Chapter XLIV: Part 3: , which deals in part with “Special Case—Extension Red-Green,” (1)

declares:

“The military political starting point used as a basis for
concentration plans Red and Green can be aggravated if either
England, Poland or Lithuania join on the side of our opponents.
Thereupon our military position would be worsened to an
unbearable, even hopeless, extent. The political leaders will
therefore do everything to keep these countries neutral, above
all England and Poland.” (_C-175_)

The date of this order is June 1937, and it seems clear that at that date, anyway, the Nazi Government appreciated the likelihood, if not the probability, of fighting England and Poland and France, and were prepared to do so. On 5 November 1937, Hitler held his conference in the Reichschancellery, the minutes of which, referred to as the Hossbach notes, contain the remarks made by Hitler in respect of England, Poland, and France:

“The Fuehrer then stated: ‘The aim of German policy is the
security and preservation of the nation and its propagation.
This is consequently a problem of space’.” (_386-PS_)

Hitler then went on to discuss what he described as “participation in world economy”, and declared:

“The only way out, and one which may appear imaginary, is the
securing of greater living space, an endeavor which at all times
has been the cause of the formation of states and movements of
nations.” (_386-PS_)

* * * * * *

“The history of all times, Roman Empire, British Empire, has
proved that every space expansion can only be effected by
breaking resistance and taking risks. Even setbacks are
unavoidable. Neither formerly nor today has space been found
without an owner. The attacker always comes up against the
proprietor.” (_386-PS_)

On the same day as this Hossbach meeting in the Reichschancellery was taking place, a communique was being issued as a result of the Polish ambassador’s audience with Hitler (_TC-73 No. 33_). In the course of this conversation, the communique stated:

“It was confirmed that Polish-German relations should not meet
with difficulty because of the Danzig question.” (_TC-73 No.
33_)

On 2 January 1938, some unknown person wrote a memorandum for the Fuehrer. This document is headed, “Very Confidential—Personal Only”, and is entitled “Deduction on the report, German Embassy, London, regarding the future form of Anglo-German relations.” It states in part:

“With the realization that Germany will not tie herself to a
status quo in Central Europe, and that sooner or later a
military conflict in Europe is possible, the hope of an
agreement will slowly disappear among Germanophile British
politicians, insofar as they are not merely playing a part that
has been given to them. Thus the fateful question arises: Will
Germany and England eventually be forced to drift into separate
camps and will they march against each other one day? To answer
this question, one must realize the following:

“Change of the status quo in the east in the German sense can
only be carried out by force. So long as France knows that
England, which so to speak has, taken on a guarantee to aid
France against Germany, is on her side, France’s fighting for
her eastern allies is probable in any case, always possible, and
thus with it war between Germany and England. This applies then
even if England does not want war. England, believing she must
attend her borders on the Rhine, would be dragged in
automatically by France. In other words, peace or war between
England and Germany rests solely in the hands of France, who
could bring about such a war between Germany and England by way
of a conflict between Germany and France. It follows therefore
that war between Germany and England on account of France can be
prevented only if France knows from the start that England’s
forces would not be sufficient to guarantee their common
victory. Such a situation might force England, and thereby
France, to accept a lot of things that a strong Anglo-France
coalition would never tolerate.

“This position would arise for instance if England, through
insufficient armament or as a result of threats to her empire by
a superior coalition of powers, e.g., Germany, Italy, Japan,
thereby tying down her military forces in other places, would
not be able to assure France of sufficient support in Europe:”

The writer goes on to discuss the possibility of a strong partnership between Italy and Japan, and then reaches a summary:

“Paragraph five: Therefore, conclusions to be drawn by us.

“1. Outwardly, further understanding with England in regard to
the protection of the interests of our friends.

“2. Formation under great secrecy, but with whole-hearted
tenacity of a coalition against England, that is to say, a
tightening of our friendship with Italy and Japan; also the
winning over of all nations whose interests conform with ours
directly or indirectly.

“Close and confidential cooperation of the diplomats of the
three great powers towards this purpose. Only in this way can we
confront England be it in a settlement or in war. England is
going to be a hard, astute opponent in this game of diplomacy.

“The particular question whether in the event of a war by
Germany in central Europe France and thereby England would
interfere, depends on the circumstances and the time at which
such a war commences and ceases, and on military considerations
which cannot be gone into here.” (_TC-75_)

Whoever it was who wrote that document, appears to have been on a fairly high level, because he concludes by saying, “I should like to give the Fuehrer some of these viewpoints verbally.” (_TC-75_)

On 20 February 1938, Hitler spoke in the Reichstag. In that speech he said:

“In the fifth year following the first great foreign political
agreement with the Reich, it fills us with sincere gratification
to be able to state that in our relations with the state with
which we had had perhaps the greatest difference, not only has
there been a ‘detente,’ but in the course of the years there has
been a constant improvement in relations. This good work, which
was regarded with suspicion by so many at the time, has stood
the test, and I may say that since the League of Nations finally
gave up its continual attempts to unsettle Danzig and appointed
a man of great personal attainments as the new commissioner,
this most dangerous spot from the point of view of European
peace has entirely lost its menacing character. The Polish State
respects the national conditions in this state, and both the
city of Danzig and Germany respect Polish rights. And so the way
to an understanding has been successfully paved, an
understanding which beginning with Danzig has today, in spite of
the attempts of certain mischief-makers, succeeded in finally
taking the poison out of the relations between Germany and
Poland and transforming them into a sincere, friendly
cooperation.

“To rely on her friendships, Germany will not leave a stone
unturned to save that ideal which provides the foundation for
the task which is ahead of us—peace.” (_2357-PS_)

A memorandum dated 2 May 1938, and entitled, “Organizational Study 1950,” originated in the office of the Chief of the Organizational Staff of the General Staff of the Air Force. Its purpose was said to be: “The task is to search, within a framework of very broadly-conceived conditions, for the most suitable type of organization of the Air Force.” (_L-43_). The result gained is termed, “Distant Objective.” From this is deduced the goal to be reached in the second phase of the process, which is called, “Final Objective 1942.” This in turn yields what is considered the most suitable proposal for the reorganization of the staffs of the Air Force Group Commands, Air Gaus, Air Divisions, etc. (_L-43_)

The Table of Contents is divided into various sections. Section I is entitled, “Assumptions.” In connection with the heading “Assumption I, frontier of Germany”, a map is enclosed (_Chart No. 10_). The map shows that on 2 May 1938 the Air Force was in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, and Hungary, all of which are shown as within the boundaries of the Reich.

The following is a pertinent extract from the memorandum:

“Consideration of the principles of organization on the basis of
the assumptions for war and peace made in Section 1:

“1. Attack Forces: Principal adversaries: England, France, and
Russia.” (_L-43_)

The study then goes on to show all the one hundred forty-four _Geschwader_ employed against England, very much concentrated in the Western half of the Reich; that is to say, they must be deployed in such a way that by making full use of their range, they can reach all English territory down to the last corner. Under the paragraph “Assumption” double heading 2, the “Organization of Air Force in peacetime” is shown and seven group commands are indicated: (1) Berlin; (2) Brunswick; (3) Munich; (4) Vienna; (5) Budapest; (6) Warsaw; and (7) Koenigsberg. (_L-43_)

Finally, the study declares:

“The more the Reich grows in area and the more the Air Force
grows in strength, the more imperative it becomes, to have
locally bound commands * * *” (_L-43_)

The original of this document is signed by an officer who is not at the top rank in the German Air Force, and the inferences that can be drawn from it should therefore not be over-emphasized. At least, however, it shows the lines upon which the General Staff of the Air Force were thinking at that time.

On the 26 August 1938, when Ribbentrop had become Foreign Minister succeeding von Neurath, a document was addressed to him as “The Reich Minister, via the State Secretary.” The document reads as follows:

“The most pressing problem of German policy, the Czech problem,
might easily, but must not lead to a conflict with the Entente.
Neither France nor England are looking for trouble regarding
Czechoslovakia. Both would perhaps leave Czechoslovakia to
herself, if she should, without direct foreign interference and
through internal signs of disintegration, due to her own faults,
suffer the fate she deserves. This process, however, would have
to take place step by step and would have to lead to a loss of
power in the remaining territory by means of a plebiscite and an
annexation of territory.

“The Czech problem is not yet politically acute enough for any
immediate action, which the Entente would watch inactively, and
not even if this action should come quickly and surprisingly.
Germany cannot fix any definite time and this fruit could be
plucked without too great a risk. She can only prepare the
desired developments.

“For this purpose the slogan emanating from England at present
of the right for autonomy of the Sudeten-Germans, which we have
intentionally not used up to now, is to be taken up gradually.
The international conviction that the choice of nationality was
being withheld from these Germans will do useful spadework,
notwithstanding the fact that the chemical process of
dissolution of the Czech form of states may or may not be
finally speeded up by the mechanical means as well. The fate of
the actual body of Czechoslovakia, however, would not as yet be
clearly decided by this, but would nevertheless be definitely
sealed.

“This method of approach towards Czechoslovakia is to be
recommended because of our relationship with Poland. It is
unavoidable that the German departure from the problems of
boundaries in the southeast and their transfer to the east and
northeast must make the Poles sit up. The fact [is] that after
the liquidation of the Czech question, it will be generally
assumed that Poland will be the next in turn.

“But the later this assumption sinks in in international
politics as a firm factor, the better. In this sense, however,
it is important for the time being, to carry on the German
policy, under the well known and proved slogans of ‘the right to
autonomy’ and ‘Racial unity’. Anything else might be interpreted
as pure imperialism on our part and create the resistance to our
plan by the Entente at an earlier date and more energetically,
than our forces could stand up to.” (_TC-76_)

That was on 26 August 1938, just as the Czech crisis was leading up to the Munich settlement. While at Munich, a day or two before the Munich agreement was signed, Herr Hitler made a speech. On 26 September he said:

“I assured him, moreover, and I repeat it here, that when this
problem is solved there will be no more territorial problems for
Germany in Europe.” (_TC-29_)

A letter from Admiral Carl, dated some time in September, with no precise date, and entitled “Opinion on the ‘Draft Study of Naval Warfare against England’,” stated as follows:

“There is full agreement with the main theme of the study.”

* * * * * *

“If according to the Fuehrer’s decision Germany is to acquire a
position as a world power who needs not only sufficient colonial
possessions but also secure naval communications and secure
access to the ocean.” (_C-23_)

That, then, was the position at the time of the Munich agreement in September 1938. The gains of Munich were not, of course, so great as the Nazi Government had hoped and intended. As a result, the conspirators were not prepared straight away to start any further aggressive action against Poland or elsewhere. But with the advantages that were gained by the seizure of Czechoslovakia, it is obvious now that they intended and had taken the decision to proceed against Poland so soon as Czechoslovakia had been entirely occupied. As Jodl and Hitler said on subsequent occasions, Czechoslovakia was only setting the stage for the attack on Poland.

It is known now from what Hitler said in talking to his military commanders at a later date, that, in his own words, from the first he never intended to abide by the Munich agreement, but that he had to have the whole of Czechoslovakia. As a result, although not ready to proceed in full force against Poland, after September 1938 they did at once begin to approach the Poles on the question of Danzig until the whole of Czechoslovakia had been taken in March. Immediately after the Sudetenland had been occupied, preliminary steps were taken to stir up trouble with Poland, which would and was to eventually lead to the Nazi excuse or justification for their attack on that country.

The earlier discussions between the German and Polish governments on the question of Danzig, which commenced almost immediately after the Munich crisis in September 1938, began as cautious and friendly discussions, until the remainder of Czechoslovakia had finally been seized in March of the following year. A document taken from the Official Polish White Book, gives an account of a luncheon which took place at the Grand Hotel, Berchtesgaden, on 25 October, where Ribbentrop had discussions with M. Lipski, the Polish ambassador to Germany. The report states:

“In a conversation on 24 October, over a luncheon at the Grand
Hotel, Berchtesgaden, at which M. Hewel was present, M. von
Ribbentrop put forward a proposal for a general settlement of
issues (_Gesamtloesung_) between Poland and Germany. This
included the reunion of Danzig with the Reich, while Poland
would be assured the retention of railway and economic
facilities there. Poland would agree to the building of an
extra-territorial motor road and railway line across Pomorze. In
exchange M. von Ribbentrop mentioned the possibility of an
extension of the Polish-German Agreement by twenty-five years
and a guarantee of Polish-German frontiers.”

* * * * * *

“Finally, I said that I wished to warn M. von Ribbentrop that I
could see no possibility of an agreement involving the reunion
of the Free City with the Reich. I concluded by promising to
communicate the substance of this conversation to you.” (_TC-73
No. 44_)

It seems clear that the whole question of Danzig, as indeed Hitler himself said, was no question at all. Danzig was raised simply as an excuse, a justification, not for the seizure of Danzig but for the invasion and seizure of the whole of Poland. As the story unfolds it will become ever more apparent that that is what the Nazi conspirators were really aiming at, only providing themselves with some kind of crisis which would afford some kind of justification for attacking Poland.

Another document taken from the Polish White Book (_TC-73 No. 45_) sets out the instructions that Mr. Beck, the Polish Foreign Minister, gave to Mr. Lipski to hand to the German government in reply to the suggestions put forward by Ribbentrop at Berchtesgaden on 24 October. The first part reviews the history of Polish-German relationship and emphasizes the needs of Poland in respect to Danzig. Paragraph 6 of the document states:

“In the circumstances, in the understanding of the Polish
government, the Danzig question is governed by two factors: the
right of the German population of the city and the surrounding
villages to freedom of life and development; and the fact that
in all matters appertaining to the Free City as a port it is
connected with Poland. Apart from the national character of the
majority of the population, everything in Danzig is definitely
bound up with Poland.” (_TC-73 No. 45_)

The document then sets out the guarantees to Poland under the statute, and continues as follows:

“Taking all the foregoing factors into consideration, and
desiring to achieve the stabilization of relations by way of a
friendly understanding with the government of the German Reich,
the Polish government proposes the replacement of the League of
Nations guarantee and its prerogatives by a bi-lateral
Polish-German Agreement. This agreement should guarantee the
existence of the Free City of Danzig so as to assure freedom of
national and cultural life to its German majority, and also
should guarantee all Polish rights. Notwithstanding the
complications involved in such a system, the Polish government
must state that any other solution, and in particular any
attempt to incorporate the Free City into the Reich, must
inevitably lead to a conflict. This would not only take the form
of local difficulties, but also would suspend all possibility of
Polish-German understanding in all its aspects.

“In face of the weight and cogency of these questions, I am
ready to have final conversations personally with the governing
circles of the Reich. I deem it necessary, however, that you
should first present the principles to which we adhere, so that
my eventual contact should not end in a breakdown, which would
be dangerous for the future.” (_TC-73 No. 45_)

The first stage in those negotiations had been entirely successful from the German point of view. The Nazis had put forward a proposal, the return of the City of Danzig to the Reich, which they might well have known would have been unacceptable. It was unacceptable and the Polish government had warned the Nazi government that it would be. The Poles had offered to enter into negotiations, but they had not agreed, which is exactly what the German government had hoped for. They had not agreed to the return of Danzig to the Reich. The first stage in producing the crisis had been accomplished.

Shortly afterwards, within a week or so, and after the Polish government had offered to enter into discussions with the German government, another top secret order was issued by the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, signed by Keitel (_C-137_). Copies went to the OKH, OKM, and OKW. The order is headed “First Supplement to Instruction dated 21 October 1938,” and reads:

“The Fuehrer has ordered: Apart from the three contingencies
mentioned in the instructions of 21 October 1938, preparations
are also to be made to enable the Free State of Danzig to be
occupied by German troops by surprise.

“The preparations will be made on the following basis: Condition
is _quasi-revolutionary_ occupation of Danzig, exploiting a
politically favorable situation, _not a war against Poland_.”
(_C-137_)

The remainder of Czechoslovakia had not yet been seized, and therefore the Nazis were not yet ready to go to war with Poland. But Keitel’s order shows how the German government answered the Polish proposal to enter into discussions.

On 5 January 1939 Mr. Beck had a conversation with Hitler. (_TC-73 No. 48_). Ribbentrop was also present. In the first part of that conversation, of which that document is an account, Hitler offered to answer any questions. He said he had always followed the policy laid down by the 1934 agreement. He discussed the question of Danzig and emphasized that in the German view it must sooner or later return to Germany. The conversation continued:

“Mr. Beck replied that the Danzig question was a very difficult
problem. He added that in the Chancellor’s suggestion he did not
see any equivalent for Poland, and that the whole of Polish
opinion, and not only people thinking politically but the widest
spheres of Polish society, were particularly sensitive on this
matter.

“In answer to this the Chancellor stated that to solve this
problem it would be necessary to try to find something quite
new, some new form, for which he used the term ‘_Korperschaft_,’
which on the one hand would safeguard the interests of the
German population, and on the other the Polish interests. In
addition, the Chancellor declared that the Minister could be
quite at ease, there would be no faits accomplis in Danzig and
nothing would be done to render difficult the situation of the
Polish Government.” (_TC-73 No. 48_)

It will be recalled that in the previous document discussed (_C-137_) orders had already been issued for preparations to be made for the occupation of Danzig by surprise. Yet some six weeks later Hitler assured the Polish Foreign Minister that there would be no fait accompli and that he should be quite at his ease.

On the day after the conversation between Beck and Hitler, Beck and Ribbentrop conferred, as follows:

“Mr. Beck asked M. Von Ribbentrop to inform the Chancellor that
whereas previously, after all his conversations and contacts
with German statesmen, he had been feeling optimistic, today for
the first time he was in a pessimistic mood. Particularly in
regard to the Danzig question, as it had been raised by the
Chancellor, he saw no possibility whatever of agreement.”

* * * * * *

“In answer M. Von Ribbentrop once more emphasized that Germany
was not seeking any violent solution. The basis of their policy
towards Poland was still a desire for the further building up of
friendly relations. It was necessary to seek such a method of
clearing away the difficulties as would respect the rights and
interests of the two parties concerned.” (_TC-73 No. 49_)

Ribbentrop apparently was not satisfied with that one expression of good faith. On the 25th of the same month, January 1939, he was in Warsaw and made another speech, of which the following is a pertinent extract:

“In accordance with the resolute will of the German National
Leader, the continual progress and consolidation of friendly
relations between Germany and Poland, based upon the existing
agreement between us, constitute an essential element in German
foreign policy. The political foresight, and the principles
worthy of true statesmanship, which induced both sides to take
the momentous decision of 1934, provide a guarantee that all
other problems arising in the course of the future evolution of
events will also be solved in the same spirit, with due regard
to the respect and understanding of the rightful interests of
both sides. Thus Poland and Germany can look forward to the
future with full confidence in the solid basis of their mutual
relations.” (_2530-PS_)

Hitler spoke in the Reichstag on 30 January 1939, and gave further assurances of the good faith of the German Government. (_TC-73 No. 57_)

In March 1939 the remainder of Czechoslovakia was seized and the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia was set up. That seizure, as was recognized by Hitler and Jodl, had immensely strengthened the German position against Poland. Within a week of the completion of the occupation of Czechoslovakia heat was beginning to be applied on Poland.

On 21 March M. Lipski, the Polish ambassador, saw Ribbentrop. The nature of the conversation was generally very much sharper than that of the discussion between Ribbentrop and Beck a little time back at the Grand Hotel, Berchtesgaden:

“I saw M. Von Ribbentrop today. He began by saying he had asked
me to call on him in order to discuss Polish-German relations in
their entirety.

“He complained about our Press, and the Warsaw students’
demonstrations during Count Ciano’s visit.”

* * * * * *

“Further, M. von Ribbentrop referred to the conversation at
Berchtesgaden between you and the Chancellor, in which Hitler
put forward the idea of guaranteeing Poland’s frontiers in
exchange for a motor road and the incorporation of Danzig in the
Reich. He said that there had been further conversations between
you and him in Warsaw on the subject, and that you had pointed
out the great difficulties in the way of accepting these
suggestions. He gave me to understand that all this had made an
unfavorable impression on the Chancellor, since so far he had
received no positive reaction whatever on our part to his
suggestions. M. von Ribbentrop had had a talk with the
Chancellor only yesterday. He stated that the Chancellor was
still in favor of good relations with Poland, and had expressed
a desire to have a thorough conversation with you on the subject
of our mutual relations. M. von Ribbentrop indicated that he was
under the impression that difficulties arising between us were
also due to some misunderstanding of the Reich’s real aims. The
problem needed to be considered on a higher plane. In his
opinion our two States were dependent on each other.”

* * * * * *

“I [Lipski] stated that now, during the settlement of the
Czechoslovakian question, there was no understanding whatever
between us. The Czech issue was already hard enough for the
Polish public to swallow, for, despite our disputes with the
Czechs they were after all a Slav people. But in regard to
Slovakia the position was far worse. I emphasized our community
of race, language and religion, and mentioned the help we had
given in their achievement of independence. I pointed out our
long frontier with Slovakia. I indicated that the Polish man in
the street could not understand why the Reich had assumed the
protection of Slovakia, that protection being directed against
Poland. I said emphatically that this question was a serious
blow to our relations.

“Ribbentrop reflected a moment, and then answered that this
could be discussed.

“I promised to refer to you the suggestion of a conversation
between you and the Chancellor. Ribbentrop remarked that I might
go to Warsaw during the next few days to talk over this matter.
He advised that the talk should not be delayed, lest the
Chancellor should come to the conclusion that Poland was
rejecting all his offers.

“Finally, I asked whether he could tell me anything about his
conversation with the Foreign Minister of Lithuania.

“Ribbentrop answered vaguely that he had seen Mr. Urbszys on the
latter’s return from Rome, and they had discussed the Memel
question, which called for a solution.” (_TC-73 No. 61_)

That conversation took place on 21 March. The world soon learned what the solution to Memel was. On the next day German armed forces marched in.

As a result of these events, considerable anxiety was growing both in the government of Great Britain and the Polish government, and the two governments therefore had been undertaking conversations between each other. On 31 March, the Prime Minister, Mr. Chamberlain, spoke in the House of Commons. He explained the results of the conversations that had been taking place between the British and Polish Governments:

“As the House is aware, certain consultations are now proceeding
with other governments. In order to make perfectly clear the
position of His Majesty’s government in the meantime before
those consultations are concluded, I now have to inform the
House that during that period, in the event of any action which
clearly threatened Polish independence, and which the Polish
government accordingly considered it vital to resist with their
national forces, His Majesty’s government would feel themselves
bound at once to lend the Polish government all support in their
power. They have given the Polish government an assurance to
this effect.

“I may add that the French government have authorized me to make
it plain that they stand in the same position in this matter as
do His Majesty’s Government.” (_TC-72 No. 17_)

On 6 April, a week later, a formal communique was issued by the Anglo-Polish governments, which repeated the assurance the Prime Minister had given a week before, and in which Poland assured Great Britain of her support should Great Britain be attacked. (_TC-72 No. 18_)

The anxiety and concern that the governments of Poland and Great Britain were feeling at that time appears to have been justified. During the same week, on 3 April, an order, signed by Keitel, emanated from the High Command of the Armed Forces. It is dated Berlin, 3 April 1939. The subject is “Directive for the Armed Forces 1939/40.” The order reads:

“Directive for the uniform preparation of war by the Armed
Forces for 1939/40 is being reissued.

“Part I (Frontier Defense) and Part III (Danzig) will be issued
in the middle of April. Their basic principles remain unchanged.

“Part II ‘_Fall Weiss_’ [the code name for the operation against
Poland] is attached herewith. The signature of the Fuehrer will
be appended later.

“The Fuehrer has added the following Directives to ‘_Fall
Weiss_’:

“1. Preparations must be made in such a way that the operations
can be carried out at any time from 1st September 1939 onwards.

“2. The High Command of the Armed Forces has been directed to
draw up a precise timetable for ‘_Fall Weiss_’ and to arrange by
conferences the synchronized timings between the three branches
of the armed forces.

“3. The plan of the branches of the Armed Forces and the details
for the timetable must be submitted to the OKW by the 1st of
May, 1939.” (C-120)

This order was distributed to the OKH, OKM, and OKW.

Another document, dated 11 April, and signed by Hitler, is annexed. It reads:

“I shall lay down in a later directive the future tasks of the
Armed Forces and the preparations to be made in accordance with
these for the conduct of the war.

“Until that directive comes into force, the Armed Forces must be
prepared for the following eventualities:

“I. Safeguarding the frontiers of the German Reich, and
protection against surprise air attacks.

“II. ‘_Fall Weiss_’.

“III. The annexation of Danzig.

“Annex IV contains regulations for the exercise of military
authority in East Prussia in the event of a warlike
development.” (_C-120_)

Again, copies of that document went to the OKH, OKM, and OKW. Annex I to this order, which concerns the safeguarding of the frontiers of the German Reich, declares:

“* * * Legal Basis: It should be anticipated that a state of
Defense or State of War, as defined in the Reichdefense law of
the 4th of September 1938, will not be declared. All measures
and demands necessary for carrying out a mobilization are to be
based on the laws valid in peacetime.” (_C-120_)

The statement of the Prime Minister in the House of Commons, followed by the Anglo-Polish communique of 6 April, was seized upon by the Nazi government to urge on the crisis which they were developing in Danzig between themselves and Poland.

On 28 April the German government issued a memorandum in which they alleged that the Anglo-Polish declaration was incompatible with the 1934 Agreement between Poland and Germany, and that as a result of entering into or by reason of entering into that agreement, Poland had unilaterally renounced the 1934 agreement. The following are pertinent passages from that memorandum:

“The German government have taken note of the Polish-British
declaration regarding the progress and aims of the negotiations
recently conducted between Poland and Great Britain. According
to this declaration there had been concluded between the Polish
government and the British government a temporary understanding
to be released shortly by a permanent agreement which will
provide for the giving of mutual assistance by Poland and Great
Britain in the event of the independence of one of the two
states being directly or indirectly threatened.” (_TC-72 No.
14_)

The memorandum goes on to set out in the next three paragraphs the history of German friendship towards Poland. It continues:

“* * * The agreement which has now been concluded by the Polish
government with the British government is in such obvious
contradiction to these solemn declarations of a few months ago
that the German government can take note only with surprise and
astonishment of such a violent reversal of Polish policy.

“Irrespective of the manner in which its final formulation may
be determined by both parties, the new Polish-British agreement
is intended as a regular Pact of Alliance, which, by reason of
its general sense and of the present state of political
relations, is directed exclusively against Germany.

“From the obligation now accepted by the Polish government, it
appears that Poland intends, in certain circumstances, to take
an active part in any possible German-British conflict, in the
event of aggression against Germany, even should this conflict
not affect Poland and her interests. This is a direct and open
blow against the renunciation of all use of force contained in
the 1934 declaration.”

* * * * * *

“The Polish government, however, by their recent decision to
accede to an alliance directed against Germany have given it to
be understood that they prefer a promise of help by a third
power to the direct guarantee of peace by the German government.
In view of this, the German government are obliged to conclude
that the Polish government do not at present attach any
importance to seeking a solution of German-Polish problems by
means of direct, friendly discussion with the German government.
The Polish government have thus abandoned the path traced out in
1934 to the shaping of German-Polish relations.” (_TC-72 No.
14_)

All this would sound very well, if it had not been for the fact that orders for the invasion of Poland had already been issued and the Armed Forces had been told to draw up a precise timetable.

The memorandum goes on to set out the history of the last negotiations and discussions. It sets out the demands of the 21st which the German government had made for the return of Danzig, the autobahn, and the railway. It mentions the promise by Germany of the twenty-five year guarantee, and continues:

“The Polish government did not avail themselves of the
opportunity offered to them by the German government for a just
settlement of the Danzig question; for the final safeguarding of
Poland’s frontiers with the Reich and thereby for permanent
strengthening of the friendly, neighbourly relations between the
two countries. The Polish government even rejected German
proposals made with this object.

“At the same time the Polish government accepted, with regard to
another state, political obligations which are not compatible
either with the spirit, the meaning or the text of the
German-Polish declaration of the 26 of January, 1934. Thereby,
the Polish government arbitrarily and unilaterally rendered this
declaration null and void.” (_TC-72 No. 14_)

In the last paragraph the German government says, that nevertheless, they are prepared to continue friendly relations with Poland.

On the same day that memorandum was issued, 28 April, Hitler made a speech in the Reichstag, in which he repeated, in effect, the terms of the memorandum. He repeated the demands and offers that Germany made in March, and went on to say that the Polish government have rejected his offer. He expressed his disappointment:

“I have regretted greatly this incomprehensible attitude of the
Polish government. But that alone is not the decisive fact. The
worst is that now Poland, like Czechoslovakia, a year ago,
believes under the pressure of a lying international campaign,
that it must call up troops although Germany, on her part, has
not called up a single man and had not thought of proceeding in
any way against Poland. As I have said, this is, in itself, very
regrettable and posterity will one day decide whether it was
really right to refuse the suggestion made this once by me.
This, as I have said, was an endeavor on my part to solve a
question which intimately affects the German people, by a truly
unique compromise and to solve it to the advantage of both
countries. According to my conviction, Poland was not a giving
party in this solution at all, but only a receiving party,
because it should be beyond all doubt, that Danzig will never
become Polish. The intention to attack on the part of Germany,
which was merely invented by the International Press, led, as
you know, to the so-called guarantee offer, and to an obligation
on the part of the Polish government for mutual assistance. * *
*” (_TC-72 No. 13_)

The speech demonstrates how completely dishonest was everything that the German government was saying at that time. Hitler, who may very well have had a copy of the orders for “_Fall Weiss_” in his pocket as he spoke, announced publicly, that the intention to attack by Germany was an invention of “the International Press.”

In answer to that memorandum and that speech, the Polish government issued a memorandum on 5 May. It sets out the objectives of the 1934 agreement to renounce the use of force and to carry on friendly relationship between the two countries; to solve difficulties by arbitration and other friendly means. The Polish government states its awareness of the difficulties about Danzig and declares that it has long been ready to carry out discussions. The Polish government sets out again its part of the recent discussions. The Polish government states that it communicated its views to the German government on 26 March, and that it then proposed joint guarantees by the Polish and German governments of the City of Danzig, based on the principles of freedom for the local population in internal affairs. The Poles stated their preparedness to examine the possibilities of a motor road and railway facilities. They received no reply to those proposals. The Polish position is summarized in one sentence:

“It is clear that negotiations in which one State formulates
demands and the other is to be obliged to accept those demands
unaltered are not negotiations in the spirit of the declaration
of 1934 and are incompatible with the vital interests and
dignity of Poland” (_TC-72 No. 16_).

The Polish government proceeds to reject the German accusation that the Anglo-Polish agreement is incompatible with the 1934 German-Polish agreement. It states that Germany herself has entered into similar agreements with other nations, and lastly it announces that it is still willing to entertain a new pact with Germany, should Germany wish to do so. (_TC-72 No. 16_)

The German answer was contained in a letter from the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, is signed by Hitler, and dated 10 May (_C-120_). Copies went to the various branches of the OKW, and with them apparently were enclosed “Instructions for the economic war and the protection of our own economy.” Not only were military preparations being carried out throughout these months and weeks, but economic and every other kind of preparation was being made for war at the earliest moment.

This period of preparation, up to May 1939, concluded with the conference in the Reichschancellery on 23 May. The report of this meeting is known as the Schmundt Minutes (_L-79_). In his address to the conference Hitler cried out for _lebensraum_ and said that Danzig was not the dispute at all. It was a question of expanding their living room in the east, and he said that the decision had been taken to attack Poland.

Goering, Raeder and Keitel, among many others, were present. The following is a significant paragraph:

“If there were an alliance of France, England and Russia against
Germany, Italy and Japan, I would be constrained to attack
England and France with a few annihilating blows. The Fuehrer
doubts the possibility of a peaceful settlement with England.”
(_L-79_)

So that, not only has the decision been taken definitely to attack Poland, but almost equally definitely to attack England and France.

C. _Final Preparations: June-September 1939_

(1) _Final Preparations of the Armed Forces._ A precise timetable for the attack had been called for. On 22 June 1939 it was ready. It provided as follows:

“The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces has submitted to the
Fuehrer and Supreme Commander a ‘preliminary timetable’ for
‘_Fall Weiss_’ based on the particulars so far available from
the Navy, Army and Air Force. Details concerning the days
preceding the attack and the start of the attack were not
included in this timetable.

“The Fuehrer and the Supreme Commander is, in the main, in
agreement with the intentions of the Navy, Army and Air Force
and made the following comments on individual points:—

“1. In order not to disquiet the population by calling up
reserves on a larger scale than usual for the maneuvers
scheduled for 1939, as is intended, civilian establishments,
employers or other private persons who make enquiries should be
told that men are being called up for the autumn maneuvers and
for the exercise units it is intended to form for these
maneuvers.

“It is requested that directions to this effect be issued to
subordinate establishments.” (_C-126_)

All this became relevant later, when the German government made allegations of mobilization on the part of the Poles. This order shows that in June the Germans were mobilizing, only doing so secretly. The order continues:

“For reasons of security the clearing of hospitals in the area
of the frontier which the Supreme Command of the Army proposed
should take place from the middle of July, must not be carried
out.” (_C-126_)

The order is signed by Keitel.

A short letter, dated 2 August, which is attached to that order, reads in part:

“Attached are Operational Directions for the employment of
U-Boats which are to be sent out to the Atlantic, by way of
precaution, in the event of the intention to carry out ‘_Fall
Weiss_’ remaining unchanged. F.O. U-Boats [Doenitz] is handing
in his Operation Orders by 12 August.” (_C-126_)

Another letter, dated 27 July, contains orders for the Air and Sea Forces for the occupation of the German Free City of Danzig. It provides:

“The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces has
ordered the reunion of the German Free State of Danzig with the
Greater German Reich. The Armed Forces must occupy the Danzig
Free State immediately in order to protect the German
population. There will be no hostile intention on the part of
Poland so long as the occupation takes place without the force
of arms.” (_C-30_)

The letter then sets out how the occupation is to be effected. All this again becomes more relevant in the subsequent discussion of the diplomatic action of the last few days before the war, when Germany was making specious offers for the settlement of the question by peaceful means. This letter is evidence that the decision had been taken, and that nothing would change that decision. During July, right up to the time of the war, steps were being taken to arm the population of Danzig and to prepare them to take part in the coming occupation.

The reports which were coming back almost daily during this period from Mr. Shepherd, British Consul-General in Danzig, to the British Foreign Minister, and published in the British Blue Book, show the kind of thing that was happening. The report dated 1 July 1939 reads as follows:

“Yesterday morning four German army officers in mufti arrived
here by night express from Berlin to organize Danzig _Heimwehr_.

“All approaches to hills and dismantled fort, which constitute a
popular public promenade on western fringe of the city, have
been closed with barbed wire and ‘_verboten_’ notices.

“The walls surrounding the shipyards bear placards: ‘Comrades
keep your mouths shut lest you regret consequence.’

“Master of British steamer ‘High Commissioner Wood’ whilst he
was roving Koenigsberg from 28th June to 30th June, observed
considerable military activity, including extensive shipment of
camouflaged covered lorries and similar material by small
coasting vessels. On 28th June four medium-sized steamers,
loaded with troops, lorries, field kitchens, etc., left
Koenigsberg, ostensibly returning to Hamburg after maneuvers,
but actually proceeding to Stettin.” (_TC-71_).

And again, as another example, the report dated 10 July states:

“The same informant, whom I believe to be reliable, advises me
that on 8th July he personally saw about thirty military lorries
with East Prussian license numbers on the Bischofsberg, where
numerous field kitchens had been placed along the hedges. There
were also eight large anti-aircraft guns in position, which he
estimated as being of over 3-inch caliber, and three
six-barreled light anti-aircraft machine guns. There were about
500 men drilling with rifles, and the whole place is extensively
fortified with barbed wire.” (_TC-71_).

On 12 and 13 August, when preparations were practically complete, Hitler and Ribbentrop at last disclosed their intentions to their allies, the Italians. It will be recalled that one of the passages in Hitler’s speech on 23 May, in regard to the proposed attack on Poland, had said, “Our object must be kept secret even from the Italians and the Japanese.” (_L-79_). Now, when the preparations were complete, Hitler disclosed his intentions to his Italian comrades in the hope that they would join him. Ciano was surprised at Hitler’s attempt to persuade the Italians to come into the war with him. He had no idea, as he said, of the urgency of the matter, and they are not prepared. He therefore tried to dissuade Hitler from starting off until the Duce could have a little more time to prepare himself. (_TC-77_)

The minutes of that meeting show quite clearly the German intention to attack England and France ultimately, if not at the same time as Poland. In trying to show the strength of Germany and its certainty of winning the war as a means of persuading the Italians to come in, Hitler declared:

“At sea, England had for the moment no immediate reinforcements
in prospect. Some time would elapse before any of the ships now
under construction could be taken into service. As far as the
land army was concerned, after the introduction of conscription
60,000 men had been called to the colors. If England kept the
necessary troops in her own country she could send to France, at
the most, two infantry divisions and one armored division. For
the rest she could supply a few bomber squadrons but hardly any
fighters since, at the outbreak of war, the German Air Force
would at once attack England and the English fighters would be
urgently needed for the defense of their own country.

“With regard to the position of France, the Fuehrer said that in
the event of a general war, after the destruction of
Poland—which would not take long—Germany would be in a
position to assemble hundreds of divisions along the West Wall
and France would then be compelled to concentrate all her
available forces from the Colonies, from the Italian frontier
and elsewhere on her own Maginot Line, for the life and death
struggle which would then ensue. The Fuehrer also thought that
the French would find it no easier to overrun the Italian
fortifications than to overrun the West Wall. Here Count Ciano
showed signs of extreme doubt. The Polish Army was most uneven
in quality. Together with a few parade divisions, there were
large numbers of troops of less value. Poland was very weak in
anti-tank and anti-aircraft defense and at the moment neither
France nor England could help her in this respect.

“If, however, Poland were given assistance by the Western
powers, over a longer period, she could obtain these weapons and
German superiority would thereby be diminished. In contrast to
the fanatics of Warsaw and Cracow, the population of their areas
was different. Furthermore, it was necessary to consider the
position of the Polish State. Out of 34 million inhabitants, one
and one-half million were German, about four million were Jews,
and nine million Ukrainians, so that genuine Poles were much
less in number than the total population and, as already said,
their striking power was not to be valued highly. In these
circumstances Poland could be struck to the ground by Germany in
the shortest time.

“Since the Poles, through their whole attitude, had made it
clear that in any case in the event of a conflict they would
stand on the side of the enemies of Germany and Italy, a quick
liquidation at the present moment could only be of advantage for
the unavoidable conflict with the Western Democracies. If a
hostile Poland remained on Germany’s eastern frontier, not only
would the eleven East Prussian divisions be tied down, but also
further contingents would be kept in Pomerania and Silesia. This
would not be necessary in the event of a previous liquidation.”

* * * * * *

“Coming back to the Danzig question, the Fuehrer said that it
was impossible for him now to go back. He had made an agreement
with Italy for the withdrawal of the Germans from South Tyrol,
but for this reason he must take the greatest care to avoid
giving the impression that this Tyrolese withdrawal could be
taken as a precedent for other areas. Furthermore, he had
justified the withdrawal by pointing to a general easterly and
northeasterly direction of a German policy. The east and
northeast, that is to say the Baltic countries, had been
Germany’s undisputed sphere of influence since time immemorial,
as the Mediterranean had been an appropriate sphere for Italy.
For economic reasons also, Germany needed the foodstuffs and
timber from these eastern regions.” (_TC-77_)

Now the truth of this matter appears. It is not the persecution of German minorities on the Polish frontiers, but economic reasons—the need for foodstuffs and timber from Poland. The minutes of the Italo-German meeting continue:

“In the case of Danzig, German interests were not only material,
although the city had the greatest harbour in the Baltic. Danzig
was a Nurnberg of the North, an ancient German city awakening
sentimental feelings for every German, and the Fuehrer was bound
to take account of this psychological element in public opinion.
To make a comparison with Italy, Count Ciano should suppose that
Trieste was in Yugoslav hands and that a large Italian minority
was being treated brutally on Yugoslav soil. It would be
difficult to assume that Italy would long remain quiet over
anything of this kind.

“Count Ciano, in replying to the Fuehrer’s statement, first
expressed the great surprise on the Italian side over the
completely unexpected seriousness of the position. Neither in
the conversations in Milan nor in those which took place during
his Berlin visit had there been any sign from the German side
that the position with regard to Poland was so serious. On the
contrary, Ribbentrop had said that in his opinion the Danzig
question would be settled in the course of time. On these
grounds, the Duce, in view of his conviction that a conflict
with the Western Powers was unavoidable, had assumed that he
should make his preparations for this event; he had made plans
for a period of two or three years. If immediate conflict were
unavoidable, the Duce, as he had told Ciano, would certainly
stand on the German side, but for various reasons he would
welcome the postponement of a general conflict until a later
time.

“Ciano then showed, with the aid of a map, the position of Italy
in the event of a general war. Italy believed that a conflict
with Poland would not be limited to that country but would
develop into a general European war.” (_TC-77_)

Thereafter, Ciano tried to dissuade Hitler from any immediate action. He argued further:

“For these reasons the Duce insisted that the Axis Powers should
make a gesture which would reassure people of the peaceful
intentions of Italy and Germany.” (_TC-77_)

The Fuehrer’s answer was clear:

“The Fuehrer answered that for a solution of the Polish problem
no time should be lost; the longer one waited until the autumn,
the more difficult would military operations in Eastern Europe
become. From the middle of September, weather conditions made
air operations hardly possible in these areas, while the
condition of the roads, which were quickly turned into a morass
by the autumn rains, would be such as to make them impossible
for motorized forces. From September to May, Poland was a great
marsh and entirely unsuited for any kind of military operations.
Poland could, however, occupy Danzig in September and Germany
would not be able to do anything about it since they obviously
could not bombard or destroy the place.” (_TC-77_)

The Germans could not possibly bombard or destroy any place such as Danzig where there happened to be Germans living. The discussion continued: