Chapter XLVI: Part 3: , which deals in part with “Special Case—Extension Red-Green,” (3)

The manner in which they did that has been shown. The German Broadcast continued, that instead of the arrival of an authorized Polish personage, the first answer the Government of the Reich received to their readiness for an understanding was the news of the Polish mobilization; and that only toward 12 o’clock on the night of 30 August 1939 did they receive a somewhat general assurance of British readiness to help towards the commencement of negotiations. The fact that the Polish negotiator expected by the Reich did not arrive, removed the necessary conditions for informing His Majesty’s Government of the views of the German Government as regards the possible basis for negotiation. Since His Majesty’s Government themselves had pleaded for direct negotiations between Germany and Poland, the German Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ribbentrop, gave the British Ambassador on the occasion of the presentation of the last British note, precise information as to the text of the German proposals which will be regarded as a basis for negotiation in the event of the arrival of the Polish Plenipotentiary. The Broadcast thereafter went on to set out the Nazi version of the story of the negotiations over the last few days. (_TC-73 No. 113_)

On 1 September, when his armies were already crossing the Polish frontier, Hitler issued this proclamation to his Armed Forces:

“The Polish Government, unwilling to establish good neighborly
relations as aimed at by me, wants to force the issue by way of
arms.

“The Germans in Poland are being persecuted with bloody terror
and driven from their homes. Several acts of frontier violation
which cannot be tolerated by a great power show that Poland is
no longer prepared to respect the Reich’s frontiers. To put an
end to these mad acts I can see no other way but from now
onwards to meet force with force.

“The German Armed Forces will with firm determination take up
the struggle for the honor and the vital rights of the German
people.

“I expect every soldier to be conscious of the high tradition of
the eternal German soldierly qualities and to do his duty to the
last.

“Remember always and in any circumstances that you are the
representatives of National Socialist Greater Germany.

“Long live our people and the Reich.” (_TC-54_)

So that at last Hitler had kept his word to his generals. He had afforded them their propagandistic justification, and at that time, anyway, it did not matter what people said about it afterwards.

“The view shall not appear, asked later on, whether we told the
truth or not. Might is what counts—or victory is what counts
and not right.” (_1014-PS_)

On that day, 1 September, when news came of this invasion of Polish ground, the British Government, in accordance with their treaty obligations, sent an ultimatum to the German Government, in which it stated:

“I am accordingly to inform your Excellency that unless the
German Government are prepared to give His Majesty’s Government
satisfactory assurances that the German Government have
suspended all aggressive action against Poland and are prepared
promptly to withdraw their forces from Polish territory, His
Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom will without
hesitation fulfill their obligations to Poland.” (_TC-72 No.
110_)

At 9 o’clock on 3 September the British Government handed a final ultimatum to the German Minister of Foreign Affairs. It read in part:

“* * * Although this communication was made more than
twenty-four hours ago, no reply has been received but German
attacks upon Poland have been continued and intensified. I have
accordingly the honor to inform you that, unless not later than
eleven o’clock, British Summer Time, today 3d September,
satisfactory assurances to the above effect have been given by
the German Government, and have reached His Majesty’s Government
in London, a state of war will exist between the two countries
as from that hour.” (_TC-72 No. 118_)

And so it was that at 11 o’clock on 3 September a state of war existed between Germany and England and between Germany and France. The plans, preparations, intentions, and determination to carry out this assault upon Poland which had been going on for months, for years before, had come to fruition despite all appeals to peace, all appeals to reason. It mattered not what anybody but the German Government had in mind or whatever rights anybody else but the German nation thought they had. If there is any doubt left about this matter, two more documents remain for consideration. Even now, on 3 September, Mussolini offered some chance of peace. At 6:30 hours on 3 September Mussolini sent a telegram to Hitler:

“The Italian Ambassador handed to the State Secretary at the
Duce’s order following copy for the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor
and for the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs:

“Italy sends the information, leaving, of course, every decision
to the Fuehrer, that it still has a chance to call a conference
with France, England and Poland on following basis: 1. Armistice
which would leave the Army Corps where they are at present. 2.
Calling the conference within two or three days. 3. Solution of
the Polish-German controversy which would be certainly favorable
for Germany as matters stand today.

“This idea which originated from the Duce has its foremost
exponent in France.

“Danzig is already German and Germany is holding already
securities which guarantee most of her demands. Besides, Germany
has had already its ‘moral satisfaction.’ If it would accept the
plan for a conference, it will achieve all her aims and at the
same time prevent a war which already today has the aspect of
being universal and of extremely long duration.” (_1831-PS_)

Perhaps even Mussolini did not appreciate what all Germany’s aims were, for his offer was turned down in the illuminating letter which Hitler was to write in reply:

“Duce:

“I first want to thank you for your last attempt at mediation. I
would have been ready to accept, but only under condition, that
there would be a possibility to give me certain guarantees that
the conference would be successful. Because, for the last two
days the German troops are engaged in an extraordinarily rapid
advance in Poland. It would have been impossible to devaluate
the bloody sacrifices made thereby by diplomatic intrigues.
Nevertheless, I believe that a way could have been found, if
England would not have been determined to wage war under all
circumstances. I have not given in to the English, because,
Duce, I do not believe that peace could have been maintained for
more than one-half year or one year. Under these circumstances,
I thought that, in spite of everything, the present moment was
better for resistance. At present, the superiority of the German
armed forces in Poland is so overwhelming in all fields that the
Polish Army will collapse in a very short time. I doubt whether
this fast success could be achieved in one or two years. England
and France would have armed their allies, to such an extent that
the crushing technical superiority of the German Armed Forces
could not have become so apparent anymore. I am aware, Duce,
that the fight which I enter, is one for life and death. My own
fate does not play any role in it at all. But I am also aware
that one cannot avoid such a struggle permanently and that one
has to choose after cold deliberation the moment for resistance
in such a way that the probability of the success is guaranteed
and I believe in this success, Duce, with the firmness of a
rock. Recently you have given me the kind assurance that you
think you will be able to help me in a few fields. I acknowledge
this in advance with, sincere thanks. But I believe also—even
if we march now over different roads—that fate will finally
join us. If the National Socialist Germany were destroyed by the
Western democracies, the Fascist Italy would also have to face a
grave future. I was personally always aware of this community of
the future of our two governments and I know that you, Duce,
think the same way. To the situation in Poland, I would like to
make the brief remark that we lay aside, of course, all
unimportant things, that we do not waste any man in unimportant
tasks, but direct all on acts in the light of great operational
considerations. The Northern Polish Army which is the Corridor,
has already been completely encircled by our action. It will be
either wiped out or will surrender. Otherwise, all operations
proceed according to plan. The daily achievements of the troops
are far beyond all expectations. The superiority of our air
force is complete, although scarcely one-third of it is in
Poland. In the West I will be on the defensive. France can here
sacrifice its blood first. Then the moment will come when we can
confront the enemy also there with the full power of the nation.
Accept my thanks, Duce, for all your assistance which you have
given to me in the past and I ask you not to deny it to me in
the future.” (_1831-PS_)

* * * * *

LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO AGGRESSION AGAINST
POLAND, DANZIG, ENGLAND AND FRANCE

Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page
│ │ │
│Charter of the International Military │ │
│ Tribunal, Article 6 (a). │ I │ 5
│ │ │
│International Military Tribunal, │ │
│ Indictment Number 1, Sections IV (F) │ │
│ 4; V. │ I │ 26, 29
│ ————— │ │
│Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │
│document indicates that the document was│ │
│received in evidence at the Nurnberg │ │
│trial. A double asterisk (**) before a │ │
│document number indicates that the │ │
│document was referred to during the │ │
│trial but was not formally received in │ │
│evidence, for the reason given in │ │
│parentheses following the description of│ │
│the document. The USA series number, │ │
│given in parentheses following the │ │
│description of the document, is the │ │
│official exhibit number assigned by the │ │
│court. │ │
│ ————— │ │
*386-PS │Notes on a conference with Hitler in the│ │
│Reich Chancellery, Berlin, 5 November │ │
│1937, signed by Hitler’s adjutant, │ │
│Hossbach, and dated 10 November 1937. │ │
│(USA 25) │ III │ 295
│ │ │
*388-PS │File of papers on Case Green (the plan │ │
│for the attack on Czechoslovakia), kept │ │
│by Schmundt, Hitler’s adjutant, │ │
│April-October 1938. (USA 26) │ III │ 305
│ │ │
*699-PS │Letter from Funk to Hitler, 25 August │ │
│1939, reporting on economic affairs. (GB│ │
│49) │ III │ 509
│ │ │
*789-PS │Speech of the Fuehrer at a conference, │ │
│23 November 1939, to which all Supreme │ │
│Commanders were ordered. (USA 23) │ III │ 572
│ │ │
*795-PS │Keitel’s conference, 17 August 1939, │ │
│concerning giving Polish uniforms to │ │
│Heydrich. (GB 54) │ III │ 580
│ │ │
*798-PS │Hitler’s speech to Commanders-in-Chief, │ │
│at Obersalzberg, 22 August 1939. (USA │ │
│29) │ III │ 581
│ │ │
*1014-PS │Hitler’s speech to Commanders-in-Chief, │ │
│22 August 1939. (USA 30) │ III │ 665
│ │ │
*1639-A-PS │Mobilization book for the Civil │ │
│Administration, 1939 Edition, issued │ │
│over signature of Keitel. (USA 777) │ IV │ 143
│ │ │
*1780-PS │Excerpts from diary kept by General │ │
│Jodl, January 1937 to August 1939. (USA │ │
│72) │ IV │ 360
│ │ │
1796-PS │Notes to the War Diary from March 1939 │ │
│to January 1940. │ IV │ 370
│ │ │
1822-PS │Telegram from Minister of Foreign │ │
│Affairs in Rome to Minister of Foreign │ │
│Affairs in Berlin, 25 August 1939, │ │
│concerning conference with Mussolini and│ │
│Ciano. │ IV │ 459
│ │ │
1823-PS │Hitler reply to Mussolini, 27 August │ │
│1939, concerning attitude of Italy in │ │
│conference of 25 August 1939. │ IV │ 462
│ │ │
1828-PS │Memorandum handed to German Foreign │ │
│Office by Count Magistrate in Rome, 7 │ │
│August 1939. │ IV │ 463
│ │ │
*1831-PS │Correspondence between Hitler and │ │
│Mussolini, September 1939. (GB 75) │ IV │ 463
│ │ │
1832-PS │Telephone report of Reich Minister for │ │
│Foreign Affairs in Rome, 27 August 1939.│ IV │ 468
│ │ │
1889-PS │Account of conference of Fuehrer and │ │
│Italian Ambassador Attolico, 31 August │ │
│1939. │ IV │ 528
│ │ │
*2327-PS │Two top secret memoranda, 14 June 1939, │ │
│concerning operation “Fall Weiss”. (USA │ │
│539) │ IV │ 1035
│ │ │
*2357-PS │Speech by Hitler before Reichstag, 20 │ │
│February 1938, published in Documents of│ │
│German Politics, Part VI, 1, pp. 50-52. │ │
│(GB 30) │ IV │ 1099
│ │ │
*2368-PS │Hitler’s speech before Reichstag, 30 │ │
│January 1937, published in Documents of │ │
│German Politics, Part VI, 2, p. 42. (GB │ │
│26) │ IV │ 1102
│ │ │
*2530-PS │Ribbentrop’s speech in Warsaw, 25 │ │
│January 1939, published in Voelkischer │ │
│Beobachter, 1 February 1939. (GB 36) │ V │ 267
│ │ │
*2751-PS │Affidavit of Alfred Naujocks, 20 │ │
│November 1945. (USA 482) │ V │ 390
│ │ │
2817-PS │Telegram from German Embassy, Rome, to │ │
│Ribbentrop, concerning answer of Duce to│ │
│Hitler’s second letter, 27 August 1939. │ V │ 452
│ │ │
*2818-PS │Secret additional protocol to the │ │
│Friendship and Alliance Pact between │ │
│Germany and Italy. (GB 292) │ V │ 453
│ │ │
2834-PS │Letter from Mussolini to Fuehrer, 25 │ │
│August 1939. │ V │ 502
│ │ │
*2835-PS │German Foreign Office memorandum on │ │
│conversation between Ribbentrop and the │ │
│Duce, 10 March 1940. (GB 291) │ V │ 502
│ │ │
*2846-PS │Affidavit of Edwin Lahousen, 13 November│ │
│1945. │ V │ 507
│ │ │
*2897-PS │Telegram from German Ambassador in │ │
│Tokyo, Ott, to Ribbentrop, 13 July 1941.│ │
│(USA 156) │ V │ 566
│ │ │
*3054-PS │“The Nazi Plan”, script of a motion │ │
│picture composed of captured German │ │
│film. (USA 167) │ V │ 801
│ │ │
*C-23 │Unsigned documents found in official │ │
│Navy files containing notes year by year│ │
│from 1927 to 1940 on reconstruction of │ │
│the German Navy, and dated 18 February │ │
│1938, 8 March 1938, September 1938. (USA│ │
│49) │ VI │ 827
│ │ │
*C-30 │Air-Sea Forces Orders for Occupation │ │
│Danzig, 27 July 1939. (GB 46) │ VI │ 831
│ │ │
*C-120 │Directives for Armed Forces 1939-40 for │ │
│“Fall Weiss”, operation against Poland. │ │
│(GB 41) │ VI │ 916
│ │ │
*C-126 │Preliminary Time Table for “Fall Weiss” │ │
│and directions for secret mobilization. │ │
│(GB 45) │ VI │ 932
│ │ │
*C-137 │Keitel’s appendix of 24 November 1938 to│ │
│Hitler Order of 21 October 1938. (GB 33)│ VI │ 949
│ │ │
*C-142 │Intention of the Army High Command and │ │
│Orders, signed by Brauchitsch. (USA 538)│ VI │ 956
│ │ │
*C-172 │Order No. 1 for “Fall Weiss” signed by │ │
│Doenitz. (GB 189) │ VI │ 1002
│ │ │
*C-175 │OKW Directive for Unified Preparation │ │
│for War 1937-1938, with covering letter │ │
│from von Blomberg, 24 June 1937. (USA │ │
│69) │ VI │ 1006
│ │ │
*D-738 │Memorandum on second conference between │ │
│German Foreign Minister with Hungarian │ │
│Prime and Foreign Minister on 1 May │ │
│1939. (GB 290) │ VII │ 193
│ │ │
*L-43 │Air Force “Organizational Study 1950”, 2│ │
│May 1938. (GB 29) (See Chart No. 10.) │ VII │ 788
│ │ │
*L-79 │Minutes of conference, 23 May 1939, │ │
│“Indoctrination on the political │ │
│situation and future aims”. (USA 27) │ VII │ 847
│ │ │
*L-172 │“The Strategic Position at the Beginning│ │
│of the 5th Year of War”, a lecture │ │
│delivered by Jodl on 7 November 1943 at │ │
│Munich to Reich and Gauleiters. (USA 34)│ VIII │ 920
│ │ │
*R-100 │Minutes of instructions given by Hitler │ │
│to General von Brauchitsch on 25 March │ │
│1939. (USA 121) │ VIII │ 83
│ │ │
*TC-2 │Hague Convention (1) for Pacific │ │
│Settlement of International │ │
│Disputes—1907. (GB 2) │ VIII │ 276
│ │ │
*TC-3 │Hague Convention (3) Relative to opening│ │
│of Hostilities. (GB 2) │ VIII │ 279
│ │ │
*TC-9 │Versailles Treaty, Section XI, Article │ │
│100, Free City of Danzig. (GB 3) │ VIII │ 290
│ │ │
*TC-15 │Arbitration Treaty between Germany and │ │
│Poland at Locarno, 16 October 1925. (GB │ │
│16) │ VIII │ 331
│ │ │
*TC-18 │Declaration concerning wars of │ │
│aggression; resolution of 3rd Committee │ │
│of League of Nations, 24 September 1927.│ │
│(GB 17) │ VIII │ 357
│ │ │
*TC-19 │Kellogg-Briand Pact at Paris. 1929 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part II, No. 9, pp. │ │
│97-101. (GB 18) │ VIII │ 359
│ │ │
*TC-21 │German-Polish Declaration, 26 January │ │
│1934. (GB 24) │ VIII │ 368
│ │ │
*TC-28 │German assurance to Czechoslovakia, 26 │ │
│September 1938, from Documents of German│ │
│Politics, Part VI, pp. 345-346. (GB 22) │ VIII │ 378
│ │ │
*TC-29 │German assurances to Poland, 26 │ │
│September 1938, from Documents of German│ │
│Politics, Part VI, p. 336. (GB 32) │ VIII │ 378
│ │ │
*TC-53-A │Marginal note to decree of final │ │
│incorporation of Memel with German │ │
│Reich, 23 March 1939, from Documents of │ │
│German Politics, Part VII, p. 552. (GB │ │
│4) │ VIII │ 408
│ │ │
*TC-54 │Proclamation of the Fuehrer to German │ │
│Armed Forces, 1 September 1939. (GB 73) │ VIII │ 408
│ │ │
*TC-70 │Hitler’s Reichstag speech concerning │ │
│agreement with Poland, 30 January 1934, │ │
│from Voelkischer Beobachter, 31 January │ │
│1934. (GB 25) │ VIII │ 433
│ │ │
*TC-71 │Reports of British Consul in Danzig, │ │
│July 1939. (GB 47) │ VIII │ 434
│ │ │
*TC-72 No. 13 │British Blue Book. Hitler’s Reichstag │ │
│speech, 28 April 1939. (GB 43) │ VIII │ 438
│ │ │
*TC-72 No. 14 │British Blue Book. German memorandum │ │
│renouncing 1934 agreement, 28 April │ │
│1939. (GB 42) │ VIII │ 441
│ │ │
*TC-72 No. 16 │British Blue Book. Polish Government’s │ │
│reply, 5 May 1939, to 28 April memo. (GB│ │
│44) │ VIII │ 445
│ │ │
*TC-72 No. 17 │British Blue Book. British Prime │ │
│Minister’s statement in House of │ │
│Commons, 31 March 1939. (GB 39) │ VIII │ 450
│ │ │
*TC-72 No. 18 │British Blue Book. Anglo-Polish │ │
│communique issued 6 April 1939. (GB 40) │ VIII │ 450
│ │ │
*TC-72 No. 53 │British Blue Book. Report of British │ │
│Ambassador, Warsaw, 26 August 1939. (GB │ │
│51) │ VIII │ 451
│ │ │
*TC-72 No. 54 │British Blue Book. Report of British │ │
│Ambassador, Warsaw, 26 August 1939. (GB │ │
│52) │ VIII │ 452
│ │ │
*TC-72 No. 55 │British Blue Book. Report of British │ │
│Ambassador, Warsaw, 27 August 1939. (GB │ │
│53) │ VIII │ 452
│ │ │
*TC-72 No. 56 │British Blue Book. British Prime │ │
│Minister’s letter to Hitler, 22 August │ │
│1939. (GB 55) │ VIII │ 453
│ │ │
*TC-72 No. 60 │British Blue Book. Hitler’s reply to │ │
│British Prime Minister, 23 August 1939. │ │
│(GB 56) │ VIII │ 455
│ │ │
*TC-72 No. 62 │British Blue Book. Danzig Senate Decree │ │
│appointing Forster Head of State, 23 │ │
│August 1939. (GB 50) │ VIII │ 457
│ │ │
*TC-72 No. 68 │British Blue Book. Hitler’s verbal │ │
│communique to Sir Neville Henderson, 25 │ │
│August 1939. (GB 65) │ VIII │ 458
│ │ │
*TC-72 No. 74 │British Blue Book. British Government’s │ │
│reply, 28 August 1939, to Hitler’s │ │
│message of 25 August. (GB 66) │ VIII │ 460
│ │ │
*TC-72 No. 75 │British Blue Book. Hitler and Sir N. │ │
│Henderson conversation, 28 August 1939. │ │
│(GB 67) │ VIII │ 463
│ │ │
*TC-72 No. 78 │British Blue Book. Hitler’s reply to │ │
│British Government, 29 August 1939. (GB │ │
│68) │ VIII │ 466
│ │ │
*TC-72 No. 79 │British Blue Book. Hitler and Sir N. │ │
│Henderson conversation, 29 August 1939. │ │
│(GB 69) │ VIII │ 469
│ │ │
*TC-72 No. 89 │British Blue Book. British Government’s │ │
│reply, 30 August 1939, to German │ │
│communication of 29 August. (GB 70) │ VIII │ 470
│ │ │
*TC-72 No. 92 │British Blue Book. Ribbentrop and Sir N.│ │
│Henderson conversation, midnight 30 │ │
│August 1939. (GB 71) │ VIII │ 472
│ │ │
*TC-72 No. 110 │British Blue Book. British Government’s │ │
│ultimatum, 1 September 1939. (GB 74) │ VIII │ 473
│ │ │
TC-72 No. 113 │British Blue Book. Copy German proposals│ │
│handed to Sir N. Henderson 9:15 P.M., 31│ │
│August 1939. │ VIII │ 474
│ │ │
TC-72 No. 118 │British Blue Book. British Government’s │ │
│final ultimatum, 3 September 1939. │ VIII │ 474
│ │ │
*TC-72 No. 124 │British Blue Book. President Roosevelt’s│ │
│appeal to Hitler, 24 August 1939. (GB │ │
│59) │ VIII │ 475
│ │ │
*TC-72 No. 126 │British Blue Book. President Moscicki’s │ │
│reply to President Roosevelt, │ │
│25 August 1939. (GB 60) │ VIII │ 476
│ │ │
*TC-72 No. 127 │British Blue Book. President Roosevelt’s│ │
│second appeal to Hitler, 25 August 1939.│ │
│(GB 61) │ VIII │ 477
│ │ │
*TC-72 No. 139 │British Blue Book. The Pope’s appeal, 24│ │
│August 1939. (GB 62) │ VIII │ 477
│ │ │
*TC-72 No. 141 │British Blue Book. The Pope’s appeal, 31│ │
│August 1939. (GB 63) │ VIII │ 480
│ │ │
*TC-73 No. 33 │Polish White Book. German-Polish │ │
│communique, 5 November 1937. (GB 27) │ VIII │ 480
│ │ │
*TC-73 No. 44 │Polish White Book. Lipski, Ribbentrop │ │
│luncheon, conversation, 24 October 1938.│ │
│(GB 27-A) │ VIII │ 483
│ │ │
*TC-73 No. 45 │Polish White Book. Beck’s instructions │ │
│to Lipski, 31 October 1938. (GB 27-B) │ VIII │ 484
│ │ │
*TC-73 No. 48 │Polish White Book. Beck and Hitler │ │
│conversation, 5 January 1939. (GB 34) │ VIII │ 486
│ │ │
*TC-73 No. 49 │Polish White Book. Beck and Ribbentrop │ │
│conversation, 6 January 1939. (GB 35) │ VIII │ 488
│ │ │
*TC-73 No. 57 │Polish White Book. Hitler’s Reichstag │ │
│speech, 30 January 1939. (GB 37) │ VIII │ 488
│ │ │
*TC-73 No. 61 │Polish White Book. Ribbentrop and Lipski│ │
│conversation, 21 March 1939. (GB 38) │ VIII │ 489
│ │ │
*TC-73 No. 91 │Polish White Book. Anglo-Polish │ │
│Agreement, 25 August 1939. (GB 57) │ VIII │ 492
│ │ │
*TC-73 No. 112 │Polish White Book. Ribbentrop-Lipski │ │
│conversation, 31 August 1939. (GB 72) │ VIII │ 494
│ │ │
TC-73 No. 113 │Polish White Book. German broadcast 9 │ │
│P.M. 31 August 1939. │ VIII │ 495
│ │ │
*TC-75 │Memo for the Fuehrer, 2 January 1938, │ │
│concerning Anglo-German relations. (GB │ │
│28) │ VIII │ 513
│ │ │
*TC-76 │Note for Reichsminister, 26 August 1938.│ │
│(GB 31) │ VIII │ 515
│ │ │
*TC-77 │Memorandum of conversation between │ │
│Hitler, Ribbentrop and Ciano, 12 August │ │
│1939. (GB 48) │ VIII │ 516
│ │ │
*TC-78 │French Prime Minister’s letter to │ │
│Hitler, 26 August 1939. (GB 58) │ VIII │ 529
│ │ │
*TC-79 │Hitler’s reply to French Prime Minister,│ │
│27 August 1939. (GB 58) │ VIII │ 531
│ │ │
*TC-90 │Goering’s interrogation, 29 August 1945.│ │
│(GB 64) │ VIII │ 534
│ │ │
*TC-91 │Ribbentrop’s interrogation, 29 August │ │
│1945. (GB 276) │ VIII │ 535
│ │ │
Affidavit A │Affidavit of Erwin Lahousen, 21 January │ │
│1946, substantially the same as his │ │
│testimony on direct examination before │ │
│the International Military Tribunal at │ │
│Nurnberg 30 November and 1 December │ │
│1945. │ VIII │ 587
│ │ │
*Chart No. 10 │1938 Proposals for Luftwaffe Expansion │ │
│1938-1950. (L-43; GB 29) │ VIII │ 779
│ │ │
**Chart No. 12 │German Aggression. (Enlargement │ │
│displayed to Tribunal.) │ VIII │ 781
│ │ │
**Chart No. 13 │Violations of Treaties, Agreements and │ │
│Assurances. (Enlargement displayed to │ │
│Tribunal.) │ VIII │ 782

9. AGGRESSION AGAINST NORWAY AND DENMARK

In the early hours of the morning of 9 April 1940 Nazi Germany invaded Norway and Denmark. Those invasions constituted wars of aggression, and also wars in violation of international treaties, agreements, and assurances.

A. _Treaties and Assurances Violated._

The invasions constituted violations of the Hague Convention and of the Kellogg-Briand Pact. In addition there were specific agreements between Germany and Norway and Denmark. There was the Treaty of Arbitration and Conciliation between Germany and Denmark, which was signed at Berlin on 2 June, 1926 (_TC-17_). The first Article of that Treaty is in these terms:

“The Contracting Parties undertake to submit to the procedure of
arbitration or conciliation, in conformity with the present
Treaty, all disputes of any nature whatsoever which may arise
between Germany and Denmark and which it has not been possible
to settle within a reasonable period by diplomacy or to bring
with the consent of both Parties before the Permanent Court of
International Justice.

“Disputes for the solution of which a special procedure has been
laid down in other Conventions in force between the Contracting
Parties shall be settled in accordance with the provisions of
such Conventions.” (_TC-17_)

The remaining Articles deal with the machinery for arbitration.

There was also the treaty of nonaggression between Germany and Denmark which was signed by Ribbentrop on 31 May 1939, ten weeks after the Nazi seizure of Czechoslovakia (_TC-24_). The preamble and Articles 1 and 2 read as follows:

“His Majesty the King of Denmark and Iceland and the Chancellor
of the German Reich,

“Being firmly resolved to maintain peace between Denmark and
Germany in all circumstances, have agreed to confirm this
resolve by means of a treaty and have appointed as their
Plenipotentiaries: His Majesty the King of Denmark and Iceland
and the Chancellor of the German Reich.

“Article I: The Kingdom of Denmark and the German Reich shall in
no case resort to war or to any other use of force one against
the other.

“Should action of the kind referred to in Paragraph 1 be taken
by a third Power against one of the Contracting Parties, the
other Contracting Party shall not support such action in any
way.

“Article II: The Treaty shall come into force on the exchange of
the instruments of ratification and shall remain in force for a
period of ten years from that date.” (_TC-24_)

The Treaty is dated 31 May 1939. At the bottom of the page there appears the signature of Ribbentrop. The invasion of Denmark by the Nazi forces less than a year after the signature of this treaty showed the utter worthlessness of treaties to which Ribbentrop put his signature.

With regard to Norway, Ribbentrop and the Nazi conspirators were party to a similar perfidy. Hitler gave an assurance to Denmark, Norway, and the Netherlands on 28 April 1939 (_TC-30_). That, of course, was after the annexation of Czechoslovakia had shaken the confidence of the world, and was presumably an attempt to try to reassure the Scandinavian States. Hitler said:

“I have given binding declarations to a large number of States.
None of these States can complain that even a trace of a demand
contrary thereto has ever been made to them by Germany. None of
the Scandinavian statesmen, for example, can contend that a
request has ever been put to them by the German Government or by
the German public opinion which was incompatible with the
sovereignty and integrity of their State.

“I was pleased that a number of European States availed
themselves of these declarations by the German Government to
express and emphasize their desire too for absolute neutrality.
This applies to Holland, Belgium, Switzerland, Denmark, etc.”
(_TC-30_)

A further assurance was given by the Nazi Government on 2 September 1939, the day after the Nazi invasion of Poland. On that day an aide memoire was handed to the Norwegian Foreign Minister by the German Minister in Oslo. It reads:

“The German Reich Government is determined, in view of the
friendly relations which exist between Norway and Germany, under
no circumstances, to prejudice the inviolability and integrity
of Norway and to respect the territory of the Norwegian State.
In making this declaration the Reich Government naturally
expects, on its side, that Norway will observe an unimpeachable
neutrality towards the Reich and will not tolerate any breaches
of Norwegian neutrality by any third party which might occur.
Should the attitude of the Royal Norwegian Government differ
from this so that any such breach of neutrality by a third party
recurs, the Reich Government would then obviously be compelled
to safeguard the interests of the Reich in such a way as the
resulting situation might dictate.” (_TC-31_)

There followed a further German assurance to Norway in a speech by Hitler on 6 October 1939 in which he said:

“Germany has never had any conflicts of interest or even points
of controversy with the Northern States; neither has she any
today. Sweden and Norway have both been offered nonaggression
pacts by Germany and have both refused them solely because they
do not feel themselves threatened in any way.” (_TC-32_)

These treaties and assurances were the diplomatic background to the Nazi aggression on Norway and Denmark. These assurances were simply given to lull suspicion and cause the intended victims of Nazi aggression to be unprepared to meet the Nazi attack. For it is now known that as early as October 1939 the conspirators were plotting the invasion of Norway, and that the most active conspirators in that plot were Raeder and Rosenberg.

B. _Early Planning for Invasion._

The Norwegian invasion is in one respect not a typical Nazi aggression, in that Hitler had to be persuaded to embark upon it. The chief instruments of persuasion were Raeder and Rosenberg; Raeder because he thought Norway strategically important, and because he coveted glory for his Navy; Rosenberg because of his political connections in Norway, which he sought to develop. And in the Norwegian, Vidkun Quisling, Rosenberg found a very model of the Fifth Column agent.

The early stages of the Nazi conspiracy to invade Norway are disclosed in a letter which Raeder wrote on 10 January 1944 to Admiral Assmann, the official German Naval historian (_C-66_). It is headed “Memorandum for Admiral Assmann for his own information; not to be used for publications.” The first part deals with “Barbarossa” (the plan to invade Russia). The next part is headed “(b) _Weseruebung_,” which was the code name for the invasion of Norway and Denmark. The following is a pertinent passage from the letter:

“During the weeks preceding the report on the 10th of October
1939, I was in correspondence with Admiral Carls, who, in a
detailed letter to me, first pointed out the importance of an
occupation of the Norwegian coast by Germany. I passed this
letter on to C/SKl (the Chief of Staff of the Naval War Staff)
for their information and prepared some notes based on this
letter for my report to the Fuehrer, which I made on the 10th of
October 1939, since my opinion was identical with that of
Admiral Carls, while at that time the SKl was more dubious about
the matter. In these notes, I stressed the disadvantages which
an occupation of Norway by the British would have for
us—control of the approaches to the Baltic, outflanking of our
naval operations and of air attacks on Britain, pressure on
Sweden. I also stressed the advantages for us of the occupation
of the Norwegian coast—outlet to the North Atlantic, no
possibility of a British mine barrier, as in the year 1917-18.
Naturally at the time, only the coast and bases were considered;
I included Narvik, though Admiral Carls, in the course of our
correspondence thought that Narvik could be excluded. The
Fuehrer saw at once the significance of the Norwegian problem;
he asked me to leave the notes and stated that he wished to
consider the question himself.” (_C-66_)

This report of Raeder shows that the evolution of this Nazi campaign against Norway affords a good example of the participation of the German High Command in the Nazi conspiracy to attack inoffensive neighbors.

Before this report of October 1939 was made to the Fuehrer, Raeder sought a second opinion on the Norwegian invasion. On 3 October 1939, he made out a questionnaire headed, “Gaining of Bases in Norway (extract from War Diary)” (_C-122_). It reads:

“The Chief of the Naval War Staff considers it necessary that
the Fuehrer be informed as soon as possible of the opinions of
the Naval War Staff on the possibilities of extending the
operational base to the North. It must be ascertained whether it
is possible to gain bases in Norway under the combined pressure
of Russia and Germany, with the aim of improving our strategic
and operational position. The following questions must be given
consideration:

“(_a_) What places in Norway can be considered as bases?

“(_b_) Can bases be gained by military force against Norway’s
will, if it is impossible to carry this out without fighting?

“(_c_) What are the possibilities of defense after the
occupation?

“(_d_) Will the harbors have to be developed completely as
bases, or have they already advantages suitable for supply
position?”

“F.O.U.-boats” [a reference to Doenitz] “already considers such
harbors extremely useful as equipment and supply bases for
Atlantic U-boats to call at temporarily.”)

“(_e_) What decisive advantages would exist for the conduct of
the war at sea in gaining bases in North Denmark, e.g. Skagen?”
(_C-122_)

A memorandum written by Doenitz on Norwegian bases presumably relates to the questionnaire of Raeder, which was in circulation about that time. Doenitz’s document is headed, “Flag Officer Submarines, Operations Division,” and is marked “Most Secret.” The subject is “Base in Norway.” Then there are set out “suppositions”, “advantages and disadvantages”, and then “conclusions”. The last paragraph (III) reads:

“The following is therefore proposed:

“(1) Establishment of a base in Trondheim, including:

“_a._ Possibility of supplying fuel, compressed air, oxygen,
provisions.

“_b._ Repair opportunities for overhaul work after an encounter.

“_c._ Good opportunities for accommodating U-boat crews.

“_d._ Flak protection, L.A. armament, petrol and M/S units.

“Secondly, establishment of the possibility of supplying fuel in
Narvik as an alternative.” (_C-5_)

In October 1939 Hitler was merely considering the Norwegian aggression and had not yet committed himself to it. Raeder persevered in pressing his point of view with regard to Norway, and at this stage he found a powerful ally in Rosenberg.

C. _Use of the Fifth Column: Quisling._

The Nazi employment of traitors and the stimulation of treachery as a political weapon are now proven historical facts. Should further proof be required, it is found in a “Brief Report on Activities of the Foreign Affairs Bureau of the Party (_Aussenpolitisches Amt der NSDAP_) from 1933 to 1943” (_007-PS_). This was Rosenberg’s Bureau. The report reads:

“When the Foreign Affairs Bureau (_Aussenpolitische Amt_) was
established on the 1st of April 1933, the Fuehrer directed that
it should not be expanded to a large bureaucratic agency, but
should rather develop its effectiveness through initiative and
suggestions.

“Corresponding to the extraordinarily hostile attitude adopted
by the Soviet Government in Moscow from the beginning, the
newly-established Bureau devoted particular attention to
internal conditions in the Soviet Union, as well as to the
effects of World Bolshevism primarily in other European
countries. It entered into contact with the most variegated
groups inclining towards National Socialism in combatting
Bolshevism, focussing its main attention on Nations and States
bordering on the Soviet Union. On the one hand, those Nations
and states constituted an _Insulating Ring_ encircling the
Bolshevist neighbor; on the other hand they were the laterals of
German living space and took up a flanking position towards the
Western Powers, especially Great Britain. In order to wield the
desired influence by one means or another, the Bureau was
compelled to use the most varying methods, taking into
consideration the completely different living conditions, the
ties of blood, intellect and history of the movements observed
by the Bureau in those countries.

“In Scandinavia an outspokenly pro-Anglo-Saxon attitude, based
on economic consideration, had become progressively more
dominant after the World War of 1914-18. There the Bureau put
the entire emphasis on influencing general cultural relations
with the Nordic peoples. For this purpose it took the Nordic
Society in Luebeck under its protection. The Reich conventions
of this society were attended by many outstanding personalities,
especially from Finland. While there were no openings for purely
political cooperation in Sweden and Denmark, an association
based on Greater Germanic ideology was found in Norway. Very
close relations were established with its founder, which led to
further consequences.” (_007-PS_)

There follows an account of the activity of Rosenberg’s Bureau in various parts of the world. The last paragraph of the main body of the report reads in part:

“With the outbreak of war, the Bureau was entitled to consider
its task as terminated. The exploitation of the many personal
connections in many lands can be resumed under a different
guise.” (_007-PS_)

The Annex to the report shows what the “exploitation of personal connections” involved. Annex One to the document is headed, “To Brief Report on Activities of the Foreign Affairs Bureau of the Nazi Party from 1933 to 1943.” The subheading is “The Political Preparation of the Military Occupation of Norway During the War Years 1939-1940”. The annex reads:

“As previously mentioned, of all political groupings in
Scandinavia, only ‘_Nasjonal Samling_’ led in Norway by the
former Minister of War and Major of the Reserve, Vidkun
Quisling, deserved serious political attention. This was a
fighting political group, possessed by the idea of a Greater
Germanic Community. Naturally, all ruling powers were hostile
and attempted to prevent, by any means, its success among the
population. The Bureau maintained constant liaison with Quisling
and attentively observed the attacks he conducted with tenacious
energy on the middle class, which had been taken in tow by the
English.

“From the beginning, it appeared probable that without
revolutionary events, which would stir the population from their
former attitude, no successful progress of _Nasjonal Samling_
was to be expected. During the winter 1938-1939, Quisling was
privately visited by a member of the Bureau.

“When the political situation in Europe came to a head in 1939,
Quisling made an appearance at the convention of the Nordic
Society in Luebeck in June. He expounded his conception of the
situation, and his apprehensions concerning Norway. He
emphatically drew attention to the geopolitically decisive
importance of Norway in the Scandinavian area, and to the
advantages that would accrue to the power dominating the
Norwegian coast in case of a conflict between the Greater German
Reich and Great Britain.

“Assuming that his statement would be of special interest to the
Marshal of the Reich Goering for aero-strategical reasons,
Quisling was referred to State Secretary Koerner by the Bureau.
The Staff Director of the Bureau handed the Chief of the Reich
Chancellery a memorandum for transmission to the Fuehrer.”
(_007-PS_)

This document is another illustration of the close interweaving between the political and military leadership of the Nazi State. Raeder, in his report to Admiral Assmann, admitted his collaboration with Rosenberg (_C-66_). The second paragraph of the Raeder report, headed “_Weseruebung_,” reads as follows:

“In the further developments, I was supported by Commander
Schreiber, Naval Attache in Oslo and the M-Chief personally—in
conjunction with the Rosenberg Organization. Thus, we got in
touch with Quisling and Hagelin, who came to Berlin at the
beginning of December and were taken to the Fuehrer by me—with
the approval of Reichsleiter Rosenberg.” (_C-66_)

The details of the manner in which Raeder made contact personally with Quisling are not clear. In a report from Rosenberg to Raeder, however, the full extent of Quisling’s preparedness for treachery and his potential usefulness to the Nazi aggressors was reported and disclosed to Raeder. The second paragraph of this report reads as follows:

“The reasons for a coup, on which Quisling made a report, would
be provided by the fact that the Storthing (the Norwegian
Parliament) had, in defense of the constitution, passed a
resolution prolonging its own life which is to become operative
on January 12th. Quisling still retains in his capacity as a
long-standing officer and a former Minister of War, the closest
relations with the Norwegian Army. He showed me the original of
a letter which he had received only a short time previously from
the Commanding Officer in Narvik, Colonel Sunlo. In this letter,
Colonel Sunlo frankly lays emphasis on the fact that, if things
went on as they were going at present, Norway was finished.”
(_C-65_)

Then came the details of a plot to overthrow the government of Norway by the traitor Quisling, in collaboration with Rosenberg:

“A plan has been put forward which deals with the possibility of
a coup, and which provides for a number of selected Norwegians
to be trained in Germany with all possible speed for such a
purpose, being allotted their exact tasks, and provided with
experienced and die-hard National Socialists, who are practiced
in such operations. These trained men should then proceed with
all speed to Norway, where details would then require to be
further discussed. Some important centers in Oslo would have to
be taken over immediately, and at the same time the German
Fleet, together with suitable contingents of the German Army,
would go into operation when summoned specially by the new
Norwegian Government in a specified bay at the approaches to
Oslo. Quisling has no doubts that such a coup, having been
carried out with instantaneous success—would immediately bring
him the approval of those sections of the Army with which he at
present has connections, and thus it goes without saying that he
has never discussed a political fight with them. As far as the
King is concerned, he believes that he would respect it as an
accomplished fact. * * *

“Quisling gives figures of the number of German troops required
which accord with German calculations.” (_C-65_)

Subsequent developments are indicated in a report by Raeder of his meeting with Hitler on 12 December 1939 at 1200 hours, in the presence of Keitel, Jodl and Puttkammer, who at this time was adjutant to Hitler. The report is headed “Norwegian Question”, and the first sentence reads:

“C-in-C Navy” (Raeder) “has received Quisling and Hagelin.
Quisling creates the impression of being reliable.” (_C-64_)

There then follows, in the next, two paragraphs, a statement of Quisling’s views. The fourth paragraph reads:

“The Fuehrer thought of speaking to Quisling personally so that
he might form an impression of him. He wanted to see Rosenberg
once more beforehand, as the latter has known Quisling for a
long while. C-in-C Navy” [Raeder] “suggests that if the Fuehrer
forms a favorable impression, the OKW should obtain permission
to make plans with Quisling for the preparation and carrying out
of the occupation.

“(_a_) By peaceful means; that is to say, German forces summoned
by Norway, or

“(_b_) To agree to do so by force.” (_C-64_)

It was at a meeting on 12 December that Raeder made the above report to Hitler.

Raeder’s record of these transactions reports the next event:

“Thus, we got in touch with Quisling and Hagelin, who came to
Berlin at the beginning of December and were taken to the
Fuehrer by me, with the approval of Reichsleiter Rosenberg.”
(_C-66_)

A note at the bottom of the page states:

“At the crucial moment, R” (presumably Rosenberg) “hurt his
foot, so that I visited him in his house on the morning of the
14th of December.” (_C-66_)

That is Raeder’s note, and it indicates the extent of his contact in this conspiracy.

The report continues:

“On the grounds of the Fuehrer’s discussion with Quisling and
Hagelin on the afternoon of the 14th of December, the Fuehrer
gave the order that the preparations for the Norwegian operation
were to be made by the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.

“Until that moment, the Naval War Staff had taken no part in the
development of the Norwegian question, and continued to be
somewhat skeptical about it. The preparations, which were
undertaken by Captain Kranke in the Supreme Command of the Armed
Forces, were founded, however, on a memorandum of the Naval War
Staff.” (_C-66_)

Raeder’s note referring to the “crucial” moment was an appropriate one, for on the same day that it was written, 14 December, Hitler gave the order that preparations for the Norwegian operation were to be begun by the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.

Rosenberg’s report on the activities of his organization deals with further meetings between Quisling and the Nazi chiefs in December. The extract reads:

“Quisling was granted a personal audience with the Fuehrer on 16
December, and once more on 18 December. In the course of this
audience the Fuehrer emphasized repeatedly that he personally
would prefer a completely neutral attitude of Norway, as well as
of the whole of Scandinavia. He did not intend to enlarge the
theatre of war and to draw still other nations into the
conflict. * * *”

“Should the enemy attempt to extend the war however, with the
aim of achieving further throttling and intimidation of the
Greater German Reich, he would be compelled to gird himself
against such an undertaking. In order to counterbalance
increasing enemy propaganda activity, he promised Quisling
financial support of his movement, which is based on Greater
German ideology. Military exploitation of the question now
raised was assigned to the special military staff, which
transmitted special missions to Quisling. Reichsleiter Rosenberg
was to take over political exploitation. Financial expenses were
to be defrayed by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs [Ribbentrop’s
organization], the Minister for Foreign Affairs [Ribbentrop]
being kept continuously informed by the Foreign Affairs Bureau
[Rosenberg’s organization].

“Chief of Section Scheidt was charged with maintaining liaison
with Quisling. In the course of further developments he was
assigned to the Naval Attache in Oslo. Orders were given that
the whole matter be handled with strictest secrecy.” (_007-PS_)

Here again is a further indication of the close link between the Nazi politicians and the Nazi service chiefs.

D. _Operational Planning_

The information available on the events of January 1940 is not full, but it is clear that the agitation of Raeder and Rosenberg bore fruit. An order signed by Keitel, dated 27 January 1940, marked “Most Secret, five copies; reference, Study ‘N’”, (an earlier code name for the _Weseruebung_ preparations) and classified "Access only through an officer,” stated:

“C-in-C of the Navy [Raeder] has a report on this * * *

“The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces wishes
that Study ‘N’ should be further worked on under my direct and
personal guidance, and in the closest conjunction with the
general war policy. For these reasons the Fuehrer has
commissioned me to take over the direction of further
preparations.

“A working staff has been formed at the Supreme Command of the
Armed Forces Headquarters for this purpose, and this represents
at the same time the nucleus of a future operational staff.”

* * * * * *

“All further plans will be made under the cover name
‘_Weseruebung_.’” (_C-63_)

The importance of that document, to the signature of Keitel upon it, and to the date of this important decision, is this: Prior to this date, 27 January 1940, the planning of the various aspects of the invasion of Norway and Denmark had been confined to a relatively small group, whose aim had been to persuade Hitler of the desirability of undertaking the operation. The issuance of this directive of Keitel’s on 27 January 1940, was the signal that the Supreme Command of the German Armed Forces, the OKW, had accepted the proposition of the group that was pressing for the Norwegian adventure, and had turned the combined resources of the German military machine to the task of producing practical and coordinated plans for the Norwegian operation. From January onward the operational planning for the invasion of Norway and Denmark was started through the normal channels.

Certain entries in the diary of Jodl reveal how the preparations progressed (_1809-PS_). The entry for 6 February commences:

“New idea: Carry out ‘H’ [_Hartmundt_, another code word for the
Norwegian and Danish invasion] and Weser Exercise only and
guarantee Belgium’s neutrality for the duration of the war.”
(_1809-PS_)

The entry for 21 February reads:

“Fuehrer has talked with General von Falkenhorst, and charges
him with preparation of ‘Weser Exercise.’ Falkenhorst accepts
gladly. Instructions issued to the three branches of the armed
forces.” (_1809-PS_)

The entry for 28 February reads:

“I propose, first to the Chief of OKW and then to the Fuehrer,
that Case Yellow [the code name for the invasion of the
Netherlands] and Weser Exercise [the invasion of Norway and
Denmark] must be prepared in such a way that they will be
independent of one another as regards both time and forces
employed. The Fuehrer completely agrees, if this is in any way
possible.” (_1809-PS_)

It will be observed that the new idea of 6 February, that the neutrality of Belgium might be preserved, had been abandoned by 28 February.

The entry for 29 February reads:

“Fuehrer also wishes to have a strong task force in Copenhagen
and a plan, elaborated in detail, showing how individual coastal
batteries are to be captured by shock troops. Warlimont, _Chef
Landesverteidigung_, instructed to make out immediately the
order of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and Director of Armed
Forces to make out a similar order regarding the strengthening
of the staff.” (_1809-PS_)

Then came Hitler’s order to complete the preparations for the invasion of Norway and Denmark (_C-174_). It bears the date of 1 March 1940, and reads as follows:

“The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, Most
Secret.

“Directive for _Fall Weseruebung_.

“The development of the situation in Scandinavia requires the
making of all preparations for the occupation of Denmark and
Norway by a part of the German Armed Forces—_Fall Weseruebung_.
This operation should prevent British encroachment on
Scandinavia and the Baltic; further, it should guarantee our ore
base in Sweden and give our Navy and Air Force a wider start
line against Britain.

“In view of our military and political power in comparison with
that of the Scandinavian States, the force to be employed in the
_Fall Weseruebung_ will be kept as small as possible. The
numerical weakness will be balanced by daring actions and
surprise execution. On principle we will do our utmost to make
the operation appear as a peaceful occupation, the object of
which is the military protection of the neutrality of the
Scandinavian States. Corresponding demands will be transmitted
to the Governments at the beginning of the occupation. If
necessary, demonstrations by the Navy and the Air Force will
provide the necessary emphasis. If, in spite of this, resistance
should be met with, all military means will be used to crush
it.”

* * * * * *

“I put in charge of the preparations and the conduct of the
operation against Denmark and Norway the Commanding General of
the 21st Army Corps, General von Falkenhorst. * * *”

“The crossing of the Danish border and the landings in Norway
must take place simultaneously. I emphasize that the operations
must be prepared as quickly as possible. In case the enemy
seizes the initiative against Norway, we must be able to apply
immediately our own counter-measures.

“It is most important that the Scandinavian States as well as
the Western opponents should be taken by surprise by our
measures. All preparations, particularly those of transport and
of readiness, drafting and embarkation of the troops, must be
made with this factor in mind.

“In case the preparations for embarkation can no longer be kept
secret, the leaders and the troops will be deceived with
fictitious objectives.” (_C-174_)