Chapter LIV: Section I: of the report of this conference (1157-PS) deals with the (3)

(_a_) _Preliminary Nazi Preparations Against the United States._ The Nazi conspirators’ intentions against the United States must be viewed in the focus of both their over-all plan and their immediate commitments elsewhere. That their over-all plan involved ultimate aggressive war against the United States was intimated by Goering in a speech on 8 July 1938, when the Nazi conspirators had already forcibly annexed Austria and were perfecting their plans for occupation of Czechoslovakia. This speech was delivered to representatives of the aircraft industry and the copy which the prosecution has obtained was transmitted as the enclosure to a secret memorandum from Goering’s adjutant to General Udet, who was then in charge of experimental research for the Luftwaffe (_R-140_). The statement in the covering memorandum notes that the enclosure is a “copy of the shorthand minutes of the conference”. In the course of his long speech, Goering called for increased aircraft production and referred to the necessity for full mobilization of German industrial capacity. He continued:

“I still am missing entirely the bomber which flies with 5 tons
of explosives as far as New York and back. I should be extremely
happy to have such a bomber so that I would at last be able to
stop somewhat the mouth of the arrogant people over there.”
(_R-140_)

Goering’s fervent hope, of course, was not capable of realization at that time, either technically or in the face of the Nazi conspirators’ schedule of aggression that has already been outlined. During the period of their preparation for and waging of aggressive war in Europe, up through the launching of the campaign against the U.S.S.R., it is only reasonable to believe that the Nazi conspirators were not disposed to involve the United States in war—_at that time_.

Nevertheless, even in the fall of 1940, the prosecution of war against the United States of America at a later date was on the military agenda. This is clearly shown in a document which was found in the files of the OKL, the German Air Force (_376-PS_). This memorandum is marked “_Chefsache_”—the German designation for Top Secret—and is directed from a Major von Falkenstein to an unspecified General, presumably a Luftwaffe General. Falkenstein, who was a Major of the General Staff, was at that time the Luftwaffe Liaison Officer with the Operations Staff of the OKW, which was the staff headed by Jodl. His memorandum, which he characterizes as a “brief resumé of the military questions current here”, is dated 29 October 1940. It covers several questions. Paragraph 5 states:

“5. The Fuehrer is at present occupied with the question of the
occupation of the Atlantic Islands with a view to the
prosecution of war against America at a later date.
Deliberations on this subject are being embarked upon here.
Essential conditions are at the present:—

“a. No operational commitment

“b. Portuguese neutrality

“c. Support of France and Spain

“A brief assessment of the possibility of seizing and holding
air bases and of the question of supply is needed from the GAF.

“Major Queisner will fetch the documents for himself from Ic
Kurfurst (C. in C. GAF Rear Hq.). I would like to ask Colonel
Schmidt to arrange that he be supplied with the information he
desires.” (_376-PS_)

The Nazi Military interest in the United States is further indicated by paragraph 7:

“7. General von Boetticher has made repeated reference,
especially in his telegram 2314 dated 26/10, to the fact that in
his opinion too many details of our knowledge of American
aircraft industry are being published in the German press. The
matter has been discussed at Armed Forces Supreme Command. I
pointed out that the matter was a specifically GAF one, but have
taken the liberty of referring the matter to you on its own
merits.” (_376-PS_)

Again in July 1941, in his first flush of confidence resulting from early gains in the aggression against the U.S.S.R., the Fuehrer signed an order for further preliminary preparations for the attack on the United States. This top secret order, found in files of the German Navy, reads:

“By virtue of the intentions announced in Directive No. 32, for
the further conduct of the War, I lay down the following
principles to govern the strength of personnel and of material
supplies:

“1. _In general_: The military domination of Europe after the
defeat of Russia will enable the strength of the _Army_ to be
considerably reduced in the near future. As far as the reduced
strength of the Army will allow, the Armoured units will be
greatly increased.

“_Naval_ armament must be restricted to those measures which
have a direct connection with the conduct of the war against
England and, should the case arise, against America. “The main
effort in armament will be shifted to the _Air Force_, which
must be greatly increased in strength.” (_C-74_)

(_b_) _Collaboration with the Japanese Against the United States._ From the documents just quoted, it appears that the Nazi conspirators were making at least preliminary military plans of their own against the United States. The Nazi over-all plan with regard to the United States, however, was a complex one, involving in addition collaboration with the Japanese. In the course of their repeated representations to the Japanese to undertake an assault against British possessions in the Pacific-Far East, they again considered war against the United States.

It will be recalled that in Basic Order No. 24 regarding collaboration with the Japanese (_C-75_), which was issued on 5 March 1941, the Nazi policy was stated in subparagraph 3_a_ as aiming at “forcing England to the ground quickly and thereby keeping the United States out of the war”. Nevertheless the Nazi conspirators clearly contemplated within the framework of that policy the possibility of the United States’ entry into the Far Eastern conflict which the Nazis were instigating. This could result from an attack by Japan on United States’ possessions practically simultaneously with the assault on the British Empire (as actually happened). Other possibilities of involvement of the United States were also discussed. Thus, Basic Order No. 24 stated in subparagraph 3 (_c_):

“_c. The raw material situation of the pact powers_ demands that
Japan should acquire possession of those territories which it
needs for the continuation of the war, especially if the United
States intervenes. Rubber shipments must be carried out even
after the entry of Japan into the war, since they are of vital
importance to Germany.” (_C-75_)

The order continues, in the unnumbered paragraph immediately below subparagraph 3 (_d_):

“In addition, attacks on other systems of bases of British naval
power—extending to those of American naval power only if the
entry of the United States into the war cannot be
prevented—will result in weakening the enemy’s system of power
in that region and also, just like the attack on sea
communications, in tying down substantial forces of all kinds
(Australia).” (_C-75_)

In these passages there is a clear envisionment of U.S. involvement, as well as a clear intent to attack. The vital threat to United States’ interests if Japan were to capture Singapore was also clearly envisaged by Raeder in his meeting of March 1941 with Hitler, Keitel, and Jodl, in which he stated:

“Japan must take steps to seize Singapore as soon as possible,
since the opportunity will never again be as favourable (whole
English Fleet contained: unpreparedness of U.S.A. for war
against Japan: inferiority of U.S. Fleet vis-a-vis the
Japanese). Japan is indeed making preparations for this action,
but according to all declarations made by Japanese officers she
will only carry it out if Germany proceeds to land in England.
Germany must therefore concentrate all her efforts on spurring
Japan to act immediately. If Japan has Singapore all other East
Asiatic questions regarding the U.S.A. and England are thereby
solved (Guam, Philippines, Borneo, Dutch East Indies).

“Japan wishes if possible to avoid war against U.S.A. She can do
so if she determinedly takes Singapore as soon as possible.”
(_C-152_)

Ribbentrop also recognized the possibility of U.S. involvement as a result of the course of aggression that he was urging on the Japanese. In his meeting of 23 February 1941 with the Japanese Ambassador Oshima, the notes of which are contained in (_1834-PS_), Ribbentrop assured Matsuoka that a surprise intervention by Japan was bound to keep the United States out of the war since she was unarmed and could not risk either her fleet or the possibility of losing the Philippines as the result of a declaration of war. Two paragraphs later, Ribbentrop practically dropped the pretense that the United States would not be involved:

“The Reich Foreign Minister mentioned further that, if America
should declare war because of Japan’s entry into the war, this
would mean that America had had the intention to enter the war
sooner or later anyway. Even though it would be preferable to
avoid this, the entry into the war would, as explained above, be
by no means decisive and would not endanger the final victory of
the countries of the Three-Power Pact. The Foreign Minister
further expressed his belief that a temporary lift of the
British morale caused by America’s entry into the war would be
cancelled by Japan’s entry into the war. If, however, contrary
to all expectations, the Americans should be careless enough to
send their Navy, in spite of all, beyond Hawaii and to the Far
East, this would represent the biggest chance for the countries
of the Three-Power Pact to bring the war rapidly to an end. He,
the Foreign Minister, is convinced that the Japanese fleet would
then do a complete job. Ambassador Oshima replied to this that
unfortunately he does not think the Americans would do it, but
he is convinced of a victory of his fleet in Japanese waters.”
(_1834-PS_)

In the paragraphs that follow, Ribbentrop again stresses the mutual interdependence of the Tripartite Pact powers and suggests coordinated action. He indulged in a typical bit of Nazi cynicism:

“The Reich Foreign Minister then touched upon the question,
explicitly pointed out as theoretical, that the contracting
powers might be required, on the basis of new affronts by the
U.S.A., to break off diplomatic relations. Germany and Italy
were fundamentally determined on this; after signing of the
Three-Power Pact we should proceed if the occasion arises, but
also jointly in this matter. Such a lesson should open the eyes
of the people in the U.S.A. to the situation and under certain
conditions bring about a swing toward isolation in public
opinion. Naturally a situation had to be chosen in which America
found herself entirely in the wrong. The common step of the
signatory powers should be exploited correspondingly in
propaganda. The question, however, was in no way acute at the
time.” (_1834-PS_)

Again on 29 March 1941, Ribbentrop—this time in a conference with the Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka—discussed the possible involvement of the United States. (_1877-PS_)

The Nazi conspirators knew that the aggressive war they were urging the Japanese to undertake both threatened the vital interests of the United States and could lead the U.S. to involvement in the contemplated Far Eastern conflict. This fact is clear from the report of the conference between Hitler and the Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka in Berlin on 4 April 1941 (_1881-PS_). The report states, in part:

“* * * Matsuoka then also expressed the request that the Fuehrer
should instruct the proper authorities in Germany to meet as
broad-mindedly as possible the wishes of the Japanese Military
Commission. Japan was in need of German help particularly
concerning the U-boat warfare, which could be given by making
available to them the latest experiences of the war as well as
the latest technical improvements and inventions. Japan would do
her utmost to avoid a war with the United States. In case that
the country should decide to attack Singapore, the Japanese
Navy, of course, had to be prepared for a fight with the United
States, because in that case America probably would side with
Great Britain. He (Matsuoka) personally believed that the United
States would be restrained by diplomatic exertions from entering
the war at the side of Great Britain. The Army and Navy had,
however, to count on the worst situation, that is, with war
against America. They were of the opinion that such a war would
extend for five years or longer and would take the form of
guerrilla warfare in the Pacific and would be fought out in the
South Sea. For this reason the German experiences in her
guerrilla warfare are of the greatest value to Japan. It was a
question how such a war would best be conducted and how all the
technical improvements of submarines, in all details such as
periscopes and such like, could best be exploited by Japan.

“To sum up, Matsuoka requested that the Fuehrer should see to it
that the proper German authorities would place at the disposal
of the Japanese those developments and inventions concerning
Navy and Army, which were needed by the Japanese.

“The Fuehrer promised this and pointed out that Germany too
considered a conflict with the United States undesirable, but
that it had already made allowances for such a contingency.”

* * * * * *

“Matsuoka once more repeated his request that the Fuehrer might
give the necessary instructions, in order that the proper German
authorities would place at the disposal of the Japanese the
latest improvement and inventions, which are of interest to
them, because the Japanese Navy had to prepare immediately for a
conflict with the United States.

“As regards Japanese-American relationship, Matsuoka explained
further that he has always declared in his country that sooner
or later a war with the United States would be unavoidable, if
Japan continued to drift along as at present. In his opinion
this conflict would happen rather sooner than later. His
argumentation went on, why should Japan, therefore, not
decisively strike at the right moment and take the risk upon
herself of a fight against America?” (_1881-PS_)

The passages just quoted show not only a realization of the probable involvement of the United States in the Far Eastern conflict that the Nazis were urging, but also a knowledge on their part that the Japanese Army and Navy were actually preparing war plans against the United States. Furthermore, the Nazis knew at least a part of what those war plans were. This fact is revealed in a secret telegram from the German military-attache in Tokyo, dated 24 May 1941 (_1538-PS_). The attache reports the conferences he has had regarding Japan’s entry in the war in the event Germany should become involved in war with the United States. In paragraph 1, this sentence appears:

“Preparations for attack on Singapore and Manila stand.”
(_1538-PS_).

A review of the Nazi position with regard to the United States at this point, the Spring of 1941, shows that in view of their press of commitments elsewhere and their aggressive plans against the U.S.S.R., set for execution in June of 1941, their temporary strategy was naturally a preference that the United States not be involved in war at that time. Nevertheless they had been considering their own preliminary plans against the United States, as seen in the Atlantic Islands document (_376-PS_). They were repeatedly urging the Japanese to aggression against the British Commonwealth, just as they would urge them to attack the U.S.S.R. soon after the launching of the Nazi invasion. They were aware that the course along which they were pushing the Japanese in the Far East would probably lead to involvement of the United States. Indeed, the Japanese Foreign Minister had told Hitler this in so many words, and their own military men had fully realized the implications of the move against Singapore. They knew also that the Japanese Army and Navy were preparing operational plans against the United States. They knew at least part of those plans.

The Nazi conspirators not only knew all these things. They accepted the risk of the aggressive course they were urging on the Japanese and pushed their Eastern allies still farther along that course. On 4 April 1941, Hitler told the Japanese Foreign Minister that in the event Japan were to become involved in war with the United States, Germany would immediately take the consequences and strike without delay. The following is a passage from the notes of the Hitler-Matsuoka conference in Berlin on 4 April 1941:

“In the further course of the discussion the Fuehrer pointed out
that Germany on her part would immediately take the
consequences, if Japan would get involved with the United
States. It did not matter with whom the United States would
first get involved, if with Germany or with Japan. They would
always try to eliminate one country at a time, not to come to an
understanding with the other country subsequently, but to
liquidate this one just the same. Therefore Germany would
strike, as already mentioned, without delay in case of a
conflict between Japan and America, because the strength of the
tripartite powers lies in their joined action. Their weakness
would be if they would let themselves be beaten individually.”
(_1881-PS_)

Hitler then encouraged Matsuoka in his decision to strike against the United States:

“The Fuehrer replied that he could well understand the situation
of Matsuoka, because he himself was in similar situations (the
clearing of the Rhineland, declaration of sovereignty of armed
Forces). He too was of the opinion that he had to exploit
favorable conditions and accept the risk of an anyhow
unavoidable fight at a time when he himself was still young and
full of vigor. How right he was in his attitude was proven by
events. Europe now was free. He would not hesitate a moment to
instantly reply to any widening of the war, be it by Russia, be
it by America. Providence favored those who will not let dangers
come to them, but who will bravely face them.” (_1881-PS_)

Here, in the passages just quoted, were assurance, encouragement, and abetment by the head of the German State, the leading Nazi co-conspirator, in April 1941. But the Nazi encouragement and promise of support did not end there. Another telegram from the German Ambassador in Tokyo regarding conversations with the Japanese Foreign Minister, dated 30 November 1941, one week before Pearl Harbor, read as follows:

“The progress of the negotiations so far confirms his viewpoint
that the difference of opinion between Japan and the U.S. is
very great. The Japanese Government since it sent Ambassador
Kurusu has taken a firm stand, as he told me. He is convinced
that this position is in our favor and makes the United States
think that her entry into the European war would be risky
business. The new American proposal of 25 November showed great
divergences in the viewpoints of the two nations. These
differences of opinion concern, for example, the further
treatment of the Chinese question. The biggest (one word
missing) however resulted from the U. S. attempt to make the
three-power agreement ineffective. U. S. suggested to Japan to
conclude treaties of nonaggression with the U. S., the British
Empire, the Soviet Union, and other countries in order to
prevent Japan’s entry into the war on the side of the Axis
powers. Japan, however, insisted upon maintaining her treaty
obligations and for this reason American demands are the
greatest obstacles for adjusting Japanese-American relations. He
avoided discussing concessions promised by the U. S. and merely
mentioned that grave decisions were at stake. “The U.S. is
seriously preparing for war and is about to operate a
considerable part of its fleet from Southern Pacific bases. The
Japanese Government is busy working out an answer in order to
clarify its viewpoint. But he has no particulars at that moment.
He thinks the American proposals, as a whole, unacceptable.

“Japan is not afraid of a breakdown of negotiations and she
hopes that in that case Germany and Italy, according to the
Three Power Agreement, would stand at her side. I answered that
there could be no doubt about Germany’s future position. The
Japanese Foreign Minister thereupon stated that he understood
from my words that Germany in such a case would consider her
relationship to Japan as that of a community of fate. I
answered, according to my opinion, Germany was certainly ready
to have mutual agreement between the two countries over this
situation.

“Minister of Foreign Affairs answered that it was possible that
he would come back to this point soon. The conversation with the
Minister of Foreign Affairs confirmed the impression that the U.
S. note, in fact, is very unsatisfactory even for the
compromise-seeking politicians here. For these circles America’s
position, especially in the China question, is very
disappointing. The emphasis upon the Three Power Pact as being
the main obstacle between successful Japanese-U. S. negotiations
seems to point to the fact that the Japanese Government is
becoming aware of the necessity of close cooperation with the
Axis powers.” (_2898-PS_)

Extracts from the handwritten diary of Count Galleazzo Ciano during the period 3 December to 8 December 1941 fill in the picture (_2987-PS_). These are taken from notes which Ciano jotted down in the course of his daily business as Foreign Minister of Italy. The entries for 3, 4, and 5 December read:

“_December 3._

_Wednesday_

“Sensational move by Japan. The Ambassador asks for an audience
with the Duce and reads him a long statement on the progress of
the negotiations with America, concluding with the assertion
that they have reached a dead end. Then, invoking the
appropriate clause in the Tripartite Pact, he asks that Italy
declare war on America immediately after the outbreak of
hostilities and proposes the signature of an agreement not to
conclude a separate peace. The interpreter translating this
request was trembling like a leaf. The Duce gave fullest
assurances, reserving the right to confer with Berlin before
giving a reply. The Duce was pleased with the communication and
said: “We are now on the brink of the inter-continental war
which I predicted as early as September 1939.” What does this
new event mean? In any case, it means that Roosevelt has
succeeded in his maneuver. Since he could not enter into the war
immediately and directly, he has entered it indirectly by
letting himself be attacked by Japan. Furthermore, this event
also means that every prospect of peace is becoming further and
further removed, and that it is now easy—much too easy—to
predict a long war. Who will be able to hold out longest? It is
on this basis that the problem must be considered. Berlin’s
answer will be somewhat delayed, because Hitler has gone to the
southern front to see General Kleist, whose armies continue to
give way under the pressure of an unexpected Soviet offensive.

“_December 4._

_Thursday_

“Berlin’s reaction to the Japanese move is extremely cautious.
Perhaps they will accept because they cannot get out of it, but
the idea of provoking America’s intervention pleases the Germans
less and less. Mussolini, on the other hand, is pleased about
it. * * *”

“_December 5._

_Friday_

“A night interrupted by Ribbentrop’s restlessness. After
delaying two days, now he cannot wait a minute to answer the
Japanese and at three in the morning he sent Mackenson to my
house to submit a plan for a triple agreement relative to
Japanese intervention and the pledge not to make a separate
peace. He wanted me to awaken the Duce, but I did not do so, and
the latter was very glad I hadn’t * * *.” (_2987-PS_)

It appears from the last entry that some sort of agreement was reached. On Sunday, 7 December 1941, Japan without previous warning or declaration of war commenced an attack against the United States at Pearl Harbor and against the British Commonwealth of Nations in the Southwest Pacific. On the morning of 11 December, four days after the Japanese assault in the Pacific, the German Government declared war on the United States. (_2507-PS_)

The same day, 11 December 1941, the Congress of the United States resolved that “the state of war between the United States and the Government of Germany which has thus been thrust upon the United States is hereby formally declared”. (_2945-PS_)

It thus appears that, apart from their own aggressive intentions and declaration of war against the United States, the Nazi conspirators in their collaboration with Japan incited and kept in motion a force reasonably calculated to result in an attack on the United States. While maintaining their preference that the United States not be involved in the war at the time, they nevertheless foresaw the distinct possibility, even probability of such involvement as a result of the actions they were encouraging; they were aware that the Japanese had prepared plans for attack against the United States; and they accepted the consequences by assuring the Japanese that they would declare war on the United States should a U.S.-Japanese conflict result. In dealing with captured documents of the enemy, the completeness of the plan is necessarily obscured. But those documents which have been discovered, and introduced into evidence before the Tribunal, show that the Japanese attack was the proximate and foreseeable consequence of their collaboration policy, and that their exhortations and encouragement of the Japanese as surely led to Pearl Harbor as though Pearl Harbor itself had been mentioned.

The entry in the Ciano Diary for 8 December 1941 gives an interesting sidelight on Ribbentrop’s reaction to the Japanese sneak attack:

“_December 8._

_Monday._

“A night telephone call from Ribbentrop; he is overjoyed about
the Japanese attack on America. He is so happy about it that I
am happy with him, though I am not too sure about the final
advantages of what has happened. One thing is now certain: that
America will enter the conflict, and that the conflict will be
so long that she will be able to realize all her potential
force. This morning I told this to the King who had been pleased
about the event. He ended by admitting that in the “long run” I
may be right. Mussolini was happy too. For a long time he has
favored a definite clarification of relations between America
and the Axis.” (_2987-PS_)

A conference was held between Hitler and Japanese Ambassador Oshima on 14 December 1941, from 1300 to 1400 hours, in the presence of the Reich Foreign Minister, Ribbentrop. The subject matter was the Pearl Harbor attack. The top secret notes of this conference read in part:

“* * * First the Fuehrer presents Ambassador Oshima with the
Grand Cross of the Order of Merit of the German Eagle in gold.
With cordial words he acknowledges his services in the
achievement of German-Japanese cooperation, which has now
obtained its culmination in a close brotherhood of arms.

“General Oshima expresses his thanks for the great honor and
emphasizes how glad he is that this brotherhood of arms has now
come about between Germany and Japan.

“The Fuehrer continues: “You gave the right declaration of war!”
This method is the only proper one. Japan pursued it formerly
and it corresponds with his own system, that is, to negotiate as
long as possible. But if one sees that the other is interested
only in putting one off, in shaming and humiliating one, and is
not willing to come to an agreement, then one should strike—as
hard as possible, indeed—and not waste time declaring war. It
was heartwarming to him to hear of the first operations of the
Japanese. He himself negotiated with infinite patience at times,
for example, with Poland and also with Russia. When he then
realized, that the other did not want to come to an agreement,
he struck suddenly and without formalities. He would continue to
go this way in the future.” (_2932-PS_)

* * * * *

LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO COLLABORATION WITH ITALY AND JAPAN AND AGGRESSIVE WAR AGAINST THE UNITED STATES: NOVEMBER 1936 TO DECEMBER 1941

Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page
│ │ │
│Charter of the International Military │ │
│ Tribunal, Article 6 (a). │ I │ 5
│ │ │
│International Military Tribunal, │ │
│ Indictment Number 1, Sections IV (F) │ │
│ 7; V. │ I │ 28, 29
│ ————— │ │
│Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │
│document indicates that the document was│ │
│received in evidence at the Nurnberg │ │
│trial. A double asterisk (**) before a │ │
│document number indicates that the │ │
│document was referred to during the │ │
│trial but was not formally received in │ │
│evidence, for the reason given in │ │
│parentheses following the description of│ │
│the document. The USA series number, │ │
│given in parentheses following the │ │
│description of the document, is the │ │
│official exhibit number assigned by the │ │
│court. │ │
│ ————— │ │
*376-PS │Top secret memorandum signed by Major │ │
│Falkenstein, 29 October 1940, concerning│ │
│current military questions, including │ │
│question of occupation of Atlantic │ │
│Islands referring to the United States. │ │
│(USA 161) │ III │ 288
│ │ │
*1538-PS │Report from German Military Attache in │ │
│Tokyo to Office Foreign Intelligence, 24│ │
│May 1941. (USA 154) │ IV │ 100
│ │ │
*1834-PS │Report on conference between Ribbentrop │ │
│and Oshima, 23 February 1941. (USA 129) │ IV │ 469
│ │ │
*1866-PS │Record of conversation between Reich │ │
│Foreign Minister and the Duce, 13 May │ │
│1941. (GB 273) │ IV │ 499
│ │ │
*1877-PS │Report on conversation between │ │
│Ribbentrop and Matsuoka in Berlin, 29 │ │
│March 1941. (USA 152) │ IV │ 520
│ │ │
*1881-PS │Notes on conference between Hitler and │ │
│Matsuoka in presence of Ribbentrop, in │ │
│Berlin, 4 April 1941. (USA 33) │ IV │ 522
│ │ │
*1882-PS │Notes on conference between Ribbentrop │ │
│and Matsuoka in Berlin, 5 April 1941. │ │
│(USA 153) │ IV │ 526
│ │ │
*2195-PS │File memorandum on conversation with │ │
│Oshima, 31 January 1939, signed Himmler.│ │
│(USA 150) │ IV │ 852
│ │ │
2506-PS │Protocol of Adherence by Italy to │ │
│Anti-Comintern Pact, 6 November 1937, │ │
│published in Documents of German │ │
│Politics, 1940, 4th edition. │ V │ 239
│ │ │
*2507-PS │Note from Ribbentrop to U. S. Charge │ │
│d’Affaires in Berlin, 11 December 1941, │ │
│containing German Declaration of War on │ │
│United States, published in Documents of│ │
│German Politics, Vol. IX, Part 1, No. │ │
│74, pp. 497-9. (USA 164) │ V │ 241
│ │ │
*2508-PS │German-Japanese Agreement against the │ │
│Communist International, 25 November │ │
│1936, signed by Ribbentrop. Documents of│ │
│German Politics, Vol. 4. (GB 147) │ V │ 242
│ │ │
*2643-PS │Announcement concerning Three-Power Pact│ │
│between Germany, Italy and Japan, 27 │ │
│September 1940, signed by Ribbentrop for│ │
│Germany. 1940 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part │ │
│II, No. 41, p. 279. (USA 149) │ V │ 355
│ │ │
*2896-PS │Telegram from Ribbentrop to German │ │
│Ambassador in Tokyo, Ott, 10 July 1941. │ │
│(USA 155) │ V │ 564
│ │ │
*2897-PS │Telegram from German Ambassador in │ │
│Tokyo, Ott, to Ribbentrop, 13 July 1941.│ │
│(USA 156) │ V │ 566
│ │ │
*2898-PS │Telegram from German Ambassador to │ │
│Tokyo, Ott, to Ribbentrop, 30 November │ │
│1941. (USA 163) │ V │ 566
│ │ │
*2911-PS │Notes on conversation between Ribbentrop│ │
│and Oshima, 9 July 1942. (USA 157) │ V │ 580
│ │ │
*2929-PS │Notes on conversation between Ribbentrop│ │
│and Oshima, 18 April 1943. (USA 159) │ V │ 603
│ │ │
*2932-PS │Notes on conference between Hitler and │ │
│Oshima, 14 December 1941. (USA 165) │ V │ 603
│ │ │
2944-PS │Statement by U. S. Secretary of State, │ │
│27 September 1940, published in Peace │ │
│and War, U. S. Foreign Policy, │ │
│1931-1941. │ V │ 624
│ │ │
2945-PS │Joint resolution by the U. S. Senate and│ │
│House of Representatives declaring state│ │
│of war with Germany, 11 December 1941, │ │
│published in Peace and War, U. S. │ │
│Foreign Policy, 1931-1941. │ V │ 625
│ │ │
*2954-PS │Minutes of conversation between │ │
│Ribbentrop and Oshima, 6 March 1943. │ │
│(USA 158; GB 150) │ V │ 658
│ │ │
*2987-PS │Entries in diary of Count Ciano. (USA │ │
│166) │ V │ 689
│ │ │
*3054-PS │“The Nazi Plan”, script of a motion │ │
│picture composed of captured German │ │
│film. (USA 167) │ V │ 801
│ │ │
3598-PS │Intercepted Japanese Diplomatic message,│ │
│Tokyo to Berlin, 30 November 1941. VI │ 308 │
│ │ │
3599-PS │Intercepted Japanese Diplomatic message,│ │
│Rome to Tokyo, 3 December 1941. │ VI │ 310
│ │ │
3600-PS │Intercepted Japanese Diplomatic message,│ │
│Tokyo to Berlin, 6 December 1941. │ VI │ 312
│ │ │
3733-PS │Minutes of interview held on 19 August │ │
│1941, between Vice-Minister Aman and │ │
│Ambassador Ott. │ VI │ 545
│ │ │
*3780-PS │Record of Fuehrer’s conference with │ │
│Oshima, 27 May 1944, concerning Japanese│ │
│treatment of American terror pilots. (GB│ │
│293) │ VI │ 655
│ │ │
*3817-PS │File of correspondence and reports by │ │
│Dr. Haushofer on Asiatic situation. (USA│ │
│790) │ VI │ 752
│ │ │
*C-74 │Top Secret Order concerning personnel │ │
│and materiel program, signed by Hitler, │ │
│14 July 1941. (USA 162) │ VI │ 905
│ │ │
*C-75 │OKW Order No. 24 initialled Jodl, signed│ │
│Keitel, 5 March 1941, concerning │ (USA │
│collaboration with Japan. │ 151) │ VI
│ │ │
C-147 │Extracts from Directive No. 18, signed │ │
│by Hitler, 12 November 1940. │ VI │ 957
│ │ │
*C-152 │Extract from Naval War Staff files, 18 │ │
│March 1941, concerning audience of │ │
│C-in-C of Navy with Hitler on 18 March │ │
│1941. (GB 122) │ VI │ 966
│ │ │
*D-656 │Extract of 29 November 1941 from │ │
│Intercepted Diplomatic Messages sent by │ │
│Japanese Government between 1 July and 8│ │
│December 1941. (GB 148) │ VII │ 160
│ │ │
*D-657 │Extract of 8 December 1941 from │ │
│Intercepted Diplomatic Messages sent by │ │
│Japanese Government between 1 July and 8│ │
│December 1941. (GB 149) │ VII │ 163
│ │ │
*R-140 │Secret letter from Goering’s adjutant, │ │
│Major Conrath, 11 July 1938, enclosing │ │
│transcript of Goering’s speech of 8 July│ │
│to representatives of aircraft industry.│ │
│(USA 160) │ VIII │ 221