the presence of the families
of the 13 National Socialists who were hanged for their part in
the July putsch. The Klagenfurt memorial celebration was also
made the occasion for the solemn swearing in of the seven
recently appointed Gauleiters of the Ostmark.

“From the point of view of the outside world, the speech of
Reichs Minister Hess was chiefly remarkable for the fact that
after devoting the first half of his speech to the expected
praise of the sacrifices of the men, women and youths of Austria
in the struggle for a greater Germany, he then launched into a
defense of the occupation of Austria and an attack on the ‘lying
foreign press’ and on those who spread the idea of a new war.
The world was fortunate, declared Hess, that Germany’s leader
was a man who would not allow himself to be provoked. ‘The
Fuehrer does what is necessary for his people in sovereign calm.
* * * and labors for the peace of Europe’ even though
provocators, ‘completely ignoring the deliberate threat to peace
of certain small states,’ deceitfully claim that he is a menace
to the peace of Europe.

“The march on the former Federal Chancellery, now the
Reichsstatthalterei, followed the exact route and time schedule
of the original attack. The marchers were met at the Chancellery
by the Reichsstatthalter Seyss-Inquart, who addressed them and
unveiled a memorial tablet. From the Reichsstatthalterei the
Standarte marched to the old RAVAG broadcasting center from
which false news of the resignation of Dollfuss had been
broadcast, and there unveiled a second memorial tablet.
Steinhausl, the present Police President of Vienna, is a member
of the S. S. Standarte 89”. (_L-273_)

The original plaque is now rubble. But a photograph of it was found in The National Library in Vienna. [The photograph was offered in evidence at the trial. See _2968-PS_.] The plaque reads: “154 German men of 89 SS Standarte stood up here for Germany on July 26, 1934. Seven found death at the hands of the hangman”. The words chosen for this marble tablet, and it may be presumed that they were words chosen carefully, reveal clearly that the men involved were not mere malcontent Austrian revolutionaries, but were regarded as German men, were members of a para-military organization, who stood up here “for Germany.” In 1934 Hitler repudiated Dr. Rieth because he “dragged the German Reich into an internal Austrian affair without any reason”. In 1938 Nazi Germany proudly identified itself with this murder, took credit for it, and took responsibility for it.

(3) _The Program Culminating in the Pact of July 11, 1936._ In considering the activities of the Nazi conspirators in Austria between 25 July 1934 and November 1937, there is a distinct intermediate point, the Pact of 11 July 1936. Accordingly, developments in the two-year period, July 1934 to July 1936, will first be reviewed.

(_a_) _Continued Aim of Eliminating Austria’s Independence—Conversation and Activities of von Papen._ The Nazi conspirators pretended to respect the independence and sovereignty of Austria, notwithstanding the aim of Anschluss stated in _Mein Kampf_. But in truth and in fact they were working from the very beginning to destroy the Austrian State.

A dramatic recital of the position of von Papen in this regard is provided in Mr. Messersmith’s affidavit. It states:

“When I did call on von Papen in the German Legation, he greeted
me with ‘Now you are in my Legation and I can control the
conversation.’ In the baldest and most cynical manner he then
proceeded to tell me that all of Southeastern Europe, to the
borders of Turkey, was Germany’s natural hinterland, and that he
had been charged with the mission of facilitating German
economic and political control over all this region for Germany.
He blandly and directly said that getting control of Austria was
to be the first step. He definitely stated that he was in
Austria to undermine and weaken the Austrian Government and from
Vienna to work towards the weakening of the Governments in the
other states to the South and Southeast. He said that he
intended to use his reputation as a good Catholic to gain
influence with certain Austrians, such as Cardinal Innitzer,
towards that end. He said that he was telling me this because
the German Government was bound on this objective of getting
this control of Southeastern Europe and there was nothing which
could stop it and that our own policy and that of France and
England was not realistic.

“The circumstances were such, as I was calling on him in the
German Legation, that I had to listen to what he had to say and
of course I was prepared to hear what he had to say although I
already knew what his instructions were. I was nevertheless
shocked to have him speak so baldly to me and when he finished I
got up and told him how shocked I was to hear the accredited
representative of a supposedly friendly state to Austria admit
that he was proposing to engage in activities to undermine and
destroy that Government to which he was accredited. He merely
smiled and said, of course this conversation was between us and
that he would of course, not be talking to others so clearly
about his objectives. I have gone into this detail with regard
to this conversation as it is characteristic of the absolute
frankness and directness with which high Nazi officials spoke of
their objectives.”

* * * * * *

“On the surface, however, German activities consisted
principally of efforts to win the support of prominent and
influential men through insidious efforts of all kinds,
including the use of the German Diplomatic Mission in Vienna and
its facilities and personnel. Von Papen as German Minister
entertained frequently and on a lavish scale. He approached
almost every member of the Austrian Cabinet, telling them, as
several of them later informed me, that Germany was bound to
prevail in the long run and that they should join the winning
side if they wished to enjoy positions of power and influence
under German control. Of course, openly and outwardly he gave
solemn assurance that Germany would respect Austrian
independence and that all that she wished to do was to get rid
of elements in the Austrian Government like the Chancellor,
Schuschnigg and Starhemberg as head of the Heimwehr and others,
and replace them by a few ‘nationally-minded’ Austrians, which
of course meant Nazis. The whole basic effort of von Papen was
to bring about Anschluss.

“In early 1935, the Austrian Foreign Minister, Berger-Waldenegg,
informed me that in the course of a conversation with von Papen,
the latter had remarked ‘Yes, you have your French and English
friends now and you can have your independence a little longer’.
The Foreign Minister, of course, told me this remark in German
but the foregoing is an accurate translation. The Foreign
Minister told me that he had replied to von Papen ‘I am glad to
have from your own lips your own opinion which agrees with what
your Chief has just said in the Saar and which you have taken
such pains to deny.’

“Von Papen undoubtedly achieved some successes, particularly
with men like Glaise-Horstenau and others who had long favored
the ‘Grossdeutschum’ idea, but who nevertheless had been greatly
disturbed by the fate of the Catholic Church. Without conscience
or scruple, von Papen exploited his reputation and that of his
wife as ardent and devout Catholics to overcome the fears of
these Austrians in this respect.” (_1760-PS_)

(_b_) _Continued Existence of Nazi Organizations with a Program of Armed Preparedness._ The wiles of von Papen represented only one part of the total program of the Nazi conspiracy. At the same time Nazi activities in Austria, forced underground during this period, were carried on.

Mr. Messersmith’s affidavit discloses the following: The Nazi organization, weakened in the events following the putsch, began reorganization work. An informant furnished the Austrian Government with a memorandum of a meeting of Austrian Nazi chiefs held in Bavaria, September, 1934. The memorandum shows that they agreed to prepare for new terroristic acts, to proceed brutally against persons cooperating with the Schuschnigg Government when the next action against the Government took place, and to appear disposed to negotiate but to arm for the struggle. A copy of this memorandum was furnished to Mr. Messersmith. At the same time the Austrian Legion was kept in readiness in Germany. This large, organized hostile group constituted a continuing menace for Austria. (_1760-PS_)

The fact of the reorganization of the Nazi party in Austria is corroborated by a report of one of the Austrian Nazis, Rainer (_812-PS_). (_812-PS_ contains three parts. First there is a letter dated 22 August 1939 from Rainer, then Gauleiter at Salzburg, to Seyss-Inquart, then Reich Minister. That letter encloses a letter dated 6 July 1939, written by Rainer to Reich Commissioner and Gauleiter Josef Buerckel. In that letter, in turn, Rainer inclosed a report on the events in the NSDAP of Austria from 1933 to 11 March 1938, the day before the invasion of Austria.)

The letter from Rainer to Buerckel indicates that he was asked to prepare a short history of the role of the party. He states that after the Anschluss Hitler and the general public gave Seyss-Inquart alone credit for effecting the Anschluss. It is Rainer’s belief that credit belongs to the entire Party, the leaders of which had to remain underground. And so Rainer writes his report to show that the Party as a whole is entitled to “the glory which was excessively ascribed to one person, Dr. Seyss-Inquart”.

Apparently Seyss-Inquart heard from Buerckel what Rainer said, and wrote to Rainer asking for an explanation. To avoid misunderstanding, Rainer prepared for Seyss-Inquart a copy of his letter to Buerckel and his report.

The Rainer report tells of the disorganization of the Nazi party in Austria and of its reconstitution. The second and third paragraphs of the report state:

“Thus the first stage of battle commenced which ended with the
July rising of 1934. The decision for the July rising was right,
the execution of it was faulty. The result was a complete
destruction of the organization; the loss of entire groups of
fighters through imprisonment or flight into the ‘Alt-Reich’;
and with regard to the political relationship of Germany to
Austria, a formal acknowledgment of the existence of the
Austrian State by the German Government. With the telegram to
PAPEN, instructing him to reinstitute normal relationships
between the two states, the Fuehrer had liquidated the first
stage of the battle; and a new method of political penetration
was to begin. By order of the Fuehrer the Landesleitung Munich
was dissolved, and the party in Austria was left to its own
resources.

“There was no acknowledged leader for the entire party in
Austria. New leaderships were forming in the nine Gaus. The
process was again and again interrupted by the interference of
the police; there was no liaison between the formations, and
frequently there were two, three or more rival leaderships. The
first evident, acknowledged speaker of almost all the Gaus in
Autumn 1934 was engineer REINTHALLER (already appointed
Landesbauernfeuhrer (leader of the country’s farmers) by Hess).
He endeavored to bring about a political appeasement by
negotiations with the government, with the purpose of giving the
NSDAP legal status again, thus permitting its political
activities. Simultaneously Reinthaller started the
reconstruction of the illegal political organization, at the
head of which he had placed engineer NEUBACHER.” (_812-PS_)

(_c_) _Secret Contacts Between German Officials, Including Papen, and the Austrian Nazis: the Use by the Austrian Nazis of “Front” Personalities._ Two cardinal factors about the Nazi organization in Austria should be borne in mind. First, although the Fuehrer had on the surface cast the Austrian Nazis adrift, in fact German officials, including Papen, maintained secret contact with the Austrian Nazis, in line with Hitler’s desires. German officials consulted and gave advice and support to the organization of the Austrian Nazis. In the second place, the Austrian Nazis remained an illegal organization, organizing for the eventual use of force in an “emergency.” But in the meanwhile they deemed it expedient to act behind “front” personalities, such as Seyss-Inquart, who had no apparent taint of illegality.

Mr. Messersmith relates in his affidavit that he obtained a copy of a document outlining this Nazi program.

“For two years following the failure of the July 25 Putsch, the
Nazis remained relatively quiet in Austria. Very few terroristic
acts occurred during the remainder of 1934 and as I recall in
1935 and most of 1936; this inactivity was in accordance with
directives from Berlin as direct evidence to that effect, which
came to my knowledge at that time, proved. Early in January, the
Austrian Foreign Minister, Berger-Waldenegg, furnished me a
document which I considered accurate in all respects and which
stated:

‘The German Minister here, von Papen, on the occasion of
his last visit to Berlin, was received three times by
Chancellor Hitler for fairly long conversations, and he
also took this opportunity to call on Schacht and von
Neurath. In these conversations the following
instructions were given to him:

‘During the next two years nothing can be undertaken
which will give Germany external political difficulties.
On this ground, everything must be avoided which could
awaken the appearance of Germany interfering in the
internal affairs of Austria. Chancellor Hitler will,
therefore, also for this reason not endeavor to
intervene in the present prevailing difficult crisis in
the National Socialist Party in Austria, although he is
convinced that order could be brought into the Party at
once through a word from him. This word, however, he
will, for foreign political reasons, give all the less,
as he is convinced that the, for him, desirable ends may
be reached also in another way. Naturally, Chancellor
Hitler declared to the German Minister here, this does
not indicate any disinterestedness in the idea of
Austria’s independence. Also, before everything, Germany
cannot for the present withdraw Party members in
Austria, and must, therefore, in spite of the very real
exchange difficulties, make every effort to bring help
to the persecuted National Socialist sufferers in
Austria. As a result, Minister of Commerce Schacht
finally gave the authorization that from then on 200,000
marks a month were to be set aside for this end (support
of National Socialists in Austria). The control and the
supervision of this monthly sum was to be entrusted to
Engineer Reinthaller, who, through the fact that he
alone had control over the money, would have a definite
influence on the Party followers. In this way it would
be possible to end most quickly and most easily the
prevailing difficulties and division in the Austrian
National Socialist Party.

‘The hope was also expressed to Herr von Papen that the
recently authorized foundation of German “Ortsgruppen”
of the National Socialist Party in Austria (made up of
German citizens in Austria) would be so arranged as not
to give the appearance that Germany is planning to
interfere in Austrian internal affairs.’” (_1760-PS_)

The report of Gauleiter Rainer to Reichskommissar Buerckel in July 1939, outlines the further history of the party and the leadership squabbles following the retirement of Reinthaller. In referring to the situation in 1935, he mentions some of the contacts with the Reich Government in the following terms:

“In August some further arrests took place, the victims of which
were, apart from the Gauleaders, also Globocnik and Rainer.
SCHATTENFROH then claimed, because of an instruction received
from the imprisoned LEOPOLD, to have been made deputy country
leader. A group led by engineer RAFFELSBERGER had at this time
also established connections with departments of the Alt-Reich
(Ministry of Propaganda, German Racial Agency, etc.) and made an
attempt to formulate a political motto in the form of a program
for the fighting movement of Austria.” (_812-PS_)

The Rainer report sets forth the situation a little later in 1936:

“The principles of the construction of the organization were:
The organization is the bearer of the illegal fight and the
trustee of the idea to create a secret organization, in a simple
manner, and without compromise, according to the principle of
organizing an elite to be available to the illegal land-party
council upon any emergency. Besides this, all political
opportunities should be taken and all legal people and legal
chances should be used without revealing any ties with the
illegal organization. Therefore, cooperation between the illegal
party organization and the legal political aides was anchored at
the top of the party leadership. All connections with the party
in Germany were kept secret in accordance with the orders of the
Fuehrer. These said that the German state should officially be
omitted from the creation of an Austrian NSDAP; and that
auxiliary centers for propaganda, press, refugees, welfare, etc.
should be established in the foreign countries bordering
Austria.

“Hinterleitner already contacted the lawyer Seyss-Inquart, who
had connections with Dr. Wachter which originated from
Seyss-Inquart’s support of the July uprising. On the other side
Seyss-Inquart had a good position in the legal field and
especially well-established relations with Christian-Social
politicians. Dr. Seyss-Inquart came from the ranks of the
‘Styrian Heimatschutz’ and became a party member when the entire
‘Styrian Heimatschutz’ was incorporated into the NSDAP. Another
personality who had a good position in the legal field was Col.
Glaise-Horstenau who had contacts with both sides. The agreement
of 11 July 1936 was strongly influenced by the activities of
these two persons. Papen mentioned Glaise-Horstenau to the
Fuehrer as being a trusted person.” (_812-PS_)

The Rainer report thus discloses the dual tactics of the Austrian Nazis during this period of keeping quiet and awaiting developments. They were maintaining their secret contacts with Reich officials, and using “front” personalities such as Glaise-Horstenau and Seyss-Inquart. The Nazis made good use of such figures, who were more discreet in their activities and could be referred to as “Nationalists”. They presented, supported, and obtained consideration of demands which could not be negotiated by out-and-out Nazis like Captain Leopold. Seyss-Inquart did not hold any public office until January 1937, when he was made Councillor of State. But Rainer, describing him as a trustworthy member of the Party through the ranks of the Styrian Heimatschutz, points him out as one who strongly influenced the agreement of 11 July 1936.

That the Nazis, but not the Austrian Government, did well to trust Seyss-Inquart, is indicated by a letter, dated 14 July 1939, addressed to Field Marshal Goering (_2219-PS_). The letter ends with the “Heil Hitler” close and is not signed, but it was undoubtedly written by Seyss-Inquart. It was found among Seyss-Inquart’s personal files. On the first page of the letter there appears a note in ink, not indicated in the partial English translation, reading: “Air Mail. 15 July, 1515 hours, Berlin, brought to Goering’s office.”

The main text of the letter consists of a plea for intercession in behalf of one Muehlmann, who unfortunately got in Buerckel’s bad graces. An extract from the letter, which shows Seyss-Inquart as one whose loyalty to Hitler and the aims of the Nazi conspiracy led him to fight for the Anschluss with all the means at his disposal, reads:

At Present In Vienna, 14 July 1939

“To the General Field Marshal

Sir:

* * * * * *

“If I may add something about myself, it is the following: I
know that I am not of an active fighting nature, unless final
decisions are at stake. At this time of pronounced activism
(_Aktivismus_) this will certainly be regarded as a fault in my
personality. Yet I know that I cling with unconquerable tenacity
to the goal in which I believe. That is Greater Germany
(_Grossdeutschland_) and the FUEHRER. And if some people are
already tired out from the struggle and some have been killed in
the fight, I am still around somewhere and ready to go into
action. This, after all, was also the development until the year
1938. Until July 1934 I conducted myself as a regular member of
the party. And if I had quietly, in whatever form, paid my
membership dues the first one, according to a receipt, I paid in
December 1931. I probably would have been an undisputed,
comparatively old fighter and party member of Austria, but I
would not have done any more for the union. I told myself in
July 1934 that we must fight this clerical regime on its own
ground in order to give the Fuehrer a chance to use whatever
method he desires. I told myself that this Austria was worth a
mass. I have stuck to this attitude with an iron determination
because I and my friends had to fight against the whole
political church, the Freemasonry, the Jewry, in short, against
everything in Austria. The slightest weakness which we might
have displayed would undoubtedly have led to our political
annihilation; it would have deprived the Fuehrer of the means
and tools to carry out his ingenious political solution for
Austria, as became evident in the days of March 1938. I have
been fully conscious of the fact that I am following a path
which is not comprehensible to the masses and also not to my
party comrades. I followed it calmly and would without
hesitation follow it again because I am satisfied that at one
point I could serve the FUEHRER as a tool in his work, even
though my former attitude even now gives occasion to very worthy
and honorable party comrades to doubt my trustworthiness. I have
never paid attention to such things because I am satisfied with
the opinion which the FUEHRER and the men close to him have of
me.” (_2210-PS_)

A letter from Papen to Hitler dated 27 July 1935 shows how Papen thought the doctrines of National Socialism could be used to effect the aim of Anschluss. It consists of a report entitled “Review and Outlook, One Year after the Death of Chancellor Dollfuss.” After reviewing the success that the Austrian Government had had in establishing Dollfuss as a martyr and his principles as the patriotic principles of Austria, Papen stated:

“National Socialism must and will overpower the new Austrian
ideology. If today it is contended in Austria that the NSDAP is
only a centralized Reich German party and therefore unable to
transfer the spirit of thought of National Socialism to groups
of people of a different political make-up, the answer must
rightly be that the national revolution in Germany could not
have been brought about in a different way. But when the
creation of the people’s community in the Reich will be
completed, National socialism could, in a much wider sense than
this is possible through the present party organization—at
least apparently—, certainly become the rallying point for all
racially German units beyond the borders. Spiritual progress in
regard to Austria cannot be achieved today with any centralized
tendency. If this recognition would once and for all be stated
clearly from within the Reich, then it would easily become
possible to effect a breakthrough into the front of the New
Austria. A Nurnberg Party Day designated as ‘The German Day’ as
in old times and the proclamation of a national socialistic
peoples’ front, would be a stirring event for all beyond the
borders of the Reich. Such attacks would win us also the
particularistic Austrian circles, whose spokesman, the
legitimistic Count Dubsky wrote in his pamphlet about the
‘Anschluss’: The Third Reich will be with Austria, or it will
not be at all. National Socialism must win it or it will perish,
if it is unable to solve this task * * *.” (_2248-PS_)

Other reports from Papen to Hitler, hereinafter mentioned, show that he maintained covert contact with the National Socialist groups in Austria. From the very start of his mission Papen was thinking of ways and means of using the principle of National Socialism for “National Germans” outside the borders of Germany. Papen was working for Anschluss, and although he preferred to use the principles of National Socialism rather than rely on the party organization, he was prepared to defend the party organization as a necessary means of establishing those principles in the German Reich.

(_d_) _Assurances and Reassurances._ The German Government did more than keep up a pretense of noninterference with Austrian groups. It employed the psychological inducement of providing assurances that it had no designs on Austria’s independence. If Austria could but hope for the execution of those assurances, she could find her way clear to the granting of concessions, and obtain relief from the economic and internal pressures.

A letter from Papen, while in Berlin, to Hitler, dated 17 May 1935, indicated that a forthright, credible statement by Germany reassuring Austria would be most useful for German diplomatic purposes and the improvement of relationships between Austria and German groups in Austria (_2247-PS_). Papen had a scheme for pitting Schuschnigg and his Social-Christian forces against Starhemberg, the Vice-Chancellor of Austria, who was backed by Mussolini. He hoped to persuade Schuschnigg to ally his forces with the NSDAP in order to emerge victorious over Starhemberg. Papen indicated that he obtained this idea from Captain Leopold, leader of the illegal National Socialists. His letter states in part:

“* * * I suggest that we take an active part in this game. The
fundamental idea should be to pit Schuschnigg and his
Christian-social Forces, who are opposed to a home front
dictatorship, against Starhemberg. The possibility of thwarting
the measures arranged between Mussolini and Starhemberg should
be afforded to him, in such way that he would submit the offer
to the government of a definitive German-Austrian compromise of
interests. According to the convincing opinion of the leader of
the NSDAP in Austria, Capt. Leopold, the totalitarian principle
of the NSDAP in Austria must be replaced in the beginning by a
combination of that part of the Christian-elements which favors
the Greater Germany idea and the NSDAP. If Germany recognizes
the national independence of Austria and guarantees full freedom
to the Austrian national opposition, then as a result of such a
compromise the Austrian government would be formed in the
beginning by a coalition of these forces. A further consequence
of this step would be the possibility of the participation of
Germany in the Danube pact, which would take the sting out of
its acuteness due to the settlement of relations between Germany
and Austria. Such a measure would have a most beneficial
influence on the European situation and especially on our
relationship with England. One may object, that Mr. Schuschnigg
will hardly be determined to follow such a pattern, that he will
rather in all probability immediately communicate our offer to
our opponents. Of course, one should first of all explore the
possibility of setting Schuschnigg against Starhemberg through
the use of ‘Go betweens’. The possibility exists. If Mr.
Schuschnigg finally says ‘No’ and makes our offer known in Rome,
then the situation would not be any worse but, on the contrary,
the efforts of the Reich government to make peace with Austria
would be revealed—without prejudice to other interests.
Therefore even in the case of refusal this last attempt would be
an asset. I consider it completely possible, that in view of the
far spread dislike of the Alpine countries of the pro-Italian
course and in view of the sharp tensions within the federal
government (_Bundesregierung_), Mr. Schuschnigg will grasp this
last straw—always under the supposition that the offer could
not be interpreted as a trap by the opponents, but that it bears
all the mark of an actually honest compromise with Austria.
Assuming success of this step, we would again establish our
active intervention in Central European politics, which, as
opposed to the French-Czech and Russian political maneuvers,
would be a tremendous success, both morally and practically.
Since there are 2 weeks left to accomplish very much work in the
way of explorations and Conferences, an immediate decision is
necessary. The Reich Army Minister (_Reichswehrminister_) shares
the opinion presented above and the Reich Foreign Minister
(_Reichsaussenminister_) wanted to discuss it with you my
Fuehrer.

(Signed) Papen”. (_2247-PS_)

In other words, Papen wanted a strong assurance and credible assurance, of Austria’s independence. As he put it, Germany had nothing to lose with what it could always call a mere effort at peace. And she might be able to convince Schuschnigg to establish an Austrian coalition government with the NSDAP. If she did this, she would vastly strengthen her position in Europe. Finally, Papen urged haste.

Exactly four days later (21 May 1935) in a Reichstag address Hitler responded to Papen’s suggestion, asserting:

“Germany neither intends nor wishes to interfere in the internal
affairs of Austria, to annex Austria or to conclude an
Anschluss”. (_TC-26_)

Despite this assurance, Papen suggested and Hitler announced, for a complexity of reasons, a policy completely at variance with their intentions, which had been and continued to be to interfere in Austria’s internal affairs and to conclude an Anschluss.

(_e_) _Temporary Continuance of a Quiet Pressure Policy._ On 1 May 1936 Hitler branded as a lie any statement that tomorrow or the day after Germany would fall upon Austria. His words were published in the _Voelkische-Beobachter_, SD, 2-3 May 1936, p. 2. (_2367-PS_)

If Hitler meant what he said, it was only in the most literal and misleading sense that he would not fall upon Austria “tomorrow or the day after”. For the conspirators well knew that the successful execution of their purpose required for a while longer the quiet policy they had been pursuing in Austria.

A memorandum of a conversation which occurred when William Bullitt, American Ambassador to France, called upon von Neurath, German Minister for Foreign Affairs, on 18 May 1936, recounts von Neurath’s explanation why Germany was trying to prevent rather than encourage an outbreak by the Nazis in Austria (_L-150_). The Nazis were growing stronger in Austria, anyway, in view of their appeal to the young people. And the German Government was doing nothing active in foreign affairs until the Rhineland, reoccupied two months before, had been “digested”, and until fortifications were constructed on the French frontier. Finally, Italy still had a conflicting interest in Austria, and Germany wished to avoid any involvement with Italy.

(_f_) _The agreement of 11 July 1936._ But if Germany was not yet ready for open conflict in Austria, its diplomatic position was vastly improved over 1934, a fact which influenced Austria’s willingness to make concessions to Germany and come to terms. As Mr. Messersmith points out, Italy, formerly a protector of Austria, had embarked on her Abyssinian adventure, and this, together with the refortification of the Rhineland, strengthened Germany’s position (_1760-PS_). This weakening of Austria helped pave the way for the Pact of 11 July 1936. (_TC-22_)

The formal part of the agreement of July 11, 1936, between the German Government and the Government of the Federal State of Austria, looks like a great triumph for Austria. It contains a confusing provision to the effect that Austria, in its policy, especially with regard to Germany, will regard herself as a German state. But the other two provisions clearly state that Germany recognizes the full sovereignty of Austria, and that it regards the inner political order of Austria (including the question of Austrian National Socialism) as an internal concern of Austria upon which it will exercise neither direct nor indirect influence.

But there was much more substance to the day’s events. Mr. Messersmith’s summary, as set forth in his affidavit, is more revealing:

“Even more important than the terms of the agreement published
in the official communique, was the contemporaneous informal
understanding, the most important provisions of which were, that
Austria would (1) appoint a number of individuals enjoying the
Chancellor’s confidence but friendly to Germany to positions in
the Cabinet; (2) would devise means to give the ‘national
opposition’ a role in the political life of Austria and within
the framework of the Patriotic Front, and (3) would amnesty all
Nazis save those convicted of the most serious offenses. This
amnesty was duly announced by the Austrian Government and
thousands of Nazis were released, and the first penetration of
the _Deutsche Nationaler_ into the Austrian Government was
accomplished by the appointment of Dr. Guido Schmidt as
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and of Dr. Edmund
Glaise-Horstenau as Minister Without Portfolio”. (_1760-PS_)

These and other provisions of the secret part of the Agreement of July 11 are set forth briefly and in general terms in an affidavit by Kurt Schuschnigg, former Chancellor of Austria, dated November 19, 1945 (_2994-PS_). By two of those provisions Austria agreed to permit Nazi organizations on Austrian soil, and also use of the swastika and singing of the Horst Wessel song—all for German subjects. On its credit side, Austria was to get repeal of the 1,000 mark barrier on tourist trade, and in general tourist trade between the two countries was to resume.

In view of the strategy and tactics of the Nazis, these were substantial concessions made by Austria to obtain Germany’s diplomatic, formal assurance of Austrian independence and non-intervention in Austrian internal affairs. The release of imprisoned Nazis to the community presented potential police problems. And as Mr. Messersmith pointed out in a 1934 dispatch, quoted in his affidavit, any prospect that the National Socialists might come to power would make it more difficult to obtain effective police and judicial action against the Nazis for fear of reprisals by the future Nazi Government against those taking action against Nazis even in the line of duty (_1760-PS_). The preservation of internal peace in Austria was thus dependent upon Germany’s living up to its obligations under the Accord.

(4) _Germany’s Continuing Program of Weakening the Austrian Government._

(_a_) _Germany’s Instructions to the Austrian National Socialists Concerning Future Plans._ In the pact of 11 July 1936 Germany agreed not to influence directly or indirectly the internal affairs of Austria, including the matter of Austrian National Socialism. On 16 July 1936, just five days later, Hitler violated that provision. The report of Gauleiter Rainer to Reich Commissioner Buerckel states:

“* * * At that time the Fuehrer wished to see the leaders of the
party in Austria in order to tell them his opinion on what
Austrian National Socialists should do. Meanwhile Hinterleitner
was arrested, and Dr. Rainer became his successor and leader of
the Austrian party. On 16 July 1936, Dr. Rainer and Globocnik
visited the Fuehrer at the ‘Obersalzburg’ where they received a
clear explanation of the situation and the wishes of the
Fuehrer. On 17 July 1936, all illegal Gauleiters met in Anif
near Salzburg, where they received a complete report from Rainer
on the statement of the Fuehrer and his political instructions
for carrying out the fight. At the same conference the
Gauleiters received organizational instructions from Globocnik
and Hiedler.”

* * * * * *

“Upon the proposal of Globocnik, the Fuehrer named Lt. Gen.
(Gruppenfuehrer) Keppler as chief of the mixed commission which
was appointed, in accordance with the state treaty of 11 July
1936, to supervise the correct execution of the agreement. At
the same time Keppler was given full authority by the Fuehrer
for the party in Austria. After Keppler was unsuccessful in his
efforts to cooperate with Leopold, he worked together with Dr.
Rainer, Globocnik, Reinthaller as leader of the peasants,
Kaltenbrunner as leader of the SS, and Dr. Jury as deputy-leader
of the Austrian party, as well as with Glaise-Horstenau and
Seyss-Inquart.” (_812-PS_)

A new strategy was developed for the Austrian Nazis. Mr. Messersmith describes it briefly in his affidavit:

“The sequel of the agreement was the only one which could have
been expected in view of all the facts and previous recorded
happenings. Active Nazi operations in Austria were resumed under
the leadership; of a certain Captain Leopold, who it was known
definitely was in frequent touch with Hitler. The Nazi program
was now to form an organization through which the Nazis could
carry on their operations openly and with legal sanction in
Austria. There were formed in Austria several organizations
which had a legal basis but which were simply a device by which
the Nazis in Austria could organize, and later seek inclusion as
a unit in the Patriotic Front. The most important of these was
the _Ostmarkischer Verein_, the sponsor of which was the
Minister of the Interior Glaise-Horstenau. Through the influence
of Glaise-Horstenau and the pro-Nazi Neustadter-Sturmer, this
organization was declared legal by the Courts. I made specific
mention of the foregoing because it shows the degree to which
the situation in Austria had disintegrated as a result of the
underground and open Nazi activities directed from Germany.”
(_1760-PS_)

A report from Papen to Hitler dated 1 September 1936 indicates Papen’s strategy after 11 July 1936 for destroying Austria’s independence. Papen had taken a substantial step forward with the agreement of July 11. Incidentally, after that agreement he was promoted from Minister to Ambassador. Now his tactics were developed in the following terms, as explained in the last three paragraphs of his letter of September 1:

“* * * The progress of normalizing relations with Germany at the
present time is obstructed by the continued persistence of the
Ministry of Security, occupied by the old anti-National
Socialistic officials. Changes in personnel are therefore of
utmost importance. But they are definitely not to be expected
prior to the conference on the abolishing of the Control of
Finances (Finanzkontrolle) at Geneva. The Chancellor of the
League has informed Minister de Glaise-Horstenau, of his
intention, to offer him the portfolio of the Ministry of the
Interior. As a guiding principle (Marschroute) I recommend on
the tactical side, continued, patient psychological treatment,
with slowly intensified pressure directed at changing the
regime. The proposed conference on economic relations, taking
place at the end of October, will be a very useful tool for the
realization of some of our projects. In discussion with
government officials as well as with leaders of the illegal
party (Leopold and Schattenfroh) who conform completely with the
agreement of July 11. I am trying to direct the next
developments in such a manner to aim at corporative
representation of the movement in the fatherland front
(Vaterlaendischen Front) but nevertheless refraining from
putting National Socialists in important positions for the time
being. However such positions are to be occupied only by
personalities, having the support and the confidence of the
movement. I have a willing collaborator in this respect in
Minister Glaise-Horstenau.

(Signature) Papen”
(_2246-PS_)

To recapitulate, this report of von Papen, discloses the following plans:

1. obtaining a change in personnel in Ministry of Security in
due course;

2. obtaining cooperative representation of the Nazi movement in
the Fatherland Front;

3. not putting avowed National Socialists in important positions
yet, but using “nationalist” personalities;

4. using economic pressure, and “patient psychological
treatment, with slowly intensified pressure directed at changing
the regime.”

(_b_) _Nazi Demands and Demonstrations._ The Nazi demanded even more open recognition. In January 1937 Captain Leopold submitted a memorandum of demands. They are listed in Mr. Messersmith’s affidavit (_1760-PS_). They were not formally received by the Austrian Cabinet, but they were known to and considered by the Cabinet. They included the following demands: (1) An amnesty for all punishments or privations suffered for National Socialist or National activity or sympathy; (2) equal treatment for National Socialists, including freedom of political activity and cultural activity; (3) abolition of laws and sanctions used by the Government against Nazi activity. The memorandum advocated cooperation on the basis of political principles including: A broadening of the Patriotic Front; changes in the Cabinet; an alliance with the Reich; common racial stock as a political aim; the application of anti-Semitic measures; and an early plebiscite on Anschluss.

Mr. Messersmith’s affidavit also states that these demands, and Leopold’s petition for a nationalistic party, were supported by frequent demonstrations and much propaganda work. As early as 29 July 1936, when the Olympic Torch was carried through Vienna, there were violent Nazi disorders. From that time on there were frequent arrests for distributing illegal literature or staging illegal demonstrations. (_1760-PS_)

(_c_) _Schuschnigg’s Concessions._ Gauleiter Rainer’s historical review points out that due to the activities of the Reich officials and the Austrians who acted as the Nazi “fronts”, it was possible to obtain the appointment of Seyss-Inquart as _Staatsrat_ (Councillor of State) in July, 1937. (_812-PS_)

Schuschnigg’s affidavit mentions the Olympic Torch incident, and in addition the demonstration of the illegal Nazis at the time of the visit of von Neurath to Vienna in February 1937. Schuschnigg also points out other examples of the pressure increasingly exerted by Germany on Austria. One of his main reasons for entering into the July 11 agreement was to eliminate Germany’s 1,000 mark penalty on tourists to Austria. The penalty was removed, but Germany made it illegal for a tourist to bring more than 5 marks out of the country. And German buyers of cattle and wood purchased only from Austrian Nazis. (_2994-PS_)

Schuschnigg further reports that the incidents and pressure culminated in the so-called Tavs Plan, discovered by the Austrian police in November, 1937, containing instructions for unrest to break out among the Nazis at a prearranged time. The German Government would submit an ultimatum that National Socialists must be brought into the Government or the German Army would invade. (_2994-PS_)

It may be recalled that during this period Schuschnigg made concessions. He appointed Seyss-Inquart as Councillor of State in July, 1937. He had previously appointed a “Committee of Seven” to discuss with him the desires of the national opposition. He played a delaying game, presumably in the hope that a change in the foreign situation would provide him with external support.

B. _Germany’s Diplomatic Preparations for Conquest._

The program of the Nazi conspiracy aimed at weakening Austria externally and internally, by removing its support from without as well as by penetrating within. This program was of the utmost significance, since the events of 25 July 1934 inside Austria were overshadowed by the fact that Mussolini had brought his troops to the Brenner Pass and poised them there as a strong protector of his northern neighbor.

Accordingly, interference in the affairs of Austria, and steady increase in the pressure needed to acquire control over that country, required removal of the possibility that Italy or any other country would come to Austria’s aid. But the program of the conspiracy for the weakening and isolation of Austria was integrated with its foreign policy program in Europe generally.