Chapter 382: , Laws of 1889, to read as follows (24)

"Pooling tobacco in Kentucky started down in the Black Patch,
or received its greatest impetus there. The regie buyers
combined, or were formed into a combination by their
superiors, and the Patch was districted, each man being given
an exclusive territory, and no farmer being allowed to sell to
any one but his own buyer. In this way a set price as low as
four cents was made, and the farmer had no option but to take
it; no option, at least, that was open to the farmer not rich
enough to ship his crop to Bremen and seek European
competition. In this situation a group of canny planters
formed a tight little corporation of $200 capital, for the
avowed purpose of holding, handling, buying, and selling
tobacco. They induced about a thousand of their
neighbors—there are forty thousand dark-tobacco growers in the
Patch—to pledge their crops with them, and they planned to
hold this much off the market and compel the regie buyers to
pay a higher price for it. This proving popular, they soon had
five thousand pledges. Then they—or interests closely allied
with them—organized a band of Ku-Klux, called Night Riders,
who, first by so-called ‘peace armies,’ and then by raiding at
night all who resisted, frightened or forced—during the next
three years—all the forty thousand to sign.

"The tight little corporation thus had a monopoly of the dark
tobacco. It forced the regie buyers to pay a price raised by
slow degrees to 11 cents round, exacted large commissions and
profits,—as much as 1500 per cent a year on the capital,—and
now controls the Black Patch absolutely. All its pledges
expire in January, 1909, and the situation will then become
anarchistic. The success of this Black Patch plan was entirely
due to the employment of Night Riders, who correspond to the
professional ‘sluggers’ of a labor union, or the hired
assassins of a Black-Hand league."

_J. L. Mathews,
The Farmers’ Union and the Tobacco Pool
(Atlantic Monthly, October, 1908)._

KHARBIN, OR HARBIN, RUSSIAN CONTROL AT.

See (in this Volume)
CHINA: A. D. 1909 (MAY).

KHARBIN: A. D. 1909.
Assassination of Prince Ito.

See (in this Volume)
JAPAN: A. D. 1909 (OCTOBER).

KHARKOFF, DISTURBANCES IN.

See (in this Volume)
RUSSIA: A. D. 1904-1905.

KHARTUM, THE NEW.

See (in this Volume)
SUDAN, THE: A. D. 1907.

KHARTUM, THE NEW:
Gordon Memorial College.

See (in this Volume)
EDUCATION: EGYPT.

KIAMIL PASHA: GRAND VIZIER.

See (in this Volume)
TURKEY: A. D. 1908 (JULY-DECEMBER), and after.

KIEFF, DISTURBANCES IN.

See (in this Volume)
RUSSIA: A. D. 1904-1905.

KINCHOU, BATTLE OF.

See (in this Volume)
JAPAN: A. D. 1904 (February-July), and
1904-1905 (May-January).

KINGSTON, Jamaica: A. D. 1907.
Destruction of Kingston.

See (in this Volume)
EARTHQUAKES: JAMAICA.

KINSHU-MARU, THE INCIDENT OF THE.

See (in this Volume)
JAPAN: A. D. 1904 (FEBRUARY-AUGUST).

KIPLING, RUDYARD.

See (in this Volume)
NOBEL PRIZES.

KIRDORF, HERR:
Head of the Coal and Steel Syndicates in Germany.
His attitude towards the Workingmen.

See (in this Volume)
LABOR ORGANIZATION: GERMANY: A. D. 1905-1907.

KISHINEFF, JEWISH MASSACRE AT.

See (in this Volume)
RUSSIA: A. D. 1903 (APRIL).

KITCHENER OF KHARTUM, GENERAL LORD:
In South Africa.

See (in this Volume)
SOUTH AFRICA: A. D. 1901-1902.

KITCHENER OF KHARTUM, GENERAL LORD:
In India.

See (in this Volume)
INDIA: A. D. 1905 (AUGUST).

KLERKSDORP CONFERENCE.

See (in this Volume)
SOUTH AFRICA: A. D. 1901-1902.

KNIAZ POTEMKIN, MUTINY ON THE.

See (in this Volume)
RUSSIA: A. D. 1905 (FEBRUARY-NOVEMBER).

KNIGHTS OF LABOR.

See (in this Volume)
LABOR ORGANIZATION: UNITED STATES.

KNOX, PHILANDER C.:
Attorney-General.

See (in this Volume)
UNITED STATES: A. D. 1901-1905.

KNOX, PHILANDER C.:
Secretary of State.

See (in this Volume)
UNITED STATES: A. D. 1909 (MARCH).

KOCH, Robert.

See (in this Volume)
NOBEL PRIZES.

KOCHER, E. T.

See (in this Volume)
NOBEL PRIZES.

KOMURA, BARON IUTARO,
Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs.

See (in this Volume)
JAPAN: A. D. 1901-1904.

KOMURA, BARON IUTARO,
Japanese Plenipotentiary for negotiating
Treaty of Peace with Russia.

See (in this Volume)
JAPAN: A. D. 1905 (JUNE-OCTOBER).

KONDRATENKO, General.

See (in this Volume)
JAPAN: A. D. 1904-1905 (MAY-JANUARY).

KOREA: A. D. 1901-1904.
Japanese distrust of Russian designs.
Negotiations and demands.

See (in this Volume)
JAPAN: A. D. 1901-1904.

KOREA: A. D. 1902.
Agreement respecting Korea between Great Britain and Japan.

See (in this Volume)
Japan: A. D. 1902.

KOREA: A. D. 1904 (February).
Occupation by the Japanese.

See (in this Volume)
JAPAN: A. D. 1904 (FEBRUARY-JULY).

KOREA: A. D. 1904-1905.
Conventions with Japan, creating Protectorate Relations
with that Empire and submitting Financial and
Diplomatic Affairs to Japanese control.

On the 25th of February, 1904, the text of a protocol,
concluded on the 23d, between the Governments of Japan and
Korea, was communicated to the Government of the United States
(and, of course to others), by the Government of Japan, with
an accompanying explanation, as follows:

"In the prosecution of the present war the use of some of the
ports and some portions of the territory of Korea is found
inevitable, and therefore, with a view to facilitate military
operations and to show that such use of ports and territory is
made with the full knowledge and consent of Korea, and not in
disregard or violation of her independence or territorial
integrity, and also in order to prevent future complications,
the Japanese Government concluded with the Korean Government
on the 23d instant the following protocol. …

"ARTICLE I.
For the purpose of maintaining permanent and solid friendship
between Japan and Korea and firmly establishing peace in the
Far East, the Imperial Government of Korea shall place full
confidence in the Imperial Government of Japan and adopt the
advice of the latter with regard to improvements in
administration.

"ARTICLE II.
The Imperial Government of Japan shall, in a spirit of firm
friendship, insure the safety and repose of the Imperial House
of Korea.

{366}

"ARTICLE III.
The Imperial Government of Japan definitively guarantee the
independence and territorial integrity of the Korean Empire.

"ARTICLE IV.
In case the welfare of the Imperial House of Korea or the
territorial integrity of Korea is endangered by the aggression
of a third power or internal disturbances, the Imperial
Government of Japan shall immediately take such necessary
measures as circumstances require, and in such case the
Imperial Government of Korea shall give full facilities to
promote the action of the Imperial Japanese Government. The
Imperial Government of Japan may, for the attainment of the
above-mentioned object, occupy, when circumstances require it,
such places as may be necessary from strategic points of view.

"ARTICLE V.
The Government of the two countries shall not in future,
without mutual consent, conclude with a third power such an
arrangement as may be contrary to the principles of the
present protocol.

"ARTICLE VI.
Details in connection with the present protocol shall be
arranged as the circumstances may require between the
representative of Japan and the minister of state for foreign
affairs of Korea."

On the 30th of August, 1904, an additional Agreement between
the Governments of Japan and Korea, signed in part on the 19th
and in part on the 22d of that month, was communicated by the
Japanese Ambassador to the United States to the State
Department at Washington, with a note saying: "In
communicating this agreement to the Government of the United
States I am instructed to say that it is nothing more than the
natural consequence or development of the protocol concluded
between the Japanese and Korean Governments on the 23rd of
last February, which I had the honor to communicate at that
time for the information of the Government of the United
States. I am further directed to say that the agreement does
not in anywise interfere with the full operation or validity
of Korea’s existing treaties; and that Article II thereof is
not intended to place any impediment in the way of legitimate
enterprise in Korea, but merely to check, as far as possible,
the future conclusion of unwise and improvident engagements,
which in the past have been fruitful sources of trouble and
complication."

The Agreement thus announced was in the following terms:

"ARTICLE I.
The Korean Government shall engage a Japanese subject
recommended by the Japanese Government as financial adviser to
the Korean Government, and all matters concerning finance
shall be dealt with after his counsel shall have been taken.

"ARTICLE II.
The Korean Government shall engage a foreigner recommended by
the Japanese Government as diplomatic adviser to the foreign
office, and all important matters concerning foreign relations
shall be dealt with after his counsel shall have been taken.

"ARTICLE III.
The Korean Government shall consult the Japanese Government
before concluding treaties and conventions with foreign
powers, and also in dealing with other important diplomatic
affairs, such as grants of concessions to or contracts with
foreigners."

Writing of this Agreement a few days later to the State
Department at Washington, the American Minister to Japan, Mr.
Lloyd Griscom, remarked:

"It is interesting to note that Mr. Megata, selected to be
financial adviser to the Korean Government, was educated in
America and is a graduate of Harvard University, and Mr.
Stevens, who has been chosen as adviser to the foreign office,
is an American gentleman about whom it would be superfluous to
inform you."

Under a third Agreement, signed April 1, 1905, Japan took over
the control and operation of the post, telegraph, and
telephone services of Korea, in order to "rearrange the system
of communications in that country, and, by amalgamating it
with that of Japan, to unite the two systems into one."

Finally, on the 17th of November, 1905, a fourth Agreement was
signed, which definitely surrendered to Japan the "control and
direction of the external relations and affairs of Korea," in
the following stipulations:

"ARTICLE I.
The Government of Japan, through the department of foreign
affairs in Tokyo, will hereafter have control and direction of
the external relations and affairs of Korea and the diplomatic
and consular representatives of Japan will have the charge of
the subjects and interests of Korea in foreign countries.

"ARTICLE II.
The Government of Japan undertake to see to the execution of
the treaties actually existing between Korea and other powers,
and the Government of Korea engage not to conclude hereafter
any act or engagement having an international character,
except through the medium of the Government of Japan.

"ARTICLE III.
The Government of Japan shall be represented at the court of
His Majesty the Emperor of Korea by a resident general, who
shall reside at Seoul primarily for the purpose of taking
charge of and directing the matters relating to diplomatic
affairs. He shall have the right of private and personal
audience of His Majesty the Emperor of Korea. The Japanese
Government shall have the right to station residents at the
several open ports and such other places in Korea as they may
deem necessary.

"Such residents shall, under the direction of the resident
general, exercise the powers and functions hitherto
appertaining to Japanese consuls in Korea, and shall perform
such duties as may be necessary in order to carry into full
effect the provisions of this agreement.

"ARTICLE IV.
The stipulations of all treaties and agreements existing
between Japan and Korea not inconsistent with the provisions
of this agreement shall continue in force.

"ARTICLE V.
The Government of Japan undertake to maintain the welfare and
dignity of the Imperial House of Korea."

With the communication of this Agreement to foreign Powers
there went a declaration by the Japanese Government, in part
as follows:

"The relations of propinquity have made it necessary for Japan
to take and exercise, for reasons closely connected with her
own safety and repose, a paramount interest and influence in
the political and military affairs of Korea. The measures
hitherto taken have been purely advisory, but the experience
of recent years has demonstrated the insufficiency of measures
of guidance alone.
{367}
The unwise and improvident action of Korea, more especially in
the domain of her international concerns, has in the past been
the most fruitful source of complications. To permit the
present unsatisfactory condition of things to continue
unrestrained and unregulated would be to invite fresh
difficulties, and Japan believes that she owes it to herself
and to her desire for the general pacification of the extreme
East to take the steps necessary to put an end once for all to
this dangerous situation."

KOREA: A. D. 1904-1905.
Status of the Korean Empire under Japanese Control.
The Japanese View.

"After her quick entry into Seoul at the outbreak of the war,
Japan found herself precisely in the position which she had
long desired to establish. The plan of joint non-intervention
in Korean affairs as agreed upon between Japan and Russia in
1896 and 1898 [see, in Volume VI. of this work, Korea], which
had again and again resulted in competitive intervention, had
proved disastrous to the interest of Japan and of general
reform; but now Russia had abruptly withdrawn from Seoul, and
Japan found herself free to move alone. Thereupon she hastened
to impose upon the Korean Foreign Minister a treaty of
alliance [as above], on February 23, 1904, which laid the
foundation for all Japan’s subsequent conduct in the
peninsula. …

"An analysis and interpretation of the forces which the war
has set loose and which are bringing their inevitable
consequences would be highly instructive. Let us, however,
content ourselves here by pointing to the Korean clauses in
the three important documents concluded within the last two
years, in which the rapid development of the Korean problem is
easily traceable,—namely, the Korean-Japanese treaty of
alliance of February 23, 1904, the Russo-Japanese treaty of
peace signed on September 5, 1905 [see, in this Volume, JAPAN;
A. D. 1905 (June-October)], and the Anglo Japanese agreement
of alliance concluded on August 12 [see JAPAN: A. D. 1905
(August)], and published with Lord Lansdowne’s dispatch to the
British Ambassador at St. Petersburg on September 26, 1905. It
will be remembered that the first instrument at once placed
Korea under Japan’s military protection and administrative
guidance, and bound Japan to uphold Korea’s independence and
territorial integrity, including the safety of her Imperial
house. One will readily observe that two distinct points are
here involved. These two points the further progress of
events, some of which have already been described, seems to
have put so far apart, that in the treaty of Portsmouth
Japan’s preponderance over Korea was recognized by Russia,
while little was said of the independence of the peninsular
empire. It was even said that M. Witte insisted during the
discussion of the clause that Baron Komura should declare in
his proposed terms that Japan intended to make of Korea a
province of the Japanese Empire. This the Baron is reported to
have emphatically declined, presumably because he would not
consider the protection by Japan and the territorial integrity
of Korea incompatible with each other. The difference between
the theoretical and practical situation is, however, reflected
unmistakably in the Anglo-Japanese agreement, the third
article of which reads: ‘Japan possessing paramount political,
military, and economic interests in Korea, Great Britain
recognizes Japan’s right to take such measures for the
guidance, control and protection of Korea as she may deem
proper and necessary to safeguard and advance those interests,
providing the measures so taken are not contrary to the
principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry
of all nations.’ In other words, Japan is left free to control
Korea and then prevail upon the latter to open her door
equally wide to all nations, including Japan herself. After
specially dwelling on the substance of this article, Lord
Lansdowne says in his dispatch: ‘The treaty at this point
differs conspicuously from that of 1902. It has, however,
become evident that Korea, owing to its close proximity to the
Japanese Empire, and to its inability to stand alone, must
fall under the control and tutelage of Japan. His Majesty’s
Government observes with satisfaction that this point has been
readily conceded by Russia in the treaty of peace, and there
is every reason to believe that similar views are held by the
other Powers with regard to the relations which should subsist
between Japan and Korea.’ Thus are Korea’s alleged incapacity
of self-government and Japan’s need of control over the
peninsular affairs openly recognized by a third Power, and it
is taken for granted that no other Power will deny these
points. Such a declaration could not be made, it is admitted,
in 1902, when the first treaty of alliance was concluded, nor
perhaps even at the time when the Korean-Japanese protocol was
signed in February, 1904. Yet the doctrine of Korea’s
independence is still not theoretically contradictory with
this situation now recognized by the Russian and British
governments, nor has it become less effective than in the last
year, for, while the control by Japan has since been
tightened, Korea remains a separate empire with all the
sovereign rights of an independent State. Japan, speaking
technically, exercises a supervisory control and discharges
administrative functions entrusted to her care. The future
trend of affairs—whether the Korean independence will vanish
into a mere fiction as the Japanese control advances, or
whether under the latter the peninsular people will be trained
to an effective self-government—must largely be determined by
the mutual interaction of the complex factors, both Korean and
Japanese, public and private, conscious and unconscious, which
are steadily working out the destiny of the peninsula."

_K. Asakawa,
Korea and Manchuria under the New Treaty
(Atlantic Monthly, November, 1905)._

KOREA: A. D. 1905 (August).
New Agreement concerning Korea between Great Britain and Japan.

See (in this Volume)
JAPAN: A. D. 1905 (AUGUST).

KOREA: A. D. 1905-1909.
Japanese Control of Korean Affairs.
Under Prince Ito.
Attempted appeal of Korea to the Hague Conference of 1907.
Enforced abdication of the Emperor.
Elevation of his Son to the Throne.
Extensive and fierce Revolt rigorously fought down.
Retirement of Prince Ito.
Recent Measures.

As to the use made by the Japanese of the entireness of their
domination in Korea, as conceded to them in the treaties
referred to above, by the Government of Korea, primarily, and
by Great Britain and Russia, secondarily, in their recognition
and endorsement of the status thus established, there has been
much controversy since.
{368}
The Koreans themselves have been loud complainants of harsh
and oppressive exercises of Japanese power in their country,
and have found many sympathizers among the western peoples to
denounce their alleged wrongs. On the other hand, many foreign
visitors to Korea, after careful observation of conditions in
the country, have borne strong testimony in favor of the
Japanese conduct of Korean affairs. Professor George T. Ladd,
for example, of Yale University, is one of these witnesses
whose judgment has great weight. Having gone to Japan to give
a course of lectures there, Professor Ladd was asked by Prince
Ito, the Japanese Resident-General in Korea, to visit the
latter country as an observer, and lend counsel to the Prince
relative specially to some matters that touched American
missions. His subsequent book, entitled "In Korea with Prince
Ito," represents, beyond question, a careful and candid study
of conditions which he had the best of opportunities for
becoming rightly acquainted with. It does not approve or
justify everything that the Japanese dictators of Korean
administration were doing, but it represents the general
motive and intent of their undertakings to have been for the
improvement of the people and country whose affairs they had
taken into their hands. The same may be said of what has been
written of Korea since the Russo-Japanese war by Mr. George
Kennan, the experienced traveller in the East and student of
its peoples and their life.

The truth appears to be that the Japanese are using their
power in Korea as justly, as honestly, as rightly as the
English are using similar power in Egypt, as the Americans are
using it in the Philippine Islands, or as any people has ever
used the power to dictate government to another people. The
question of right and wrong in all such cases goes back of the
mode of using the overlordship, and is a question of the right
to hold it for any mode of use. That there was compulsion in
the procurement of the convention by which the Emperor of
Korea and his decadent Government surrendered themselves to
the dictatorial protection of Japan goes without saying. That
there is not a strong nation in the world to-day that would
not, in the same circumstances, have exercised the same
compulsion and wrung the same surrender, is just as
indisputable; but the political morality of the world is still
too undeveloped for that fact to be exonerating. It only
"sights" the political ethics of Japan along the level of our
Christendom, and finds her to be, at least, not below it.

Soon after the Convention of November 17, 1905 had been
signed, Marquis Ito, the Japanese Resident-General in Korea,
invited the newspaper editors in Seoul to a luncheon, at which
he addressed them, as reported at the time, partly in these
words:

"If the state of affairs in Korea be examined, it is found
that the relations between sovereign and subject, government
and governed, are of a very distant nature, and are by no
means so close as those in Japan. Hence it becomes inevitable
to adopt toward the Government measures of a more or less
compulsory nature. The people, however, are eminently peaceful
and quiet, and toward them, therefore, the policy pursued must
be one of gentle persuasion. Those are points which have to be
kept in view not merely by our officials, but also by all
Japanese subjects residing in Korea. Such Japanese subjects
must carefully refrain from all acts of violence to which
their country’s victories may prompt them, and must be guided
by a spirit of kindness in their dealings with the Koreans.
Already the United States representative in Seoul has received
instructions from his Government for the removal of the legation,
and it may be assumed that the other powers will similarly
recognize Japan’s convention. It will then be for Japan not to
forget the duties that heaven has delegated to her, but to
lead Korea gently and helpfully along the path of progress,
for assuredly anything like arbitrary or coercive conduct will
earn for Korea the sympathy of the nations, and will defeat
the true and abiding policy of Japan."

Discontent, complaint, resistance in Korea were inevitable,
whatever treatment the country in so helpless and humbled a
situation might receive. By a dexterous movement in 1907 it
compelled the world to take notice of its plight. The Emperor,
or his immediate entourage, succeeded by some means in fairly
smuggling out of the country a delegation commissioned to
claim a hearing before the Peace Conference at The Hague.
Their claim was effectually extinguished by the agreement of
1904, which turned over to Japan the whole management of the
foreign affairs of Korea; but the Korean situation was
discussed widely for a time. Nothing of benefit to the native
Korean Government, however, came from the event. The iron hand
of Japanese control was laid in heavier pressure on the feeble
court, at once. The nominal Korean Ministry was made to demand
and compel the abdication of the Emperor, on the ground that
he had endangered the national welfare by violation of the
treaty of August, 1904. His young son was crowned in his
stead, and Korea was required to submit to a new Agreement,
signed on the 24th of July, 1907, by which the
Resident-General "acquired initiative as well as consultatory
competence to enact and enforce laws and ordinances, to
appoint and remove Korean officials, and to place capable
Japanese subjects in the ranks of Korean officialdom." Special
provision was made for the separation of the Judiciary and the
Executive, so as to put an end, wrote an English
correspondent, "to the grievous corruption practised under a
system which invested provincial governors and district
magistrates with judicial functions, reducing the
administration of justice to a mere matter of favour or
interest." Under this new agreement the Resident-General
acquired authority sufficient to overcome obstruction, for it
pledged the Government of Korea to act under his guidance in
matters of administrative reform; not to enact any laws or
take any important measures without his previous assent; and
not to appoint or dismiss high officials without his
concurrence.

The attempt to carry an appeal to the Hague Conference was not
fortunate for Korea in the result. As a coup it was skilfully
executed, but can hardly be regarded as shrewd in the
planning. It was attributed, in both plan and execution, to an
American, Mr. Homer B. Hurlbert, who went to Korea as an
educator some years before, under an appointment by the
Government of the United States, on an official request from
Korea; who had acquired much influence there and was
strenuously a partisan of the Koreans, as against the
Japanese.
{369}
Publishing a small periodical, the _Korean Review_, Mr.
Hurlburt became an effective champion of their cause, publicly
as well as privately in the native counsels of the overlorded
empire. In the latter capacity he was pitted against another
American, Mr. Durham White Stevens, whose appointment by
Japanese selection, in 1904, to be adviser to the Korean
Foreign Office, is mentioned above. Originally in the service
of his own country, Mr. Stevens had then become official
adviser to the Japanese Legation at Washington, and passed
from that to the service in Korea. His fidelity to Japanese
interests centered on him the animosity of the rebellious
element in Korea, and he fell a victim to their hate.

The forcing of the old Emperor from the throne and the
exaction of a more direct and complete submission of Korea to
Japanese rule had provoked an extensive revolt. This was made
more serious by an acknowledged mistake committed by Prince
Ito, in disbanding the Korean army. A correspondent of the New
York _Evening Post_, who wrote from Tokyo on the 14th of
December, 1908, gave this account of the effect, and of the
dreadful suffering of the country from the conflict that
followed, in 1907-1908:

"The discharged soldiers, stung by the disgrace of dismissal
and the dishonor of forced submission to hated intruders,
quickly spread all over the country, stirring up their
compatriots to a fearless and often a fatal zeal against the
alien administration. The Japanese authorities forthwith set
about a vigorous suppression of the malcontents, even to the
extent of a merciless annihilation of life and a wholesale
destruction of property. … The rebel forces only waxed more
formidable, until by the approach of spring the insurgent
bands were so widely distributed and menacing that no Japanese
could safely venture beyond the confines of well-guarded towns
and cities.

"Accordingly the imperial authorities were driven to replace
their new policy of remaining on the defensive by the former
one of extermination, and no quarter. Last summer, therefore,
a well-organized campaign for completely wiping out the
insurrectionary forces was resolved upon and put into
execution. … A proclamation had previously been issued to the
effect that all Koreans affording food or shelter to the
insurgents, or in any way rendering assistance liable to
involve a charge of complicity, would be summarily dealt with;
while those who surrendered to the proper authorities would be
pardoned. The message placed the people between the devil and
the deep sea. If the natives refused assistance to the
insurgents, obedience would be required of them at the point
of the bayonet by their insulted fellow-patriots; while if
they were suspected of thus acquiescing, they perished at the
hands of the Japanese soldiery. Under the circumstances the
Koreans naturally chose rather to die serving their own people
than to suffer the same fate by resisting them."

A tragical incident of this fierce struggle was the
assassination of Mr. Durham White Stevens, while visiting the
United States. He had been marked for death by the Korean
insurgents, and was slain by their emissaries, in March, 1908,
soon after his landing in California.

The correspondent above quoted regarded the insurrection as
having spent its force at the time of his writing, December,
1908. Against the enormous destruction of life and property
which the suppression of it had cost, he proceeded to set a
brief summary of the simultaneous constructive and reformative
work which the Japanese had been carrying on. This was
described more broadly, however, a little later, by a writer
in the London _Times_, from whom we quote;

"The coasts have been lighted and buoyed; posts, telegraphs,
and, telephones have been provided; roads and railways have
been built; public buildings have been erected; various
industrial enterprises have been started, as printing,
brick-making, forestry, and coal-mining; model farms have been
laid out; the cultivation of cotton has been commenced and
promises to become a great industry; an industrial training
school has been built and equipped; an exposition has been
held in Seoul; sanitary works have been inaugurated; fine
hospitals and medical schools have been opened; an excellent
educational system modelled on that of Japan has been
organized; waterworks have been constructed in several towns;
and, last though not least, complete freedom of conscience has
replaced the old anti-Christian bigotry."

In June, 1909, the veteran statesman, Prince Ito, was relieved
of the trying office of Resident-General in Korea, and
succeeded by Viscount Sone, who had previously served with him
as Vice Resident-General. A Tokyo correspondent wrote of the
change:

"It was first planned to appoint Viscount Terauchi, minister
of war in the Japanese Cabinet, to the residency in Korea, but
Prince Ito objected, pointing out to the ministers that the
selection of Viscount Terauchi, a lieutenant-general, would be
considered as a triumph for the military regime and an
abandonment and disavowal of Prince Ito’s policy for the
peaceful development of Korea. As usual, Prince Ito’s advice
was accepted by his fellow statesmen, and Viscount Sone, who
received his training in Korea under the administration of
Prince Ito, was named to the post.

"A high officer said to-day that when the Korea residency was
created it was incumbent upon Japan to send her most able
statesman, Prince Ito, to fill the important post. He
formulated his policy of administration without interference,
and while some of the leading men of Japan were inclined to
doubt the wisdom of that policy they are now virtually
converted to his ideas, and it is generally believed that the
feeling of confidence and friendship for Japan can be created
among the Koreans and make the country doubly valuable."

Further changes in the administration of Korean affairs
attended this official change. They were reported to the
London _Times_ by its Tokyo correspondent, July 18, as
follows:

"Japan has just taken some important steps in Korea, the
occasion chosen being the simultaneous presence of the
outgoing and the incoming Residents-General in Seoul. She has
made arrangements for the establishment of a central bank
under official auspices, and she has negotiated for the
abolition of the two Departments of War and Justice. … The
capital will be one million sterling in £10 shares, 30,000 of
which shares will be allotted to the Korean Government, the
remainder being offered for subscription in Korea and Japan.
… An important feature is that all the bank’s officers will
be nominated by the Japanese Government, though they may
include Korean subjects.

{370}

"This being a purely financial measure which falls naturally
into its place in the sequence of Japan’s protectorate
programme has not attracted any special attention. Not so,
however, the abolition of the Korean Department of Justice,
and its replacement by a bureau in the Residency-General. The
immediate effect of that change is to convert the Korean
Courts of law into branches of the Japanese tribunals of
justice. Korean laws will, of course, be administered—and
their revision and codification cannot be accomplished in a
moment—but all the occupants of the bench will be selected
and appointed by Japan, and if competent Koreans cannot be
found, or until they are educated, Japanese alone will be
nominated. Japan is to bear the charges of this arrangement—
namely, £50,000 annually. The innovation is not so radical as
it appears at first sight. Already the assistant Judges in the
principal Courts were Japanese subjects, so that what is now
done is to extend the system rather than to alter it. …

"These things may be regarded as a definite step towards the
reality of Japan’s control in Korea. There have been three
distinct stages in her attitude towards her neighbour: first,
the advisory stage; then the stage of subordinate
administration; and finally the stage of well-nigh effective
direction. The first stage was antecedent to the Convention of
November, 1906. During that period Japan limited herself to
tendering counsels which Korea adopted or rejected at will.
The second stage was marked by assumption of entire authority
in the realm of foreign affairs; entire authority in the
domain of communications; practically entire authority in
military and police affairs, and vicarious authority in the
Departments of State by means of Vice-Ministers, in the field
of justice by the agency of assistant judges, and in
provincial administration by means of secretaries who ranked
as assistant-governors. The third stage has just been
inaugurated; military control has been made complete; judicial
control has been made complete, and financial control has been
made well-nigh complete. Very little remains to be done."

----------KOREA: End--------

KOSSUTH, Ferencz:
Leader of the Independence Party in Hungary.

See (in this Volume)
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY: A. D. 1902-1903; 1904;
1905-1906; 1908-1909.

KRATZ, Charles:
Municipal "Boodler" of St. Louis.

See (in this Volume)
MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT.

KRONSTADT:
Revolutionary Disturbances.
The treachery that defeated the Rising of 1906.

See (in this Volume)
RUSSIA: A. D. 1905 (FEBRUARY-NOVEMBER), and
1906 (AUGUST).

KUANG-HSU: Emperor of China.
His death.

See (in this Volume)
CHINA: A. D. 1908 (NOVEMBER).

KUENSAN HILL, CAPTURE OF.

See (in this Volume)
JAPAN: A. D. 1904-1905 (MAY-JANUARY).

KULTURKAMPF, The.

See (in this Volume)
EDUCATION: PRUSSIA; A. D. 1904.

KURINO: JAPANESE MINISTER AT ST. PETERSBURG.

See (in this Volume)
JAPAN: A. D. 1901-1904.

KUROKI, General.

See (in this Volume)
JAPAN: A. D. 1904 (FEBRUARY-JULY), and after.

KUROPATKIN, General:
In the Russo-Japanese War.

See (in this Volume)
JAPAN: A. D. 1904 (FEBRUARY-JULY), and after.

KUYPER, REVEREND DR. ABRAHAM.

See (in this Volume)
NETHERLANDS: A. D. 1905-1909.

L.

LABOR EXCHANGES ACT, British.

See (in this Volume)
POVERTY, PROBLEMS OF: ENGLAND.

----------LABOR ORGANIZATION: Start--------

Trade Unions
Labor Parties
Strikes
Lockouts
Mediations
Arbitrations
Industrial Agreements

LABOR ORGANIZATION: Australia: A. D. 1886-1906.
The Rise of the Labor Party.
Its rigorous organization.

Some account of the part played in Australian politics by the
Labor Party is given elsewhere.

See, in this Volume,
AUSTRALIA: A. D. 1903-1904, and after.

The circumstances of the rise and growth of the party are
related briefly and the rigorousness of its organization is
described in the following:

"To trace the origin of the movement we must go back to the
fall of prices which began about 1886, to the succeeding lean
years 1886-1892, and the miseries of the consequent period of
unsuccessful strikes. The strikers and their working-class
sympathizers were taunted with appealing to brute force, and
recommended to depend rather upon constitutional political
methods for the redress of grievances. The workingmen took the
advice and bettered it. The trades unions devoted a portion of
their funds and much of their energy to political propaganda.
First in New South Wales, later in all the colonies and in
many widely separated districts, labor leagues were organized
which sketched out a policy and laid down a pledge which all
candidates supported by the leagues must sign. These formed
the nucleus of a new and independent political party which
gave their votes to either Liberal or Conservative
indifferently, regardless of which was in office, in return
for legislative concessions from either. The new party
springing thus almost simultaneously to life all over the
continent was at first regarded as a pathetic joke. They were
few in numbers, uneducated, inexperienced in affairs of state,
and had opposed to them all the wealth and the legal
astuteness in every chamber where they held seats. But they
were determined, united, and, with rare exceptions,
self-sacrificing. They were mutually bound not to take office
except with the consent of their fellow-laborites, so that
they were labeled from the first as ‘Not for sale.’ And from
their point of view the plan has succeeded.

{371}

"Friend and foe alike pay tribute to the magnificent
organization and discipline of the movement, and to the
personal disinterestedness of the leaders. A great economy of
effort is assured by having a platform and organization
practically identical for the Federal, State and municipal
elections, and for general propaganda work, and consequently
being able to utilize the same bodies—the local political
labor leagues—and the same workers for what seems to them
social righteousness, whether in national, State, or municipal
concerns. The Labor party was born of trades-unionism, and its
whole administration has been based on trades union methods.
The political labor leagues were at first composed of
trades-unionists, and are still closely in touch with trades
unions. These are the bodies who vote for the selection of
candidates for all elections and for delegates to the annual
and triennial State and Federal conferences of the party. The
Labor party in Parliament may be the controlling force, but no
other party in Australia has to carry out the behests of its
constituents as does this.

"We now come to the pledge and the caucus. The pledge, which
was first drafted by the New South Wales Labor Conference in
1895, reads as follows: ‘I hereby pledge myself not to oppose
the candidate selected by the recognized political Labour
organisation, and, if elected, to do my utmost to carry out
the principles—embodied in the Federal Labour Platform, and on
all questions affecting the Platform to vote as a majority of
the Parliamentary Party may decide at a duly constituted
caucus meeting.’

"As the pledge binds all members to carry out the general
principles of a platform decided for him by the united labor
vote of Australia, so each man has his vote in the legislature
decided for him beforehand on all details of that policy by
the caucus vote of his party in the legislature, before or
during the course of debate. The advocates of the system say
that this is the only way in which any consistent policy can
be carried out to a successful end. Opponents assert that in
it we have the germs of machine politics, and that labor may
by and by pay dearly for its present victory. The large amount
of direct representation in Australia, and the increasing
probabilities of the initiative and referendum being more
largely used, may check this tendency."

_Alice Henry,
The Australian Labor Movement
(The Outlook, November 3, 1906)._

LABOR ORGANIZATION: A. D. 1905-1909.
Failures of the Compulsory Arbitration Law.

In this Volume, under the heading—AUSTRALIA: A. D. 1905-1906,—
an instance of failure in the operation of the compulsory
Arbitration Law to arrest a strike of coal miners in New South
Wales is recorded. The failure was repeated in the same field
in the fall of 1909, when 12,000 miners of the Newcastle and
Maitland collieries of New South Wales stopped work. "The
men," it was reported, "demand an open conference to deal with
the principal grievances, with resort, in the event of
failure, to the Federal Arbitration Court or a special
commission. The owners, on the other hand, insist on a
conference with closed doors and the settlement of undecided
questions under the State Industrial Act. They further want
work to be resumed simultaneously with the opening of the
conference. The men, however, refuse to hew coal until their
grievances have been settled, but offer to carry on during the
conference all work necessary to keep the mines in working
order."

The correspondent who reported this went on to say:

"The public seems to be without a remedy against the strikers,
since it is impossible to imprison the whole mass, and the
imprisonment of the leaders would mean a general strike. In
addition the only available labour for colliery purposes is
controlled by the trade unions."

Evidently, however, the law was vindicated in the end, since a
report from Sydney on the 29th of December, made known that 13
officials of the miners’ union had been fined £100 each, with
two months hard labor in default.

LABOR ORGANIZATION: Austria: A. D. 1902.

During a strike of about 6500 men in various employments at
Trieste, in February, 1902, there were conflicts with the
military in which about 40 were killed and wounded. The demand
was for an eight hours day, and it was conceded in the end,
after an arbitration which decided in their favor. In the
following August serious labor disturbances occurred in
Galicia, where the peasants claimed better wages, and troops
had to be sent to the region to restore order.

LABOR ORGANIZATION: Belgium: A. D. 1902.
General Strike of Workmen as Protest against
the Plural Suffrage.

See (in this Volume)
BELGIUM: A. D. 1902.

LABOR ORGANIZATION: A. D. 1903.
Compensation for Injuries to Workmen.

After months of debate an Act prescribing compensation for
accidents injurious to workmen was passed, attempts to attach
to it the principle of compulsory insurance having failed.

LABOR ORGANIZATION: Canada: A. D. 1907-1908.
The Act known as "The Industrial Disputes
Investigation Act."
Its main provisions.
Its object, not Compulsory Arbitration, but the
Compulsory Attempting of Arbitration.
General success of the Act.
Failure to prevent Canadian Pacific Railway Strike.

In the judgment of many who give thought and study to labor
questions, the most promising experiment yet made in
legislation for dealing with disputes between employers and
workmen is the Canadian Act of March, 1907, entitled "An Act
to aid in the Prevention and Settlement of Strikes and
Lockouts in Mines and Industries connected with Public
Utilities." The essence of the Act is in its 56th to 61st
sections, which read as follows:

"56.
It shall be unlawful for any employer to declare or cause a
lockout, or for any employee to go on strike, on account of
any dispute prior to or during a reference of such dispute to
a Board of Conciliation and Investigation under the provisions
of this Act, or prior to or during a reference under the
provisions concerning railway disputes in the Conciliation and
Labour Act: Provided that nothing in this Act shall prohibit
the suspension or discontinuance of any industry or of the
working of any persons therein for any cause not constituting
a lockout or strike: Provided also that, except where the
parties have entered into an agreement under section 62 of
this Act, nothing in this Act shall be held to restrain any
employer from declaring a lockout, or any employee from going
on strike in respect of any dispute which has been duly
referred to a Board and which has been dealt with under
section 24 or 25 of this Act, or in respect of any dispute
which has been the subject of a reference under the provisions
concerning railway disputes in the Conciliation and Labour
Act.

{372}

"57.
Employers and employees shall give at least thirty days’
notice of an intended change affecting conditions of
employment with respect to wages or hours; and in every case
where a dispute has been referred to a Board, until the
dispute has been finally dealt with by the Board, neither of
the parties nor the employees affected shall alter the
conditions of employment with respect to wages or hours, or on
account of the dispute do or be concerned in doing, directly
or indirectly, anything in the nature of a lockout or strike,
or a suspension or discontinuance of employment or work, but
the relationship of employer and employee shall continue
uninterrupted by the dispute, or anything arising out of the
dispute; but if, in the opinion of the Board, either party
uses this or any other provision of this Act for the purpose
of unjustly maintaining a given condition of affairs through
delay, and the Board so reports to the Minister, such party
shall be guilty of an offence, and liable to the same
penalties as are imposed for a violation of the next preceding
section.

"58.
Any employer declaring or causing a lockout contrary to the
provisions of this Act, shall be liable to a fine of not less
than one hundred dollars, nor more than one thousand dollars,
for each day or part of a day that such lockout exists.

"59.
Any employee who goes on strike contrary to the provisions of
this Act shall be liable to a fine of not less than ten
dollars, nor more than fifty dollars, for each day or part of
a day that such employee is on strike.

"60.
Any person who incites, encourages or aids in any manner any
employer to declare or continue a lockout, or any employee to
go or continue on strike contrary to the provisions of this
Act, shall be guilty of an offence and liable to a fine of not
less than fifty dollars nor more than one thousand dollars.

"61.
The procedure for enforcing penalties imposed or authorized to
be imposed by this Act shall be that prescribed by Part XV. of
the Criminal Code relating to summary convictions."

A sufficient understanding of the practical operation of the
Act may be derived from the following prescriptive sections:

"5.
Wherever any dispute exists between an employer and any of his
employees, and the parties thereto are unable to adjust it,
either of the parties to the dispute may make application to
the Minister for the appointment of a Board of Conciliation and
Investigation, to which Board the dispute maybe referred under
the provisions of this Act: Provided, however, that, in the
case of a dispute between a railway company and its employees,
such dispute may be referred, for the purpose of conciliation
and investigation, under the provisions concerning railway
disputes in the Conciliation and Labour Act.

"6.
Whenever, under this Act, an application is made in due form
for the appointment of a Board of Conciliation and
Investigation, and such application does not relate to a
dispute which is the subject of a reference under the
provisions concerning railway disputes in the Conciliation and
Labour Act, the Minister, whose decision for such purpose
shall be final, shall, within fifteen days from the date at
which the application is received, establish such Board under
his hand and seal of office, if satisfied that the provisions
of this Act apply.

"7.
Every Board shall consist of three members who shall be
appointed by the Minister. Of the three members of the Board
one shall be appointed on the recommendation of the employer
and one on the recommendation of the employees (the parties to
the dispute), and the third on the recommendation of the
members so chosen."

"11.
No person shall act as a member of the Board who has any
direct pecuniary interest in the issue of a dispute referred
to such Board."

"23.
In every case where a dispute is duly referred to a Board it
shall be the duty of the Board to endeavour to bring about a
settlement of the dispute, and to this end the Board shall, in
such manner as it thinks fit, expeditiously and carefully
inquire into the dispute and all matters affecting the merits
thereof and the right settlement thereof. In the course of
such inquiry the Board may make all such suggestions and do
all such things as it deems right and proper for inducing the
parties to come to a fair and amicable settlement of the
dispute, and may adjourn the proceedings for any period the
Board thinks reasonable to allow the parties to agree upon
terms of settlement.

"24.
If a settlement of the dispute is arrived at by the parties
during the course of its reference to the Board, a memorandum
of the settlement shall be drawn up by the Board and signed by
the parties, and shall, if the parties so agree, be binding as
if made a recommendation by the Board under section 62 of this
Act, and a copy thereof with a report upon the proceedings
shall be forwarded to the Minister.

"25.
If a settlement of the dispute is not arrived at during the
course of its reference to the Board, the Board shall make a
full report, thereon to the Minister, which report shall set
forth the various proceedings and steps taken by the Board for
the purpose of fully and carefully ascertaining all the facts
and circumstances, and shall also set forth such facts and
circumstances, and its findings therefrom, including the cause
of the dispute and the Board’s recommendation for the
settlement of the dispute according to the merits and
substantial justice of the case.

"26.
The Board’s recommendation shall deal with each item of the
dispute and shall state in plain terms, and avoiding as far as
possible all technicalities, what in the Board’s opinion ought
or ought not to be done by the respective parties concerned.
Wherever it appears to the Board expedient so to do, its
recommendation shall also state the period during which the
proposed settlement should continue in force, and the date
from which it should commence."

"28.
Upon receipt of the Board’s report the Minister shall
forthwith cause the report to be filed in the office of the
Registrar and a copy thereof to be sent free of charge to the
parties to the dispute and to the representative of any
newspaper published in Canada who applies therefor, and the
Minister may distribute copies of the report, and of any
minority report, in such manner as to him seems most desirable
as a means of securing compliance with the Board’s
recommendation."

{373}

The fundamental object of the law, as will be seen, is not to
compel arbitration, but to compel an attempt at arbitration,
before any strike or lockout is permitted, and to give
authentic and full publicity to all the circumstances which
can justify or condemn a strike or lockout, if one occurs. So
far in the experience of Canada with this wise enactment it
has generally been successful in bringing about a peaceful
settlement of labor disputes. It failed in the case of a
disagreement between the Canadian Pacific Railway Company and
its mechanical employés, which arose in April, 1908, when the
Company served notice of a reduction of wages to one class of
boiler-makers, and of an increase in the proportion of
apprentices to be employed in its shops, together with some
changes of rules concerning machine tools, etc. The men
applied for the appointment of a Conciliation Board, in
accordance with the law, but were not satisfied with the
conclusions reported by a majority of the Board, and struck,
as the law then permitted them to do. The strike was weakened
by the unfavorable public opinion which the investigation
produced.

LABOR ORGANIZATION: England: A. D. 1892-1901.
A Statistical Study of Ten Years of Trade Disputes.

The following is the concluding summary of an elaborate
statistical study of Strikes and Lockouts in England during
the ten years from 1892 to 1901, made by an eminent
statistician, Mr. J. H. Schooling:

"To sum up the chief practical points that seem to have come
out of this examination of trade disputes during 1892-1901,
these are:

"(_a_)
An improvement during 1897-1901 as compared with 1892-1896.

"(_b_)
An altogether undue predominance of the Mining and Quarrying
Trades in trade disputes, not only actually, but also
relatively to the industrial population of each group of
trades compared. This is a most unsatisfactory feature, for
the reason that so many other trades depend upon
non-interruption of coal mining for their successful working.
Therefore, efforts to prevent disputes should be specially
directed to the Mining and Quarrying Trades.

"(_c_)
Nearly two-thirds of all trade disputes are caused by disputes
about wages, and nearly one-half of all trade disputes are
caused by a demand by workpeople for ‘an increase of wages.’
Only 6 per cent. of all disputes are caused by resistance
‘against decrease of wages.’ …

"(_d_)
Trade Unionism is not so productive of strikes as it is
commonly supposed to be.

"(_e_)
Conciliation Boards, etc., do not cause the settlement of many
disputes after the dispute has commenced. Their work is in the
direction of preventing strikes and lock-outs. That this work
is effective and that it should be zealously promoted is
evidenced by the fact that in 1901, 75 per cent. of all
changes in wages and in hours of labour were arranged by
sliding scales, wages boards, or by other peaceful methods,
while only 2 per cent. of these changes followed upon strikes
or lock-outs.

"(_f_)
The respective chances of success by workpeople or by
employers when a trade dispute is entered upon are, in round
numbers:
150 chances for the employers; and
100 chances for the workpeople.

"In addition to this relatively small chance of success by
workpeople when they strike, the cost to them and to their
trade organisations is relatively greater than the cost to
employers."

_J. H. Schooling,
Strikes and Lock-outs, 1892-1901
(Fortnightly Review, May, 1904)._

LABOR ORGANIZATION: A. D. 1900-1906.
The Taff Vale Decision.
Trades Unions made liable for Damages.
Resulting amendment of the English Law.