Chapter V (6)

Ribbentrop was not unreceptive to Henlein’s suggestion. The conversations Henlein had proposed took place in the Foreign Office in Berlin on 29 March 1938. The previous day Henlein had conferred with Hitler himself. The captured German Foreign Office notes of the conference on 29 March read as follows:

“The Reichsminister started out by emphasizing the necessity to
keep the conference which had been scheduled strictly a secret;
he then explained, in view of the directives which the Fuehrer
himself had given to Konrad Henlein personally yesterday
afternoon that there were two questions which were of
outstanding importance for the conduct of policy of the Sudeten
German Party * * *”

* * * * * *

“The aim of the negotiations to be carried out by the Sudeten
German party with the Czechoslovakian Government is finally
this: to avoid entry into the Government by the extension and
gradual specification of the demands to be made. It must be
emphasized clearly in the negotiations that the Sudeten German
Party alone is the party to the negotiations with the
Czechoslovakian Government, not the Reich Cabinet
(_Reichsregierung_). The Reich Cabinet itself must refuse to
appear toward the Government in Prague or toward London and
Paris as the advocate or peacemaker of the Sudeten German
demands. It is a self-evident prerequisite that during the
impending discussion with the Czechoslovak Government the
Sudeten-Germans would be firmly controlled by Konrad Henlein,
would maintain quiet and discipline, and would avoid
indiscretions. The assurances already given by Konrad Henlein in
this connection were satisfactory.

“Following these general explanations of the Reich Minister the
demands of the Sudeten German Party from the Czechoslovak
Government as contained in the enclosure were discussed and
approved in principle. For further cooperation, Konrad Henlein
was instructed to keep in the closest possible touch with the
Reichminister and the Head of the Central Office for Racial
Germans (_mit dem Leiter der Volksdeutschen Mittelstelle_), as
well as the German Minister in Prague, as the local
representative of the Foreign Minister. The task of the German
Minister in Prague would be to support the demands of the
Sudeten German Party as reasonable, not officially, but in more
private talks with the Czechoslovak politicians without exerting
any direct influence on the extent of the demands of the Party.

“In conclusion there was a discussion whether it would be useful
if the Sudeten German Party would cooperate with other
minorities in Czechoslovakia, especially with the Slovaks. The
Foreign Minister decided that the Party should have the
discretion to keep a loose contact with other minority groups if
the adoption of a parallel course by them might appear
appropriate.

“Berlin, 29 March 1938.
“R [Initial]”
(_2788-PS_)

Not the least interesting aspect of this secret meeting is the list of those who attended. Konrad Henlein, his principal deputy, Karl Hermann Frank, and two others represented the Sudeten German Party. Professor Haushofer and SS Obergruppenfuehrer Lorenz represented the _Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle_, the Central Office for Racial Germans. The Foreign Office was represented by a delegation of eight. These eight included Ribbentrop, who presided at the meeting and did most of the talking, von Mackensen, Weiszacker, and Minister Eisenlohr from the German Legation at Prague. (_2788-PS_)

In May Henlein came to Berlin for more conversations with the Nazi conspirators. At this time the plans for Case Green, the attack on Czechoslovakia, were already on paper, and it may be assumed that Henlein was briefed on the role he was to play during the summer months. The entry for 22 May 1938 in General Jodl’s diary reads as follows:

“22 May: Fundamental conference between the Fuehrer and K.
Henlein” (see enclosure). (_1780-PS_)

The enclosure, unfortunately, is missing.

It will be recalled that in his speech in Vienna, Henlein had admitted that he had been selected by the Nazi conspirators in the fall of 1933 to take over the political leadership of the Sudeten Germans (_2863-PS_). The foregoing documents show conclusively the nature of Henlein’s mission. They demonstrate that Henlein’s policy, his propaganda, even his speeches were controlled by Berlin. Furthermore, from the year 1935 the Sudeten German Party had been secretly subsidized by the German Foreign Office. A secret memorandum, captured in the German Foreign Office files, signed by Woermann and dated Berlin, 19 August 1938, was occasioned by the request of the Henlein Party for additional funds. This memorandum reads:

“MEMORANDUM

“The Sudeten German Party has been subsidized by the Foreign
Office regularly since 1935 with certain amounts, consisting of
a monthly payment of 15,000 Marks; 12,000 Marks of this are
transmitted to the Prague Legation for disbursement, and 3000
Marks are paid out to the Berlin representation of the party
(Bureau Buerger). In the course of the last few months the tasks
assigned to the Bureau Buerger have increased considerably due
to the current negotiations with the Czech Government. The
number of pamphlets and maps which are produced and disseminated
has risen; the propaganda activity in the press has grown
immensely; the expense accounts have increased especially
because due to the necessity for continuous good information,
the expenses for trips to Prague, London, and Paris (including
the financing of travels of Sudeten-German deputies and agents)
have grown considerably heavier. Under these conditions the
Bureau Buerger is no longer able to get along with the monthly
allowance of 3000 Marks if it is to do everything required.
Therefore, Mr. Buerger has applied to this office for an
increase of this amount, from 3000 Marks to 5500 Marks monthly.
In view of the considerable increase in the business transacted
by the Bureau, and of the importance which marks the activity of
the Bureau in regard to the cooperation with the Foreign Office,
this desire deserves the strongest support.

“Herewith submitted to the Dep: Pers(onnel) with a request for
approval. It is requested to increase the payments with
retroactive effect from 1 August.^{*}

“Berlin, 19 August 1938
/s/ Woermann

^{*} “_Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle_ (Central Office for Racial
Germans) will be informed by the Political Dept. [handwritten
marginal note].” (_3059-PS_; _also 3061-PS_)

As the military preparations to attack Czechoslovakia moved forward in the late summer and early fall of 1938, the Nazi command made good use of Henlein and his followers. About the first of August the Air Attache at the German Legation in Prague, Major Moericke, acting on instructions from Luftwaffe headquarters in Berlin, visited the Sudeten-German leader in Freudenthal. With his assistance, and in the company of the local leader of the FS (the Henlein equivalent of the SS), he reconnoitered the surrounding countryside to select possible airfield sites for German use. The FS leader, a Czech reservist then on leave, was in the uniform of the Czech army—a fact which, the attache noted, served as excellent camouflage.

The Air Attache’s report reads in part as follows:

“The manufacturer M. is head of the Sudeten-German Glider Pilots
in Freudenthal and said to be absolutely reliable by my trusted
men. My personal impression fully confirmed this judgment. No
hint of my identity was made to him, although I had the
impression that M. knew who I was.

“At my request, with which he complied without any question, M.
travelled with me over the country in question. We used M.’s
private car for the trip.

“As M. did not know the country around Beneschau sufficiently
well, he took with him the local leader of the FS, a Czech
reservist of the Sudeten German Racial Group, at the time on
leave. He was in uniform. For reasons of camouflage I was
entirely in agreement with this—without actually saying so.

“As M., during the course of the drive, observed that I
photographed large open spaces out of the car, he said ‘Aha, so
you’re looking for airfields!’ I answered that we supposed that,
in the case of any serious trouble, the Czechs would put their
airfields immediately behind the line of fortifications and that
I had the intention of looking over the country from that point
of view.” (_1536-PS_)

In the latter part of the Air Attache’s report reference is made to the presence of reliable agents and informers (_V-Leute_) apparently drawn from the ranks of the Henlein Party in this area. It was indicated that these agents were in touch with the _Abwehrstelle_, the intelligence office in Breslau. (_1536-PS_)

In September, when the propaganda campaign was reaching its height, the Nazis were not satisfied with playing merely on the Sudeten demands for autonomy. They attempted to use the Slovaks as well. On 19 September the Foreign Office in Berlin sent the following telegram to the German Legation in Prague:

“Please inform deputy Kundt, at Konrad Henlein’s request, to get
into touch with the Slovaks at once and induce them to start
their demands for autonomy tomorrow.

“(signed) ALTENBURG”
(_2858-PS_)

Kundt was Henlein’s representative in Prague.

As the harassed Czech government sought to stem the disorder in the Sudetenland, the German Foreign Office turned to threatening diplomatic tactics in a deliberate effort to increase the tension between the two countries. Four telegrams from the Foreign Office in Berlin to the Legation in Prague, dispatched between the 16th and 24th of September 1938, are self-explanatory. The first telegram is dated 16 September:

“Tonight 150 subjects of Czechoslovakia of Czech blood were
arrested in Germany. This measure is an answer to the arrest of
Sudeten-Germans since the Fuehrer’s speech of 12 September. I
request you to ascertain the number of Sudeten-Germans arrested
since 12 September as extensively as possible. The number of
those arrested there is estimated conservatively at 400 by the
Gestapo. Cable report.

“Woermann.”
(_2855-PS_)

The second telegram is dated 17 September. The first two paragraphs read:

“I. Request to inform the local government immediately of the
following:

“The Reich Government has decided that:

“(_a_) Immediately as many Czech subjects of Czech descent,
Czech-speaking Jews included, will be arrested in Germany as
Sudeten-Germans have been in Czechoslovakia since the beginning
of the week.

“(_b_) If any Sudeten-Germans should be executed pursuant to a
death sentence on the basis of martial law, an equal number of
Czechs will be shot in Germany.” (_2854-PS_)

The third telegram was sent on 24 September:

“According to information received here Czechs have arrested 2
German frontier-policemen, seven customs-officials and 30
railway-officials. As countermeasure all the Czech staff in
Marschegg were arrested. We are prepared to exchange the
arrested Czech officials for the German officials. Please
approach Government there and wire result.

“(signed) WOERMANN”
(_2853-PS_)

On the same day the fourth telegram was dispatched. The last paragraph read:

“Confidential:

“Yielding of the Czech hostages arrested here for the prevention
of the execution of any sentences passed by military courts
against Sudeten-Germans is, of course, out of question.

“WOERMANN”
(_2856-PS_)

In the latter half of September Henlein devoted himself and his followers wholeheartedly to preparation for the coming German attack. About 15 September, after Hitler’s provocative Nurnberg speech in which he accused “this Benes” of “torturing” and planning the “extermination” of the Sudeten-Germans, Henlein and Karl Hermann Frank, one of his principal deputies, fled to Germany to avoid arrest by the Czech government. In Germany Henlein broadcast over the powerful _Reichssender_ radio station his determination to lead the Sudeten-Germans “home to the Reich” and denounced “the Hussite Bolshevik criminals of Prague”. From his headquarters in a castle at Dondorf, outside Bayreuth, he kept in close touch with the leading Nazi conspirators, including Hitler and Himmler. He directed activities along the border and began the organization of the Sudeten German Free Corps, an auxiliary military organization. These events are set forth in the Czechoslovak official report. (_998-PS_; _3061-PS_)

Henlein’s activities were carried on with the advice and assistance of the Nazi leaders. Lt. Col. Koechling was assigned to Henlein in an advisory capacity to assist with the Sudeten German Free Corps. In a conference with Hitler on the night of 17 September Koechling received far-reaching military powers. At this conference the purpose of the Free Corps was frankly stated: the “maintenance of disorder and clashes”. _Item 25_, of the Schmundt file (388-PS), a telegram labeled Most Secret reads as follows:

“Last night conference took place between Fuehrer and
Oberstleutnant Koechling. Duration of conference 7 minutes. Lt.
Col. Koechling remains directly responsible to OKW. He will be
assigned to Konrad Henlein in an advisory capacity. He received
far-reaching military plenary powers from the Fuehrer. The
Sudeten German Free Corps remains responsible to Konrad Henlein
alone. Purpose: Protection of the Sudeten-Germans and
maintenance of disturbances and clashes. The Free Corps will be
established in Germany. Armament only with Austrian weapons.
Activities of Free Corps to begin as soon as possible.”
(_388-PS, Item 25_)

General Jodl’s diary gives a further insight into the position of the Henlein Free Corps. At this time the Free Corps was engaged in active skirmishing along the Czech border, furnishing incidents and provocation in the desired manner. Jodl’s entries for 19 and 20 September 1938 state:

“_19 September_:

“Order is given to the Army High Command to take care of the
Sudeten German Free Corps.

“_20 September_:

“England and France have handed over their demands in Prague,
the contents of which are still unknown. The activities of the
Free Corps start assuming such an extent that they may bring
about, and already have brought about consequences harmful to
the plans of the Army. (Transferring rather strong units of the
Czech Army to the proximity of the border.) By checking with Lt.
Col. Koechling, I attempt to lead these activities into normal
channels.

“Toward the evening the Fuehrer also takes a hand and gives
permission to act only with groups up to 12 men each, after the
approval of the Corps HQ.” (_1780-PS_)

A report from Henlein’s staff, which was filed in Hitler’s headquarters, boasted of the offensive operations of the Free Corps in the following terms:

“Since 19 Sept.—in more than 300 missions—the Free Corps has
executed its task with an amazing spirit of _attack_ and with a
willingness often reaching a degree of unqualified
self-sacrifice. The result of the first phase of its activities:
more than 1500 prisoners, 25 MG’s and a large amount of other
weapons and equipment, aside from serious losses in dead and
wounded suffered by the _enemy_.” (_388-PS, Item 30_)

In this document the word “attack” was subsequently crossed out, and the word “defense” substituted. Similarly “the enemy” was changed to read “the Czech terrorists”.

In his headquarters in the castle at Dondorf, Henlein was in close touch with Admiral Canaris of the Intelligence Division of the OKW and with the SS and SA. The liaison officer between the SS and Henlein was Oberfuehrer Gottlob Berger, who in later years became prominent in the SS command. An affidavit executed by Berger reads as follows:

“I, GOTTLOB BERGER, under oath and being previously sworn, make
the following statement:

“1. In the fall of 1938 I held the rank and title of Oberfuehrer
in the SS. In mid-September I was assigned as SS Liaison Officer
with Konrad Henlein’s Sudeten German Free Corps at their
headquarters in the castle of Dondorf outside Bayreuth. In this
position I was responsible for all liaison between the
Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler and Henlein and, in particular, I was
delegated to select from the Sudeten-Germans those who appeared
to be eligible for membership in the SS or VT (_Verfuegungs
Truppe_). In addition to myself, Liaison Officers stationed with
Henlein included an Obergruppenfuehrer from the NSKK, whose name
I have forgotten, and Obergruppenfuehrer Max Juettner, from the
SA. In addition, Admiral Canaris, who was head of the OKW
_Abwehr_, appeared at Dondorf nearly every two days and
conferred with Henlein.

“2. In the course of my official duties at Henlein’s
headquarters I became familiar with the composition and
activities of the Free Corps. Three groups were being formed
under Henlein’s direction: One in the Eisenstein area, Bavaria;
one in the Bayreuth area; one in the Dresden area; and possibly
a fourth group in Silesia. These groups were supposedly composed
of refugees from the Sudetenland who had crossed the border into
Germany, but they actually contained Germans with previous
service in the SA and NSKK (Nazi Motor Corps) as well. These
Germans formed the skeleton of the Free Corps. On paper the Free
Corps had a strength of 40,000 men. I do not know its actual
strength, but I believe it to be considerably smaller than the
paper figure. The Corps was armed with Manlicher-Schoenauer
rifles from Army depots in Austria. It was my understanding that
about 18,000 rifles were issued to men under Henlein’s command.
In addition, small numbers of machine guns[1], hand grenades,
and 2 captured antitank guns were placed at Henlein’s disposal.
Part of the equipment furnished to Henlein, mostly haversacks,
cooking utensils, and blankets, were supplied by the SA.

“3. In the days preceding the conclusion of the four-power pact
at Munich I heard of numerous occasions on which the Henlein
Free Corps was engaged in skirmishes with Czech patrols along
the border of the Sudetenland. These operations were under the
direction of Henlein, who went forward from his Headquarters
repeatedly in order to take direct command of his men.

“The facts stated above are true; this declaration is made by me
voluntarily and without compulsion; after reading over this
statement I have signed and executed the same.

“(Signed) Gottlob Berger”
(_3036-PS_)

-----

[1] “(Rifles and machine guns were of doubtful serviceability due to inferior ammunition).”

Henlein and his Free Corps were also acting in collaboration with the SD, (_Sicherheitsdienst_) Himmler’s intelligence organization. An affidavit executed by Alfred Helmut Naujocks, a member of the SD, reads as follows:

“I, ALFRED HELMUT NAUJOCKS, being first duly sworn, depose and
state as follows:

“1. In September 1938 I was working in Amt III of the SD. (The
department which was then called Amt III later became Amt VI).
In the course of my work I traveled between Berlin, Hof and
Munich.

“2. While in Hof, which is on the Czech border, I paid repeated
visits to the SD Service Department, that is, Intelligence
Office, which has been established there. This Service
Department had the task of collecting all political intelligence
emanating from the Czechoslovak border districts and passing it
on to Berlin. Continuous day and night teleprinter
communications had been established from Hof direct to Amt III
of the SD in Berlin. To the best of my recollection the head of
the Hof office was Daufeldt. The head of Amt III in Berlin at
this time was Jost and his assistant was Filbert.

“3. The bulk of the intelligence we collected came from Henlein
Free Corps, which had its headquarters in a castle at Dondorf,
outside Bayreuth; the distance between Hof and Bayreuth is not
very great, and we had daily access to all intelligence received
by the Free Corps. There was a continuous liaison maintained
with Czech territory by runners. Exploitation of this
Intelligence was carried out every day in Berlin and was placed
before Heydrich and Himmler.

“4. I remember that the Free Corps made continuous complaints
that they had not received sufficient supply of arms.
Negotiations by letter and teleprint message went on for a
number of days with Berlin until it became quite a nuisance.
After that arms were supplied from the army, but I believe it
was only a small quantity.

“5. Hof was the center for all intelligence collected by the SD
on the Czechoslovak question. The SD had agents all along the
border in every town. The names of these agents were reported to
Hof, and two motor cars toured the border every day to collect
the intelligence which had been unearthed. In addition, I
remember that two or three companies of the SS-Totenkopf units
were stationed in the neighborhood of Asch.

“The facts stated above are true: this declaration is made by me
voluntarily and without compulsion; after reading over this
statement I have signed and executed the same at Nurnberg,
Germany this 20th day of November 1945.

“(signed) Alfred Helmut Naujocks.”
(_3029-PS_)

Offensive operations along the Czechoslovak border were not confined to skirmishes carried out by the Free Corps. Two SS _Totenkopf_ battalions were operating across the border in Czech territory near Asch. _Item 36_ in the Schmundt file (_388-PS_), an OKW most secret order signed by Jodl and dated 28 September, states:

“Those SS-Totenkopf units now operating in the Asch Promontory
(I and II Bn of Oberbayern Regiment) will come under the C in C
Army only when they return to German Reich territory, or when
the Army crosses the German-Czech frontier.” (_388-PS, Item 36_)

According to the 25 September entry in General Jodl’s diary these SS Totenkopf battalions were operating in this area on direct orders from Hitler. (_1780-PS_)

As the time for X-day approached, the disposition of the Free Corps became a matter of dispute. On 26 September Himmler issued an order to the Chief of Staff of the Sudeten German Free Corps directing that the Free Corps come under control of the Reichsfuehrer SS in the event of German invasion of Czechoslovakia (_388-PS, Item 37_). On 28 September Keitel directed that as soon as the German Army crosses the Czech border the Free Corps will take orders from the OKH. In this most secret order of the OKW Keitel discloses that Henlein’s men are already operating in Czechoslovak territory:

“For the Henlein Free Corps and units subordinate to this the
principle remains valid, that they receive instructions direct
from the Fuehrer and that they carry out their operations only
in conjunction with the competent general staff corps. The
advance units of the Free Corps will have to report to the local
commander of the frontier guard immediately before crossing the
frontier.

“Those units remaining forward of the frontier should—in their
own interests—get into communication with the frontier guard as
often as possible.

“As soon as the army crosses the Czech border the Henlein Free
Corps will be subordinate to the OKH. Thus it will be expedient
to assign a sector to the Free Corps even now which can be
fitted into the scheme of army boundaries later.” (_388-PS, Item
34_)

On 30 September, when it became clear that the Munich settlement would result in a peaceful occupation of the Sudetenland, Keitel ordered that the Free Corps Henlein in its present composition be placed under command of Himmler:

“1. _Attachment of Henlein Free Corps_:

“The Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces has just ordered that
the Henlein Free Corps in its present composition be placed
under command of Reichsfuehrer-SS and Chief of German Police.

“It is therefore at the immediate disposal of OKH as field unit
for the invasion, but is to be later drawn in like the rest of
the police forces for police duties in agreement with the
Reichsfuehrer SS.” (_388-PS, Item 38_)

J. _Occupation of the Sudetenland under the Terms of the Munich Agreement._

Under the threat of war by the Nazi conspirators, and with war in fact about to be launched, the United Kingdom and France concluded a pact with Germany and Italy at Munich on the night of 29 September 1938. This treaty provided for the cession of the Sudetenland by Czechoslovakia to Germany. Czechoslovakia was required to acquiesce. (_TC-23_)

On 1 October 1938 German troops began the occupation of the Sudetenland.

During the conclusion of the Munich Pact the _Wehrmacht_ had been fully deployed for attack, awaiting only the word of Hitler to begin the assault. With the cession of the Sudetenland new orders were issued. On 30 September Keitel promulgated Directive #1 on “Occupation of territory separated from Czechoslovakia” (_388-PS, Item 39_). This directive contained a timetable for the occupation of sectors of former Czech territory between 1 and 10 October and specified the tasks of the German armed forces. The fourth and fifth paragraphs provided:

“2. The Armed Forces will have the following tasks:

“The present degree of mobilized preparedness is to be
maintained completely, for the present also in the West. Order
for the rescinding of measures taken is held over. “The entry is
to be planned in such a way that it can easily be converted into
operation ‘_Gruen_’.” (_388-PS, Item 39_)

It contained one further provision about the Henlein forces:

“Henlein Free Corps. All combat action on the part of the
Volunteer Corps must cease as from 1st October.” (_388-PS, Item
39_)

The Schmundt file contains a number of additional secret OKW directives giving instructions for the occupation of the Sudetenland and showing the scope of the preparations of the OKW. Directives specifying the occupational area of the army and the units under its command; arranging for communications facilities, exchange facilities, supply, and propaganda; and giving instructions to the civil departments of the government were issued over Keitel’s signature on 30 September (_388-PS, Items 40, 41, 42_). By 10 October von Brauchitsch was able to report to Hitler that German troops had reached the demarcation line and that the order for the occupation of the Sudetenland had been fulfilled. The OKW requested Hitler’s permission to rescind Case Green, to withdraw troops from the occupied area and to relieve the OKH of executive powers in the Sudeten-German area as of 15 October. (_388-PS, Items 46, 47, 49_)

On 18 October, in a formal letter to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Col. Gen. von Brauchitsch, Hitler announced that the civil authorities would take over responsibility for the Sudeten-German territory on 21 October and that the OKH would be relieved of executive powers as of that date (_388-PS, Item 51_). On the same date additional demobilization of the forces in the Sudetenland was ordered by Hitler and Keitel. Three days later the OKW requested Hitler’s consent to the reversion of the RAD from the control of the armed forces. (_388-PS, Items 52, 53_)

As the German forces entered the Sudetenland Henlein’s _Sudetendeutsche Partei_ was merged with the NSDAP of Hitler. The two men who had fled to Hitler’s protection in mid-September, Henlein and Karl Hermann Frank, were appointed Gauleiter and Deputy Gauleiter, respectively, of the _Sudetengau_. In the parts of the Czechoslovak Republic that were still free the _Sudetendeutsche Partei_ constituted itself as the _National-Sozialistische Deutsche Arbeiter-Partei in der Tschechoslovakei_ (NSDAP in Czechoslovakia) under the direction of Kundt, another of Henlein’s deputies. These events are set forth in the Czechoslovak official report. (_998-PS_; _3061-PS_)

The stage was now prepared for the next move of the Nazi conspirators.

K. _Planning for the Conquest of the Remainder of Czechoslovakia._

With the occupation of the Sudetenland and the inclusion of the German-speaking Czechs within the Greater Reich it might have been expected that the Nazi conspirators would be satisfied. Thus far in the Nazi program of aggression the conspirators had used as a pretext for their conquests the union of the _Volksdeutsche_, the people of German descent, with the Reich. Now, after Munich, substantially all the _Volksdeutsche_ in Czechoslovakia had been returned to German rule. On 26 September, at the Sportspalast in Berlin, Hitler spoke these words:

“And now we are confronted with the last problem which must be
solved and which will be solved. It is the last territorial
claim which I have to make in Europe, but it is a claim from
which I will not swerve, and which I will satisfy, God willing.”

* * * * * *

“I have little to explain. I am grateful to Mr. Chamberlain for
all his efforts, and I have assured him that the German people
want nothing but peace; but I have also told him that I cannot
go back beyond the limits of our patience.

“I assured him, moreover, and I repeat it here, that when this
problem is solved there will be no more territorial problems for
Germany in Europe. And I further assured him that from the
moment when Czechoslovakia solves its other problems, that is to
say when the Czechs have come to an arrangement with their other
minorities peacefully and without oppression, I will no longer
be interested in the Czech State. And that as far as I am
concerned I will guarantee. We don’t want any Czechs at all.”
(_2358-PS_)

Yet no more than two weeks later Hitler and Keitel were preparing estimates of the military forces required to break Czechoslovak resistance in Bohemia and Moravia. _Item 48_ of the Schmundt file is a top secret telegram sent by Keitel to Hitler’s headquarters on 11 October 1938 in answer to four questions which Hitler had propounded to the OKW. These were the questions:

“Question 1: What reinforcements are necessary in the present
situation to break all Czech resistance in Bohemia and Moravia?

“Question 2: How much time is required for the regrouping or
moving up of new forces?

“Question 3: How much time will be required for the same purpose
if it is executed after the intended demobilization and return
measures?

“Question 4: How much time would be required to achieve the
state of readiness of October 1st?” (_388-PS, Item 48_)

Whereupon, in the same telegram, Keitel reported to Hitler the considered answers of the OKH and the Luftwaffe.

On 21 October, the same day on which the administration of the Sudetenland was handed over to the civilian authorities, a directive outlining plans for the conquest of the remainder of Czechoslovakia was signed by Hitler and initialed by Keitel. In this Top Secret Order, of which 10 copies were made, the Nazi conspirators, only three weeks after the winning of the Sudetenland, were already looking forward to new conquests:

“The future tasks for the Armed Forces and the preparations for
the conduct of war resulting from these tasks will be laid down
by me in a later Directive.

“Until this Directive comes into force the Armed Forces must be
prepared at all times for the following eventualities:

“1. The securing of the frontiers of Germany and the protection
against surprise air attacks.

“2. The liquidation of the remainder of Czechoslovakia.

“3. The occupation of the Memelland.”

* * * * * *

“It must be possible to smash at any time the remainder of
Czechoslovakia if her policy should become hostile towards
Germany.

“The preparations to be made by the Armed Forces for this
contingency will be considerably smaller in extent than those
for ‘_Gruen_’; they must, however, guarantee a continuous and
considerably higher state of preparedness, since planned
mobilization measures have been dispensed with. The
organization, order of battle and state of readiness of the
units earmarked for that purpose are in peace-time to be so
arranged for a surprise assault that Czechoslovakia herself will
be deprived of all possibility of organized resistance. The
object is the swift occupation of Bohemia and Moravia and the
cutting off of Slovakia. The preparations should be such, that
at the same time ‘_Grenzsicherung West_’ (the measures of
frontier defense in the West) can be carried out.

“The detailed mission of Army and Air Force is as follows:

“_a. Army_

“The units stationed in the vicinity of Bohemia-Moravia and
several motorized divisions are to be earmarked for a surprise
type of attack. Their number will be determined by the forces
remaining in Czechoslovakia; a quick and decisive success must
be assured. The assembly and preparations for the attack must be
worked out. Forces not needed will be kept in readiness in such
a manner that they may be either committed in securing the
frontiers or sent after the attack army.

“_b. Air Force_

“The quick advance of the German Army is to be assured by an
early elimination of the Czech Air Force.

“For this purpose the commitment in a surprise attack from
peace-time bases has to be prepared. Whether for this purpose
still stronger forces may be required can only be determined
from the development of the military situation in
Czechoslovakia. At the same time a simultaneous assembly of the
remainder of the offensive forces against the West must be
prepared.” (_C-136_)

This order was signed by Hitler and authenticated by Keitel. It was distributed to the OKH, to Goering’s Luftwaffe, and to Raeder at Navy headquarters.

Two months later, on 17 December 1938, Keitel issued an appendix to the original order stating that by command of the Fuehrer preparations for the liquidation of Czechoslovakia are to continue. Distribution of this Top Secret order was the same as for the 21 October order. The order provides:

“2. _COROLLARY TO DIRECTIVE OF 21.10.38._

“Reference ‘Liquidation of the Rest of Czechoslovakia’ the
Fuehrer has given the following additional order:

“The preparations for this eventuality are to continue on the
assumption that no resistance worth mentioning is to be
expected.

“To the outside world too it must clearly appear that it is
merely an action of pacification and not a warlike undertaking.

“The action must therefore be carried out by the peace time
Armed Forces _only_, without reinforcements from mobilization.
The necessary readiness for action, especially the ensuring that
the most necessary supplies are brought up, must be effected by
adjustment within the units.

“Similarly the units of the Army detailed for the march must, as
a general rule, leave their stations only during the night prior
to the crossing of the frontier, and will not previously form up
systematically on the frontier. The transport necessary for
previous organization should be limited to the minimum and will
be camouflaged as much as possible. Necessary movements, if any,
of single units and particularly of motorized forces, to the
troop-training areas situated near the frontier, must have the
approval of the Fuehrer.

“The Air Force should take action in accordance with the similar
general directives.

“For the same reasons the exercise of executive power by the
Supreme Command of the Army is laid down only for the newly
occupied territory and only for a short period.

“Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces.
“KEITEL”
(_C-138_)

This particular copy of the order, an original carbon signed in ink by Keitel, was the one sent to the OKM, the German naval headquarters. It bears the initials of Fricke, head of the Operational Division of the Naval War Staff, of Schniewind, Chief of Staff of the Naval War Staff, and of Raeder.

As the _Wehrmacht_ moved forward with plans for what it clearly considered would be an easy victory, the Foreign Office played its part. In a discussion of means of improving German-Czech relations with the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister, Chvalkovsky, in Berlin on 21 January 1939, Ribbentrop urged upon the Czech government a “quick reduction” in the size of the Czech army. The captured German Foreign Office notes of this discussion bear the following footnote, in Ribbentrop’s handwriting:

“I mentioned to Chvalkovsky especially that a quick reduction in
the Czech army would be decisive in our judgment.” (_2795-PS_)

L. _Extension of Fifth Column Activity_

As in the case of Austria and the Sudetenland, the Nazi conspirators did not intend to rely on the _Wehrmacht_ alone to accomplish their calculated objective of “liquidating” Czechoslovakia. With the German minority separated from Czechoslovakia, they could no longer use the cry, “home to the Reich.” One sizeable minority, the Slovaks, remained within the Czechoslovak State. The Czechoslovak Government had made every effort to conciliate Slovak extremists in the months after the cession of the Sudetenland. Autonomy had been granted to Slovakia, with an autonomous cabinet and parliament at Bratislava. Nonetheless, despite these concessions, it was in Slovakia that the Nazi conspirators found men ready to take their money and do their bidding. The following picture of Nazi operations in Slovakia is based on the Czechoslovak official report. (_998-PS_; _3061-PS_)

Nazi propaganda and “research” groups had long been interested in maintaining close connections with the Slovak autonomist opposition. When Bela Tuka, who later became Prime Minister of the puppet state of Slovakia, was tried for espionage and treason in 1929, the evidence established that he had already established connections with Nazi groups within Germany. Prior to 1938 Nazi aides were in close contact with Slovak traitors living in exile and were attempting to establish more profitable contacts in the semi-fascist Slovak Catholic Peoples Party of Monsignor Andrew Hlinka. Out of sympathy with the predominantly anti-clerical government in Prague, some Catholic elements in Slovakia proved willing to cooperate with the Nazis. In February and July 1938 the leaders of the Henlein movement conferred with top men of Father Hlinka’s party and agreed to furnish one another with mutual assistance in pressing their respective claims to autonomy. This understanding proved useful in the September agitation when, at the proper moment, the Foreign Office in Berlin wired the Henlein leader, Kundt, in Prague to tell the Slovaks to start their demands for autonomy. (See _2858-PS_.)

By this time, mid-summer 1938, the Nazis were in direct contact with figures in the Slovak autonomist movement and had paid agents among the higher staff of Father Hlinka’s party. These agents undertook to render impossible any understanding between the Slovak autonomists and the Slovak parties in the government at Prague. Franz Karmasin, later to become _Volksgruppenfuehrer_, had been appointed Nazi leader in Slovakia and professed to be serving the cause of Slovak autonomy while on the Nazi pay roll. On 22 November the Nazis indiscreetly wired Karmasin to collect his money at the German Legation in person. The telegram, sent from the German Legation at Prague to Bratislava (Pressburg), reads as follows:

“Delegate Kundt asks to notify State Secretary Karmasin that he
would appreciate it if he could personally draw the sum which is
being kept for him at the treasury of the embassy.

“HENCKE” (_2859-PS_)

Karmasin proved to be extremely useful to the Nazi cause. A captured memorandum of the German Foreign Office, dated Berlin, 29 November 1939—eight months after the conquest of Czechoslovakia—throws a revealing light both on Karmasin and on the German Foreign Office:

“_On the question of payments to KARMASIN_

“Karmasin receives 30,000 Marks for the VDA (Peoples’ League for
Germans Abroad) until 1 April 1940; from then on 15,000 Marks
monthly.

“Furthermore, the Central Office for Racial Germans
(_Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle_) has deposited 300,000 Marks for
Karmasin with the German Mission in Bratislava (Pressburg) on
which he could fall back in an emergency.

“Furthermore, Karmasin has received money from Reich Minister
Seyss-Inquart; for the present it has been impossible to
determine what amounts had been involved, and whether the
payments will continue.

“Therefore it appears that Karmasin has been provided with
sufficient money; thus one could await whether he would put up
new demands himself.

“Herewith presented to the Reich Foreign Minister.

“/s/ WOERMANN” (_2794-PS_)

This document shows the complicity of the German Foreign Office in the subsidization of illegal organizations abroad. More important, it shows that the Germans still considered it necessary to supply their under-cover representatives in Pressburg with substantial funds even after the declaration of the so-called independent State of Slovakia.

Some time in the winter of 1938-1939 Goering conferred with Durcansky and Mach, two leaders in the Slovak extremist group, who were accompanied by Karmasin. The Slovaks told Goering of their desire for what they called “independence,” with strong political, economic, and military ties to Germany. They promised that the Jewish problem would be solved as it had been in Germany and that the Communist Party would be prohibited. The notes of the meeting report that Goering considered that the Slovak efforts towards independence were to be supported, although his motives were scarcely altruistic. The undated minutes of this conversation between Goering and Durcansky, captured among the files of the German Foreign Office, are jotted down in somewhat telegraphic style:

“To begin with DURKANSKY (Deputy Prime Minister) reads out
declaration. Contents: Friendship for the Fuehrer; gratitude,
that through the Fuehrer autonomy has become possible for the
SLOVAKS. The SLOVAKS _never_ want to belong to HUNGARY. The
SLOVAKS want _full independence_ with strongest political,
economic and military ties to Germany. BRATISLAVA to be capital.
The execution of the plan only possible if the army and police
are SLOVAK.

“An independent SLOVAKIA to be proclaimed at the meeting of the
first SLOVAK Diet. In the case of a plebiscite the majority
would favour a separation from PRAGUE. Jews will vote for
Hungary. The area of the plebiscite to be up to the MARCH, where
a large SLOVAK population lives.

“The _Jewish problem_ will be solved similarly to that in
Germany. The Communist party to be prohibited.

“The _Germans_ in SLOVAKIA do not want to belong to Hungary but
wish to stay in SLOVAKIA.

“The _German influence_ with the SLOVAK Government considerable;
the appointment of a German Minister (member of the cabinet) has
been promised.

“At present negotiations with HUNGARY are being conducted by the
SLOVAKS. The CZECHS are more yielding towards the Hungarians
than the SLOVAKS.

“The Fieldmarshall considers; that the SLOVAK negotiations
towards independence are to be supported in a suitable manner.
Czechoslovakia without Slovakia is still more at our mercy.

“Air bases in Slovakia are of great importance for the German
Air Force for use against the East.” (_2801-PS_)

In mid-February 1939 a Slovak delegation journeyed to Berlin. It consisted of Tuca, one of the Slovaks with whom the Germans had been in contact, and Karmasin, the paid representative of the Nazi conspirators in Slovakia. They conferred with Hitler and Ribbentrop in the Reichs Chancellery in Berlin on Sunday, 12 February 1939. The captured German Foreign Office minutes of that meeting read as follows:

“After a brief welcome Tuca thanks the Fuehrer for granting this
meeting. He addresses the Fuehrer with ‘My Fuehrer’ and he
voices the opinion that he, though only a modest man himself,
might well claim to speak for the Slovak nation. The Czech
courts and prison gave him the right to make such a statement.
He states that the Fuehrer had not only opened the Slovak
question but that he had been also the first one to acknowledge
the dignity of the Slovak nation. The Slovakian people will
gladly fight under the leadership of the Fuehrer for the
maintenance of European civilization. Obviously future
association with the Czechs had become an impossibility for the
Slovaks from a moral as well as economic point of view.”
(_2790-PS_)

It is noteworthy that Tuca addressed Hitler as “My Fuehrer”. During this meeting the Nazi conspirators apparently were successful in planting the idea of insurrection with the Slovak delegation. The final sentence of this document, spoken by Tuca, is conclusive:

“I entrust the fate of my people to your care.” (_2790-PS_)

It is apparent from these documents that in mid-February 1939 the Nazis had a well-disciplined group of Slovaks at their service, many of them drawn from the ranks of Father Hlinka’s party. Flattered by the personal attention of such men as Hitler and Ribbentrop, and subsidized by German representatives, these Slovaks proved willing tools in the hands of the Nazi conspirators.

In addition to the Slovaks, the Nazi conspirators made use of the few Germans still remaining within the mutilated Czech republic. Kundt, Henlein’s deputy who had been appointed leader of this German minority, created as many artificial “focal points of German culture” as possible. Germans from the districts handed over to Germany were ordered from Berlin to continue their studies at the German University in Prague and to make it a center of aggressive Naziism. With the assistance of German civil servants, a deliberate campaign of Nazi infiltration into Czech public and private institutions was carried out, and the Henleinists gave full cooperation with Gestapo agents from the Reich who appeared on Czech soil. The Nazi “political activity” was designed to undermine and to weaken Czech resistance to the commands from Germany. In the face of continued threats and duress on both diplomatic and propaganda levels, the Czech government was unable to take adequate measures against these trespasses on its sovereignty. (_998-PS_; _3061-PS_)

In early March, with the date for the invasion of Czechoslovakia already close at hand, fifth column activity moved into its final phase. In Bohemia and Moravia the FS, Henlein’s equivalent of the SS, were in touch with the Nazi conspirators in the Reich and laid the groundwork for the events of 14 and 15 March. An article by SS-Gruppenfuehrer Karl Hermann Frank, published in _Boehmen und Maehren_, the official periodical of the Reichs Protector of Bohemia and Moravia, March 1941, page 79, reveals with considerable frankness the functions which the FS and SS served and the pride the Nazi conspirators took in the activities of these organizations:

“The SS on March 15, 1939

“A modern people and a modern state are today unthinkable
without political troops. To these are allotted the special task
of being the advance guard of the political will and the
guarantor of its unity. This is especially true of the German
folk-groups, which have their home in some other people’s state.
Accordingly the Sudeten German Party had formerly also organized
its political troop, the Voluntary Vigilantes (_Freiwilliger
Selbstschutz_), called ‘FS’ for short. This troop was trained
essentially in accordance with the principles of the SS, so far
as these could be used in this region at that time. The troop
was likewise assigned here the special task of protecting the
homeland, actively, if necessary. It stood up well in its first
test in this connection, wherever in the fall crisis of 1938 it
had to assume the protection of the homeland, arms in hand.

“After the annexation of the Sudeten Gau, the tasks of the FS
were transferred essentially to the German student organizations
as compact troop formations in Prague and Brunn, aside from the
isolated German communities which remained in the second
republic. This was also natural because many active students
from the Sudeten Gau were already members of the FS. The student
organizations then had to endure this test, in common with other
Germans, during the crisis of March 1939 * * *”

* * * * * *

“In the early morning hours of March 15, after the announcement
of the planned entry of German troops in various localities,
German men had to act in some localities in order to assure a
quiet course of events, either by assumption of the police
authority, as for instance in Brunn, or by corresponding
instruction of the police president, etc. In some Czech offices,
men had likewise, in the early hours of the morning, begun to
burn valuable archives and the material of political files. It
was also necessary to take measures here in order to prevent
foolish destruction * * *. How significant the many-sided and
comprehensive measures were considered by the competent German
agencies, follows from the fact that many of the men either on
March 15 itself or on the following days were admitted into the
SS with fitting acknowledgment, in part even through the
Reichsfuehrer SS himself or through SS Group Leader Heydrich.
The activities and deeds of these men were thereby designated as
accomplished in the interest of the SS.

“Immediately after the corresponding divisions of the SS had
marched in with the first columns of the German Army and had
assumed responsibility in the appropriate sectors, the men here
placed themselves at once at their further disposition and
became valuable auxiliaries and collaborators. * * *”
(_2826-PS_)

The background of the German intrigue in Slovakia is outlined in two British diplomatic despatches (_D-571_, _D-572_) and excerpts from despatches sent by M. Coulondre, the French Ambassador in Berlin to the French Foreign Office between 13 and 18 March 1939, and published in the French Yellow Book. (_2943-PS_)

In Slovakia the long-anticipated crisis came on 10 March. On that day the Czechoslovakian government dismissed those members of the Slovak Cabinet who refused to continue negotiations with Prague, among them Prime Minister Tiso and Durcansky. Within 24 hours the Nazis seized upon this act of the Czech government as an excuse for intervention. On the following day, 11 March, a strange scene was enacted in Bratislava, the Slovak capital. It is related in the report of the British Minister in Prague to the British government:

“Herr Buerckel, Herr Seyss-Inquart and five German generals came
at about 10 P. M. on the evening of Saturday, the 11th March,
into a Cabinet meeting in progress at Bratislava, and told the
Slovak Government that they should proclaim the independence of
Slovakia. When M. Sidor (the Prime Minister) showed hesitation,
Herr Buerckel took him on one side and explained that Herr
Hitler had decided to settle the question of Czecho-Slovakia
definitely. Slovakia ought, therefore, to proclaim her
independence because Herr Hitler would otherwise disinterest
himself in her fate. M. Sidor thanked Herr Buerckel for this
information, but said that he must discuss the situation with
the Government at Prague.” (_D-571_)

Events were now moving rapidly. Durcansky, one of the dismissed ministers, escaped with Nazi assistance to Vienna, where the facilities of the German broadcasting station were placed at his disposal. Arms and ammunition were brought from German Offices in Engerau, across the Danube, into Slovakia where they were used by the FS and the Hlinka Guard to create incidents and disorder of the type required by the Nazis as an excuse for military action. The situation at Engerau is described in an affidavit of Alfred Helmut Naujocks:

“I, ALFRED HELMUT NAUJOCKS, being first duly sworn, depose and
state as follows—

“1. From 1934 to 1941 I was a member of the SD. In the winter of
1939 I was stationed in Berlin, working in Amt VI, Chief Sector
South East. Early in March, four or five days before Slovakia
declared its independence, Heydrich, who was chief of the SD,
ordered me to report to Nebe, the chief of the Reich Criminal
Police. Nebe had been told by Heydrich to accelerate the
production of explosives which his department was manufacturing
for the use of certain Slovak groups. These explosives were
small tins weighing approximately 500 grams.

“2. As soon as forty or fifty of these explosives had been
finished, I carried them by automobile to a small village called
Engerau, just across the border from Pressburg in Slovakia. The
Security Police had a Service Department in this village for the
handling of SD activities. I turned over the explosives to this
office and found there a group of Slovaks, including Karmasin,
Mach, Tuka and Durcansky. In fact, three of these people then
present later became ministers in the new Slovak government. I
was informed that the explosives were to be turned over to the
Hlinka Guards across the border in Slovakia and were to be used
in incidents designed to create the proper atmosphere for a
revolution.

“3. I stayed in Engerau for a day and a half and then returned
to Berlin.

“4. One or two weeks later I met in Berlin the same Slovak
delegation, including Mach, Tuka, Durcansky and Karmasin, which
I had seen in Engerau. They had flown to Berlin for a conference
with Goering. Heydrich asked me to look after them and to report
to him what developed during the conference with Goering. I
reported this conference in detail to Heydrich. It dealt
principally with the organization of the new Slovak state. My
principal recollection of the conference is that the Slovaks
hardly got a word in because Goering was talking all the time.

“The facts stated above are true; this declaration is made by me
voluntarily and without compulsion; after reading over the
statement I have signed and executed the same at NURNBERG,
Germany this 20th day of November 1945.

“(Signed) Alfred Helmut Naujocks
“ALFRED HELMUT NAUJOCKS”
(_3030-PS_)

At this time the German press and radio launched a violent campaign against the Czechoslovak government. And, significantly, an invitation from Berlin was delivered in Bratislava. Tiso, the dismissed prime minister, was summoned by Hitler to an audience in the German capital. A plane was awaiting him in Vienna. (_998-PS_; _3061-PS_; _2943-PS_)

M. _Occupation of Czechoslovakia Under Threat of Military Force._

At this point, in the second week of March 1939, preparations for what the Nazi leaders liked to call the “liquidation” of Czechoslovakia were progressing with a gratifying smoothness. The military, diplomatic, and propaganda machinery of the Nazi conspirators was moving in close coordination. As during Case Green of the preceding summer, the Nazi conspirators had invited Hungary to participate in the attack. It appears from a letter Admiral Horthy, the Hungarian Regent, wrote to Hitler on 13 March 1939, which was captured in the German Foreign Office files, that Horthy was flattered by the invitation:

“Your Excellency,

“My sincere thanks.

“I can hardly tell you how happy I am because this Head Water
Region—I dislike using big words—is of vital importance to the
life of Hungary.

“In spite of the fact that our recruits have only been serving
for 5 weeks we are going into this affair with eager enthusiasm.
The dispositions have already been made. On Thursday, the 16th
of this month, a frontier incident will take place which will be
followed by the big blow on Saturday.

“I shall never forget this proof of friendship and your
Excellency may rely on my unshakeable gratitude at all times.

“Your devoted friend.
“(Signed) HORTHY”

“Budapest. 13.3.1939.” (_2816-PS_)

From this letter it may be inferred that the Nazi conspirators had already informed the Hungarian government of their plans for military action against Czechoslovakia. As it turned out, the timetable was advanced somewhat.

On the diplomatic level Ribbentrop was active. On 13 March, the same day on which Horthy wrote his letter, Ribbentrop sent a cautionary telegram to the German minister in Prague, outlining the course of conduct he should pursue during the coming diplomatic pressure:

“_Telegram in secret code_

“With reference to telephone instructions given by Kordt today.