Chapter XXXI: Part 31

Mr. CADIGAN. Only, insofar, that I know that on November 23, when the vast bulk of this material came in, that it was photographed. Some of these items I saw before they were photographed, and some afterward. But the exact sequence to select one item out of four or five hundred, I cannot, in all honesty, say I definitely recall seeing this before it was photographed.

Mr. EISENBERG. Can you explain what the procedure is when a document came in involving the assassination?

Mr. CADIGAN. Initially, the first big batch of evidence was brought into the laboratory on November 23 of 1963 and this consisted of many, many items.

Mr. EISENBERG. 1963?

Mr. CADIGAN. November 23, 1963. It was a very large quantity of evidence that was brought in. There were several agent examiners available to evaluate this material. There were supervisory officials, there were representatives from our Internal Security Division, all of whom had an interest in this matter, and it was decided they wanted certain items treated for latent fingerprints. The basic rule is always that before an exhibit is treated for latent fingerprints it is photographed, and that is what was done in this case.

Mr. EISENBERG. What happens to the negative after it is photographed? Were they all given to you?

Mr. CADIGAN. Yes; the negatives that pertain to the document aspects I took over and maintained under my control. Negatives pertaining to firearms evidence or hairs or fibers, they were turned over to Mr. Frazier.

Mr. EISENBERG. So under the regular procedure, as soon as the document came in it would be photographed, before it was treated for latents and the negative would be turned over to you?

Mr. CADIGAN. Yes.

Mr. EISENBERG. So at least if the procedure had been followed, any negative you had would be a negative of a document before it had been treated for fingerprints, is that correct?

Mr. CADIGAN. That is correct.

Mr. EISENBERG. Now, returning to Commission Exhibits Nos. 820 and 819, did you prepare a photograph which would show the remnants of the signature A. J. Hidell on the Commission Exhibit No. 820?

Mr. CADIGAN. No.

Mr. EISENBERG. Is the preparation of such a photograph possible?

Mr. CADIGAN. I doubt it very much, because the indentations are so faint that the enlargement would serve no useful purpose. Actually, the best examination is by low-power magnification under the proper lighting.

Mr. EISENBERG. Did you attempt to determine whether the signature of Lee H. Oswald on this card was written by Lee H. Oswald?

Mr. CADIGAN. Yes.

Mr. EISENBERG. What was your conclusion?

Mr. CADIGAN. That the Lee H. Oswald signature on Commission Exhibit No. 820 was written by Lee H. Oswald.

Mr. EISENBERG. What about the signature "A. J. Hidell"?

Mr. CADIGAN. I was unable to reach a conclusion. First of all, at the time I compared this signature the known standards of Lee Harvey Oswald were inadequate for this particular comparison.

I did, however, note that there were certain differences in this signature that indicate the possibility of someone other than Oswald having prepared it. But in my opinion, the characteristics I observed were not of sufficient weight for a positive opinion in this regard.

Mr. EISENBERG. Could you note those characteristics?

Mr. CADIGAN. Yes; I think the capital letter "A" and the capital letter "H" in "Hidell" are different from the "A's" that Oswald makes, that appear in the enlarged photographs, Cadigan Exhibits Nos. 4 through 10.

Mr. EISENBERG. Anything else?

Mr. CADIGAN. I think the lower case "d," especially in the rounded shape of the body of it and the relatively short height of the staff, so that the staff compared to the body is very short. The "J" is made different or in a different manner than Oswald regularly makes or usually makes his "J's" in the known standards, but again it is a question of judgment as to whether you believe a combination of characteristics is enough to either eliminate or identify. In this instance, in my opinion, these differences point to the possibility of another writer other than Oswald.

Mr. EISENBERG. You indicated before, also, that there was another ink used.

Mr. CADIGAN. That is correct. This, of course, in and of itself, is of no consequence, since the same person can use two different pens, so the color of the ink would not be, in my mind, significant.

Mr. EISENBERG. Does that signature appear to have been written naturally?

Mr. CADIGAN. Yes.

Mr. EISENBERG. At normal speed?

Mr. CADIGAN. Yes.

Mr. EISENBERG. Any evidence of retouching?

Mr. CADIGAN. No.

Mr. EISENBERG. Generally, were the signatures and other handwritings in the questioned documents you have reviewed in this deposition today written naturally?

Mr. CADIGAN. With the exception of the "Hidell" signature on his certificate of vaccination. There is, in my opinion, distortion present there. But, by and large, in fact in almost all of the various handwritings, hand printings, and signatures, there is no evidence of disguise or distortion, in my opinion.

Mr. EISENBERG. What type of evidence indicates disguise or distortion?

Mr. CADIGAN. Distortion and disguise can take many forms. It can be in the form of a change in slant, a deliberate malformation of the individual letters. It can be shown in broken or interrupted strokes. It can be shown in waves or wiggles in the line itself which should not normally be there. It may be occasioned by a person using other than normal hand, a left-handed person writing with his right hand or a right-handed person writing with his left hand. All these introduce elements of distoration or disguise. The extent of it can only be determined by comparing a given writing with known writings, and observing the characteristics present, and on that basis you can then formulate an opinion as to whether or not there is any appreciable amount of distortion or disguise.

Mr. EISENBERG. How would you evaluate the possibility of another person having simulated the handwriting of Lee Harvey Oswald in these questioned documents?

Mr. CADIGAN. I don't think there is any possibility.

Mr. EISENBERG. On what do you base that?

Mr. CADIGAN. I base that on 23 years experience and judgment and the examination of the documents and the various writings involved in this instance.

Mr. EISENBERG. And do I understand that if that had happened, the person would have left evidence behind which you would have detected?

Mr. CADIGAN. In my opinion, yes.

Mr. EISENBERG. And that would be in what form?

Mr. CADIGAN. It would be in many forms. Failure to incorporate into the writings things that should be there, and including in the writings things that are not in Oswald's writing, differences in slant, spacing, proportions of letters, both to other letters and proportions of letters within themselves, the adoption of the various variations that you find in the known writings. When the amount of writing approaches the amount involved here, there is a large, a relatively large volume of questioned writings. The possibilities of successful or undetectible forgery, in my opinion, are nil.

Mr. EISENBERG. Mr. Cadigan, I now hand you Commission Exhibit No. 1, which is a note in the Russian language in cyrillic print, and ask you whether you have examined that item?

Mr. CADIGAN. Yes.

Mr. EISENBERG. I now hand you Commission Exhibit Nos. 55, 56, and 66, consisting of various notes in the cyrillic language, rather in the Russian language in cyrillic print, and ask you whether you have examined those notes?

Mr. CADIGAN. Yes.

Mr. EISENBERG. Who is the purported signer of those notes, Exhibits Nos. 55, 56, and 66?

Mr. CADIGAN. From the translation that I read these are purportedly written by Lee Harvey Oswald.

Mr. EISENBERG. Now, for the record, these have also been identified by Marina as having been written by Lee Harvey Oswald.

And these are signed Alek in some or all cases?

Mr. CADIGAN. Yes; they are signed A-l-e-k, Alek in all three instances.

Mr. EISENBERG. Again, for the record, this is a name which was used for Oswald during his period of staying in the Soviet Union.

Have you attempted to determine whether Commission Exhibit No. 1 was written by the person who wrote Commission Exhibits Nos. 55, 56, and 66?

Mr. CADIGAN. Yes.

Mr. EISENBERG. And what was your conclusion?

Mr. CADIGAN. That Commission Exhibit No. 1 was written by Lee Harvey Oswald.

Mr. EISENBERG. Have you prepared photographs of Commission Exhibits Nos. 55, 56, and 66?

Mr. CADIGAN. Yes; of the letters contained in those exhibits.

Mr. EISENBERG. I will mark those as Cadigan Exhibits Nos. 25, 26, 27, and 28.

(The documents referred to were marked Cadigan Exhibits Nos. 25, 26, 27, and 28.)

Mr. EISENBERG. Have you also taken a photograph of Commission Exhibit No 1?

Mr. CADIGAN. Yes.

Mr. EISENBERG. I will mark that as Cadigan Exhibit No. 29----

Mr. CADIGAN. Front and back.

Mr. EISENBERG. And Cadigan Exhibit No. 30, representing respectively the back and front of Commission Exhibit No. 1.

(The documents referred to were marked Cadigan Exhibits Nos. 29 and 30.)

Mr. EISENBERG. Now, by use of photographs Cadigan Exhibits Nos. 25 through 30, could you explain some of the reasons which led you to your conclusion?

Mr. CADIGAN. Yes; and I would point out that in addition to the four enlargements written in Russian, I also used Cadigan Exhibits or the documents represented by Cadigan Exhibits Nos. 4 through 10, the known standards of Oswald, since there are English letters interspersed with the Russian writing on Commission Exhibit No. 1. Thus, for example, in the second line in Cadigan Exhibit No. 29 appears the word "to" which is directly comparable to the same word appearing in Cadigan Exhibits Nos. 4 through 10. This is characterized by a long sweeping upstroke, and the recurving downstroke cuts the staff about in half. And the "o" is without any tail, and it is relatively small and set fairly close into the staff. The "t" crossing is rather long and fairly high.

I noted these same characteristics in Cadigan Exhibits Nos. 4 through 10.

Further, there is the wording in English, "Red Cross" appearing about two-thirds of the way down the side of the page beginning with the numeral 6, and here, again, I noted the same characteristics in the English hand printing in Cadigan Exhibits Nos. 4 through 10. Again, the use of the small "e" and the small "d" in conjunction with the capital "R," and then in the word "cross" he has used the capital letters. On the face of the Commission Exhibit No. 1 appear the printed English letters "ERVAY" which are almost directly comparable with the name "Lee Harvey Oswald" in Cadigan Exhibit No. 10. The E here is characterized by the little loop at the base of the staff. The "R" has a flat closed loop on the left side of the staff. The "Y" is constructed of two strokes, almost a perfect "V" shape for the body and a tail slanting back away from it.

The letter "p" or what appears to be the letter "p," indicated by the roman numeral 2 and a red arrow, is similar to the English "p," characterized by a long narrow staff without much of a loop. The body of the letter extends above the staff and the base is open. The bottom of the letter is not closed in.

The numeral "1" on the chart Cadigan Exhibit No. 29 points to a Russian character which resembles somewhat the English letter "G," the capital letter G. This is characterized by a rather large elongated loop along the left side of the upstroke, and the finishing stroke is short and straight.

The numeral "3" in red on Cadigan Exhibit No. 29 points to the Russian word which resembles the English word "tbi." The "t" has a very long beginning upstroke. The crossing of the "t" is high and is at the top of the letter. The b is formed with a straight staff on the back side, and there is a well spaced connection to the following letter which resembles the English letter "i."

I further noted that on this same side of the document shown in Cadigan Exhibit No. 29 in the second to the last line from the bottom appears the combination "exa," which is directly comparable with the "exa" in "Texas" appearing on the photograph Cadigan Exhibits Nos. 6, 4, and 9, among others. Again this characteristic way of making the "x" is almost like a "u" or an open "o." There is a little extra stroke that breaks off of the "x" so that instead of looking like "exa" it has the appearance of "eva" with a diagonal stroke through the "v."

The number "6" in red on Cadigan Exhibit No. 29 points to the combination which looks like the English letters "Ha," where the same two letters appear on the photographs, Cadigan Exhibits Nos. 25 and 26, the "H" being made in two roughly parallel straight strokes. The "a" is almost in the form of a circle, and the tail of the "a" runs out horizontally to the line of writing.

On Cadigan Exhibit No. 30, the number "8" in red with an arrow points to the combination of letters which resemble the English letters "tak," and this same combination or the same letters appear on Cadigan Exhibit No. 27. Again, the "t" has a rather long beginning stroke. The crossing is high and long, and I noted that the "k" in both instances is made in a similar manner.

The figure "9" on Cadigan Exhibit No. 30 also points to a different style of k, or what resembles the English letter "k," in that it is composed of a straight staff and the body or the right portion of the letter is almost the shape of a v tilted on its side.

Because of this combination of characteristics, as well as many others, I reached the opinion that Government's Exhibit No. 1 was written by Lee Harvey Oswald.

Mr. EISENBERG. Commission Exhibit No. 1, that is?

Mr. CADIGAN. Yes, of which Cadigan Exhibits Nos. 30 and 29 are photographic enlargements.

Mr. EISENBERG. I have no further questions, Mr. Cadigan. Thank you very much. You have been extremely helpful.

AFFIDAVIT OF EARLENE ROBERTS

The following affidavit was executed by Earlene Roberts on December 5, 1963.

AFFIDAVIT

PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY

STATE OF TEXAS, _County of Dallas, ss_:

I, Earlene Roberts, after being duly sworn, do depose and state:

I live at 1026 Beckley, Dallas, Texas, where I serve as housekeeper for a rooming house owned by Mr. & Mrs. A. C. Johnson.

On Friday, November 22, 1963, at approximately 1:00 pm I was sitting in the living room watching television about the President's assassination when a man I knew as O. H. Lee, but who has since been identified as Lee Harvey Oswald, came into the front door and went to his room. Oswald did not have a jacket when he came in the house and I don't recall what type of clothing he was wearing.

Oswald went to his room and was only there a very few minutes before coming out. I noticed he had a jacket he was putting on. I recall the jacket was a dark color and it was the type that zips up the front. He was zipping the jacket up as he left.

Oswald went out the front door. A moment later I looked out the window. I saw Lee Oswald standing on the curb at the bus stop just to the right, and on the same side of the street as our house. I just glanced out the window that once. I don't know how long Lee Oswald stood at the curb nor did I see which direction he went when he left there.

About thirty minutes later three Dallas policemen came to the house looking for Lee Harvey Oswald. We didn't know who Lee Harvey Oswald was until sometime later his picture was flashed on television. I then let the Dallas policemen in the room occupied by Lee Oswald. While the Dallas police were searching the room two FBI agents came in.

The police and FBI agents took everything in the room that belong to Lee Oswald and also took our pillow case and two towels and wash cloths.

I have made this statement, consisting of three pages, to Special Agents William N. Carter and Arthur W. Blake of the U.S. Secret Service. I have read this statement over and I find it to be true to the best of my knowledge.

Signed this 5th day of December 1963.

(S) Earlene Roberts,
EARLENE ROBERTS.

AFFIDAVIT OF RALPH W. YARBOROUGH

The following affidavit was executed by Ralph W. Yarborough on July 10, 1964.

AFFIDAVIT

PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, _ss_:

In response to the oral request of one of the attorneys for the Commission that I send you an affidavit for inclusion in the record of the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, I make the following statement:

On November 22, 1963, as the President and Mrs. Kennedy rode through the streets of Dallas, I was in the second car behind them. The first car behind the Presidential car was the Secret Service car; the second car behind them was Vice-President Lyndon Johnson's car. The driver and a secret service agent were on the front seat of the Vice-President's car. Vice-President Lyndon B. Johnson sat on the right side of the rear seat of the automobile, Mrs. Lyndon B. Johnson was in the center of the rear seat, while I sat on the left side of the rear seat.

After the Presidential motorcade had passed through the heart of downtown Dallas, experiencing an exceptionally warm and friendly greeting, as the motorcade went down the slope of Elm Street toward the railroad underpass, a rifle shot was heard by me; a loud blast, close by. I have handled firearms for fifty year, and thought immediately that it was a rifle shot. When the noise of the shot was heard, the motorcade slowed to what seemed to me a complete stop (though it could have been a near stop). After what I took to be about three seconds, another shot boomed out, and after what I took to be one-half the time between the first and second shots (calculated now, this would have put the third shot about one and one-half seconds after the second shot--by my estimate--to me there seemed to be a long time between the first and second shots, a much shorter time between the second and third shots--these were my impressions that day), a third shot was fired. After the third shot was fired, but only after the third shot was fired, the cavalcade speeded up, gained speed rapidly, and roared away to the Parkland Hospital.

I heard three shots and no more. All seemed to come from my right rear. I saw people fall to the ground on the embankment to our right, at about the time of or after the second shot, but before the cavalcade started up and raced away.

Due to the second car, with the secret service men standing on steps on the sides of it, I could not see what was happening in the Presidential car during the shooting itself. Some of the secret service men looked backward and to the right, in the general direction from which the rifle explosions seemed to come.

After the shooting, one of the secret service men sitting down in the car in front of us pulled out an automatic rifle or weapon and looked backward. However, all of the secret service men seemed to me to respond very slowly, with no more than a puzzled look. In fact, until the automatic weapon was uncovered, I had been lulled into a sense of false hope for the President's safety, by the lack of motion, excitement, or apparent visible knowledge by the secret service men, that anything so dreadful was happening. Knowing something of the training that combat infantrymen and Marines receive, I am amazed at the lack of instantaneous response by the Secret Service, when the rifle fire began. I make this statement in this paragraph reluctantly, not to add to the anguish of anyone, but it is my firm opinion, and I write it out in the hope that it might be of service in the better protection of our Presidents in the future.

After we went under the underpass, on the upward slope I could see over the heads of the occupants of the second car (Secret Service car) and could see an agent lying across the back or trunk of the Presidential car, with his feet to the right side of the car, his head at the left side. He beat the back of the car with one hand, his face contorted by grief, anguish, and despair, and I knew from that instant that some terrible loss had been suffered.

On arrival at the hospital, I told newsmen that three rifle shots had been fired. There was then no doubt in my mind that the shots were rifle shots, and I had neither then or now any doubts that any other shots were fired. In my opinion only three shots were fired.

The attached photograph from pages 24 and 25 of the _Saturday Evening Post_ of December 14, 1963, shows the motorcade, as I remember it, an instant after the first shot. [Photograph is Yarborough Exhibit A.]

Given and sworn to this 10th day of July, 1964, at Washington, District of Columbia.

Signed this 10th day of July 1964.

(S) Ralph W. Yarborough,
RALPH W. YARBOROUGH.

TESTIMONY OF KENNETH P. O'DONNELL

The testimony of Kenneth P. O'Donnell was taken at 12:05 p.m., on May 18, 1964, at the White House Office, Washington, D.C., by Messrs. Norman Redlich and Arlen Specter, assistant counsel of the President's Commission.

Mr. SPECTER. Would you rise, please? Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you shall give in this deposition proceeding before the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. O'DONNELL. I do.

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. O'Donnell, the purpose of our asking you to testify today is to obtain whatever knowledge you have about the origin of the trip to Texas by President Kennedy, the events during the trip, and the trip back to Washington, D.C., on November 22. With that general statement of purpose, I will ask you if you have any objection to giving a deposition at this time?

Mr. O'DONNELL. I do not.

Mr. SPECTER. Would you state your full name for the record, please?

Mr. O'DONNELL. Kenneth P. O'Donnell.

Mr. SPECTER. What were your duties on November 22, 1963?

Mr. O'DONNELL. I was special assistant to the President. I was in charge of his appointments and any itineraries that he might have.

Mr. SPECTER. How long had you served in that capacity?

Mr. O'DONNELL. I served as special assistant to the President since the inauguration, January 20, 1961, with the same duties.

Mr. SPECTER. Were you a party to the original conversations and decision for President Kennedy to make a trip to Texas in November of 1963?

Mr. O'DONNELL. I was.

Mr. SPECTER. Would you outline the origin of that trip to Texas, please?

Mr. O'DONNELL. The origin of the trip I would think came from a conversation between the President, then Vice President Johnson, and myself. It concerned President Kennedy's desire, and President Johnson's desire that he come to Texas and spend some time there, looking forward to the campaign of 1964, in which Texas would play a very vital role in President Kennedy's view.

Mr. SPECTER. Approximately when did that first conversation occur, Mr. O'Donnell?

Mr. O'DONNELL. We had been discussing this for almost 6 or 7 months, but the time had never seemed quite right, either in the Vice President's mind or in Governor Connally's mind. Governor Connally and the Vice President had discussed this. They arrived at a general agreement that it be done some time in the latter part of the month of November. I think this decision probably came in October, some time in October.

Mr. SPECTER. When had President Kennedy been in Dallas prior to the trip of November 1963?

Mr. O'DONNELL. The last time the President had been in Dallas was as a candidate for the Presidency.

I correct myself. He had been to--visit Speaker Rayburn in the hospital. I was not on that trip.

Mr. SPECTER. Then aside from the trip to see Speaker Rayburn, in the hospital, had the President been in Dallas at all since the campaign of 1960?

Mr. O'DONNELL. He had not.

Mr. SPECTER. Do you know approximately when it was that President Kennedy visited Speaker Rayburn in the hospital in Dallas?

Mr. O'DONNELL. I don't know exactly. It would be just before he passed away.

Mr. SPECTER. Does October 1961 sound about right to you?

Mr. O'DONNELL. It sounds about right.

Mr. SPECTER. And how many times had President Kennedy been to Texas between the campaign of 1960 and November 1963, if you know?

Mr. O'DONNELL. Well, he had been to the Speaker's funeral at Bonham. He had been to Houston, to see the new space center, and also he spoke at Rice Stadium. And he had been to El Paso, on a military inspection tour.

Mr. SPECTER. Are those, then, all the trips he made, to your knowledge?

Mr. O'DONNELL. That is all I can recollect at the moment.

Mr. SPECTER. In a general way, what was the purpose of the President's trip to Texas in November of 1963?

Mr. O'DONNELL. Well, he hadn't conducted any political activities in Texas. There were great controversies existing. There was a party problem in Texas that the President and the Vice President felt he could be helpful, as both sides of the controversy were supporting President Kennedy, and they felt he could be a bridge between these two groups, and this would be helpful in the election of 1964. I think that is the major reason for the trip.

Mr. SPECTER. Was President Kennedy motivated, to any extent at all, by his interest in making himself as President available to the people generally in every section of the country, including Texas?

Mr. O'DONNELL. Very definitely. The President's views of his responsibilities as President of the United States were that he meet the people, that he go out to their homes and see them, and allow them to see him, and discuss, if possible, the views of the world as he sees it, the problems of the country as he sees them. And he felt that leaving Washington for the President of the United States was most necessary--not only for the people, but for the President himself, that he expose himself to the actual basic problems that were disturbing the American people. It helped him in his job here, he was able to come back here with a fresh view of many things. I think he felt very strongly that the President ought to get out of Washington, and go meet the people on a regular basis.

Mr. SPECTER. Did he enjoy that exposure, strictly as a personal matter?

Mr. O'DONNELL. He enjoyed it very much. The President--liked people, and he liked to mingle with people.

Mr. SPECTER. When were the specific dates of November 21 and November 22 finally set as being the precise times for the trip to Texas?

Mr. O'DONNELL. Well, I am not clear in my recollection of that. I would think some time early in November. I know Thanksgiving was one of the problems we had to work with. We decided that would be the best time to go, in that general area, and we, in general, would keep a file--once we agreed we were going to Texas--we would keep a file on all the speaking engagements, all the invitations the President had received.

I would go to that file and select some that might look promising. One of them that I recollect was an invitation from Congressman Albert Thomas, or his committee, that was giving him an appreciation dinner--not the Congressman himself. And the President was very fond of Congressman Thomas, he was most helpful to him, and I knew he would want to go, if this was at all possible. I would think that probably had more to do with setting the actual definite dates of the 21st and 22d.

Mr. SPECTER. When, if you recall, was the Secret Service notified of the forthcoming trip to Texas?

Mr. O'DONNELL. I would think they would be notified around the first week in November. The general desire is that they have the specific information at least on the places that he might go 3 weeks prior to the trip.

Mr. SPECTER. And who among the members of the Presidential staff would be charged with the responsibility for coordinating the trip with the Secret Service?

Mr. O'DONNELL. That would be my responsibility. The manner in which we would set it up would be that I would notify the head here, who is Gerry Behn, and Gerry Behn would ask me when we were sending people down, so that his people and our people could go down at the same time. And I recollect that Jerry Bruno was one of them.

The first step would be to confer with the Governor, go over the general proposals that the Governor would make, and then bring it back to me. And I would go over it with the Governor and the Vice President and the President.

Mr. SPECTER. What planning was undertaken with respect to the determination of the motorcade route through Dallas?

Mr. O'DONNELL. Well, I think once we arrived--we chose the four cities we were going into. And then the advance men and the Secret Service went out. Then we would work backwards from where we had to be at what time, and what things we had agreed we would do there. And the original--Dallas, as I recollect, was going to be an evening affair. The Governor thought the evening affair should be in Austin, and that we should hit Dallas around noontime.

Mr. SPECTER. When you say the evening affair, what are you referring to specifically there?

Mr. O'DONNELL. There was a political dinner which was to be conducted at Austin that evening, at the end of which the President was going with the Vice President to the ranch. This was a political fundraising dinner.

Mr. SPECTER. Now, had there been any conversation given at all to omitting a motorcade through Dallas?

Mr. O'DONNELL. None.

Mr. SPECTER. And what were the considerations behind the decision on having a motorcade through Dallas?

Mr. O'DONNELL. Well, we had a motorcade wherever we went. Particularly when we went to a large city, the purpose of going there was to give the President as much exposure to the people of Dallas and vice versa, the people of Dallas to the President, as possible.

The speaking engagement was a luncheon which was rather limited. And the President would not want to leave Dallas feeling that the only ones that were able to see him were a rather select group. So it would be automatic, and we would not even proceed with instructions, that the advance man and the Secret Service would, within the time allotted to them--would bring the President into Dallas, through an area which exposes him to the greatest number of people.

Mr. SPECTER. When was a decision made, if you recall, as to the precise route that the motorcade would follow through Dallas?

Mr. O'DONNELL. I don't recall. I would think it would be perhaps a week before the final decision was made. The President would not involve himself in anything like this. Once we agreed on where he would go, that was my responsibility to work it out. The normal course of events--they would say to me, "Do you want a motorcade in Dallas?" I would say, "Yes; this is how much time you have got." They would work out a motorcade. The Secret Service would time the route. Once they had worked out this point, they would come back to me and say, "We have accomplished the purpose you want." The Secret Service would say it takes so much time, the Governor would say "You have to be here at a certain time." Once all those are put together, the route is laid out and accepted.

Mr. SPECTER. Do you recall how long after the determination of the motorcade route that that information was transmitted to the press in Dallas?

Mr. O'DONNELL. I don't. I would think on the transmission to the press that that would not come from here anyway. That would come from down there. I would think the Governor's office would probably put that out. We would under normal circumstances inform through Mr. Salinger's office, I would inform him of the trip, and then I would give him a schedule that is given to me by the Secret Service, which would give the times, but no routes--times and locations, and would go along that he would arrive at 12 o'clock, address such and such a group at 1 o'clock. So we would not normally be privy--they could be saying to me, "We are going down 12th Street"--it would not mean anything to me. So I would think that our advance man and the Governor's advance man would make a decision on when they were going to announce the route.

I would think that was almost normal. You might say you wanted to do it 4 days ahead of time in New York, and the local fellow would really determine it--"Down here we do it this way."

Mr. SPECTER. Would the route be disclosed to the press as a matter of normal procedure in general as soon as it was ascertained?

Mr. O'DONNELL. Yes.

Mr. SPECTER. Were there any factors peculiar to Dallas which delayed the determination of the motorcade route?

Mr. O'DONNELL. The only factor that really did hold up a final decision was we had not been able to finally agree on where he would end up and where he would deliver the speech. There was a controversy between the Governor, and between some of the local democratic figures, and between our people, as to whether the place finally selected was the best place for the President to give the address. The Governor felt very strongly on it. And we finally acquiesced to his views. But I would think that came rather late in the game, and it would have altered the route quite dramatically.

Mr. SPECTER. Would you tell us if there was any consideration at all given to omitting Dallas as a stop on the trip in Texas?

Mr. O'DONNELL. I don't think so; no. I would think that the President would not have--once he had agreed to go to three or four other cities, that he could not possibly go to Texas and avoid Dallas. It would cause more controversy--and it would not accomplish for us what really was the long-range purpose of the visit.

Mr. SPECTER. And the long-range purpose was what, sir?

Mr. O'DONNELL. Was to attempt to in some way bridge the gap between the two political groups in Texas who were at odds, and to assist the President and prepare for the 1964 campaign as best he could at this period of time.

Mr. SPECTER. What was the President's reaction towards Dallas generally, if you know, with respect to the current publicity about, say, Ambassador Stevenson's reception there?

Mr. O'DONNELL. Well, he was not in anyway concerned about it. I think that the President was a very charitable man. He felt that really the picture of Dallas as painted--and as a reflection of their press in many ways--was not the real picture of Dallas; that they were Americans like everybody else, that there were good and bad, and the fact that 50 shouting people didn't portray the city of Dallas. He had been there in the 1960 campaign when the Vice President had been spit upon, and the President received one of the finest receptions he ever got. He didn't carry the city. They opposed him. But they were not particularly different than anybody else. And that wouldn't concern him, and I think, very frankly, the more difficult it was the more he liked to go there. But I think he generally felt that the loud noises emanating from Dallas were a very small minority, and so reflected.

Mr. SPECTER. Had there been any discussion about limiting the trip to Texas to a 1 day venture?

Mr. O'DONNELL. I don't recollect any. I do know one of the original thoughts was that he go to this dinner in Austin, which was a political dinner. Whether there was any consideration in some other people's minds that he just go in for the dinner and leave, I know he, number 1, would not consider it.

Mr. SPECTER. Why not?

Mr. O'DONNELL. He would not consider it because he had a great aversion to going into any place to a fundraising political dinner in which he felt that the people that were there were not really representative of the people, but were politically committed people, where it was a business meeting. And he thought this reflected to some degree on the office of the Presidency, that on his only visit to Texas, or any other State in 3 years, that he came to raise money for a political party, that he owed to the people to expose himself to them. So he he felt it was a duty of the Presidency to expose himself to the public. So he would not go to any place on a purely--but he certainly considered there were some political problems in Texas--that would also be in his judgment a bad political mistake. So I don't think there was ever any question that he would go some place else.

Mr. SPECTER. Did you accompany the President on all phases of the trip to Texas?

Mr. O'DONNELL. I was with him when he left. The only time that I was not with him was at Congressman Thomas' dinner. He went to the dinner. We ate at the hotel and went directly to the airport.

Mr. SPECTER. When did you depart, then, from Washington, on that trip to Texas?

Mr. O'DONNELL. Well, we left that morning by helicopter from the lawn. I think the records show it is 10:45. But the schedule was on time, certainly arriving there, and, as I recollect, we were on time pretty much the whole way as the schedule would reflect.

Mr. SPECTER. And from the helicopter at the White House lawn, where was your first stop by helicopter?

Mr. O'DONNELL. We stopped and boarded _Air Force 1_ at Andrews Air Force Base.

Mr. SPECTER. Would the time of 11 a.m., as reflected in the records, be accurate as your point of departure, then, from Andrews Air Force Base?

Mr. O'DONNELL. Yes; I would think it would be.

Mr. SPECTER. And your first stop in Texas was what?

Mr. O'DONNELL. San Antonio.

Mr. SPECTER. Arrival time of 1:30 p.m.--would that be an accurate time of arrival, within a few minutes, say, of when you actually set down in San Antonio?

Mr. O'DONNELL. I would think that is right. As I say, we were on schedule, and the schedule would indicate we were due to arrive at 1:30.

Mr. SPECTER. What were the activities at San Antonio, Tex?

Mr. O'DONNELL. We motorcaded through San Antonio and went to the Aerospace Medical Center, where the President made a speech, and from there to a second airport. We had moved _Air Force 1_ from one airfield to another, on the other side of the city.

Mr. SPECTER. At the Aerospace Center, was there a dedication there of some new facilities?

Mr. O'DONNELL. Yes.

Mr. SPECTER. Was there any other public appearance, then, besides the one you mentioned, in San Antonio?

Mr. O'DONNELL. No.

Mr. SPECTER. To where did you go from San Antonio?

Mr. O'DONNELL. We flew to Houston.

Mr. SPECTER. And about what time did you arrive in Houston?

Mr. O'DONNELL. I would have to look at the record.

Mr. SPECTER. Was it late in the afternoon on November 21?

Mr. O'DONNELL. Late in the afternoon, I would think around 4 or 5 o'clock.

Mr. SPECTER. And what were the activities in Houston?

Mr. O'DONNELL. We drove from the airfield into the hotel. As I recollect, there were very large crowds.

Mr. SPECTER. Was that a motorcade procession, also?

Mr. O'DONNELL. Motorcade; and particularly as we got in downtown Houston, the crowds were very large, and very enthusiastic. Getting in the hotel was somewhat of a chore.

Mr. SPECTER. What public appearances did the President then make in Houston?

Mr. O'DONNELL. The President spoke at the appreciation dinner for Congressman Thomas. The records will show the location. I did not accompany him. And I went directly from the hotel to the airport, and met him as he got aboard the plane.

Mr. SPECTER. Approximately when did the Presidential party depart from Houston?

Mr. O'DONNELL. Well, I would have to guess again. I would think around 10:30 or 11 o'clock. The alternative was staying overnight in Houston, getting in early in the morning--or getting in to Fort Worth late at night, and allowing the President a little more rest, and we selected going to Fort Worth that night.

Mr. SPECTER. What were the public appearances made by the President, then, in Fort Worth, Tex.?

Mr. O'DONNELL. He spoke at 8 o'clock that morning at a breakfast which was given by the business community, as I remember, came back up to his room, chatted for a few minutes, went back down. It had been raining. The sun had just come out. He went out and spoke to a group assembled in the parking lot and went back and departed for--came back upstairs, we chatted for a few minutes again, and then came back down and departed for Carswell.

Mr. SPECTER. And how did the President travel out of Fort Worth?

Mr. O'DONNELL. He left Fort Worth in an open car, traveled by car to Carswell.

Mr. SPECTER. And from Carswell, what was his mode of travel?

Mr. O'DONNELL. _Air Force 1_ to Love Field, Dallas?

Mr. SPECTER. What were the weather conditions on the arrival at Love Field in Dallas?

Mr. O'DONNELL. The weather was clear, sunny, excellent weather.

Mr. SPECTER. What decision had been made as to whether to have an open car in Dallas?

Mr. O'DONNELL. The decision had been made to have an open--if the weather was good, he would ride in an open car.

Mr. SPECTER. And do you recall who made that decision?

Mr. O'DONNELL. Well, I would make that decision under normal circumstances. But it was almost an automatic decision, that whenever the weather was clear, he preferred to ride in an open car.

Mr. SPECTER. Do you recall at approximately what time the Presidential party arrived at Love Field, Tex.--Love Field, Dallas, Tex.?

Mr. O'DONNELL. I would think it would be around 11, 11:15. We were on time. We always allowed a few minutes at the airport, because he always shook hands with the crowd. So we left--my recollection is that we departed from Love Field approximately according to the schedule.

Mr. SPECTER. What were President Kennedy's activities at Love Field?

Mr. O'DONNELL. He had no scheduled activities. It was a matter of assembling the motorcade. He got off _Air Force 1_, and he went over to the crowd that was gathered around the rail, shook hands, went up and down.

Mr. SPECTER. What type of a crowd was it with respect to size?

Mr. O'DONNELL. It was a large crowd.

Mr. SPECTER. Would you tell us how the motorcade was constituted with respect to the general number of the cars and the way they were lined up, if you recall, please?

Mr. O'DONNELL. Well, I can't go more than--I got into the second car, and I didn't really look behind me. There was some controversy as to what Congressman sat in what car. We had a lot of Congressmen with us and a lot of dignitaries, and there was a lot of juggling around, which Mr. O'Brien was more involved with than I was, as to where Senator Yarborough and the Vice President and the Congressman sat. But it was a lengthy motorcade, more lengthy than normal. We always tried to keep them down as much as possible. But because of the number of Congressmen and the dignitaries involved.

Mr. SPECTER. How many cars were there ahead of yours?

Mr. O'DONNELL. Well, I think there was a scout car, which was the lead, the President's vehicle, and I was in the car right behind him, in the Secret Service followup car.

Mr. SPECTER. Who else besides you was in that car?

Mr. O'DONNELL. David Powers was with me. All the rest were agents.

Mr. SPECTER. Do you recall whether anything unusual occurred on the trip from Love Field down to the center of Dallas?

Mr. O'DONNELL. No; I thought it was normal--the crowds, going through the suburbs, were, I would say, from medium to heavy for that trip. I noted they were mostly white collar, mostly industrial places we passed by which I would say were highly technical. Therefore, the crowd reflected a middle to an upper class type. They were not unfriendly nor terribly enthusiastic. They waved. But were reserved, I thought.

Mr. SPECTER. Where were you seated in the car?

Mr. O'DONNELL. I was seated in the front jump seat--the jump seat.

Mr. SPECTER. On the left-hand side or the right-hand side?

Mr. O'DONNELL. Left-hand side.

Mr. SPECTER. And who sat on your immediate right?

Mr. O'DONNELL. Mr. Powers.

Mr. SPECTER. How many agents were there in front of you?

Mr. O'DONNELL. Well, there were the normal two or sometimes three in the front seat. I would not be clear as to how many there were. I would think there were about--just guessing--seven or eight agents in the car. Some on the running board, some seated, depending on the speed of the motorcade, or the activity.

Mr. SPECTER. Was there a front seat in the car, immediately ahead of you?

Mr. O'DONNELL. Yes.

Mr. SPECTER. And was that occupied by Secret Service agents?

Mr. O'DONNELL. It was.

Mr. SPECTER. And how about immediately to your rear? Was there a rear seat?

Mr. O'DONNELL. There was a rear seat. There were agents in that--again depending on the speed of the motorcade they were either on the running board, or as it slows up and the crowds got larger the agents would get on the running board. But as it moved along rather rapidly, as it did on the way in, they were seated most of the time.

Mr. SPECTER. Do you recall whether or not the President's automobile made any stops en route from the airport into the downtown area?

Mr. O'DONNELL. I don't recollect, clearly. I would be surprised if it did not. But I don't have any clear recollection.

Mr. SPECTER. Was it a usual practice for the President to make a stop on the motorcade?

Mr. O'DONNELL. If the crowds got too large, he would stop, or if he saw some child had gone to some great extreme with a sign, he would sometimes stop. Usually unless the crowds were particularly heavy, or indicated a need for a stop, he would not stop.

Mr. SPECTER. And what was the nature of the crowd in downtown Dallas?

Mr. O'DONNELL. The nature of the crowd was extremely heavy, one of the heaviest I have seen in any American city.

Mr. SPECTER. How did they compare with the crowds during the 1960 campaign in Dallas?

Mr. O'DONNELL. I would think probably heavier. But very close. They were both very large crowds, very enthusiastic. I think, as I have always noticed, to the President and candidate there is a different aura. But that would be the only difference I would notice in the crowd. There was a little bit more respect--still the same enthusiasm. At the last trip in Dallas he stopped the motorcade every 5 minutes--they mobbed the car. There was none of that. But they were in the middle of the street and off the sidewalks. So there was a very narrow lane to progress through. But they were still very orderly, but cheerful.

Mr. SPECTER. Did you have any specific reaction to the Dallas crowd in terms of what your expectation might have been about Dallas?

Mr. O'DONNELL. Well, I was pleased with it. As a politician, I was particularly pleased with it. I thought we had accomplished what we had come to Dallas to do, was, one, to establish the fact that the average person living in that city was no different than any other American, and that they respected and admired their President. And I felt one of the greatest things that does occur of a political nature is the Congressmen and the political leaders who had also been reading the same newspaper about how unpopular he was, it is good for them to see it really is not true, it is a reflection of a very small minority, and that the President of the United States was extremely popular in Dallas.

And that was the basic reason we went. And as we finished through the business section of town, that was my pleased impression.

Mr. SPECTER. Do you recall the scene when you left the Main Street of downtown Dallas, with respect specifically to the presence of a large building which was immediately ahead of the motorcade?

Mr. O'DONNELL. I did not. I was looking at the crowd. And I frankly didn't look at the building, except when there were people in the windows. And as we made that turn, I had been standing--I remember I sat down. And as far as I was concerned, that was the end--we were then going to the luncheon--and I didn't notice any building at all.

Mr. SPECTER. Were you familiar with the identity of the specific plaza there, being known as Dealey Plaza?

Mr. O'DONNELL. I was not. I afterward have reflected on it many times.

Mr. SPECTER. Tell us what occurred then as you made that turn away from the crowded downtown Dallas area and headed toward the plaza area.

Mr. O'DONNELL. Well, I sat down. I remember saying to Dave Powers that it was a fantastic crowd. He agreed.

We turned. I remember the overpass. And then the shots occurred--which, at that time, I did not know were shots. My first impression was it was a firecracker. And then either somebody said, "He has been hit," or I noticed the slump--he had been waving out the right side of the car, and I noticed him slump over toward Mrs. Kennedy, and I realized then that they had been shots. But as fast as that realization occurred, I saw the third shot hit. It was such a perfect shot--I remember I blessed myself. I was rather convinced that was a fatal blow.

Mr. SPECTER. When you say you made a turn, which way did the motorcade turn?

Mr. O'DONNELL. Turned to the left.

Mr. SPECTER. And approximately how far behind the Presidential vehicle was the followup car at that time?

Mr. O'DONNELL. My guess would be 5 to 8 feet, the normal--when there are large crowds, pressing in on the side, they try to stay close. It was moving at a steady pace. The crowds were orderly. So he was at a normal--I would presume they were just about turning to step up the speed a little bit, because there would be no crowds from there.

Mr. SPECTER. What is your best estimate of the speed of the President's vehicle at that time?

Mr. O'DONNELL. Well, I would think we probably were going between 15 and 20, up until that moment, and I think he probably had just begun to accelerate probably up to about 25, somewhere in that vicinity.

Mr. SPECTER. Had the Secret Service followup car completed its left-hand turn prior to the time the shots rang out?

Mr. O'DONNELL. My recollection is they had, just about.

I don't recollect a separation of this nature. It was a slight sloping turn, as I remember, and I thought we were right together.

Mr. SPECTER. So that when you just indicated with your hands, you were showing a pattern of the Secret Service car having made the turn and straightened up immediately behind the Presidential vehicle proceeding down the street?

Mr. O'DONNELL. That is my impression.

Mr. SPECTER. And was the overpass in sight at that time, did you say?

Mr. O'DONNELL. Yes; it was.

Mr. SPECTER. On which side of the car was President Kennedy seated?

Mr. O'DONNELL. He was on the right side.

Mr. SPECTER. The extreme right?

Mr. O'DONNELL. The extreme right.

Mr. SPECTER. And what was he doing with his hands prior to the time of the shooting, if you recall?

Mr. O'DONNELL. He was waving. We had just left the mass of crowds. But as we turned on the grass plot there were four or five people there, and I believe he waved to them.

Mr. SPECTER. Indicating a right-handed wave?

Mr. O'DONNELL. Yes.

Mr. SPECTER. Where was Governor Connally seated with respect to the President?

Mr. O'DONNELL. He was directly in front of the President.