Chapter IX: ) (1)

A top secret memorandum, dated 16 July, 1941, of a conference at the Fuehrer’s headquarters concerning the war in the East, seems to have been prepared by Bormann, because his initials appear at the top of page one (_L-221_). The text of the memorandum indicates that the conference was attended by Hitler, Lammers, Goering, Keitel, Rosenberg, and Bormann. This memorandum throws light upon the conspirators’ plans to Germanize conquered areas of the Soviet Union. It also discloses the fraudulent character of the Nazi propaganda program; and shows how the conspirators sought to deceive the entire world; how they pretended to pursue one course of action when their aims and purposes were to follow precisely the opposite course. The following portions are particularly relevant.

“Now it was essential that we did not publicize our aims before
the world; also there was no need for that, but the main thing
was that we ourselves knew what we wanted. By no means should we
render our task more difficult by making superfluous
declarations. Such declarations were superfluous because we
could do everything wherever we had the power, and what was
beyond our power we would not be able to do anyway.

“What we told the world about the motives for our measures ought
to be conditioned, therefore, by tactical reasons. We ought to
act here in exactly the same way as we did in the cases of
Norway, Denmark, Holland, and Belgium. In these cases too we did
not publish our aims, and it was only sensible to continue in
the same way.

“Therefore, we shall emphasize again that we were forced to
occupy, administer, and secure a certain area; it was in the
interest of the inhabitants that we provided order, food,
traffic, etc., hence our measures. Nobody shall be able to
recognize that it initiates final settlement. This need not
prevent our taking all necessary measures—shooting,
de-settling, etc.—and we shall take them.

“But we do not want to make any people into enemies prematurely
and unnecessarily. Therefore we shall act as though we wanted to
exercise a mandate only. At the same time we must know clearly
that we shall never leave those countries.

“Our conduct therefore ought to be:

“1. To do nothing which might obstruct the final settlement, but
to prepare for it only in secret. * * *”

“2. To emphasize that we are liberators.

“In particular: The Crimea has to be evacuated by all foreigners
and to be settled by Germans only. In the same way the former
Austrian part of Galicia will become Reich territory.

“Our present relations with Roumania are good, but nobody knows
what they will be at any future time. This we have to consider,
and we have to draw our frontiers accordingly. One ought not to
be dependent on the good will of other people. We have to plan
our relations with Roumania in accordance with this principle.

“On principle, we have now to face the task of cutting up the
giant cake according to our needs, in order to be able—

“first, to dominate it;

“second, to administer it, and;

“third, to exploit it.

“The Russians have now ordered partisan warfare behind our
front. This partisan war again has some advantage for us; it
enables us to eradicate everyone who opposes us.

“Principles: Never again must it be possible to create a
military power west of the Urals, even if we have to wage war
for a hundred years in order to attain this goal. Every
successor of the Fuehrer should know: security for the Reich
exists only if there are no foreign military forces west of the
Urals; it is Germany who undertakes the protection of this area
against all possible danger. Our iron principle is and has to
remain: We must never permit anybody but the Germans to carry
arms.”

* * * * * *

“The Fuehrer emphasizes that the entire Baltic country will have
to be incorporated into Germany.

“At the same time the Crimea, including a considerable
hinterland, (situated north of the Crimea) should become Reich
territory; the hinterland should be as large as possible.

“Rosenberg objects to this because of the Ukrainians living
there.

“Incidental question: It occurred to me several times that
Rosenberg has a soft spot for the Ukrainians; thus he desires to
aggrandize the former Ukraine to a considerable extent.”

“The Fuehrer emphasizes furthermore that the Volga Colony, too,
will have to become Reich territory, also the district around
Baku; the latter will have to become a German concession
(military colony).”

“The Finns wanted East Carelia, but the Kola Peninsula will be
taken by Germany because of the large nickel mines there.

“The annexation of Finland as a federated state should be
prepared with caution. The area around Leningrad is wanted by
the Finns; the Fuehrer will raze Leningrad to the ground and
then hand it over to the Finns.” (_L-221_)

Thus, the program, as outlined by the conspirators at this meeting of 16 July, 1941, called for the unlawful incorporation of a part of Galicia and all the Baltic countries into Germany; and for the unlawful conversion of the Crimea and areas north of it, the Volga territory and the district around Baku, into German colonies.

This point is reinforced by a directive entitled, “Instruction for a Reich Commissar in the Baltic Countries and White Russia,” which states:

“The aim of a Reich Commissar for Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
and White Russia [last two words added in pencil] must be to
strive to achieve the form of a German protectorate, and then
transform the region into part of the Greater German Reich by
Germanizing racially possible elements, colonizing Germanic
races, and banishing undesirable elements. The Baltic Sea must
become a Germanic inland sea, under the guardianship of Greater
Germany.” (_1029-PS_)

Even in the food-surplus areas of the occupied regions of the Ukraine, the conspirators planned to allocate food on a basis which left virtually nothing for those persons who were not engaged in the compulsory production of commodities for the German war machine. This was in violation of the explicit provision in Article 52 of the Hague Regulations of 1907, that requisitions in kind and services shall not be demanded from municipalities or inhabitants except for the needs of the army of occupation. This program was disclosed in a top secret memorandum, dated 18 September, 1941, concerning a meeting of German military officials presided over by Goering (_EC-3_). The memorandum was signed by General Nagl, liaison officer between Goering’s Four Year Plan Office and the OKW. The memorandum states:

“At this conference which was concerned with the better
exploitation of the occupied territories for the German food
economy, the Reich Marshal (Goering) called attention to the
following:”

* * * * * *

“It is clear that a graduated scale of food allocations is
needed.

“First in line are the combat troops, then the remainder of
troops in enemy territory, and then those troops stationed at
home. The rates are adjusted accordingly. The supply of the
German nonmilitary population follows and only then comes the
population of the occupied territories.” (_EC-3_)

Another memorandum, dated 25 November 1941, relating to the general principles of economic policy in the newly-occupied eastern territories, as prescribed in a conference held in Berlin on 8 November 1941, also bears out this point. This memorandum was also written by General Nagl. It is on the stationery of the Supreme Headquarters Armament Procurement Office. The following portions are pertinent:

“I. For the duration of the war the requirements of the war
economy will be the all-dominant factor of any economic measures
in the newly-occupied Eastern territories.

“II. Seen from a long range point of view the newly-occupied
eastern areas will be exploited economically from the point of
view of colonial administration and by colonial methods.

“Exceptions will be made only for those parts of the Eastland
which are to be Germanized by order of the Fuehrer, but even
they are subject to the principle expressed in paragraph I.

“III. The main emphasis of all economic work rests with the
production of food and raw materials.

“The highest possible production surplus for the supply of the
Reich and of other European countries is to be attained by cheap
production based on the maintenance of the low living standard
of the native population. Besides covering thereby the European
needs for food supplies and raw materials as far as possible,
this measure is intended to create a source of income for the
Reich which will make it possible to liquidate in a few decades,
with utmost consideration for the German taxpayer, an essential
part of the debts incurred in the financing of the war.”
(_EC-3_)

On 17 July, 1941, Hitler and Keitel issued a decree appointing Rosenberg as Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories. This was the day following the meeting at the Fuehrer’s headquarters, which is reported in the document previously quoted from (_L-221_). This decree states, _inter alia_:

“The Civil Administration in the newly-occupied Eastern
territories where these territories are not included in the
administration of the territories bordering on the Reich or the
Government-General, is subject to the Reich Minister for the
Occupied Eastern Territories.

* * * * * *

“I appoint Reichsleiter Alfred Rosenberg as Reich Minister for
the occupied Eastern territories. He will hold office in
Berlin.” (_1997-PS_)

Rosenberg’s views well fitted him for his task as one of the chief executioners of the conspirators’ plans in the Soviet Union. His views were plainly expressed in a speech delivered on 20 June 1941:

“The job of feeding the German people, stands, this year,
without a doubt, at the top of the list of Germany’s claims on
the East; and here the southern territories and the northern
Caucasus will have to serve as a balance for the feeding of the
German people. We see absolutely no reason for any obligation on
our part to feed also the Russian people with the products of
that surplus territory. We know that this is a harsh necessity,
bare of any feelings.” (_1058-PS_)

These views were implemented in the directives issued by Rosenberg in his capacity as Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories. Among his directives were these:

“The principal task of the civilian administration in the
occupied Eastern territories is to represent the interest of the
Reich. This basic principle is to be given precedence in all
measures and considerations. Therefore, the occupied
territories, in the future, may be permitted to have a life of
their own in a form not as yet to be determined. However, they
remain parts of the Greater German living space and are always
to be governed according to this guiding principle.

“The regulations of the Hague Convention on Land Warfare, which
concern the administration of a country occupied by a foreign
belligerent power, are not applicable, since the USSR is to be
considered dissolved, and therefore the Reich has the obligation
of exercising all governmental and other sovereign functions in
the interests of the country’s inhabitants. Therefore, any
measures are permitted which the German administration deems
necessary and suitable for the execution of this comprehensive
task.” (_EC-347_)

Implicit in Rosenberg’s statement that the Hague Regulations are not applicable to the Soviet Union is the recognition by him that the conspirators’ action in the Soviet Union flagrantly violated the Hague Regulations and applicable principles of International Law.

A top secret memorandum, dated 5 October 1942, written by Braeutigam, who was a high official in Rosenberg’s Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories, made the following statements:

“In the East, Germany is carrying on a threefold war: a war for
the destruction of Bolshevism, a war for the destruction of the
greater Russian Empire, and finally a war for the acquisition of
colonial territory for colonizing purposes and economic
exploitation.

* * * * * *

“With the inherent instinct of the Eastern peoples the primitive
man soon found out also that for Germany the slogan: ‘Liberation
from Bolshevism’ was only a pretext to enslave the Eastern
peoples according to her own methods.” (_294-PS_)

Certain German industrialists and financiers aided and abetted Himmler in his relentless program of Germanization, exploitation, oppression, and destruction. A letter from the banker, Baron Kurt von Schroeder to Himmler, dated 27 August 1943, stated:

“My very honorable Reichsfuehrer:

“With great joy I learn of your appointment as Reichsminister of
the Interior and take the liberty to extend my heartiest
congratulations to you on assuming your new post.

“A strong hand is now very necessary in the operation of this
Department and it is universally welcomed but especially by your
friends that it was you who were chosen for this by the Fuehrer.
Please be assured that we will always do everything in our power
at all times to assist you in every possible way.

“I am pleased to inform you at this opportunity that your circle
of friends has again placed at your disposal this year a sum
slightly in excess of RM 1 million for ‘special purposes.’ An
exact list showing the name of the contributors will be sent to
you shortly.

“Again all my very best wishes—as well as those of my family—I
remain yours, in old loyalty and esteem.

“Heil Hitler! Yours truly.” (_EC-454_)

A later letter from von Schroeder to Himmler, dated 21 September 1943, enclosed the list of contributors. The letter stated:

“Dear Reichsleader:

“I thank you very much for your kind letter of the 14th of this
month with which you made me very happy. At the same time, I am
enclosing a list with the total amount of funds made available
to you by your circle of friends and totalling RM 1,000,000. We
are very glad indeed to render some assistance to you in your
special tasks and to be able to provide some small relief for
you in your still further extended sphere of duties.

“Wishing you, dear Reichsleader, the best of luck, I remain in
old loyalty and esteem.

“Heil Hitler! Yours very truly.” (_EC-453_)

The Himmler “circle of friends,” it may be noted, was a relatively small, select group. It did not include all, or even a majority of the industrialists and financiers in Germany. These contributions were not like the “_Hitler Spende_” or the Winter Relief contributions which were exacted from all industrialists by the Nazi state. These were contributions by a small group of very influential industrialists and financiers who, for selfish reasons, were anxious to “do everything in our power at all times to assist you “(Himmler)” in every possible way.” By a rather strange coincidence, firms like I. G. Farben, the Flick Combine, and the Herman Goering Werke, which are on the list of contributors to Himmler, were among the chief beneficiaries of the conspirators’ program of plunder of public and private property in the occupied countries. (_EC-453_)

4. THE WESTERN OCCUPIED COUNTRIES

(This section is based on a brief originally prepared for submission by the United States Prosecution in support of the allegation, in Count One of the Indictment, of a plan or conspiracy to commit war crimes. The evidence relating to the plan or conspiracy, however, proved to be inseparable from that on the execution thereof, a subject assigned to the French Prosecution. The materials contained herein were accordingly made available to the French for such use as they might deem appropriate in connection with the proof of their case.)

A. _The Nazi Conspirators Obtained Enormous Quantities of Foodstuffs, Raw Materials and Equipment From the Occupied Western Countries._

(1) _The Nazis planned in advance of the invasion to secure from the conquered territories the strategic materials which Germany lacked and without which Germany could not prevail in a war of long duration._ In this war, as in the last, German resources were sufficient only for a conflict of short duration. As early as the winter of 1939-40, following the swift and crushing defeat of Poland, Germany suffered from a critical shortage of essential raw materials (_EC-615_). The Nazi leaders were thus faced with the question whether to conserve their supplies for a long war or to commit their limited reserves in the hope of obtaining an early decision. Hitler decided on the latter course. As Goering told General Thomas:

“The Fuehrer is firmly convinced that he will succeed in
reaching a decision * * * in the year 1940 by a big attack in
the West. He reckons that Belgium, Holland, and Northern France
will get into our possession and * * * had figured out that the
industrial areas of Douai and Lens and those of Luxembourg,
Longwy, and Briey could, from the point of view of raw material,
replace the supplies from Sweden. Therefore, the Fuehrer had
decided now to make use of our reserve of raw materials without
regard to future times. * * *” (_EC-606_)

Careful plans were made in advance of the invasion in 1940 to secure for Germany the raw material resources of the to-be-occupied countries. A manual of directives and decrees issued by the Quartermaster, OKH, for the economic administration of the military government set forth an exhaustive list of important raw materials to be seized wherever found (_EC-155_). Directives were issued to the so-called economic squads (_Wirtschafts Truppe_) attached to the tactical units on the procedures to be followed in locating, seizing, and preparing such materials for shipment to Germany (_EC-618_). Also included in the manual mentioned were drafts of decrees to be promulgated by the German occupation authorities, for the establishment in the occupied countries of Goods Offices, modeled after the German rationing boards, to control production and distribution in the occupied countries in the German interest. (_EC-155_)

(2) _The occupied Western countries were ruthlessly exploited according to plan._ The occupied areas were systematically stripped of their economic resources to feed the German war machine. The extent of German exploitation is partially indicated by the staggering totals of the occupation levies and the “credit” balances of the local central banks under clearing arrangements imposed by the Nazis, the principal sources of the funds with which Germany financed the spoliation of Western Europe. (For a brief explanation of the clearing system, see _infra_ under D, 2.)

The total occupation charges exacted from France alone were 31,600,000,000 RM from 25 June, 1940, to 5 September, 1944 (_3615-PS_). They averaged more than 7,000,000,000 RM annually, a sum more than four times the German annual payments under the Dawes and Young Plans. This sum is in addition to a “credit” of the Bank of France under the Franco-German clearing, which, as of September, 1943, amounted to 4,400,000,000 RM (_3615-PS_). For the period May 1942-43, the tribute exacted from Belgium (mainly from occupation charges and clearing credits) amounted to more than two-thirds of the Belgium national income (_ECR-149_). These figures, large as they are, take no account of the substantial quantities of materials seized and removed to the Reich without compensation (see _infra_ under B, (1)) nor do they reflect the windfall to the Reich resulting from the substantial over-valuation of the Reichsmark, particularly in the case of France and Belgium. (_EC-86_)

A few illustrative examples of specific items, taken from the report of the German Military Commander for France of 10 September, 1942 (_EC-267_), will serve to show even more concretely than monetary figures, the extent to which materials and equipment were taken from the occupied countries for the benefit of the Reich. Since the Armistice, according to this report, the French contributed to the Germans 73 percent of the normal annual French consumption of iron, amounting to nearly 5 million tons. From the Armistice to July, 1942, 225,000 tons of copper and 5,700 tons of nickel were delivered by France to Germany, amounting to 80 percent and 86 percent of French supplies respectively; also 55 percent of the French aluminum and 80 percent of the magnesium production. For her own needs France retained only 30 percent of the normal production of the wool industry, 16 percent of the cotton production, and 13 percent of the linen production. The total French production of locomotives and the major part of the machine tool industry were put at the disposal of the Germans. (_EC-267_)

B. _The Foodstuffs, Raw Materials and Equipment Delivered to Germany were Obtained by Compelling the Nationals of the Conquered Countries to Produce and Distribute in Accordance with German War Requirements, by Seizure and Requisition, and by Purchases Financed with Funds Exacted from the Occupied Countries and Their Nationals._

(1) _Much of the material and equipment removed to Germany was obtained by seizure, requisition, and confiscation of private property._ During the first phase of the occupation, the Nazis systematically removed to the Reich almost all available supplies to satisfy the immediate German requirements. This phase, according to the German Military Commander’s description of the practice in France, was one of “stripping” occupied areas of “foodstuffs, raw materials and machinery”, leaving only enough to secure the “bare subsistence” of the population (_EC-614_). In the words of the report of the Wi-Rue Staff in France:

“In this period the legal concepts of the Hague Regulations
regarding Land Warfare are not yet strictly observed. The main
purpose is to get out of France through seizure _Beschlagnahme_
or purchase at infinitesimal prices the materials of use for the
German armament.” (_EC-422_)

By order of the German High Command, booty was defined to include not merely public property but “beyond the Hague Regulations on Land Warfare,” also “privately owned finished and semi-finished products if they were manufactured in fulfillment of an order of the French armed forces” (_EC-422_). At the same time, payments made by the French armed forces on account of war material orders were likewise treated as war booty. Even goods in transit were arbitrarily placed in this category (_EC-422_). Machinery and equipment affixed to the realty were seized and shipped to Germany in wilful disregard of the limitations of the Hague Regulations authorizing seizure only of chattels. (_EC-84_)

The “stripping phase” of Nazi spoliation was relatively short-lived. Decision was soon reached to utilize at least part of the industrial capacity of the occupied areas to relieve the burden on the armament plants in Germany (_EC-620_). Throughout the period of occupation, however, the Nazis continued the seizure and requisition of machinery and certain raw materials in short supply in the Reich. From December, 1942, to the end of the occupation, for example, 242 German demands for Belgian machinery were met, of which 110 were fulfilled by requisitions (_ECH-10_). In 79 instances the requisitioned equipment was shipped to Germany. (_ECH-10_)

Support for such requisitions was found in an order of the Military Commander of Belgium of 6 August 1942. This order was explained as embodying the “modern” German view that, as “total war is no longer limited in space but has become a struggle of peoples and nations against each other,” requisitions under Article 52 of the Hague Regulations should no longer be limited to the “needs of the occupying forces” but may also be used in the “general interest of the German war effort”; and that requisitioned articles may be used not only in the territory in which they were obtained but also “in other territories in the sphere of the occupying power.” (_ECH-10_)

In April 1941, Goering ordered the removal of church bells in France “which represent the most important and last reserve of copper and tin,” stressing that “no church bells would be removed in Germany before all bells had been removed in France” (_EC-323_). In 1943, after the removal of church bells from the other occupied countries and even from the Reich, Hitler ordered their removal from Belgium (_ECH-11_). The Belgians protested, invoking the Hague Regulations, and refused an offer to buy; thereupon the Germans requisitioned the bells against receipt. (_ECH-11_)

By circular letter, dated 23 June 1943, Speer ordered that scientific instruments and apparatus be taken out of the laboratories and research institutes in the occupied Western countries, directing that applications for instruments be made through channels and that the requisitions be made by the Military Government. (_ECH-14_)

In many cases, representatives of German scientific institutions sought to acquire scientific instruments in order to modernize their own installations, appearing in Army uniforms to give the impression that the requisition was a military measure (_ECH-15_). The Military Government of Belgium decided that Articles 52 and 56 of the Hague Regulations were inapplicable because the Allies had destroyed a number of German scientific installations in the Reich through bombing, which therefore had to be replaced from the occupied territories, and that “in a total war, no consideration could be given to the cited articles of the Hague Regulations”. (_ECH-16_)

As part of the design to supply the armament industry in Germany with material from the occupied Western territories, a program for the removal of copper and lead from transmission installations of power distribution plants in the occupied Western countries was instituted by a decree of Speer dated 31 May, 1943 (_EC-101_). The plan contemplated from the outset that the transmission of facilities would not be restored (as required by the second paragraph of Article 53 of the Hague Regulations) but that an equivalent amount of metal would be returned after the war. (_EC-101_)

(2) _The Nazis purchased war materials and consumer goods_ _in the regular and black markets for shipment to the Reich, all with funds exacted from the occupied countries._ Following the initial “stripping” phase of the occupation, the Nazis promptly instituted an extensive “buying-out” program (_061-PS_) with the object of procuring not merely materials required for the German war effort, but to obtain also consumer goods, including luxury items, for the civilian population of Germany (_EC-485_).

No limitations, legal or moral, were observed in the execution of this program. Supplies which could not be obtained through normal channels were purchased on the black market. The disastrous effects of competition among various German agents led the central occupational authorities in Belgium, France, and Holland to take over black market operation directly (_1765-PS_). On 13 June 1942, by order of Goering, Col. Veltjens was appointed to direct black market purchases in all occupied territories and a new agency, the so-called UEWA, was placed at his disposal. (_ECH-7_)

The actual purchases were made by several corporations, including Pimetex, an agency of the Speer Ministry of Armament and Munitions. The goods were distributed through Roges according to directives of the Central Planning Board (Speer, Koerner, Milch) and in appropriate cases by the German Ministry of Economics and the _Reichsstellen_ (_ECH-7_). Black market operations were finally abolished by order of Goering dated 2 April, 1943, confirmed in Belgium by circular of the Military Commander of 19 June, 1943. (_ECH-9_)

Certain of the purchases made through the black market while under the direction of Col. Veltjens are of special interest:

_Christmas Drive._ On 22 September 1942, Goering ordered a
special drive in the Western occupied countries to purchase
presents for the civil population in Germany for the coming
Christmas. The Roges Company effected the distribution of the
articles in Germany.

_Special Drive WABO._ This drive was pursuant to Hitler’s order
to Speer to procure Christmas packages for the soldiers. The O.
Todt Cantine accepted offers of sale on the black market and
Pimetex did the buying.

_Special Drive LOWA_ (Degenkolb locomotive program). The
purchase were made by Pimetex. (_ECH-7_)

As of 15 January 1943, black market purchases totaled approximately 1,100,000,000 RM, including:

RM 929,100,000 in France.

RM 103,881,929 in Belgium, and

RM 73,685,162.64 in Holland. (_1765-PS_)

Payment in France was made out of occupation funds, in Belgium out of such funds and through the clearing, and in Holland through “normal bank transactions” (_1765-PS_; _ECR-132_). As appears very clearly from the report of Col. Veltjens of 15 January, 1943, substantially all the goods so purchased were shipped to the Reich. (_1765-PS_)

(3) _The Nazi conspirators compelled the nationals of the occupied countries to produce and distribute materials and equipment in accordance with the German general war requirements._ The “stripping” and “buying-out” phases of the Nazi spoliation were both gradually superseded by a regulated program for the utilization of the industrial plant of the occupied areas and the transfer of orders (subcontracting) to local concerns. The Nazi conspirators established comprehensive rationing controls under which essential raw materials were made available only to those who produced in the German interest; those reluctant to produce on German order were placed under compulsory administration. “This,” Keitel noted in commenting on the controls established in France, “is * * * booty of the victor”. (_EC-613_)

_Belgium_

The means employed in Belgium were typical. Production quotas for coal, iron and steel, textiles and leather, and other products were fixed by the Ministry of Economics and its _Reichsstellen_, in some cases after consultation with the Reich Minister (Funk). (_ECH-2_)

Comprehensive production controls were established in Belgium to assure the fulfillment of these quotas. Pursuant to plans developed in advance of the invasion (_EC-155_), a decree was issued by the Military Commander on 27 May, 1940, creating so-called “Goods Offices,” endowed with authority to issue general and special orders to Belgian firms requiring production of designated products, and the sale thereof to designated buyers, and with the further power to prohibit production or sale without license (_3604-PS_). By decree of the Military Commander of 29 April, 1941, the appointment of a commissar to direct operations of private plants was authorized. (_3610-PS_)

The German Goods Offices (_ECH-3_) were transferred to similar units established by Belgian decree of 3 September, 1940. (Whether this decree was issued on German order or suggestion does not appear.) The Germans supervised the Belgian Goods Offices and adopted as German orders both the Belgian decree establishing the Offices and the orders issued thereunder, and prescribed punishment by fine and imprisonment for violations. (_3609-PS_)

For the first two years of the occupation, German control was exercised mainly through prohibitions and restrictions, that is, by a priority system (_ECH-4_), although even then important sectors of the Belgian economy, notably textiles and leather products, were controlled by “positive” orders directing the amount in kind to be produced and the persons to whom distribution must be made (_ECH-4_; _ECH-2_). During this period the Military Commander issued instructions to the Goods Offices through “command channels,” that is, through the Belgian Minister of Economics. (_ECH-3_)

On 6 August, 1942, the Military Commander, however, published a decree reaffirming explicitly the power to compel production of designated articles (_3612-PS_), a signal for the introduction of “positive” controls. In 1943, on instructions from the Reich Ministry of Economics, German representatives selected from the _Reichsstellen_ were attached directly to the Belgian Goods Offices (_ECH-3_). At the end of 1943, the office of the “Ruestungsobmann” of the Speer Ministry for Armaments and War Production began issuing “positive orders” for production to individual concerns directly, without clearing with the Goods Offices, pursuant to decree of the Minister for Armaments and War Production (Speer). (_ECH-3_)

Production facilities in Belgium which were not deemed to serve the German interest were shut down. By order of 30 March 1942, the Military Commander prohibited the enlargement of existing plants and the construction of new ones without German authorization, and provided for the closing down of factories at his discretion (_3616-PS_). In the iron and metal industry alone at least 400 plants “not important for the war effort” had been closed down by 15 April 1943 (_EC-335_). By the end of the occupation, 1360 put of a total of 2164 plants in the textile industry had been closed down. (_ECH-19_)

_France and Holland_

Substantially the same system was put into effect in France and Holland. German Goods Offices were established in Occupied France at the same time as in Belgium (_3604-PS_). These were subsequently abolished in November, 1940, however, when the Vichy Government, at the “suggestion” of the Nazis, created raw material rationing boards, on which delegates of the German Military Administration served as technical advisers (_EC-613_; _EC-616_). In the Netherlands, controls were exercised by the local German Armament Inspectorate (_EC-471_; _EC-472-A_), who, it is believed, made use of the rationing boards set up in Holland before the outbreak of war.

C. _The Nazi Conspirators Acquired Ownership of Belgian, Dutch, and French Participations in European Industries by Means of Governmental Pressure and Through the Use of Funds Unlawfully Exacted from the Occupied Countries and Their Nationals._

The Nazi conspirators were not content with securing for Germany the supplies necessary for the period of the war. They aimed at obtaining permanent ownership and domination of European industry to the fullest extent possible, and embarked on a program to that end even during the progress of the war.

(1) _The Nazi conspirators established a program to acquire for German interests ownership of Belgian, Dutch, and French participations during the war._ On 23 May 1940, recommendation was made that it would be opportune to secure all Dutch and Belgian stocks “in order, especially in the case of holding companies, to win influence * * * over the controlled companies” (_EC-41_). The memorandum recommended the taking possession of stocks of the dominated companies located in foreign countries and influencing the decisions of members of holding companies located in Holland and Belgium or of other owners of such stock. Because of the provisions of Article 46 of the Hague Regulations prohibiting confiscation of private property, it was deemed more advisable to influence members of holding companies through careful guiding than through plain force. (_EC-41_)

At a meeting held in the Reich Ministry of Economics on 3 June 1940 on the subject of “Belgian and Dutch capital shares in southeastern European countries,” it was decided that regulations should be issued immediately by the Military Commander for Belgium prohibiting the destruction, transfer, or disposition of any bonds or stocks of these countries, and that registration should be required of owners and trustees. (_1445-PS_)

In a memorandum of 2 August 1940 Goering declared that the goal of the Germans’ economic policy was the “increase of German influence with foreign enterprises,” that it was “necessary already now that any opportunity is used to make it possible for the German economy to start the penetration even during the war of the interesting objects of the economy of the occupied countries,” and directed that the transfer of capital from Germany to the occupied countries be facilitated to make possible the immediate purchase of enterprises in the occupied countries. (_EC-137_)

At a meeting at the Reich Ministry of Economics on 8 August 1940 on the subject of “Acquisition of shares of important foreign enterprises in southeastern Europe,” Dr. Schlotterer of the Reich Ministry of Economics commented that “private economical penetration of the Southeast area by German influence is desirable, likewise the supplanting of British and French interests in that territory” (_EC-43_). The group present, including representatives of the Reich Ministry of Economics and the Reichsbank, agreed that “attempts should be made immediately to acquire shares” and that “in doing so the tendency should be preserved to present a bill for the shares at the peace conference.” It was further agreed that “it should be attempted if possible to transfer the shares into private hands” but that “in order to make the right selection it appears necessary to introduce an intermediary stage” in which “first of all, enterprises should be taken over through banks, thereupon the plants should be managed as a matter of trusteeship for the Reich with the aim that the Reich (Reich Marshal Goering)” undertake handing them over to private industry. (_EC-43_)

(2) _The Nazi conspirators carried out this program by compulsory sale where necessary and by purchases financed out of occupation charges and under clearing agreements with the occupied countries._

_Belgium_

Immediate steps were taken to implement these measures in Belgium. The annual report of the Commissar at the National Bank from May 1940-41 states:

“According to the directions of the Reichsmarshal Goering as
early as September 1940 the first measures for a closer
formation of capital ties between the Belgian and German economy
were taken. Two different procedures were concerned here:

“1. Direct negotiations between German industrialists and
Belgian industrialists, for the purpose of obtaining
constructive participations in important Belgian enterprises
which offer the basis for collaboration between the two
economies even after the war. Furthermore, it is desired to
transfer to German hands important Belgian participations in
foreign enterprises whose administration is located in Belgium,
particularly so far as enterprises are concerned which are
located in the Balkans and in which a general German interest
exists.

“2. Ties which result from purchases of stock by German parties
on the Belgian stock markets. For this purpose the Reich
Economic Minister has given general permission to 32 German
banks to obtain participation rights, particularly stocks, in a
limited quantity in Belgium. Till now use has been made of this
permission in the amount of about 25 million RM, to which can be
added an additional 10 million RM for the procurement of Belgian
participations in Rumania, Bulgaria, and the former Poland.”
(_ECR-24_)

In his report for November 1940 the Military Commander for Belgium stated:

“A certain readiness exists on the part of the Belgians to give
up investments in stocks in such countries which, at the present
time, are being ruled militarily or economically by Germany.
Among the important business deals of this kind which have been
concluded should be mentioned the taking over by the
_Kreditanstalt, Wien_ (Credit Institute, Vienna) of an essential
interest in the _Allgemeiner Jugoslawischer Bankverein_ (General
Yugoslav Bank Association) from the _Societé Generale_ (capital
approximately 1 million RM) and the taking over by the _Deutsche
Bank_ of the overwhelming majority [translator’s note: of
shares] of the _Banca Commerciala Romana_ from the _Societé
Generale_ (capital approximately 2 million RM). The _Deutsche
Bank_ also succeeded in acquiring shares of the _Kreditanstalt,
Wien_, of approximately 800,000 RM nominally from the _Societé
Generale_ and from one of its subsidiaries. Negotiations between
the _Deutsche Bank_ and the _Societé Generale_ on the transfer
of approximately 25% of the capital of the _Banque Generale du
Luxembourg_ are about to be concluded. Through this deal the
_Deutsche Bank_ together with the other German groups obtains
the absolute majority of the Luxembourger Bank (approximately
70% of the shares). The _Deutsche Bank_ gets the right to
acquire another 25% of the shares which for the time being,
remained with the _Societé Generale_.” (_EC-34_)

While the Military Commander of Belgium may have given some assurance that the owners would not be compelled to sell (_ECH-22_), in at least one instance, purchase could be effected only by military order (_EC-335_). In this instance the procurement for the Main Branch of Trustees East of shares of the Belgian “Trust Metallurgique” in electricity and road enterprises of East Silesia and the General Government, as well as purchase of shares in the iron works Ostrovica for the Reichswerk Hermann Goering had “to be done, at the request of the Reich Ministry for Economics, forcibly, as an agreement on a financial basis could not be obtained.” (_EC-335_)

The German acquisition of Belgian stock participations was financed through the Belgium-German clearing. The Belgian clearing balances of 20 March 1940 included an item of 296 millions bfrs., which “is explained by out-payment of large clearing transfers to purchase Belgian capital participations in Balkan enterprises” (_ECR-14_). Increasing transfers resulting from the German capital penetration program precipitated a controversy with the Emission Bank, which was resolved by the Commissar’s issuance of an order requiring the bank to make payment (_ECR-24_). As a sequel, “capital” payments were separated from those for “goods and services” and financed by a separate “capital” clearing agreement covering purchases of securities and other “capital” transactions (_ECR-24_). The Belgian clearing “credit” under the capital clearing, as of 31 July 1943, amounted to 1,071,000,000 bfrs (_ECR-173_). As shown below, (see _infra_, D, 2) the Belgian credit under the capital clearing traffic represents a forced loan, exacted for a purpose not even remotely related to the needs of the occupation army.

_France and Holland_

The limited evidence, in the presently available German documents indicates that similar methods were employed in French and Dutch participations. The procedure followed in the Netherlands is indicated below in the discussion of the removal of restrictions on the free transfer of Reichsmarks in that country. (See _infra_, D, 5.) In France, participations of a value of 121,000,000 RM were purchased for German interests, paid for in part out of occupation funds and in part through the clearing. (_1991-PS_)

D. _The Nazi Conspirators Compelled the Occupied Countries and Their Nationals to Furnish the Monetary Requirements for the German Exploitation, by Means of Occupation Levies, Forced Loans, and the Requisition of Gold and Foreign Exchange in Amounts Far in Excess of the Needs of the Occupation Armies._

Except for the early period of the occupation, during which _Reichskreditkassen_ certificates were issued to finance the needs of the occupation troops (Lemkin, _Axis Rule In Occupied Europe_, p. 329), the Nazis obtained the necessary local currency through the levy of excessive occupation charges, the imposition of clearing arrangements under which the local central banks were compelled to finance exports to the Reich, and by requisition of gold and foreign exchange.

(1) _The Nazi conspirators exacted excessive occupation charges from the conquered countries._

_Belgium_

The Nazi conspirators demanded from Belgium both “internal occupation costs” and “external occupation costs” (_ECR-32_). The former was defined as “those sums which are gotten out of the country to finance the needs of the German military formations located in the country” (_ECR-32_). The term “external occupation costs” was used interchangeably with the title “antibolshevistic contribution” (_EC-401_). Under whatever theory, the exaction of occupation charges was made “to the limit of capacity”. (_ECR-59_)

Throughout the period of German occupation, a substantial part of the contribution charges obtained from Belgium was used as a matter of regular practice “not for occupation cost purposes” (_ECR-166_; _ECR-155-A_; _ECR-35_), including:

(_a_) Exports to Germany, Holland, and France (_ECR-89_; _ECR-104_).

(_b_) Exchange for Belgian francs of RKK certificates, a “not inconsiderable part” of which did “not have the least thing to do with occupation costs” (_ECR-39_; _ECR-142_).

(_c_) “Political purposes (that is, SS, Propaganda, Hitler Youth)” (_ECR-106_).

(_d_) Purchases in the “black market” (_ECR-106_), many of them destined for export. (See _supra_, B, (2).)

(_e_) General war expenses, including the supply of troops based in Belgium for military operations against England (_ECH-5_); the Commander-in-Chief of the Army rejected a recommendation of the Military Commander that a distinction be drawn between occupation troops and those for military operations (_ECH-5_).

Notwithstanding the extensive use of occupation levies for non-occupation purposes, the contributions exacted from Belgium

“were not only sufficient to cover the needs of the _Wehrmacht_
* * * but also made it possible * * * to fund a cash reserve
which reached at certain times about 2,500,000,000 bfrs”.
(_ECH-5_)

_France_

The occupation cost accounts of the _Reichskreditkasse_ in Paris disclose on their face that a large part of the occupation funds was obtained and used for nonoccupational purposes. Two sets of occupation cost accounts, were maintained: Account A, into which payments were made on behalf of various Reichs ministeries and agencies, and for specified purposes; and Account B, into which payments were made for disposal for the _Wehrmacht_ (_3615-PS_). The funds in Account A were used for obviously nonoccupational purposes, as follows:

_June 1940 to end
1943_
A I. Reich Minister for Economic Affairs
(primarily for the buying agency,
“Roges,” also for the purchase of
securities and devisen) RM 1,518,000,000
A II. Foreign Office (for propaganda
purposes in France) 27,000,000
A III. Payment of support to dependents of
laborers recruited in France for
work in Germany 1,500,000
A IV. Reich Minister for Transportation
(purchase of securities) 2,500,000
A V. Paris Agency of the
_Reichstierstelle_ (Reich Agency
for Animals)—imports of meat and
meat products 19,000,000
A VI. Exchange by the Bank of France of
RM notes for persons evacuated
from Alsace-Lorraine 900,000
A VII. Financing purchases of raw sugar in
North France by sugar refinery in
South Germany 1,285,000
A VIII. Compensation for war damage to
_Reichsdeutsche_ and
_Volkdeutsche_ in France 8,500,000
A IX. Sale of French francs to the Reich
(Commodity imports into
Alsace-Lorraine) 66,000,000
A X. Reich Minister of Education
(Purchases for libraries in the
Reich of books destroyed in air
raids) 1,000,000
(_3615-PS_)

The available records do not disclose the full extent to which the _Wehrmacht_ used the funds at its disposal in Account B for nonoccupational purposes. It is certain, however, that large sums were expended for such purposes. Thus, a communication of the OKW to the Foreign Office of 6 November 1942, explaining the decrease in reserve for Account B, states:

“In addition, payments to a considerable extent had to be made
from the occupation cost funds which were not allotted to meet
the demands of those units of the German Wehrmacht stationed in
France. On 15 January the B account of occupation costs was
approximately 3 bill. RM. The reason for the decrease appears
from the following compilation:

_Million RM._ _a._ For procurement of goods exported from France during the period of 1 Jan.-31 Oct. 1942 an estimated 10 × 90 mill. RM 900 _b._ To Roges Raw Material Trading Company Ltd. for purchases on black market 700 _c._ For procurement of foreign bills by the Navy (the purchase of foreign bills with French francs was necessary to buy and repair merchant ships in Spanish harbors. These merchant ships are to serve for supplying Rommel’s Panzer army in Africa) 40 _d._ Reimbursement to Foreign Office (account Syria) 4 _e._ Allotments in favor of families of French workersw orking in Germany 1.5 _f._ Special commissioner Rumania 1.3 _g._ Costs of building completions for directors of French powder factories 0.2 ——— 1,647

Therefrom it appears that the decrease of reserves of occupation
cost funds amounting to 3,000 mill. RM on 15 January 1942 is
primarily due to expenditures for purposes unrelated to the
occupation.” (_1741-PS_)

_Holland_

Occupation charges were fixed at about 100,000,000 gulden a month (_ECR-174_; _EC-86_). (100 RM = 75 gulden, approximately (_EC-468_)).

Expenditures were divided between “occupation” purposes and “nonoccupation” purposes, according to whether “the products purchased or produced on orders of the armed forces of the Netherlands remain in the Netherlands (occupation cost) or leave the Netherlands (nonoccupation cost)” (_ECR-174_). During the 20-month period from March 1941 to October 1942, inclusive (the only period for which figures are available), out of the total occupation charges of 1,545,500,000 gulden, 433,800,000 gulden were expended for “nonoccupation” purposes (_ECR-175-193_). A large part of the “pure” occupation expenditure, moreover, was for general war expenses, including the construction of fortifications and airfields, and the letting of shipbuilding contracts. (_ECR-180, 181, 183, 187, 191_)

In theory, only the “occupation” costs were supposed to be charged to the Netherlands (_ECR-174_); until April 1941, the “nonoccupation” expenditures were returned to the Military Commander in the Netherlands (_ECR-175_). The claim of the Netherlands to the sums “returned,” however, was rejected. Moreover, as appears from the above cited reports (_ECR-175-193_), nonoccupation expenditure continued even after April 1941, when reimbursements ceased. (_ECR-176_)

During the first year of the occupation Germany exacted an additional levy from the Netherlands under the heading of “external occupation costs,” amounting to 500,000,000 RM (_ECR-194_). Of this sum, 100,000,000 RM was paid in gold; the remainder was paid by a transfer of the clearing balance of the Netherlands Bank at the _Verrechnungskasse_ to the German Ministry of Finance, that is, was used to reduce a credit which arose by reason of exports to the Reich. (_ECR-194_)

In April 1942, “at the instigation of the Reich Commissioner Seyss-Inquart,” the Netherlands began to pay a “voluntary contribution to the war against Bolshevism” of 50,000,000 guilders per month, retroactive to 1 July 1941, of which 10,000,000 per month was paid in gold (_ECR-195_). By 31 March 1944, this “contribution” amounted to 2,150,000,000 RM. (_EC-86_)

It is immaterial whether this “contribution” was made at the direction of Seyss-Inquart or was in fact the “voluntary” act of the then President of the Netherlands Bank and Treasurer in the Ministry of Finance, Van Tonningen. Van Tonningen was appointed by Seyss-Inquart and acted in the German interest. His acts, like that of civilian administrators in occupied territories generally, must be charged to the occupant. (See _infra_, _Conclusion_.) The spirit in which he discharged his duties is sympathetically described by the German Commissar at the Netherlands Bank as follows:

“The new President of the Netherlands Bank, Mr. Rost Van
Tonningen, is, in contrast to a large part of the leadership,
penetrated in his movements and his official acts by the greater
German thought, and convinced of the necessity of the creation
of a greater European economic space. This ideological attitude
in itself gives him the correct position on financial and
monetary policy questions for his country in relation to the
greater German economic space. Furthermore, it makes easier
cooperation with my office, a fact which deserves special
mention in consideration of the frequently observed passive
conduct of the Netherlands agencies before the entrance into
office of the new President. I consider as a fortunate solution
the fact that the Reichskommissar for the Occupied Dutch Areas
has also entrusted Mr. Rost Van Tonningen with the Treasury of
the Ministry of Finance (_Schatzamt des Finanzministeriums_).
Mr. Rost Van Tonningen took over this office at the end of the
month of April. Thus there is a guarantee that the financial and
monetary policy of the country will be conducted according to
unified points of view.” (_ECR-196_)

(2) _The Nazi conspirators financed exports from the occupied countries to Germany by means of forced loans under the guise of clearing agreements._

_Belgium_

The principle of the clearing system is as follows:

The importer makes a deposit of the purchase price in his own currency at the national clearing agency of his country, which places the same amount to the credit of the clearing agency of the exporting country. The latter institution then pays the exporter in his own currency. Thus if trade between two countries is unequal the clearing agency of one acquires a claim against the agency of the other which, however, is satisfied only when a shift in the balance of trade gives rise to an offsetting claim.

In the order establishing the German-Belgium clearing, the Belgium clearing agency was the National Bank of Belgium (_3608-PS_). The administration of the clearing was shortly thereafter transferred to Emission Bank, an organization originally incorporated by Belgian interests pursuant to order of the Military Commander of 27 June 1940 (_ECR-24_). The change was one in name only, however, since at this time the management of the two banks was substantially identical and the Emission Bank obtained its currency by loan from the National Bank. The Emission Bank was, by its charter terms, subject to orders of the Commissar at the National Bank; the Commissar obtained the same powers over the National Bank by German order of 16 December 1940. (_ECR-24_)

The Belgian total “credit” under the clearing, as of 31 July 1944, amounted to 60,837,000,000 bfrs = 4,867,000,000 RM, of which 54,993,000,000 bfrs = 4,399,000,000 RM arose from the Belgian-German clearing for goods and services. (_ECR-173_)

The continued increase in the Belgian “credit” was due mainly to “the increasing Belgian export to Germany for which there are only small imports from Germany on the other side of the account.” (_ECR-149_)

The entire Belgian credit under the clearing constitutes a forced loan, largely for nonoccupation purposes:

(_a_) The Belgian-German clearing was established by circular of the Reichs Minister of Economics, 4 July 1940 (_ECH-6_), which was published to the Belgians by proclamation of the Military Commander of 10 July 1940 (_EC-604_; _3608-PS_).

(_b_) “Since it was to be foreseen that as the result of the increased deliveries from Belgium to the Reich, which were not matched by opposite accounts, particularly in the early period, the clearing status would develop to the favor of the Emission Bank” (_ECR-24_), an agreement was signed by the Emission Bank and the German Reichsbank on 16/17 August 1940 under which each undertook to pay out clearing transfers immediately (_ECR-24_; _ECH-5_).

(_c_) This agreement did not prescribe what must be financed through the clearing; it merely provided for immediate payment of claim arising thereunder without waiting until the account should be balanced by equalizing of imports and exports. As the Military Commander stated, the German-Belgian clearing was “not regulated by an agreement, but has been regulated unilaterally by my proclamation of 10 July 1940” (_EC-604_). The Military Commander made clear the absolute power asserted by the German authorities over the Belgian Note Banks (as the Germans described the Emission and National Banks). He stated:

“* * * The claim made to the Commissar that the Emission Bank is
entitled to ask in every case for detailed explanation of
compensation payments coming from Germany is incorrect. The
clearing activities between Germany and Belgium are not
regulated by an agreement but have been regulated unilaterally
by my proclamation on July 10, 1940 and are not subject to any
Belgian control. Inter-alia the transfer of all payments which
have been specially authorized by the Reich Ministry of Economy
has been expressly permitted * * *.” (_EC-604_)

(_d_) The Commissar freely invoked his directive power over the Note Banks.

1. When, in April 1941, the clearing balance of the Emission
Bank exceeded 1,500,000 bfrs the Emission Bank refused to pay
out several large sums arising by virtue of German-Belgian
“capital” transactions. Thereupon, the Commissar issued an order
directing the bank to make the payment. (_ECR-24_)

2. In December 1941, the Emission Bank refused to pay out a sum
of 43,256,000 RM transferred from Paris. The Commissar thereupon
issued an order directing the bank to do so. (_ECR-172_)