Chapter V (7)

“In case you should get any written communication from President
HACHA, please do not make any written or verbal comments or take
any other action on them but pass them on here by cipher
telegram. Moreover, I must ask you and the other members of the
Embassy to make a point of not being available if the Czech
government wants to communicate with you during the next few
days.

“(Signed) RIBBENTROP”. (_2815-PS_)

On the afternoon of 13 March, Monsignor Tiso, accompanied by Durcansky and by Karmasin, the local Nazi leader, arrived in Berlin in response to the summons from Hitler. Late that afternoon Tiso was received by Hitler in his study in the Reichs Chancellery and was presented with an ultimatum. Two alternatives were given him: either to declare the independence of Slovakia or to be left, without German assistance, to the mercies of Poland and Hungary. This decision, Hitler said, was not a question of days, but of hours. The captured German Foreign Office minutes of this meeting between Hitler and Tiso on 13 March show that in the inducements Hitler held out to the Slovaks Hitler displayed his customary disregard for truth:

“* * * Now he [Hitler] had permitted Minister Tiso to come here
in order to make this question clear in a very short time.
Germany had no interests east of the Carpathian mountains. It
was indifferent to him what happened there. The question was
whether Slovakia wished to conduct her own affairs or not. He
did not wish for anything from Slovakia. He would not pledge his
people or even a single soldier to something which was not in
any way desired by the Slovak people. He would like to secure
final confirmation as to what Slovakia really wished. He did not
wish that reproaches should come from Hungary that he was
preserving something which did not wish to be preserved at all.
He took a liberal view of unrest and demonstration in general,
but in this connection, unrest was only an outward indication of
interior instability. He would not tolerate it, and he had for
that reason permitted Tiso to come in order to hear his
decision. It was not a question of days, but of hours. He had
stated at that time that if Slovakia wished to make herself
independent he would support this endeavor and even guarantee
it. He would stand by his word so long as Slovakia would make it
clear that she wished for independence. If she hesitated or did
not wish to dissolve the connection with Prague, he would leave
the destiny of Slovakia to the mercy of events, for which he was
no longer responsible. In that case he would only intercede for
German interests and those did not lie east of the Carpathians.
Germany had nothing to do with Slovakia. She had never belonged
to Germany.

“The Fuehrer asked the Reich Foreign Minister if he had any
remarks to add. The Reich Foreign Minister also emphasized for
his part the conception that in this case a decision was a
question of hours not of days. He showed the Fuehrer a message
he had just received which reported Hungarian troop movements on
the Slovak frontiers. The Fuehrer read this report, mentioned it
to Tiso, and expressed the hope that Slovakia would soon decide
clearly for herself.” (_2802-PS_)

Those present at this meeting included Ribbentrop, Keitel, State Secretary Dietrich, State Secretary Keppler, and Minister of State Meissner.

While in Berlin, the Slovaks also conferred separately with Ribbentrop and with other high Nazi officials. Ribbentrop solicitously handed Tiso a copy, already drafted in Slovak, of the law proclaiming the independence of Slovakia. On the night of 13 March a German plane was placed at Tiso’s disposal to carry him home. On 14 March, pursuant to the wishes of the Nazi conspirators, the Diet of Bratislava proclaimed the independence of Slovakia.

With Slovak extremists, acting at Nazi bidding, in open revolt against the Czechoslovak government, the Nazi leaders were now in a position to move against Prague. On the evening of 14 March, at the suggestion of the German Legation in Prague M. Hacha, the president of the Czechoslovak republic, and M. Chvalkovsky, his foreign minister, arrived in Berlin. The atmosphere in which they found themselves was hostile. Since the preceding weekend the Nazi press had accused the Czechs of using violence against the Slovaks and especially against members of the German minority and citizens of the Reich. Both press and radio proclaimed that the lives of Germans were in danger, that the situation was intolerable and that it was necessary to smother as quickly as possible the focus of trouble which Prague had become in the heart of Europe.

After midnight on the 15 March, at 1:15 in the morning, Hacha and Chvalkovsky were ushered into the Reichs Chancellery. They found there Hitler, von Ribbentrop, Goering, Keitel, and other high Nazi officials. The captured German Foreign Office account of this meeting furnishes a revealing picture of Nazi behaviour and tactics. It must be remembered that this account of the conference of the night of March 14-15 comes from German sources, and must be read as an account biased by its source.

Hacha opened the conference. He was conciliatory, even humble. He thanked Hitler for receiving him and said he knew that the fate of Czechoslovakia rested in the Fuehrer’s hands. Hitler replied that he regretted that he had been forced to ask Hacha to come to Berlin, particularly because of the great age of the President. (Hacha was then in his seventies.) But this journey, Hitler told the President, could be of great advantage to his country, because “it was only a matter of hours until Germany would intervene.” The conference proceeded as follows, with Hitler speaking:

“Slovakia was a matter of indifference to him. If Slovakia had
kept closer to Germany, it would have been an obligation to
Germany, but he was glad that he did not have this obligation
now. He had no interests whatsoever in the territory east of the
Lower Carpathian Mts. Last autumn he had not wanted to draw the
final consequences because he had believed that it was possible
to live together. But even at that time, and also later in his
conversations with Chvalkovsky, he made it clear that he would
ruthlessly smash this state if Benes’ tendencies were not
completely revised. Chvalkovsky understood this and asked the
Fuehrer to have patience. The Fuehrer saw this point of view,
but the months went by without any change. The new regime did
not succeed in eliminating the old one psychologically. He
observed this from the press, mouth to mouth propaganda,
dismissals of Germans and many other things, which, to him, were
a symbol of the whole situation. At first he had not understood
this but when it became clear to him he drew his conclusions
because, had the development continued in this way, the
relations with Czechoslovakia would in a few years have become
the same as six months ago. Why did Czechoslovakia not
immediately reduce its army to a reasonable size? Such an army
was a tremendous burden for such a state because it only makes
sense if it supports the foreign political mission of the State.
Since Czechoslovakia no longer has a foreign political mission,
such an army is meaningless. He enumerates several examples
which proved to him that the spirit in the army had not changed.
This symptom convinced him that the army would be a severe
political burden in the future. Added to this were the
inevitable development of economic necessities and, further, the
protests from national groups which could no longer endure life
as it was.

“Last Sunday, therefore, for me the die was cast. I summoned the
Hungarian envoy and notified him that I was withdrawing my
[restraining] hands from that country. We were now confronted
with this fact. He had given the order to the German troops to
march into Czechoslovakia and to incorporate Czechoslovakia into
the German Reich. He wanted to give Czechoslovakia fullest
autonomy and a life of her own to a larger extent than she ever
had enjoyed during Austrian rule. Germany’s attitude towards
Czechoslovakia will be determined tomorrow and the day after
tomorrow and depends on the attitude of the Czechoslovakian
people and the Czechoslovakian military towards the German
troops. He no longer trusts the government. He believes in the
honesty and straight forwardness of Hacha and Chvalkovsky but
doubts that the government will be able to assert itself in the
entire nation. The German Army had already started out today,
and at one barracks where resistance was offered, it was
ruthlessly broken; another barracks had given in at the
deployment of heavy artillery.

“At 6 o’clock in the morning the German army would invade
Czechoslovakia from all sides and the German air force would
occupy the Czech airfields. There existed two possibilities. The
first one would be that the invasion of the German troops would
lead to a battle. In this case the resistance will be broken by
all means with physical force. The other possibility is that the
invasion of the German troops occurs in bearable form. In that
case it would be easy for the Fuehrer to give Czechoslovakia at
the new organization of Czech life a generous life of her own,
autonomy and a certain national liberty.

“We witnessed at the moment a great historical turning-point. He
would not like to torture and de-nationalize the Czechs. He also
did not do all that because of hatred but in order to protect
Germany. If Czechoslovakia in the fall of last year would not
have yielded, the Czech people would have been exterminated.
Nobody could have prevented him from doing that. It was his will
that the Czech people should live a full national life and he
believed firmly that a way could be found which would make
far-reaching concessions to the Czech desires. If fighting would
break out tomorrow, the pressure would result in
counter-pressure. One would annihilate one another and it would
then not be possible any more for him to give the promised
alleviations. Within two days the Czech army would not exist any
more. Of course, Germans would also be killed and this would
result in a hatred which would force him because of his instinct
of self-preservation not to grant autonomy any more. The world
would not move a muscle. He felt pity for the Czech people when
he read the foreign press. It gave him the impression expressed
in a German proverb: ‘The Moor has done his duty, the Moor may
go.’

“That was the state of affairs. There were two courses open to
Germany, a harder one which did not want any concessions and
wished in memory of the past that Czechoslovakia would be
conquered with blood, and another one, the attitude of which
corresponded with his proposals stated above.

“That was the reason why he had asked Hacha to come here. This
invitation was the last good deed which he could offer to the
Czech people. If it would come to a fight, the bloodshed would
also force us to hate. But the visit of Hacha could perhaps
prevent the extreme. Perhaps it would contribute to finding a
form of construction which would be much more far-reaching for
Czechoslovakia than she could ever have hoped for in old
Austria. His aim was only to create the necessary security for
the German people.

“The hours went past. At 6 o’clock the troops would march in. He
was almost ashamed to say that there was one German division to
each Czech battalion. The military action was no small one, but
planned with all generosity. He would advise him now to retire
with Chvalkovsky in order to discuss what should be done.”
(_2798-PS_)

In reply to this long harangue, Hacha, according to the German minutes, said that he agreed that resistance would be useless. He expressed doubt that he would be able to issue the necessary orders to the Czech Army in the four hours left to him before the German Army crossed the Czech border. He asked if the object of the invasion was to disarm the Czech Army. If so, that might be arranged. Hitler replied that his decision was final, that it was well known what a decision of the Fuehrer meant. He turned to the circle of Nazi conspirators surrounding him, which included Goering, Ribbentrop, and Keitel, for their support. The only possibility of disarming the Czech Army, Hitler said, was by the intervention of the German Army. At this point Hacha and Chvalkovsky retired from the room. (_2798-PS_)

A dispatch from the British Ambassador, Sir Neville Henderson, published in the British Blue Book, describes a conversation with Goering in which the events of this early morning meeting are set forth (_2861-PS_). Dispatch No. 77 in the French Yellow Book from M. Coulondre, the French Ambassador, gives another well-informed version of this same midnight meeting (_2943-PS_). The following account of the remainder of this meeting is drawn from these two sources, as well as from the captured German minutes (_2787-PS_). (Cf. also _3061-PS_.)

When President Hacha left the conference room in the Reichs Chancellery, he was in such a state of exhaustion that he needed medical attention from a physician who was on hand for that purpose. It appears that he was given an injection to sustain him during the ordeal. When the two Czechs returned to the room the Nazi conspirators again told them of the power and invincibility of the _Wehrmacht_. They reminded him that in three hours, at 6 in the morning, the German Army would cross the border. Goering boasted of what the German _Wehrmacht_ would do if Czech forces resisted the invading Germans. If German lives were lost, Goering said, his Luftwaffe would blast half Prague into ruins in two hours. And that, Goering said, would be only the beginning. Under this threat of imminent and merciless attack by land and air, the President of Czechoslovakia at 4:30 in the morning signed the document with which the Nazi conspirators confronted him. This Declaration of 15 March 1939 reads:

“the President of the Czechoslovak State * * * entrusts with
entire confidence the destiny of the Czech people and the Czech
country to the hands of the Fuehrer of the German Reich.”
(_TC-49_)

While the Nazi officials were threatening and intimidating the representatives of the Czech government, the _Wehrmacht_ had in some areas already crossed the Czech border. The Czech industrial centres of Maehrisch-Ostrau and Witkowitz, close to the Silesian and Polish borders, were occupied by German troops and SS units during the early evening of 14 March. An article in the German military magazine, the _Wehrmacht_, of 29 March 1939 describes the movement of German troops during the occupation:

“From Silesia, Saxony and Northern Bavaria and the Ostmark,
seven Army Corps moved on the morning of March 15 past the
former Czech border. On the evening of March 14 parts of the
VIII Army Corps and the SS Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler, under the
command of the Commanding General of the VIII Army Corps, had
already occupied the industrial centers of Witkowitz and
Maehrisch Ostrau.

“The troops of Army Group 3 under the command of General of
Infantry Blaskowitz were to take Bohemia under their protection,
while the troops of Army Group 5 under General of Inf. List were
given the same mission for Moravia.

“For this purpose parts of the Air Force (particularly
reconnaissance planes and antiaircraft artillery) as well as
parts of the _SS Verfuegungstruppen_ were placed at the disposal
of the two army groups.

“On the evening of March 14, the march order was received by the
troops. On March 15 at 6 A. M. the columns moved past the border
and then moved on with utmost precision. * * *” (_3571-PS_)

(Other descriptions of the military movements of 14 and 15 March are contained in documents _2860-PS_, _3618-PS_, and _3619-PS_.)

At dawn on 15 March German troops poured into Czechoslovakia from all sides. Hitler issued an order of the day to the Armed Forces and a proclamation to the German people, which stated succinctly, “Czechoslovakia has ceased to exist.” (_TC-50_)

On the following day, in direct contravention of Article 81 of the Treaty of Versailles, Czechoslovakia was formally incorporated into the German Reich under the name of the “Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia.” This decree, signed in Prague on 16 March 1939 by Hitler, Lammers, Frick, and Ribbentrop, commenced with this declaration:

“The Bohemian-Moravian countries belonged for a millennium to
the living space of the German people.” (_TC-51_)

The remainder of the decree sets forth in bleak detail the extent to which Czechoslovakia henceforth was to be subjugated to Germany. A German Protector was to be appointed by the Fuehrer for the so-called Protectorate. The German Government assumed charge of their foreign affairs and of their customs and their excise. It was specified that German garrisons and military establishments would be maintained in the Protectorate. (_TC-51_)

At the same time the extremist leaders in Slovakia, who at German insistence had done so much to undermine the Czech State, found that the independence of their week-old state was in fact qualified. A Treaty of Protection between Slovakia and the Reich was signed in Vienna on 18 March and by Ribbentrop in Berlin on 23 March (_1439-PS_). A secret protocol to this treaty was also signed in Berlin on 23 March by Ribbentrop for Germany, and by Tuka and Durcansky for Slovakia (_2793-PS_). The first four articles of this treaty provide:

“The German Government and the Slovak Government have agreed,
after the Slovak State has placed itself under the protection of
the German Reich, to regulate by treaty the consequences
resulting from this fact. For this purpose the undersigned
representatives of the two governments have agreed on the
following provisions.

“ARTICLE 1. The German Reich undertakes to protect the political
independence of the State of Slovakia and the integrity of its
territory.

“ARTICLE 2. For the purpose of making effective the protection
undertaken by the German Reich, the German armed forces shall
have the right, at all times, to construct military
installations and to keep them garrisoned in the strength they
deem necessary, in an area delimited on its western side by the
frontiers of the State of Slovakia, and on its eastern side by a
line formed by the eastern rims of the Lower Carpathians, the
White Carpathians and the Javornik Mountains.

“The Government of Slovakia will take the necessary steps to
assure that the land required for these installations shall be
conveyed to the German armed forces. Furthermore the Government
of Slovakia will agree to grant exemption from custom duties for
imports from the Reich for the maintenance of the German troops
and the supply of military installations.

“Military sovereignty will be assumed by the German armed forces
in the zone described in the first paragraph of this Article.

“German citizens who, on the basis of private employment
contracts, are engaged in the construction of military
installations in the designated zone shall be subject to German
jurisdiction.

“ARTICLE 3. The Government of Slovakia will organize its
military forces in close agreement with the German armed forces.

“ARTICLE 4. In accordance with the relationship of protection
agreed upon, the Government of Slovakia will at all times
conduct its foreign affairs in close agreement with the German
Government.” (_1439-PS_)

The secret protocol provided for close economic and financial collaboration between Germany and Slovakia. Mineral resources and subsoil rights were placed at the disposal of the German government. Article I, Paragraph 3, provided:

“(3) Investigation, development and utilization of the Slovak
natural resources. In this respect the basic principle is that
insofar as they are not needed to meet Slovakia’s own
requirements, they should be placed in first line at Germany’s
disposal. The entire soil-research (_Bodenforschung_) will be
placed under the Reich agency for soil-research (_Reichsstelle
fuer Bodenforschung_). The government of the Slovak State will
soon start an investigation to determine whether the present
owners of concessions and privileges have fulfilled the
industrial obligations prescribed by law and it will cancel
concessions and privileges in cases where these duties have been
neglected.” (_2793-PS_)

In their private conversations the Nazi conspirators gave abundant evidence that they considered Slovakia a puppet State, in effect a German possession. A memorandum of information given by Hitler to von Brauchitsch on 25 March 1939 deals in the main with problems arising from recently occupied Bohemia and Moravia and Slovakia. It states in part:

“Col. Gen. Keitel shall inform Slovak Government via Foreign
Office that it would not be allowed to keep or garrison armed
Slovak units (Hlinka Guards) on this side of the border formed
by the river Waag. They shall be transferred to the new Slovak
territory. Hlinka Guards should be disarmed.

“Slovak shall be requested via Foreign Office to deliver to us
against payment any arms we want and which are still kept in
Slovakia. This request is to be based upon agreement made
between Army and Czech troops. For this payment these millions
should be used which we will pour anyhow into Slovakia.

“_Czech Protectorate._

“H. Gr. [translator’s note: probably Army groups] shall be asked
again whether the request shall be repeated again for the
delivery of all arms within a stated time limit and under the
threat of severe penalties.

“We take all war material of former Czechoslovakia _without_
paying for it. The guns bought by contract before 15 February
though shall be paid for.

“Bohemia-Moravia have to make annual contributions to the German
treasury. Their amount shall be fixed on the basis of the
expenses earmarked formerly for the Czech Army.” (_R-100_)

The German conquest of Czechoslovakia in direct contravention of the Munich agreement was the occasion for formal protests from the British (_TC-52_) and French (_TC-53_) governments, both dated 17 March 1939. On the same day, 17 March 1939, the Acting Secretary of State of the United States issued a statement which read in part as follows:

“* * * This Government, founded upon and dedicated to the
principles of human liberty and of democracy, cannot refrain
from making known this country’s condemnation of the acts which
have resulted in the temporary extinguishment of the liberties
of a free and independent people with whom, from the day when
the Republic of Czechoslovakia attained its independence, the
people of the United States have maintained specially close and
friendly relations.” (_2862-PS_)

N. _The Importance of Czechoslovakia in Future Aggressions._

With Czechoslovakia in German hands, the Nazi conspirators had accomplished the program they had set for themselves in the meeting in Berlin on 5 November 1937 (_386-PS_). This program of conquest had been intended to shorten Germany’s frontiers, to increase its industrial and food reserves, and to place it in a position, both industrially and strategically, from which the Nazis could launch more ambitious and more devastating campaigns of aggression. In less than a year and a half this program had been carried through to the satisfaction of the Nazi leaders.

Of all the Nazi conspirators perhaps Goering was the most aware of the economic and strategic advantages which would accrue from the possession of Czechoslovakia. The Top Secret minutes of a conference with Goering in the Air Ministry, held on 14 October 1938—just two weeks after the occupation of the Sudetenland—reports a discussion of economic problems. At this date Goering’s remarks were somewhat prophetic:

“The Sudetenland has to be exploited with all the means. General
Field Marshal Goering counts upon a complete industrial
assimilation of the Slovakia. Czechia and Slovakia would become
German dominions. Everything possible must be taken out. The
Oder-Danube Canal has to be speeded up. Searches for oil and ore
have to be conducted in Slovakia, notably by State Secretary
Keppler.” (_1301-PS, Item 10_)

In the summer of 1939, after the incorporation of Bohemia and Moravia into the Reich, Goering again revealed the great interest of the Nazi leaders in the Czechoslovak economic potential. The minutes dated Berlin, 27 July 1939, and signed Mueller, of a conference two days earlier between Goering and a group of officials from the OKW and from other agencies of the German government concerned with war production, read as follows:

“1. In a rather long statement the Field Marshal explained that
the incorporation of Bohemia and Moravia into the German economy
had taken place, among other reasons, to increase the German war
potential by exploitation of the industry there. Letters, such
as the decree of the Reich Minister for Economics—S 10 402/39
of 10 July 39—as well as a letter with similar meaning to the
JUNKERS firm, which might possibly lower the kind and extent of
the armament measures in the Protectorate, are contrary to this
principle. If it is necessary to issue such directives, this
should be done only with his consent. In any case, he insists,
in agreement with the directive by Hitler, that the war
potential of the Protectorate is definitely to be exploited in
part or in full and is to be directed towards mobilization as
soon as possible. * * *” (_R-133_)

In addition to strengthening the Nazi economic potential for war, the conquest of Czechoslovakia provided the Nazis with new bases from which to wage their next war of aggression, the attack on Poland. It will be recalled that the minutes of the conference between Goering and a pro-Nazi Slovak delegation in the winter of 1938-39 state Goering’s conclusions as follows:

“Air bases in Slovakia are of great importance for the German
Air Force for use against the East.” (_2801-PS_)

In a conference between Goering, Mussolini, and Ciano on 15 April 1939, one month after the conquest of Czechoslovakia, Goering told his junior partners in the Axis of the progress of German preparations for war. He compared the strength of Germany with the strength of England and France. He mentioned the German occupation of Czechoslovakia in these words:

“However, the heavy armament of Czechoslovakia shows, in any
case, how dangerous this country could have been, even after
Munich, in the event of a serious conflict. Because of Germany’s
action the situation of both Axis countries was ameliorated,
among other reasons because of the economic possibilities which
result from the transfer to Germany of the great production
capacity (armament potential) of Czechoslovakia. That
contributes toward a considerable strengthening of the axis
against the Western powers. Furthermore, Germany now need not
keep ready a single division for protection against that country
in case of a bigger conflict. This, too, is an advantage by
which both axis countries will, in the last analysis, benefit.”

* * * * * *

“* * * the action taken by Germany in Czechoslovakia is to be
viewed as an advantage for the axis in case Poland should
finally join the enemies of the axis powers. Germany could then
attack this country from 2 flanks and would be within only 25
minutes flying distance from the new Polish industrial center
which had been moved further into the interior of the country,
nearer to the other Polish industrial districts, because of its
proximity to the border. Now by the turn of events it is located
again in the proximity of the border.” (_1874-PS_)

The absorption of the Sudetenland, effected on 1 October 1938, in practical effect destroyed Czechoslovakia as a military power. The final conquest of Czechoslovakia came on 15 March 1939. This conquest had been the intention and aim of the Nazi leaders during the preparations for Case Green in the summer of 1938, and had been forestalled only by the Munich agreement. With Czechoslovakia, less than six months after the Munich agreement, securely in German hands, the Nazi conspirators had achieved their objective. Bohemia and Moravia were incorporated into the Reich, shortening German frontiers and adding the Czech manufacturing plant to the German war potential. The puppet state of Slovakia, conceived in Berlin and independent only in name, had been set up to the east of Moravia. In this state, which outflanked Poland to the south, the Nazi army, under the terms of the treaty drafted by Ribbentrop, took upon itself the establishment of bases and extensive military installations. From this state in September 1939 units of the German Army did, in fact, carry out the attack on Poland.

Logic and premeditation are patent in each step of the German aggression. Each conquest of the Nazi conspirators was deliberately planned as a stepping-stone to new and more ambitious aggression. The words of Hitler in the conference in the Reichs Chancellery on 23 May 1939, when he was planning the Polish campaign, are significant,

“The period which lies behind us has indeed been put to good
use. All measures have been taken in the correct sequence and in
harmony with our aims.” (_L-79_)

It is appropriate to refer to two other speeches of the Nazi leaders. In his lecture at Munich on 7 November 1943 Jodl spoke as follows:

“The bloodless solution of the Czech conflict in the autumn of
1938 and spring of 1939 and the annexation of Slovakia rounded
off the territory of Greater Germany in such a way that it now
became possible to consider the Polish problem on the basis of
more or less favourable strategic premises.” (_L-172_)

In the speech to his military commanders on 23 November 1939, Hitler described the process by which he had rebuilt the military power of the Reich:

“The next step was Bohemia, Moravia and Poland. This step also
was not possible to accomplish in one campaign. First of all,
the western fortifications had to be finished. It was not
possible to reach the goal in one effort. It was clear to me
from the first moment that I could not be satisfied with the
Sudeten-German territory. That was only a partial solution. The
decision to march into Bohemia was made. Then followed the
erection of the Protectorate and with that the basis for the
action against Poland was laid.” (_789-PS_)

* * * * *

LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EXECUTION OF THE
PLAN TO INVADE CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page
│ │ │
│Charter of the International Military │ │
│ Tribunal, Article 6 (a). │ I │ 5
│ │ │
│International Military Tribunal, │ │
│ Indictment Number 1, Sections IV (F) 3│ │
│ (a, c); V. │ I │ 22, 29
│ ————— │ │
│Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │
│document indicates that the document was│ │
│received in evidence at the Nurnberg │ │
│trial. A double asterisk (**) before a │ │
│document number indicates that the │ │
│document was referred to during the │ │
│trial but was not formally received in │ │
│evidence, for the reason given in │ │
│parentheses following the description of│ │
│the document. The USA series number, │ │
│given in parentheses following the │ │
│description of the document, is the │ │
│official exhibit number assigned by the │ │
│court. │ │
│ ————— │ │
*375-PS │Case Green with wider implications, │ │
│report of Intelligence Division, │ │
│Luftwaffe General Staff, 25 August 1938.│ │
│(USA 84) │ III │ 280
│ │ │
*386-PS │Notes on a conference with Hitler in the│ │
│Reich Chancellery, Berlin, 5 November │ │
│1937, signed by Hitler’s adjutant, │ │
│Hossbach, and dated 10 November 1937. │ │
│(USA 25) │ III │ 295
│ │ │
*388-PS │File of papers on Case Green (the plan │ │
│for the attack on Czechoslovakia), kept │ │
│by Schmundt, Hitler’s adjutant, │ │
│April-October 1938. (USA 26) │ III │ 305
│ │ │
*789-PS │Speech of the Fuehrer at a conference, │ │
│23 November 1939, to which all Supreme │ │
│Commanders were ordered. (USA 23) │ III │ 572
│ │ │
*998-PS │“German Crimes Against Czechoslovakia”. │ │
│Excerpts from Czechoslovak Official │ │
│Report for the prosecution and trial of │ │
│the German Major War Criminals by the │ │
│International Military Tribunal │ │
│established according to Agreement of │ │
│four Great Powers of 8 August 1945. (USA│ │
│91) │ III │ 656
│ │ │
*1301-PS │File relating to financing of armament │ │
│including minutes of conference with │ │
│Goering at the Air Ministry, 14 October │ │
│1938, concerning acceleration of │ │
│rearmament. (USA 123) │ III │ 868
│ │ │
*1439-PS │Treaty of Protection between Slovakia │ │
│and the Reich, signed in Vienna 18 March│ │
│and in Berlin 23 March 1939. 1939 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 606. (GB │ │
│135) │ IV │ 18
│ │ │
*1536-PS │Report of Luftwaffe General Staff, │ │
│Intelligence Division, 12 August 1938, │ │
│on reconnaissance by German Air Attache │ │
│at Prague for airfields in │ │
│Czechoslovakia, enclosing report of the │ │
│Air Attache, Major Moericke, 4 August │ │
│1938. (USA 83) │ IV │ 96
│ │ │
*1780-PS │Excerpts from diary kept by General │ │
│Jodl, January 1937 to August 1939. (USA │ │
│72) │ IV │ 360
│ │ │
*1874-PS │Notes on conference between Goering, │ │
│Mussolini and Ciano, 15 April 1939. (USA│ │
│125) │ IV │ 518
│ │ │
2358-PS │Speech by Hitler in Sportspalast, │ │
│Berlin, 26 September 1938, from │ │
│Voelkischer Beobachter, Munich Edition, │ │
│27 September 1938. │ IV │ 1100
│ │ │
*2360-PS │Speech by Hitler before Reichstag, 30 │ │
│January 1939, from Voelkischer │ │
│Beobachter, Munich Edition, 31 January │ │
│1939. (GB 134) │ IV │ 1101
│ │ │
*2786-PS │Letter from Ribbentrop to Keitel, 4 │ │
│March 1938. (USA 81) │ V │ 419
│ │ │
*2788-PS │Notes of conference in the Foreign │ │
│Office between Ribbentrop, Konrad │ │
│Henlein, K. H. Frank and others on │ │
│program for Sudeten agitation, 29 March │ │
│1938. (USA 95) │ V │ 422
│ │ │
*2789-PS │Letter from Konrad Henlein to │ │
│Ribbentrop, 17 March 1938. (USA 94) │ V │ 424
│ │ │
*2790-PS │German Foreign Office minutes of │ │
│conference between Hitler, Ribbentrop, │ │
│Tuca and Karmasin, 12 February 1939. │ │
│(USA 110) │ V │ 425
│ │ │
*2791-PS │German Foreign Office minutes of │ │
│conversation between Ribbentrop and │ │
│Attolico, the Italian Ambassador, 23 │ │
│August 1938. (USA 86) │ V │ 426
│ │ │
*2792-PS │German Foreign Office minutes of │ │
│conversations between Ribbentrop and │ │
│Attolico, 27 August 1938 and 2 September│ │
│1938. (USA 87) │ V │ 426
│ │ │
*2793-PS │Confidential protocol concerning │ │
│economic and financial collaboration │ │
│between the German Reich and State of │ │
│Slovakia. (USA 120) │ V │ 427
│ │ │
*2794-PS │German Foreign Office memorandum on │ │
│payments to Karmasin, 29 November 1939. │ │
│(USA 108) │ V │ 429
│ │ │
*2795-PS │Handwritten postscript by Ribbentrop to │ │
│German Foreign Office notes of │ │
│Ribbentrop-Chvalkovsky conversation, 21 │ │
│January 1939. (USA 106) │ V │ 430
│ │ │
*2796-PS │German Foreign Office notes on │ │
│conversations between Hitler, Ribbentrop│ │
│and von Weizsäcker and the Hungarian │ │
│Ministers Imredy and von Kanya, 23 │ │
│August 1938. (USA 88) │ V │ 430
│ │ │
*2797-PS │German Foreign Office memorandum of │ │
│conversation between Ribbentrop and von │ │
│Kanya, 25 August 1938. (USA 89) │ V │ 432
│ │ │
*2798-PS │German Foreign Office minutes of the │ │
│meeting between Hitler and President │ │
│Hacha of Czechoslovakia, 15 March 1939. │ │
│(USA 118; GB 5) │ V │ 433
│ │ │
*2800-PS │German Foreign Office notes of a │ │
│conversation with Attolico, the Italian │ │
│Ambassador, 18 July 1938. (USA 85) │ V │ 442
│ │ │
*2801-PS │Minutes of conversation between Goering │ │
│and Slovak Minister Durkansky (probably │ │
│late fall or early winter 1938-39). (USA│ │
│109) │ V │ 442
│ │ │
*2802-PS │German Foreign Office notes of │ │
│conference on 13 March 1939 between │ │
│Hitler and Monsignor Tiso, Prime │ │
│Minister of Slovakia. (USA 117) │ V │ 443
│ │ │
*2815-PS │Telegram from Ribbentrop to the German │ │
│Minister in Prague, 13 March 1939. (USA │ │
│116) │ V │ 451
│ │ │
*2816-PS │Letter from Horthy, the Hungarian │ │
│Regent, to Hitler, dated Budapest, 13 │ │
│March 1939. (USA 115) │ V │ 451
│ │ │
*2826-PS │The SS on March 15, 1939, an article by │ │
│SS-Gruppenfuehrer K. H. Frank, in │ │
│magazine Bohemia and Moravia, May 1941, │ │
│p. 179. (USA 111) │ V │ 472
│ │ │
*2853-PS │Telegram from German Foreign Office to │ │
│German Legation in Prague, 24 September │ │
│1938. (USA 100) │ V │ 521
│ │ │
*2854-PS │Telegram from German Foreign Office to │ │
│German Legation in Prague, 17 September │ │
│1938. (USA 99) │ V │ 521
│ │ │
*2855-PS │Telegram from German Foreign Office to │ │
│German Legation in Prague, 16 September │ │
│1938. (USA 98) │ V │ 522
│ │ │
*2856-PS │Telegram from German Foreign Office to │ │
│German Legation in Prague, 24 September │ │
│1938. (USA 101) │ V │ 522
│ │ │
*2858-PS │Telegram from German Foreign Office to │ │
│German Legation in Prague, 19 September │ │
│1938. (USA 97) │ V │ 523
│ │ │
*2859-PS │Telegram from German Legation, Prague, │ │
│to Consulate at Bratislava, 22 November │ │
│1938. (USA 107) │ V │ 523
│ │ │
*2860-PS │Document No. 10 in the British Blue │ │
│Book. Speech by Lord Halifax in the │ │
│House of Lords, 20 March 1939. (USA 119)│ V │ 523
│ │ │
*2861-PS │Document No. 12 in the British Blue │ │
│Book. Dispatch from Sir Nevile Henderson│ │
│to British Foreign Office, 28 May 1939, │ │
│relating details of conversation with │ │
│Goering. (USA 119) │ V │ 524
│ │ │
*2862-PS │Document No. 126 in Peace and War. │ │
│Statement by Acting Secretary of State │ │
│Sumner Welles, 17 March 1939. (USA 122) │ V │ 525
│ │ │
**2863-PS │Lecture by Konrad Henlein, delivered in │ │
│Vienna, 4 March 1941. Quoted in “Four │ │
│Fighting Years”, Czechoslovak Ministry │ │
│of Foreign Affairs, London, 1943, pp. │ │
│29-30. (Referred to but not offered in │ │
│evidence.) (USA 92) │ V │ 525
│ │ │
2906-PS │German Foreign Office minutes of meeting│ │
│between Hitler and Chvalkovsky, the │ │
│Czechoslovak Foreign Minister, 21 │ │
│January 1939. │ V │ 571
│ │ │
*2943-PS │Documents Numbers 55, 57, 62, 65, 66, │ │
│73, 77 and 79 in the French Yellow Book.│ │
│Excerpts from eight dispatches from M. │ │
│Coulondre, the French Ambassador in │ │
│Berlin, to the French Foreign Office, │ │
│between 13 and 18 March 1939. (USA 114) │ V │ 608
│ │ │
**3029-PS │Affidavit of Alfred Naujocks, 20 │ │
│November 1945, on activities of the SD │ │
│along the Czechoslovak border during │ │
│September 1938. (USA 103) (Objection to │ │
│admission in evidence upheld.) │ V │ 738
│ │ │
3030-PS │Affidavit of Alfred Naujocks, 20 │ │
│November 1945, on relationship between │ │
│the SD and pro-Nazi Slovak groups in │ │
│March 1939. │ V │ 739
│ │ │
**3036-PS │Affidavit of Gottlob Berger on the │ │
│composition and activity of the Henlein │ │
│Free Corps in September 1938. (Objection│ │
│to admission in evidence upheld.) (USA │ │
│102) │ V │ 742
│ │ │
3037-PS │Affidavit of Fritz Wiedemann, 21 │ │
│November 1945, on the meeting between │ │
│Hitler and his principal advisers in │ │
│Reichs Chancellery on 28 May 1938. │ V │ 743
│ │ │
*3054-PS │“The Nazi Plan”, script of a motion │ │
│picture composed of captured German │ │
│film. (USA 167) │ V │ 801
│ │ │
*3059-PS │German Foreign Office memorandum, 19 │ │
│August 1938, on payments to Henlein’s │ │
│Sudeten-German Party between 1935 and │ │
│1938. (USA 96) │ V │ 855
│ │ │
*3060-PS │Dispatch from German Minister in Prague │ │
│to Foreign Office in Berlin about policy│ │
│arrangements with Henlein, 16 March │ │
│1938. (USA 93) │ V │ 856
│ │ │
*3061-PS │Supplement No. 2 to the Official │ │
│Czechoslovak Report entitled German │ │
│Crimes Against Czechoslovakia” (document│ │
│998-PS). (USA 126) │ V │ 857
│ │ │
3571-PS │Report of U. S. Military Attache, │ │
│Berlin, including an article in magazine│ │
│Wehrmacht, 29 March 1939, describing │ │
│occupation of Bohemia and Moravia by │ │
│German troops. │ VI │ 264
│ │ │
3618-PS │Report of U. S. Military Attache in │ │
│Berlin, 20 March 1939, concerning │ │
│occupation of Czechoslovakia. │ VI │ 389
│ │ │
3619-PS │Report of U. S. Military Attache in │ │
│Berlin, 19 April 1939, concerning │ │
│occupation of Czechoslovakia. │ VI │ 398
│ │ │
3638-PS │Memorandum of Ribbentrop, 1 October │ │
│1938, concerning his conversation with │ │
│Ciano about the Polish demands made on │ │
│Czechoslovakia. │ VI │ 400
│ │ │
*3842-PS │Statement of Fritz Mundhenke, 7 March │ │
│1946, concerning the activities of │ │
│Kaltenbrunner and SS in preparation for │ │
│occupation of Czechoslovakia. (USA 805) │ VI │ 778
│ │ │
*C-2 │Examples of violations of International │ │
│Law and proposed counter-propaganda, │ │
│issued by OKW, 1 October 1938. (USA 90) │ VI │ 799
│ │ │
*C-136 │OKW Order on preparations for war, 21 │ │
│October 1938, signed by Hitler and │ │
│initialled by Keitel. (USA 104) │ VI │ 947
│ │ │
*C-138 │Supplement of 17 December 1938, signed │ │
│by Keitel, to 21 October Order of the │ │
│OKW. (USA 105) │ VI │ 950
│ │ │
*C-175 │OKW Directive for Unified Preparation │ │
│for War 1937-1938, with covering letter │ │
│from von Blomberg, 24 June 1937. (USA │ │
│69) │ VI │ 1006
│ │ │
*D-571 │Official report of British Minister in │ │
│Prague to Viscount Halifax, 21 March │ │
│1939. (USA 112) │ VII │ 88
│ │ │
*D-572 │Dispatch from Mr. Pares, British Consul │ │
│in Bratislava to Mr. Newton, 20 March │ │
│1939, describing German support of │ │
│Slovak separatists. (USA 113) │ VII │ 90
│ │ │
*L-79 │Minutes of conference, 23 May 1939, │ │
│“Indoctrination on the political │ │
│situation and future aims”. (USA 27) │ VII │ 847
│ │ │
*L-172 │“The Strategic Position at the Beginning│ │
│of the 5th Year of War”, a lecture │ │
│delivered by Jodl on 7 November 1943 at │ │
│Munich to Reich and Gauleiters. (USA 34)│ VII │ 920
│ │ │
*R-100 │Minutes of instructions given by Hitler │ │
│to General von Brauchitsch on 25 March │ │
│1939. (USA 121) │ VIII │ 83
│ │ │
*R-133 │Notes on conference with Goering in │ │
│Westerland on 25 July 1939, signed │ │
│Mueller, dated Berlin 27 July 1939. (USA│ │
│124) │ VIII │ 202
│ │ │
*R-150 │Extracts from Luftwaffe Group Command │ │
│Three Study on Instruction for │ │
│Deployment and Combat “Case Red”, 2 June│ │
│1938. (USA 82) │ VIII │ 268
│ │ │
*TC-14 │Arbitration Treaty between Germany and │ │
│Czechoslovakia, signed at Locarno, 16 │ │
│October 1925. (GB 14) │ VIII │ 325
│ │ │
*TC-23 │Agreement between Germany, the United │ │
│Kingdom, France and Italy, 29 September │ │
│1938. (GB 23) │ VIII │ 370
│ │ │
*TC-27 │German assurances to Czechoslovakia, 11 │ │
│and 12 March 1938, as reported by M. │ │
│Masaryk, the Czechoslovak Minister to │ │
│London to Viscount Halifax. (GB 21) │ VIII │ 377
│ │ │
*TC-49 │Agreement with Czechoslovakia, 15 March │ │
│1939, signed by Hitler, von Ribbentrop, │ │
│Hacha and Chvalkovsky, from Documents of│ │
│German Politics, Part VII, pp. 498-499. │ │
│(GB 6) │ VIII │ 402
│ │ │
*TC-50 │Proclamation of the Fuehrer to the │ │
│German people and Order of the Fuehrer │ │
│to the Wehrmacht, 15 March 1939, from │ │
│Documents of German Politics, Part VII, │ │
│pp. 499-501. (GB 7) │ VIII │ 402
│ │ │
*TC-51 │Decree establishing the Protectorate of │ │
│Bohemia and Moravia, 16 March 1939. (GB │ │
│8) │ VIII │ 404
│ │ │
*TC-52 │Formal British protest against the │ │
│annexation of Czechoslovakia in │ │
│violation of the Munich Agreement, 17 │ │
│March 1939. (GB 9) │ VIII │ 407
│ │ │
*TC-53 │Formal French protest against the │ │
│annexation of Bohemia and Moravia in │ │
│violation of the Munich Agreement, 17 │ │
│March 1939. (GB 10) │ VIII │ 407
│ │ │
Affidavit H │Affidavit of Franz Halder, 22 November │ │
│1945. │ VIII │ 643
│ │ │
**Chart No. 11 │Aggressive Action 1938-39. (Enlargement │ │
│displayed to Tribunal.) │ VIII │ 780
│ │ │
**Chart No. 12 │German Aggression. (Enlargement │ │
│displayed to Tribunal.) │ VIII │ 781
│ │ │
**Chart No. 13 │Violations of Treaties, Agreements and │ │
│Assurances. (Enlargement displayed to │ │
│Tribunal.) │ VIII │ 782

5. OPENING ADDRESS FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM

_The following address, opening the British presentation of the case under Count II of the Indictment, was delivered by Sir Hartley Shawcross, K.C., M.P., British Attorney General and Chief Prosecutor for the United Kingdom, before the Tribunal on 4 December 1945._