Chapter 382: , Laws of 1889, to read as follows (11)

The first chapter provides for the organization of a police
force, not less than 2000 nor more than 2500 in number,
recruited from among Moorish Mussulmans and commanded by
Kaids, but having Spanish and French officers and
non-commissioned officers for instructors, nominated to the
Sultan by their respective Governments, and their services
given for five years.
{255}
This police force, moreover, is subject to general inspection
by a superior officer of the Swiss army. The regulations of
the second chapter are minute and precise for their stated
purpose. The Morocco State Bank, provided for in the third, is
made subject to the law of France, and is to "discharge the
duties of disbursing Treasurer of the Empire" and "financial
agent of the Government." The Directors of the Bank are
chosen, of course, by the shareholders; but one article
stipulates that "the Shereefian Government shall exercise its
high control over the Bank through a Moorish High
Commissioner, whom it shall appoint after previous agreement
with the board of directors," while another requires that
"each of the following institutions, viz., the German Imperial
Bank, the Bank of England, the Bank of Spain and the Bank of
France, shall, with the approval of its Government, appoint a
Censor to the State Bank of Morocco." The prescriptions in the
fourth and fifth chapters of the act are not of general
significance or interest. In the sixth, relating to "public
services and public works," it is set forth that, "should the
Shereefian Government consider it necessary to have recourse
to foreign capital or to foreign industries for the working of
public services or for the execution of public works, roads,
railways, ports, telegraphs, or other, the Signatory Powers
reserve to themselves the right to see that the control of the
State over such large undertakings of public interest remain
intact." On the signing of the Act Mr. Henry White, the chief
delegate from the United States to the Conference, made the
following Declaration on behalf of his Government:

"The Government of the United States of America, having no
political interests in Morocco, and having taken part in the
present Conference with no other desires or intentions than to
assist in assuring to all the nations in Morocco the most
complete equality in matters of commerce, treatment, and
privileges, and in facilitating the introduction into that
Empire of reforms which should bring about a general state of
well-being founded on the perfect cordiality of her foreign
relations, and on a stable internal administration, declares:
that in subscribing to the Regulations and Declarations of the
Conference by the act of signing the General Act, subject to
ratification according to constitutional procedure, and the
Additional Protocol, and in consenting to their application to
American citizens and interests in Morocco, it assumes no
obligation or responsibility as to the measures which may be
necessary for the enforcement of the said Regulations and
Declarations."

EUROPE: A. D. 1907 (AUGUST).
Convention between Great Britain and Russia, containing
arrangements on the subject of Persia, Afghanistan, and Tibet.

Parallel with the Agreements—the "_Entente Cordiale_"—of
1904 between England and France, in its purpose and in its
importance to Europe, was the Convention between England and
Russia in 1907, which harmonized the interests and the policy
of the two nations in matters relating to Persia, Afghanistan,
and Tibet. In each case the dictating motive looked not so
much to a settlement of the particular questions involved, as
to a general extinguishment of possible causes of contention
which might at some time disturb the peaceful or friendly
relations of the peoples concerned. Taken together, the two
formally expressed understandings, Anglo-French and
Anglo-Russian, added to the Franco-Russian Alliance of 1895
(see, in Volume VI. of this work, FRANCE: A. D. 1895)
constituted, not a new Triple Alliance, set over against that
of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy, but an amicable
conjunction which bore suggestions of alliance, and which
introduced a counterweight in European politics that makes
undoubtedly for peace.

The Anglo-Russian Convention, signed August 31, 1907,
contained three distinct "Arrangements," under a common
preamble, as follows:

"His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas,
Emperor of India, and His Majesty the Emperor of All the
Russias, animated by the sincere desire to settle by mutual
agreement different questions concerning the interests of
their States on the Continent of Asia, have determined to
conclude Agreements destined to prevent all cause of
misunderstanding between Great Britain and Russia in regard to
the questions referred to, and have nominated for this purpose
their respective Plenipotentiaries. … Who, having communicated
to each other their full powers, found in good and due form, have
agreed on the following:

Arrangement concerning Persia.

"The Governments of Great Britain and Russia having mutually
engaged to respect the integrity and independence of Persia,
and sincerely desiring the preservation of order throughout
that country and its peaceful development, as well as the
permanent establishment of equal advantages for the trade and
industry of all other nations;

"Considering that each of them has, for geographical and
economic reasons, a special interest in the maintenance of
peace and order in certain provinces of Persia adjoining, or
in the neighbourhood of, the Russian frontier on the one hand,
and the frontiers of Afghanistan and Baluchistan on the other
hand; and being desirous of avoiding all cause of conflict
between their respective interests in the above-mentioned
Provinces of Persia;

"Have agreed on the following terms:

"I. Great Britain engages not to seek for herself, and not to
support in favour of British subjects, or in favour of the
subjects of third Powers, any Concessions of a political or
commercial nature—such as Concessions for railways, banks,
telegraphs, roads, transport, insurance, &c.—beyond a line
starting from Kasr-i-Shirin, passing through Isfahan, Yezd,
Kakhk and ending at a point on the Persian frontier at the
intersection of the Russian and Afghan frontiers, and not to
oppose, directly or indirectly, demands for similar
Concessions in this region which are supported by the Russian
Government. It is understood that the above-mentioned places
are included in the region in which Great Britain engages not
to seek the Concessions referred to.

"II. Russia, on her part, engages not to seek for herself, and
not to support in favour of Russian subjects, or in favour of
the subjects of third Powers, any Concessions of a political
or commercial nature—such as Concessions for railways, banks,
telegraphs, roads, transport, insurance, &c.—beyond a line
going from the Afghan frontier by way of Gazik, Birjand,
Kerman, and ending at Bunder Abbas, and not to oppose,
directly or indirectly, demands for similar Concessions in
this region which are supported by the British Government. It
is understood that the above-mentioned places are included in
the region in which Russia engages not to seek the Concessions
referred to.

{256}

"III. Russia, on her part, engages not to oppose, without
previous arrangement with Great Britain, the grant of any
Concessions whatever to British subjects in the regions of
Persia situated between the lines mentioned in Articles I and
II. Great Britain undertakes a similar engagement as regards
the grant of Concessions to Russian subjects in the same
regions of Persia. All Concessions existing at present in the
regions indicated in Articles I and II are maintained.

"IV. It is understood that the revenues of all the Persian
customs, with the exception of those of Farsistan and of the
Persian Gulf, revenues guaranteeing the amortization and the
interest of the loans concluded by the Government of the Shah
with the ‘Banque d’Escompte et des Prêts de Perse ’ up to the
date of the signature of the present Arrangement, shall be
devoted to the same purpose as in the past. It is equally
understood that the revenues of the Persian customs of
Farsistan and of the Persian Gulf, as well as those of the
fisheries on the Persian shore of the Caspian Sea and those of
the Posts and Telegraphs, shall be devoted, as in the past, to
the service of the loans concluded by the Government of the
Shah with the Imperial Bank of Persia up to the date of the
signature of the present Arrangement.

"V. In the event of irregularities occurring in the
amortization or the payment of the interest of the Persian
loans concluded with the ‘Banque d’Escompte et des Prêts de
Perse’ and with the Imperial Bank of Persia up to the date of
the signature of the present Arrangement, and in the event of
the necessity arising for Russia to establish control over the
sources of revenue guaranteeing the regular service of the
loans concluded with the first-named bank, and situated in the
region mentioned in Article II of the present Arrangement, or
for Great Britain to establish control over the sources of
revenue guaranteeing the regular service of the loans
concluded with the second-named bank, and situated in the
region mentioned in Article I of the present Arrangement, the
British and Russian Governments undertake to enter beforehand
into a friendly exchange of ideas with a view to determine, in
agreement with each other, the measures of control in question
and to avoid all interference which would not be in conformity
with the principles governing the present Arrangement.

Convention concerning Afghanistan.

"The High Contracting Parties, in order to ensure perfect
security on their respective frontiers in Central Asia and to
maintain in these regions a solid and lasting peace, have
concluded the following Convention:

"Article I.
His Britannic Majesty’s Government declare that they have no
intention of changing the political status of Afghanistan. His
Britannic Majesty’s Government further engage to exercise
their influence in Afghanistan only in a pacific sense, and
they will not themselves take, nor encourage Afghanistan to
take, any measures threatening Russia. The Russian Government,
on their part, declare that they recognize Afghanistan as
outside the sphere of Russian influence, and they engage that
all their political relations with Afghanistan shall be
conducted through the intermediary of His Britannic Majesty’s
Government; they further engage not to send any Agents into
Afghanistan.

"Article II.
The Government of His Britannic Majesty having declared in the
Treaty signed at Kabul on the 21st March, 1905, that they
recognize the Agreement and the engagements concluded with the
late Ameer Abdur Rahman, and that they have no intention of
interfering in the internal government of Afghan territory,
Great Britain engages neither to annex nor to occupy in
contravention of that Treaty any portion of Afghanistan or to
interfere in the internal administration of the country,
provided that the Ameer fulfils the engagements already
contracted by him towards His Britannic Majesty’s Government
under the above-mentioned Treaty.

"Article III.
The Russian and Afghan authorities, specially designated for
the purpose on the frontier or in the frontier provinces, may
establish direct relations with each other for the settlement
of local questions of a non-political character.

"Article IV.
His Britannic Majesty’s Government and the Russian Government
affirm their adherence to the principle of equality of
commercial opportunity in Afghanistan, and they agree that any
facilities which may have been, or shall be hereafter obtained
for British and British-Indian trade and traders, shall be
equally enjoyed by Russian trade and traders. Should the
progress of trade establish the necessity for Commercial
Agents, the two Governments will agree as to what measures
shall be taken, due regard, of course, being had to the
Ameer’s sovereign rights.

"Article V.
The present Arrangements will only come into force when His
Britannic Majesty’s Government shall have notified to the
Russian Government the consent of the Ameer to the terms
stipulated above.

Arrangement concerning Thibet.

"The Governments of Great Britain and Russia recognizing the
suzerain rights of China in Thibet, and considering the fact
that Great Britain, by reason of her geographical position,
has a special interest in the maintenance of the status quo in
the external relations of Thibet, have made the following
Arrangement:—

"Article I.
The two High Contracting Parties engage to respect the
territorial integrity of Thibet and to abstain from all
interference in its internal administration.

"Article II.
In conformity with the admitted principle of the suzerainty of
China over Thibet, Great Britain and Russia engage not to
enter into negotiations with Thibet except through the
intermediary of the Chinese Government. This engagement does
not exclude the direct relations between British Commercial
Agents and the Thibetan authorities provided for in Article V
of the Convention between Great Britain and Thibet of the 7th
September, 1904, and confirmed by the Convention between Great
Britain and China of the 27th April, 1906; nor does it modify
the engagements entered into by Great Britain and China in
Article I of the said Convention of 1906.

{257}

"It is clearly understood that Buddhists, subjects of Great
Britain or of Russia, may enter into direct relations on
strictly religious matters with the Dalai Lama and the other
representatives of Buddhism in Thibet; the Governments of
Great Britain and Russia engage, as far as they are concerned,
not to allow those relations to infringe the stipulations of
the present Arrangement.

"Article III.
The British and Russian Governments respectively engage not to
send Representatives to Lhassa.

"Article IV.
The two High Contracting Parties engage neither to seek nor to
obtain, whether for themselves or their subjects, any
Concessions for railways, roads, telegraphs, and mines, or
other rights in Thibet.

"Article V.
The two Governments agree that no part of the revenues of
Thibet, whether in kind or in cash, shall be pledged or
assigned to Great Britain or Russia or to any of their
subjects.

Annex to the Arrangement between Great Britain and Russia
concerning Thibet.

"Great Britain reaffirms the Declaration, signed by his
Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India and
appended to the ratification of the Convention of the 7th
September, 1904, to the effect that the occupation of the
Chumbi Valley by British forces shall cease after the payment
of three annual instalments of the indemnity of 25,000,000
rupees, provided that the trade marts mentioned in Article II
of that Convention have been effectively opened for three
years, and that in the meantime the Thibetan authorities have
faithfully complied in all respects with the terms of the said
Convention of 1904. It is clearly understood that if the
occupation of the Chumbi Valley by the British forces has, for
any reason, not been terminated at the time anticipated in the
above Declaration, the British and Russian Governments will
enter upon a friendly exchange of views on this subject."

As an Inclosure with the Convention, Notes were exchanged by
the Plenipotentiaries, of which that from Mr. Nicolson was in
the following words, M. Iswolsky replying to the same effect.

"ST. PETERSBURG, AUGUST 18 (31), 1907.
"M. LE MINISTRE,
"With reference to the Arrangement regarding Thibet, signed
to-day, I have the honour to make the following Declaration to
your Excellency:

"'His Britannic Majesty’s Government think it desirable, so
far as they are concerned, not to allow, unless by a previous
agreement with the Russian Government, for a period of three
years from the date of the present communication, the entry
into Thibet of any scientific mission whatever, on condition
that a like assurance is given on the part of the Imperial
Russian Government.

"‘His Britannic Majesty’s Government propose, moreover, to
approach the Chinese Government with a view to induce them to
accept a similar obligation for a corresponding period; the
Russian Government will as a matter of course take similar
action.

"‘At the expiration of the term of three years above mentioned
His Britannic Majesty’s Government will, if necessary, consult
with the Russian government as to the desirability of any
ulterior measures with regard to scientific expeditions to
Thibet.’ I avail, &c.
(Signed) A. NICOLSON."

In authorizing Sir A. Nicolson to sign the preceding
Convention, Sir Edward Grey, the British Secretary for Foreign
Affairs, wrote, on the 29th of August, as follows:

"I have to-day authorized your Excellency by telegraph to sign
a Convention with the Russian Government containing
Arrangements on the subject of Persia, Afghanistan, and
Thibet.

"The Arrangement respecting Persia is limited to the regions
of that country touching the respective frontiers of Great
Britain and Russia in Asia, and the Persian Gulf is not part
of those regions, and is only partly in Persian territory. It
has not therefore been considered appropriate to introduce
into the Convention a positive declaration respecting special
interests possessed by Great Britain in the Gulf, the result
of British action in those waters for more than a hundred
years.

"His Majesty’s Government have reason to believe that this
question will not give rise to difficulties between the two
Governments, should developments arise which make further
discussion affecting British interests in the Gulf necessary.
For the Russian Government have in the course of the
negotiations leading up to the conclusion of this Arrangement
explicitly stated that they do not deny the special interests
of Great Britain in the Persian Gulf—a statement of which His
Majesty’s Government have formally taken note.

"In order to make it quite clear that the present Arrangement
is not intended to affect the position in the Gulf, and does
not imply any change of policy respecting it on the part of
Great Britain, His Majesty’s Government think it desirable to
draw attention to previous declarations of British policy, and
to reaffirm generally previous statements as to British
interests in the Persian Gulf and the importance of
maintaining them.

"His Majesty’s Government will continue to direct all their
efforts to the preservation of the _status quo_ in the
Gulf and the maintenance of British trade; in doing so, they
have no desire to exclude the legitimate trade of any other
Power."

_Parliamentary Papers by Command.
Russia. Number 1. 1907 (Cd. 3750)._

EUROPE: A. D. 1907-1908.
Treaties respecting the Independence and Territorial Integrity
of Norway, and concerning the Maintenance of the Status Quo
in the territories bordering upon the North Sea.

Two Treaties of great importance to the security of peace in
Europe, having for object a joint protection by several Powers
of existing conditions on the North Sea and the Baltic exit to
it, were concluded and signed on the 2d of November, 1907, and
the 23d of April, 1908, respectively. The parties to the first
of these Treaties were Great Britain, France, Germany, Norway,
and Russia, and its purpose was "to secure to Norway, within
her present frontiers and with her neutral zone, her
independence and territorial integrity, as also the benefits
of peace." It was signed at Christiania, where ratifications
were deposited on the 6th of February following: The following
is the text of the Treaty;

{258}

"Article I.
The Norwegian Government undertake not to cede any portion of
the territory of Norway to any Power to hold on a title
founded either on occupation, or on any other ground
whatsoever.

"Article II.
The German, French, British, and Russian Governments recognize
and undertake to respect the integrity of Norway. If the
integrity of Norway is threatened or impaired by any Power
whatsoever, the German, French, British, and Russian
Governments undertake, on the receipt of a previous
communication to this effect from the Norwegian Government, to
afford to that Government their support, by such means as may
be deemed the most appropriate, with a view to safeguarding
the integrity of Norway.

"Article III.
The present Treaty is concluded for a period of ten years from
the day of the exchange of ratifications. If the Treaty is not
denounced by any of the parties at least two years before the
expiration of the said period, it will remain in force, in the
same manner as before, for a further period of ten years and
so on accordingly.

"In the event of the Treaty being denounced by one of the
Powers who have participated with Norway in the conclusion of
the present Treaty, such denunciation shall have effect only
as far as that Power is concerned.

"Article IV.
The present Treaty shall be ratified and the ratifications
shall be exchanged at Christiania as soon as possible."

The second of the two Treaties was in two documents, styled
"Declaration and Memorandum between the United Kingdom,
Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden,
concerning the maintenance of the _Status Quo_ in the
territories bordering upon the North Sea." They were signed at
Berlin, where ratifications were deposited on the 2d of July,
1908, and were in the following terms:

"Declaration.
The British, Danish, French, German, Netherland, and Swedish
Governments,

"Animated by the desire to strengthen the ties of neighbourly
friendship existing between their respective countries, and to
contribute thereby to the preservation of universal peace, and
recognizing that their policy with respect to the regions
bordering on the North Sea is directed to the maintenance of
the existing territorial _status quo_,

"Declare that they are firmly resolved to preserve intact, and
mutually to respect, the sovereign rights which their
countries at present enjoy over their respective territories
in those regions.

"Should any events occur which, in the opinion of any of the
above-mentioned Governments, threaten the existing territorial
_status quo_ in the regions bordering upon the North Sea,
the Powers Signatory of the present Declaration will
communicate with each other in order to concert, by an
agreement to be arrived at between them, such measures as they
may consider it useful to take in the interest of the
maintenance of the _status quo_ as regards their
possessions.

"The present Declaration shall be ratified with the least
possible delay. The ratifications shall be deposited at Berlin
as soon as may be, and, at the latest, on the 31st December,
1908. The deposit of each ratification shall be recorded in a
Protocol, of which a certified copy shall be forwarded through
the diplomatic channel to the Signatory Powers.

"Memorandum.
At the moment of signing the Declaration of this day’s date,
the Under signed, by order of their respective Governments,
consider it necessary to state—

"1. That the principle of the maintenance of the _status
quo_, as laid down by the said Declaration, applies solely
to the territorial integrity of all the existing possessions
of the High Contracting Parties in the regions bordering upon
the North Sea, and that consequently the Declaration can in no
case be invoked where the free exercise of the sovereign
rights of the High Contracting Parties over their
above-mentioned respective possessions is in question;

"2. That, for the purposes of the said Declaration, the North
Sea shall be considered to extend eastwards as far as its
junction with the waters of the Baltic."

_British Parliamentary Papers by Command,
Treaty Series No. 35, 1907, and 23, 1908
(Cd. 3754 and 4248)._

EUROPE: A. D. 1907-1909.
The Situation in Crete as controlled by the Four Protecting
Powers.

See (in this Volume)
CRETE: A. D. 1907-1909.

EUROPE: A. D. 1908-1909 (October-March).
Declaration of Bulgarian Independence.
Austrian Annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Excitement of Servia.
The menace to European peace.
The question of a Conference.
Attitude of Germany.
Was Russia coerced to assent?
Violation of the Public Law of Europe.

On the 5th of October, 1908, the independence of Bulgaria as a
Kingdom was formally proclaimed, the suzerainty of the Sultan
of Turkey renounced, and Prince Ferdinand invested with the
title of Tzar, or King. This proceeding was consequent on the
revolution in Turkey, which had resurrected the suspended
Constitution of 1876, broken the despotism of the Sultanate
and subjected it to a Parliamentary system of government.

See (in this Volume)
TURKEY: A. D. 1908, JULY-DECEMBER.

Never having accepted the arrangements of 1878, made by the
Congress of Berlin, which gave them self-government but kept
them tributary and nominally subject to the over lordship of
the Sultan, the Bulgarians had but waited for the opportunity
which now seemed to invite this act.

See, in Volume V. of this work,
TURKS: A. D. 1878;
and in Volume I.,
BALKAN AND DANUBIAN STATES: A. D. 1878, and 1878-1886)

An immediate provocation to their declaration of independence
was supplied by a thoughtless offence to them given by the new
Ministry at Constantinople. To celebrate the triumph of the
revolution a state dinner was given, the Sultan presiding, and
all the diplomats at the Turkish capital were invited to it
excepting the representative of Bulgaria. When he asked for an
explanation of this exception he was told that he could not be
recognized as an ambassador or envoy, but only as the agent of
a subject province. This was enough to set Bulgaria aflame.
Her affronted Minister at Constantinople was withdrawn and
diplomatic intercourse with the Turkish Government dropped.
The breach was accentuated further by the recent occurrence of
a strike on the railway, owned by the Turkish Government,
which traverses both Turkish and Bulgarian territory. The
Bulgarians had taken possession of and were operating the
section within their own domain, and when the strike was
called off the Government announced its intention to retain
that portion of the line, with due compensation to the company
which leased it. This proceeding intensified and doubled the
ferments produced by the proclamation of independence.
Statesmen were disturbed by the violation of the Treaty of
Berlin and capitalists by the danger which menaced their
Turkish railway securities.

{259}

But this tells of only half the threatening incidents of the
time. Simultaneously with the Bulgarian defiance of the Treaty
of Berlin and its signatory sponsors, the Government of
Austria-Hungary broke away from its obligations, by a formal
announcement that the simple occupation and administration of
Bosnia, and Herzegovina, which that treaty had permitted the
Dual Empire to undertake, was now to be complete annexation,
by no other authority than the Imperial will to have it so.

Many interests and ambitions, many jealousies and distrusts
among the Powers, were disturbed and excited by this sudden
disordering of the political geography of Southeastern Europe.
Pan-Slavic feelings and hopes were profoundly antagonistic to
the Austrian absorption of more Slavic populations and lands.
Servia was alarmed to desperation by the aggrandizement of her
dangerous great neighbor, and Russia was more than sympathetic
with her alarm. What Turkey could or would do in vindication
of her treaty rights over Bulgaria, Bosnia, and Herzegovina,
was a question of little gravity compared with that which
asked what Servia might attempt in resistance to the Austrian
scheme, and what Russia would venture if an Austro-Servian war
should break out. The situation very soon became one in which
any act of hostility on any side could hardly fail to
precipitate a great tempest of war; and thus the peace of
Europe was held in a trembling balance for months. The state
of affairs was described clearly and with ample knowledge at
the time by Mr. Archibald R. Colquhoun, in a paper which he
read in London, at a meeting of the Royal Society of Arts.
"The more hot-headed Servians," he said, "undoubtedly felt
that their whole future was imperilled, and that they might as
well risk all on a desperate hazard, in the belief that
intervention would come to their assistance should their
independence be threatened. The close racial ties between the
Bosnians, Servians, and Montenegrins made it impossible to say
how far an armed movement might spread if it once broke out.
While Turkey and Bulgaria might come to terms, and while
Austria might effect an amicable arrangement with Turkey, it
was difficult to see how the question of the Southern Slavs
was to be finally adjusted unless Austria could placate them
in sections, and so perhaps divide them. Concessions of a
comparatively unimportant nature might induce Montenegro to
keep quiet, and a liberal policy, with a promise of autonomy
in the near future, would discount a good deal of the
agitation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The more far-sighted
Bosnians appreciated the fact that their shortest cut to
comparative freedom lay through that local autonomy which they
could legitimately demand from Austria. …

"The spectacle of these Southern Slave countries, whose
peoples exhibited so many splendid qualities, but yet did not
have that instinct for government which characterized some far
less gifted races, was rather a melancholy one. In the tangle
of mountains, races, and religions which made up the Balkans
the people needed peace above every other thing—a breathing
space in which to develop themselves and their resources, and
to get a truer perspective on their position in Europe. To the
Great Powers who controlled the destinies of these small ones
peace was no less essential, but it was not quite clear that
Austria-Hungary, with the great military power of Germany
behind her, realized this or was prepared to ‘seek peace and
ensue it.’ It was this uncertainty which made many await with
anxiety the melting of the Balkan snows, which put an end to
enforced inactivity in those regions."

Great Britain, France, Russia, and Italy were agreed in
desiring a Conference of the Powers which had been parties to
the Berlin Treaty of thirty years before, to adjudicate all
the questions raised by the acts of Austria and Bulgaria, in
contravention of that treaty. Austria was supported by Germany
in holding back from such a conference, and nothing definite
in that direction was done. Meantime Turkey was brought to
negotiations with both of the trespassers on her ancient
sovereignty, and within a few months she came to terms with
both. The arrangement with Austria, determining an indemnity
to be paid for the surrender of Turkish claims to Bosnia and
Herzegovina, was quickened by a boycott of Austrian
merchandise in Turkey, so extensive as to be felt very
seriously in Austrian and Hungarian trade. By the terms of a
protocol, which was signed on the 26th of February, 1909,
Austria-Hungary paid £T2,500,000 ($10,800,000) of indemnity to
the Ottoman Government; assured religious freedom and
political equality to Mussulman Bosniaks who should choose to
remain in the province, with liberty of emigration during
three years to all who might choose to depart, and promised a
commercial treaty on lines which the Turks desired. This
cleared the situation as between Austria and Turkey, but
intensified the Servian and Montenegrin bitterness of anger
and dread, which menaced the peace of the continent for
another month.

Meantime the terms of a Turkish adjustment with Bulgaria had
been practically settled, on the basis of a helpful suggestion
from St. Petersburg. Bulgaria offered $16,400,000 of
indemnity; Turkey claimed $24,000,000. The bargaining was at a
standstill until Russia offered to remit a yearly
war-indemnity of $1,600,000 which Russia owed her under the
Berlin Treaty, until the Turkish claim on Bulgaria should be
satisfied, while she would collect from Bulgaria in similar
instalments until the offer of the latter had been made good.
Inasmuch as the Turkish debt to Russia bore no interest, while
Bulgaria would pay interest on the deferred payments to
Russia, the Muscovite treasury would suffer no loss. The
matter was so arranged, and the interests of peace were served
by a most ingenious and happy device.

{260}

But peace was made more than insecure for some weeks yet by
the irreconcilability of Servia to the Austrian annexation of
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Of course that small State could not
hope to resist it successfully alone, or with Montenegrin aid;
but a desperate venture of war, into which Russia might be
dragged, and if Russia, then Germany,—and who could tell what
other powers!—and out of the wreckage of which something
better for Southeastern Europe than an Austro-Hungarian
domination might be drawn,—this appeal to the lottery of
battle seemed a dangerous temptation to the Servian mind. It
was extinguished as such in the end by the decision of Russia
to drop the project of a Conference of Powers, accept the
action of Austria, and recognize, unreservedly, on her own
part, the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina as an
accomplished fact. This was announced on the 15th of March,
and with the announcement came excited and exciting reports
that Germany had extorted the concession from the Russian
Government, by pressures that were humiliating, but which the
Empire, in its present circumstances, was powerless to resist.
Germany denied having exercised an illegitimate pressure in
the matter, but made no concealment of the fact that she stood
by Austria-Hungary with approval of what the Imperial
Government at Vienna had done. In a speech on the 29th of
March Chancellor Bülow was reported as saying:

"In her quarrel with Servia Austria indisputably had right on
her side. The annexation was no cynical act of robbery, but
the last step on the road of the political work of
civilization which had been followed for 30 years with the
recognition of the Powers. Any offence against the form of the
law had been disposed of by the negotiations with Turkey, and
after this agreement between the parties most nearly
interested the formal recognition of the other Powers
signatory of the Berlin Treaty could not be withheld. The
controllers of Russian policy, and especially the Emperor
Nicholas, had earned the gratitude of all friends of peace in
Europe. Concerning the Conference question, Germany still had
no objection in principle to a Conference in which all the
Powers took part and of which the programme was established in
advance. They had been charged with inactivity, but they had
no reason for special activity. They had done what they could
and used influence, not without success, between Vienna and
Constantinople, and also between Vienna and St. Petersburg.
They had, however, carefully observed the limits prescribed by
their interests and their loyalty. They had done nothing, and
they would do nothing, which could afford the smallest doubt
of their determination to sacrifice no vital interest of
Austria-Hungary, and they would have nothing to do with
suggestions to Austria which were incompatible with the
dignity of the Hapsburg Monarchy. They had experiences of
their own to inspire caution with regard to playing the part
of the broker, even in the most honourable way. … To sum up,
by loyalty to her ally Germany best secured her own interests
and contributed most to the maintenance of the peace of
Europe."

On the day of this speech at Berlin the London _Times_
expressed, in an editorial article, what was then and what
continues to be the prevailing belief and judgment of the best
informed political circles throughout Europe, when it said:
"The decision of the Russian Government to recognize the
annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was, of course, an
admission of their inability, in present circumstances, to
countenance the aspirations of the Southern Slavs. The intense
and general indignation which it has excited in Russia is
natural, and indeed, in the known state of public feeling,
inevitable. We trust, however, that it may be kept within
bounds, and that it will not find expression in useless and
vehement invective. Those who are tempted to indulge in it
without restraint should reflect upon the difficulties which
confront the responsible rulers of the State, and should
consider whether, as Statesmen answerable for the future, as
well as for the immediate present, of the Empire and of the
Slav race, those rulers could wisely have rejected the
proposal peremptorily made to them by the German Ambassador.
The cardinal fact in the situation—the fact upon which
Austria-Hungary and Germany have based their calculations and
determined their action throughout—is that Russia could not
for some time to come engage in a great war without incurring
unjustified risks. Nothing, we may be sure, but the
overwhelming consciousness of this fact could have induced the
Emperor and his advisers to adopt the decision to which they
came a few days ago. They must have been well aware of the
painful effect which it was certain to produce, in the first
instance, abroad as well as at home. None can have realized
more acutely than they that the presentation of the demand was
humiliating, and that the circumstances attending it were
eminently calculated to make that humiliation bitter. But they
held, and rightly held, that it was their duty to accept
humiliation rather than to jeopardize the great permanent
interests which are committed to their keeping. They might,
indeed, have been somewhat less precipitate. They might
reasonably have asked for time for consulting the Powers with
whom they have acted, and who have consistently supported
them, upon the proposals which Germany sprang upon them. The
fact that they did not do so is a significant indication that
the pressure which Count Pourtalès was instructed to put upon
them must have been of the most imperious and dictatorial
kind.

"As to the precise form of the intimation conveyed to M.
Isvolsky by the German Ambassador no definite information is
yet forthcoming, but of its nature there can be no possible
doubt. Our Paris Correspondent learns that, immediately after
his interview with Count Pourtalès, the Russian Minister
summoned a Council, and, after a hasty audience with the Tsar,
communicated to the German Ambassador Russia’s acquiescence in
the demands of his Government. There was no alternative to
this course, as we are told from St. Petersburg, unless Russia
was prepared to face the consequences of the mobilization of
the German Army. The matter, our Correspondent adds, was
treated as of ‘supreme urgency,’ from which it may be inferred
that a reply was required without delay. The Council of
Ministers knew what ‘German mobilization’ in the circumstances
would mean."

{261}

In appearance, if not in reality, Germany or Germany’s Kaiser
had again, as in the Morocco affair of 1905, taken advantage
of the weakened circumstances of Russia to play a dictatorial
part in European politics. The distrust and apprehension kept
alive by such repeated performances of the military big stick
at Berlin seem infinitely more dangerous to Europe than any
possible explosion of the unstable compounds of race,
religion, and lawless politics that are mixed in the Balkan
magazine. For the time being, however, the sparks that
sputtered alarmingly in the latter, throughout the winter of
1908-1909, were easily extinguished by the sudden dash of cold
water upon them from St. Petersburg. Great Britain, France,
and Italy, accepting the situation, joined Germany and Russia
in persuading the Government at Belgrade to be equally
submissive to events. Their persuasions were effective, and a
note to the following purpose, which the Powers in question
had formulated, was signed by the Servian Ministry and
presented to the Government at Vienna on the 31st of March:

"(1.) Servia declares that her rights have not been violated
by the annexation by Austria-Hungary of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, and accepts the Powers’ decision to annul
paragraph 25 of the Treaty of Berlin.

(2.) Servia will not protest against the annexation of Bosnia
and Herzegovina.

(3.) Servia will maintain peaceful relations with
Austria-Hungary.

(4.) Servia will return her military forces to normal
conditions, and will discharge the reservists and volunteers;
she will not permit the formation of irregular troops or
bands."

The arbitrary annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was now
legitimated; the Treaty of Berlin was revised by violations
condoned; a serious precedent had been injected into European
public law. What was said on the subject by the London
_Times_ on the morning after the delivery of the Servian
note is hardly open to the least dispute. "The danger of war,"
said the Times, "has thus, we may confidently hope, been
averted. But the sense of immediate relief with which this
deliverance may well be greeted cannot blind us to the cost at
which it has been achieved. The first great international
compact to which the new German Empire of the Hohenzollerns
subscribed within a few months of its proclamation at
Versailles was that which embodied the resolutions of the
London Conference of 1871. The European Powers, rightly
disputing Russia’s claim to denounce motu proprio the Black
Sea Clauses of the Treaty of Paris, maintained that no
revision of an international treaty could take place without
‘impartial examination’ and ‘free discussion.’ None upheld
that principle more stoutly than Austria-Hungary. Russia
herself finally accepted it, and it was solemnly placed on
record by Lord Granville in his opening speech as President of
the London Conference. It was embodied in a Protocol, signed
by all the Plenipotentiaries of the Powers, laying down as ‘an
essential principle of the law of nations that no Power can
repudiate treaty engagements or modify treaty provisions,
except with the consent of the contracting parties by mutual
agreement.’ That instrument has, until recently, governed the
public law of Europe. In conformity with its provisions,
Russia, after her war with Turkey in 1877-1878, was fain to
submit the Treaty of San Stefano to the Congress of Berlin;
and again in 1885 a Conference was held at Constantinople to
settle the question of the union of Eastern Rumelia with
Bulgaria which had been effected in violation of the Treaty of
Berlin. Five months ago, immediately after the annexation of
Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary and the proclamation
of Bulgarian independence, Great Britain, France, and Russia
were agreed, after M. Isvolsky’s conversations with M.
Clemenceau and Sir Edward Grey, that the same 'essential
principle of the law of nations’ was once more at stake and
must be upheld. Italy adhered subsequently to that agreement,
which took shape in the suggestion for a conference, and
neither Germany nor Austria-Hungary openly rejected it at the
time. …

"The terms of the submission now made by Servia at the
instance of the Powers show how far we have travelled away
from that ‘essential principle of the law of nations’ since
October last. … Whether the formal ratification of the
breaches of international law which were committed last autumn
takes place now at a Conference, or by an exchange of Notes,
is a matter of small moment. In substance the Powers have
already conveyed their acquiescence in the abrogation of
Article XXV. of the Berlin Treaty concerning Bosnia and
Herzegovina, without the slightest show even of that
‘impartial examination’ and ‘perfectly free discussion’ which
the London Conference of 1871 laid down as an essential
preliminary to the revision of treaty engagements."

There was an illuminating sequel to this transaction near the
end of the year, in the trial of a libel suit, known as the
Friedjung case, which uncovered many hidden circumstances of
the annexation. One of the arguments by which the annexation
of Bosnia-Herzegovina was defended at the time was the
necessity of putting an end to an alleged conspiracy of the
Southern Slavs against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

See (in this Volume),
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY: A. D. 1908-1909.
"Agram Trials", page 40.)

At the trial it was proved that the "documents" which had been
accepted as proving the existence of this conspiracy were
forgeries of the clumsiest description.

EUROPE: A. D. 1909.
Changed conditions making for peace.
Three striking examples.

Speaking at Sheffield, England, on the occasion of "the
Cutlers’ Feast," October 21, Sir Edward Grey, the British
Secretary for Foreign Affairs, called to mind, in a few
admirable sentences, three illustrations in the past year of
wonderfully changed conditions in Europe, making for peace. He
said:

"In the world at large to-day—if I may say a few words about
the business of my own department—there is no doubt plenty of
trouble, as there always is, but if you take the true measure
of the situation by comparing it with what it was a short time
ago, the outlook is distinctly favourable. I will give you
three points which are, I think, subjects of congratulation.

"It is only a year ago to this very month that we were at the
beginning of what was called the Balkan crisis. I do not know
whether the Budget has driven all recollection of it from your
minds, but it did occupy a good deal of attention a year ago
and for some months afterwards. For a long time it had been
almost an axiom of the diplomacy of Europe that some day or
other there would be trouble in the Balkans, and that, when
that trouble came, there would be danger of a European war.
The trouble came a year ago; it caused anxiety; there was a
storm; and for some months some anxiety as to whether one or
other of the Great European Powers might not drift from their
moorings.
{262}
But the anchors held, and now the swell has subsided, and
though there may be trouble again in the future, the fact that
the Great Powers of Europe have passed through the Balkan
troubles of the last year and yet maintained their peace is a
good augury that in future troubles the same may be done.

"Then I will take the question of Persia. A few years ago, had
any one foretold exactly what has happened in Persia in the
last year—that there would be a revolution, that there would
be great outbreaks of disorder throughout the country, and
that the Shah would be deposed—he would certainly have said
that it would be a time of considerable anxiety both for
Russia and for ourselves. A few years ago the representatives
of those two countries were watching each other in Persia with
jealousy, suspicion, and distrust. Had what has happened in
Persia in the last year happened a few years ago when those
were the relations between the two countries, I do not say
that there would actually have been war, but there would
certainly have been considerable anxiety and considerable
scares in the public opinion of both countries as to the
effect upon their relations with each other. Now we have
passed through the troubles of the last year in Persia, and in
no section of the Press of either country, in no section of
public opinion of either country, has there been a fear that
relations between ourselves and Russia would be impaired by
what was happening in Persia.

"The third subject to which I would refer is that of Morocco.
Morocco is to-day very full of trouble, and the trouble is a
matter of concern and worry to those Powers who have
conterminous frontiers in Morocco. That of course is so, but
look back over the last few years and survey. The matter which
occupied men’s minds in regard to Morocco was not the troubles
in Morocco itself but the possible effect which events in
Morocco might have upon the relations of the European Powers
to each other. To-day the trouble continues in Morocco, but
during the last year the anxiety that what was happening in
Morocco might cause serious difficulties between European
Powers themselves has greatly diminished if it has not
entirely disappeared. That, again, is a satisfactory
retrospect."

EUROPE: A. D. 1909.
Contradictory feeling and action concerning War.
Its causes.
International Barbarism with Inter-personal Civilization.
The two main knots of difficulty in the situation.
Great Britain and Germany.

See (in this Volume)
WAR, THE PREPARATIONS FOR.

EUROPE: A. D. 1909.
Size and cost of its armies.

See (in this Volume)
WAR, THE PREPARATIONS FOR: MILITARY.

----------EUROPE: End--------

EVANS, Rear-Admiral Robley D.:
Commanding the American Battleship Fleet.

See (in this Volume)
WAR, THE PREPARATIONS FOR: NAVAL.

EVICTED TENANTS ACT.

See (in this Volume)
IRELAND: A. D. 1907.

EXCLUSION OF ALIENS.

See (in this Volume)
IMMIGRATION AND EMIGRATION, AND RACE PROBLEMS.

EXPATRIATION:
Its Rights.
Principles maintained by the United States.

See (in this Volume)
NATURALIZATION.

EXPLORATION, Polar.

See (in this Volume)
POLAR EXPLORATION.

EXPOSITIONS, Industrial.

See (in this Volume)
BUFFALO; ST. LOUIS; CHARLESTON;
JAMESTOWN; PORTLAND, OREGON; SEATTLE.

EZCURRA, COLONEL:
Deposed President of Paraguay.

See (in this Volume)
PARAGUAY: A. D. 1904.

F.

FABIAN SOCIETY.

See (in this Volume)
SOCIALISM: ENGLAND: A. D. 1909.

FAIRBANKS, Charles W.:
Elected Vice-President of the United States.

See (in this Volume)
UNITED STATES: A. D. 1904 (MARCH-NOVEMBER).

FAKUMENN RAILWAY QUESTION, between Japan and China.

See (in this Volume)
CHINA: A. D. 1905-1909.

FALLIÈRES, ARMAND:
President of the French Senate.

See (in this Volume)
FRANCE: A. D. 1903.

FALLIÈRES, ARMAND:
President of the French Republic.

See (in this Volume)
FRANCE: A. D. 1906.

FALL RIVER STRIKE, in the Cotton Mills.

See (in this Volume)
LABOR ORGANIZATION: UNITED STATES: A. D. 1904-1905.

FAMINES:
In China.

See (in this Volume)
CHINA: A. D. 1906-1907.

FAMINES:
In India: The poverty they signify.

See (in this Volume)
INDIA; A. D. 1905-1908.

FAMINES:
In Russia.

See (in this Volume)
RUSSIA: A. D. 1901-1904.

FARADAY, MICHAEL:
His Prophetic Conception of Radiant Matter.

See (in this Volume)
SCIENCE, RECENT: RADIUM.

FARM COLONY, Cleveland, Ohio.

See (in this Volume)
CRIME AND CRIMINOLOGY, PROBLEMS OF.

FARMAN, Henri.

See (in this Volume)
SCIENCE AND INVENTION: AERONAUTICS.

FARMERS’ ORGANIZATIONS.

See (in this Volume)
LABOR ORGANIZATION: UNITED STATES: A. D. 1902-1909; and
LABOR REMUNERATION: COÖPERATIVE ORGANIZATION.

FEDAKIARANS, The.

See (in this Volume)
TURKEY: A. D. 1909 (JANUARY-MAY).

FEDERAL PARTY.

See (in this Volume)
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: A. D. 1901 and 1907.

FEHIM PASHA, THE FATE OF.

See (in this Volume)
TURKEY: A. D. 1908(JULY-DECEMBER), AND 1909 (JANUARY-MAY).

FEJERVARY MINISTRY.

See (in this Volume)
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY: A. D. 1905-1906.

FENGHUANGCHENG.

See (in this Volume)
JAPAN: A. D. 1904 (FEBRUARY-JULY).

FENSHUILING.

See (in this Volume)
JAPAN: A. D. 1904 (FEBRUARY-JULY), AND (JULY-SEPTEMBER).

FERRER, Professor Francisco:
His trial and execution.

See (in this Volume)
Spain: A. D. 1907-1909.

FERTILIZER TRUST:
Dissolution and indictment.

See (in this Volume)
COMBINATIONS, INDUSTRIAL: UNITED STATES: A. D. 1901-1906.

{263}

FETVA, of the Sheik-ul-Islam.

See (in this Volume)
TURKEY: A. D. 1909 (JANUARY-MAY).

FIALA ARCTIC EXPLORATION.

See (in this Volume)
POLAR EXPLORATION.

FICHTE’S PROPHECY, of a World Commonwealth.

See (in this Volume)
WORLD MOVEMENTS.

FILIPINO CATHOLIC CHURCH, Independent.

See (in this Volume)
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: A. D. 1902.

----------FINANCE AND TRADE: Start--------

FINANCE AND TRADE: A. D. 1901-1909.
A Review of the decade.
The Sequence of Phenomena from the beginning of "the great
Trade Boom" to the Collapse of 1907, and after.
The Process of Recovery.

On the 31st of December, 1908, the New York _Evening
Post_ gave an admirably studied and clear, though succinct,
review of the sequence of phenomena in financial and
commercial affairs that could be traced through "the series of
years since the great trade boom began which collapsed in
1907," and thence to the close of 1908. By permission of the
proprietors of the _Evening Post_ a considerable part of
that review is quoted here. While it relates more especially
to conditions and events in the United States, it affords
substantially a summary of the financial history of the world
from 1901 to 1908, both inclusive:

"1901.
This was preeminently the ‘boom year’—much more legitimately
so, as events have proved, than 1905 or 1906, when
overstrained capital resources gave an atmosphere of unreality
to what seemed altogether real in the days of abundant capital
in 1901. It is first to be said of 1901 that a probably
unexampled surplus of ready capital in the United States, and
a certainly unprecedented foreign credit balance—due to our
amazing surplus of exports over imports—happened to coincide
with a period of European trade reaction which released
foreign capital from foreign industries and left it free for
use in America. Presuming the foregoing influences, the six
main causes for the phenomena of 1901 were:

(1) The series of enormous company amalgamations, beginning
with the billion-dollar Steel incorporation, and culminating
in the purchase of the British steamship lines at wildly
extravagant prices; these operations being based on issues of
securities in unprecedented quantity;

(2) Formation of ‘underwriting syndicates’ to float these
securities, one of those syndicates receiving a bonus of
$50,000,000 for one year’s use of $25,000,000, and all of them
using freely for their purposes the surpluses of life
insurance companies and the deposits of trust companies;

(3) Acquisition of control of great railway companies by
powerful millionaires, through purchase of stock of these
railways in the open market, often at extravagant prices; the
purchase-money being obtained through issue of bonds by
railways already under control of the purchasers;

(4) Wild speculation by the public;

(5) Sudden fright of Europe at our excesses, withdrawal of its
capital, and consequent severe reaction in our markets;

(6) The failure of the corn crop, which in the summer applied
a further check to this speculation, but which was itself
offset by a wheat crop larger than any harvested in this
country before or since, and sold at the highest average price
since 1897.

"1902.
This year was one both of reaction and of further expansion;
it was both a legitimate sequel to 1901 and a legitimate
forerunner of 1903. …

"Its salient phenomena were these:

(1) Abundant harvests;

(2) Overstraining of bank resources by financial ‘deals’ and
Stock Exchange speculation, exhausting the bank surplus in
September;

(3) Enormous increase in imports and decrease in agricultural
exports, along with Europe’s withdrawal of its capital;

(4) Rapid advance in cost of raw material and labor;

(5) Struggle of capitalists to so entrench themselves in
control of corporate enterprises that they could not be
dislodged.

"1903.
The year which followed was an entirely logical sequel. Its
controlling factors were:

(1) Forced liquidation by individuals and syndicates who were
tied up in new securities at a time when the investing public
withdrew from the market;

(2) Inability of great corporations to sell bonds, and their
resort to notes at a high interest rate;

(3) Abundant grain crops, but an inadequate cotton crop, with
great speculation, and famine prices;

(4) Rapid fall in the price of steel and iron;

(5) Severe contraction in profits of industrial combinations,
with reduced dividends in some, reorganization of capital in
others, and bankruptcy in still others.

"1904.
For obvious reasons, 1904 is an interesting year to compare
with 1908. Both were in a sense 'after-panic years,’ though
the strain of 1903, and the resultant financial and commercial
reaction of 1904, were trifles compared with those of the past
two years. It will be seen that 1904, which did in fact usher
in another great boom in trade, paralleled closely in some
respects the history of 1908, but in others diverged very
widely from it. Its dominant influences were: