Chapter V (5)

“_a._ _Army_: The basic principle of the surprise attack against
Czechoslovakia must not be endangered by the inevitable time
required for transporting the bulk of the field forces by rail
nor the initiative of the Air Force be wasted. Therefore it is
first of all essential to the army that as many assault columns
as possible be employed at the same time as the surprise attack
by the Air Force. These assault columns—the composition of
each, according to their tasks at that time—must be formed with
troops which can be employed rapidly owing to their proximity to
the frontier or to motorization and to special measures of
readiness. It must be the purpose of these thrusts to break into
the Czechoslovakian fortification lines at numerous points and
in a strategically favorable direction, to achieve a
breakthrough or to break them down from the rear. For the
success of this operation, cooperation with the Sudeten-German
frontier population, with deserters from the Czechoslovakian
army, with parachutists or airborne troops and with units of the
sabotage service will be of importance. The bulk of the army has
the task of frustrating the Czechoslovakian plan of defense, of
preventing the Czechoslovakian army from escaping into Slovakia,
of forcing a battle, of beating the Czechoslovakian army and of
occupying Bohemia and Moravia speedily. To this end a thrust
into the heart of Czechoslovakia must be made with the strongest
possible motorized and armored units using to the full the first
successes of the assault columns and the effects of the Air
Force operations. The rear cover provided for the _West_ must be
limited in numbers and quality to the extent which suits the
present state of fortifications. Whether the units assigned this
will be transported to the Western frontier immediately or held
back for the time being will be decided in my special order.
Preparations must however, be made to enable security
detachments to be brought up to the Western frontier even during
the strategic concentration ‘Gruen’. Independent of this, a
first security garrison must be improvised from the engineers at
present employed in constructing fortifications and from
formations of the Labor Corps. The _remaining frontiers_ as well
as East Prussia, are to be only weakly protected. But, always
depending on the political situation, the transfers by sea, of a
part or even the bulk of the active forces of East Prussia, into
the Reich must be taken into account.

“_b._ _Air Force._ While leaving a minimum of defensive forces
in the West, the Air Force is to be employed in bulk in a
surprise attack against Czechoslovakia. The frontier is to be
flown over at the same time as it is crossed by the first
section of the Army * * *.” (_388-PS, Item 11_)

After detailed instructions for action by the Luftwaffe and by the Navy the directive continues as follows:

“In war economy it is essential that in the field of the
armament industry a maximum-deployment of forces is made
possible through increased supplies. In the course of
operations, it is of value to contribute to the reinforcement of
the total war-economic strength by rapidly reconnoitering and
restarting important factories. For this reason the sparing of
Czechoslovakian industrial and works installations—insofar as
military operations permit.—can be of decisive importance to
us.” (_388-PS, Item 11_)

In other words, the Nazi conspirators, four months before the date of their planned attack, were already looking forward to the contribution which the Czech industrial plant would make to the Nazi war economy. The last paragraph of this directive reads as follows:

“All preparations for sabotage and insurrection will be made by
OKW. They will be made, in agreement with and according to the
requirement of the branches of the Armed Forces, so that their
effects accord with the operations of the Army and Air Force.

“(Signed) ADOLF HITLER
“Certified copy
“(Signed) Zeitzler
“Oberstleutnant on the General Staff.”
(_388-PS, Item 11_)

Three weeks later, on 18 June 1938, a draft for a new directive was prepared and initialed by Keitel. It does not supersede the 30 May directive. It reads, in part:

“The immediate aim is a solution of the Czech problem by my own,
free decision; this stands in the foreground of my political
intentions. I am determined to use to the full every favorable
political opportunity to realize this aim.”

* * * * * *

“However, I will decide to take action against Czechoslovakia
only if I am firmly convinced as in the case of the occupation
of the demilitarized zone and the entry into Austria that France
will not march and therefore England will not intervene.”

* * * * * *

“The directives necessary for the prosecution of the war itself
will be issued by me from time to time.”

“K [Initialed by Keitel]
Z [Initialed by Zeitzler]”
(_388-PS, Item 14_)

The second and third parts of this directive contain general directions for the deployment of troops and for precautionary measures in view of the possibility that, during the execution of Case Green, France or England might declare war on Germany. Six pages of complicated schedules which follow this draft in the original have not been translated into English. These schedules, which constitute _Item 15_ in the Schmundt file (_388-PS_), give a timetable of specific measures for the preparation of the Army, Navy, and Luftwaffe for the contemplated action.

Corroboration for the documents in the Schmundt file is found in three entries in General Jodl’s diary written in the spring of 1938 (_1780-PS_). Although the first entry is not dated, it appears to have been written several months after the annexation of Austria:

“After annexation of Austria, the Fuehrer mentions that there is
no hurry to solve the Czech question because Austria has to be
digested first. Nevertheless preparations for Case Green will
have to be carried out energetically; they will have to be newly
prepared on the basis of the changed strategic position because
of the annexation of Austria. State of preparations (see
memorandum L I a of 19 April) reported to the Fuehrer on 21
April.

“The intention of the Fuehrer not to touch the Czech problem as
yet is changed because of the Czech strategic troop
concentration of 21 May, which occurs without any German threat
and without the slightest cause for it.

“Because of Germany’s self restraint, its consequences lead to a
loss of prestige of the Fuehrer, which he is not willing to take
once more. Therefore, the new order is issued for ‘green’ on 30
May.

* * * * * *

“_23 May_:

“Major Schmundt reports ideas of the Fuehrer. Further
conferences, which gradually reveal the exact intentions of the
Fuehrer take place with the Chief of the Armed Forces High
Command (OKW) on 28 May, 3 and 9 June, see enclosures. (War
Diary L).”

* * * * * *

“_30 May_:

“The Fuehrer signs directive Green, where he states his final
decision to destroy Czechoslovakia soon and thereby initiates
military preparation all along the line. The previous intentions
of the Army must be changed considerably in the direction of an
immediate breakthrough into Czechoslovakia right on D-Day
(X-Tag), combined with aerial penetration by the Air Force.
Further details are derived from directive for strategic
concentration of the army. The whole contrast becomes acute once
more between the Fuehrer’s intuition that we must do it this
year and the opinion of the Army that we cannot do it as yet, as
most certainly the Western Powers will interfere and we are not
as yet equal to them.” (_1780-PS_)

E. _Luftwaffe Participation in Early Planning for Case Green._

During the spring and summer of 1938 the Luftwaffe was also engaged in planning in connection with the forthcoming Case Green and the further expansion of the Reich. A Top Secret Document, dated 2 June 1938, was issued by Air Group Command 3 and entitled “Plan Study 1938: Instruction for Deployment and Combat: Case Red.” (_R-150_). This is another staff plan, this time for mobilization and employment of the Luftwaffe in the event of war with France. It is given significance by the considerable progress, at this date, in planning for the attack on Czechoslovakia. Various possibilities under which war with France may occur are noted: all of them are predicated on the assumption of a German-Czech conflict:

“France will

“_a_ either interfere in the struggle between the Reich and
Czechoslovakia in the course of ‘Case Green’, or

“_b_ start hostilities simultaneously with Czechoslovakia.

“_c_ It is possible but not likely that France will begin the
fight, while Czechoslovakia still remains aloof.”

* * * * * *

“Regardless of whether France enters the war as a result of
‘Case Green’ or whether she makes the opening move of the war
simultaneously with Czechoslovakia, in any case the mass of the
German offensive formations will, in conjunction with the Army,
first deliver the decisive blow against Czechoslovakia.”
(_R-150_)

By mid-summer direct and detailed planning for Case Green was being carried out by the Luftwaffe. In early August, at the direction of the Luftwaffe General Staff, the German Air Attache in Prague reconnoitered the Freudenthal area of Czechoslovakia, south of Upper Silesia, for suitable landing grounds. This action is disclosed by a report of the Luftwaffe General Staff, Intelligence Division, dated 12 August 1938 (_1536-PS_). This was a Top Secret document, for General Officers only, of which only two copies were made. Attached as an enclosure was the report of Major Moericke, the German air attache in Prague, dated 4 August 1938. The first four paragraphs of the enclosure read:

“I was ordered by the General Staff of the Air Force to
reconnoitre the land in the region Freudenthal/Freihermersdorf
for landing possibilities.

“For this purpose I obtained private lodgings in Freudenthal
with the manufacturer Macholdt, through one of my trusted men in
Prague.

“I had specifically ordered this man to give no details about me
to M, particularly about my official position.

“I used my official car (_Dienst Pkw_) for the journey to
Freudenthal, taking precautions against being observed.”
(_1536-PS_)

By 25 August the imminence of the attack on Czechoslovakia compelled the issuance by the Luftwaffe of a detailed intelligence memorandum entitled “Extended Case Green,” which consisted of an estimate of possible action by the Western Powers during the attack on Czechoslovakia (_375-PS_). This Top Secret memorandum of the Intelligence Section of the Luftwaffe General Staff is dated at Berlin, 25 August 1938. Based on the assumption that Great Britain and France will declare war on Germany during Case Green, this study contains an estimate of the strategy and air strength of the Western Powers as of 1 October 1938, the target date for Case Green. The first two sentences read as follows:

“The basic assumption is that France will declare war during the
Case Green. It is presumed that France will only decide upon war
if active military assistance by Great Britain is definitely
assured.” (_375-PS_)

F. _Negotiations with Italy and Hungary about Case Green._

Knowledge of pending action against Czechoslovakia was not confined to a close circle of high officials of the Reich. During the summer Germany’s allies, Italy and Hungary, were apprised by one means or another of the plans of the Nazi conspirators. A captured document from German Foreign Office files contains a confidential memorandum of a conversation with the Italian ambassador, Attolico, in Berlin on 18 July 1938 (_2800-PS_). At the bottom is a handwritten note, headed “For the Reichsminister [Ribbentrop] only.” This note reads:

“Attolico added that we had made it unmistakably clear to the
Italians what our intentions are regarding Czechoslovakia. He
also knew the appointed time well enough so that he could take
perhaps a two months’ holiday now which he could not do later
on.

“Giving an idea of the attitude of other governments Attolico
mentioned that the Roumanian government had refused to grant
application for leave to its Berlin Minister.” (_2800-PS_)

A month later Mussolini sent a message to Berlin, asking that he be told the date on which Case Green would take place. The German response is outlined in a German Foreign Office note on a conversation with Ambassador Attolico, signed “R” (for Ribbentrop) and dated 23 August 1938:

“On the voyage of the ‘Patria’ Ambassador Attolico explained to
me that he had instructions to request the notification of a
contemplated time for German action against Czechoslovakia from
the German government.

“In case the Czechs should again cause a provocation against
Germany, Germany would march. This would be tomorrow, in six
months or perhaps in a year. However, I could promise him, that
the German government, in case of an increasing gravity of the
situation or as soon as the Fuehrer made his decision, would
notify the Italian Chief of Government as rapidly as possible.
In any case, the Italian government will be the first one Who
will receive such a notification.

“23 Aug 1938
“R (initial).”
(_2791-PS_)

Four days later Attolico again asked to be notified of the date of the pending attack. The conversation is recorded in another German Foreign Office Memorandum:

“Ambassador Attolico paid me a visit today at 12 o’clock to
communicate the following:

“He had received another written instruction from Mussolini
asking that Germany communicate in time the probable date of
action against Czechoslovakia. Mussolini asked for such
notification, as Mr. Attolico assured me, in order ‘to be able
to take in due time the necessary measures on the French
frontier.’

“Berlin, 27 August 1938
“R

“N. B. I replied to Ambassador Attolico, just as on his former
demarche, that I could not impart any date to him, that,
however, in any case Mussolini would be the first one to be
informed of any decision.

“Berlin, 2 September 1938.”
(_2792-PS_)

Hungary, which borders Czechoslovakia to the southeast, was from the first considered to be a possible participant in Case Green. It will be recalled that in early March 1938 Keitel and Ribbentrop had exchanged letters on the question of bringing Hungary into the Nazi planning (_2786-PS_). At that time the decision was in the negative. But by mid-August 1938 the Nazi conspirators were attempting to persuade Hungary to join in the attack.

From August 21st to 26th Admiral Horthy and some of his ministers visited Germany. Admiral Horthy witnessed the launching of the _Prince Eugen_ and conferred with Hitler. There were discussions of the Czechoslovak question. A captured German Foreign Office document, signed by von Weizsäcker, records the conversations between Hitler and Ribbentrop and a Hungarian delegation consisting of Horthy, Imredy, and Kanya aboard the S. S. _Patria_ on 23 August 1938 (_2796-PS_). In this conference Ribbentrop inquired about the Hungarian attitude in the event of a German attack on Czechoslovakia and suggested that such an attack would prove to be a good opportunity for Hungary. The Hungarians, with the exception of Horthy, who wished to put the Hungarian intention to participate on record, proved reluctant to commit themselves. Thereupon Hitler emphasized Ribbentrop’s statement, and said:

“Whoever wanted to join the meal would have to participate in
the cooking as well.” (_2796-PS_)

Von Weizsäcker’s memorandum reads as follows:

“Von Ribbentrop inquired what Hungary’s attitude would be if the
Fuehrer would carry out his decision to answer a new Czech
provocation by force. The reply of the Hungarians presented two
kinds of obstacles: The Yugoslavian neutrality must be assured
if Hungary marches towards the North and perhaps the East.
Moreover, the Hungarian rearmament had only been started and 1
or 2 more years’ time for its development should be allowed.

“Von Ribbentrop then explained to the Hungarians that the
Yugoslavs would not dare to march while they were between the
pincers of the Axis Powers. Rumania alone would therefore not
move. England and France would also remain tranquil. England
would not recklessly risk her Empire. She knew our newly
acquired power. In reference to time, however, for the
above-mentioned situation, nothing definite could be predicted
since it would depend on Czech provocation. Von Ribbentrop
repeated that whoever desires revision must exploit the good
opportunity and participate.

“The Hungarian reply thus, remained a conditional one. Upon, the
question of von Ribbentrop, what purpose the desired General
Staff conferences were to have, not much more was brought
forward than the Hungarian desire of a mutual inventory of
military material and preparedness for the Czech conflict. The
clear political basis for such a conference—the time of
Hungarian intervention—was not obtained.

“In the meantime, more positive language was used by von Horthy
in his talk with the Fuehrer. He wished not to hide his doubts
with regard to the English attitude, but he wished to put
Hungary’s intention to participate on record. The Hungarian
Ministers were and remained, even later, more skeptical since
they feel more strongly about the immediate danger for Hungary
with its unprotected flanks.

“When von Imredy had a discussion with the Fuehrer in the
afternoon, he was very relieved _when the Fuehrer explained to
him, that, in regard to the situation in question, he demanded
nothing of Hungary_. He himself would not know the time. Whoever
wanted to join the meal would have to participate in the cooking
as well. Should Hungary wish conferences of the General Staffs,
he would have no objections.” (_2796-PS_)

By the third day of the conference the Germans were able to note that in the event of a German-Czech conflict Hungary would be sufficiently armed for participation on 1 October. Another captured German Foreign Office Memorandum reports a conversation between Ribbentrop and Kanya on 25 August 1938. The last paragraph of this memorandum states:

“Concerning Hungary’s military preparedness in case of a
German-Czech conflict von Kanya mentioned several days ago that
his country would need a period of one to two years in order to
develop adequately the armed strength of Hungary. During today’s
conversation von Kanya corrected this remark and said that
Hungary’s military situation was much better. His country would
be ready, as far as armaments were concerned, to take part in
the conflict by October 1st of this year.” (_2797-PS_)

The signature to this document is not clear, but it appears to be that of von Weizsäcker.

These accounts of the German-Hungarian conference are corroborated by General Jodl’s diary. The entry for 21-26 August reads as follows:

“_21-26 August_:

“Visit to Germany of the Hungarian Regent (_Reichsverweser_).
Accompanied by the Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign
Affairs and the Honved Minister v. Raatz.

“They arrive with the idea that in the course of a great war,
after a few years, and with the help of German troops, the old
state of Hungary can be reestablished. They leave with the
understanding that we have neither demands from, nor claims
against them, but that Germany will not stand for a second
provocation by Czechoslovakia, even if it should be tomorrow. If
they want to participate at that moment, it is up to them.

“Germany, however, will never play the role of arbitrator
between them and Poland. The Hungarians agree; but they believe
that, when the issue arises, a period of 48 hours would be
indispensable to them to find out Yugoslavia’s attitude.”
(_1780-PS_)

The upshot of the talks with the Hungarians proved to be a staff conference on 6 September. Jodl’s diary entry for that day states:

“_6 September_:

“Chief of General Staff, General of Artillery Halder, has a
conference with the Hungarian Chief of General Staff Fischer.

“Before that he is briefed by me on the political attitude of
the Fuehrer—especially his order not to give any hint on the
exact moment. The same with OQI, General v. Stuelpnagel.”
(_1780-PS_)

G. _Final Preparations for the Attack._

The setting in which these events took place was that of the Munich Pact and the international crisis which led to it. As this crisis was developing in August and September 1938, frantic efforts were being made by the statesmen of the world to preserve the peace of the world. These statesmen, unfortunately, were unaware of the plans and designs of the Nazi conspirators.

The documents captured by Allied troops reveal the hitherto-unknown story underlying the Pact of Munich. These papers reveal the fraud and deceit practiced by the Nazi conspirators in negotiating the Pact of Munich as a stepping-stone toward further aggression. The hope for peace which came with the Munich Pact, which later turned out to be a snare and a deceit, was a trap carefully set by the Nazi conspirators. The nature of the trap is indicated by the events of the weeks just preceding the Munich agreement.

With a 1 October target date set for Case Green, there was a noticeable increase in the tempo of the military preparations in late August and September. Actual preparations for the attack on Czechoslovakia were well under way. The agenda of the Nazi conspirators were devoted to technical details: the timing of X-day, questions of mobilization, questions of transport and supply.

On 26 August Jodl initialed a memorandum entitled “Timing of the X-Order and the Question of Advance Measures” (_388-PS, Item 17_). This memorandum demonstrates clearly the complicity of the OKW and of Keitel and Jodl, in the fabrication of an incident as an excuse for war. It reveals the character of the attack that Germany was preparing to launch. The memorandum reads as follows:

“_TIMING OF THE X-ORDER AND THE QUESTION OF ADVANCE MEASURES_

“The Luftwaffe’s endeavor to take the enemy air forces by
surprise at their peace-time airports justifiably leads them to
oppose measures taken in advance of the X-order and to the
demand that the X-order itself be given sufficiently late on X
minus 1 to prevent the fact of Germany’s mobilization becoming
known to Czechoslovakia on that day.

“The army’s efforts are tending in the opposite direction. It
intends to let OKW initiate all advance measures between X minus
3 and X minus 1, which will contribute to the smooth and rapid
working of the mobilization. With this in mind OKW _also
demands_ that the X order be given _not later than 1400 on X
minus 1_.

“To this the following must be said:

“Operation (Aktion) Green will be set in motion by means of an
‘incident’ in Czechoslovakia which will give Germany provocation
for military intervention. The fixing of the _exact time_ for
this incident is of the utmost importance.

“It must come at a time when weather conditions are favorable
for our superior air forces to go into action and at an hour
which will enable authentic news of it to reach us on the
afternoon of X minus 1.

“It can then be spontaneously answered by the giving of the X
order at 1400 on X minus 1.

“On X minus 2 the Navy, Army and Air Force will merely receive
an advance warning.

“If the _Fuehrer_ intends to follow this plan of action, all
further discussion is superfluous.

“For then no advance measures may be taken before X minus 1 for
which there is not an innocent explanation as we shall otherwise
appear to have manufactured the incident. Orders for absolutely
essential advance measures must be given in good time and
camouflaged with the help of the numerous maneuvers and
exercises.

“Also, the question raised by the Foreign Office as to whether
all Germans should be called back in time from prospective enemy
territories must in no way lead to the conspicuous departure
from Czechoslovakia of any German subjects before the incident.

“Even a warning of the diplomatic representatives in Prague is
impossible before the first air-attack, although the
consequences could be very grave in the event of their becoming
victims of such an attack (e.g., death of representatives of
friendly or confirmed neutral powers.)

“If, for technical reasons, the _evening hours_ should be
considered desirable for the incident, then the following day
cannot be X day, but it must be the day after that.

“In any case we must act on the principle that nothing must be
done before the incident which might point to mobilization, and
that the swiftest possible action must be taken after the
incident. (X-Fall)

“It is the purpose of these notes to point out what a great
interest the _Wehrmacht_ has in the incident and that it must be
informed of the Fuehrer’s intentions in good time—insofar as
the _Abwehr_ Section is not also charged with the organization
of the incident.

“I request that the Fuehrer’s decision be obtained on these
points.

“J [Jodl] 26/8.”
(_388-PS, Item 17_)

In handwriting at the bottom of the page are the notes of Schmundt, Hitler’s adjutant. These reveal that the memorandum was submitted to Hitler on 30 August; that Hitler agreed to act along these lines; and that Jodl was so notified on 31 August.

On 3 September Keitel and von Brauchitsch met with Hitler at the Berghof. Again Schmundt kept notes of the conference (_388-PS, Item 18_). The first three paragraphs of these minutes state:

“_Gen. Ob. v. Brauchitsch_: Reports on the exact time of the
transfer of the troops to ‘exercise areas’ for ‘_Gruen_’. Field
units to be transferred on 28 Sept. From here will then be ready
for action. When X Day becomes known, field units carry out
exercises in opposite directions.

“_Fuehrer_: Has objection. Troops assemble field units a 2-day
march away. Carry out camouflage exercises everywhere.

“?: OKH must know when X-day is by 1200 noon, 27
September.” (_388-PS, Item 18_)

During the remainder of the conference Hitler gave his views on the strategy the German armies should employ and the strength of the Czech defenses they would encounter. He spoke of the possibility of “drawing in the Henlein people.” The situation in the West still troubled him. Schmundt noted:

“The Fuehrer gives orders for the development of the Western
fortifications; improvement of advance positions around Aachen
and Saarbrucken. Construction of 300 to 400 battery positions
(1600 artillery pieces.)” (_388-PS, Item 18_)

Five days later General Stulpnagel asked Jodl for written assurance that the OKH would be informed five days in advance about the pending action. In the evening Jodl conferred with Luftwaffe generals about the coordination of ground and air operations at the start of the attack. The 8 September entry in General Jodl’s diary states:

“_8 September_:

“General Stulpnagel OQI asks for written assurance that the Army
High Command will be informed five days in advance if the plan
is to take place. I agree and add that the overall
meteorological situation can be estimated to some extent only
for two days in advance, and that therefore the plans may be
changed up to this moment (D-day-2) (X-2 TAGE).

“General Stulpnagel mentions that for the first time he wonders
whether the previous basis of the plan is not being abandoned.
It presupposed that the Western Powers would not interfere
decisively. It gradually seems as if the Fuehrer would stick to
his decision even though he may no longer be of this opinion. It
must be added that Hungary is at least moody and that Italy is
reserved.

“I must admit that I am worrying too, when comparing the change
of opinion about political and military potentialities,
according to directives of 24 June, 5 Nov 37, 7 Dec 37, 30 May
38, with the last statements.

“In spite of that one must be aware of the fact that the other
nations will do everything they can to apply pressure to us. We
must pass this test of nerves, but because only very few people
know the art of withstanding this pressure successfully, the
only possible solution is to inform only a very small circle of
officers of news that causes us anxiety, and not to have it
circulate through anterooms as heretofore.

“1800 hours to 2100 hours: Conference with Chief of Army High
Command and Chief of General Staff of the Air Force (present
were Jeschonnek, Kammhuber, Sternburg and myself).

“We agree about the promulgation of the D-Day order (X-Befehl),
(X-1, 4 o’clock) and preannouncement to the Air Force (D-Day-1,
X-1 day, 7 o’clock). The ‘Y time’ has yet to be examined; some
formations have an approach flight of one hour.” (_1780-PS_)

Late on the evening of the following day, 9 September, Hitler met with Keitel and Generals von Brauchitsch and Halder at Nurnberg. Dr. Todt, the construction engineer, later joined the conference, which lasted from 10 in the evening until 3:30 the following morning. Schmundt’s minutes are _Item 19_ in his file (_388-PS_). In this meeting General Halder reviewed the missions assigned to four of the German armies being committed to the attack: the 2d, 10th, 12th, and 14th. With his characteristic enthusiasm for military planning, Hitler then delivered a soliloquy on strategic considerations which should be taken into account as the attack developed. The discussions proceeded as follows:

“_General Oberst v. Brauchitsch_: Employment of motorized
divisions was based on the difficult rail situation in Austria
and the difficulties in getting other divisions (ready to march)
into the area at the right time. In the West vehicles will have
to leave on the 20th of Sept, if X-Day remains as planned.
Workers leave on the 23d, by relays. Specialist workers remain
according to decision by Army Command 2.

“_The Fuehrer_: Doesn’t see why workers have to return home as
early as X-11. Other workers and people are also on the way on
mobilization day. Also the RR cars, they will stand around
unnecessarily later on.

“_General Keitel_: Workers are not under the jurisdiction of
district commands (Bezirks Kdos.) in the West. Trains must be
assembled.

“_v. Brauchitsch_: 235,000 men RAD (Labour Service) will be
drafted. 96 Construction Bns will be distributed (also in the
east). 40,000 trained laborers stay in the West.” (_388-PS, Item
19_)

From this date forward the Nazi conspirators were occupied with the intricate planning required before the attack. On 11 September Jodl conferred with a representative of the Propaganda Ministry about methods of refuting German violations of International Law and exploiting those of the Czechs. The 11 September entry in the Jodl diary reads as follows:

“_11 September_:

“In the afternoon conference with Secretary of State Jahnke from
the Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda on imminent
common tasks.

“The joint preparations for refutation (_Wiederlegung_) of our
own violations of international law, and the exploitation of its
violations by the enemy, were considered particularly
important.” (_1780-PS_)

This discussion developed into a detailed study compiled by Section L, Jodl’s section of the OKW (_C-2_). Seven copies of this captured document were prepared and distributed on 1 October 1938 to the OKH, the OKM, the Luftwaffe, and the Foreign Office. In this study anticipated violations of International Law in the invasion of Czechoslovakia are listed and counter-propaganda suggested for the use of the propaganda agencies. This document is presented in a tabular form, in which possible incidents are listed in the left-hand column. In the second column are given specific examples of the incidents; in the third and fourth columns the position to be taken toward these incidents under International Law and under the laws of warfare is set forth; the fifth column, which is blank, is reserved for the explanation to be offered by the Propaganda Minister. The first 10 hypothetical incidents, for which justification must be found, and which are listed in column b of the table are as follows:

“1_a_. In an air-raid on Prague the British Embassy is
destroyed.

“2. Englishmen or Frenchmen are injured or killed;

“3. The Hradschin is destroyed in an air raid on Prague.

“4. On account of a report that the Czechs have used gas, the
firing of gas projectiles is ordered.

“5. Czech civilians, not recognizable as soldiers, are caught in
the act of sabotage (destruction of important bridges,
destruction of foodstuffs and fodder) are discovered looting
wounded or dead soldiers and thereupon shot.

“6. Captured Czech soldiers or Czech civilians are detailed to
do road work or to load munitions.

“7. For military reasons it is necessary to requisition billets,
foodstuffs and fodder from the Czech population. As a result the
latter suffer from want.

“8. Czech population is, for military reasons, compulsorily
evacuated to the rear area.

“9. Churches are used for military accommodation.

“10. In the course of their duty, German aircraft fly over
Polish territory where they are involved in an air battle with
Czech aircraft.” (_C-2_)

From Nurnberg, on 10 September, Hitler issued an order bringing the _Reichsarbeitsdienst_, the German labor service, under the OKW. This top secret order, of which 25 copies were made, provides as follows:

“1. The whole RAD organization comes under the command of the
Supreme Command of the Army effective 15 September.

“2. The Chief of OKW decides on the first commitments of this
organization in conjunction with the Reichs Labor Leader
(_Reichsarbeitsfuehrer_) and on assignments from time to time to
the Supreme Commands of the Navy, Army and Air Force. Where
questions arise with regard to competency he will make a final
decision in accordance with my instructions.

“3. For the time being this order is to be made known only to
the departments and personnel immediately concerned.

“(signed) ADOLF HITLER.”
(_388-PS, Item 20_)

Four days later, on 14 September, Keitel issued detailed instructions for the employment of specific RAD units. This order is _Item 21_ in the Schmundt file. A further order issued by Jodl on 16 September specified RAD units which would receive military training. This is _Item 24_ in the Schmundt file. (_388-PS_)

Two entries in Jodl’s diary give further indications of the problems of the OKW in this period of mid-September, just two weeks before the anticipated X-day. The entries for 15 and 16 September read as follows:

“_15 September_:

“In the morning conference with Chief of Army High Command and
Chief of General Staffs of Army and Air Forces; the question was
discussed what could be done if the Fuehrer insists on
advancement of the date, due to the rapid development of the
situation.

“_16 September_:

“General Keitel returns from the Berghof at 1700 hours. He
graphically describes the results of the conference between
Chamberlain and the Fuehrer. The next conference will take place
on the 21st or 22nd in Godesberg.

“With consent of the Fuehrer, the order is given in the evening
by the Armed Forces High Command to the Army High Command and to
the Ministry of Finance, to line up the VGAD along the Czech
border.

“In the same way, an order is issued to the railways to have the
empty rolling stock kept in readiness clandestinely for the
strategic concentrations of the Army, so that it can be
transported starting 28 September.” (_1780-PS_)

The order to the railroads to make rolling stock available which General Jodl referred to appears as _Item 22_ in the Schmundt file. In this order Keitel told the railroads to be ready by 28 September but to continue work on the western fortifications even after 20 September in the interest of camouflage. The first and fourth paragraphs of this order provide:

“The Reichsbahn must provide trains of empty trucks in great
numbers by September 28 for the carrying out of mobilization
exercises. This task now takes precedence over all others.”

* * * * * *

“However, in accordance with the Fuehrer’s directive, every
effort should be made to continue to supply the materials in as
large quantities as feasible even after 20 September 1938, and
this for reasons of camouflage as well as in order to continue
the important work of the Lines.” (_388-PS, Item 22_)

The penultimate stage of the aggression began on 18 September. From that day until the 28th a series of orders were issued advancing preparations for the attack. These orders are included in the Schmundt file (_388-PS_). On the 18th the commitment schedule for the five participating armies—the 2d, 8th, 10th, 12th, and 14th—was set forth (_388-PS, Item 26_). Hitler approved the secret mobilization of five divisions in the west to protect the German rear during Case Green (_388-PS, Item 31_). Further discussions were held between the Army and the Luftwaffe about the time of day for the attack. Conference notes initialed by Jodl and dated 27 September reveal the difference in views. These notes are _Item 54_ in the Schmundt file. The first three paragraphs read:

“_COORDINATED TIME OF ATTACK BY ARMY AND AIR FORCES ON X DAY._

“As a matter of principle, every effort should be made for a
coordinated attack by Army and Air Forces on X Day.

“The Army wishes to attack at dawn, i.e., about 0615. It also
wishes to conduct some limited operations in the previous night,
which however, would not alarm the entire Czech front.

“Air Force’s time of attack depends on weather conditions. These
could change the time of attack and also limit the area of
operations. The weather of the last few days, for instance,
would have delayed the start until between 0800 and 1100 due to
low ceiling in Bavaria.” (_388-PS, Item 54_)

A satisfactory solution appears to have been arrived at. The last two paragraphs read:

“_Thus it is proposed_:

“Attack by the Army—independent of the attack by the air
force—at the time desired by the Army (0615) and permission for
limited operations to take place before then, however, only to
an extent that will not alarm the entire Czech front.

“The Luftwaffe will attack at a time most suitable to them.

(J)” (_388-PS, Item 54_)

On the same day, 27 September, Keitel sent a most secret memorandum to Hess and the Reichsfuehrer SS, Himmler, for the guidance of Nazi Party officials. This memorandum is _Item 32_ in the Schmundt file. It directs the Party officials and organizations to comply with the demands of the Army during the secret mobilization in such matters as turning over equipment and facilities. The first four paragraphs of this message read:

“As a result of the political situation the Fuehrer and
Chancellor has ordered mobilization measures for the Armed
Forces, without the political situation being aggravated by
issuing the mobilization (X) order or corresponding code-words.

“Within the framework of these mobilization measures it is
necessary for the Armed Forces authorities to issue demands to
the various Party authorities and their organizations, which are
connected with the previous issuing of the mobilization order,
the advance measures or special code names.

“The special situation makes it necessary that these demands be
met (even if the code word has not been previously issued)
immediately and without being referred to higher authorities.

“OKW requests that subordinate offices be given immediate
instructions to this effect so that the mobilization of the
Armed Forces can be carried out according to plan.” (_388-PS,
Item 32_)

Two additional entries from Jodl’s diary reveal the extent to which the Nazi conspirators carried forward their preparations for attack even during the period of the negotiations which culminated in the Munich Agreement. The entries for 26 and 27 September read:

“_26 September_:

“Chief of the Armed Forces High Command, acting through the Army
High Command, has stopped the intended approach march of the
advance units to the Czech border, because it is not yet
necessary and because the Fuehrer does not intend to march in
before the 30th in any case. Order to approach towards the Czech
frontier need be given on the 27th only.

“In the evening of the 26th, fixed radio stations of Breslau,
Dresden and Vienna are put at the disposal of the Reich Ministry
for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda for interference with
possible Czech propaganda transmissions. “Question by Foreign
office whether Czechs are to be allowed to leave and cross
Germany. Decision from Chief of the Armed Forces High Command:
yes.

“1515 hours: The Chief of the Armed Forces High Command informs
General Stumpf about the result of the Godesberg conversations
and about the Fuehrer’s opinion. In no case will X day be before
the 30th.

“It is important that we do not permit ourselves to be drawn
into military engagements because of false reports, before
Prague replied.

“A question of Stumpf about Y hour results in the reply that on
account of the weather situation, a simultaneous intervention of
the Air Force and Army cannot be expected. The Army needs the
dawn, the Air Force can only start later on account of frequent
fogs.

“The Fuehrer has to make a decision for the commander in chief
who is to have priority.

“The opinion of Stumpf is also that the attack of the Army has
to proceed. The Fuehrer has not made any decision as yet about
commitment against Prague.

“2000 hours: The Fuehrer addresses the people and the world in
an important speech at the Sportspalast.

“_27 September_:

“1320 hours: The Fuehrer consents to the first wave of attack
being advanced to a line from where they can arrive in the
assembly area by 30 September.” (_1780-PS_)

The order referred to by General Jodl in the last entry was also recorded by the faithful Schmundt. It appears as _Item 33_ of the file. It is the order which brought the Nazi armies to the jumping-off point for unprovoked aggression:

“MOST SECRET
“_MEMORANDUM_

“At 1300 September 27 the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the
Armed Forces ordered the movement of the assault units from
their exercise areas to their jumping-off points.

“The assault units (about 21 reinforced regiments, or 7
divisions,) must be ready to begin the action against ‘_Gruen_’
on September 30, the decision having been made one day
previously by 1200 noon.” (_388-PS, Item 33_)

There follows a pencil note by Schmundt:

“This order was conveyed to General Keitel at 1320 through Major
Schmundt.” (_388-PS, Item 33_)

H. _The Campaign Within Czechoslovakia._

The military preparations for aggression against Czechoslovakia had not been carried out in vacuo. They had been preceded by a skillfully conceived campaign designed to promote civil disobedience to the Czechoslovak State. Using the techniques they had already developed in other ventures, the Nazi conspirators over a period of years used money, propaganda, and force to undermine Czechoslovakia. In this program the Nazis focussed their attention on the persons of German descent living in the Sudetenland, a mountainous area bounding Bohemia and Moravia on the north, west, and south.

The Czechoslovak government’s official report for the prosecution and trial of German major war criminals, entitled “German Crimes Against Czechoslovakia,” shows the background of the subsequent Nazi intrigue. (_998-PS_; _3061-PS_)

Nazi agitation in Czechoslovakia dated from the earliest days of the NSDAP. In the years following the First World War a German National Socialist Workers Party (DNSAP), which maintained close contact with Hitler’s NSDAP, was active in the Sudetenland. In 1932, ring-leaders of the _Sudeten Volksport_, an organization corresponding to the Nazi SA, openly endorsed the 21 points of Hitler’s program, the first of which demanded the union of all Germans in a Greater Germany. Soon thereafter they were charged with planning armed rebellion on behalf of a foreign power and were sentenced for conspiracy against the Czech Republic. Late in 1933 the National Socialist Party of Czechoslovakia forestalled its dissolution by voluntary liquidation, and several of its chiefs escaped across the frontier. For a year thereafter Nazi activity in Czechoslovakia continued underground. (_998-PS_; _3061-PS_)

On 1 October 1934, with the approval and at the urging of the Nazi conspirators, Konrad Henlein, an instructor of gymnastics, established the “German Home Front” (_Deutsche Heimatfront_), which the following spring became the Sudeten German Party (_Sudeten-deutsche Partei—SDP_). Profiting from the experience of the Czech National Socialist Party, Henlein denied any connection with the German Nazis. He rejected pan-Germanism, and professed his respect for individual liberties and his loyalty to “honest democracy” and to the Czech state. His party, none-the-less, was built on the basis of the Nazi _Fuehrerprinzip_, and he became its Fuehrer. By 1937, when the power of Hitler’s Germany had become manifest, Henlein and his followers were striking a more aggressive note, demanding, without definition, “complete Sudeten autonomy“. The SDP laid proposals before the Czech Parliament which would, in substance, have created a state within a state. (_998-PS_; _3061-PS_)

After the annexation of Austria in March 1938 the Henleinists, who were now openly organized after the Nazi model, intensified their activity. Undisguised anti-Semitic propaganda started in the Henlein press; the campaign against “bolshevism” was intensified; terrorism in the Henlein-dominated communities increased. A storm troop organization, patterned and trained on the principles of the Nazi SS, was established, known as the FS (_Freiwilliger Selbstschutz_, or Voluntary Vigilantes). On 24 April 1938, in a speech to the Party Congress in Karlovy Vary, Henlein came into the open with his “Karlsbad Program”. In this speech, which echoed Hitler in tone and substance, Henlein asserted the right of the Sudeten-Germans to profess “German political philosophy”, which, it was clear, meant National Socialism. (_998-PS_; _3061-PS_)

As the summer of 1938 wore on, the Henleinists used every technique of the Nazi Fifth Column. As summarized in the Czech official report, these included:

(1) _Espionage._ Military espionage was conducted by the SDP, the FS, and by other members of the German minority on behalf of Germany. Czech defenses were mapped, and information on Czech troop movements was furnished to the German authorities.

(2) _Nazification of German Organizations in Czechoslovakia._ The Henleinists systematically penetrated the whole life of the German population of Czechoslovakia. Associations and social and cultural centers gradually underwent “_Gleichschaltung_”, i.e., “purification”, by the SDP. Among the organizations conquered by the Henleinists were sport societies, rowing clubs, associations of ex-service men, and choral societies. The Henleinists were particularly interested in penetrating as many business institutions as possible and in bringing over to their side the directors of banks, the owners or directors of factories, and the managers of commercial firms. In the case of Jewish ownership or direction they attempted to secure the cooperation of the clerical and technical staffs of the institution.

(3) _German Direction and Leadership._ The Henleinists maintained permanent contact with the Nazi officials designated to direct operations within Czechoslovakia. Meetings in Germany at which Henleinists were exhorted and instructed in Fifth Column activity were camouflaged by being held in conjunction with _Saenger Feste_ (choral festivals), gymnastic shows and assemblies, and commercial gatherings such as the Leipzig Fair. Whenever the Nazi conspirators needed incidents for their war of nerves, it was the duty of the Henleinists to supply them.

(4) _Propaganda._ Disruptive and subversive propaganda was beamed at Czechoslovakia in German broadcasts and was echoed in the German press. Goebbels called Czechoslovakia a “nest of Bolshevism” and spread the false report of “Russian troops and airplanes” centered in Prague. Under direction from the Reich the Henleinists maintained whispering propaganda in the Sudetenland, which contributed to the mounting tension and to the creation of incidents. Illegal Nazi literature was smuggled from Germany and widely distributed in the border regions. The Henlein press more or less openly espoused Nazi ideology to the German population.

(5) _Murder and Terrorism._ The Nazi conspirators provided the Henleinists, and particularly the FS, with money and arms with which to provoke incidents and to maintain a state of permanent unrest. Gendarmes, customs officers, and other Czech officials were attacked. A boycott was established against Jewish lawyers, doctors, and tradesmen. The Henleinists terrorized the non-Henlein population, and the Nazi Gestapo crossed into border districts to carry Czechoslovak citizens across the border to Germany. In several cases political foes of the Nazis were murdered on Czech soil. Nazi agents murdered Professor Theodor Lessing in 1933 and the engineer Formis in 1935. Both men were anti-Nazis who had escaped from Germany after Hitler came to power and had sought refuge in Czechoslovakia. (_998-PS_; _3061-PS_)

Some time afterwards, when there was no longer need for pretense and deception, Konrad Henlein made a clear and frank statement of the mission assigned to him by the Nazi conspirators. This statement was made in a lecture by Konrad Henlein quoted on page 29 of “Four Fighting Years”, a publication of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In this lecture, delivered by Henlein on 4 March 1941 in the Auditorium of the University of Vienna under the auspices of the _Wiener Verwaltungsakadamie_, he discussed the “fight for the liberation of the Sudetens” in the following terms:

“National Socialism soon swept over us Sudeten-Germans. Our
struggle was of a different character from that in Germany.
Although we had to behave differently in public we were, of
course, secretly in touch with the National Socialist revolution
in Germany so that we might be a part of it. The struggle for
Greater Germany was waged on Sudeten soil, too. This struggle
could be waged only by those inspired by the spirit of National
Socialism, persons who were true followers of our Fuehrer,
whatever their outward appearance. Fate sought me out to be the
leader of the national group in its final struggle. When * * *
in autumn, 1933, the leaders of the NSDAP asked me to take over
the political leadership of the Sudeten-Germans, I had a
difficult problem to solve. Should the National Socialist Party
continue to be carried on illegally or should the movement, in
the interest of the self-preservation of the Sudeten-Germans and
in order to prepare their return to the Reich, wage its struggle
under camouflage and by methods which appeared quite legal to
the outside world? For us Sudeten-Germans only the second
alternative seemed possible, for the preservation of our
national group was at stake. It would certainly have been easier
to exchange this hard and mentally exhausting struggle for the
heroic gesture of confessing allegiance to National Socialism
and entering a Czechoslovak prison. But it seemed more than
doubtful whether by this means we could have fulfilled the
political task of destroying Czechoslovakia as a bastion in the
alliance against the German Reich.” (_2863-PS_)

I. _Evidence Implicating Nazi Conspirators in Czechoslovak Agitation._

The foregoing account of Nazi intrigue in Czechoslovakia is the outline of this conspiracy as it had been pieced together by the Czechoslovak government early in the summer of 1945. Since then captured documents and other information made available since the defeat of Germany have clearly and conclusively demonstrated the implication, which hitherto could only be deduced, of the Nazi conspirators in the Sudetenland agitation.

A telegram sent from the German Legation in Prague on 16 March 1938 to the Foreign Office in Berlin, presumably written by the German Minister, Eisenlohr, proves conclusively that the Henlein movement was an instrument of the Nazi conspirators (_3060-PS_). The Henlein party, it appears from this telegram, was directed from Berlin and from the German Legation in Prague. It could have no policy of its own; even the speeches of its leaders had to be coordinated with the German authorities. This telegram reads as follows:

“Rebuff to Frank has had a salutary effect. Have thrashed out
matters with Henlein, who recently had shunned me, and with
Frank separately and received following promises;

“1. The line of German Foreign Policy as transmitted by the
German Legation is exclusively decisive for policy and tactics
of the Sudeten German Party. My directives are to be complied
with implicitly.

“2. Public speeches and the press will be coordinated uniformly
with my approval. The editorial staff of “_Zeit_” (Time) is to
be improved.

“3. Party leadership abandons the former intransigent line which
in the end might lead to political complications and adopts a
line of gradual promotion of Sudeten-German interests. The
objectives are to be set in every case with my participation and
to be promoted by parallel diplomatic action. Laws for the
protection of nationalities (_Volksschutzgesetze_) and
‘territorial autonomy’ are no longer to be stressed.

“4. If consultations with Berlin agencies are required or
desired before Henlein issues important statements on his
program, they are to be applied for and prepared through the
Mission.

“5. All information of the Sudeten German Party for German
agencies is to be transmitted through the Legation.

“6. Henlein will establish contact with me every week, and will
come to Prague at any time if requested.

“I now hope to have the Sudeten German Party under firm control,
as this is more than ever necessary for coming developments in
the interest of foreign policy. Please inform ministries
concerned and Mittelstelle (Central Office for Racial Germans)
and request them to support this uniform direction of the
Sudeten German Party.” (_3060-PS_)

The dressing-down administered by Eisenlohr to Henlein had the desired effect. The day after the telegram was dispatched from Prague, Henlein addressed a humble letter to Ribbentrop, asking an early personal conversation (_2789-PS_). This letter, dated 17 March 1938, and captured in the German Foreign Office files, states:

“Most honored Minister of Foreign Affairs:

“In our deeply felt joy over the fortunate turn of events in
Austria we feel it our duty to express our gratitude to all
those who had a share in this new grand achievement of our
Fuehrer.

“I beg you, most honored Minister, to accept accordingly the
sincere thanks of the Sudeten-Germans herewith.

“We shall show our appreciation to the Fuehrer by doubled
efforts in the service of the Greater German policy.

“The new situation requires a reexamination of the Sudeten
German policy. For this purpose I beg to ask you for the
opportunity for a very early personal talk.

“In view of the necessity of such a clarification I have
postponed the Nation-wide Party Congress, originally scheduled
for 26th and 27th of March, 1938, for 4 weeks.

“I would appreciate if the Minister, Dr. Eisenlohr, and one of
my closest associates would be allowed to participate in the
requested talks.

“Heil Hitler,
“Loyally yours,
“/s/ Konrad Henlein.”
(_2789-PS_)

This letter makes it clear that Henlein was quite aware that the seizure of Austria made possible the adoption of a new policy toward Czechoslovakia. It also reveals that he was already in close enough contact with Ribbentrop and the German minister in Prague to feel free to suggest “early personal” talks.