Chapter XXVII: Part III: provides for penalties. The law is signed, “The Fuehrer and (2)

“The relation to Poland has become unbearable. My Polish policy
hitherto was in contrast to the ideas of the people. My
propositions to Poland, the Danzig corridor, were disturbed by
England’s intervention. Poland changed her tune towards us. The
initiative cannot be allowed to pass to others. This moment is
more favorable than in two to three years. An attempt on my life
or Mussolini’s could only change the situation to our
disadvantage. One cannot eternally stand opposite one another
with cocked rifle. A suggested compromise would have demanded
that we change our convictions and make agreeable gestures. They
talked to us again in the language of Versailles. There was
danger of losing prestige. Now the probability is still great
that the West will not interfere. We must accept the risk with
reckless resolution. A politician must accept a risk as much as
a military leader. We are facing the alternative to strike or to
be destroyed with certainty sooner or later.”

* * * * * *

“Now it is also a great risk. Iron nerves, iron resolution.”

* * * * * *

“We need not be afraid of a blockade. The East will supply us
with grain, cattle, coal, lead and zinc. It is a big arm, which
demands great efforts. I am only afraid that at the last minute
some _Schweinhund_ will make a proposal for mediation.”

* * * * * *

“Goering answers with thanks to the Fuehrer and the assurance
that the armed forces will do their duty.” (_798-PS_)

In his second speech on 22 August 1939 the Fuehrer had this to say:

“It may also turn out differently regarding England and France.
One cannot predict it with certainty. I figure on a
trade-barrier, not on blockade, and with severance of relations.
Most iron determination on our side. Retreat before nothing.
Everybody shall have to make a point of it that we were
determined from the beginning to fight the Western powers.
Struggle for life or death. Germany has won every war as long as
she was united. Iron, unflinching attitude of all superiors,
greatest confidence, faith in victory, overcoming of the past by
getting used to heaviest strain. A long period of peace would
not do us any good. Therefore it is necessary to expect
everything. Manly bearing. It is not machines that fight each
other, but men. We have the better quality of men. Mental
factors are decisive. The opposite camp has weaker people. In
1918, the Nation fell down because the mental prerequisites were
not sufficient. Frederic the Great secured final success only
through his mental power.

“Destruction of Poland in the foreground. The aim is elimination
of living forces, not the arrival at a certain line. Even if war
should break out in the West, the destruction of Poland shall be
the primary objective. Quick decision because of the season.

“I shall give a propagandistic cause for starting the war, never
mind whether it be plausible or not. The victor shall not be
asked, later on, whether we told the truth or not. In starting
and making a war, not the Right is what matters but Victory.

“Have no pity. Brutal attitude. 80,000,000 people shall get what
is their right. Their existence has to be secured. The strongest
has the Right. Greatest severity.

“Quick decision necessary. Unshakable faith in the German
soldier. A crisis may happen only if the nerves of the leaders
give way.

“First aim: advance to the Vistula and Narew. Our technical
superiority will break the nerves of the Poles. Every
newly-created Polish force shall again be broken at once.
Constant war of attrition.

“New German frontier according to healthy principle. Possibly a
protectorate as a buffer. Military operations shall not be
influenced by these reflections. Complete destruction of Poland
is the military aim. To be fast is the main thing. Pursuit until
complete elimination.

“Conviction that the German _Wehrmacht_ is up to the
requirements. The start shall be ordered, probably by Saturday
morning.” (_1014-PS_)

D. _Expansion into General War of Aggression: Scandinavia, The Low Countries, The Balkans._

The aggressive war having been initiated in September 1939, and Poland having been defeated shortly after the initial assaults, the Nazi aggressors converted the war into a general war of aggression extending into Scandinavia, into the Low Countries, and into the Balkans. (Under the division of the case agreed by the four Chief Prosecutors, this phase of aggression was left for development to the British prosecuting staff, and is discussed in Sections 9, 10 and 11 of this Chapter, _infra_.)

E. _Aggression Against the U. S. S. R._

The attack upon Russia was preceded with premeditation and deliberation. Just as, in the case of aggression against Czechoslovakia, the Nazis had a code name for the secret operation, “Case Green”, so in the case of aggression against the Soviet Union, they had a code name, “Case Barbarossa”. A secret directive, Number 21, issued from the Fuehrer’s Headquarters on 18 December 1940, relating to “Case Barbarossa,” was captured among the OKW files at Flensberg (_446-PS_). This directive was issued more than six months in advance of the attack. (Other evidence shows that the planning occurred even earlier.) This order, signed by Hitler and initialled by Jodl and Keitel, was issued in nine copies, of which we have the fourth. The directive reads:

“The German Armed Forces must be prepared to crush Soviet Russia
in a quick campaign before the end of the war against England.
(Case Barbarossa.)

“For this purpose the Army will have to employ all available
units with the reservation that the occupied territories will
have to be safeguarded against surprise attacks.

“For the Eastern campaign the Air force will have to free such
strong forces for the support of the Army that a quick
completion of the ground operations may be expected and that
damage of the Eastern German territories will be avoided as much
as possible. This concentration of the main effort in the East
is limited by the following reservation: That the entire battle
and armament area dominated by us must remain sufficiently
protected against enemy air attacks and that the attacks on
England and especially the supply for them must not be permitted
to break down.

“Concentration of the main effort of the Navy remains
unequivocally against England also during an Eastern campaign.

“If occasion arises I will order the concentration of troops for
action against Soviet Russia eight weeks before the intended
beginning of operations.

“Preparations requiring more time to start are—if this has not
yet been done—to begin presently and are to be completed by 15
May 1941.

“Great caution has to be exercised that the intention of an
attack will not be recognized.

“The preparations of the High Command are to be made on the
following basis:

“I. _General Purpose_:

“The mass of the Russian Army in Western Russia is to be
destroyed in daring operations by driving forward deep wedges
with tanks and the retreat of intact battle-ready troops into
the wide spaces of Russia is to be prevented.

“In quick pursuit a (given) line is to be reached from where the
Russian Air force will no longer be able to attack German Reich
territory. The first goal of operations is the protection from
Asiatic Russian from the general line Volga-Archangelsk. In case
of necessity, the last industrial area in the Urals left to
Russia could be eliminated by the Luftwaffe.

In the course of these operations the Russian Baltic Sea Fleet
will quickly erase its bases and will no longer be ready to
fight.

“Effective intervention by the Russian Air force is to be
prevented through forceful blows at the beginning of the
operations.” (_446-PS_)

Another secret document captured from the OKW files establishes the motive for the attack on the Soviet Union (_2718-PS_). It also establishes the full awareness of the Nazi conspirators of the Crimes against Humanity which would result from their attack. The document is a memorandum of 2 May 1941 concerning the results of a discussion on that day with the State Secretaries concerning “Case Barbarossa.” The memorandum reads in part:

“Matter for Chief; 2 copies; first copy to files Ia. Second copy
to General Schubert. May 2nd, 1941. Memorandum. About the result
of today’s discussion with the State Secretaries about
Barbarossa.

“1. The war can only be continued if all armed forces are fed by
Russia in the third year of war.

“2. There is no doubt that as a result many millions of people
will be starved to death if we take out of the country the
things necessary for us.” (_2718-PS_)

F. _Collaboration with Japan: Precipitation Of The Pearl Harbor Attack._

With the unleashing of the German aggressive war against the Soviet Union in June 1941, the Nazi conspirators and, in particular Ribbentrop, called upon the Eastern co-architect of the New Order, Japan, to attack in the rear. The Nazi’s incited and kept in motion a force reasonably calculated to result in an attack on the United States. For a time, they preferred that the United States not be involved in the conflict, due to military considerations. However, their incitement resulted in the attack on Pearl Harbor, and long prior to that attack, they had assured the Japanese that they would declare War on the United States should a United States-Japanese conflict occur. It was in reliance on these assurances that the Japanese struck at Pearl Harbor.

These matters are disclosed in a document, captured from the files of the German Foreign Office, which consists of notes dated 4 April 1941, signed by Schmidt, regarding discussions between the Fuehrer and the Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka, in the presence of Ribbentrop (_1881-PS_). Pertinent parts of this document read as follows:

“Matsuoka then also expressed the request, that the Fuehrer
should instruct the proper authorities in Germany to meet as
broad-mindedly as possible the wishes of the Japanese Military
Commission. Japan was in need of German help particularly
concerning the U-boat warfare, which could be given by making
available to them the latest experiences of the war as well as
the latest technical improvements and inventions. * * *

“Japan would do her utmost to avoid a war with the United
States. In case that the country should decide to attack
Singapore, the Japanese navy, of course, had to be prepared for
a fight with the United States, because in that case America
would probably side with Great Britain. He (Matsuoka) personally
believed, that the United States could be restrained by
diplomatic exertions from entering the war at the side of Great
Britain. Army and Navy had, however, to count on the worse
situation, that is war against America. They were of the opinion
that such a war would extend for five years or longer and would
take the form of guerilla warfare in the Pacific and would be
fought out in the South Sea. For this reason the German
experiences in her guerilla warfare are of the greatest value to
Japan. It was a question how such a war would best be conducted
and how all the technical improvements of submarine, in all
details such as periscopes and such like, could best be
exploited by Japan. “To sum up, Matsuoka requested that the
Fuehrer should see to it that the proper German authorities
would place at the disposal of the Japanese these developments
and inventions concerning navy and army, which were needed by
the Japanese.

“The Fuehrer promised this and pointed out that Germany too
considered a conflict with the United States undesirable, but
that it had already made allowance for such a contingency. In
Germany one was of the opinion that America’s contribution
depended upon the possibilities of transportation, and that this
again is conditioned by the available tonnage. Germany’s war
against tonnage, however, means a decisive weakening not merely
against England, but also against America. Germany has made her
preparations so that no American could land in Europe. She would
conduct a most energetic fight against America with her U-boats
and her Luftwaffe, and due to her superior experience, which
would still have to be acquired by the United States, she would
be vastly superior, and that quite apart from the fact, that the
German soldier naturally ranks high above the American.

“In the further course of the discussion the Fuehrer pointed
out, that Germany on her part would immediately take the
consequences, if Japan would get involved with the United
States. It did not matter with whom the United States would
first get involved, if with Germany or with Japan. They would
always try to eliminate one country at a time, not to come to an
understanding with the other country subsequently. Therefore
Germany would strike, as already mentioned, without delay in
case of a conflict between Japan and America, because the
strength of the tripartite powers lies in their joined action,
their weakness would be if they would let themselves be beaten
individually.

“Matsuoka once more repeated his request, that the Fuehrer might
give the necessary instructions, in order that the proper German
authorities would place at the disposal of the Japanese the
latest improvements and inventions, which are of interest to
them. Because the Japanese navy had to prepare immediately for a
conflict with the United States.

“As regards Japanese-American relationship, Matsuoka explained
further that he has always declared in his country, that sooner
or later a war with the United States would be unavoidable, if
Japan continued to drift along as at present. In his opinion
this conflict would happen rather sooner than later. His
argumentation went on, why should Japan, therefore, not
decisively strike at the right moment and take the risk upon
herself of a fight against America? Just thus would she perhaps
avoid a war for generations, particularly if she gained
predominance in the South Seas. There are, to be sure, in Japan
many who hesitate to follow those trends of thought. Matsuoka
was considered in those circles a dangerous man with dangerous
thoughts. He, however, stated that, if Japan continued to walk
along her present path, one day she would have to fight anyway
and that this would then be under less favorable circumstances
than at present.

“The Fuehrer replied that he could well understand the situation
of Matsuoka, because he himself was in similar situations (the
clearing of the Rhineland, declaration of sovereignty of armed
Forces). He too was of the opinion that he had to exploit
favorable conditions and accept the risk of an anyhow
unavoidable fight at a time when he himself was still young and
full of vigor. How right he was in his attitude was proven by
events. Europe now was free. He would not hesitate a moment
instantly to reply to any widening of the war, be it by Russia,
be it by America. Providence favored those who will not let
dangers come to them, but who will bravely face them.

“Matsuoka replied, that the United States or rather their ruling
politicians had recently still attempted a last manoeuver
towards Japan, by declaring that America would not fight Japan
on account of China or the South Seas provided that Japan gave
free passage to the consignment of rubber and tin to America to
their place of destination. However, America would war against
Japan the moment she felt that Japan entered the war with the
intention to assist in the destruction of Great Britain. * * *

“The Fuehrer commented on this, that this attitude of America
did not mean anything but that the United States had the hope,
that, as long as the British World Empire existed, one day they
could advance against Japan together with Great Britain,
whereas, in case of the collapse of the World Empire, they would
be totally isolated and could not do anything against Japan.

“The Reich Foreign Minister interjected that the Americans
precisely under all circumstances wanted to maintain the
powerful position of England in East Asia, but that on the other
hand it is proved by this attitude, to what extent she fears a
joint action of Japan and Germany.

“Matsuoka continued that it seemed to him of importance to give
to the Fuehrer an absolutely clear picture of the real attitude
inside Japan. For this reason he also had to inform him
regretfully of the fact that he (Matsuoka) in his capacity as
Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs could not utter in Japan
itself a single word of all that he had expounded before the
Fuehrer and the Reich Foreign Minister regarding his plans. This
would cause him serious damage in political and financial
circles. Once before, he had committed the mistake, before he
became Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, to tell a close
friend something about his intentions. It seems that the latter
had spread these things and thus brought about all sorts of
rumors, which he as Foreign Minister had to oppose
energetically, though as a rule he always tells the truth. Under
those circumstances he also could not indicate, how soon he
could report on the questions discussed to the Japanese Premier
or to the Emperor. He would have to study exactly and carefully
in the first place the development in Japan, so as to make his
decision at a favorable moment, to make a clean breast of his
proper plans towards the Prince Konoye and the Emperor. Then the
decision would have to be made within a few days, because the
plans would otherwise be spoiled by talk.

“Should he, Matsuoka, fail to carry out his intentions, that
would be proof that he is lacking in influence, in power of
conviction, and in tactical capabilities. However, should he
succeed, it would prove that he had great influence in Japan. He
himself felt confident that he would succeed.

“On his return, being questioned, he would indeed admit to the
Emperor, the Premier and the Ministers for the Navy and the
Army, that Singapore had been discussed; he would, however,
state that it was only on a hypothetical basis.

“Besides this Matsuoka made the express request not to cable in
the matter of Singapore because he had reason to fear that by
cabling something might leak out. If necessary he would send a
courier.

“The Fuehrer agreed and assured after all, that he could rest
entirely assured of German reticence.

“Matsuoka replied he believed indeed in German reticence, but
unfortunately could not say the same of Japan.

“The discussion was terminated after the exchange of some
personal parting words.

“Berlin, the 4th of April 1941.

“(signed) SCHMIDT” (_1881-PS_)

* * * * *

LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE PLOTTING OF
AGGRESSIVE WAR

Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page
│ │ │
│Charter of the International Military │ │
│ Tribunal, Article 6 (a). │ I │ 5
│ │ │
│International Military Tribunal, │ │
│ Indictment Number 1, Section IV (F); │ │
│ V. │ I │ 22, 29
│ ————— │ │
│Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │
│document indicates that the document was│ │
│received in evidence at the Nurnberg │ │
│trial. A double asterisk (**) before a │ │
│document number indicates that the │ │
│document was referred to during the │ │
│trial but was not formally received in │ │
│evidence, for the reason given in │ │
│parentheses following the description of│ │
│the document. The USA series number, │ │
│given in parentheses following the │ │
│description of the document, is the │ │
│official exhibit number assigned by the │ │
│court. │ │
│ ————— │ │
*386-PS │Notes on a conference with Hitler in the│ │
│Reich Chancellery, Berlin, 5 November │ │
│1937, signed by Hitler’s adjutant, │ │
│Hossbach, and dated 10 November 1937. │ │
│(USA 25) │ III │ 295
│ │ │
*388-PS │File of papers on Case Green (the plan │ │
│for the attack on Czechoslovakia), kept │ │
│by Schmundt, Hitler’s adjutant, │ │
│April-October 1938. (USA 26) │ III │ 305
│ │ │
442-PS │General Order No. 16 on the preparation │ │
│of a landing operation against England, │ │
│16 July 1940, initialled by Jodl and │ │
│Keitel. │ III │ 399
│ │ │
*446-PS │Top Secret Fuehrer Order No. 21 signed │ │
│by Hitler and initialled by Jodl, │ │
│Warlimont and Keitel, 18 December 1940, │ │
│concerning the Invasion of Russia (case │ │
│Barbarossa). (USA 31) │ III │ 407
│ │ │
*789-PS │Speech of the Fuehrer at a conference, │ │
│23 November 1939, to which all Supreme │ │
│Commanders were ordered. (USA 23) │ III │ 572
│ │ │
*798-PS │Hitler’s speech to Commanders-in-Chief, │ │
│at Obersalzberg, 22 August 1939. (USA │ │
│29) │ III │ 581
│ │ │
*1014-PS │Hitler’s speech to Commanders-in-Chief, │ │
│22 August 1939. (USA 30) │ III │ 665
│ │ │
*1881-PS │Notes on conference between Hitler and │ │
│Matsuoka in presence of Ribbentrop in │ │
│Berlin, 4 April 1941. (USA 33) │ IV │ 522
│ │ │
*2261-PS │Directive from Blomberg to Supreme │ │
│Commanders of Army, Navy and Air Forces,│ │
│24 June 1935; accompanied by copy of │ │
│Reich Defense Law of 21 May 1935 and │ │
│copy of Decision of Reich Cabinet of 12 │ │
│May 1935 on the Council for defense of │ │
│the Reich. (USA 24) │ IV │ 934
│ │ │
*2718-PS │Memorandum “About the result of today’s │ │
│discussion with State Secretaries about │ │
│Barbarossa”, 2 May 1941. (USA 32) │ V │ 378
│ │ │
*D-660 │Extracts from Hutchinson’s Illustrated │ │
│edition of Mein Kampf. (GB 128) │ VII │ 164
│ │ │
**L-3 │Contents of Hitler’s talk to Supreme │ │
│Commander and Commanding Generals, │ │
│Obersalzberg, 22 August 1939. (USA 28) │ │
│(Referred to but not offered in │ │
│evidence) │ VII │ 752
│ │ │
*L-79 │Minutes of conference, 23 May 1939, │ │
│“Indoctrination on the political │ │
│situation and future aims”. (USA 27) │ VII │ 847

2. PREPARATION FOR AGGRESSION: 1933-1936

By 1933 the Nazi Party, the NSDAP, had reached very substantial proportions. At that time its plans called for the acquisition of political control of Germany. This was indispensable for consolidation, within the country, of all the internal resources and potentialities.

As soon as there was sufficient progress along this line of internal consolidation, the next step was to become disengaged from some of the external disadvantages of existing international limitations and obligations.

The restrictions of the Versailles Treaty were a bar to the development of strength in all the fields necessary if Germany were to make war. Although there had been an increasing amount of circumvention and violation from the very time that the Versailles Treaty came into effect, such operations under disguise and subterfuge could not attain proportions adequate for the objectives of the Nazis. To get the Treaty of Versailles out of the way was indispensable to the development of the extensive military power which they had to have for their purposes. It was as a part of the same plan and for the same reason that Germany withdrew from the Disarmament Conference and from the League of Nations. It was impossible for the Nazis to carry out their plan on the basis of existing international obligations or on the basis of the orthodox kind of future commitments.

Every military and diplomatic operation undertaken by the Nazis was preceded by a plan of action and a careful coordination of all participating forces. At the same time each event was part of a long prepared plan of aggression. Each represented a necessary step in the preparation of the schedule of aggressions which was subsequently carried out.

Three of the steps in preparation for aggression were first, the withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations; second, the institution of compulsory military service; and, third, the reoccupation of the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland. Each of these steps was progressively more serious in the matter of international relations. In each of these steps Germany anticipated the possibility of sanctions being applied by other countries, and, particularly, a strong military action from France with the possible assistance of England. However, the conspirators were determined that nothing less than a preventive war would stop them, and they also estimated correctly that no one or combination of big powers would undertake the responsibility for such a war. The withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference and from the League of Nations was, of course, action that did not violate any international obligation. The League Covenant provided the procedure for withdrawal. These actions, however, cannot be disassociated from the general conspiracy and the plan for aggression. The announcement of the institution of universal military service was a more daring action. It was a violation of the Versailles Treaty, but the Nazis got away with it. Then came outright military defiance, with the occupation of the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland.

A. _Planning to Overthrow the Versailles Treaty._

The determination and the plans of the Nazi conspirators to remove the restrictions of Versailles, started very early. This fact is confirmed by their own statements, their boasts of long planning and careful execution. Hitler, in his speech to all Supreme Commanders on 23 November 1939, stated that his primary goal was to wipe out Versailles (_789-PS_). And Jodl, as Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, delivered an address after four years of war, on 7 November 1943, in which he traced the development of German strength (_L-172_). The seizure of power to him meant the restoration of fighting sovereignty, including conscription, occupation of the Rhineland, and rearmament, with special emphasis on modern armor and air forces. In his speech, entitled “The Strategic Position at the Beginning of the 5th Year of War,” General Jodl gave a retrospective summary of the war for the benefit of the Reich and Gau leaders. He stated:

“Introduction: Reichsleiter Bormann has requested me to give you
a review today of the strategic position in the beginning of the
5th Year of War.

“I must admit that it was not without hesitation that I
undertook this none too easy task. It is not possible to do it
justice with a few generalities. It is not necessary to say
openly what is. No one—the Fuehrer has ordered—may know more
or be told more than he needs for his own immediate task, but I
have no doubt at all in my mind, Gentlemen, but that you need a
great deal in order to be able to cope with your tasks. It is in
your Gaus, after all, and among their inhabitants that all the
enemy propaganda, the defeatism, and the malicious rumours
concentrate, that try to find themselves a plan among our
people. Up and down the country the devil of subversion strides.
All the cowards are seeking a way out, or—as they call it—a
political solution. They say, we must negotiate while there is
still something in hand, and all these slogans are made use of
to attack the natural sense of the people, that in this war
there can only be a fight to the end. Capitulation is the end of
the Nation, the end of Germany. Against this wave of enemy
propaganda and cowardice you need more than force. You need to
know the true situation and for this reason I believe that I am
justified in giving you a perfectly open and uncolored account
of the state of affairs. This is no forbidden disclosure of
secrets, but a weapon which may perhaps help you to fortify the
morale of the people. For this war will not only be decided by
the force of arms but by the will of the whole people. Germany
was broken in 1918 not at the front but at home. Italy suffered
not military defeat but morale defeat. She broke down
internally. The result has been not the peace she expected
but—through the cowardice of these criminal traitors—a fate
thousand times harder than continuation of the war at our side
would have brought to the Italian people. I can rely on you,
Gentlemen, that since I give concrete figures and data
concerning our own strength, you will treat these details as
your secret; all the rest is at your disposal without
restriction for application in your activities as leaders of the
people.

“The necessity and objectives of this war were clear to all and
everyone at the moment when we entered upon the War of
Liberation of Greater Germany and by attacking parried the
danger which menaced us both from Poland and from the Western
powers. Our further incursions into Scandinavia, in the
direction of the Mediterranean, and in that of Russia—these
also aroused no doubts concerning the general conduct of the war
so long as we were successful. It was not until more serious
set-backs were encountered and our general situation began to
become increasingly acute, that the German people began to ask
itself whether perhaps we had not undertaken more than we could
do and set our aims too high. To provide an answer to this
questioning and to furnish you with certain points of view for
use in your own explanatory activities is one of the main points
of my present lecture; I shall divide it into three parts:

“I. A review of the most important development up to the
present.

“II. Consideration of the present situation.

“III. The foundation of our morale and our confidence in
victory.

“In view of my position as military advisor to the Fuehrer, I
shall confine myself in my remarks to the problems of my own
personal sphere of action, fully appreciating at the same time
that in view of the protean nature of this war, I shall in this
way be giving expression only to one side of events.

“I. _Review_

“1. The fact that the National Socialist movement and its
struggle for internal power were the preparatory stage of the
outer liberation from the bonds of the Dictate of Versailles is
not one on which I need enlarge in this circle. I should like
however to mention at this point how clearly all thoughtful
regular soldiers realize what an important part has been played
by the National Socialist movement in reawakening the will to
fight [_Wehrwillen_] in nurturing fighting strength
[_Wehrkraft_] and in rearming the German people. In spite of all
the virtue inherent in it, the numerically small _Reichswehr_
would never have been able to cope with this task, if only
because of its own restricted radius of action. Indeed, what the
Fuehrer aimed at—and has so happily been successful in bringing
about—was the fusion of these two forces.

“2. The seizure of power in its turn has meant in the first
place restoration of fighting sovereignty
[_Wehrhoheit_—conscription, occupation of the Rhineland] and
rearmament with special emphasis being laid on the creation of a
modern armoured and air arm.

“3. The Austrian ‘_Anschlluss_’ in its turn, brought with it not
only the fulfillment of an old national aim but also had the
effect both of reinforcing our fighting strength and of
materially improving our strategic position. Whereas up till
then the territory of Czechoslovakia had projected in a most
menacing way right into Germany (a wasp waist in the direction
of France and an air base for the Allies, in particular Russia),
Czechoslovakia herself was now enclosed by pincers.

“Its own strategic position had now become so unfavorable that
she was bound to fall a victim to any attack pressed home with
rigour before effective aid from the West could be expected to
arrive.

“This possibility of aid was furthermore made more difficult by
the construction of the West Wall, which, in contra-distinction
to the Maginot Line, was not a measure based on debility and
resignation but one intended to afford rear cover for an active
policy in the East.

“4. The bloodless solution of the Czech conflict in the autumn
of 1938 and spring of 1939 and the annexation of Slovakia
rounded off the territory of Greater Germany in such a way that
it now became possible to consider the Polish problem on the
basis of more or less favourable strategic premises.

“This brings me to the actual outbreak of the present war, and
the question which next arises is whether the moment for the
struggle with Poland—in itself unavoidable—was favorably
selected or not. The answer to this question is all the less in
doubt since the opponent—after all, not inconsiderable in
himself—collapsed unexpectedly quickly, and the Western Powers
who were his friends, while they did declare war on us and form
a second front, yet for the rest made no use of the
possibilities open to them of snatching the initiative from our
hands. Concerning the course of the Polish campaign, nothing
further need be said beyond that it proved in a measure which
made the whole world sit up and take notice a point which up
till then had not been certain by any means; that is, the high
state of efficiency of the young Armed Forces of Great Germany.”
(_L-172_)

In this speech General Jodl identifies himself fully with the Nazi movement. His own words show that he was not a mere soldier. Insofar as he is concerned, his speech identifies the military with the political, it also shows the deliberation with which the Treaty of Versailles was abrogated by Germany and the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland was militarized and fortified.

In one of Adolf Hitler’s reviews of the six-year period between his ascendancy to power and the outbreak of hostilities, he not only admitted but boasted about the orderly and coordinated long-range planning. The minutes of conference of the Fuehrer kept by Schmundt, his adjutant, contain the following passage:

“In the period 1933-1939 progress was made in all fields. Our
military system improved enormously.”

* * * * * *

“The period which lies behind us has, indeed, been put to good
use. All measures have been taken in the correct sequence and in
harmony with our aims.” (_L-79_)

B. _Economic and Financial Preparations for Aggressive War._

One of the most significant preparations for aggressive war is found in the Secret Reich Defense Law of 21 May 1935 (_2261-PS_). The law went into effect upon its passage. It stated at its outset that it was to be made public instanter, but at the end of it Adolf Hitler signed the decree ordering that it be kept secret. General Thomas, who was in charge of War Armament Economy and for some time a high-ranking member of the German High Command, refers, to this law as the cornerstone of war preparations. He points out that, although the law was not made public until the outbreak of war, it was put into immediate execution as a program for preparations. These statements are made at page 25 of General Thomas’ work, “A History of the German War and Armament Economy, 1923-1944.” (_2353-PS_)

This secret law remained in effect until 4 September 1939, at which time it was replaced by another secret defense law (_2194-PS_) revising the system of defense organization and directing more detailed preparations for the approaching status of “mobilization,” which was clearly an euphemism for war.

The covering letter, under which this second Reich Defense Law, was sent to the Ministry for Economy and Labor for Saxony in Dresden, on 6 December 1939, was classified Top Secret and read as follows:

“Transportation Section, attention of Construction Chief
Counsellor Hirches, or representative in the office of the Reich
Protector in Bohemia and Moravia, received Prague, 5 September
1939, No. 274.

“Inclosed please find a copy of the Reich Defense Law of 4
September 1938 and a copy each of the decrees of the Reich
Minister of Transportation, dated 7 October 1938, RL 10.2212/38,
top secret, and of 17 July 1939, RL/LV 1.2173/39, top secret.
For your information and observance, by order, signed
Kretzchmar. 3 inclosures completed to Dresden, 4 September 1939,
signed Schneider 3 inclosures. Receipt for the letter of 4
September 1939, with 3 inclosures, signed 5 September, 1939, and
returned to construction Counsellor Kretzchmar.” (_2194-PS_)

Thus the second secret Reich Defense Law was transmitted under top secret cover.

The general plan for the breach of the Treaty of Versailles and for the ensuing aggressions was carried out in four ways: (1) secret rearmament from 1933 to March 1935; (2) the training of military personnel (that includes secret or camouflage training); (3) production of munitions of war; (4) the building of an air force.

The facts of rearmament and of secrecy are self-evident from the events that followed. The significant phase of this activity lies in the fact that it was necessary in order to break the barriers of the Treaty of Versailles and of the Locarno Pact, and to make ready for aggressive wars which were to follow.

Those activities by their nature and extent, could only have been for aggressive purposes. The highest importance which the German government attached to the secrecy of the program is emphasized by the disguised methods of financing utilized both before and after the announcement of conscription, and the rebuilding of the army, on 16 March 1935.

The point is illustrated by an unsigned memorandum by Schacht dated 3 May 1935, entitled, “The Financing of the Armament program, “_Finanzierung der Ruestung_.” (1168-PS) It is not signed by Schacht, but in an interrogation on 16 October 1945, he identified it as being his memorandum. The memorandum reads as follows:

“Memorandum from Schacht to Hitler [identified by Schacht as
Exhibit A, interrogation 16 October 1945, page 40] May 3, 1935.

“Financing of Armament. The following explanations are based
upon the thought, that the accomplishment of the armament
program with speed and in quantity is _the_ problem of German
politics, that everything else therefore should be subordinated
to this purpose as long as the main purpose is not imperiled by
neglecting all other questions. Even after March 16, 1935, the
difficulty remains that one cannot undertake the open
propagandistic treatment of the German people for support of
armament without endangering our position internationally
(without loss to our foreign trade). The already nearly
impossible financing of the armament program is rendered hereby
exceptionally difficult.

“Another supposition must be also emphasized. The printing press
can be used only for the financing of armament to such a degree,
as permitted by maintaining of the money value. Every inflation
increases the prices of foreign raw materials and increases the
domestic prices, is therefore like a snail biting its own tail.
The circumstance that our armament had to be camouflaged
completely till March 16, 1935, and even since this date the
camouflage had to be continued to a larger extent, making it
necessary to use the printing press (bank note press) already at
the beginning of the whole armament program, while it would have
been natural, to start it (the printing press) at the final
point of financing. In the porte-feuille of the Reichsbank are
segregated notes for this purpose, that is, armament, of 3,775
millions and 866 millions, altogether 4,641 millions, out of
which the armament notes amount to Reichsmarks 2,374 millions,
that is, of April 30, 1935. The Reichsbank has invested the
amount of marks under its jurisdiction, but belonging to
foreigners in blank notes of armament. Our armaments are also
financed partly with the credits of our political opponents.
Furthermore, 500 million Reichsmarks were used for financing of
armament, which originated out of [_Reichsanleihe_], the federal
loans, placed with savings banks. In the regular budget, the
following amounts were provided. For the budget period 1933-34,
Reichsmarks 750 millions; for the budget period 1934-35,
Reichsmarks 1,100 millions; and for the budget period 1935-36,
Reichsmarks 2,500 millions.

“The amount of deficits of the budget since 1928 increases after
the budget 1935-36 to 5 to 6 millions Reichsmarks. This total
deficit is already financed at the present time by short term
credits of the money market. It therefore reduces in advance the
possibilities of utilization of the public market for the
armament. The Minister of Finance [_Reichsfinanzminister_],
correctly points out at the defense of the budget: As a
permanent yearly deficit is an impossibility, as we cannot
figure with security with increased tax revenues in amount
balancing the deficit and any other previous debits, as on the
other hand a balanced budget is the only secure basis for the
impending great task of military policy. For all these reasons
we have to put in motion a fundamental and conscious budget
policy which solves the problem of armament financing by organic
and planned reduction of other expenditures not only from the
point of receipt, but also from the point of expenditure, that
is, by saving.

“How urgent this question is, can be deduced from the following,
that a large amount of task has been started by the state and
party and which is now in process, all of which are not covered
by the budget, but from contributions and credits, which have to
be raised by industry in addition to the regular taxes.

“The existing of various budgets side by side, which serve more
or less public tasks, is the greatest impediment for gaining a
clear view over the possibilities of financing the armaments. A
whole number of ministries and various branches of the party
have their own budgets, and for this reason have possibilities
of incomes and expenses, though based on the sovereignty of
finance of the state, but not subject to the control of the
Minister of Finance and therefore also not subject to the
control of the cabinet. Just as in the sphere of politics the
much too far-reaching delegation of legislative powers to
individuals brought about various states within the states,
exactly in the same way the condition of various branches of
state and party, working side by side and against each other,
has a devastating effect on the possibility of financing. If on
this territory concentration and unified control is not
introduced very soon, the solution of the already impossible
task of armament financing is endangered.

“We have the following tasks:

“(1) A deputy is entrusted with finding all sources and
revenues, which have its origin in contributions to the federal
government, to the state and party and in profits of public and
party enterprises.

“(2) Furthermore experts, entrusted by the Fuehrer, have to
examine how these amounts were used and which of these amounts
can in the future be withdrawn from their previous purpose.

“(3) The same experts have to examine the investments of all
public and party organizations, to which extent this property
can be used for the purpose of armament financing.

“(4) The federal Ministry of Finance is to be entrusted to
examine the possibilities of increased revenues by way of new
taxes or increasing of existing taxes.

“The up-to-date financing of armaments by the Reichsbank under
existing political conditions was a necessity and the political
success proved the correctness of this action. The other
possibilities of armament financing have to be started now under
any circumstances. For this purpose all absolutely non-essential
expenditures for other purposes must not take place and the
total financial strength of Germany, limited as it is, has to be
concentrated for the one purpose of armament financing. Whether
the problem of financing, as outlined in this program, succeeds,
remains to be seen, but without such concentration, it will fail
with absolute certainty.” (_1168-PS_)

C. _Renunciation of Armament Provisions of Versailles Treaty._

21 May 1935 was a very important date in the Nazi calendar. It was on that date that the Nazis passed the secret Reich Defense Law (_2261-PS_). The secrecy of their armament operations had already reached the point beyond which they could no longer maintain successful camouflage. Since their program called for still further expansion, they unilaterally renounced the armament provisions of the Versailles Treaty on the same date, 21 May 1935. Hitler’s speech to the Reichstag on that day (_2288-PS_) was published in “_Voelkischer Beobachter_” under the heading “The Fuehrer Notifies the World of the Way to Real Peace.” Hitler declared:

“1. The German Reich Government refuses to adhere to the Geneva
Resolution of 17 May.

“The Treaty of Versailles was not broken by Germany
unilaterally, but the well-known paragraphs of the dictate of
Versailles were violated, and consequently invalidated, by those
powers who could not make up their minds to follow the
disarmament requested of Germany with their own disarmament as
agreed upon by Treaty.

“2. Because the other powers did not live up to their
obligations under the disarmament program, the Government of the
German Reich no longer considers itself bound to those articles,
which are nothing but a discrimination against the German nation
for an unlimited period of time, since, through them, Germany is
being nailed down in a unilateral manner contrary to the spirit
of the agreement.” (_2288-PS_)

In conjunction with other phases of planning and preparation for aggressive war, there were various programs for direct and indirect training of a military nature. They included not only the training of military personnel, but also the establishment and training of other military organizations, such as the Police Force, which could be and were absorbed by the Army. The extent of this program for military training is indicated by Hitler’s boast of the expenditure of ninety billion Reichsmarks during the period 1933 to 1939, in the building up of the armed forces.

In a speech by Adolf Hitler delivered on 1 September, 1939, (_2322-PS_), which was published in the “_Voelkischer Beobachter_” under the heading “The Fuehrer announces the Battle for the Justice and Security of the Reich”, the following passage occurred:

“For more than six years now, I have been engaged in building up
the German Armed Forces. During this period more than ninety
billion Reichsmarks were spent building up the _Wehrmacht_.
Today, ours are the best-equipped armed forces in the world, and
they are superior to those of 1914. My confidence in them can
never be shaken.” (_2322-PS_)

The secret nature of this training program and the fact of its early development is illustrated by a report to Hess, in 1932, concerning the secret training of flying personnel, as well as the early plans to build a military air force (_1143-PS_). This report was sent in a letter from Schickedantz to Rosenberg, for delivery to Hess. Apparently Schickedantz was very anxious that no one but Hess should get this letter, and therefore sent it to Rosenberg for personal delivery to Hess. The letter points out that the civilian pilots should be so organized as to enable their transfer into the military air force organization. The letter dated 20 October 1932, reads:

“Dear Alfred [Rosenberg]: I am sending you enclosed a
communication from the RWM forwarded to me by our confidential
man (_Vertrauensmann_) which indeed is very interesting. I
believe we will have to take some steps so that the matter will
not be procured secretly for the Stahlhelm. This report is not
known to anybody else. I intentionally did not inform even our
tall friend.” [Rosenberg, in an interrogation on 5 October 1945,
identified this “tall friend” as being Von Albensleben.] “I am
enclosing an additional copy for Hess, and ask you to transmit
the letter to Hess by messenger, as I do not want to write a
letter to Hess for fear that it might be read somewhere. _Mit
bestem Gruss_, Yours Amo.” (_1143-PS_)

Enclosed in the report is:

“Air Force Organization”

“Purpose: Preparation of material and training of personnel to
provide for the case of the armament of the air force.

“Entire management as a civilian organization will be
transferred to Col. Von Willberg, at present commander of
Breslau, who, retaining his position in the Reichwehr, is going
on leave of absence.

“(a) Organizing the pilots of civilian air lines in such a way
as to enable their transfer to the air force organization.

“(b) Prospects to train crews for military flying. Training to
be done within the organization for military flying of the
Stahlhelm [steel helmet] which is being turned over to Col.
Hanel, retired.

“All existing organizations for sport flying are to be used for
military flying. Directions on kinds and tasks of military
flying will be issued by this Stahlhelm directorate. The
Stahlhelm organization will pay the military pilots 50 marks per
hour flight. These are due to the owner of the plane in case he
himself carries out the flight. They are to be divided in case
of non-owners of the plane, between flight organization,
proprietor and crew in the proportion of 10:20:20. Military
flying is now paid better than flying for advertisement (40). We
therefore have to expect that most proprietors of planes or
flying associations will go over to the Stahlhelm organization.
It must be achieved that equal conditions will be granted by the
RWM, also the NSDAP organization.” (_1143-PS_)

D. _Secret Rearmament_

The program of rearmament and the objectives of circumventing and breaching the Versailles Treaty are forcefully shown by a number of Navy documents, showing the participation and cooperation of the German navy in this rearmament program which was secret at first. When it was deemed safe to say so, the Navy openly acknowledged that it had always been its objective to break the Versailles Treaty.

In 1937 the Navy High Command (OKM) published a secret book entitled, “The Fight of the Navy Against Versailles, 1919 to 1935”, written by Sea Captain Schussler (_C-156_). The preface refers to the fight of the navy against the unbearable regulations of the peace treaty of Versailles. The table of contents includes a variety of navy activities, such as saving of coastal guns from destruction as required by Versailles; independent armament measures behind the back of the government and behind the back of the legislative bodies; resurrection of the U-boat arm; economic rearmament; and camouflaged rearmament from 1933 to the freedom from the restrictions in 1935. (_C-156_)

This book points out the significant effect of seizure of power by the Nazis in 1933 on increasing the size and determining the nature of the rearmament program. It also refers to the far-reaching independence in the building and development of the navy, which was only hampered insofar as concealment of rearmament had to considered in compliance with the Versailles Treaty (_C-156_). With the restoration of what was called the military sovereignty of the Reich in 1935—the reoccupation of the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland—the external camouflage of rearmament was eliminated.

This book of the German navy bears the symbol of the Nazi Party, the Swastika, in the spread eagle on the cover sheet, and it is headed “secret”, underscored (_C-156_). Raeder has identified this book in an interrogation and explained that the Navy tried to fulfill the letter of the Versailles Treaty and at the same time to make progress in naval development. The following are pertinent extracts from the book:

“The object and aim of this memorandum under the heading
‘Preface’, is to draw a technically reliable picture based on
documentary records and the evidence of those who took part in
the fight of the Navy against the unbearable regulations of the
peace treaty of Versailles. It shows that the Reich navy after
the liberating activities of the Free Corps and of Scapa Flow
did not rest, but found ways and means to lay with unquenchable
enthusiasm, in addition to the building up of the 15,000-man
navy, the basis for a greater development in the future, and so
create by work of soldiers and technicians the primary condition
for a later rearmament. It must also distinguish more clearly
the services of these men, who, without being known in wide
circles, applied themselves with extraordinary zeal in
responsibility in the service of the fight against the peace
treaty; thereby stimulated by the highest feeling of duty, they
risked, particularly in the early days of their fight,
themselves and their position unrestrainedly in the partially
self-ordained task. This compilation makes it clearer, however,
that even such ideal and ambitious plans can be realized only to
a small degree if the concentrated and united strength of the
whole people is not behind the courageous activity of the
soldier. Only when the Fuehrer had created the second and even
more important condition for an effective rearmament in the
coordination of the whole nation and in the fusion of the
political, financial and spiritual power, could the work of the
soldier find its fulfillment. The framework of this peace
treaty, the most shameful known in world history, collapsed
under the driving power of this united will, [signed] The
Compiler”. (_C-156_)

The summary of the contents indicated in the chapter titles is significant:

“I. First, defensive action against the execution of the Treaty
of Versailles (from the end of the war to the occupation of the
Ruhr, 1923).

“1. Saving of coastal guns from destruction to removal of
artillery equipment and ammunition, hand and machine weapons. *
* *

“3. Limitation of destruction in Heligoland.

“II. Independent armament measures behind the back of the Reich
Government and of the legislative body (from 1923 to the Lomann
case in 1927).

“1. An attempt to increase the personnel strength of the Reich
Navy.

“2. Contributing to the strengthening of patriotism among the
people.

“3. Activities of Captain Lohmann.

“4. Preparation for the resurrection of the German U-boat arm.

“5. Building up of the air force.

“6. Attempt to strengthen our mine arm (_Die Mine_).

“7. Economic rearmament.

“8. Miscellaneous measures.

“a. The Aerogeodetic, and;

“b. Secret evidence.