Chapter XLVII: Part 3: , which deals in part with “Special Case—Extension Red-Green,” (4)

The section on “The Occupation of Denmark” which is given the code name of “_Weseruebung Sued_”, provides:

“The task of Group XXI: Occupation by surprise of Jutland and of
Fuenen immediately after occupation of Seeland.

“Added to this, having secured the most important places, the
Group will break through as quickly as possible from Fuenen to
Skagen and to the east coast.” (_C-174_)

There then follow other instructions with regard to the operation.

The section on “The Occupation of Norway”, given the code name of “_Weseruebung Nord_”, provides:

“The task of the Group XXI: Capture by surprise of the most
important places on the coast by sea and airborne operations.

“The Navy will take over the preparation and carrying out of the
transport by sea of the landing troops. * * * The Air Force,
after the occupation has been completed, will ensure air defense
and will make use of Norwegian bases for air warfare against
Britain.” (_C-174_)

Whilst these preparations were being made, and just prior to the final decision of Hitler, reports were coming in through Rosenberg’s organization from Quisling. The third paragraph in Annex I, the section dealing with Norway, has this information:

“Quisling’s reports, transmitted to his representative in
Germany, Hagelin, and dealing with the possibility of
intervention by the Western Powers in Norway with tacit consent
of the Norwegian Government, became more urgent by January.
These increasingly better substantiated communications were in
sharpest contrast to the views of the German Legation in Oslo,
which relied on the desire for neutrality of the then Norwegian
Nygardszvold Cabinet, and was convinced of that government’s
intention and readiness to defend Norway’s neutrality. No one in
Norway knew that Quisling’s representative for Germany
maintained closest relations to him; he therefore succeeded in
gaining a foothold within governmental circles of the
Nygardszvold cabinet and in listening to the cabinet members’
views. Hagelin transmitted what he had heard to the Bureau
[Rosenberg’s bureau], which conveyed the news to the Fuehrer
through Reichsleiter Rosenberg. During the night of the 16th to
17th of February, English destroyers attacked the German steamer
‘Altmark’ in Jessingjord.* * *” (_007-PS_)

(That is a reference to the action by the British destroyer _Cossack_ against the German naval auxiliary vessel _Altmark_, which was carrying three hundred British prisoners, captured on the high seas, to Germany through Norwegian territorial waters. The position of the British delegation with regard to that episode is that the use that was being made by the _Altmark_ of Norwegian territorial waters was in fact a flagrant abuse in itself of Norwegian neutrality, and that the action taken by H.M.S. _Cossack_, which was restricted to rescuing the three hundred British prisoners on board, no attempt being made to destroy the _Altmark_ or to capture the armed guards on board her, was fully justified under international law.)

The Rosenberg report continues:

“The Norwegian Government’s reaction to this question permitted
the conclusion that certain agreements had been covertly arrived
at between the Norwegian Government and the Allies. Such
assumption was confirmed by reports of Section Scheidt, who in
turn derived his information from Hagelin and Quisling. But even
after this incident the German Legation in Oslo championed the
opposite view, and went on record as believing in the good
intentions of the Norwegians.” (_007-PS_)

And so the Nazi Government preferred the reports of the traitor Quisling to the considered judgment of German diplomatic representatives in Norway. The result of the receipt of reports of that kind was the Hitler decision to invade Norway and Denmark. The culminating details in the preparations for the invasion are again found in Jodl’s diary. The entry for 3 March relates:

“The Fuehrer expressed himself very sharply on the necessity of
a swift entry into N [Norway] with strong forces.

“No delay by any branch of the armed forces. Very rapid
acceleration of the attack necessary.” (_1809-PS_)

The last entry for 3 March reads:

“Fuehrer decides to carry out ‘Weser Exercise’ before case
‘Yellow’ with a few days interval.” (_1809-PS_)

Thus, the important issue of strategy which had been concerning the German High Command for some time had been decided by this date, and the fate of Scandinavia was to be sealed before the fate of the Low Country. It will be observed from those entries of 3 March that by that date Hitler had become an enthusiastic convert to the idea of aggression against Norway.

The entry in Jodl’s diary for 5 March reads:

“Big conference with the three commanders-in-chief about ‘Weser
Exercise.’ Field Marshal in a rage because not consulted till
now. Won’t listen to anyone and wants to show that all
preparations so far made are worthless.

“Result: (_a_) Stronger forces to Narvik.

“(_b_) Navy to leave ships in the ports (Hipper or Luetzow in
Trondheim).

“(_c_) Christiansand can be left out at first.

“(_d_) Six divisions envisaged for Norway.

“(_e_) A foothold to be gained immediately in Copenhagen.”
(_1809-PS_)

The entry for 13 March is one of the most remarkable in the documentation of this case.

“Fuehrer does not give order yet for ‘W’ [Weser Exercise]. He is
still looking for an excuse.” (_1809-PS_)

The entry of the next day, 14 March, shows a similar preoccupation on the part of Hitler with the search for an excuse for this aggression. It reads:

“English keep vigil in the North Sea with fifteen to sixteen
submarines; doubtful whether reason to safeguard own operations
or prevent operations by Germans. Fuehrer has not yet decided
what reason to give for ‘Weser Exercise.’” (_1809-PS_)

The entry for 21 March reads:

“Misgivings of Task Force 21 [Falkenhorst’s Force, detailed to
conduct the invasion] about the long interval between taking up
readiness positions at 05.30 hours and close of diplomatic
negotiations. Fuehrer rejects any earlier negotiations, as
otherwise calls for help go out to England and America. If
resistance is put up it must be ruthlessly broken. The political
plenipotentiaries must emphasize the military measures taken,
and even exaggerate them.” (_1809-PS_)

The entry of 28 March reads:

“Individual naval officers seem to be lukewarm concerning the
Weser Exercise and need a stimulus. Also Falkenhorst and the
other two commanders are worrying about matters which are none
of their business. Franke sees more disadvantages than
advantages.

“In the evening the Fuehrer visits the map room and roundly
declares that he won’t stand for the Navy clearing out of the
Norwegian ports right away. Narvik, Trondheim and Oslo will have
to remain occupied by naval forces.” (_1809-PS_)

The entry for 2 April reads:

“Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, Commander-in-Chief of the
Navy, and General von Falkenhorst with the Fuehrer. All confirm
preparations completed. Fuehrer orders carrying out of the Weser
Exercise for April 9th.” (_1809-PS_)

The entry for 4 April reads:

“Fuehrer drafts the proclamation. Piepenbrock, Chief of Military
Intelligence 1, returns with good results from the talks with
Quisling in Copenhagen.” (_1809-PS_)

From the large number of operation orders that were issued in connection with the aggression against Norway and Denmark, two may be cited to illustrate the extent of the secrecy and deception that was used by the conspirators in the course of that aggression. The first dated 4 April 1940, reads in part:

“* * * The barrage-breaking vessels (_Sperrbrechers_) will
penetrate inconspicuously, and with lights on, into Oslo Fjord,
disguised as merchant steamers.

“Challenge from coastal signal stations and lookouts are to be
answered by the deceptive use of the names of English steamers.
I lay particular stress on the importance of not giving away the
operation before zero hour.” (_C-115_)

An order for reconnaissance forces, dated 24 March 1940, entitled “Behavior during entrance into the harbor,” reads in part:

“The disguise as British craft must be kept up as long as
possible. All challenges in Morse by Norwegian ships will be
answered in English. In answer to questions a text with
something like the following content will be chosen:

“Calling at Bergen for a short visit; no hostile intent.

“Challenges to be answered with names of British warships:

“Koeln H.M.S. Cairo “Koenigsberg H.M.S. Calcutta “Bromso H.M.S. Faulkner “Karl Peters H.M.S. Halcyon “Leopard British destroyer “Wolf British destroyer “E-boats British motor torpedo boats

“Arrangements are to be made enabling British war flags to be
illuminated. Continual readiness for making smoke.” (_C-115_)

An order dated 24 March 1940, classified “Most Secret,” provides:

“Following is laid down as guiding principle should one of our
own units find itself compelled to answer the challenge of
passing craft. To challenge in case of the ‘Koeln’ H.M.S. Cairo.
Then to order to stop: (1) Please repeat last signal. (2)
Impossible to understand your signal. In case of a warning shot:
Stop firing. British ship. Good friend. In case of an inquiry as
to destination and purpose: Going Bergen. Chasing German
steamers.” (_C-115_)

Doenitz’s order in connection with this operation is headed “Top Secret, Operation Order ‘_Hartmut_.’”

“Occupation of Denmark and Norway. This order comes into force
on the codeword ‘_Hartmut_.’ With its coming into force the
orders hitherto valid for the boats taking part lose their
validity.

“The day and hour are designated as ‘Weser-Day’ and
‘Weser-Hour’, and the whole operation is known as
‘_Weseruebung_’.

“The operation ordered by the codeword has its objective the
rapid surprise landing of troops in Norway. Simultaneously
Denmark will be occupied from the Baltic and from the land side.
* * * The naval force will as they enter the harbor fly the
British flag until the troops have landed, except presumably at
Narvik.” (_C-151_)

E. _Nazi Justification of Invasion._

On 9 April 1940 the Nazi onslaught on the unsuspecting and almost unarmed people of Norway and Denmark was launched. When the invasions had already begun, a German memorandum was handed to the governments of Norway and Denmark attempting to justify the German action (_TC-55_). That memorandum alleges that England and France were guilty in their maritime warfare of breaches of international law; that Britain and France are making plans themselves to invade and occupy Norway; and that the government of Norway was prepared to acquiesce in such a situation. The memorandum further states:

“The German troops therefore do not set foot on Norwegian soil
as enemies. The German High Command does not intend to make use
of the points occupied by German troops as bases for operations
against England, so long as it is not forced to do so by
measures taken by England and France. German military operations
aim much more exclusively at protecting the north against
proposed occupation of Norwegian strong points by English-French
forces.” (_TC-55_)

In connection with that statement it may be recalled that in his operation order on 1 March Hitler had given orders to the Air Force to make use of Norwegian bases for air warfare against Britain. That was on 1 March. And this is the memorandum which was produced as an excuse on 9 April. The last two paragraphs of the German memorandum to Norway and Denmark are a classic Nazi combination of diplomatic hypocrisy and military threat:

“The Reich Government thus expects that the Royal Norwegian
Government and the Norwegian people will respond with
understanding to the German measures and offer no resistance to
it. Any resistance would have to be and would be broken by all
possible means by the German forces employed, and would
therefore lead only to absolutely useless bloodshed. The Royal
Norwegian Government is therefore requested to take all measures
with the greatest speed to ensure that the advance of the German
troops can take place without friction and difficulty. In the
spirit of the good German-Norwegian relations that have always
existed, the Reich Government declares to the Royal Norwegian
Government that Germany has no intention of infringing by her
measures the territorial integrity and political independence of
the Kingdom of Norway now or in the future.” (_TC-55_)

What the Nazis meant by “protection of the kingdom of Norway” was shown by their conduct on 9 April.

A report by the Commander in Chief of the Royal Norwegian Forces states:

“* * * The Germans, considering the long lines of communications
and the threat of the British Navy, clearly understood the
necessity of complete surprise and speed in the attack. In order
to paralyze the will of the Norwegian people to defend their
country and at the same time to prevent allied intervention it
was planned to capture all the more important towns along the
coast simultaneously. Members of the Government and Parliament
and other military and civilian people occupying important
positions were to be arrested before organized resistance could
be put into effect and the King was to be forced to form a new
government with Quisling as the head.”

* * * * * *

“The German attack came as a surprise and all the invaded towns
along the coast were captured according to plan with only slight
losses. In the Oslofjord, however, the cruiser ‘Blucher’,
carrying General Engelbrecht and parts of his division,
technical staffs and specialists who were to take over the
control of Oslo, was sunk. The plan to capture the King and
members of the Government and Parliament failed in spite of the
surprise of the attack; resistance was organized throughout the
country.” (_TC-56_)

What happened in Denmark is described in a memorandum prepared by the Royal Danish Government (_D-628_). An extract from it reads:

“Extracts from the Memorandum concerning Germany’s attitude
towards Denmark before and during the occupation, prepared by
the Royal Danish Government.

“On the 9th of April, 1940 at 4.20 hours the German Minister
appeared at the private residence of the Danish Minister for
Foreign Affairs accompanied by the Air Attache of the Legation.
The appointment had been made by a telephone call from the
German Legation to the Secretary-General of the Ministry for
Foreign Affairs at 4.00 o’clock the same morning. The Minister
said at once that Germany had positive proof that Great Britain
intended to occupy bases in Denmark and Norway. Germany had to
safeguard Denmark against this. For this reason German soldiers
were now crossing the frontier and landing at various points in
Zealand including the port of Copenhagen; in a short time German
bombers would be over Copenhagen; their orders were not to bomb
until further notice. It was now up to the Danes to prevent
resistance as any resistance would have the most terrible
consequences. Germany would guarantee Denmark’s territorial
integrity and political independence. Germany would not
interfere with the internal government of Denmark, but wanted
only to make sure of the neutrality of the country. For this
purpose the presence of the German Wehrmacht in Denmark was
required during the war.

“The Minister for Foreign Affairs declared in reply that the
allegation concerning British plans to occupy Denmark was
completely without foundation; there was no possibility of
anything like that. The Minister for Foreign Affairs protested
against the violation of Denmark’s neutrality which according to
the German Minister’s statement was in progress. The Minister
for Foreign Affairs declared further that he could not give a
reply to the demands, which had to be submitted to the King and
the Prime Minister, and further observed that the German
Minister knew, as everybody else, that the Danish armed forces
had orders to oppose violations of Denmark’s neutrality so that
fighting presumably already took place. In reply the German
Minister expressed that the matter was very urgent, not least to
avoid air bombardment.” (_D-628_)

What happened thereafter is described in a dispatch from the British Minister in Copenhagen to the British Foreign Secretary (_D-627_). That dispatch reads:

“The actual events of the 9th April have been pieced together by
members of my staff from actual eye-witnesses or from reliable
information subsequently received and are given below. Early in
the morning towards 5 o’clock three small German transports
steamed into the approach to Copenhagen harbor, whilst a number
of airplanes circled overhead. The northern battery, guarding
the harbor approach, fired a warning shot at these planes when
it was seen that they carried German markings. Apart from this,
the Danes offered no further resistance, and the German vessels
fastened alongside the quays in the Free Harbor. Some of these
airplanes proceeded to drop leaflets over the town urging the
population to keep calm and cooperate with the Germans. I
enclose a specimen of this leaflet, which is written in a
bastard Norwegian-Danish, a curiously un-German disregard of
detail, together with a translation. Approximately 800 soldiers
landed with full equipment, and marched to Kastellet, the old
fortress of Copenhagen and now a barracks. The door was locked,
so the Germans promptly burst it open with explosives and
rounded up all the Danish soldiers within, together with the
womenfolk employed in the mess. The garrison offered no
resistance, and it appears that they were taken completely by
surprise. One officer tried to escape in a motor car, but his
chauffeur was shot before they could get away. He died in
hospital two days later. After seizing the barracks, a
detachment was sent to Amalienborg, the King’s palace, where
they engaged the Danish sentries on guard, wounding three, one
of them fatally. Meanwhile, a large fleet of bombers flew over
the city at low altitudes.”

* * * * * *

“It has been difficult to ascertain exactly what occurred in
Jutland. It is clear, however, that the enemy invaded Jutland
from the south at dawn on the 9th April and were at first
resisted by the Danish forces, who suffered casualties. The
chances of resistance were weakened by the extent to which the
forces appear to have been taken by surprise. The chief
permanent official of the Ministry of War, for instance, motored
into Copenhagen on the morning of the 9th April and drove
blithely past a sentry who challenged him, in blissful ignorance
that this was not one of his own men. It took a bullet, which
passed through the lapels of his coat, to disillusion him.”
(_D-627_)

The German memorandum to the Norwegian and Danish governments spoke of the German desire to maintain the territorial integrity and political independence of those two small countries. Two documents indicate the kind of territorial integrity and political independence the Nazi conspirators contemplated for the victims of their aggression. An entry in Jodl’s diary for 19 April reads:

“Renewed crisis. Envoy Braver is recalled: since Norway is at
war with us, the task of the Foreign Office is finished. In the
Fuehrer’s opinion, force has to be used. It is said that
Gauleiter Terboven will be given a post. Field Marshal
[presumably a reference to Goering] is moving in the same
direction. He criticizes as defects that we didn’t take
sufficiently energetic measures against the civilian population,
that we could have seized electrical plant, that the Navy didn’t
supply enough troops. The Air Force can’t do everything.”
(_1809-PS_)

It will be seen from that entry and the reference to Gauleiter Terboven that already by 19 April, rule by Gauleiters had replaced rule by Norwegians.

A memorandum dated 3 June 1940, signed by Fricke, at that date the head of the Operations Division of the German Naval War Staff, which was a key appointment in the very nerve center of German naval operations, relates to questions of territorial expansion and bases (_C-41_). It reads:

“These problems are preeminently of a political character and
comprise an abundance of questions of a political type, which it
is not the Navy’s province to answer, but they also materially
affect the strategic possibilities open—according to the way in
which this question is answered—for the subsequent use and
operation of the Navy.

“It is too well known to need further mention that Germany’s
present position in the narrows of the Heligoland Bight and in
the Baltic—bordered as it is by a whole series of States and
under their influence—is an impossible one for the future of
Greater Germany. If, over and above this, one extends these
strategic possibilities to the point that Germany shall not
continue to be cut off for all time from overseas by natural
geographical facts, the demand is raised that somehow or other
an end shall be put to this state of affairs at the end of the
war.

“The solution could perhaps be found among the following
possibilities.

“1. The territories of Denmark, Norway and Northern France
acquired during the course of the war continue to be so occupied
and organized that they can in future be considered as German
possessions.

“This solution will recommend itself for areas where the
severity of the decision tells, and should tell, on the enemy
and where a gradual ‘Germanizing’ of the territory appears
practicable.

“2. The taking over and holding of areas which have no direct
connection with Germany’s main body, and which, like the Russian
solution in Hango, remain permanently as an enclave in the
hostile State. Such areas might be considered possibly around
Brest and Trondjem.

“3. The power of Greater Germany in the strategic areas acquired
in this war should result in the existing population of these
areas feeling themselves politically, economically and
militarily to be completely dependent on Germany. If the
following results are achieved—that expansion is undertaken (on
a scale I shall describe later) by means of the military
measures for occupation taken during the war, that French powers
of resistance (popular unity, mineral resources, industry, Armed
Forces) are so broken that a revival must be considered out of
the question, that the smaller States such as the Netherlands,
Denmark and Norway are forced into a dependence on us which will
enable us in any circumstances and at any time easily to occupy
these countries again, then in practice the same, but
psychologically much more, will be achieved.” (_C-41_)

Then Fricke recommends:

“The solution given in 3, therefore, appears to be the proper
one, that is, to crush France, to occupy Belgium, part of North
and East France, to allow the Netherlands, Denmark and Norway to
exist on the basis indicated above.”

* * * * * *

“Time will show how far the outcome of the war with England will
make an extension of these demands possible.” (_C-41_)

The submission of the prosecution is that that and other documents which have been submitted tear apart the veil of Nazi pretense. These documents reveal the menace behind the good-will of Goering; they expose as fraudulent the diplomacy of Ribbentrop; they show the reality behind the ostensible political ideology of tradesmen in treason like Rosenberg; and finally and above all, they render sordid the professional status of Keitel and of Raeder.

* * * * *

LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO AGGRESSION AGAINST
NORWAY AND DENMARK

Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page
│ │ │
│Charter of the International Military │ │
│ Tribunal, Article 6 (a). │ I │ 5
│ │ │
│International Military Tribunal, │ │
│ Indictment Number 1, Sections IV (F) │ │
│ 5; V. │ I │ 27, 29
│ ————— │ │
│Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │
│document indicates that the document was│ │
│received in evidence at the Nurnberg │ │
│trial. A double asterisk (**) before a │ │
│document number indicates that the │ │
│document was referred to during the │ │
│trial but was not formally received in │ │
│evidence, for the reason given in │ │
│parentheses following the description of│ │
│the document. The USA series number, │ │
│given in parentheses following the │ │
│description of the document, is the │ │
│official exhibit number assigned by the │ │
│court. │ │
│ ————— │ │
*004-PS │Report submitted by Rosenberg to Deputy │ │
│of the Fuehrer, 15 June 1940, on the │ │
│Political Preparation of the Norway │ │
│Action. (GB 140) │ III │ 19
│ │ │
*007-PS │Report on activities of the Foreign │ │
│Affairs Bureau from 1933 to 1943 signed │ │
│Rosenberg. (GB 84) │ III │ 27
│ │ │
*957-PS │Rosenberg’s letter to Ribbentrop, 24 │ │
│February 1940. (GB 139) │ III │ 641
│ │ │
1546-PS │Raeder memorandum, 9 April 1940, │ │
│concerning occupation of Norway. │ IV │ 104
│ │ │
*1809-PS │Entries from Jodl’s diary, February 1940│ │
│to May 1940. (GB 88) │ IV │ 377
│ │ │
*3054-PS │“The Nazi Plan”, script of a motion │ │
│picture composed of captured German │ │
│film. (USA 167) │ V │ 801
│ │ │
3596-PS │Covering memorandum and notes of │ │
│conversation on 8 August 1940, between │ │
│Chief Custodian of Army Archives GOES │ │
│and Major-General Himmler. │ VI │ 299
│ │ │
*C-5 │Memorandum to Supreme Command of the │ │
│Navy by Doenitz, 9 October 1939, │ │
│concerning base in Norway. (GB 83) │ VI │ 815
│ │ │
*C-41 │Memorandum by Fricke, 3 June 1940, on │ │
│questions of territorial expansion and │ │
│bases. (GB 96) │ VI │ 868
│ │ │
*C-63 │Keitel order on preparation for │ │
│“Weseruebung”, 27 January 1940. (GB 87) │ VI │ 883
│ │ │
*C-64 │Raeder’s report, 12 December 1939, on │ │
│meeting of Naval Staff with Fuehrer. (GB│ │
│86) │ VI │ 884
│ │ │
*C-65 │Notes of Rosenberg to Raeder concerning │ │
│visit of Quisling. (GB 85) │ VI │ 885
│ │ │
*C-66 │Memorandum from Raeder to Assmann, 10 │ │
│January 1944, concerning “Barbarossa” │ │
│and “Weseruebung”. (GB 81) │ VI │ 887
│ │ │
*C-115 │Naval deception and camouflage in │ │
│invasion of Norway taken from file of │ │
│naval operation orders for operation │ │
│“Weseruebung”. (GB 90) │ VI │ 914
│ │ │
*C-122 │Extract from Naval War Diary. │ │
│Questionnaire on Norway bases, 3 October│ │
│1939. (GB 82) │ VI │ 928
│ │ │
*C-151 │Details for execution of operation │ │
│“Weseruebung”, 3 March 1940, signed by │ │
│Doenitz. (GB 91) │ VI │ 965
│ │ │
*C-174 │Hitler Order for operation │ │
│“Weseruebung”, 1 March 1940. (GB 89) │ VI │ 1003
│ │ │
*D-627 │Dispatch from British Minister in │ │
│Copenhagen to Foreign Secretary, 25 │ │
│April 1940. (GB 95) │ VII │ 97
│ │ │
*D-628 │Memorandum concerning Germany’s attitude│ │
│towards Denmark before and during │ │
│occupation. (GB 94) │ VII │ 98
│ │ │
*D-629 │Letter from Keitel to Ribbentrop, 3 │ │
│April 1940. (GB 141) │ VII │ 99
│ │ │
*L-323 │Entry in Naval War Diary concerning │ │
│operation “Weseruebung”. (USA 541) │ VII │ 1106
│ │ │
*M-156 │Year Book of the Ausland (Foreign) │ │
│Organization of the NSDAP for 1942. (GB │ │
│284) │ VIII │ 49
│ │ │
*TC-17 │Treaty of Arbitration and Conciliation │ │
│between Germany and Denmark, signed at │ │
│Berlin, 2 June 1926. (GB 76) │ VIII │ 346
│ │ │
*TC-24 │Treaty of nonaggression between German │ │
│Reich and Kingdom of Denmark, 31 May │ │
│1939. (GB 77) │ VIII │ 373
│ │ │
*TC-30 │German assurance to Denmark, Norway, │ │
│Belgium, and the Netherlands, 28 April │ │
│1939, from Documents of German Politics,│ │
│Part VII, I, pp. 139, 172-175. (GB 78) │ VIII │ 379
│ │ │
*TC-31 │German assurance to Norway, 2 September │ │
│1939. (GB 79) │ VIII │ 380
│ │ │
*TC-32 │German assurance to Norway, 6 October │ │
│1939, from Documents of German Politics,│ │
│Vol. VII, p. 350. (GB 80) │ VIII │ 381
│ │ │
*TC-55 │German ultimatum to Norway and Denmark, │ │
│9 April 1940, from Documents of German │ │
│Politics, Part VIII, pp. 21-31. (GB 92) │ VIII │ 410
│ │ │
*TC-56 │German Plans for Invasion of Norway, 1 │ │
│October 1945. (GB 93) │ VIII │ 414
│ │ │
**Chart No. 12 │German Aggression. (Enlargement │ │
│displayed to Tribunal.) │ VIII │ 781
│ │ │
**Chart No. 13 │Violations of Treaties, Agreements and │ │
│Assurances. (Enlargement displayed to │ │
│Tribunal.) │ VIII │ 782

10. AGGRESSION AGAINST BELGIUM, THE NETHERLANDS,
AND LUXEMBOURG

The independence of Belgium, which for so many centuries was the cockpit of Europe, was guaranteed by the great European powers in 1839. That guarantee was observed for 75 years, until it was broken by the Germans in 1914, who brought all the horrors of war, and the even greater horrors of German occupation, to Belgium. History was to repeat itself in a still more catastrophic fashion some 25 years after, in 1940.

Among the applicable treaties are the Hague Convention of 1907 (_TC-3_; _TC-4_), the Locarno Arbitration and Conciliation Convention of 1925, in which Belgium’s independence and neutrality were guaranteed by Germany; the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, by which all the Powers renounced recourse to war; and the Hague Convention of Arbitration and Conciliation May 1926 between Germany and the Netherlands (_TC-16_). Article I of the latter treaty provides:

“The contracting parties” (the Netherlands and the German Reich)
“undertake to submit all disputes of any nature whatever which
may arise between them which it has not been possible to settle
by diplomacy, and which have not been referred to the Permanent
Court of International Justice, to be dealt with by arbitration
or conciliation as provided.” (_TC-16_)

Subsequent clauses deal with the machinery of conciliation. The last article, Article 21, provides that the Convention shall be valid for ten years, and then shall remain in force for successive periods of five years until denounced by either party. And this treaty never was denounced by Germany at all.

The last of the applicable treaties, all of which belong to the days of the Weimar Republic, is the Treaty of Arbitration and Conciliation between Germany and Luxembourg, executed at Geneva in 1929 (_TC-20_). The first few words of Article 1 are familiar:

“The contracting parties undertake to settle by peaceful means
all disputes of any nature whatever which may arise between them
and which it may not be possible to settle by

Then follow clauses dealing with the machinery for peaceful settlement of disputes, which are in the common form.

Those were the treaty obligations between Germany and Belgium at the time when the Nazi Party came into power in 1933. Hitler adopted and ratified the obligations of Germany under the Weimar Republic with regard to the treaties which had been entered into. Nothing more occurred to alter the position of Belgium until March 1936. Germany reoccupied the Rhineland and announced the resumption of conscription. And Hitler, on 7 March 1936 purported in a speech to repudiate the obligations of the German Government under the Locarno Pact, the reason being given as the execution of the Franco-Soviet Pact of 1935. There was no legal foundation for this claim that Germany was entitled to renounce obligations under the Locarno Pact. But Belgium was left in the air, in the sense that it had itself entered into various obligations under the Locarno Pact in return for the liabilities which other nations acknowledged, and now one of those liabilities, namely, the liability of Germany to observe the Pact, had been renounced.

And so on 30 January 1937, perhaps because Hitler realized the position of Belgium and of the Netherlands, Hitler gave solemn assurance—he used the word “solemn”—which amounted to a full guarantee (_TC-33_). In April 1937, France and England released Belgium from her obligations under the Locarno Pact. Belgium gave guarantees of strict independence and neutrality, and France and England gave guarantees of assistance should Belgium be attacked. It was because of those facts that Germany, on 13 October 1937, gave a clear and unconditional guarantee to Belgium:

“I have the honor on behalf of the German Government to make the
following communication to Your Excellency: The German
Government has taken cognizance with particular interest of the
public declaration in which the Belgium Government defines the
international position of Belgium. For its part, it has
repeatedly given expressions, especially through the declaration
of the Chancellor of the German Reich in his speech of January
30th, 1937, to its own point of view. The German Government has
also taken cognizance of the declaration made by the British and
French Governments on the 24th of April 1937 * * *

“Since the conclusion of a treaty to replace the Treaty of
Locarno may still take some time, and being desirous of
strengthening the peaceful aspirations of the two countries, the
German Government regards it as appropriate to define now its
own attitude towards Belgium. To this end, it makes the
following declaration: First, the German Government has taken
note of the views which the Belgian Government has thought fit
to express. That is to say, (_a_) of the policy of independence
which it intends to exercise in full sovereignty; (_b_) of its
determination to defend the frontiers of Belgium with all its
forces against any aggression or invasion and to prevent Belgian
territory from being used for purposes of aggression against
another state as a passage or as a base of operation by land, by
sea, or in the air, and to organize the defense of Belgium in an
efficient manner to this purpose. Two: The German Government
considers that the inviolability and integrity of Belgium are
common interests of the Western Powers. It confirms its
determination that in no circumstances will it impair this
inviolability and integrity and that it will at all times
respect Belgian territory except, of course, in the event of
Belgium’s taking part in a military action directed against
Germany in an armed conflict in which Germany is involved. The
German Government, like the British and French Governments, is
prepared to assist Belgium should she be subjected to an attack
or to invasion. * * *” (_TC-34_)

The following reply was made:

“The Belgian Government has taken note with great satisfaction
of the declaration communicated to it this day by the German
Government. It thanks the German Government warmly for this
communication.” (_TC-34_)

Thus, in October 1937, Germany gave a solemn guarantee to this small nation of its peaceful aspiration towards her, and its assertion that the integrity of the Belgian frontier was a common interest between her and Belgium and the other Western Powers. Yet eighteen months afterwards Germany had violated that assurance.

That this declaration of October 1937 meant very little to the leaders and to the high command of Germany can be seen from a document which came into existence on 24 August 1938, at the time when the Czechoslovakia drama was unfolding, and when it was uncertain whether there would be war with the Western Powers. This Top Secret document is addressed to the General Staff of the 5th Section of the German Air Force, and deals with the subject, “Extended Case Green—Appreciation of the Situation with Special Consideration of the Enemy.” Apparently some staff officer had been asked to prepare this appreciation. The last paragraph (No. H) reads:

“Requests to Armed Forces Supreme Command, Army and Navy. * * *

“Belgium and the Netherlands would, in German hands, represent
an extraordinary advantage in the prosecution of the air war
against Great Britain as well as against France. Therefore it is
held to be essential to obtain the opinion of the Army as to the
conditions under which an occupation of this area could be
carried out and how long it would take, and in this case it
would be necessary to reassess the commitment against Great
Britain.” (_375-PS_)

It was apparently assumed by the staff officer who prepared this document, and assumed quite rightly, that the leaders of the German nation and the High Command would not pay the smallest attention to the fact that Germany had given her word not to invade Holland or Belgium. It was recommended as a militarily advantageous thing to do, with the knowledge that, if the commanders and the Fuehrer agreed with that view, treaties would be completely ignored. Such was the honor of the German Government and of its leaders.

In March of 1939, the remainder of Czechoslovakia had been peacefully annexed, and the time had come for further guarantees. Assurances which were accordingly given to Belgium and the Netherlands on the 28th of April 1939 (_TC-30_). A guarantee was also made to Luxembourg in a speech by Hitler in the Reichstag, in which he dealt with a communication from Mr. Roosevelt, who was feeling a little uneasy as to Hitler’s intentions (_TC-42-A_). In “The Nazi Plan,” a motion picture shown to the Tribunal by the American prosecution (_3054-PS_), the delivery by Hitler of this part of this speech was shown. Hitler appeared in one of his jocular moods, as his words were greeted and delivered in a jocular vein. The film shows that Goering, who sits above Hitler in the Reichstag, appreciated very much the joke, the joke being this: That it is an absurd suggestion to make that Germany could possibly go to war with any of its neighbors.

In this speech Hitler declared:

“Finally Mr. Roosevelt demands the readiness to give him an
assurance that the German fighting forces will not attack the
territory or possessions of the following independent nations,
and above all, that they will not march into them. And he goes
on to name the following as the countries in question: Finland,
Latvia, Lithuania, Esthonia, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Holland,
Belgium, Great Britain, Ireland, France, Portugal, Spain,
Switzerland, Lichtenstein, Luxembourg, Poland, Hungary, Rumania,
Yugoslavia, Russia, Bulgaria, Turkey, Iraq, Arabia, Syria,
Palestine, Egypt, and Iran.

“Answer: I started off by taking the trouble to find out in the
case of the countries listed, firstly, whether they feel
themselves threatened, and secondly and particularly, whether
this question Mr. Roosevelt has asked us was put as the result
of a demarche by them or at least with their consent.

“The answer was a general negative, which in some cases took the
form of a blunt rejection. Actually, this counter-question of
mine could not be conveyed to some of the states and nations
listed, since they are not at present in possession of their
liberty (as for instance Syria), but are occupied by the
military forces of democratic states, and therefore, deprived of
all their rights.

“Thirdly, apart from that, all the states bordering on Germany
have received much more binding assurances and, above all, much
more binding proposals than Mr. Roosevelt asked of me in his
peculiar telegram.” (_TC-42-A_)

Although that is sneering at Mr. Roosevelt, it is suggesting in the presence, among others, of Goering, as being quite absurd that Germany should nurture any warlike feeling against its neighbors. The hollow falsity of that declaration and of the preceding guarantee is shown by the minutes of Hitler’s conference of the 23rd of May (_L-79_). The first page shows that those present included the Fuehrer, Goering, Raeder, von Brauchitsch, Keitel, Warlimont (Jodl’s deputy), and various others. The purpose of the conference was an analysis of the situation, which proceeded in this fashion:

“What will this struggle be like?”

* * * * * *

“The Dutch and Belgian air bases must be occupied by armed
force. Declarations of neutrality must be ignored.”

* * * * * *

“Therefore, if England intends to intervene in the Polish war,
we must occupy Holland with lightning speed. We must aim at
securing a new defense line on Dutch soil up to the Zuider Zee.”
(_L-79_)

In Hitler’s speech on 22 August, the following passage occurred:

“Attack from the West from the Maginot Line: I consider this
impossible.

“Another possibility is the violation of Dutch, Belgium, and
Swiss neutrality. I have no doubts that all these states as well
as Scandinavia will defend their neutrality by all available
means. England and France will not violate the neutrality of
these countries.” (_798-PS_)

Nevertheless, a further assurance was given by the Ambassador of Germany to the Belgian Government:

“In view of the gravity of the international situation, I am
expressly instructed by the Head of the German Reich to transmit
to Your Majesty the following communication:

“Though the German Government is at present doing everything in
its power to arrive at a peaceful solution of the questions at
issue between the Reich and Poland, it nevertheless desires to
define clearly, here and now, the attitude which it proposes to
adopt towards Belgium should a conflict in Europe become
inevitable.

“The German Government is firmly determined to abide by the
terms of the declaration contained in the German note of October
13, 1937. This provides in effect that Germany will in no
circumstances impair the inviolability of Belgium and will at
all times respect Belgium territory. The German Government
renews this undertaking; however, in, the expectation that the
Belgium Government, for its part, will observe an attitude of
strict neutrality and that Belgium will tolerate no violations
on the part of a third power, but that, on the contrary, she
will oppose it with all the forces at her disposal. It goes
without saying that if the Belgium Government were to adopt a
different attitude, the German Government would naturally be
compelled to defend its interests in conformity with the new
situation thus created.” (_TC-36_)

It seems likely that the decision having been made to violate Belgian neutrality, those last words were put in to afford some excuse in the future.

A similar document assurance was communicated to Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands on the same day, 26 August 1939 (_TC-40_). Likewise assurances were given to Luxembourg at the same time. It is in the same terms as the other two assurances, and amounts to a complete guarantee with the sting in the tail (_TC-42_). Poland was occupied by means of a lightning victory, and in October 1939 German armed forces were free for other tasks. The first step that was taken, so far as the Netherlands and Belgium are concerned, was a German assurance on 6 October 1939, as follows:

“Belgium.

“Immediately after I had taken over the affairs of the state I
tried to create friendly relations with Belgium. I renounced any
revision or any desire for revision. The Reich has not made any
demands which would in any way be likely to be considered in
Belgium as a threat.” (_TC-32_)

A similar assurance was made to the Netherlands on the same day:

“The new Reich has endeavored to continue the traditional
friendship with Holland. It has not taken over any existing
differences between the two countries and has not created any
new ones.” (_TC-32_)

The value of these pledges of Germany’s good faith is shown by an order issued on the very next day, 7 October. This order was from the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Von Brauchitsch, and was addressed to various Army Groups. The third paragraph provided:

“The Dutch Border between Ems and Rhine is to be observed only.

“At the same time, Army Group B has to make all preparations
according to special orders, for immediate invasion of Dutch and
Belgian territory, if the political situation so demands.”
(_2329-PS_)

Two days later, on 9 October, Hitler directed that:

“Preparations should be made for offensive action on the
northern flank of the Western Front crossing the area of
Luxembourg, Belgium and Holland. This attack must be carried out
as soon and as forcefully as possible. * * *”

* * * * * *

“The object of this attack is to acquire as great an area of
Holland, Belgium and Northern France as possible.” (_C-62_)

That document is signed by Hitler himself. It is addressed to the Supreme Commander of the Army, Keitel; Navy, Raeder; and Air Minister and Commander in Chief of the Air Force, Goering. On 15 October 1939, a supplementary order was issued from the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. It was signed by Keitel in his familiar red pencil signature, and was addressed to Raeder, Goering, and the General Staff of the Army. It declared, in part:

“It must be the object of the Army’s preparations, therefore, to
occupy—on receipt of a special order—the territory of Holland,
in the first instance as far as the Grebbe-Maas line.” (_C-62_)

The second paragraph deals with the taking possession of the West-Frisian islands.

It is clear that from that moment the decision to violate the neutrality of these three countries had been made. All that remained was to work out the details, to wait until the weather became favorable, and in the meantime, to give no hint that Germany’s word was about to be broken again. Otherwise, these small countries might have had some chance of combining with themselves and their neighbors.

Another Keitel directive, again sent to the Supreme Commanders of the Army, Navy, and Air Forces, gives details of how the attack is to be carried out. The following are pertinent passages:

“Contrary to previously issued instructions, all action intended
against Holland may be carried out without a special order which
the general attack will start.

“The attitude of the Dutch armed forces cannot be anticipated
ahead of time.”

* * * * * *

“Wherever there is no resistance, the entry should carry the
character of a peaceful occupation.”

* * * * * *

“At first the Dutch area, including the West-Frisian islands
situated just off the coast, for the present without Texel, is
to be occupied up to the Grebbe-Maas line.”

“The 7th Airborne Division will be committed for the airborne
operation only after the possession of bridges across the Albert
Canal” (in Belgium) “has been assured.” (_440-PS_)

In addition to Belgium and Holland, the document, in paragraph (5) and (6)(b) mentions Luxembourg. The signature of Keitel is typed. It is authenticated by a staff officer.

A later order of 28 November 1939, over the signature of Keitel, in the usual red pencil, is addressed to the Army, Navy, and Airforce. It states that if a quick breakthrough should fail north of Liege, other machinery for carrying out the attack will be used. Paragraph 2 shows clearly that the Netherlands is to be violated. It speaks of “The occupation of Walcheren Island and thereby Flushing harbor, or of some other southern Dutch island especially valuable for our sea and air warfare,” and “_b_ Taking of one or more Maas crossings between Namur and Dinant * * *.” (_C-10_)

From November until March of 1940 the High Command and the Fuehrer were waiting for favorable weather before A-Day, as they called it. That referred to the attack on Luxembourg, Belgium and the Netherlands. The successive postponements are shown in a series of orders which range in date from 7 November 1939 until 9 May 1940, and which are all signed either by Keitel or by Jodl. (_C-72_)

On 10 January 1940, a German airplane made a forced landing in Belgium. The occupants endeavored to burn the orders of which they were in possession, but they were only partially successful. Among the papers which were captured is an order to the Commander of the Second Army Group, Air Force Group—Luftflotte—the Second Air Force Fleet, clearly for offensive action against France, Holland, and Belgium. It deals with the disposition of the Belgian Army. The Belgian Army covers the Liege-Antwerp Line. Then it deals with the disposition of the Dutch Army. The German Western Army is accordingly directing its attack between the North Sea and the Moselle, with the strongest possible air-force support, through the Belgo-Luxembourg region. The rest consists of operational details as to the bombing of the various targets in Belgium and in Holland. (_TC-58_)

The nature of the Army’s planning is shown in the 1 February 1940 entry in Jodl’s diary, which reads in part as follows:

“1. Behavior of parachute units. In front of The Hague they have
to be strong enough to break in if necessary by sheer brute
force. The 7th Division intends to drop units near the town.

“2. Political mission contrasts to some extent with violent
action against the Dutch air force.” (_1809-PS_)

The entry for 2 February 1940 states that “landings can be made in the centre of The Hague.” On 26 February Jodl wrote: “Fuehrer raises the question whether it is better to undertake the Weser Exercise before or after case ‘Yellow.’” On 3 March, he recorded the answer: “Fuehrer decides to carry out Weser Exercise before case ‘Yellow’, with a few days’ interval.” And on May 8, two days before the invasion, Jodl made this entry:

“Alarming news from Holland, cancelling of furloughs,
evacuations, road-blocks, other mobilization measures; according
to reports of the intelligence service the British have asked
for permission to march in, but the Dutch have refused.”
(_1809-PS_)

In other words, the Germans objected because the Dutch were actually making some preparation to resist their endeavor. Furthermore, the Dutch armies, according to the Germans’ own intelligence reports, were still adhering properly to their neutrality.

At 4:30 a. m. on 10 May, the months of planning bore fruit, and Holland, Belgium, and Luxembourg were violently invaded with all the fury of modern warfare. No warning was given by Germany and no complaint was made by Germany of any breaches of neutrality before this action was taken.

After the invasion of each of the three countries was a fait accompli, the German Ambassador called upon representatives of the three Governments some hours later and handed them documents which were similar in each case, and which are described as memoranda or ultimatums. An account of what happened in Belgium is contained in an official Belgian report:

“From 4:30 information was received which left no shadow of
doubt: the hour had struck. Aircraft were first reported in the
east. At five o’clock came news of the bombing of two
Netherlands aerodromes, the violation of the Belgian frontier,
the landing of German soldiers at the Eben-Emael Fort, the
bombing of the Jemelle station.”

* * * * * *

“At 8:30 the German Ambassador came to the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. When he entered the Minister’s room, he began to take a
paper from his pocket. M. Spaak” [Belgian Foreign Minister]
“stopped him ‘I beg your pardon, Mr. Ambassador. I will speak
first.’ And in an indignant voice, he read the Belgian
Government’s protest: ‘Mr. Ambassador, the German Army has just
attacked our country. This is the second time in twenty-five
years that Germany has committed a criminal aggression against a
neutral and loyal Belgium. What has just happened is perhaps
even more odious than the aggression of 1914. No ultimatum, no
note, no protest of any kind has ever been placed before the
Belgian Government. It is through the attack itself that Belgium
has learned that Germany has violated the undertakings given by
her on October 13th, 1937, and renewed spontaneously at the
beginning of the war. The act of aggression committed by
Germany, for which there is no justification whatever, will
deeply shock the conscience of the world. The German Reich will
be held responsible by history. Belgium is resolved to defend
herself. Her cause, which is the cause of Right, cannot be
vanquished’.”

* * * * * *

“The Ambassador was then able to read the note he had brought:
‘I am instructed by the Government of the Reich,’ he said, ‘to
make the following declaration: In order to forestall the
invasion of Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg, for which Great
Britain and France have been making preparations clearly aimed
at Germany, the Government of the Reich is compelled to ensure
the neutrality of the three countries mentioned by means of
arms. For this purpose, the Government of the Reich will bring
up an armed force of the greatest size, so that resistance of
any kind will be useless. The Government of the Reich guarantees
Belgium’s European and colonial territory, as well as her
dynasty, on condition that no resistance is offered. Should
there be any resistance, Belgium will risk the destruction of
her country and loss of her independence. It is therefore, in
the interests of Belgium that the population be called upon to
cease all resistance and that the authorities be given the
necessary instructions to make contact with the German Military
Command.”

* * * * * *

“In the middle of this communication, M. Spaak, who had by his
side the Secretary-General of the Department, interrupted the
Ambassador: ‘Hand me the document’, he said. ‘I should like to
spare you so painful a task.’ After studying the note, M. Spaak
confined himself to pointing out that he had already replied by
the protest he had just made. * * *” (_TC-58_)

The so-called ultimatum, which was delivered some hours after the invasion had started, read in part as follows:

“The Reich Government has for a long time had no doubts as to
what was the chief aim of the British and French war policy. It
consists of the spreading of the war to other countries, and of
the misuse of their peoples as auxiliary and mercenary troops
for England and France.

“The last attempt of this sort was the plan to occupy
Scandinavia with the help of Norway, in order to set up a new
front against Germany in this region. It was only Germany’s last
minute action which upset the project. Germany has furnished
documentary evidence of this before the eyes of the world.