Chapter XIX: , page 276 (13)

During the debate in the British House on the Navy Estimates,
in the spring of 1909, the Premier, Mr. Asquith, was called on
by the Opposition to define the Government's understanding of
the requirements of the "two Power standard" of naval
strength, so called (see above). In reply, he laid it down
that in dealing with this standard they must not merely take
into account the number of Dreadnoughts and Invincibles, but
the total effective strength of the British for defensive
purposes as compared with the combined effective strength of
any two other navy Powers. That was the two-Power standard as
understood by successive Administrations, and the present
Government had in this matter in no way changed the policy
pursued by preceding Administrations. For the moment this
question was an academic one, because whatever two Powers
might be selected, their combined effective strength for
aggressive purposes against Great Britain was far below the
defensive strength of the latter. The expression "two-Power
standard" was a purely empirical generalization, a convenient
rule of thumb, and he should be very sorry to predict that
this formula would be an adequate or necessary formula some
years hence.
{699}
In measuring the combined effective strength of the two next
strongest fleets the power of one powerful homogeneous fleet
ought to be borne in mind. Further it had been established
that the rule only applied to battleships and ships ejusdem
generis. Then in existing conditions "we ought not," he said,
"to limit our vision to Europe alone; but at the same time,
while considering the combined effective strength of any other
two Powers for aggressive purposes against this country regard
should be had to geographical conditions." Supposing China had
a fleet of Dreadnoughts, no rational Minister would treat that
fleet as standing upon the same footing for the purpose of the
two-Power standard as the German or French fleet. In the same
way, the fleet of the United States could not be put in the
same category with the fleets of France and Germany.

WAR, THE PREPARATIONS FOR:
Canadian Share of the Undertakings of British Imperial Defence.

For performance of the share assumed by Canada, of
undertakings of British imperial defence agreed to at the
Imperial Conference in London, July, 1909 (see above), Sir
Wilfrid Laurier brought forward a Bill in the Dominion House
of Commons, on the 12th of January, 1910, the essential
provisions of which he set forth in a speech from which the
following passages are taken:

"The bill is entitled ‘An act respecting the naval service of
Canada.’ It provides for the creation of a naval force to be
composed of a permanent corps, of a reserve force, and of a
volunteer force on the same pattern absolutely as the present
organization of the militia force. … Every man who will be
enrolled for naval service in Canada will be enrolled by
voluntary engagement. There is no compulsion of any kind, no
conscription, no balloting. … ‘Active service’ as defined by
the act means service or duty during an emergency, and
emergency means war, invasion or insurrection, real or
apprehended. The act provides also that at any time when the
Governor in Council deems it advisable, in case of war,
invasion, or insurrection, the force may be called into active
service. There is also an important provision that while the
naval force is to be under the control of the Canadian
Government, and more directly under the control and
administration of the Department of Marine, yet in case of
emergency the Governor in Council may place at the disposal of
his Majesty for general service in the Royal Navy the naval
force or any part thereof, and any ships or vessels of the
naval service and any officers or men serving on these
vessels, or any officers or men of the naval service. There is
a subsequent provision that if action is taken by the Governor
in Council at a time when Parliament is not sitting,
Parliament shall immediately be called. …

"Another important provision of the bill is that it provides
for the establishment of a naval college on the pattern of the
Military College now in existence at Kingston."

Coming to a statement of the armament contemplated, the
Premier said: "Two plans were proposed and discussed, one
involving the expenditure of $2,000,000 a year and the other
involving an expenditure of $3,000,000. The first one would
have consisted of seven ships, the second one would have
consisted of eleven ships, namely—four Bristols, one Boadicea,
and six destroyers. We have determined to accept the second
proposition, that is to say, the larger one of eleven ships.
That is the force which we intend to create, and to start with
four Bristols, one Boadicea and six destroyers. Perhaps it
will be interesting to the House to understand what is meant
by a fleet unit, by a Bristol, a Boadicea, and a destroyer.
The fleet unit, which was suggested and which has been
accepted by Australia, and to which the government contributed
a certain sum per annum, is to be composed of one armored
cruiser of the type of the Indomitable, three protected
cruisers, six destroyers and three submarines. Now the fleet
which we have agreed to accept is to be composed of four
Bristols, one Boadicea, and six destroyers.

"A Bristol is a protected cruiser, which means that it has a
steel deck which protects all the vital parts of the ship. It
has a tonnage of 4,800 tons, with a speed of 25 knots. The
number of guns has not yet been determined, but the largest
Indomitable carries eight guns. A Boadicea carries six guns,
so that it is probable that the number of guns will be eight.
It has a total crew of 391 men, of which twenty are officers.
The Boadicea is an unarmored cruiser, with a tonnage of 3,300
tons, and carries six 4-inch guns. It has a crew of 278 men,
of whom seventeen are officers. We are to build six destroyers
of what is known as the improved river class. …

"The total cost of these eleven ships will be, according to
the British figures, £2,338,000, or a little more than
$11,000,000. According to Canadian prices, supposing the ships
were to be built in Canada, we would have to add at least 33
per cent, to the cost just given. I may say that it is our
intention to start at the earliest possible moment with the
construction of this fleet, and, if possible, to have the
construction done in Canada."

The leader of the Opposition, Mr. Borden, who spoke after Mr.
Laurier, endorsed fully the purpose of the Bill, but
criticised the proposals of the Government as being
inadequate. "They are," he said, "either too much or too
little. They are too much for carrying on experiments in the
organization of a Canadian naval service; they are too little
for immediate and effective aid, and it seems to me that the
policy of the Government will be attended with a very great
waste of money, with no immediate effective result."

The Bill embodying the naval programme of the Government, as
set forth by the Prime Minister, was enacted on the 11th of
March, 1910, by 119 votes to 78.

WAR, THE PREPARATIONS FOR:
Chilian Navy-building.

It was reported from Santiago de Chile to the English Press,
October 21, 1909, that "the Government has decided upon a
naval expenditure of £4,000,000, which includes a 20,000 ton
battleship, two ocean-going destroyers, and several
submarines. Instructions for tenders have been sent to the
Commission in London." A later message to the American Press,
November 12, stated that "the naval building programme decided
upon by the Chilian government, provides for the construction
of one battleship, four torpedo boat destroyers, and two
submarines at an expenditure of $14,000,000."

{700}

WAR, THE PREPARATIONS FOR:
The Chinese Programme.

A Press message from Peking, October 11, 1909, announced that
a naval commission, consisting of Prince Tsai-hsun, the
Regent’s brother, Admiral Sa Chen-ping, and Sir Chen Tung
Liang Cheng, who was secretary to the Special Chinese Embassy
to the Diamond Jubilee celebrations in 1897, left that day for
Europe. This was understood to be the first step toward the
fulfilment of China’s programme for the expenditure of
£40,000,000 on the rehabilitation of her army and navy.

WAR, THE PREPARATIONS FOR:
Denmark’s Fortification and Naval Defense.

See (in this Volume)
DENMARK: A. D. 1905-1909.

WAR, THE PREPARATIONS FOR:
The "Dreadnought" Era.
Outclassing of all Battleships built prior to 1906.
The New Type.
Effects of its Introduction.

The evolution of sea-fighting monstrosities received a
startling and revolutionizing impulsion in 1906, when a new
_Dreadnought_ (replacing an obsolete battleship of that
name) was added to the British navy. In size, plan and
armament it embodied naval teachings just taken from the
Russo-Japanese War, and was supposed to put every other
existing battle-ship into an inferior second class. It brought
suddenly a new standard into all comparative measurements of
naval power, impairing seriously the worth of the costly
monsters then afloat. It signalled, in fact, a start for
entirely new racing among the competitors for "sea-power,"
since the prizes of substantial fighting efficiency among the
navies must all be won over again, by the quickest builders of
the _Dreadnought_ type of ship. England had more reason
than any other nation to lament this happening, and her Lords
of the Admiralty have been sharply criticised for bringing it
about; though the new type of battle-ship would have had
creation elsewhere (as still newer types of monstrosity are
being created already) if English naval architects had not
produced it. Even Admiral Lord Charles Beresford has lashed
the naval authorities of his country for bringing on the
_Dreadnought_ craze. In a speech at London within the
past year he said that "he did not object to Dreadnoughts or
improvements in battleships; what he did object to was the
advertisement connected with the first Dreadnought. Then they
had told another nation that that ship would sink the whole of
its fleet, and the result was that that nation set to work
upon a definite naval programme of its own. Having given that
insane advertisement of their Dreadnought, the British delayed
ship-building with the inevitable result that they would have
to pay a great deal more than if they had kept up their yearly
proportion of ships. The command of the seas was their life,
and he believed that they would have to spend £50,000,000 more
than they need have spent through that insane advertisement.
It would be absolutely impossible for Great Britain alone,
under present conditions, to keep up the two-Power standard,
and if there were no other alternative, there could only be
the prospect of bankruptcy or defeat; but the two-Power
standard could easily be kept up with an Imperial Navy."

Similar criticism appeared in a pamphlet published last year
by Mr. Carnegie; and when his attention was called to the fact
that both Japan and Russia had bigger ships than the
_Dreadnought_ on the stocks before the latter was begun,
he wrote:

"Britain, having so much larger a Navy compared with any other
Power or compared with several other Powers together, should
have adopted the policy of waiting before building a type that
rendered most of her ships ineffective. She had nothing to
fear from Japan, Russia, nor the United States, and could
easily have overtaken Germany if Germany began building the
new type. Britain made such a noise about the Dreadnought as
to attract the attention of the whole world."

The following account of the _Dreadnought_ and of the
interest she had excited in naval circles appeared in a
prominent technical magazine while the building of the ship
was in progress:

"Not for many years has the building of a man-of-war excited
such wide-spread interest as that of H. M. S.
_Dreadnought_. In many respects this ship has assumed a
sensational character; she is the largest vessel ever
constructed for any war fleet; she was the first to be
commenced after the recent great struggle in the Far East; her
design, which embodies many new features, has hitherto been
kept an official secret, and the work of construction has been
pressed forward with so much success that it is hoped she will
be in commission within fourteen months of the laying of the
keel plates. All these facts have contributed to arouse
curiosity, particularly as it is well known that British naval
attaches were accorded special privileges by the Japanese and
were enabled to watch the progress of the war to greater
advantage than the representatives of other powers.
Consequently, from the day when the first whispers of the
coming of the _Dreadnought_ were heard, an unusual amount
of interest has been taken in this ship, not only in the
United Kingdom, but in foreign countries, and the influence of
the design may be traced in the new programmes of several
rival Powers. … The essential feature of the
_Dreadnought_ which distinguishes her from all
battleships now in commission in the world’s fleets is that
she is of huge size and mounts only one type of gun for use in
line of battle, instead of three types, as in the 'King Edward
VII.’ class.

"The war between Japan and Russia conclusively showed that the
intermediate armament carried by the vessels flying European
flags was not effective at modern battle ranges. Even on the
partial evidence obtained by the French authorities it has
been calculated that the effective ranges for battle have been
raised from 3000 yards to 7000 or 8000 yards. Careful
calculations show that at such a distance the striking power
of 7.5-inch and 6-inch guns, which have been the favourite
intermediate weapons in the British Navy hitherto, are
comparatively useless. … It is understood that originally the
_Dreadnought_ was to have carried twelve guns of the
12-inch type, but difficulties arose in working out the
design, and it was eventually decided to drop out two of these
weapons in order to mount effectively ten pieces of this
colossal striking power, so as to enable eight of them to fire
on the broadside, six ahead and four astern, without
endangering either the stability of the ship or running any
undue risks owing to the blast. … With a broadside of eight
12-inch guns, the _Dreadnought_ is equivalent to any two
battleships built for the British fleet prior to the
construction of 'King Edward VII.,' and yet her total cost,
complete with guns, will be only £1,797,497, while the ships
of the ‘King Edward VII.,’ class, carrying only four 12-inch
guns and the same number of 9.2-inch guns, represent an outlay
of just under a million and a half sterling."

_Cashier's Magazine,
June, 1906._

{701}

The steadily increasing sine of the _Dreadnought_ ships
is shown in the following, reported from Portsmouth, England,
September 30, 1909: "Since the launch of the
_Dreadnought_ by the King in February, 1906, each
successive ship which has taken the water at Portsmouth has
exceeded her predecessor in size. The weight of the
_Neptune_, successfully floated by the Duchess of Albany
to-day shows an advance of no fewer than 1,500 tons upon that
of the vessel launched by his Majesty; and of 500 tons over
that of the St. Vincent, the preceding battleship on the
building slip. The ship which is to be laid down next month
will probably far exceed the dimensions of the
_Neptune_."

WAR, THE PREPARATIONS FOR:
England and Germany.
Their "Dreadnought" Building Compared.
The Question in the British Parliament and the Hysteria
in the Country.

An exciting period of debate in Parliament and of discussion
throughout Great Britain was opened on the 17th of March,
1909, when the Navy estimates for the coming year were
submitted to the House of Commons. In his speech on bringing
forward the Estimates, which contemplated an expenditure of
£35,142,700, being nearly £3,000,000 in excess of the
expenditures of the current year, the First Lord of the
Admiralty, Mr. Reginald McKenna, explained the reasons for the
increase at length, saying in part: "We cannot take stock of
our Navy, and measure our requirements except in relation to
the strength of foreign navies. I am, therefore, obliged to
refer to foreign countries in making estimates of our naval
requirements. Several of the Powers are rapidly developing
their naval strength at this moment; but none at a pace
comparable with that of Germany. If in what I have to say now
I select that Power as the standard by which to measure our
own requirements, the House will understand that I do so only
for what may be called arithmetical purposes, and without
presuming upon the expression of any feeling or opinion of my
own—except it be one of respectful admiration for
administrative and professional efficiency. …

"When the Estimates were presented to Parliament a year ago we
had seven battleships of the Dreadnought class and three
cruisers of the Invincible class, either afloat or in process
of construction. The whole of these were due for completion by
the end of 1910. At that time Germany was building four
Dreadnoughts and one Invincible, of which two Dreadnoughts
were expected to be completed by the end of this year, and the
remaining three ships in the autumn of 1910. Thus, at that
time, we had a superiority in these classes of ships of ten to
five in course of construction, with the additional advantage
that the whole of ours were expected to be completed some
months in advance of the last three of the German ships. The
new German Fleet Bill had at that time become law, and
according to our interpretation of its provisions three
Dreadnoughts and one Invincible would be laid down in the
course of the year 1908-1909. The financial provisions of that
Bill were such as to lead us to the opinion that no work would
be commenced upon these four ships until the month of August
last year, and that they would not be completed before
February, 1911. This time last year, therefore, we had to
contemplate five German ships under construction, three of
which would be completed in the autumn of 1910 and four more
ships to be commenced about August, 1908, and commissioned in
February, 1911. In view of this state of affairs this House of
Commons last year approved of a programme of two large ships
to be laid down at such a time as would give to this country a
total of 12 of these new ships, as against a possible
completed German total of nine. In the face of last year’s
programme no one could with any fairness charge this
Government with having started upon a race of competitive
armaments. By example as well as by precept we sought to check
the rapid rate of shipbuilding. We failed. …

"The difficulty in which the Government find themselves placed
at this moment is that we do not know—as we thought we did—the
rate at which German construction is taking place. We know
that the Germans have a law which, when all the ships under it
have been completed, will give them a navy more powerful than
any at present in existence. We know that, but we do not know
the rate at which the provisions of this Act are to be carried
into execution. We now expect that the four German ships of
the 1908-1909 programme will be completed, not in February, 1911,
but in the autumn of 1910. I am informed, moreover, that the
collection of materials and the manufacture of armaments,
guns, and gun-mountings have already begun for four more ships
which, according to the Navy Law, belong to the programme of
1909-1910. Therefore we have to take stock of the new
situation, in which we reckon not nine but 13 German ships may
be completed in 1911, and in 1912 such further ships, if any,
as may be begun in the course of the next financial year, or
laid down in April, 1910. We may stop here and pay a tribute
to the extraordinary growth of the power of constructing ships
of the largest size in Germany. Two years ago, I believe,
there were in Germany, with the possible exception of one or
two slips in private yards, no slip capable of carrying a
Dreadnought. To-day they have actually no less than 14 such
slips and three more under construction. And what is true of
the hull of the ships is true also of the guns, armour, and
mountings. Two years ago any one familiar with the capacity of
Krupp’s and other great German firms would have ridiculed the
possibility of their undertaking the supply of all the
component parts of eight battleships in a single year. To-day
this productive power is a realized fact, and it will tax the
resources of our own great firms if we are to retain the
supremacy in rapidity and Volume of construction.

{702}

"Having said so much on foreign naval development, I turn to
our own programme of construction. As I have said, we shall
have in March, 1911, eight completed Dreadnoughts and four
Invincibles. We propose to lay down two more Dreadnoughts in
July of this year, and the terms of the contracts will provide
that they shall be completed in July, 1911. … Two more ships
will be laid down in November this year, to be completed in
1911, and in that year our total strength in Dreadnoughts and
Invincibles will be 12 of the former and four of the latter.
The date, however, which we have to bear in mind is that up to
which the present programme must provide—April, 1912. I have
shown that we shall in the course of 1911 have 16 of these
modern ships, as against 13 ships for which Germany is already
making provision. The German law provides for four more ships
to be laid down in 1910-1911. But if the construction of these
ships is accelerated—as I understand was the case of the four
ships of the 1909-1910 programme—they would be completed by
April, 1912. Therefore on that date Germany would have 17
Dreadnoughts and Invincibles. But even if no acceleration
takes place before April, 1910, this number would be completed
in the autumn of 1912. This is a contingency which his
Majesty’s Government have to take into account.

"We cannot afford to run risks. If we are to be sure of
retaining superiority in this by far the most powerful types
of battleships, the Board of Admiralty must be in a position,
if the necessity arises, to give orders for guns,
gun-mountings, armour, and other materials at such a time and
to such an amount as will enable them to obtain delivery of
four more large armoured ships by March, 1912. We should be
prepared to meet the contingency of Germany having 17 of these
ships in the spring of 1912 by our having 20, but we can only
meet that contingency if the Government are empowered by
Parliament to give the necessary orders in the course of the
present year. I can well imagine that this method of
calculating in Dreadnoughts and Invincibles alone may seem
unsatisfactory, and even unfair to many persons. They may say:
‘What has become of the Lord Nelsons, the King Edwards, the
Duncans, and the Formidables and the earlier battleships on
which our naval superiority has been so constantly reckoned?
Is no account to be taken of our powerful fleet of armoured
cruisers, numbering no less than 35?’ Yes; the Board of
Admiralty have not forgotten these ships. They still
constitute a mighty fleet. The Dreadnought has not rendered
them obsolete, and many of them would give a good account of
themselves in the line of battle for many years to come. But,
though they have not been rendered obsolete by the
Dreadnoughts and the Invincibles, yet their life has been
shortened. … A battleship must be regarded as a machine of
which the output is fighting capacity. All improvements in the
designs of ships which increase the fighting capacity
necessarily shorten the life of earlier battleships just as in
the case of any other machine. The greater the value of the
improvements, the sooner the earlier ships become obsolete."

Mr. McKenna’s reckoning of the comparative numbers of
Dreadnoughts that Great Britain and Germany would have in 1912
was challenged at once by the leader of the Opposition, Mr.
Balfour, who said: "On the two-years’ basis of building we
shall in December, 1910, as I calculate, have ten, and only
ten, Dreadnoughts. But the Germans at that date, as I
calculate, will have 13. That assumes, of course, that I am
right in stating, and I do not think I shall be contradicted,
that the Germans anticipated their programme by four months.
If you work that out, and assume that the German ships begun
last November, in anticipation by five months of the ordinary
date, are completed in two years, then you will find that I am
not wrong in saying that in December, 1910, we shall have only
ten Dreadnoughts and the Germans will have 13. That danger
period in which, according to my calculation, the ratio of
British to German Dreadnoughts is as ten to 13 extends, on the
basis of two years’ building, from December, 1910, to the end
of March, 1911. On April 1, 1911, the Germans, as I understand
it, will have only 13 and we shall have raised our number to
12. We should still, therefore, on April 1, 1911, according to
my calculation, have one less than the Germans, and that
period of what I might call the 12 British to 13 Germans will
last until July, 1911. Then we shall have 14; but in the
meanwhile the Germans, if they build their four ships this
year, in addition to the anticipated ships they laid down in
November, will have 17, as I understand. We should still have
14 in July, 1911, but the Germans would, as I make out, have
17."

Mr. Balfour contended that the four ships which, according to
the German programme, were to be laid down on the 1st of April
coming (1909) had been actually laid down in advance of that
time. He had information to that effect; whereas Mr. McKenna
was informed that materials for them had been collected in
advance, but that the construction was not begun. Mr. Balfour
contended stoutly for the correctness of his own information,
and argued: "If they [the four battleships supposedly waiting
to be laid down April 1, 1909] were laid down in November, as
I believe, that means that the Germans laid down eight
Dreadnoughts last year. They may lay down no Dreadnoughts this
year, and they may say, ‘We anticipated our four ships for
1909-1910; we anticipated them by laying them down in November;
we have no ships for this financial year.’ But there are two
other things to remember. Having laid down eight ships last
year, they may lay down four ships this year, or they may lay
down eight ships this year. That the capacity of their yards
and their great engineering shops renders that process
perfectly feasible no one now doubts. … If the Germans go on
at that rate, which is more than possible, the probability is
that they will have on April 1, 1912, 21 Dreadnoughts to our
20. The hypotheses, then, are these, and I want to make it
clear to the Government and to the House:—Eight Dreadnoughts
have been laid down in 1908 by Germany. If four are laid down
in 1909, there will be 17 on April 1, 1912; if eight are laid
down—as eight have been laid down last year—there will be 21
on April 1, 1912, to our 20; and if the Germans imitate the
policy of the present Government and lay down not only their
eight in the financial year, but begin a new group of four
when the Government propose their group of four, on April 1,
12 months hence, they will then have 25."

{703}

Over this difference of information as to the facts of German
Dreadnought-building, and consequent differences of
conclusion, controversy raged throughout the kingdom for
weeks. The Prime Minister, Mr. Asquith, tried unavailingly to
moderate the impeachment of German good faith in the matter.
"It is fair and right to the German Government that I should
say," he remarked, "that we have had a most distinct
declaration from them that it is not their intention to
accelerate their programme (cheers) and we cannot possibly, as
a Government, believing as we do most explicitly in the good
faith of those declarations (cheers), we cannot possibly put
before the House of Commons and Parliament a programme based
on the assumption that a declaration of that kind will not be
carried out. Be it observed—I want to be very careful in the
language I use about this—I am not saying that it is a pledge
in the sense of an agreement between the two countries.
Nothing of the kind. I should not accuse the German Government
of anything in the nature of bad faith if they altered their
intention. We have been told by them expressly and explicitly
that that is their intention, an intention not to accelerate,
or in other words not to do what the right honourable
gentleman contemplates, when he credits them with the
intention possibly of doing—namely, of laying down as many as
eight ships in one financial year. It is impossible in framing
these Estimates to do so while at the same time ignoring that
declaration from the German Government, and that is why I say
in taking this power to lay down if need be four ships on
April 1 next year we are making such provision as prudence
shows to be necessary for all the contingencies which we can
reasonably anticipate at the present moment."

At the same time, Mr. Asquith made a statement of importance
in reply to the question, Why should there be an increasing
competition in naval expenditure between these two countries?
"The question," he said, "has been raised by us, the British
Government, more than once, with a view to ascertaining
whether any proposal for a mutual reduction of expenditure for
naval purposes would be accepted by the German Government, but
we have been assured more than once, and in the most formal
manner, that their naval expenditure is governed solely by
reference to their own needs, and that their programme does
not depend upon ours. That is the statement which has been
made to us. They tell us quite plainly that if we build 100
Dreadnoughts we must not assume that they would add to their
naval programme, and, on the other hand, if we built no
Dreadnoughts at all they would go on with their programme just
as it is. If that is so, it is perfectly clear that there is
no possibility of an arrangement for mutual reduction. I
regret it very much, but I do not complain. The Germans, like
every other nation, are the best judges of their own national
requirements and necessities."

As will have been learned from Mr. McKenna’s statement, quoted
above, the Government desired authority to begin construction
of two new Dreadnoughts in July and two in November, 1909,
with contingent authority in addition to give orders during
the year for four more, if reasons for doing so appeared. This
did not satisfy the Opposition, which insisted that not less
than eight the new type of battle-ships should be built
outright; and a veritable panic of public excitement on the
subject of German designs against England was created in the
country, by the combined agency of speech and press and the
melodramatic stage. The Government was so little shaken by the
clamor that a motion of censure on its "declared policy" in the
matter was defeated in the House of Commons by a majority of
218. Nevertheless, on the 26th of July, Mr. McKenna made the
following announcement of a modification in its naval
programme:

"After very anxious and careful examination of the condition
of shipbuilding in foreign countries the Government have come
to the conclusion that it is desirable to take all the
necessary steps to ensure that the second four ships referred
to in this year’s programme should be completed by March,
1912. They propose to take all the necessary steps in the way
of preparation of plans, getting out of specifications,
invitations to tender, and, finally, the giving of orders
which will procure the delivery of these ships at the time I
have named. As was said in the month of March, there will be
no need to lay the keels of these ships in the course of the
present financial year. It will be quite time enough if the
keels are laid in the month of April next. …

"The examination of the state of foreign shipbuilding
programmes to which I have referred is bound to lead in the
minds of most members of the Committee to the conclusion that
the Government had no other course open to them. The Committee
had stated to them last March very amply what was the
condition of foreign shipbuilding up to that date. Since then
the development of shipbuilding in foreign countries has gone
on apace. Two countries, Italy and Austria, have now declared
a definite programme of four large armoured ships of the
latest type. In Italy one of those ships is already laid down,
a second is to be laid down immediately, and the remaining two
are both to be laid down in the course of the present year.
With regard to the Austrian programme, sceptics might say they
would never believe in it until, as in the case of Italy, they
saw the keels actually laid down, but the fact is every
earnest has been given of the determination of the Austrian
Government, and two large slips have been prepared for the
construction of battleships of the largest type."

WAR, THE PREPARATIONS FOR:
The English Naval Programme for 1910.

"The navy estimates for 1910, which were issued by the British
Admiralty last night, provide for an expenditure of
$203,000,500, [thousands digits, "000", obscured and unknown]
an increase of $27,805,000 over 1909. The increase is almost
wholly taken up by shipbuilding armaments authorized by
Parliament before dissolution. The new programme provides for
five large armored ships, five protected cruisers, twenty
destroyers, and a considerable number of submarines. By April
1 there will be under construction seven battleships, three
armored, nine protected, and two unarmored cruisers,
thirty-seven destroyers, and nine submarines."

_New York Evening Post,
March 10, 1910._

{704}

WAR, THE PREPARATIONS FOR:
The French Naval Administration.
Alarming discovery of Bad Conditions.

France was greatly startled and shocked in March, 1909, by
rumored scandals in naval administration, uncovered by the
investigations of a Parliamentary Commission, but not yet
officially made known. The report of the Commission was not
published until late in June, and when it appeared it
confirmed, not the worst of the state of things which rumor
had described, but enough to show an alarming and unsuspected
weakness of the nation on that side of its armament for war.
From the conclusion of the elaborate report a few translated
passages will suffice to indicate some of the conditions it
brought to light. In this final summary, the Commission states
that the testimony submitted by it establishes, among other
facts, the following:

"That during the last ten years Parliament has been asked to
authorize the construction of ships for which in most cases
the plans have not been definitely (_sérieusement_)
fixed; that months, and most generally years, elapsed between
the different contracts for the essential parts of the ships,
the hulls, the turrets, the boilers, &c., entailing
considerable loss of time and of money …; that numerous and
important changes were introduced in the course of
construction, … changes the chief inconvenience of which,
apart from the increase of expenditure and the retardation of
construction, is to impair that homogeneity which is the
supreme quality of a squadron; that most of these defects are
aggravated in the case of the six battleships of the Danton
type, the original contract for which, signed at the end of
December, 1906, has undergone hundreds of modifications which
must now be placed on a proper basis. …

"That the arsenals are not at present in a state to carry out
with the rapidity which is desirable new constructions and
repairs; that the mechanical equipment is in general
inadequate and out of date; that the abolition of piece-work,
which has coincided with a reduction of working hours and the
diminution of the powers and authority of the superintendents
in charge, has resulted in a considerable lessening of
production; and that lack of material sometimes entails a
stoppage of work. …

"That the four divisions of battleships and the cruiser
division of the Mediterranean Squadron have not the regulation
supply of steel shells, that the two divisions of armoured
cruisers of the Northern Squadron have only one-third of their
proper supply of steel shells, and that for both squadrons the
stores for renewing their supplies of steel shells are not
ready.

"That the various branches of the administration are wanting
in unity of views and purpose, in method and in defined
responsibility, and that neglect, disorder, and confusion too
frequently prevail. …

"In view of the fact that only a small part of the scheme of
1901 for modernizing ports and (lock yards in accordance with
the requirements of the construction programme of 1900 has
been executed, and in view of the total failure to provide
docking accommodation for the large battleships of the Danton
class, the Commission invites the Chamber to censure the want
of foresight and the indifference which these lamentable
discoveries disclose."

WAR, THE PREPARATIONS FOR:
French Naval Programme revised in 1909.
Radical Changes in the Department of the Marine.

A despatch from Paris, June 8, 1909, announced:

"According to the _Temps_ this evening, the Navy Council
has finally decided to recommend that, in addition to 45 ships
of the line, the fleet shall consist of 12 ‘scout cruisers,’
60 large destroyers, and 64 submarines. The importance
attached to an increase in the number of capital ships, which
is the chief feature of the new proposals, is illustrated by a
comparison with the so-called ‘programmes’ of 1900 and 1907.
In 1900 it was decided on paper that the fleet should consist
of 28 battleships, 24 armoured cruisers, 52 destroyers, 263
torpedo-boats, and 38 submarines or submersibles. In 1907 the
composition of the fleet was changed to 38 battleships, 20
armoured cruisers, six scouts, 109 destroyers, 170
torpedo-boats, 82 submarines for offensive purposes, and 49
defence submarines.

"A comparison of these three ‘programmes’ shows an increase in
the number of capital ships and destroyers, the abolition of
armoured cruisers as a separate class and of torpedo-boats in
favour of destroyers, and a decrease in the number of
submarines. With regard to the existing armoured cruisers,
which the Navy Council no longer regards as efficient fighting
units, it may be noted that two out of the four 14,000-ton
Gambettas have not yet been completed. Given the age limit of
armoured ships as fixed at 20 years, only the six Danton and
the six République battleships would still figure on the
effective list by 1925. In other words, 33 armoured ships
would have to be completed during the next 16 years. In
addition, 12 scout cruisers would have to be constructed, and,
besides a number of submarines, over 100 destroyers would have
to be laid down, since the life of this class of vessel is
fixed at 17 years."

On the 29th of July the Paris correspondent of the London
_Times_ wrote: "It is semi officially announced this
evening that the Council of Ministers at its meeting to-day
approved a number of radical changes proposed by the new
Minister of Marine, among the higher ranks of the
_personnel_ of the naval administration. All the heads of
departments at the Ministry of Marine appointed under the old
regime have been removed and their places have been filled by
Admiral Boué de Lapeyrère’s own nominees. So complete a
reconstruction of a public department is without precedent in
modern French history. These changes, moreover, are
supplemented by a number of new appointments in the commands
afloat."

On the first of April, 1910, it was announced from Paris that
the Chamber of Deputies had voted to lay down two battle-ships
in the current year, designed to equal the latest type added
to the navies of Great Britain and Germany.

WAR, THE PREPARATIONS FOR:
French Naval Administration.
Parliamentary Investigation.

See (in this Volume)
FRANCE: A. D. 1909 (MARCH-JUNE).

{705}

WAR, THE PREPARATIONS FOR:
The German Emperor’s Statement of his Peace Policy based
on Preparation for War.

In the spring of 1905, speaking at Bremen, on the unveiling of
a monument to his father, the Emperor made an impressive
statement of his motives in striving for the creation in
Germany of a great naval and military power. He said that in
boyhood he had been angered at the weakness of the German
navy, and that his policy had sprung from that feeling, not
directed toward aggression, but to the command of respect from
the rest of the world. His aim was to "do everything possible to
let bayonets and cannon rest, but to keep the bayonets sharp
and the cannon ready, so that envy and greed shall not disturb
us in tending our garden or building our beautiful house." "I
vowed," he said, "never to strike for world-mastery. The
world-power that I then dreamed of was to create for the
German Empire on all sides the most absolute confidence as a
quiet, honest, and peaceable neighbor. I have vowed that if
ever the time comes that history shall speak of a German
world-power, or a Hohenzollern world-power, this should not be
based upon conquest, but should come through the mutual
striving of nations after common purposes."

It is not difficult to believe in the perfect truthfulness of
this assertion of high motives, and the perfect sincerity with
which they have been obeyed, while seeing at the same time how
much, in their working, they have threatened the peace of the
world. As the power of Germany has grown under his hand, the
Kaiser has been tempted more and more to impose his will on
neighbors whose cannon were not as ready or their sharpened
bayonets as many as his. The world-power of his desire has
become more and more a dictatorial power. The peace he has
preserved by it has been peace on his own terms, more than
once. The result has been to excite throughout the world such
a feeling of being menaced by war as had not been known since
Napoleon’s day, and to impel among nations, big and little, a
more feverish and competitive arming for war than ever busied
them before. As worked out by the man, the Kaiser’s policy of
peace-making by the tools of war has certainly lost the
innocence it had when conceived by the boy.

WAR, THE PREPARATIONS FOR:
The German Side of the Navy-building Question.

When, in March, 1909, debate on the Navy Estimates in England
started excitement over the rapidity with which Germany seemed
to have developed the building of Dreadnoughts, Chancellor
Bülow, on the 29th of that month, said in the Reichstag: "The
Federated Governments entertain no thoughts of entering into
competition with British sea-power by means of the
construction of the German navy. According to the provisions
of the Navy Law, the immovable purpose of German naval policy
is founded upon the fact that we desire to create our naval
armaments solely for the protection of our coasts and our
trade. It is, moreover, an indisputable fact that the
programme of our naval construction lies open in absolute
publicity. We have nothing to keep secret, nothing to hide,
and it is not intended to accelerate the carrying out of our
construction programme beyond the limits of time contemplated
by the law (_über die gesetzliche Frist hinaus zu
beschleunigen_). All rumours to the contrary are false. In
the autumn of 1912, at the earliest, we shall have ready for
service the 13 large new ships, including three armoured
cruisers, provided by law."

This statement was supplemented by one from Admiral Tirpitz,
who said:

"Now, as previously, we build all ships in about 36 months
—about 40 months in the small yards. To that period are added
trials, which last for several months. Equally inaccurate is
the assertion that, with a view to more rapid construction,
the contracts for the newer ships are placed sooner than is
allowed by the estimates. All that is true is the following:
Subject to approval by the Reichstag, contracts for two ships
of the 1909 financial programme were last autumn promised to
two private yards at comparatively low prices. This was done
because there was a danger that, if orders for four ships were
placed at the same time at the beginning of 1909 there would
be a considerable advance in price. If orders for two ships
were already placed the Imperial Navy Office was in a much
more favourable position for placing orders for the other two.
We can put the Imperial yards into competition with the
private yards. The Imperial yards cannot undertake more than
two ships at once. The private firms, therefore, will be
compelled to ask lower terms. If the matter has been kept
secret, that is solely because the firms must not be made
aware of the business transactions of the Navy Office.
Contracts for the ships have not been placed; assurances only
have been given. The contract is concluded only after the
voting of the estimate. The period for delivery is 36 months
from April 1, 1909. Not a penny is available for the
‘promised’ ships before April 1. That must be clear to
everybody who knows the Parliamentary conditions and our
accounts system. Not even indirectly has any money been
procured from banks for the yards in any way whatever by the
agency of the Navy Office.

"In regard to the placing of the order for the first of the
two ships special account was taken of the fact that the yard
in question is principally engaged in the construction of this
kind of ship. Accelerated completion of these two ships is
neither asked for nor intended. The firms get their money only
in quarterly instalments. Contracts for the two other ships of
this year’s programme are not to be placed until some months
after the conditions for tendering are drawn up late in the
summer. As the private yards no more than the Imperial yards
know whether they will get the orders for these ships, there
can be no possibility of special preparation of material. If
there has been any such accumulation, it is, presumably, due
to business reasons, certainly to no incentive of ours.

"In conclusion, I repeat once more with emphasis that, as the
Imperial Chancellor has already said, we shall have ready for
use in 1912 ten Dreadnoughts and three Invincibles—in all 13,
and not 17, large modern ships—and that not in the spring, but
in the autumn. How far it is right to base comparisons of
naval strength upon the number of Dreadnoughts is a question
which I shall not here discuss."

As to the suggested readiness and desire of Great Britain to
join in an international agreement for the limiting of naval
armaments, the Germans have always had a rather reasonable
answer, which was phrased forcibly by one of the Agrarian
organs when it said:

"When the weaker promises the stronger to abstain from all
means of increasing his strength, the strong man needs to make
no further effort to retain his relative preponderance for
ever. If the other naval Powers entered into such an
agreement, England, without taking upon herself any further
burdens, would retain mastery at sea before which all must
bow. Little need as we have to interfere with regard to
England’s programme, even so little need has England to look
askance upon our construction of ships, not to attack England,
but only in order to have a naval power with which even the
strongest opponent will not light-heartedly engage in battle.
This good right of ours we shall not surrender by any
agreement."

{706}

But a better view was that taken by one of the German
Conservative journals, the _Kreuz Zeitung_, which said
last summer: "First of all we must complete our construction
programme. Before that we could not agree to any limitation of
naval armaments. Otherwise we should not be able to create the
navy of moderate size which corresponds to our position as a
seafaring people. … Even after the completion of our
construction programme our navy will be but a dwarf as
compared with the British Navy. Nevertheless, the moment ought
then to have arrived for entering into an international
agreement about limitation of armaments, and on the part of
Germany there will, presumably, be readiness for it."

WAR, THE PREPARATIONS FOR:
Elasticity of the German Navy Law.

At the annual meeting of the German Navy League in June, 1909,
Admiral Weber, speaking of the German Navy Law, praised its
elasticity. "In international relations," he said, "it had
lately proved to be a political instrument of equal force with
the American Monroe doctrine and the English two-Power
standard. In 1906 the Reichstag had agreed to increase the
size of capital ships without altering the number. The
amending law of 1908 (which shortened the ‘life’ of
battleships) had rendered possible a rational fulfilment of
all immediate possibilities with regard to battleships, small
cruisers, torpedo-boats, and submarines."

WAR, THE PREPARATIONS FOR:
Italian and Austrian Programmes of Naval Construction.

A despatch from Rome in May, 1909, announced that the minister
of marine, Admiral Mirabello, had obtained the approval of the
Cabinet to a naval programme that provides for the
construction within three years at a total expense of
$52,800,000 of four "Dreadnoughts" and a number of fast scout
cruisers. A local paper stated that the decision to build
these vessels was reached after Italy had learned that
Austria-Hungary was going to spend $40,000,000 on increased
naval power.

Four months later, on the 1st of October, a report came to the
English Press from Rome as follows:

"The Minister of Marine announced in June that the ships would
be begun at once, and completed before the middle of 1912.
Only one, the Dante Alighieri, has yet been laid down, and
owing to some blunder with regard to her steel plates, no work
has been done on her for more than a month. The second is
still awaiting the completion of a building slip before it can
be laid down. As to the other two, according to the
_Tribuna_, the contracts, which ought to have been
concluded with two shipbuilding firms last June, have not yet
been even examined by the Council of State; consequently
neither firm has yet been able to begin the work which will be
necessary in its yards before the ships can be laid down. The
_Tribuna_ throws the blame upon the bureaucratic system."

WAR, THE PREPARATIONS FOR:
Italian Fighting Strength at the End of 1909.

The fighting strength of the Italian Navy was reckoned by the
Rome correspondent of the London _Times_, in November,
1909, as follows:

"Counting in all four of the San Giorgio cruisers [only two of
which were then finished] as forming part of the available
navy at the end of this year, and setting aside some 20 ships
of various kinds and 40 or 50 torpedo-boats, which may,
however, be of some secondary use, the full fighting force of
the Italian navy at the beginning of 1910 should be six
first-class battleships, five second class battleships, seven
first-class armoured cruisers, three second-class armoured
cruisers, 19 destroyers, and 36 first-class torpedo-boats. But
it must be borne in mind that eight of the first 21 fighting
units—the five battleships and three armoured cruisers
described here as of the second class—are not very modern
ships.

"The shipbuilding programme of Admiral Mirabello promises,
besides other less important vessels, four battleships of the
Dreadnought type. As far as one could learn at first these
ships were to be on much the same lines as the Bellerophon,
with a displacement of 18,200, and an armament of ten 12 inch
guns. The chief question then was, When would they be ready
for sea? Admiral Mirabello said in 1912. In order to effect
this he would have had to revolutionize the whole system of
shipbuilding in the Italian navy."

WAR, THE PREPARATIONS FOR:
Japan’s Armament, Present and Prospective.

The naval status of Japan in December, 1909, as ascertained
and described by the Tokio correspondent of T_he Times_,
London, was as follows: