Chapter V (1)

“_The Navy_
“_Fulfillment and avoidance of the Versailles Treaty_
“_Foreign Countries_

“(a) _The inter-allied Control Commissions._

“(b) _Defense measures against the fulfillment of the Versailles
Treaty and independent arming behind the back of the Reich
Government and the legislative bodies._

“1. Dispersal of artillery gear and munitions, of hand and
automatic weapons.

“2. Limitation of demolition work in Heligoland.

“3. Attempt to strengthen personnel of the navy, from 1923.

“4. The activities of Captain Lohmann (founding of numerous
associations at home and abroad, participations, formation of
“sports” unions and clubs, interesting the film industry in
naval recruitment).

“5. Preparation for re-establishing the German U-boat arm since
1920. (Projects and deliveries for Japan, Holland, Turkey,
Argentine and Finland. Torpedo testing.)

“6. Participation in the preparation for building of the
Luftwaffe (preservation of aerodromes, aircraft construction,
teaching of courses, instruction of midshipmen in anti-air raid
defense, training of pilots).

“7. Attempt to strengthen the mining branch.

_Part C (1925-1932. Replacement of Tonnage)_ Chapter IV.
“_The Navy, The Versailles Treaty, Foreign Countries._

“(a) _The activities of the Inter-allied Control Commissions (up
to 31.1.27; discontinuance of the activity of the Naval Peace
Commission)_

“_Independent armament measures behind the back of the Reich
Government and legislative bodies up to the Lohmann case._

“1. The activities of Captain Lohmann (continuation), their
significance as a foundation for the rapid reconstruction work
from 1935.

“2. Preparation for the re-strengthening of the German U-boat
arm from 1925 (continuation), the merit of Lohmann in connection
with the preparation for rapid construction in 1925,
relationship to Spain, Argentine, Turkey: the first post war
U-boat construction of the German Navy in Spain since 1927; 250
ton specimen in Finland, preparation for rapid assembly;
electric torpedo; training of U-boat personnel abroad in Spain
and Finland. Formation of U-boat school in 1932 disguised as an
anti-U-boat school.

“3. Participation in the preparation for the reconstruction of
the Luftwaffe (continuation). Preparations for a Naval Air Arm,
Finance Aircraft Company Sevra, later Luftdienst CMRH; Naval
Flying School Warnemunde; Air Station List, training of sea
cadet candidates, Military tactical questions “Air Defense
Journeys”, technical development, experimental station planning,
trials, flying boat development DOX etc., catapult aircraft,
arming, engines ground organization, aircraft torpedoes, the
Deutschland Flight 1925 and the Seaplane Race 1926.

“4. Economic rearmament (“the Tebeg”—Technical Advice and Supply
Company as a disguised Naval Office abroad for investigating the
position of raw materials for industrial capacity and other War
economic questions.)

“5. Various measures. (The NV Aerogeodetic Company—secret
investigations.)

“(c) _Planned armament work with the tacit approval of the Reich
government, but behind the backs of the legislative bodies_
(1928 to the taking over of power.)

“1. The effect of the Lohmann case on the secret preparations;
winding up of works which could not be advocated; resumption and
carrying on of other work.

“2. Finance question. (“Black Funds” and the Special Budget).

“3. The Labor Committee and its objectives.

“(d) _The Question of Marine Attaches_ (The continuation under
disguise; open re-appointment 1932-1933).

“(e) _The question of Disarmament of the Fleet abroad and in
Germany_ (The Geneva Disarmament Conference 1927; the London
Naval Treaty of 1930; the Anglo-French-Italian Agreement 1931.
The League of Nations Disarmament Conference 1932).

“_Part D (1933-1939. The Germany Navy during the Military
Freedom Period)_

“I. National Socialism and the question of the Fleet and of
prestige at sea.

“II. Incorporation of the navy in the National Socialist State.”

“III. The Re-armament of the Navy under the Direction of the
Reich Government in a Disguised Way.” (_C-17_)

The policy development of the navy is also reflected from the financial side. The planned organization of the navy budget for armament measures was based on a co-ordination of military developments and political objectives. Military-political development was accelerated after the withdrawal from the League of Nations. (_C-17_)

A captured document, entitled “_Chef der Marineleitung_, Berlin, 12 May 1934,” and marked “Secret Commando Matter,” discusses the “Armament Plan (A.P.) for the 3rd Armament Phase.” (_C-153_). This document, which bears the facsimile signature of Raeder at the end, speaks of war tasks, war and operational plans, armament target, etc., and shows that it was distributed to many of the High Command of the Navy. Dated 12 May 1934, it shows that a primary objective was readiness for a war without any alert period. The following are pertinent extracts:

* * * “The planned organization of armament measures is
necessary for the realization of the target; this again requires
a coordinated and planned expenditure in peace time. This
organization of financial measures over a number of years
according to the military viewpoint is found in the armament
program and provides

“_a._ for the _military leaders_ a sound basis for their
operational considerations and

“_b._ for the political leaders a clear picture of what may be
achieved with the military means available at a given time.”

* * * * * *

“All theoretical and practical A-preparations are to be drawn up
with a primary view to readiness for a war without any alert
period.” (C-153)

The conspiratorial nature of these Nazi plans and preparations long before the outbreak of hostilities is illustrated in many other ways. Thus, in 1934, Hitler instructed Raeder to keep secret the U-Boat construction program; also the actual displacement and speed of certain ships. Work on U-Boats had been going on, as already indicated, in Holland and Spain. The Nazi theory was ingenious in that respect. The Versailles Treaty forbade re-arming by the Germans in Germany, but the Nazis said it did not forbid them to rearm in Holland, Spain, and Finland.

Secrecy was equally important then because of the pending naval negotiations with England. The subject was discussed in a conversation between Raeder and Adolf Hitler in June 1934. The record of that conversation (_C-189_) is not signed by Raeder, but in an interrogation on 8 November 1945, Raeder admitted that (_C-189_) was a record of this conversation, and that it was in his handwriting, though he did not sign his name at the end. The report is headed, “Conversation with the Fuehrer in June 1934 on the occasion of the resignation of the Commanding Officer of the _Karlsruhe_.” It reads:

“1. Report by the C-in-C Navy concerning displacement of D. and
E. (defensive weapons).

“Fuehrer’s instructions: No mention must be made of a
displacement of 25-26,000 tons, but only of improved 10,000-ton
(ships). Also, the speed over 26 nautical miles may be stated.

“2. C-in-C Navy expresses the opinion that later on the Fleet
must anyhow be developed to oppose England, that therefore from
1936 onwards, the large ships must be armed with 35 c.m. guns
(Like the King George Class).

“3. The Fuehrer demands to keep the construction of the U-Boats
completely secret. Plebiscite also in consideration of the
Saar.” (_C-189_)

In order to continue the increase in navy strength, as planned, more funds were needed than the navy had available. Hitler therefore proposed to put funds of the Labor Front at the disposal of the navy. This appears from another Raeder memorandum of a conversation between Raeder with Hitler, on 2 November 1934 (_C-190_). This report, again, is not signed, but it was found in Raeder’s personal file and seems clearly his memorandum. It is headed: “Conversation with the Fuehrer on 2.11.34 at the time of the announcement by the Commanding Officer of the “Emden”. It reads:

“1. When I mentioned that the total funds to be made available
for the armed forces for 1935 would presumably represent only a
fraction of the required sum, and that therefore it was possible
that the navy might be hindered in its plans, he replied that he
did not think the funds would be greatly decreased. He
considered it necessary that the navy be speedily increased by
1938 with the deadlines mentioned. In case of need, he will get
Dr. Ley to put 120-150 million from the Labor Front at the
disposal of the navy, as the money would still benefit the
workers. Later in a conversation with Minister Goering and
myself, he went on to say that he considered it vital that the
navy be increased as planned, as no war could be carried on if
the navy was not able to safeguard the ore imports from
Scandinavia.

“2. Then, when I mentioned that it would be desirable to have
six U-Boats assembled at the time of the critical situation in
the first quarter of 1935, he stated that he would keep this
point in mind, and tell me when the situation demanded that the
assembling should commence.” (_C-190_)

Then there is an asterisk and a note at the bottom:

“The order was not sent out. The first boats were launched in
the middle of June 35 according to plan.” (_C-190_)

The development of the armament industry by the use of foreign markets was a program encouraged by the navy, so that this industry would be able to supply the requirements of the navy in case of need. A directive of Raeder, dated 31 January 1933, and classified “Secret Commando Matter,” requires German industry to support the armament of the navy (_C-29_). It provides:

“_TOP SECRET_
_General directions for support given by the German Navy to the German
Armament Industry_

“The effects of the present economic depression have led here
and there to the conclusion that there are no prospects of an
active participation of the German Armament Industry abroad,
even if the Versailles terms are no longer kept. There is no
profit in it and it is therefore not worth promoting.
Furthermore, the view has been taken that the increasing
“self-sufficiency” would in any case make such participation
superfluous.

“However obvious these opinions may seem, formed because of the
situation as it is today, I am nevertheless forced to make the
following contradictory corrective points:

“_a._ The economic crisis and its present effects must perforce
be overcome sooner or later. Though equality of rights in war
politics is not fully recognized today, it will, by the
assimilation of weapons, be achieved at some period, at least to
a certain extent,

“_b._ The consequent estimation of the duties of the German
Armament Industry lies mainly in the _Military-political_
sphere. It is impossible for this industry to satisfy,
militarily and economically, the growing demands made of it by
limiting the deliveries to our own armed forces. Its capacity
must therefore be increased by the delivery of supplies to
foreign countries over and above our own requirements.

“_c._ Almost every country is working to the same end today,
even those which, unlike Germany, are not tied down by
restrictions. Britain, France, North America, Japan, and
especially Italy are making supreme efforts to ensure markets
for their armament industries. The use of their diplomatic
representations, of the propaganda voyages of their most modern
ships and vessels, of sending missions and also of the
guaranteeing of loans and insurance against deficits are not
merely to gain commercially advantageous orders for their
armament industries, but first and foremost to expand their
output from the point of view of military policy.

“_d._ It is just when the efforts to do away with the
restrictions imposed on us have succeeded, that the German Navy
has an ever-increasing and really vital interest in furthering
the German Armament Industry and preparing the way for it in
every direction in the competitive battle against the rest of
the world.

“_e._ If, however the German Armament Industry is to be able to
compete in foreign countries, it must inspire the _confidence_
of its purchasers. The condition for this is that secrecy for
our own ends be not carried too far. The amount of material to
be kept secret under all circumstances in the interest of the
defence of the country is comparatively small. I would like to
issue a warning against the assumption that, at the present
stage of technical development in foreign industrial states, a
problem of vital military importance which we perhaps have
solved, has not been solved there. Solutions arrived at today,
which may become known, if divulged to a third person by
naturally always possible indiscretion, have often been already
superseded by new and better solutions on our part, even at that
time or at any rate after the copy has been made. It is of
greater importance that we should be technically well to the
fore in any really fundamental matters, than that less important
points should be kept secret unnecessarily and excessively.

“_f._ To conclude: I attach particular importance to
guaranteeing the continuous support of the industry concerned by
the navy, even after the present restrictions have been relaxed.
If the purchasers are not made confident that something special
is being offered them, the industry will not be able to stand up
to the competitive battle and therefore will not be able to
supply the requirements of the German Navy in case of need.”
(C-29)

This surreptitious rearmament, in violation of treaty obligations, starting even before the Nazi came into power, is illustrated by a 1932 order of Raeder, chief of the naval command, addressed to the main naval command, regarding the concealed construction of torpedo tubes in E-Boats (_C-141_). He ordered that torpedo tubes be removed and stored in the naval arsenal but be kept ready for immediate refitting. By using only the number permitted under the Treaty, at a given time, and by storing them after satisfactory testing, the actual number of operationally effective E-Boats was constantly increased.

This German order for the concealed armament of E-Boats, issued by Raeder on 10 February 1932, provides:

“In view of our treaty obligations and the Disarmament
Conference steps must be taken to prevent the 1st
E-Boat-Half-Flotilla, which in a few months will consist of
exactly similar newly built (E)-Boats, from appearing openly as
a formation of torpedo-carrying boats as it is not intended to
count these E-Boats against the number of torpedo-carrying boats
allowed us.

“I therefore order:

“1. S2-S5, will be commissioned in the shipyard Luerssen,
Vegesack without armament, and will be fitted with easily
removable cover-sheet-metal on the spaces necessary for
torpedo-tubes. The same will be arranged by T.M.I. [Inspectorate
of Torpedoes and Mining] in agreement with the naval arsenal,
for the Boat ‘S1’ which will dismantle its torpedo-tubes, on
completion of the practice shooting, for fitting on another
boat.

“2. The torpedo-tubes of all S-Boats will be stored in the naval
arsenal ready for immediate fitting. During the trial runs the
torpedo-tubes will be taken on board one after the other for a
short time to be fitted and for practice shooting so that only
one boat at a time carries torpedo armament. For public
consumption this boat will be in service for the purpose of
temporary trials by the T.V.A. [Technical Research
Establishment].

“It should not anchor together with the other, unarmed boats of
the Half-Flotilla because of the obvious similarity of type. The
duration of firing, and consequently the length of time the
torpedo-tubes are aboard, is to be as short as possible.

“3. Fitting the torpedo-tubes on all E-Boats is intended as soon
as the situation of the political control allows it.” (_C-141_)

Along similar lines the navy was also carrying on the concealed preparation of auxiliary cruisers, under the disguised designation of Transport Ships O. The preparations under this order were to be completed by 1 April 1935. At the very time of construction of these ships as commercial ships, plans were made for their conversion. This was the result of a Top Secret order from the command office of the navy, dated 12 March 1934, and signed in draft by Groos. This order bears the seal of the _Reichministerium, Marineleitung_, over the draft signature. It provides:

“Subject: Preparation of Auxiliary Cruisers.

“It is intended to include in the Establishment Organization 35
(_AG-Aufstellungsgliederung_) a certain number of auxiliary
cruisers which are intended for use in operations on the high
seas.

“In order to disguise the intention and all the preparations the
ships will be referred to as “Transport Ships O”. It is
requested that in future this designation only will be used.

“The preparations are to be arranged so that they can be
completed by 1.4.35.” (_C-166_)

In the official navy files, notes were kept year by year, from 1927 to 1940, on the reconstruction of the German Navy. One of these notes discloses that the displacement of the battleship “_Scharnhorst-Gneisenau_” was actually greater than the tonnage which had been notified to the British under the treaty obligations:

“The true displacement of the battleship
‘_Scharnhorst-Gneisenau_’ _and_ ‘F/G’ exceeds by 20 percent in
both cases the displacement reported to the British.” (_C-23_)

There is annexed to this document a table with reference to different ships, and two columns, headed “Displacement by Type”; one column reads “Actual Displacement,” and the other, “Notified Displacement.” The actual displacement of the “_Scharnhorst_”, is thus shown to be 31,300 tons, although the notified displacement was only 26,000 tons. On the “F/G” actual was 41,700, while notified was 35,000. On the “HI”, actual was 56,200 tons, while notified was 46,850. And so on down the list. (_C-23_)

In these notes there also occurs the statement:

“In a clear cut program for the construction, the Fuehrer and
Reich Chancellor has set the navy the task of carrying out the
aims of his foreign policy.” (_C-23_)

The German Navy constantly planned and committed violations of armament limitation, and with characteristic German thoroughness had prepared superficial pretexts to explain away these violations. Following a conference with the chief of “A” section [the military department of the Navy], an elaborate survey list was prepared and compiled, giving a careful list of the quantity and type of German naval armament and ammunition on hand under manufacture or construction (_C-32_). A statement of the justification or defense that might be used was included in those instances where the Versailles Treaty was violated or its allotment has been exceeded. The list contained 30 items under “Material Measures” and 14 items under “Measures of Organization.” The variety of details covered necessarily involved several sources within the navy, which must have realized their significance.

This Top Secret document, which is headed “A Survey Report of German Naval Armament after Conference with Chief of “A” Section, dated 9 September 1933,” contains three columns, one headed “Measure,” one headed “Material Measures, Details,” and the third headed “Remarks.” The “Remarks” contain the pretext or justification for explaining away the violations of the treaty. The following are examples:

“1. Exceeding the permitted number of mines.” Then figures are given. “Remarks: Further mines are in part ordered, in part being delivered.” (_C-32_)

“Number 2. Continuous storing of guns from the North Sea area for Baltic artillery batteries.” The remarks column reads, “Justification: Necessity for over-hauling. Cheaper repairs.” (_C-32_)

“Number 6. Laying gun-platforms in the Kiel area.” Remarks: “The offense over and above that in serial number 3 lies in the fact that all fortifications are forbidden in the Kiel area. This justification will make it less severe; pure defense measures.” (_C-32_)

“Number 7. Exceeding the calibre permitted for coastal batteries.” Remarks: “Possible justification is that, though the calibre is larger, the number of guns is less.” (_C-32_)

“Number 8. Arming of mine-sweepers.” Remarks: “The guns are taken from the fleet reserve stores, have been temporarily installed only for training purposes. All nations arm their mine-sweeping forces (equality of rights).” (_C-32_)

“Number 13. Exceeding the number of machine guns, et cetera, permitted.” Remarks: “Can be made light of.” (_C-32_)

“Number 18. Construction of U-boat parts.” Remarks: “Difficult to detect. If necessary can be denied.” (_C-32_)

“Number 20. Arming of fishing vessels.” Remarks: “For warning shots. Make little of it.” And so on throughout the list (_C-32_). This document must have been used as a guide for negotiators who were attending the Disarmament Conference, as to the position that they might take.

E. _Withdrawal From the Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations: Building of the Air Force._

At this point, on 14th October 1933, Germany withdrew from the International Disarmament Conference and from the League of Nations. The Nazis took this opportunity to break away from the international negotiations and to take an aggressive position on an issue which would not be serious enough to provoke reprisal from other countries. At the same time, Germany attached so much importance to this action that it considered the possibility of the application of sanctions by other countries. In anticipation of the probable nature of such sanctions and the countries which might apply them, plans were made for armed resistance on land, at sea, and in the air. Military preparations were ordered in a directive from the Reichsminister for Defense (von Blomberg) to the head of the Army High Command (Fritsch), the head of the Navy High Command, (Raeder), and the Reichsminister for Air, (Goering) (_C-140_). This directive, dated 25 October 1933, 11 days after the withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations, provides:

“1. The enclosed directive gives the basis for preparation of
the armed forces in the case of sanctions being applied against
Germany.

“2. I request the chiefs of the Army and Navy High Command and
the Reichsminister for Air to carry out the preparations in
accordance with the following points:

“(_a_) Strictest secrecy. It is of the utmost importance that no
facts become known to the outside world from which preparation
for resistance against sanctions can be inferred or which is
incompatible with Germany’s existing obligations in the sphere
of foreign policy regarding the demilitarized zone. If
necessary, the preparations must take second place to this
necessity.” (_C-140_)

One of the immediate consequences of this action was that following the withdrawal from the League of Nations, Germany’s armament program was still further increased. As it was ordered on 12 May, 1934:

“5. Owing to the speed of military political development since
Germany quitted Geneva and based on the progress of the army,
the new A-Plan will only be drawn up for a period of two years.
The third A phase lasts accordingly from 1.4.34 to 31.3.36.”
(_C-153_)

On 10 March 1935, Goering announced that Germany was building a military air force. At page 1830 of _Das Archiv_ it is stated:

“The Reich Minister for Aviation, General of the Airmen,
Goering, in his talk with the special correspondent of the Daily
Mail, Ward Price, expressed himself on the subject of the German
Air Force.

“General Goering said:

“In the extension of our national defense [_Sicherheit_], it was
necessary, as we repeatedly told the world, to take care of
defense in the air. As far as that is concerned, I restricted
myself to those measures absolutely necessary. The guiding line
of my actions was, not the creation of an aggressive force which
would threaten other nations, but merely the completion of a
military aviation which would be strong enough to repel, at any
time, attacks on Germany.”

* * * * * *

“In conclusion, the correspondent asked whether the German Air
Force will be capable of repelling attacks on Germany. General
Goering replied to that exactly as follows:

“The German Air Force is just as passionately permeated with the
will to defend the Fatherland to the last as it is convinced, on
the other hand, that it will never be employed to threaten the
peace of other nations.” (_2292-PS_)

Since they had gone as far as they could on rearmament and the secret training of personnel, the next step necessary to the conspirators’ program for aggressive war was a large-scale increase in military strength. This could no longer be done under disguise and camouflage, and would have to be known to the world. Accordingly, on 16 March 1935, there was promulgated a law for universal military service, in violation of Article 173 of the Versailles Treaty. That law appeared in the _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Title I, Vol. I, 1935, page 369. The text of the law itself provides:

“In this spirit the German Reich Cabinet has today passed the
following law:

“Law for the Organization of the Armed Forces of March 16, 1935.

“The Reich Cabinet has passed the following law which is
herewith promulgated:

“Section 1.

“Service in the Armed Forces is based upon compulsory military
duty.

“Section 2.

“In peace time, the German Army, including the police troops
transferred to it, is organized into: 12 Corps and 36 Divisions.

“Section 3.

“The Reich Minister of War is charged with the duty of
submitting immediately to the Reich Ministry detailed laws on
compulsory military duty.” (_1654-PS_)

The law is signed first by the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor Adolf Hitler, and then by many other officials, including von Neurath, Frick, Schacht, Goering, Hess, and Frank. (_1654-PS_)

F. _Assurances._

As a part of their program to weaken resistance in other states, the Nazis followed a policy of making false assurances, thereby tending to create confusion and a false sense of security. Thus, on 21 May 1935, the same date on which Germany renounced the armament provisions of the Versailles Treaty, Hitler announced the intent of the German Government to respect the territorial limitations of the Versailles and Locarno Treaties. In his speech in the Reichstag on that date Hitler stated:

“Therefore, the Government of the German Reich shall absolutely
respect all other articles pertaining to the cooperation
[_zusammenleben_] of the various nations including territorial
agreements; revisions which will be unavoidable as time goes by
it will carry out by way of a friendly understanding only.

“The Government of the German Reich has the intention not to
sign any treaty which it believes not to be able to fulfill.
However, it will live up to every treaty signed voluntarily even
if it was composed before this government took over. Therefore,
it will in particular adhere to all the allegations under the
Locarno Pact as long as the other partners of the pact also
adhere to it.” (_2288-PS_)

For convenient reference, the territorial limitations in the Locarno and Versailles Treaties, include the following:

Article 1 of the Rhine Pact of Locarno, 16 October 1925, provides:

“The High Contracting parties, collectively and severally,
guarantee, in the manner provided in the following Articles: the
maintenance of the territorial status quo, resulting from the
frontiers between Germany and Belgium and between Germany and
France and the inviolability of the said frontiers, as fixed by,
or in pursuance of the Treaty of Peace, signed at Versailles, on
June 28, 1919, and also the observance of the stipulation of
Articles 42 and 43 of the said Treaty, concerning the
demilitarized zone.”

That has reference, of course, to the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland.

Article 42 of the Versailles Treaty, 28 June 1919, provides:

“Germany is forbidden to maintain or construct any
fortifications either on the left bank of the Rhine or on the
right bank, to the west of the line drawn 50 kilometers to the
east of the Rhine.”

Article 43 provides:

“In the area defined above, the maintenance and the assembly of
armed forces, either permanently or temporarily and military
maneuvers of any kind, as well as the upkeep of all permanent
works for mobilization, are in the same way forbidden.”

G. _Reoccupation of the Rhineland._

The demilitarized zone of the Rhineland was a sore spot with the Nazis ever since its establishment after World War I. Not only was this a blow to their increasing pride, but it was a bar to any effective strong position which Germany might want to take on any vital issues. In the event of any sanctions against Germany, in the form of military action, the French and other powers would get well into Germany east of the Rhine, before any German resistance could even be put up. Therefore, any German plans to threaten or breach international obligations, or for any kind of aggression, required the preliminary reoccupation and refortification of this open Rhineland territory. Plans and preparations for the reoccupation of the Rhineland started very early.

A document apparently signed in the handwriting of von Blomberg, deals with what is called “Operation _Schulung_”, meaning schooling or training (_C-139_). It is dated 2 May 1935 and refers to prior staff discussions on the subject. It is addressed to the Chief of the Army Command, who at that time was Fritsch; the Chief of the Navy High Command (Raeder); and the Reich Minister for Air (Goering). The document does not use the name “Rhineland” and does not, in terms, refer to it. It seems clear, however, that it was a plan for the military reoccupation of the Rhineland, in violation of the Treaty of Versailles and the Rhine Pact of Locarno. The first part, headed “Secret Document,” provides:

“For the operation, suggested in the last staff talks of the
Armed Forces, I lay down the _Code name Schulung_ [training].

“The supreme direction of the operation ‘_Schulung_’ rests with
the Reich Minister of Defense as this is a joint undertaking of
the three services.

“Preparations for the operation will begin forthwith according
to the following directives:

“1. General.

“1. The operation must, on issue of the code word ‘Carry out
_Schulung_,’ be executed by a surprise blow at lightning speed.
_Strictest_ secrecy is necessary in the preparations and only
the very smallest number of officers should be informed and
employed in the drafting of reports, drawings, etc., and these
officers only in person.

“2. There is no time for mobilization of the forces taking part.
These will be employed in their peace-time strength and with
their peace-time equipment.

“3. The preparation for the operation will be made without
regard to the present inadequate state of our armaments. Every
improvement of the state of our armaments will make possible a
greater measure of preparedness and thus result in better
prospects of success.” (_C-139_)

The rest of the order deals with military details. There are certain points in this order which are inconsistent with any theory that it was merely a training order, or that it might have been defensive in nature. The operation was to be carried out as a surprise blow at lightning speed. The air forces were to provide support for the attack. There was to be reinforcement by the East Prussian division. Furthermore, since this order is dated 2 May 1935, which is about 6 weeks after the promulgation of the Conscription Law of 16 March 1935, it could hardly have been planned as a defensive measure against any expected sanctions which might have been applied by reason of the passage of the Conscription Law.

The actual reoccupation of the Rhineland did not take place until 7 March, 1936, and this early plan (_C-139_) necessarily underwent revision to suit changed conditions and specific objectives. That the details of this particular plan were not ultimately the ones that were carried out in reoccupying the Rhineland does not detract from the fact that as early as 2 May 1935, the Germans had already planned that operation, not merely as a staff plan but as a definite operation. It was evidently not on their timetable to carry out the operation so soon, if it could be avoided. But they were prepared to do so if necessary.

It is significant to note the date of this order is the same as the date of the signing of the Franco-Russian Pact, which the Nazis later asserted as their excuse for the Rhineland reoccupation.

The military orders on the basis of which the Rhineland reoccupation was actually carried into execution on 7 March 1936, were issued on 2 March 1936 by the War Minister and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, von Blomberg. They were addressed to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army (Fritsch), the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy (Raeder), and the Air Minister and C-in-C of the Air Force (Goering) (_C-159_). That order, classified “Top Secret”, in the original bears Raeder’s initial in green pencil, with a red pencil note, “To be submitted to the C-in-C of the Navy”.

The first part of the Order reads:

“Supreme Command of the Navy:

“1. The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor has made the following
decision:

“By reason of the Franco-Russian alliance, the obligations
accepted by Germany in the Locarno Treaty, as far as they apply
to Articles 42 and 43 of the Treaty of Versailles, which
referred to the demilitarized zone, are to be regarded as
obsolete.

“2. Sections of the army and air force will therefore be
transferred simultaneously in a surprise move to garrisons of
the demilitarized zone. In this connection, I issue the
following orders: * * *” (_C-159_)

There follow detailed orders for the military operation.

The order for Naval cooperation was issued on 6 March 1936, in the form of an order on behalf of the Reich Minister for War, von Blomberg, signed by Keitel, and addressed to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy (Raeder) (_C-194_). The order set out detailed instructions for the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet and the admirals commanding the Baltic and North Sea. The short covering letter is as follows:

“To: C-in-C Navy:

“The Minister has decided the following after the meeting:

“1. The inconspicuous air reconnaissance in the German bay, not
over the line Texel-Doggerbank, from midday on Z-Day onward, has
been approved. C-in-C air force will instruct the air command VI
from midday 7 March to hold in readiness single reconnaissance
aircraft to be at the disposal of the C-in-C fleet.

“2. The Minister will reserve the decision to set up a U-Boat
reconnaissance on line, until the evening of 7 March. The
immediate transfer of U-Boats from Kiel to Wilhelmshaven has
been approved.

“3. The proposed advance measures for the most part exceed
Degree of Emergency A and therefore are out of the question as
the first counter-measures to be taken against military
preparations of neighboring states. It is far more essential to
examine the advance measures included in Degree of Emergency A,
to see whether one or other of the especially conspicuous
measures could not be omitted.” (_C-194_)

The reoccupation and fortification of the Rhineland was carried out on 7 March 1936. For the historical emphasis of this occasion, Hitler made a momentous speech on the same day, in which he declared:

“Men of the German Reichstag! France has replied to the repeated
friendly offers and peaceful assurances made by Germany by
infringing the Reich pact through a military alliance with the
Soviet Union exclusively directed against Germany. In this
manner, however, the Locarno Rhine Pact has lost its inner
meaning and ceased in practice to exist. Consequently, Germany
regards herself, for her part, as no longer bound by this
dissolved treaty. The German government are now constrained to
face the new situation created by this alliance, a situation
which is rendered more acute by the fact that the Franco-Soviet
treaty has been supplemented by a Treaty of Alliance between
Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union exactly parallel in form. In
accordance with the fundamental right of a nation to secure its
frontiers and ensure its possibilities of defense, the German
government have today restored the full and unrestricted
sovereignty of Germany in the demilitarized zone of the
Rhineland.” (_2289-PS_)

The German reoccupation of the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland caused extensive international repercussions. As a result of the protests lodged with the League of Nations, the Council of the League made an investigation and announced the following finding, which is published in the League of Nations monthly summary, March, 1936, Volume 16, Page 78. [It is also quoted in the _American Journal of International Law_, page 487 (1936)]:

“That the German government has committed a breach of Article 43
of the Treaty of Versailles, by causing on March 7, 1936,
military forces to enter and establish themselves in the
demilitarized zone, referred to in Article 42 and the following
articles of that Treaty, and in the Treaty of Locarno. At the
same time, on March 7, 1936, the Germans reoccupied the
Rhineland in flagrant violation of the Versailles and Locarno
Treaties. They again tried to allay the fears of other European
powers and lead them into a false sense of security by
announcing to the world ‘we have no territorial demands to make
in Europe.’”

The last phrase occurred in Hitler’s speech on 7 March 1936:

“We have no territorial claims to make in Europe. We know above
all that all the tensions resulting either from false
territorial settlements or from the disproportion of the numbers
of inhabitants to their living space cannot, in Europe, be
solved by war.” (_2289-PS_)

The existence of prior plans and preparations for the reoccupation and fortification of the Rhineland is indisputable. The method and sequence of these plans and their accomplishments are clearly indicative of the increasingly aggressive character of the Nazi objectives, international obligations and considerations of humanity notwithstanding.

The Nazi conspirators were determined, as these documents have shown, to use whatever means were necessary to abrogate and overthrow the Treaty of Versailles and its restrictions upon the military armament and activity of Germany. In this process, they conspired and engaged in secret armament and training, the secret production of munitions of war, and they built up an air force. They withdrew from the International Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations on 14 October 1933. They instituted universal military service on 16 March 1935. On 21 May 1935 they falsely announced that they would respect the territorial limitations of Versailles and Locarno. On March 7 1936 they reoccupied and fortified the Rhineland and at the same time, falsely announced that they had no territorial demands in Europe.

The accomplishment of all these objectives, particularly the repudiation of the Versailles Treaty restrictions, opened the gates for the numerous aggressions which were to follow.

* * * * *

LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO PREPARATION FOR
AGGRESSION: 1933-1936

Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page
│ │ │
│Charter of the International Military │ │
│ Tribunal, Article 6 (a). │ I │ 5
│ │ │
│International Military Tribunal, │ │
│ Indictment Number 1, Sections IV (F) │ │
│ 1, 2; V. │ I │ 22, 29
│ ————— │ │
│Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │
│document indicates that the document was│ │
│received in evidence at the Nurnberg │ │
│trial. A double asterisk (**) before a │ │
│document number indicates that the │ │
│document was referred to during the │ │
│trial but was not formally received in │ │
│evidence, for the reason given in │ │
│parentheses following the description of│ │
│the document. The USA series number, │ │
│given in parentheses following the │ │
│description of the document, is the │ │
│official exhibit number assigned by the │ │
│court. │ │
│ ————— │ │
*789-PS │Speech of the Fuehrer at a conference, │ │
│23 November 1939, to which all Supreme │ │
│Commanders were ordered. (USA 23) │ III │ 572
│ │ │
*1143-PS │Letter from Schickendanz to Rosenberg, │ │
│20 October 1932, for personal │ │
│transmission to Hess concerning │ │
│organization of Air Force. (USA 40) │ III │ 806
│ │ │
*1168-PS │Unsigned Schacht memorandum to Hitler, 3│ │
│May 1935, concerning the financing of │ │
│the armament program. (USA 37) │ III │ 827
│ │ │
*1639-A-PS │Mobilization book for the Civil │ │
│Administration, 1939 Edition, issued │ │
│over signature of Keitel. (USA 777) │ IV │ 143
│ │ │
**1654-PS │Law of 16 March 1935 reintroducing │ │
│universal military conscription. 1935 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 369. │ │
│(Referred to but not offered in │ │
│evidence) │ IV │ 163
│ │ │
*2194-PS │Top secret letter from Ministry for │ │
│Economy and Labor, Saxony, to Reich │ │
│Protector in Bohemia and Moravia, │ │
│enclosing copy of 1938 Secret Defense │ │
│Law of 4 September 1938. (USA 36) │ IV │ 843
│ │ │
*2261-PS │Directive from Blomberg to Supreme │ │
│Commanders of Army, Navy and Air Forces,│ │
│24 June 1935; accompanied by copy of │ │
│Reich Defense Law of 21 May 1935 and │ │
│copy of Decision of Reich Cabinet of 12 │ │
│May 1935 on the Council for defense of │ │
│the Reich. (USA 24) │ IV │ 934
│ │ │
*2288-PS │Adolf Hitler’s speech before the │ │
│Reichstag, published in Voelkischer │ │
│Beobachter, Southern Germany Special │ │
│Edition, No. 142a, 22 May 1935. (USA 38)│ IV │ 993
│ │ │
*2289-PS │Hitler’s speech in the Reichstag, 7 │ │
│March 1936, published in Voelkischer │ │
│Beobachter, Berlin Edition, No. 68, 8 │ │
│March 1936. (USA 56) │ IV │ 994
│ │ │
*2292-PS │Interview of Goering by representative │ │
│of London Daily Mail, concerning the │ │
│German Air Force, from German report in │ │
│The Archive, March 1935, p. 1830. (USA │ │
│52) │ IV │ 995
│ │ │
*2322-PS │Hitler’s speech before the Reichstag, 1 │ │
│September 1939. (USA 39) │ IV │ 1026
│ │ │
*2353-PS │Extracts from General Thomas’ Basic │ │
│Facts for History of German War and │ │
│Armament Economy. (USA 35) │ IV │ 1071
│ │ │
2907-PS │Notes of conferences of Reich Ministers │ │
│on 12 September 1933, 13 October 1933, │ │
│and 14 October 1933. │ V │ 572
│ │ │
*3054-PS │“The Nazi Plan”, script of a motion │ │
│picture composed of captured German │ │
│film. (USA 167) │ V │ 801
│ │ │
*3308-PS │Affidavit by Paul Otto Gustav Schmidt, │ │
│28 November 1945. (GB 288) │ V │ 1100
│ │ │
*3474-PS │Manuscript notes by Bodenschatz on │ │
│conference of German Air Forces leaders,│ │
│2 December 1936. (USA 580) │ VI │ 199
│ │ │
*3575-PS │Memorandum, 19 November 1938, concerning│ │
│meeting of Reich Defense Council. (USA │ │
│781) │ VI │ 267
│ │ │
3581-PS │Letter from Minister of Interior to │ │
│Minister of Propaganda Goebbels, 20 July│ │
│1934, concerning unauthorized press │ │
│releases about military affairs. │ VI │ 278
│ │ │
3585-PS │Letter from Chief of Staff of Army (von │ │
│Fritsch) to Minister of War, 8 October │ │
│1934, enclosing memorandum signed by │ │
│Brauchitsch 29 September 1934, on │ │
│military situation in East Prussia. │ VI │ 279
│ │ │
3586-PS │Directive to Counter-Intelligence units,│ │
│16 October 1934, directing that new │ │
│troop units which may be activated │ │
│should be listed in telephone books only│ │
│under camouflage designations. │ VI │ 281
│ │ │
3587-PS │Memorandum from Beck, 14 November 1934, │ │
│forbidding public use of designation │ │
│“General Staff”. │ VI │ 282
│ │ │
*C-17 │Extracts from History of the German Navy│ │
│1919-1939. (USA 42) │ VI │ 819
│ │ │
*C-23 │Unsigned documents found in official │ │
│Navy files containing notes year by year│ │
│from 1927 to 1940 on reconstruction of │ │
│the German Navy, and dated 18 February │ │
│1938, 8 March 1938, September 1938. (USA│ │
│49) │ VI │ 827
│ │ │
*C-29 │Directive of 31 January 1933 by Raeder │ │
│for German Navy to support the armament │ │
│industry. (USA 46) │ VI │ 830
│ │ │
*C-32 │Survey report of German Naval Armament │ │
│after conference with Chief of “A” │ │
│Section, 9 September 1933. (USA 50) │ VI │ 833
│ │ │
*C-135 │Extract from history of war organization│ │
│and of the scheme for mobilization. (GB │ │
│213) │ VI │ 946
│ │ │
*C-139 │Directive for operation “Schulung” │ │
│signed by Blomberg, 2 May 1935. (USA 53)│ VI │ 951
│ │ │
*C-140 │Directive for preparations in event of │ │
│sanctions, 25 October 1935, signed by │ │
│Blomberg. (USA 51) │ VI │ 952
│ │ │
*C-141 │Order for concealed armament of E-boats,│ │
│10 February 1932, signed by Raeder. (USA│ │
│47) │ VI │ 955
│ │ │
*C-153 │Naval Armament Plan for the 3rd Armament│ │
│Phase, signed by Raeder, 12 May 1934. │ │
│(USA 43) │ VI │ 967
│ │ │
*C-156 │Concealed Rearmament under Leadership of│ │
│Government of Reich, from “Fight of the │ │
│Navy against Versailles 1919-1935”. (USA│ │
│41) │ VI │ 970
│ │ │
*C-159 │Order for Rhineland occupation signed by│ │
│Blomberg, 2 March 1936. (USA 54) │ VI │ 974
│ │ │
*C-166 │Order from Command Office of Navy, 12 │ │
│March 1934, signed in draft by Groos, │ │
│concerning preparation of auxiliary │ │
│cruisers. (USA 48) │ VI │ 977
│ │ │
*C-175 │OKW Directive for Unified Preparation │ │
│for War 1937-1938, with covering letter │ │
│from von Blomberg, 24 June 1937. (USA │ │
│69) │ VI │ 1006
│ │ │
*C-189 │Conversation with the Fuehrer in June │ │
│1934 on occasion of resignation of │ │
│Commanding Officer of “Karlsruhe”. (USA │ │
│44) │ VI │ 1017
│ │ │
*C-190 │Memorandum of conversation with Hitler │ │
│on financing Naval rearmament and │ │
│assembling six submarines, 2 November │ │
│1934. (USA 45) │ VI │ 1018
│ │ │
*C-194 │Orders by Keitel and Commander-in-Chief │ │
│of Navy, 6 March 1936, for Navy │ │
│cooperation in Rhineland occupation. │ │
│(USA 55) │ VI │ 1019
│ │ │
*EC-177 │Minutes of second session of Working │ │
│Committee of the Reich Defense held on │ │
│26 April 1933. (USA 390) │ VII │ 328
│ │ │
*EC-404 │Minutes of conference of Sixth Session │ │
│of Working Committee of Reichs Defense │ │
│Council, held on 23 and 24 January 1934.│ │
│(USA 764) │ VII │ 443
│ │ │
*EC-405 │Minutes of Tenth Meeting of Working │ │
│Committee of Reichs Defense Council, 26 │ │
│June 1935. (GB 160) │ VII │ 450
│ │ │
*EC-406 │Minutes of Eleventh Meeting of Reichs │ │
│Defense Council, 6 December 1935. (USA │ │
│772) │ VII │ 455
│ │ │
*EC-407 │Minutes of Twelfth Meeting of Reichs │ │
│Defense Council, 14 May 1936. (GB 247) │ VII │ 462
│ │ │
*L-79 │Minutes of conference, 23 May 1939, │ │
│“Indoctrination on the political │ │
│situation and future aims”. (USA 27) │ VII │ 847
│ │ │
*L-172 │“The Strategic Position at the Beginning│ │
│of the 5th Year of War”, a lecture │ │
│delivered by Jodl on 7 November 1943 at │ │
│Munich to Reich and Gauleiters. (USA 34)│ VII │ 920
│ │ │
*TC-44 │Notice by German government of existence│ │
│of German Air Force, 9 March 1935. (GB │ │
│11) VIII │ 386 │
│ │ │
TC-45 │Proclamation to German People of 16 │ │
│March 1935. │ VIII │ 388
│ │ │
TC-46 │German memorandum to Signatories of │ │
│Locarno Pact reasserting full German │ │
│sovereignty over Rhineland, 7 March │ │
│1936. │ VIII │ 394
│ │ │
Statement VII │The Development of German Naval │ │
│Policy—1933-1939 by Erich Raeder, │ │
│Moscow, fall 1945. │ VIII │ 684
│ │ │
Statement XIV │Hungarian Relations with Germany Before │ │
│and During the War by Nicholas Horthy, │ │
│Jr., Nurnberg, 22 February 1946. │ VIII │ 756

3. AGGRESSION AGAINST AUSTRIA

A. _The Events Leading up to the Autumn of 1937 and the Strategic Position of the National Socialists in Austria._

(1) _The National Socialist Aim of Absorption of Austria._ In order to understand more clearly how the Nazi conspirators proceeded after the meeting in the Reichschancellery on 5 November 1937, at which Hitler laid plans for the conquest of Austria and Czechoslovakia (_386-PS_), it is advisable to review the steps which had already been taken in Austria by the National Socialists of both Germany and Austria. The position which the Nazis had reached by the Fall of 1937 made it possible for them to complete their absorption of Austria much sooner and with less cost than was contemplated in this meeting.

The acquisition of Austria had long been a central aim of the German National Socialists. On the first page of _Mein Kampf_, Hitler had written, “German-Austria must return to the great German mother-land.” He continued by stating that this purpose, of having common blood in a common Reich, could not be satisfied by a mere economic union. This aim was regarded as a serious program which the Nazis were determined to carry out.

This fact is borne out by an affidavit executed in Mexico City on 28 August 1945 by George S. Messersmith, United States Ambassador in Mexico City (_1760-PS_). Mr. Messersmith was Consul General of the United States of America in Berlin from 1930 to the late Spring of 1934. He was then made American Minister in Vienna, where he stayed until 1937. In this affidavit he states that the nature of his work brought him into frequent contact with German Government officials, many of whom were, on most occasions, amazingly frank in their conversations, and made no concealment of their aims.

In particular, Mr. Messersmith states that he had contact with the following twenty governmental officials, among others: Hermann Goering, General Milch, Hjalmar Schacht, Hans Frank, Wilhelm Frick, Count Schwerin von Krosigk, Josef Goebbels, Richard Walter Darré, Robert Ley, Hans Heinrich Lammers, Otto Meissner, Franz von Papen, Walter Funk, General Wilhelm Keitel, Admiral Erich von Raeder, Admiral Karl Doenitz, Dr. Behle, Dr. Stuckart, Gustav Krupp von Bohlen, and Dr. Davidson. Mr. Messersmith further states that in addition to this contact with officials of the Government he maintained contact with individuals in all parties in Germany in order to keep himself and the Government informed of political developments in Germany.

With regard to the Austrian matter, he states that from the very beginning of the Nazi Party he was told by both high and secondary government officials in Germany that incorporation of Austria into Germany was both a political and economic necessity and that this incorporation was going to be accomplished “by whatever means were necessary.” He further states:

“I can assert that it was fully understood by everyone in
Germany who had any knowledge whatever of what was going on that
Hitler, and the Nazi Government were irrevocably committed to
this end and the only doubt which ever existed in conversations
or statements to me was ‘how’ and ‘when.’” (_1760-PS_).

As Mr. Messersmith relates, at the beginning of the Nazi regime in 1933 Germany was too weak to make open threats of force against any country. It developed a policy of securing its aims in Austria in the same manner as in Germany—by obtaining a foothold in the Cabinet, particularly in the Ministry of Interior which controls the police, and quickly eliminating the opposition elements. Mr. Messersmith states that throughout his stay in Austria he was told on any number of occasions by high officials of the Austrian Government, including Chancellor Dollfuss, Chancellor Schuschnigg, and President Miklas, that the German Government kept up constant pressure upon the Austrian Government to appoint ministers with Nazi orientation.

(2) _Pressure Used, Including Terror and Intimidation, Culminating in the Unsuccessful Putsch of 25 July 1934._ To achieve their end the Nazis used various pressures. They used economic pressure. The law of 24 March 1933 imposed a prohibitive 1,000 reichsmark penalty on trips to Austria, thus bringing hardship to Austria, which relied heavily on its tourist trade (_Reichsgesetzblatt_ 1933, I, 311). The Nazis used propaganda. And they used terroristic acts, primarily bombings.

Mr. Messersmith’s affidavit (_1760-PS_) goes into some detail with respect to these means. Although they were committed by National Socialists in Austria, high Nazi officials in Germany admitted to Mr. Messersmith that they were instigating and directing these waves of terror in Austria. They made no effort to conceal their use of terror, which they justified on the ground that terror was a necessary instrument to impose the will of the party not only in Germany but in other countries. Mr. Messersmith recalls specifically that General Milch of the Air Force stated that the terrorism in Austria was being directed by the Nazi Party in Berlin.

Mr. Messersmith points out that all these outrages were a common occurrence. They had peaks and distinct periods, one in mid-1933 and another in early 1934. He points out that the wave of outrages in May and June 1934 diminished markedly for a few days during the meeting of Hitler and Mussolini in Venice, in mid-June 1934. (At that time Mussolini was strongly supporting the Austrian Government and interested in its independence.) Mr. Messersmith’s affidavit quotes extensively from dispatches sent from the American Legation in Vienna to the State Department during this period. These dispatches indicate that the terror was often directed at Catholic Churches and institutions, and at railways and tourist centers.

Mr. Messersmith also recalls that in addition, the Nazis maintained a threat of violent action against Austria through the “Austrian Legion.” This was a para-military force of several thousand men, armed by the Nazis in Germany, and stationed in Germany near the Austrian border. It included Austrian Nazis who fled from Austria after committing crimes.