Chapter V (4)

“G: As you know the Fuehrer has entrusted me with the
administration of the current government procedures (_Fuehrung
der Regierungsgeschaft_). And therefore I wanted to inform you.
There is overwhelming joy in Austria, that you can hear over the
radio.

“R: Yes, it is fantastic, isn’t it?

“G: Yes, the last march into the Rhineland is completely
overshadowed. The Fuehrer was deeply moved, when he talked to me
last night. You must remember it was the first time that he saw
his homeland again. Now, I mainly want to talk about political
things. Well, this story we had given an ultimatum, that is just
foolish gossip. From the very beginning the National Socialist
ministers and the representatives of the people
(_Volksreferenten_) have presented the ultimatum. Later on, more
and more prominent people of the Movement Party participated,
and as a natural result, the Austrian National Socialist
ministers asked us to back them up, so they would not be
completely beaten up against and be subjected to terror and
civil war. Then we told them we would not allow Schuschnigg to
provoke a civil war, under no circumstances. Whether by
Schuschnigg’s direct order, or with consent the Communists and
the Reds had been armed, and were already making demonstrations,
which were photographed with “Heil Moskau” and so on; naturally;
all these facts caused some danger for Wiener-Neustadt. Then you
have to consider that Schuschnigg made his speeches, telling
them the Fatherland Front (_Vaterlandische Front_) would fight
to its last man; one could not know that they would capitulate
like that and therefore Seyss-Inquart who already had taken over
the government asked us to march in immediately. Before we had
already marched up to the frontier since we could not know
whether there would be a civil war or not. These are the actual
facts which can be proved by documents. * * *”

* * * * * *

“G: No, no, I think so, too. Only, I did not know if you spoke
already to these people. I want that you once more,—but no—not
at all once more,—but generally speaking—tell the following to
Halifax and Chamberlain: It is not correct that Germany has
given any ultimatum. This is a lie by Schuschnigg, because the
ultimatum was presented to him by S-I, Glaise-Horstenau and
Jury. Furthermore, it is not true that we have presented an
ultimatum to the Federal President, but it also was given by the
others and as far as I know just a military-attache came along,
asked by S-I, because of a technical question; he was supposed
to ask whether in case S-I would ask for the support of German
troops, Germany would grant this request. Furthermore, I want to
state that S-I asked us expressly by phone as by telegram to
send troops because he did not know about the situation in
Wiener-Neustadt, Vienna, and so on; because arms had been
distributed there. And then he could not know how the Fatherland
Front might react since they always had had such a big mouth.

“R: Mr. Goering, tell me, how is the situation in Vienna, is
everything settled yet?

“G: Yes. Yesterday I landed hundreds of airplanes with some
companies, in order to secure the airfield and they were
received with joy. Today the advance unit of the 17 division
marches in, together with the Austrian troops. Also I want to
point out that the Austrian troops did not withdraw but that
they got together and fraternized immediately with the German
troops, wherever they were stationed.” (_2949-PS, Part W_)

In view of the previous conversations, these are interesting explanations—that the ultimatum was made by Seyss-Inquart alone and not by Goering; that Lt. Gen. Muff, the military attache, came along merely to answer a technical question; and that Seyss-Inquart asked expressly by telephone and by telegram for troops. But perhaps this conversation can best be understood in light of the actual physical scene of time and place:

“G: Well, do come! I shall be delighted to see you.

“R: I shall see you this afternoon.

“G: The weather is wonderful here. Blue sky. I am sitting here
on my balcony—all covered with blankets—in the fresh air,
drinking my coffee. Later on I have to drive in, I have to make
the speech, and the birds are twittering, and here and there I
can hear over the radio the enthusiasm, which must be wonderful
over there.

“R: That is marvelous.” (_2949-PS, Part W_)

The British Foreign Office had protested the tactics employed by the German Government. In a letter dated 12 March 1938 Ambassador Neville Henderson, at the British Embassy, Berlin, wrote to Lord Halifax, Foreign Minister, as follows:

“My Lord,

“With reference to your telegram No. 79 of March 11th, I have
the honor to transmit to Your Lordship herewith a copy of a
letter which I addressed to Baron von Neurath in accordance with
the instructions contained therein and which was delivered on
the same evening.

“The French Ambassador addressed a similar letter to Baron von
Neurath at the same time.” (_3045-PS_)

The enclosure was the note of March 11th from the British Embassy to Von Neurath and it reads as follows:

“Dear Reich Minister,

“My Government are informed that a German ultimatum was
delivered this afternoon at Vienna demanding _inter alia_, the
resignation of the Chancellor and his replacement by the
Minister of the Interior, a new Cabinet of which two-thirds of
the members were to be National Socialists, and the re-admission
of the Austrian Legion to the country with the duty of keeping
order in Vienna.

“I am instructed by my Government to represent immediately to
the German Government that if this report is correct, H.M.G. in
the U.K. feel bound to register a protest in the strongest terms
against such use of coercion backed by force against an
independent State in order to create a situation incompatible
with its national independence.

“As the German Minister for Foreign Affairs has already been
informed in London, such action is found to produce the greatest
reactions of which it is impossible to foretell the issues.”
(_3045-PS_)

Von Neurath wrote a letter of response dated 12 March 1938. He first objected to the fact that the British Government was undertaking the role of protector of Austria’s independence:

“In the name of the German Government I must point out here that
the Royal British Government has no right to assume the role of
a protector of Austria’s independence. In the course of
diplomatic consultations on the Austrian question, the German
Government never left any doubt with the Royal British
Government that the formation of relations between Germany and
Austria could not be considered anything but the inner concern
of the German people and that it did not affect third Powers.”
(_3287-PS_)

Then, in response to the assertions regarding Germany’s ultimatum, Von Neurath set out what he stated to be the true version of events:

“* * * Instead, the former Austrian Chancellor announced, on the
evening of the 9th of March, the surprising and arbitrary
resolution, decided on by himself, to hold an election within a
few days which, under the prevailing circumstances, and
especially according to the details provided for the execution
of the election, could and was to have the sole purpose of
oppressing politically the predominant majority of the
population of Austria. As could have been foreseen, this
procedure, being a flagrant violation of the agreement of
Berchtesgaden, led to a very critical point in Austria’s
internal situation. It was only natural that the members of the
then Austrian Cabinet who had not taken part in the decision for
an election protested very strongly against it. Therefore, a
crisis of the Cabinet occurred in Vienna which, on the 11th of
March, resulted in the resignation of the former Chancellor and
in the formation of a new Cabinet. It is untrue that the Reich
used forceful pressure to bring about this development.
Especially the assertion which was spread later by the former
Chancellor, that the German Government had presented the Federal
President with a conditional ultimatum, is a pure invention;
according to the ultimatum he had to appoint a proposed
candidate as Chancellor and to form a Cabinet conforming to the
proposals of the German Government, otherwise the invasion of
Austria by German troops was held in prospect. The truth of the
matter is that the question of sending military or police forces
from the Reich was only brought up when the newly formed
Austrian Cabinet addressed a telegram, already published by the
press, to the German Government, urgently asked for the dispatch
of German troops as soon as possible in order to restore peace
and in order to avoid bloodshed. Faced with the immediately
threatening danger of a bloody civil war in Austria, the German
Government then decided to comply with the appeal addressed to
it.

“This being the state of affairs, it is impossible that the
attitude of the German Government, as asserted in your letter,
could lead to some unforeseeable reactions. A complete picture
of the political situation is given in the proclamation which,
at noon today, the German Reich Chancellor has addressed to the
German people. Dangerous reactions to this situation can take
place only if eventually a third party should try to exercise
its influence, contrary to the peaceful intentions and
legitimate aims of the German Government on the shaping of
events in Austria, which would be incompatible with the right of
self-government of the German people.” (_3287-PS_)

In light of the documents already adverted to, this version of events given by von Neurath is palpably untrue.

F. _The Invasion and Absorption of Austria._

(1) _The Invasion and Immediate Events: Control of Austria in Fact._ In accordance with the directive of March 11 (_C-182_), the German Army crossed the Austrian border at daybreak on 12 March 1938. Hitler issued a proclamation to the German people announcing and purporting to justify the invasion (_TC-47_). The British Government and the French Government filed protests.

The German Government and the Austrian National Socialists swiftly secured their grip on Austria. Seyss-Inquart welcomed Hitler at Linz and they both expressed their joy over events of the day. Seyss-Inquart in his speech declared Article 88 of the Treaty of St. Germain inoperative. (_2485-PS_)

A telegram from the American Legation in Vienna to the Secretary of State, on 12 March 1938, gave a picture of what was happening in Vienna:

“Secretary of State,

Washington.

70, March 12, noon.

“Numerous German bombers flying over Vienna dropping leaflets
‘National Socialist Germany greets its possession National
Socialist Austria and its new government in true indivisible
union’.

“Continual rumors small German troop movements into Austria and
impending arrival Austrian legion.

“SS and SA in undisputed control in Vienna.

“Police wear swastika arm bands. Schuschnigg and Schmidt rumored
arrested.

“Himmler and Hess here.

WILEY” (_L-292_)

(2) _Statutes of Consolidation: Control of Austria in Law._ The law-making machine was put to work on the task of consolidation. First, Miklas was caused to resign as President (_2466-PS_). Seyss-Inquart became both Chancellor and President. He then signed a Federal Constitutional Law of 13 March 1938, for the Reunion of Austria with the German Reich, which in turn was incorporated into the Reich Statute of Reunion passed the same day (_2307-PS_). This Federal Constitutional Law declared Austria to be a province of the German Reich.

By annexing Austria into the German Reich, Germany violated Article 80 of the Treaty of Versailles, which provides:

“Germany acknowledges and will respect the independence of
Austria within the frontier which may be fixed in a treaty
between that State and the principle Allied and Associated
Powers; she agrees that this independence shall be inalienable,
* * *”

Similarly, the Austrian invasion violated Article 88 of the Treaty of St. Germain, which provides:

“The independence of Austria is inalienable otherwise than with
the consent of the Council of the League of Nations.
Consequently Austria undertakes in the absence of the consent of
the said Council to abstain from any act which might directly or
indirectly or by any means whatever compromise her independence,
particularly, and until her admission to membership of the
League of Nations, by participation in the affairs of another
Power.”

This basic constitutional law provided for a plebiscite to be held on 10 April 1938, concerning the question of reunion. But this was a mere formality. The plebiscite could only confirm the union. It could not undo Germany’s union with and control over Austria. To illustrate the way in which legal consolidation was swiftly assured, with Austria occupied by troops, it is not necessary to do more than review some of the statutes passed within the month. Hitler placed the Austrian Federal Army under his command and required all members of the Army to take an oath of allegiance to Hitler as their Supreme Commander (_2936-PS_). Public officials of the Province of Austria were required to take an oath of office swearing obedience to Hitler, Fuehrer of the German Reich and People; Jewish officials, as defined, were not permitted to take the oath. (_2311-PS_)

Hitler and Frick signed a decree applying to Austria various Reich laws, including the law of 1933 against formation of new parties and the 1933 law for the preservation of unity of party and state (2310-PS). Hitler, Frick, and Goering ordered that the Reich Minister of the Interior be the central authority for carrying out the reunion of Austria with the German Reich. (_1060-PS_)

In connection with Germany’s extensive propaganda campaign to ensure acceptability of the German regime, Goebbels established a Reich Propaganda Office in Vienna (_2935-PS_). The ballot, addressed to soldiers of the former Austrian Army as “German soldier”, asked the voters whether they agreed with the “accomplishment” and “ratification” on March 13, 1938, of the reuniting of Austria with Germany (_1659-PS_). The groundwork was fully laid before the holding of the plebiscite “for German men and women of Austria” promised in the basic law of March 13. (_2307-PS_)

(3) _The Importance of Austria in Further Aggressions._ Germany’s desire to consummate the Anschluss with Austria, and its determination to execute that aim in the way and at the time that it did (with threat of military force, quickly, and despite political risks), was due to the importance of Austria in its further plans of aggression. The conference of the conspirators held on November 5, 1937, which laid plans for aggressive war in Europe, outlined as objectives in Austria the conquest of food, through expulsion of a million people, and an increase in fighting strength in part through the improvement in frontier. (_386-PS_)

Austria yielded material resources. Moreover she provided ready cash, taken from the Jews and from the Austrian Government. One of the first orders passed after the Anschluss was an order signed by Hitler, Frick, Schwerin von Krosigk, and Schacht, for the transfer to the Reich of the assets of the Austrian National Bank. (_2313-PS_)

Austria yielded human resources. Three months after Anschluss, there was enacted a decree requiring 21-year-old men to report for active military service. (_1660-PS_)

And the acquisition of Austria improved the military strategic position of the German Army. In a lecture delivered by General Jodl, Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, on 7 November 1943, at Munich, to the Gauleiters, Jodl reviewed the situation in 1938:

“The Austrian ‘Anschluss’ in its turn, brought with it not only
the fulfilment of an old national aim but also had the effect
both of reinforcing our fighting strength and of materially
improving our strategic position. Whereas up till then the
territory of Czechoslovakia had projected in a most menacing way
right into Germany (a wasp waist in the direction of France and
an air base for the Allies, in particular Russia),
Czechoslovakia herself was now enclosed by pincers. Its own
strategic position had now become so unfavorable that she was
bound to fall a victim to any attack pressed home with rigor
before effective aid from the WEST could be expected to arrive.”
(_L-172_)

The Nazi conspirators were now ready to carry out the second part of their second phase of their aggressions. Czechoslovakia was next.

* * * * *

LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO AGGRESSION AGAINST
AUSTRIA

Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page
│ │ │
│Charter of the International Military │ │
│ Tribunal, Article 6 (a). │ I │ 5
│ │ │
│International Military Tribunal, │ │
│ Indictment Number 1, Sections IV (F) 3│ │ 23-24,
│ (a, b); V. │ I │ 29
│ ————— │ │
│Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │
│document indicates that the document was│ │
│received in evidence at the Nurnberg │ │
│trial. A double asterisk (**) before a │ │
│document number indicates that the │ │
│document was referred to during the │ │
│trial but was not formally received in │ │
│evidence, for the reason given in │ │
│parentheses following the description of│ │
│the document. The USA series number, │ │
│given in parentheses following the │ │
│description of the document, is the │ │
│official exhibit number assigned by the │ │
│court. │ │
│ ————— │ │
*386-PS │Notes on a conference with Hitler in the│ │
│Reich Chancellery, Berlin, 5 November │ │
│1937, signed by Hitler’s adjutant, │ │
│Hossbach, and dated 10 November 1937. │ │
│(USA 25) │ III │ 295
│ │ │
*812-PS │Letter from Rainer to Seyss-Inquart, 22 │ │
│August 1939 and report from Gauleiter │ │
│Rainer to Reichskommissar Gauleiter │ │
│Buerckel, 6 July 1939 on events in the │ │
│NSDAP of Austria from 1933 to 11 March │ │
│1938. (USA 61) │ III │ 586
│ │ │
**1060-PS │Order pursuant to law concerning Reunion│ │
│of Austria with German Reich, 16 March │ │
│1938. 1938 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p.│ │
│249. (Referred to but not offered in │ │
│evidence.) │ III │ 717
│ │ │
*1544-PS │Von Papen’s notes, 26 February 1938, on │ │
│his parting visit with Chancellor │ │
│Schuschnigg. (USA 71) │ IV │ 103
│ │ │
**1659-PS │Second Order concerning Plebiscite and │ │
│Election for the Greater German │ │
│Reichstag of 24 March 1938. 1938 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 303. │ │
│(Referred to but not offered in │ │
│evidence.) │ IV │ 170
│ │ │
1660-PS │Decree for registration for active │ │
│service in Austria in the year 1938 of │ │
│16 June 1938. 1938 Reichsgesetzblatt, │ │
│Part I, p. 631. │ IV │ 171
│ │ │
*1760-PS │Affidavit of George S. Messersmith, 28 │ │
│August 1945. (USA 57) │ IV │ 305
│ │ │
*1775-PS │Propositions to Hitler by OKW, 14 │ │
│February 1938. (USA 73) │ IV │ 357
│ │ │
*1780-PS │Excerpts from diary kept by General │ │
│Jodl, January 1937 to August 1939. (USA │ │
│72) │ IV │ 360
│ │ │
*2219-PS │Excerpt from letter from Seyss-Inquart │ │
│to Goering, 14 July 1939. (USA 62) │ IV │ 854
│ │ │
*2246-PS │Report of von Papen to Hitler, 1 │ │
│September 1936, concerning Danube │ │
│situation. (USA 67) │ IV │ 930
│ │ │
*2247-PS │Letter from von Papen to Hitler, 17 May │ │
│1935, concerning intention of Austrian │ │
│government to arm. (USA 64) │ IV │ 930
│ │ │
*2248-PS │Report of von Papen to Hitler, 27 July │ │
│1935, concerning National Socialism in │ │
│Austria. (USA 63) │ IV │ 932
│ │ │
*2307-PS │Law concerning reunion of Austria with │ │
│German Reich, 13 March 1938. 1938 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 237. (GB │ │
│133) │ IV │ 997
│ │ │
**2310-PS │First Decree of Fuehrer and Reich │ │
│Chancellor concerning Introduction of │ │
│German Reich Law into Austria, 15 March │ │
│1938. 1938 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p.│ │
│247. (Referred to but not offered in │ │
│evidence.) │ IV │ 1004
│ │ │
**2311-PS │Decree of Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor │ │
│concerning Administration of the Oath to│ │
│Officials of Province of Austria, 15 │ │
│March 1938. 1938 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part│ │
│I, p. 245. (Referred to but not offered │ │
│in evidence.) │ IV │ 1005
│ │ │
**2313-PS │Order for Transfer of Austrian National │ │
│Bank to Reichsbank, 17 March 1938. 1938 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 254. │ │
│(Referred to but not offered in │ │
│evidence.) │ IV │ 1006
│ │ │
**2367-PS │Hitler’s speech of 1 May 1936, published│ │
│in Voelkischer Beobachter, Southern │ │
│German edition, 2-3 May 1936. (Referred │ │
│to but not offered in evidence.) │ IV │ 1101
│ │ │
*2385-PS │Affidavit of George S. Messersmith, 30 │ │
│August 1945. (USA 68) │ V │ 23
│ │ │
*2461-PS │Official German communique of meeting of│ │
│Hitler and Schuschnigg, 12 February │ │
│1938, published in Documents of German │ │
│Politics, 1939, Vol. VI, Part 1. (GB │ │
│132) │ V │ 206
│ │ │
*2463-PS │Telegram from Seyss-Inquart to Hitler, │ │
│11 March 1938, published in Documents of│ │
│German Politics, 1939, Vol. VI, Part 1. │ │
│(USA 703) │ V │ 207
│ │ │
**2464-PS │Official Austrian communique of the │ │
│reorganization of the Austrian Cabinet │ │
│and general political amnesty, 16 │ │
│February 1938, published in Documents of│ │
│German Politics, 1939, Vol. VI, Part 1. │ │
│(Referred to but not offered in │ │
│evidence.) │ V │ 208
│ │ │
**2465-PS │Announcement of appointment of │ │
│Seyss-Inquart as Federal Chancellor, 11 │ │
│March 1938, published in Documents of │ │
│German Politics, 1938, Vol. VI, Part 1. │ │
│(Referred to but not offered in │ │
│evidence.) │ V │ 209
│ │ │
**2466-PS │Official communique of resignation of │ │
│Austrian President Miklas, 13 March │ │
│1938, published in Documents of German │ │
│Politics, 1939, Vol. VI, Part 1. │ │
│(Referred to but not offered in │ │
│evidence.) │ V │ 209
│ │ │
2467-PS │Hitler’s telegram to Mussolini from │ │
│Linz, 13 March 1938, published in │ │
│Documents of German Politics, 1939, Vol.│ │
│VI, Part 1. │ V │ 210
│ │ │
**2469-PS │Official German and Austrian communique │ │
│concerning equal rights of Austrian │ │
│National Socialists in Austria, 18 │ │
│February 1938, published in Documents of│ │
│German Politics, 1939, Vol. VI, Part 1. │ │
│(Referred to but not offered in │ │
│evidence.) │ V │ 210
│ │ │
**2484-PS │Official German communique of visit of │ │
│Austrian Minister Seyss-Inquart to │ │
│Hitler, Berlin, 17 February 1938, │ │
│published in Documents of German │ │
│Politics, 1939, Vol. VI, Part 1. │ │
│(Referred to but not offered in │ │
│evidence.) │ V │ 234
│ │ │
**2485-PS │Address by Federal Chancellor │ │
│Seyss-Inquart from Balcony of City Hall │ │
│at Linz, 12 March 1938, published in │ │
│Documents of German Politics, Vol. VI, │ │
│Part 1, p. 144-145. (Referred to but not│ │
│introduced in evidence.) │ V │ 234
│ │ │
2510-PS │Hitler letter to Mussolini, 11 March │ │
│1938, published in Documents of German │ │
│Politics, Vol. VI, Part 1, pp. 135-7, │ │
│No. 24. │ V │ 244
│ │ │
**2799-PS │Letter from Hitler to von Papen, 26 July│ │
│1934, published in Documents of German │ │
│Politics, Vol. II, p. 83, No. 38. │ │
│(Referred to but not offered in │ │
│evidence.) │ V │ 441
│ │ │
2831-PS │Letter from Office of Extraordinary and │ │
│Plenipotentiary Ambassador of German │ │
│Government to Reich Chancellery, │ │
│inclosing report on Political situation │ │
│in Austria, 14 January 1937. │ V │ 498
│ │ │
*2832-PS │Entry for July 26, 1934 from Ambassador │ │
│Dodd’s diary. (USA 58) │ V │ 500
│ │ │
2909-PS │Affidavit of August Eigruber, 9 November│ │
│1945. │ V │ 578
│ │ │
**2935-PS │Order concerning establishment of Reich │ │
│Propaganda Office in Vienna, 31 March │ │
│1938. 1938 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p.│ │
│350. (Referred to but not offered in │ │
│evidence.) │ V │ 604
│ │ │
**2936-PS │Instruction of the Fuehrer and Reich │ │
│Chancellor, concerning the Austrian │ │
│Federal Army, 13 March 1938, published │ │
│in Documents of German Politics, 1938, │ │
│Vol. VI, Part 1, p. 150. (Referred to │ │
│but not offered in evidence.) │ V │ 604
│ │ │
*2949-PS │Transcripts of telephone calls from Air │ │
│Ministry, 11-14 March 1938. (USA 76) │ V │ 628
│ │ │
*2968-PS │Memorandum from U. S. Army officer │ │
│concerning plaque erected in Austrian │ │
│Chancellery in memoriam to killers of │ │
│Dollfuss. (USA 60) │ V │ 677
│ │ │
2985-PS │Telephone message of Mr. Hadow, British │ │
│Legation, Vienna, to Sir John Simon, 26 │ │
│July 1934. │ V │ 687
│ │ │
**2994-PS │Affidavit of Kurt von Schuschnigg, │ │
│former Chancellor of Austria, concerning│ │
│Austrian-German Treaty of 11 July 1936. │ │
│(USA 66) (Objection to admission in │ │
│evidence upheld) │ V │ 703
│ │ │
2995-PS │Affidavit of Kurt von Schuschnigg, │ │
│former Chancellor of Austria, concerning│ │
│his visit to Berchtesgaden on 12 │ │
│February 1938. │ V │ 709
│ │ │
2996-PS │Affidavit of Kurt von Schuschnigg, │ │
│former Chancellor of Austria, concerning│ │
│events of 11 March 1938. │ V │ 713
│ │ │
*3045-PS │Letter, 12 March 1938, to British │ │
│Embassy enclosing letter from Henderson │ │
│to Halifax, 11 March 1938. (USA 127) │ V │ 765
│ │ │
*3054-PS │“The Nazi Plan”, script of a motion │ │
│picture composed of captured German │ │
│film. (USA 167) │ V │ 801
│ │ │
3062-PS │Memorandum found in Goering’s office, 19│ │
│November 1936, concerning Guido Schmidt,│ │
│Foreign Minister of Austria under │ │
│Schuschnigg. │ V │ 868
│ │ │
*3254-PS │The Austrian Question, 1934-1938, by │ │
│Seyss-Inquart, 9 September 1945. (USA │ │
│704) │ V │ 961
│ │ │
*3270-PS │Goering’s speech on 27 March in Vienna, │ │
│published in Documents of German │ │
│Politics, Vol. VI, Part 1, p. 183. (USA │ │
│703) │ V │ 1047
│ │ │
*3271-PS │Letter from Seyss-Inquart to Himmler, 19│ │
│August 1939. (USA 700) │ V │ 1047
│ │ │
*3287-PS │Letter from von Neurath to Henderson, 12│ │
│March 1938. (USA 128) │ V │ 1090
│ │ │
*3308-PS │Affidavit by Paul Otto Gustav Schmidt, │ │
│28 November 1945. (GB 288) │ V │ 1100
│ │ │
3390-PS │Letter from Seyss-Inquart to Keppler, 25│ │
│October 1937. │ VI │ 105
│ │ │
3392-PS │Letter from Seyss-Inquart to Keppler, 3 │ │
│September 1937. │ VI │ 109
│ │ │
3395-PS │Letter from Seyss-Inquart to Keppler, 3 │ │
│September 1937. │ VI │ 113
│ │ │
*3396-PS │Letter from Seyss-Inquart to Dr. Jury. │ │
│(USA 889) │ VI │ 114
│ │ │
*3397-PS │Letter from Keppler to Seyss-Inquart, 8 │ │
│January 1938. (USA 702) │ VI │ 115
│ │ │
3400-PS │Minutes of meeting of German │ │
│Association, 28 December 1918, and │ │
│Constitution and By-Laws thereof found │ │
│in personal files of Seyss-Inquart for │ │
│period of 1918 to 1943. │ VI │ 118
│ │ │
*3425-PS │Voluntary statement made by │ │
│Seyss-Inquart with advice of counsel, 10│ │
│December 1945. (USA 701) │ VI │ 124
│ │ │
3467-PS │Law on Limitation of travel to Republic │ │
│Austria 29 May 1933. 1933 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, No. 57, p. │ │
│311. │ VI │ 169
│ │ │
*3471-PS │Letter from Keppler to Bodenschatz, 21 │ │
│February 1938, with enclosures noting │ │
│activity of Leopold as leader of │ │
│Austrian Nazis and possible appointment │ │
│of Klausner as his successor. (USA 583) │ VI │ 195
│ │ │
*3472-PS │Letter from Keppler to Goering, 9 │ │
│February 1938, requesting that Leopold │ │
│be forbidden to negotiate with │ │
│Schuschnigg except with approval of │ │
│Reich authorities. (USA 582) │ VI │ 196
│ │ │
*3473-PS │Letter from Keppler to Goering, 6 │ │
│January 1938, giving details of Nazi │ │
│intrigue in Austria. (USA 581) │ VI │ 197
│ │ │
3574-PS │Filing notice regarding discussion │ │
│between Chief of CI and Chief of Foreign│ │
│CI on 31 January 1938, 2 February 1938, │ │
│signed Canaris. │ VI │ 265
│ │ │
3576-PS │Letter from Keppler to Goering, 19 │ │
│February 1938, with enclosure reporting │ │
│on situation in Austria as of 18 │ │
│February. │ VI │ 271
│ │ │
3577-PS │Letter presumably from Buerkel to │ │
│Goering, dated Vienna, 26 March 1938, │ │
│concerning Aryanization of Jewish-held │ │
│business in Austria and disposition of │ │
│resulting funds. │ VI │ 275
│ │ │
*C-102 │Document signed by Hitler relating to │ │
│operation “Otto”, 11 March 1938. (USA │ │
│74) │ VI │ 911
│ │ │
*C-103 │Directive signed by Jodl, 11 March 1938,│ │
│on conduct towards Czech or Italian │ │
│troops in Austria. (USA 75) │ VI │ 913
│ │ │
*C-175 │OKW Directive for Unified Preparation │ │
│for War 1937-1938, with covering letter │ │
│from von Blomberg, 24 June 1937. (USA │ │
│69) │ VI │ 1006
│ │ │
*C-182 │Directive No. 2 from Supreme Commander │ │
│Armed Forces, initialled Jodl, 11 March │ │
│1938. (USA 77) │ VI │ 1017
│ │ │
*L-150 │Memorandum of conversation between │ │
│Ambassador Bullitt and von Neurath, │ │
│German Minister for Foreign Affairs, 18 │ │
│May 1936. (USA 65) │ VII │ 890
│ │ │
*L-151 │Report from Ambassador Bullitt to State │ │
│Department, 23 November 1937, regarding │ │
│his visit to Warsaw. (USA 70) │ VII │ 894
│ │ │
*L-172 │“The Strategic Position at the Beginning│ │
│of the 5th Year of War”, a lecture │ │
│delivered by Jodl on 7 November 1943 at │ │
│Munich to Reich and Gauleiters. (USA 34)│ VII │ 920
│ │ │
*L-273 │Report of American Consul General in │ │
│Vienna to Secretary of State, 26 July │ │
│1938, concerning anniversary of │ │
│assassination of Chancellor Dollfuss. │ │
│(USA 59) │ VII │ 1094
│ │ │
L-281 │Text of Schuschnigg radio address of 11 │ │
│March 1938, contained in telegram from │ │
│American Legation in Vienna to the │ │
│Secretary of State, 11 March 1938. │ VII │ 1096
│ │ │
L-291 │Telegram from American Embassy Berlin to│ │
│Secretary of State, 11 March 1938, │ │
│concerning Austrian situation. │ VII │ 1097
│ │ │
*L-292 │Telegram of American Consul General in │ │
│Vienna to Secretary of State, 12 March │ │
│1938, concerning propaganda dropped over│ │
│Vienna. (USA 78) │ VII │ 1098
│ │ │
L-293 │Telegram from American Legation in │ │
│Vienna to Secretary of State, 12 March │ │
│1938. │ VII │ 1098
│ │ │
*TC-22 │Agreement between Austria and German │ │
│Government and Government of Federal │ │
│State of Austria, 11 July 1936. (GB 20) │ VIII │ 369
│ │ │
*TC-26 │German assurance to Austria, 21 May │ │
│1935, from Documents of German Politics,│ │
│Part III, p. 94. (GB 19) │ VIII │ 376
│ │ │
TC-47 │Hitler’s Proclamation of Invasion of │ │
│Austria, 12 March 1938. │ VIII │ 398
│ │ │
Affidavit H │Affidavit of Franz Halder, 22 November │ │
│1945. │ VIII │ 643
│ │ │
**Chart No. 11 │Aggressive Action 1938-39. (Enlargement │ │
│displayed to Tribunal.) │ VIII │ 780
│ │ │
**Chart No. 12 │German Aggression. (Enlargement │ │
│displayed to Tribunal.) │ VIII │ 781
│ │ │
**Chart No. 13 │Violations of Treaties, Agreements and │ │
│Assurances. (Enlargement displayed to │ │
│Tribunal.) │ VIII │ 782

4. THE EXECUTION OF THE PLAN TO INVADE CZECHOSLOVAKIA

A. _Development of the Nazi Program of Aggression._

In the period 1933-1936 the conspirators had initiated a program of rearmament designed to give the Third Reich military strength and political bargaining power to be used against other nations. Furthermore, beginning in the year 1936 they had embarked on a preliminary program of expansion which, as it turned out, was to last until March 1939. This program was intended to shorten Germany’s frontiers, to increase its industrial and food-reserves, and to place it in a position, both industrially and strategically, from which the Nazis could launch a more ambitious and more devastating campaign of aggression. At the moment, in the early spring of 1938, when the Nazi conspirators first began to lay concrete plans for the conquest of Czechoslovakia they had reached approximately the halfway point in this preliminary program.

The preceding autumn, at the conference in the Reichs Chancellery on 5 November 1937, Hitler had set forth the program which Germany was to follow. The events of this conference are contained in the so-called Hossbach minutes. The question for Germany, as the Fuehrer had informed his military commanders at this meeting, is where the greatest possible conquest can be made at the lowest cost (_386-PS_). At the top of his agenda stood two countries: Austria and Czechoslovakia. On 12 March 1938 Austria was occupied by the German Army, and on the following day it was annexed to the Reich. The time had come for a redefinition of German intentions toward Czechoslovakia.

A little more than a month later Hitler and Keitel met to discuss plans for the envelopment and conquest of the Czechoslovak State. On 21 April 1938, Hitler and Keitel discussed the pretexts which Germany might develop to serve as an excuse for a sudden and overwhelming attack. They considered the provocation of a period of diplomatic squabbling which, growing more serious, would lead to the excuse for war. In the alternative, and this alternative they found to be preferable, they planned to unleash a lightning attack as the result of an “incident” of their own creation. Consideration was given to the assassination of the German Ambassador at Prague to create the requisite incident. The necessity of propaganda to guide the conduct of Germans in Czechoslovakia and to intimidate the Czechs was recognized. Problems of transport and tactics were discussed with a view to overcoming all Czechoslovak resistance within four days, thus presenting the world with a fait accompli and forestalling outside intervention. (_388-PS, Item 2_)

Thus in mid-April 1938 the designs of the Nazi conspirators to conquer Czechoslovakia had already reached the stage of practical planning.

B. _The Background of Friendly Diplomatic Relations._

This conspiracy must be viewed against a background of amicable German-Czech diplomatic relations. Although they had in the fall of 1937 determined to destroy the Czechoslovak State, the leaders of the German government were bound by a treaty of arbitration and by assurances freely given to observe the sovereignty of Czechoslovakia. By a formal treaty signed at Locarno on 16 October 1925, Germany and Czechoslovakia agreed, with certain exceptions, to refer to an arbitral tribunal or to the Permanent Court of International Justice,

“* * * all disputes of every kind between Germany and
Czechoslovakia with regard to which the parties are in conflict
as to their respective rights, and which it may not be possible
to settle amicably by the normal methods of diplomacy. * * *”
(_TC-14_)

The preamble of this treaty stated:

“The President of the German Empire and the President of the
Czechoslovak Republic; equally resolved to maintain peace
between Germany and Czechoslovakia by assuring the peaceful
settlement of differences which might arise between the two
countries; declaring that respect for the rights established by
treaty or resulting from the law of nations is obligatory for
international tribunals; agreeing to recognize that the rights
of a State cannot be modified save with its consent; and
considering that sincere observance of the methods of peaceful
settlement of international disputes permits of resolving,
without recourse to force, questions which may become the cause
of division between States; have decided to embody in a treaty
their common intentions in this respect. * * *” (_TC-14_)

Formal and categoric assurances of their good will toward Czechoslovakia were forthcoming from the Nazi conspirators as late as March 1938. On 11 and 12 March 1938, at the time of the annexation of Austria, Germany had a considerable interest in inducing Czechoslovakia not to mobilize. At this time Goering assured M. Mastny, the Czechoslovak Minister in Berlin, on behalf of the German Government that German-Czech relations were not adversely affected by the developments in Austria and that Germany had no hostile intentions toward Czechoslovakia. As a token of his sincerity Goering accompanied his assurance with the statement: “_Ich gebe Ihnen mein Ehrenwort_” (“I give you my word of honor”) (_TC-27_). At the same time von Neurath, who was handling German foreign affairs during Ribbentrop’s stay in London, assured M. Mastny on behalf of Hitler and the German government that Germany still considered herself bound by the Arbitration Convention of 1925 (_TC-27_).

C. _Planning for Aggression._

Behind the screen of these assurances the Nazi conspirators proceeded with their military and political plans for aggression. Ever since the preceding fall it had been established that the immediate aim of German policy was the elimination of Austria and Czechoslovakia. In both countries the Nazi conspirators planned to undermine the will to resist by propaganda and by fifth column activities, while the actual military preparations were being developed. The Austrian operation, which received priority for political and strategic reasons, was carried out in February and March 1938. Thenceforth _Wehrmacht_ planning was devoted to Case Green (_Fall Gruen_), the designation given to the operation against Czechoslovakia.

The military plans for Case Green had been drafted in outline form as early as June 1937. The OKW top secret “Directive for the Unified Preparation of the Armed Forces for War”, signed by von Blomberg on 24 June 1937 and promulgated to the Army, Navy, and Luftwaffe for the year beginning 1 July 1937, included as a probable warlike eventuality, for which a concentration plan was to be drafted, Case Green (“War on two fronts with the main struggle in the southeast”) (_C-175_). The original section of this directive dealing with the “probable war” against Czechoslovakia—it was later revised—opens with this supposition:

“The war in the east can begin with a surprise German operation
against Czechoslovakia in order to parry the imminent attack of
a superior enemy coalition. The necessary conditions to justify
such an action politically and in the eyes of international law
must be created beforehand.” (_C-175_)

After detailing possible enemies and neutrals in the event of such action, the directive continues as follows:

“2. The task of the German Armed Forces is to make their
preparations in such a way that the bulk of all forces can break
into Czechoslovakia quickly, by surprise, and with the greatest
force, while in the West the minimum strength is provided as
rear cover for this attack.

“The aim and object of this surprise attack by the German Armed
Forces should be to eliminate from the very beginning, and for
the duration of the war, the threat by Czechoslovakia to the
rear of the operations in the West, and to take from the Russian
Air Force the most substantial portion of its operational base
in Czechoslovakia. This must be done by the defeat of the enemy
armed forces and the occupation of Bohemia and Moravia.”
(_C-175_)

The introduction to this directive sets forth as one of its guiding principles the following statement:

“The politically fluid world situation, which does not preclude
surprising incidents, demands constant preparedness for war on
the part of the German Armed Forces * * * to make possible the
military exploitation of politically favorable opportunities
should they occur.” (_C-175_)

It ordered further work on the plan for mobilization without public announcement “in order to put the Armed Forces in a position to be able to begin a war suddenly which will take the enemy by surprise both as regards strength and time of attack.” (_C-175_). This directive is, of course, a directive for staff planning. But the nature of the planning, and the very tangible and ominous developments which resulted from it, give it a significance that it would not have in another setting.

Planning along the lines of this directive was carried forward during the fall of 1937 and the winter of 1937-1938. On the political level this planning for the conquest of Czechoslovakia received the approval and support of Hitler in the conference with his military commanders-in-chief on 5 November 1937 (_386-PS_). In early March 1938, before the march into Austria, Ribbentrop and Keitel were concerned over the extent of the information about war aims against Czechoslovakia to be furnished to Hungary. On 4 March 1938 Ribbentrop wrote to Keitel, enclosing for Keitel’s confidential cognizance the minutes of a conference with Sztojay, the Hungarian ambassador to Germany, who had suggested an interchange of views (_2786-PS_). An acknowledgment of the receipt of this letter was signed by Keitel on 5 March. In his letter to Keitel, Ribbentrop said:

“I have many doubts about such negotiations. In case we should
discuss with Hungary possible war aims against Czechoslovakia,
the danger exists that other parties as well would be informed
about this. I would greatly appreciate it if you would notify me
briefly whether any commitments were made here in any respect.”
(_2786-PS_)

D. _Development of Specific Plans._

At the 21 April meeting between Hitler and Keitel, specific plans for the attack on Czechoslovakia were discussed for the first time (_388-PS, Item 2_). This meeting was followed in the late spring and summer of 1938 by a series of memoranda and telegrams advancing Case Green. These notes and communications were carefully filed at Hitler’s headquarters by Major Schmundt, the Fuehrer’s military adjutant, and were captured by American troops in a cellar at Obersalzberg, Hitler’s headquarters, near Berchtesgaden. This file, preserved intact, is document (_388-PS_).

The individual items in this file tell more graphically than any narrative the progress of the Nazi conspirators’ planning to launch an unprovoked war against Czechoslovakia. From the start the Nazi leaders displayed a lively interest in intelligence data concerning Czechoslovak armament and defense. This interest is reflected in _Item 4_ of the Schmundt file, a telegram from Colonel Zeitzler in General Jodl’s office of the OKW to Schmundt at Hitler’s headquarters; _Item 12_, Short survey of Armament of the Czech Army, dated Berlin 9 June 1938 and initialed “Z” for Zeitzler; and _Item 13_, Questions of the Fuehrer, dated Berlin, 9 June 1938 and classified “Most Secret”. The following are four of the questions on which Hitler wanted authoritative information:

“Question 1: Armament of the Czech Army?

“Question 2: How many battalions, etc., are employed in the
West for the construction of emplacements?

“Question 3: Are the fortifications of Czechoslovakia still
occupied in unreduced strength?

“Question 4: Frontier protection in the West?” (_388-PS, Item
13_)

These questions were answered in detail by the OKW and initialed by Colonel Zeitzler of Jodl’s staff.

As a precaution against French and British action during the attack on Czechoslovakia, it was necessary for the Nazi conspirators to rush the preparation of fortification measures along the western frontier of Germany. A telegram, presumably sent from Schmundt in Berchtesgaden to Berlin, read in part as follows:

“Inform Colonel General von Brauchitsch and General Keitel: * *
* The Fuehrer repeatedly emphasized the necessity of pressing
forward greatly the fortification work in the west.” (_388-PS,
Item 8_)

In May, June, July, and August of 1938 conferences between Hitler and his political and military advisers resulted in the issuance of a series of constantly revised directives for the attack. It was decided that preparations for X-day, the day of the attack, should be completed no later than 1 October.

On the afternoon of 28 May 1938 Hitler called a conference of his principal military and political advisers in the winter garden of the Reichs Chancellery in Berlin. This conference was the occasion on which Hitler made known to the inner circle of the Nazi conspirators the outlines of his plan to attack Czechoslovakia and issued the necessary instructions. The meeting is described in an affidavit of Fritz Wiedemann, who at that time was Hitler’s adjutant:

“FRITZ WIEDEMANN, being first duly sworn, deposes and says as
follows:

“From the month of January 1935 to January 1939 I served as
adjutant to Hitler. In this time my duties were to handle
correspondence and complaints addressed to the Fuehrer’s office.
Occasionally I attended conferences held by the Fuehrer.

“I recall that on the afternoon of 28 May 1938 Hitler called a
conference in the winter garden of the Reichs Chancellery of all
the people who were important, from the Foreign Office, the
Army, and the Command Staffs. Those present at this conference,
as I recall, included Goering, Ribbentrop, von Neurath, General
Beck, Admiral Raeder, General Keitel, and General von
Brauchitsch. On this occasion Hitler made the following
statement: ‘It is my unshakable will that Czechoslovakia shall
be wiped off the map.’ Hitler then revealed the outlines of the
plan to attack Czechoslovakia. Hitler addressed himself to the
Generals, saying: ‘So, we will first tackle the situation in the
East. Then I will give you three to four years’ time, and then
we will settle the situation in the West.’ The situation in the
West was meant to be the war against England and France.

“I was considerably shaken by these statements, and on leaving
the Reichs Chancellery I said to Herr von Neurath: ‘Well, what
do you say to these revelations?’ Neurath thought that the
situation was not so serious as it appeared and that nothing
would happen before the spring of 1939.

“/s/ Fr. Wiedemann.”
(_3037-PS_)

In the months after the occupation of the Sudetenland Hitler made no secret of this meeting. In a speech before the Reichstag on 30 January 1939, Hitler spoke as follows:

“On account of this intolerable provocation which had been
aggravated by a truly infamous persecution and terrorization of
our Germans there, I had resolved to solve once and for all, and
this time radically, the Sudeten-German question. On May 28 I
ordered (1) that preparations should be made for military action
against this state by October 2. I ordered (2) the immense and
accelerated expansion of our defensive front in the West.”
(_2360-PS_)

Hitler also referred to this conference in his meeting with President Hacha on 15 March 1939. (_2798-PS_)

Two days after this conference, on 30 May 1938, Hitler issued the revised military directive for Case Green. This directive is _Item 11_ in the Schmundt file (_388-PS_). Entitled “Two front war with main effort in the Southeast,” this directive replaced the corresponding section, Part 2, Section II, of the “Directive for Unified Preparation for War” promulgated by von Blomberg on 24 June 1937 (_C-175_). This directive represented a further development of the ideas for political and military action discussed by Hitler and Keitel in their conference on 21 April. It is an expansion of a rough draft submitted by Keitel to Hitler on 20 May, which may be found as _Item 5_ in the Schmundt file (_388-PS_). It was signed by Hitler. Only five copies were made. Three copies were forwarded with a covering letter from Keitel to General von Brauchitsch for the Army, to Raeder for the Navy, and to Goering for the Luftwaffe. In his covering memorandum Keitel noted that its execution must be assured “as from 1 October 1938 at the latest”. (_388-PS, Item 11_)

This document, which is the basic directive under which the _Wehrmacht_ carried out its planning for Case Green, reads as follows:

“1. _Political Prerequisites._

“It is my unalterable decision to smash Czechoslovakia by
military action in the near future. It is the job of the
political leaders to await or bring about the politically and
militarily suitable moment.

“An inevitable development of conditions inside Czechoslovakia
or other political events in Europe creating a surprisingly
favorable opportunity and one which may never come again may
cause me to take early action.

“The proper choice and determined and full utilization of a
favorable moment is the surest guarantee of success. Accordingly
the preparations are to be made at once.

“2. _Political Possibilities for the Commencement of the
Action._

“The following are necessary prerequisites for the intended
invasion:

“_a._ suitable obvious cause and, with it

“_b._ sufficient political justification,

“_c._ action unexpected by the enemy, which will find
him prepared to the least possible degree.

“From a military as well as a political standpoint the most
favorable course is a lightning-swift action as the result of an
incident through which Germany is provoked in an unbearable way
for which at least part of world opinion will grant the moral
justification of military action.

“But even a period of tension, more or less preceding a war,
must terminate in sudden action on our part—which must have the
elements of surprise as regards time and extent—before the
enemy is so advanced in military preparedness that he cannot be
surpassed.

“3. _Conclusions for the Preparation of “Fall Gruen”._

_a._ For the _Armed War_ it is essential that the surprise
element as the most important factor contributing to success be
made full use of by appropriate preparatory measures already in
peace-time and by an unexpectedly rapid course of the action.
Thus it is essential to create a situation within the first four
days which plainly demonstrates, to hostile nations eager to
intervene, the hopelessness of the Czechoslovakian military
situation and which at the same time will give nations with
territorial claims on Czechoslovakia an incentive to intervene
immediately against Czechoslovakia. In such a case, intervention
by Poland and Hungary against Czechoslovakia may be expected,
especially if France—due to the obvious pro-German attitude of
Italy—fears, or at least hesitates, to unleash a European war
by intervening against Germany. Attempts by Russia to give
military support to Czechoslovakia mainly by the Air Force are
to be expected. If concrete successes are not achieved by the
land operations within the first few days, a European crisis
will certainly result. This knowledge must give commanders of
all ranks the impetus to decided and bold action.

“_b._ The _Propaganda War_ must on the one hand intimidate
Czechoslovakia by threats and soften her power of resistance, on
the other hand issue directions to national groups for support
in the Armed War and influence the neutrals into our way of
thinking. I reserve further directions and determination of the
date.

“4. _Tasks of the Armed Forces._

“Armed Forces Preparations are to be made on the following
basis:

“_a._ The mass of all forces must be employed against
Czechoslovakia.

“_b._ For the West, a minimum of forces are to be provided as
rear cover which may be required, the other frontiers in the
East against Poland and Lithuania are merely to be protected,
the Southern frontiers to be watched.

“_c._ The sections of the army which can be rapidly employed
must force the frontier fortifications with speed and decision
and must break into Czechoslovakia with the greatest daring in
the certainty that the bulk of the mobile army will follow them
with the utmost speed. Preparations for this are to be made and
timed in such a way that the sections of the army which can be
rapidly employed cross the frontier at the appointed time _at
the same time_ as the penetration by the Air Force before the
enemy can become aware of our mobilization.

“For this, a timetable between Army and Air Force is to be
worked out in conjunction with OKW and submitted to me for
approval.

“5. _Missions for the branches of the Armed Forces._