Chapter XIX: , page 276 (12)

Repeated outbreaks of both Mont Pelée and La Souffrière
occurred at intervals during more than a year following the
great explosion, adding much to the destruction of the means
of living on large parts of the islands and to the misery of
the inhabitants remaining in the regions affected, though not
greatly to the loss of life. Of the relief in money and
supplies from all sources that was poured into the two
afflicted islands no full reckoning can be obtained; but the
Governor of the Windward Islands reported to the Colonial
Office at London on the 20th of June, 1903, that total
receipts for the Eruption Fund to that date were £77,000, and
expenditures £42,787. "I shall have sufficient funds left in
the Colony," he added, "to meet all present needs, unless any
further unforeseen misfortune takes place."

VULGATE, REVISION OF THE.

See (in this Volume)
PAPACY: A. D. 1907-1909.

{691}

W.

WAGES AND COST OF LIVING.

See (in this Volume)
LABOR REMUNERATION: WAGES, &c.

WAI-WU-PU.

See (in this Volume)
CHINA: A. D. 1901-1908.

WALDECK-ROUSSEAU, PIERRE MARIE:
Resignation of Ministry.

See (in this Volume )
FRANCE: A. D. 1902 (APRIL-OCTOBER).

WALLER, DR. AUGUSTUS.

See (in this Volume)
SCIENCE AND INVENTION, RECENT: OPSONINS.

WALL STREET INVESTIGATION, THE.

See (in this Volume)
FINANCE AND TRADE: UNITED STATES: A. D. 1909.

----------WAR, THE PREPARATIONS FOR: Start--------

WAR, THE PREPARATIONS FOR: At Large:
Contradictory Feeling and Action in the World.
Its Causes.
International Barbarism with Inter-Personal Civilization.
The Two Main Knots of Difficulty in the Situation.
The British and the German Posture.

There was never before in the world so wide-spread and so
passionate a hatred of War, among civilized peoples, or so
earnest and determined an endeavor to supplant it by rational
methods of composing international disputes. At the same time,
there was never so frenzied a rivalry of preparation among the
nations for Warfare, by monstrous accumulation of its horrible
engines and tools. How can the glaring inconsistency be
accounted for without impeaching the general sanity of
mankind?

The strangeness of the situation was described most
graphically and feelingly, not long since, by Lord Rosebery,
in speaking at a banquet given to the delegates attending the
British Imperial Press Conference, at London, in June, 1909,
and his own feeling that went into the description of it
affords an explanation of the anomaly. "I do not know," said
the eloquent Earl, "that in some ways I have ever seen a
condition of things in Europe so remarkable, so peaceful, and
in some respects so ominous as the condition which exists at
this moment. There is a hush in Europe, a hush in which you
may almost hear a leaf fall to the ground. There is an
absolute absence of any questions which ordinarily lead to
war. One of the great Empires which is sometimes supposed to
menace peace is entirely engrossed with its own internal
affairs. Another great Eastern empire which furnished a
perpetual problem to statesmen has taken a new lease of life
and youth in searching for constitutional peace and reform.

"All forebodes peace; and yet at the same time, combined with
this total absence of all questions of friction, there never
was in the history of the world so threatening and so
overpowering a preparation for war. That is a sign which I
confess I regard as most ominous. For 40 years it has been a
platitude to say that Europe is an armed camp, and for 40
years it has been true that all the nations have been facing
each other armed to the teeth, and that has been in some
respects a guarantee of peace. Now, what do we see? Without
any tangible reason we see the nations preparing new
armaments. They cannot arm any more men on land, so they have
to seek new armaments upon the sea, piling up these enormous
preparations as if for some great Armageddon—and that in a
time of profoundest peace. We live in the midst of what I
think was called by Petrarch _tacens bellum_—a silent
warfare, in which not a drop of blood is shed in anger, but in
which, however, the last drop is extracted from the living
body by the lancets of the European statesmen. There are
features in this general preparation for war which must cause
special anxiety to the friends of Great Britain and the
British Empire, but I will not dwell upon these. I will only
ask you who have come to this country to compare carefully the
armaments of Europe with our preparations to meet them, and
give your impressions to the Empire in return. (Cheers.) I
myself feel confident in the resolution and power of this
country to meet any reasonable conjunction of forces. But when
I see this bursting out of navies everywhere, when I see one
country alone asking for 25 millions of extra taxation for
warlike preparation, when I see the absolutely unprecedented
sacrifices which are asked from us on the same ground, I do
begin to feel uneasy at the outcome of it all and wonder where
it will stop, or if it is nearly going to bring back Europe
into a state of barbarism, (hear, hear), or whether it will
cause a catastrophe in which the working men of the world will
say, ‘We will have no more of this madness, this foolery which
is grinding us to powder.’ (Cheers.)

"We can and we will build Dreadnoughts—or whatever the newest
type of ship may be (loud cheers)—as long as we have a
shilling to spend on them or a man to put into them. (Loud
cheers.) All that we can and will do; but I am not sure that
even that will be enough, and I think it may be your duty to
take back to your young dominions across the seas this message
and this impression—that some personal duty and responsibility
for national defence rests on every man and citizen. (Loud and
prolonged cheers.) Yes, take that message back with you. Tell
your people—if they can believe it—the deplorable way in which
Europe is lapsing into militarism and the pressure which is
put upon this little island to defend its liberties—and yours.
(Cheers.) But take this message also back with you—that the
old country is right at heart, that there is no failing or
weakness in heart, and that she rejoices in renewing her youth
in her giant dominions beyond the seas. (Loud cheers.) For her
own salvation she must look to herself, and that failing her
she must look to you. (Cheers.)"

{692}

Here, in the feeling of one superlatively civilized man, is
the feeling of more than half the world epitomized. It shrinks
with horror from the enormity of preparations that are "as if
for some great Armageddon," and shudders over what seems to be
"nearly going to bring back Europe into a state of barbarism";
but suspicion, distrust, fear impel it nevertheless, to cry
with Lord Rosebery: "We can and we will build Dreadnoughts as
long as we have a shilling to spend on them or a man to put
into them—because others are building them who may use them
against us." There is senselessness in this predicament of
mind, but it is the senselessness of a persisting
international barbarism, which keeps nation-neighbors still
standing in attitudes toward one another which became
foolishness to individual neighbors a thousand years ago. It
means, simply, that the society of nations is as barbaric as
it was when Englishmen and Normans fought at Senlac; and that
it is only in little street-neighborhoods that men have
arrived at the rational relationships which offer an
appearance of civilization in some parts of the world.

Two principal knots of difficulty must be cut in some way,
before an international civilization can be developed, by the
rational and moral processes which have civilized us
interpersonally in some considerable degree. The hardest of
these knots is tightened upon England, by the weight and the
strain of her great world-wide empire on the little island to
which it is bound. Not only the whole exterior fabric of
British Empire, but the bare subsistence of the people of the
small island at its center, depends on the uninterrupted use
of the surrounding seas for trade and travel between its
parts. To lose freedom in that use means the downfall of Great
Britain, not merely as a militant power, but in everything
that could carry her past importance into the future of the
world. It means so much as this, because the resources of the
island-home of the nation, within themselves, are so small.
There can be no wonder, then, that Englishmen reckon nothing
else so important to them as an indisputable free use of the
seas. Nor can there be wonder that they learned in the past to
look on an indisputable free use of the seas as implying a
mastery of the sea. Until within the last generation or two
this was the sole condition on which there could be security
in ocean trade. That it remains so still is the continued
belief of all the Governments which put millions on millions
into bigger and bigger steel-clad battleships, and of the
publics behind the Governments, which cry with Rosebery, "We
can and we will build Dreadnoughts as long as we have a
shilling to spend on them or a man to put into them." England
differs from the rest only in the imperativeness to her of
what is simply important to them. If security in the use of
the seas is still impossible of attainment without the
supremacy over them of an irresistible sea-power, then England
has justifications for the enormity of her naval armament
which no other nation can claim.

So long as a majority of Englishmen feel constrained to
believe that their ocean trade is made secure from hostile
obstruction by nothing but their naval strength, so long they
will strive to maintain a navy that shall be equal to the
combined navies of any other two Powers; and so long as that
"Two Power Standard" of British naval policy remains
inflexible, it seems forbidding to the hope of a common
agreement among the maritime nations to reduce their building
of battleships. With other Powers than Germany there might be
possibilities of such an agreement, even subject to a
concession of British naval supremacy, because of the
exceptionality of circumstance in England’s case; but it is
here that we come to the second of the two principal knots of
difficulty which hinder the international civilization of the
world, now so flagrantly over-due. Germany, coming late, by a
tardy unification, into the national career which the German
people are entitled to, by their energy of spirit and capacity
of brain, is impatient in the ambitions that were repressed so
long. Her industries, her commerce, her maritime undertakings
have been pushed in the last generation, against the older
competitions of Europe and America, with an impassioned
determination that has won extraordinary triumphs on every
line. Here, again, as in the case of England, there is an
exceptional exposure of the nation to those perils from war
which the state of international barbarism still keeps in
suspense. Germany elbows so many close neighbors in Europe
that nothing but a perfectly trusting friendship or a
perfectly organized reign of law among them can make safety
for any. In the absence of both friendly trust and
authoritative law, they stand on guard against each other in
the twentieth century as they did in the tenth; but with arms
a hundred-fold more hellish and a thousand-fold more ruinous
in cost. Under the pressure of her long-pent ambitions and
energies, Germany has beaten all her neighbors in this as in
other fields of exertion. She commands the best trained, the
best organized, the best equipped army in the world, and
stands admittedly the first among military Powers. But
military power does not give "world power," in the accepted
meaning of that term, and Germany is impelled by all the
strong motives of our time to acquire that. She is competing
with England in commerce, in shipping, in exploitations of
enterprise, everywhere, and she manifestly hopes yet to make
good the lateness of her coming into the field of colonial
plantation. By everything in the prevailing theories of
statesmanship, this calls for a development of naval power to
mate the military; and Germany has been zealously obedient to
the call,—so zealously that England has taken alarm. Since
about the year 1900 a German navy has been created so fast
that the "two power standard" of Great Britain has begun of
late to be a seriously difficult, because a frightfully
costly, naval standard to maintain. Yet England more than ever
believes that she must maintain it at any cost; because the
strenuousness of the German navy-building inspires her with a
new distrust. Hence these two Powers are setting a new pace to
the increase of naval armament, all other Governments catching
some infection from the new temper of suspicion and distrust
which works in theirs.

And this, mainly, at least, is why the world is busier to-day
than it was ever busy before in building monstrous ships and
guns and horrible inventions of a thousand sorts for battle,
while it loathes battle and war as they were never loathed by
mankind before.

{693}

One of the most impressive of recent utterances on this grave
subject fell from the lips of the Secretary for Foreign
Affairs in the Government of Great Britain, Sir Edward Grey,
on the 29th of March, 1909, when he said in Parliament: "Sir,
the martial spirit, I should be the last to deny, has its
place, and its proper place, in the life of a nation. That the
nation should take pride in its power to resist force by force
is a natural and wholesome thing. It is a source of perfectly
healthy pride to have soundness of wind and limb and physical
strength, and it has no unworthy part in the national spirit.
That I sympathize with entirely, but I would ask the people to
consider to what consequences the growth of armaments has led.
The great countries of Europe are raising enormous revenues
and something like one-half of them is being spent on naval
and military preparations. You may call it national insurance,
that is perfectly true; but it is equally true that one-half
of the national revenue of the great countries in Europe is
being spent on what are, after all, preparations to kill each
other. Surely the extent to which this expenditure has grown
really becomes a satire and a reflection upon civilization.
(Cheers.) Not in our generation, perhaps, but if it goes on at
the rate at which it has recently increased, sooner or later I
believe it will submerge that civilization. The burden already
shows itself in national credit—less in our national credit
than in the national credit of other nations—but sooner or
later, if it goes on at this rate, it must lead to national
bankruptcy. Is it to be wondered that the hopes and
aspirations of the best men in the leading countries are
devoted to trying to find some means of checking it? (Cheers.)
Surely that is a statement of the case in which, however
attached a man may be to what I may call the martial spirit,
he may at least see that the whole of Europe is in the
presence of a great danger. But, Sir, no country alone can
save that."

WAR, THE PREPARATIONS FOR: At Large:
Lord Morley on the Responsibility of the Press.

Speaking to the Imperial Press Conference, at London, in June,
1909, and referring to the "rebarbarism of Europe—the
rattling back into arms and the preparation to use arms," Lord
Morley said he thought the Press was more answerable for this
than all the ministers, officers, and diplomatists taken
together, and he pleaded for a systematic and persevering work
on the part of newspapers in behalf of peace among the
nations.

WAR, THE PREPARATIONS FOR: Military:
Average Cost of the Armies of the Great Military Powers.

In his report on the French army budget of 1909 M. Gervais
made a calculation of the average military expenditure of the
six Powers—namely, Russia, Germany, France, Austria-Hungary,
Italy, and Japan, which can mobilize the largest armies, and
found the total amount spent annually to be no less than 5,037
million francs (more than $1,000,000,000), and the number of
men which they could put into the field to be 31,700,000. The
army which England can mobilize comes seventh, and is given as
555,000 men, though her average annual expenditure is the same
as that of France—namely, 700 million francs ($140,000,000).
Comparing next the expenditure and the effectives of France
and Germany, the report states that the German army estimates
show an increase in 1909 to 69 million francs, being fixed at
1,067,862,437f., of which 838,037,151f., belong to the
ordinary budget and 229,825,226f. to the extraordinary budget.
The French army estimates for the year were 742,443,745f.
($150,000,000). The totals on either side were: Germany,
34,118 officers and 602,670 men; France, 27,310 officers and
511,930 men. The average cost per man in Germany is l,398f.
and in France 1,150f.

WAR, THE PREPARATIONS FOR:
Belgian Military Service Stiffened.
Substitution Abolished.
Personal Service Exacted.

Conscription of a mild type has existed in Belgium for some
years, supplemented by voluntary enlistments and ameliorated
by hired substitution, which released the well-to-do from
military service if they wished to escape it. The Liberals and
Socialists have for a long time been advocating the abolition
of the practice of substitution in favor of a system of
personal and universal military service; and, latterly they
were joined in the demand by a section of the Catholics. The
question became a dominant one in politics, and brought about
an extraordinary session of the Belgian Chamber in October,
1909, for discussion of a comprehensive measure of military
reform, for strengthening the self-defense of the kingdom. It
resulted in a decision that "general personal service
restricted to one son per family should be introduced, that
the annual contingent should be raised to 18,000 men, that the
peace strength should stand at 48,400, and that the eventual
war strength should be 250,000 men. It was also agreed that,
the ecclesiastics should be exempt."

WAR, THE PREPARATIONS FOR:
Brazilian Military Service.

Service in the Brazilian army was made obligatory by
legislation in 1907.

WAR, THE PREPARATIONS FOR:
The British Territorial Force.
The Reorganization of 1907-1908.
Lord Roberts’ Criticism.
His Bill for Compulsory Training.

The volunteer or militia forces of the United Kingdom, for
home service, underwent an important reorganization in 1907,
according to the provisions of an Act entitled the
"Territorial and Reserve Forces Act," the general scheme of
which may be learned from the following clauses, taken out of
the text of the Act:

"For the purposes of the reorganisation under this Act of His
Majesty’s military forces other than the regulars and their
reserves, and of the administration of those forces when so
reorganised, and for such other purposes as are mentioned in
this Act, an association may be established for any county in
the United Kingdom, with such powers and duties in connection
with the purposes aforesaid as may be conferred on it by or
under this Act. Associations shall be constituted, and the
members thereof shall be appointed and hold office in
accordance with schemes to be made by the Army Council."

"It shall be the duty of an association when constituted to
make itself acquainted with and conform to the plan of the
Army Council for the organisation of the Territorial Force
within the county and to ascertain the military resources and
capabilities of the county, and to render advice and
assistance to the Army Council and to such officers as the
Army Council may direct, and an association shall have,
exercise, and discharge such powers and duties connected with
the organisation and administration of His Majesty’s military
forces as may for the time being be transferred or assigned to
it by order of His Majesty signified under the hand of a
Secretary of State or, subject thereto, by regulations under
this Act, but an association shall not have any powers of
command or training over any part of His Majesty’s military
forces."

{694}

"The Army Council shall pay to an association, out of money
voted by Parliament for army services, such sums as, in the
opinion of the Army Council, are required to meet the
necessary expenditure connected with the exercise and
discharge by the association of its powers and duties.

"All men of the Territorial Force shall be enlisted by such
persons and in such manner and subject to such regulations as
may be prescribed: Provided that every man enlisted under this
Part of this Act—

(_a_)
Shall be enlisted for a county for which an association has
been established under this Act and shall be appointed to
serve in such corps for that county or for an area comprising
the whole or part of that county as he may select, and, if
that corps comprises more than one unit within the county,
shall be posted to such one of those units as he may select:

(_b_)
Shall be enlisted to serve for such a period as may be
prescribed, not exceeding four years, reckoned from the date
of his attestation:

(_c_)
May be re-engaged within twelve months before the end of his
current term of service for such a period as may be prescribed
not exceeding four years from the end of that term."

"Any part of the Territorial Force shall be liable to serve in
any part of the United Kingdom, but no part of the Territorial
Force shall be carried or ordered to go out of the United
Kingdom. Provided that it shall be lawful for His Majesty, if
he thinks fit, to accept the offer of any part or men of the
Territorial Force, signified through their commanding officer,
to subject themselves to the liability to serve in any place
outside the United Kingdom."

"Subject to the provisions of this section, every man of the
Territorial Force shall, by way of annual training—

(_a_)
Be trained for not less than eight nor more than fifteen, or
in the case of the mounted branch eighteen, days in every year
at such times and at such places in any part of the United
Kingdom as may be prescribed, and may for that purpose be
called out once or oftener in every year:

(_b_)
Attend the number of drills and fulfill the other conditions
relating to training prescribed for his arm or branch of the
service":

"His Majesty in Council may—Order that the period of annual
training in any year of all or any part of the Territorial
Force be extended, but so that the whole period of annual
training be not more than thirty days in any year."

The King is empowered to make orders with respect to pay and
allowances of the Territorial Force, as well as concerning its
government and discipline.

Under this Act the Territorial Force assumed form on the 1st
of April, 1908. The former organizations of Yeomanry and
Volunteers were given until 30th June to transfer to the new
Force. The strength of the Yeomanry and Volunteers on 31st
March had been 9,174 officers and 241,085 men. On 1st July the
strength of the new Force, including both transfers and
recruits, was about 8,000 officers and 176,500 men. Of these
some 112,000 men had joined for one year.

The latest published statement of the enrollment in the
Territorial Force (that can be referred to, here) was made on
the 26th of April, 1909, in the House of Lords, by Lord Lucas,
speaking for the Government, in reply to questions as to "how
many of the 315,000 men required to complete the Territorial
Force had been enrolled up to date; how many of these now
serving in the force were under 20 years of age; what was the
lowest age at which they had been and were now accepted; and
how many Territorials now serving had engaged for one year
only." The answer was: "the strength of the Territorial Force
on the first of this month was 8,938 officers out of an
establishment of 11,267, or 79 percent.; 254,524 men out of a
strength of 302,047; or a total of 263,462 out of an
establishment of 313,314, which came out at 84 per cent. In
answer to the second question he was sorry that they had not
got later particulars than October 1, 1908, but on that day
there were 188,785 men on the strength of the Territorial
Force of whom 62,288 were under 20. The answer to the third
question was that the limit of age for men was 17, and for
boys 14. In answer to the fourth, he could not give the noble
earl the actual number of men serving at the present time for
one year, but the figures he could give would make it pretty
clear. They had last year 107,857 one-year men serving in the
force—Volunteers who had transferred for one year. On April 1
last out of these 107,857 men 56,238 had already reengaged for
one year or more. That was to say, that these men had
signified their intention of re-engaging before their year was
actually up."

Lord Roberts has no confidence in the efficiency of the
Territorial Force, as a voluntary organization. In a letter
read to the House of Lords on the 17th of May, 1909, when a
motion expressive of this opinion was to be made and he found
himself unable to attend and support it personally, he wrote:

"On July 10, 1905, I said that ‘I have no hesitation in
stating that our armed forces as a body are as absolutely
unfitted and unprepared for war as they were in 1899-1900.
Close upon four years have passed since then, and I have no
hesitation in reaffirming my conviction."

Subsequently Lord Roberts introduced in the House of Lords a
"National Service (Training and Home Defence) Bill," on which
he spoke with great earnestness on the 12th of July. His Bill
imposed on all male subjects the obligation of serving in the
Territorial Force between the ages of 18 and 30, excepting
officers of the Regular and Reserve Forces, naval and
military, and some others; but subject to this and other
modifications every person who came under the Bill would be in
the same position as a person who voluntarily joins the
existing Territorial Force. The liability to training would
not extend over the whole term of service, but be limited to
four years. The Bill provided for absolute equality of
treatment of all classes, no purchase of discharge or of
exemption from service being allowed; but in the matter of
training various exemptions were provided for.

The Bill encountered more opposition than support in the
debate on it, and did not secure a second reading.

{695}

WAR, THE PREPARATIONS FOR:
British Army Reorganization.
Creation of a General Staff.
Result of the Report of the Esher Army Commission.
Work of the Defence Committee.

Speaking, in April, at the Imperial Conference of 1907, Mr.
Haldane, the Secretary for War in the British Ministry, gave a
brief but clear account of the reforms in the organization of
the Army which had been in progress since 1904. "The effect of
the war in South Africa," he said, "made a profound impression
on the minds of our advisers here. We realized that we had
gone into the war without adequate preparation for war on a
great scale, and that we had never fully apprehended the
importance of the maxim that all preparation in time of peace
must be preparation for war; it is of no use unless it is
designed for that; it is the only justification for the
maintenance of armies—the preparation for war. In consequence,
when the war was over, the then Government set to work—and the
present Government has continued to work—to endeavour to put
the modern military organization into shape. In 1904 a very
important committee sat. It was presided over by a civilian
who had given great attention to the study of military
organization, Lord Esher, and it contained on it two very
distinguished exponents of naval and military views, Sir John
Fisher and Sir George Clarke, as its other members. The
committee reported, and its report contained a complete scheme
for the reorganization of the War Office and of the Army. That
scheme was adopted by the late Government and has been carried
on by the present Government. One broad feature is this, that
our naval organization has been the one with which we have
been conspicuously successful in the history of this country,
as distinguished from our military organization, and,
therefore, as far as was possible, the naval organization was
taken as a type. But the broad feature which emerged with
regard to military preparations was this—Count Moltke was
able to organize victory for the Prussian and German armies in
1866, and again in 1870, because he and the General Staff
working under him were free to apply their minds wholly to war
preparation. That he was able to do this was due to the fact
that the organization and business administration of the Army
in peace were kept entirely distinct from the service which
consisted in the study of war problems and in the higher
training of the Staff and of the troops. That was the
principle recommended by the Esher Committee, and it
culminated in the provision of a brain for the Army in the
shape of a General Staff. That General Staff we have been at
work on for a long time past in endeavouring to get together.
The task was not as difficult as it seemed at first, because
the effect of the war was to bring to the front a number of
young officers who had shown remarkable capacity, and who
constituted the nucleus of a serious and thoughtful military
school. They were got together under the Esher reorganization,
and virtually there has been a General Staff in existence for
some time. But it was not until last September that it
received formal and complete shape in the Army Order of that
month."

Besides this fundamental reform, the Esher Commission pointed
the way to other important changes or effective improvements
in the administrative system of the Army. In place of the
commander-in-chief, a new post, that of inspector-general,
with a term of five years, was proposed, the principal duty of
the office being to inspect and report on the efficiency of
the military forces. Earl Roberts had just retired from the
position of commander-in-chief, and the Duke of Connaught
became inspector-general under the new regime. The existing
Defence Committee, instituted in 1902, was to be enlarged by
the addition of a permanent secretary, holding office for five
years; two naval officers, selected by the admiralty; two
military officers, chosen by the Viceroy of India; and, if
possible, other colonial representatives, holding office for
two years.

Of the importance of this Defence Committee, and of its work,
Prime Minister Asquith took occasion to speak recently in
Parliament (July 29, 1909). "Under the present Government," he
said, "during the four years we have been in office the full
Committee constituted by my predecessor, and which has since
rendered the same service to myself, has consisted of six
Cabinet Ministers in addition to the Prime Minister—namely,
the four Secretaries of State other than the Home Secretary,
the First Lord of the Admiralty, and the Chancellor of the
Exchequer. It has consisted next, as representing the Navy, of
the First Sea Lord and the Director of Naval Intelligence, and
as representing the Army the Chief of the General Staff and
the Director of Military Operations; and in addition to these
official members it has had the services and the coöperation
of the Inspector-General of the Forces (Sir John French), who
occupies an independent position; of Lord Esher, who is a
great expert in all these matters; and latterly, at my
nomination, Admiral Sir Arthur Wilson. That has been the
composition of the full Committee, but from time to time we
were able to add to it, and we ought to add to it, members
_ad hoc_. …

"The functions of the Defence Committee arise out of the
necessity felt, I think, in almost all the great countries of
the world, but which is nowhere so pressing as it is here
owing to our geographical and economic conditions—the
necessity of coordinating the work of the Navy and Army. It is
the primary business of the Defence Committee to study and
determine what is the best provision that can from time to
time be made for the military and naval requirements of the
Empire as a whole, to keep both naval and military
requirements, and their due relation to each other, constantly
in view." Giving examples of the subjects which the committee
had discussed, he said they had had under consideration the
military needs of the Empire with reference to recent changes
in Army organization; its military requirements as affected by
the defence of India; the strategical aspects of the Firth of
Clyde Canal; aerial navigation in view of the present and
prospective developments; our policy in regard to the Channel
tunnel and to the means of transit across the Channel; the
standard of fixed defences and garrisons in various parts of
the Empire, and the scale of reinforcements.

{696}

"In 1905 Mr. Balfour, who was then Prime Minister, made a
statement of the highest importance in regard to the
possibility of an invasion of these islands. Since then Lord
Roberts had asked for a reinvestigation of the problem in the
light of new facts and of the changed situation, and in 1907 a
special committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence was
appointed to go into the whole matter. In arriving at their
conclusion the committee conceded to those who were
apprehensive of invasion that it would take place when our
Regular Forces were absent upon some foreign expedition and
that the attack might be a surprise attack. The view
unanimously arrived at was, in the first place, that as long
as the naval supremacy of the country was adequately assured,
invasion on a large scale, involving the transport of 150,000
men, was an absolutely impracticable operation. The committee
held, on the other hand, that if we were permanently to lose
command of the sea, whatever might be the strength and
organization of our military forces at the moment—even if we
had an army like that of Germany—the subjection of the country
by the enemy would be inevitable. It followed from this that
it was the business of the Admiralty to maintain our naval
supremacy at such a height as would enable us to retain
command of the sea against any reasonably possible
combination. The second conclusion arrived at was that we
ought to have an Army for home defence sufficient in numbers
and organization to repel raids and to compel an enemy who
contemplated invasion to embark a force so considerable that
it could not possibly evade our Fleet. The belief of the
Admiralty was that a force of 70,000 men could not get
through; but an ample margin must be allowed for safety, and
it therefore became the business of the War Office to see that
we had a force capable of dealing effectively with 70,000 men.
For this country, then, to be secure against invasion we ought
to have an unassailable supremacy at sea and a home Army ready
to cope with a force of the dimensions he had named. It was
upon these conclusions that both the military and naval policy
of the country during his administration would be carried on."

Speaking in Parliament, in June, 1909, of the peculiar
character and efficient quality of the Regular Army of Great
Britain, Mr. Haldane, the Secretary for War, described it as
"an Army of the kind which no other Power in the world
possesses to the same extent as we do. It is customary," he
said, "to speak of the small British Army; but what Power in
the world has 80,000 white soldiers raised in their own
country stationed in a country like India, and 40,000 in other
parts of the Empire, and a further large force at home which
is tending to increase—and more and more the overseas
Dominions are tending to undertake their own defence? Now that
force is not primarily for use at home, though it may be used
for that; its real purpose is to work with the Navy overseas
and to undertake wars there. The great armies of the Continent
can only be mobilized for a limited time, and they cannot
undertake wars which last for two or five or ten years, as
ours can because it is a professional Army and leaves the
resources of the nation unaffected. That kind of overseas Army
is a peculiarity of the military organization of this country,
a peculiarity which is too often overlooked, but which is just
as essential as the command of the sea."

WAR, THE PREPARATIONS FOR:
German Emperor’s Speech.

The following speech by the Emperor William was made at
Karlsruhe, September 11, 1909, after a military review in
Baden: "We Germans are a people glad to bear arms and proud of
the game of war (_kriegsspielfreudiy_). We carry the
burden of our defence lightly and willingly, for we know that,
we must preserve and maintain our peace in which alone our
labour can prosper. At the review from which I have just come
I have seen that portion of the warrior sons of our Fatherland
which springs from the land of Baden. Today, under the command of
their illustrious lord, they have given me the most complete
satisfaction. So long as there are peoples there will be
enemies and envious folk; and so long as there are enemies and
envious folk it will be necessary to be on one’s guard against
them. Consequently there will continue to be prospects of war,
and even war itself, and we must be ready for everything.
Hence our army before all forms the _rocher de bronze_ on
which the peace of Europe is based and with which no one
intends to pick a quarrel. It is to preserve this peace, to
maintain the position in the world which is our due, that our
army serves; this also is the aim of the strenuous days which
are expected of it. But I am firmly convinced that it will
stand its test successfully and that our German Fatherland may
rest in confidence that we are on guard and that with God’s
help and under God’s protection nothing will befall us."

MILITARY AND NAVAL;

WAR, THE PREPARATIONS FOR:
British Imperial Defence Conference of 1909.
Its Agreements for an Imperial System.
Compulsory Military Training contemplated in Australia.

In connection with the doubts that were awakened in Great
Britain, and throughout the British Empire, in 1909, as to the
adequacy of their general preparations for defence, the
Premier announced in the House of Commons, on the 3d of May,
that steps had "been taken to ascertain whether the
Governments of the self-governing Dominions are prepared to
favour a conference at an early date for the discussion of
Imperial co-operation for defence. The Government had
suggested, he said, that the conference should be held this
summer—if possible, in July." The proposal was approved
throughout the Empire, and delegates to the Conference from
each of the self-governing Dominions came to London and held
sessions with representatives of the Home Government,
beginning on the 28th of July. The delegates in attendance
were the following;

Commonwealth of Australia.—
Colonel J. F. Foxton, Minister without portfolio, assisted by
Captain Creswell and Colonel Bridges, naval and military
experts.

New Zealand.—
Sir Joseph Ward, Prime Minister and Minister of Defence.

Canada.—
Sir Frederick Borden, Minister of Militia and Defence, Mr. L.
Brodeur, Minister of Marine and Fisheries, these Ministers
being assisted by Admiral Kingsmill and General Sir Percy
Lake, as naval and military advisers.

Newfoundland.—
Sir E. P. Morris, Prime Minister.

Cape Colony.—
Mr. J. F. X. Merriman, Prime Minister.

Natal.—
Mr. J. R. Moor, Prime Minister, assisted by
Colonel Greene, Minister of Railways.

The Transvaal.—
General J. C. Smuts, Colonial Secretary.

Orange River Colony.—
General Hertzog, Colonial Secretary.

{697}

The discussions of the Conference were unreported, but on the
26th of August, after its adjournment, the Premier, in a
statement to the House of Commons, summarized its main
conclusions as follows: "First as regards military defence:
after the main Conference at the Foreign Office, a military
Conference took place at the War Office, and resulted in an
agreement on the fundamental principles set out in papers
which had been prepared by the General Staff for consideration
by the delegates. The substance of these papers, which will be
included among the papers to be published, was the
recommendation that, without impairing the complete control of
the Government of each Dominion over the military forces
raised within it, those forces should be standardized, the
formation of units, the arrangements for transport, the
patterns of weapons, and so forth, being as far as possible
assimilated to those which have been recently worked out for
the British Army. Thus while the Dominion troops would in each
case be raised for the defence of the Dominion concerned, it
would be made readily practicable in case of need for that
Dominion to mobilize and use them for the defence of the
Empire as a whole. The military Conference then entrusted to a
sub-Conference, consisting of military experts at headquarters
and from the various Dominions, and presided over by Sir
William Nicholson, acting for the first time in the capacity
of Chief of the Imperial General Staff, the duty of working
out the detailed application of these principles. I may point
out here that the creation early this year of an Imperial
General Staff thus brought into active working is a result of
the discussions and resolutions of the Conference of 1907.
Complete agreement was reached by the members of the
sub-Conference, and their conclusions were finally approved by
the main Conference and by the Committee of Imperial Defence,
which sat for the purpose under the presidency of the Prime
Minister. The result was a plan for so organizing the forces
of the Crown wherever they are that while preserving the
complete autonomy of each Dominion, should these Dominions
desire to assist in the defence of the Empire, in a real
emergency, their forces could be rapidly combined into one
homogeneous Imperial Army.

"Naval defence was discussed at meetings of the Conference
held at the Foreign Office on August 3, 5, and 6. The
Admiralty memorandum which had been circulated to the Dominion
representatives formed the basis of the preliminary
conference. The alternative methods which might be adopted by
Dominion Governments in co-operating in Imperial naval defence
were discussed. New Zealand preferred to adhere to her present
policy of contribution; Canada and Australia preferred to lay
the foundation of fleets of their own. It was recognized that
in building up a fleet a number of conditions should be
conformed to. The fleet must be of a certain size in order to
offer a permanent career to the officers and men engaged in
the service: the _personnel_ should be trained and
disciplined under regulations similar to those established in
the Royal Navy, in order to allow of both interchange and
union between the British and the Dominion services, and with
the same object the standard of vessels and armaments should
be uniform. A remodelling of the squadrons maintained in Far
Eastern waters was considered on the basis of establishing a
Pacific Fleet, to consist of three units in the East Indies,
Australia, and the China Seas. … The generous offer of New
Zealand and then of the Commonwealth Government to contribute
to Imperial naval defence by the gift each of a battleship was
accepted with the substitution of cruisers of the new
‘Indomitable’ type for battleships, these two ships to be
maintained one on the China and one on the Australian station.
Separate meetings took place at the Admiralty with the
representatives of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, and
general statements were agreed to in each case for further
consideration by their respective Governments.

"As regards Australia, the suggested arrangement is that with
some temporary assistance from Imperial funds the Commonwealth
Government should provide and maintain the Australian unit of
the Pacific Fleet. The contribution of the New Zealand
Government would be applied towards the maintenance of the
China unit, of which some of the smaller vessels would have
New Zealand waters as their headquarters. The New Zealand
armoured cruiser would be stationed in China waters. As
regards Canada, it was considered that her double seaboard
rendered the provision of a fleet unit of the same kind
unsuitable for the present. It was proposed according to the
amount of money that might be available that Canada should
make a start with cruisers of the ‘Bristol’ class and
destroyers of the improved ‘River’ class, a part to be
stationed on the Atlantic seaboard and a part on the Pacific.
In accordance with an arrangement already made, the Canadian
Government would undertake the maintenance of dockyards at
Halifax and Esquimault, and it was a part of the arrangement
proposed by the Australian representatives that the
Commonwealth Government should eventually undertake the
maintenance of the dockyard at Sydney. Papers containing all
the material documents will be laid before Parliament in due
course, and it is hoped before the conclusion of the Session."

In Australia and New Zealand there had been eagerness for some
time to take a more effective part in the defence of the
Empire, their remote position and their contiguity to swarming
alien populations giving their people some special anxieties
which are reasonable enough. They are lonely communities of
Europeans, planted on the edge of the prodigious populations
of the Asiatic world. They have learned suddenly that some, at
least, of those populations can do things, in war and
otherwise, that were supposed to be reserved especially for
effective performance by the white variety of the human race.
What disposition of mind will move the Eastern folk in the
exercise of these powers of action—which are discoveries as
new to them as to us—has yet to be learned. It is doubtful if
they themselves know what the inclination of their career will
be, when they have really digested the new contents of their
minds and have fully surveyed their new position in the world.
Meantime, Australia has good reason to think anxiously of what
Japan certainly and China most probably can do, if they are
moved by imperialistic ambitions to an aggressive career.

{698}

If anywhere in the British Empire there was reason for the
lively stir of increased preparation for defence, it was Far
East Australasia. New Zealand, in March, had put a heavy
strain on its resources by offering to build a
_Dreadnought_ for the Imperial Navy, and Australia had
followed quickly by the proffer of another. When,
subsequently, these projects were superseded by the
arrangement made at the London Conference, funds raised by
private subscription for the Australian _Dreadnought_
were applied partly to the foundation of a naval college near
Sydney for the training of officers of the Australian
squadron, and partly to the establishment of at least two
farms for the training of young British immigrants, who will
be specially selected by the county colonization societies.

In acting promptly to realize the plans of military
organization that were formed at the London Conference,
Australia went far beyond anything that is likely to be done
by any other of the British Dominions, unless it may be New
Zealand; for that Commonwealth has undertaken to organize a
system of compulsory military training. A Defence Bill
introduced in the Federal Parliament on the 21st of September
applies compulsory training to all males from the age of 12 to
that of 20. "Junior cadets are to have annually 120 hours’
physical drill, elementary marching, and practice with
miniature rifles, for two years. Senior cadets will have 96
hours’ annually, including four whole-day drills, elementary
naval or military exercises, and musketry practice at ranges
up to 500 yards, for four years. The citizen forces are to
have 16 whole-day drills or their equivalent annually,
including eight days in camp for two years. Those who are to
undergo naval, artillery, and engineer training will have 25
days instead of 16. Males from the age of 20 to 26 will remain
enrolled, attending only one muster parade each year.
Exemptions will be made only on the ground of unfitness or in
the case of persons of non-European descent. The latter,
however, will be trained in non-combatant duties. Sparsely
populated districts may be exempted temporarily. Persons
failing to attend the training will be fined from £5 to £500
according to the culprit’s wealth, or may be confined and
trained till they have performed the duties they have shirked.
Persons failing to reach efficiency must undergo another
year’s training. The cadet training begins in 1911, and the
citizen training in 1912. When the scheme is in full working
order it is estimated that it will provide 40,000 junior
cadets, 75,000 senior cadets, and 55,000 citizen soldiers
under 21. The Militia, 25,000 strong, will thenceforth be
recruited only from the fully-trained, and will become a corps
d'élite."

On this subject of British imperial defence,

See (in this Volume)
BRITISH EMPIRE: A. D. 1909.

WAR, THE PREPARATIONS FOR:
New Zealand adoption of Compulsory Military Training.

An Act which establishes compulsory military training in New
Zealand, on lines similar to that in Australia, passed the
colonial Parliament during its session which closed December
29, 1909.

NAVAL:

WAR, THE PREPARATIONS FOR:
Brazil and Argentina in a "Dreadnought" Competition.

"The controversy between Brazil and Argentina about what is
called ‘equilibrium of armament’ is still carried on with much
animation in the Press of both countries, but apparently
without producing any effect, good or otherwise. The subject
of discord is the Brazilian Government’s order for three large
battleships of the ‘Dreadnought’ type, which is to be met by
an Argentine triplet, for which tenders are urgently called.
Fortunately these big ships take a long time to build, and by
the time they are ready the Press will probably be commenting
upon the _entente cordiale_ in South America and the
obsolescence of floating engines of war; but in the meantime
taxpayers in both countries are inclined to support the
somewhat daring proposal from Buenos Ayres that Brazil should
keep the first ‘Dreadnought,’ cede the second to Argentina,
and cancel the order for the third."

_Rio de Janeiro Correspondent
London Times, December 22, 1902._

Four months later the same correspondent telegraphed, May 3,
1909, among other statements quoted from the President’s
Message to Congress, that day: "In regard to the navy seven
vessels would be launched under the new programme. Two-thirds
of the total expenditure of £4,500,000 had already been paid
from ordinary resources, and this proved that the
reorganization of the navy would not be disastrous to the
national finances. Tenders would shortly be invited for the
construction of a new dry dock."

WAR, THE PREPARATIONS FOR:
British Navy War Council.

The following is from an official statement issued by the
British Admiralty, October 11, 1909: "In further development
of the policy which has actuated the Board of Admiralty for
some time past of organizing a Navy War Council, it has been
decided to place on an established footing the arrangements
made in previous years for the study of strategy and the
consideration and working out of war plans. A new department,
called the Naval Mobilization Department, has been formed
under the directorship of a flag officer, and there is
concentrated in it that part of the business of the Naval
Intelligence Department and the Naval War College which
related to war plans and mobilization. Under the presidency of
the First Sea Lord, the officers directing the Naval
Intelligence Department and the Naval Mobilization Department,
and the Assistant Secretary of the Admiralty will form the
standing Navy War Council."

WAR, THE PREPARATIONS FOR:
The British "Two Power Standard."