Chapter LI: Section I: , paragraph 4

“4. The Fuehrer has entrusted the uniform direction of _the
administration of economy_ in the area of operations and in the
territories of political administration to the Reich Marshal who
has delegated the Chief of the ‘Wi Rue Amt’ with the execution
of the task. Special orders on that will come from the
OKW/Wi/Rue/Amt.” (_447-PS_)

The second section deals with matters of personnel, supply, and communication traffic. Section III of the order deals with the relations with certain other countries and states, in part, as follows:

“III. _Regulations regarding Rumania, Slovakia, Hungary and
Finland._

9. The necessary arrangements with these countries shall be made
by the OKW, together with the Foreign Office, and according to
the wishes of the respective high commands. In case it should
become necessary during the course of the operations to grant
special rights, applications for this purpose are to be
submitted to the OKW.” (_447-PS_)

The document closes with a section regarding Sweden:

“IV. _Directives regarding Sweden._

12. Since Sweden can only become a transient-area for troops, no
special authority is to be granted the commander of the German
troops. However, he is entitled and compelled to secure the
immediate protection of RR-transports against sabotage and
attacks.

“The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces

“signed: KEITEL”
(_447-PS_)

As was hinted in the original Barbarossa Order, Directive No. 21 (_446-PS_), the plan originally contemplated that the attack would take place about the 15th of May 1941. In the meantime, however, the Nazi conspirators found themselves involved in a campaign in the Balkans and were forced to delay Barbarossa for a few weeks. Evidence of this postponement is found in a document (_C-170_) which has been identified by Raeder as a compilation of official extracts from the Naval War Staff War Diary. It was prepared by naval archivists who had access to the Admiralty files and contains file references to the papers which were the basis for each entry. This item dated 3 April 1941 reads as follows:

“_Balkan Operations delayed ‘Barbarossa’ at first for about five
weeks._ All measures which can be construed as _offensive
actions_ are to be stopped according to Fuehrer order.”
(_C-170_)

By the end of April, however, things were sufficiently straightened out to permit the Fuehrer definitely to set D-Day as 22 June—more than seven weeks away. A “Top Secret” report of a conference with the Chief of the Section _Landsverteidigung_ of the _Wehrmachtfuhrungsstab_ on 30 April 1941 states, in the first two paragraphs:

“1. _Timetable Barbarossa_:

The Fuehrer has decided:

_Action Barbarossa_ begins on 22 June. From 23 May maximal troop
movements performance schedule. At the beginning of operations
the OKH reserves will have not yet reached the appointed areas.

“2. _Proportion of actual strength in the plan Barbarossa:
Sector North_: German and Russian forces approximately of the
same strength.

_Sector Middle_: Great German superiority.

_Sector South_: Russian superiority.” (_873-PS_)

Early in June, approximately three weeks before D-Day, preparations for the attack were so complete that it was possible for the High Command to issue an elaborate timetable showing in great detail the disposition and missions of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. This timetable (_C-39_) was prepared in 21 copies. The copy reproduced here was the third copy, which was given to the High Command of the Navy. Page 1 is in the form of a transmittal and reads as follows:

“_Top Military Secret_
“Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
Nr. 44842/41 Top Military Secret WFST/Abt.L (I op)
“Fuehrer’s Headquarters
(no date)
“Top Secret (_Chefsache_)
_Only through officer_

“_21 copies_
3rd copy Ob. d. m.
I op.00845/41
Received 6 June
Enclosures:—

“The Fuehrer has authorized the appended timetable as a
foundation for further preparations for ‘Barbarossa’. If
alterations should be necessary during execution, the Supreme
Command of the Armed Forces must be informed.

“Chief of Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

signed: Keitel”
(_C-39_)

The document then proceeds to outline the state of preparations as of 1 June 1941. The outline is in six paragraphs covering the status on that date under six headings: General; Negotiations with Friendly States; Army; Navy; Air Force, and Camouflage. The remainder of the document is in tabular form with six columns headed from left to right at the top of each page—Date; Serial No.; Army; Navy; OKW; Remarks. The item appearing under date 21 June and Serial No. 29, provides in the columns for Army, Navy, and Air Forces that, “Till 1300 hours latest time at which operation can be cancelled (_spaetester Anhaltetermin_)” (_C-39_). Under the column headed OKW appears the note: “Cancelled by code word ‘Altona’ or further confirmation of start of attack by code word: ‘Dortmund’” (_C-39_). In the Remarks column appears the statement that: “Complete absence of camouflage of formation of Army point of main effort (_Schwerpunkt_), concentration of armour and artillery must be reckoned with” (_C-39_). The entry for 22 June, under serial number 31, gives a notation which cuts across the columns for the Army, Air Force, Navy, and OKW and provides as follows:

“_Invasion Day_

“H-hour for the start of the invasion by the Army and crossing
of the frontier by the Air Forces. 0330 hours”. (_C-39_)

In the Remarks column it is stated that:

“Army assembly independent of any lateness in starting owing to
weather on the part of the Air Force.” (_C-39_)

The other parts of the chart are similar in nature to those quoted and give great detail concerning the disposition and missions of the various components of the Armed Forces.

On 9 June 1941 the order of the Fuehrer went out for final reports on Barbarossa to be made in Berlin on 14 June 1941—8 days before “D-Day” (_C-78_). This order, signed by Hitler’s Adjutant, Schmundt, reads as follows:

“TOP SECRET
Only by Officer
“Office of Wehrmacht Adjutant
“at Berchtesgaden
9th June 1941

“_To the Fuehrer_

Br. B. No. 7 Top Secret

“_Top Secret_

“_Re: Conference ‘Barbarossa’_

“1. The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces have
ordered reports on ‘Barbarossa’ by the Commanders of Army
Groups, armies, and Naval and Air Commanders of equal rank.

“2. The reports will be made on Saturday, 14 June 1941, at the
Reich Chancellery, Berlin.

“3. _Time Table._
“_a._ 11.00 hrs. “Silver Fox”
“_b._ 12.00 hrs-14.00 hrs. Army Group South
“_c._ 14.00 hrs-15.30 hrs. Lunch party for all
participants in
conference
“_d._ From 15.30 hrs. Baltic, Army Group
North, Army Group
“Center” in this
order.

Participants see enclosed list of participants.

(list of names, etc. follows)

“(signed) Schmundt
Colonel of the General Staff and Chief
Wehrmacht Adjutant to the Fuehrer”.
(_C-78_)

There is attached a list of participants and the order in which they will report. The list includes a large number of the members of the High Command and General Staff Group as of that date. Among those to participate were Goering, Keitel, Jodl, and Raeder.

The foregoing documents are sufficient to establish the premeditation and calculation which marked the military preparations for the invasion of the U.S.S.R. Starting almost a full year before the launching of the attack, the Nazi conspirators planned and prepared every military detail of their aggression against the Soviet Union with all that thoroughness and meticulousness which has come to be associated with the German character. The leading roles were performed in this preparation by the military figures—Goering, Keitel, Jodl, and Raeder.

D. _Plans for the Economic Exploitation and Spoliation of the U.S.S.R._

Not only was there detailed preparation for the invasion from a purely military standpoint, but equally elaborate and detailed planning was undertaken by the Nazi conspirators to insure that their aggression would prove economically profitable. The motives which led the conspirators to plan and launch attack were both political and economic. The economic basis may be simply summarized as the greed of the Nazi conspirators for the raw material, food, and other supplies which their neighbor possessed and which they conceived of themselves as needing for the maintenance of their war machine. To the Nazi conspirators a need was translated as a right, and they early began planning and preparing with typical care and detail to insure that every bit of the plunder which it would be possible to reap in the course of their aggression would be exploited to their utmost benefit.

As early as August 1940 General Thomas, Chief of the _Wi Rue Amt_, received a hint from Goering about a possible attack on the U.S.S.R., which prompted him to begin considering the Soviet war economy. In November 1940—8 months before the attack—Thomas was categorically informed by Goering of the planned operation in the East, and preliminary preparations were commenced for the economic plundering of the territories to be occupied in the course of such operation (_2353-PS_). Goering played the overall leading role in this activity by virtue of his position at the head of the Four Year Plan. Thomas describes his receipt of the knowledge and this early planning in these terms:

“* * * In November, 1940, the Chief of the _Wi Rue_ together
with Secretaries of state Koerner, Neumann, Backe and General
von Hanneken were informed by the Reichmarshal of the action
planned in the East.

“By reason of these directives the preliminary preparations for
the action in the East were commenced by the office of Wi Rue at
the end of 1940.

“The preliminary preparations for the action in the East
included first of all the following tasks:

“1. Obtaining of a detailed survey of the Russian Armament
industry, its location, its capacity and its associate
industries.

“2. Investigation of the capacity of the different big armament
centers and their dependency one on the other.

“3. Determine the power and transport system for the industry of
the Soviet Union.

“4. Investigation of sources of raw materials and petroleum
(crude oil).

“5. Preparation of a survey of industries other than armament
industries in the Soviet Union.

“These points were concentrated in one big compilation ‘War
Economy of the Soviet Union’ and illustrated with detailed maps,
etc.”

“Furthermore a card index was made, containing all the important
factories in Soviet-Russia, and a lexicon of economy in the
German-Russian language for the use of the German War Economy
Organization.

“For the processing of these problems a task staff, Russia, was
created, first in charge of Lieutenant Colonel Luther and later
on in charge of Brigadier General Schubert. The work was carried
out according to the directives from the Chief of the Office,
resp. the group of depts. for foreign territories (Ausland) with
the cooperation of all departments, economy offices and any
other persons, possessing information on Russia. Through these
intensive preparative activities an excellent collection of
material was made, which proved of the utmost value later on for
carrying out the operations and for administering the
territory.” (_2353-PS_)

By the end of February 1941 this preliminary planning had proceeded to a point where a broader plan of organization was needed. General Thomas held a conference, with his subordinates on 28 February 1941 to call for such a plan. A memorandum of this conference classified Top Secret and dated 1 March 1941, reads as follows:

“The general ordered that a broader plan of organization be
drafted for the Reich Marshal.

“Essential Points:

“1. The whole organization to be subordinate to the Reich
Marshal. _Purpose_: Support and extension of the measures of the
four-year plan.

“2. The organization must include everything concerning war
economy, excepting only food, which is said to be made already a
special mission of State Secretary Backe.

“3. Clear statement that _the organization is to be independent
of the military or civil administration_. Close cooperation, but
instructions direct from the central office in Berlin.

“4. Scope of activities to be divided in two steps:

_a._ Accompanying the advancing troops directly behind the front
lines, in order to avoid the destruction of supplies and to
secure the removal of important goods.

_b._ Administration of the occupied industrial districts and
exploitation of economically complimentary districts.

“5. In view of the extended field of activity, the term _war
economy_ inspection is to be used preferably, instead of
armament inspection.

“6. In view of the great field of activity, the organization
must be generously equipped and personnel must be
correspondingly numerous. _The main mission of the organization_
will consist of _seizing raw materials and taking over all_
_important concerns_. For the latter mission reliable persons
from German concerns will be interposed suitably from the
beginning, since successful operation from the beginning can
only be performed by the aid of their experiences, (for example,
lignite, ore, chemistry, petroleum).

“After the discussion of further details, Lt. Col. Luther was
instructed to make an initial draft of such an organization
within one week.

“Close cooperation with the individual sections in the building
is essential. An officer must still be appointed for Wi and Rue,
with whom the operational staff can remain in constant contact.
Wi is to give each section chief and Lt. Col. Luther a copy of
the new plan regarding Russia.

“Major General Schubert is to be asked to be in Berlin the
second half of next week. Also, the four officers who are
ordered to draw up the individual armament inspections are to
report to the Office Chief at the end of next week.

“(signed:) Hamann”.
(_1317-PS_)

Hamann, who signed the report is listed among those attending as a Captain, was apparently the junior officer present. Presumably it fell naturally to his lot to prepare the minutes of the meeting.

The authority and mission of this organization which Thomas was organizing at the direction of Goering was clearly recognized by Keitel in his operational order of 13 March 1941 (_447-PS_). The order stated that the Fuehrer had entrusted the uniform direction of the administration of economy in the area of operations and political administration to the Reichsmarshal (Goering) who in turn had delegated his authority to the Chief of the _Wi Rue Amt_ (Thomas). (_447-PS_)

The organizational work called for by General Thomas at the meeting on 28 February apparently proceeded apace, and on 29 April 1941 a conference was held with various branches of the Armed Forces to explain the organizational set-up of Economic Staff _Oldenburg_. (_Oldenburg_ was the code name given to this economic counterpart of _Barbarossa_.)