Chapter XXVIII: Part III: provides for penalties. The law is signed, “The Fuehrer and (3)

“III. Planned armament work countenance by the Reich government
but behind the back of the legislative body from 1927 to the
seizure of power, 1933.

“IV. Rearmament under the leadership of the Reich Government in
camouflage (from 1933 to the freedom from restrictions, 1935).”
(_C-156_)

The following is a passage from Chapter IV:

“The unification of the whole nation which was combined with the
taking over of power on 30 January 1933 was of the decisive
influence on the size and shape of further rearmament.

“While the second chamber, _Reichsrat_, approached its
dissolution and withdrew as a legislative body, the _Reichstag_
assumed a composition which could only take a one-sided attitude
toward the rearmament of the armed forces. The government took
over the management of the rearmament program upon this
foundation.

“Development of the Armed Forces.”

“This taking over of the management by the Reich Government
developed for the armed forces in such a manner that the War
Minister, General von Blomberg, and through him the three
branches of the armed forces, received far-reaching powers from
the Reich Cabinet for the development of the armed forces. The
whole organization of the Reich was included in this way. In
view of these powers the collaboration of the former inspecting
body in the management of the secret expenditure was from then
on dispensed with. There remained only the inspecting duty of
the accounting office of the German Reich.

“Independence of the Commander in Chief of the Navy”

“The commander-in-chief of the Navy, Admiral Raeder, honorary
doctor, had received the help of a far-reaching independence in
the building and development of the navy. This was only hampered
insofar as the previous concealment of rearmament had to be
continued in consideration of the Versailles Treaty. Besides the
public budget there remained the previous special budget, which
was greatly increased in view of the considerable credit for the
provision of labor, which was made available by the Reich. Wide
powers in the handling of these credits were given to the
Director of the Budget Department of the navy, up to 1934
Commodore Schussler, afterwards Commodore Foerster. These took
into consideration the increased responsibility of the Chief of
the Budget.

“Declaration of Military Freedom”

“When the Fuehrer, relying upon the strength of the armed forces
executed in the meanwhile, announced the restoration of the
military sovereignty of the German Reich, the last-mentioned
limitation on rearmament works namely, the external camouflage,
was eliminated. Freed from all the shackles which have hampered
our ability to move freely on and under water, on land and in
the air for one and a half decades, and carried by the
newly-awakened fighting spirit of the whole nation, the armed
forces, and as part of it, the navy, can lead with full strength
towards its completion the rearmament already under way with the
goal of securing for the Reich its rightful position in the
world.” (_C-156_)

An interrogation of Raeder concerning this book went as follows:

“Q. I have here a document, _C-156_, which is a photostatic copy
of the work prepared by the High Command of the Navy, and covers
the struggle of the Navy against the Versailles Treaty from 1919
to 1935. I ask you initially whether you are familiar with the
work?

“A. I know this book. I read it once when it was edited.

“Q. Was that an official publication of the Germany navy?

“A. This Captain Schuessler, indicated there, was Commander in
the Admiralty. Published by the OKM, which was an idea of these
officers to put all these things together.

“Q. Do you recall the circumstances under which the
authorization to prepare such a work was given to him?

“A. I think he told me that he would write such a book as he
told us here in the foreword.

“Q. In the preparation of this work he had access to the
official naval files, and based his work on the items contained
therein?

“A. Yes, I think so. He would have spoken with other persons,
and he would have had the files, which were necessary.

“Q. Do you know whether before the work was published, a draft
of it was circulated among the officers in the Admiralty for
comment?

“A. No, I don’t think so. Not before it was published. I saw it
only when it was published.

“Q. Was it circulated freely after its publication?

“A. It was a secret object. I think the upper commands in the
Navy had knowledge of it.

“Q. It was not circulated outside of the naval circles?

“A. No.

“Q. What then is your opinion concerning the comments contained
in the work regarding the circumventing of the provisions of the
Versailles Treaty?

“A. I don’t remember very exactly what is in here. I can only
remember that the Navy had always the object to fulfill the word
of the Versailles Treaty, but wanted to have some advantages.
But the flying men were exercised one year before they went into
the Navy. Quite young men. So that the word of the Treaty of
Versailles was filled. They didn’t belong to the Navy, as long
as they were exercised in flying, and the submarines were
developed but not in Germany, and not in the Navy, but in
Holland. There was a civil bureau, and in Spain there was an
Industrialist; in Finland, too, and they were built much later
when we began to act with the English government about the
Treaty of thirty-five to one-hundred, because we could see that
then the Treaty of Versailles would be destroyed by such a
treaty with England, and so in order to keep the word of
Versailles, we tried to fulfill the word of Versailles, but
tried to have advantages.

“Q. Would the fair statement be that the Navy High Command was
interested in avoiding the limited provisions of the Treaty of
Versailles regarding the personnel and limits of armaments, but
would it attempt to fulfill the letter of the treaty, although
actually avoiding it?

“A. That was their endeavor”.

Raeder had his explanations:

“Q. Why was such a policy adopted?

“A. We were much menaced in the first years after the first war
by danger that the Poles would attack East Prussia and so we
tried to strengthen a little our very, very weak forces in this
way, and so all our efforts were directed to the aim to have a
little more strength against the Poles, if they would attack us;
it was nonsense to them of attacking the Poles in this state,
and for the Navy a second aim was to have some defense against
the entering of French forces into the Ostsee, or East Sea,
because we knew the French had intentions to sustain the Poles
from ships that came into the Ostsee Goettinger, and so the Navy
was a defense against the attack by the Poles, and against the
entrance of French shipping into an Eastern Sea. Quite defensive
aims.

“Q. When did the fear of attack from Poles first show itself in
official circles in Germany would you say?

“A. When the first years they took Wilma. In the same minute we
thought that they would come to East Prussia. I don’t know
exactly the year, because those judgments were the judgments of
the German government ministers, of the Army and Navy Ministers,
Groner and Noske.

“Q. Then those views in your opinion were generally held
existing perhaps as early as 1919 or 1920, after the end of the
First World War?

“A. Oh, but the whole situation was very, very uncertain, and
about those years in the beginning, I can not give you a very
exact thing, because I was then two years in the Navy archives
to write a book about the war, and how the cruisers fought in
the first war. Two years, so I was not with these things.”

The same kind of aims and purposes are reflected in the table of contents of a history of the German Navy, 1919 to 1939, found in captured official files of the German Navy (_C-17_). Although a copy of the book itself has not been found, the project was written by Oberst Scherff, Hitler’s special military historian. The table of contents however, is available. It refers by numbers to groups of documents and notes in the documents, which evidently were intended as working material for the basis of the chapters to be written in accordance with the table of contents. The title of this table of contents fairly establishes the navy planning and preparations that were to get the Versailles Treaty out of the way, and to rebuild the navy strength necessary for war. Some of the headings in the table of contents read:

“_Part A (1919—The year of Transition.)_

“Chapter VII.

First efforts to circumvent the Versailles Treaty and to limit
its effects.

“Demilitarization of the Administration, incorporation of naval
offices in civil ministries, etc. Incorporation of greater
sections of the German maritime observation station and the
sea-mark system in Heligoland and Kiel, of the Ems-Jade-Canal,
etc. into the Reich Transport Ministry up to 1934;

“Noskos’ proposal of 11.8.1919 to incorporate the Naval
Construction Department in the Technical High School, Berlin;

“Formation of the “Naval Arsenal Kiel”.

“(b) The saving from destruction of coastal fortifications and
guns.

“1. North Sea. Strengthening of fortifications with new
batteries and modern guns between the signing and the taking
effect of the Versailles Treaty; dealings with the Control
Commission—information, drawings, visits of inspection, result
of efforts.”

* * * * * *

“2. Baltic. Taking over by the Navy of fortresses Pilau and
Swinemunde;

“Salvage for the Army of one-hundred and eighty-five movable
guns and mortars there.

“3. The beginnings of coastal air defense.

“_Part B (1920-1924. The Organizational New Order)_