Chapter LIV: Section 4: provides that ‘Any difficulty or disagreement (5)

"Something has happened during the two weeks preceding the
Conference at Algeciras [see EUROPE: A. D. 1904-1906], which
may or may not be brought to the attention of the
international diplomats. France from the start has refused to
submit her doings along the Algerian frontier to the
discussion of the conference. That concerns herself and
Morocco alone. What has been happening would in any case put
the conference in face of an accomplished fact. Some time ago
M. Jonnart, Governor-General of Algiers, was informed that
emissaries from Fez were notifying the frontier tribes, whose
submission to France dates only from the last few years, that
Germany would help the Sultan very shortly to force the French
to evacuate their tribal territories. … M. Jonnart at once set
out on a long and ceremonious visit to the tribes along the
extreme southern frontier. He was accompanied by General
Lyautey, the ‘pacificating’ general, who has been M. Jaurès’
bugbear in this Moroccan affair. The Governor-General returned
to Algiers Friday last, just in time to have his news ready
for the conference. He has reason to be satisfied. Except for
a vague idea that the Moroccan territory along the Algerian
frontier is a ‘hled-es-siba’—a country where the Sultan has
difficulty in collecting his taxes—the foreign press has not
kept pace with what has been going on for the last ten years.
In one word, during that time France has brought under her
domination a stretch of territory of some thousands of square
miles. It is true that this territory is sparsely settled by
wilfully independent tribes, who so far alternately aided in
the Algerian harvests and raided the French outposts. This
situation quite justifies the action of the French troops,
which has consisted in throwing forward the unbroken line of
outposts that enclose and keep in order the French dominion,
and not in any military conquest of volatile tribes. M. Jaurès
always fell foul of the latter policy, which he ascribed to
the military; but it would be as useless as it is absurd. What
General Lyautey has been doing all these years, without
Germany or any other friend of the Sultan giving sign of life,
is not only reasonable: it is better—it has proved effective.
And M. Jonnart’s tour has secured the formal submission of
these tribes whose territory geographers have all along made a
part of Tafilalt--the southeasternmost of the four ancient
kingdoms which, together, make up the empire of Morocco. The
boundary between Morocco and French territory in Algiers has
never been settled since the original treaty of 1845. That
drew a line from the coast southward about a hundred miles to
Teniet-es-Sassi, four degrees of longitude west from Paris,
and then stopped. Whatever was to the south—then a No Man’s
Land, so far as France was concerned—was to be divided
amicably along as natural a line as possible, leaving the east
to France as a sphere of influence (the word had not yet been
invented). During these sixty years the frontier line has
remained about the same on the maps. But France has steadily
prolonged her settled domination southward, gaining over a
Mohammedan population by serving their material interests
without offence to their religion. The railway now reaches
Beni Ounif, only a short distance from Fighig, whose Amel is
among those notified that Morocco with German help will soon
send the French over the desert and far away. At Beni Ounif,
besides the Grand Hotel for tourists, there are extensive
counting houses for the trade of all the Hinterland, with an
appropriate banking system, and everything to draw the
Moroccan tribes. There is no doubt that this territory has
always been nominally a part of Morocco. … And now M. Jonnart
has visited officially the great Zaouia, or religious centre
of Kenadsa, still farther to the west."

_Paris Special Correspondence
New York Evening Post,
February 3, 1906._

{425}

MOROCCO: A. D. 1903.
State of Affairs in the Moorish Sultanate.
Abd el Aziz, the young Sultan.
His expensive tastes.
His enjoyment of the Playthings of Civilization and Science.

"Regarded as a Moorish ruler and leader, the late Sultan,
Mulai Hassan, was a strong man, almost, perhaps, a great man.
The loss of Morocco is that apparently she cannot produce his
like in the present generation. She was richer a few years
ago; and that is part of her decadence. Mulai Hassan had a
companion of his right hand: Ba Hamed, the Grand Wazeer. In
them Morocco could boast the possession of two strong men;
crude, narrow of vision, even brutal and merciless, if judged
by European standards, yet genuinely strong men. The greater
of them died, and his subordinate successfully hid the fact
(though the Court was journeying at the time) from all
Morocco, masquerading as one in close attendance upon a Sultan
whose corpse, as a fact, was tied in its litter, until city
walls were reached, preparations made, and the succession of
the youth Abd el Aziz assured. Be it remembered that Ba Hamed,
the survivor, was a strong man in his own right. Young Abd el
Aziz [who succeeded his father in 1894] was docile perforce,
and Ba Hamed ruled, without pity, with greed, and quite
unhampered by what Europe calls honour or justice. …

"Rather more than two years ago [1901], when already the
country was perturbed by news of the French advance upon and
occupation of Igli, the Moorish town which was regarded as the
depot and junction via which the caravan traffic of the desert
filtered through Morocco to the coast; at this critical
juncture, in the thick of conflicting intrigues, poisonings,
and official treachery, Ba Hamed, the greatly feared, greatly
hated, and rigidly obeyed Wazeer, died at Marrakish, leaving
many scheming heirs-presumptive to his office, but no single
successor to the mantle of his authority, the inherent
masterfulness of his personality.

"Still youthful Abd el Aziz IV. stretched forth both hands and
personally took up the fallen reins of government with a great
flourish of trumpets and display of energy. … Optimistic
Europeans, naturally gratified by the active good sense with
which Abd el Aziz checked his Filali tribesmen’s turbulent
resentment of contact with the French in Igli and its oasis,
freely predicted a new lease of life for the Moorish Empire.
They credited the new broom with powers which, in view of its
origin and environment, had been little short of miraculous.
And they omitted reflection regarding the hand which moved the
new broom. This was a power behind the Parasol, a latent
intelligence, not wholly Moorish, capricious, feminine,
subtle, unstable, and somewhat vitiated from long repression
in an unwholesome atmosphere. The late Mulai Hassan’s
Circassian wife, young Abd el Aziz’s mother, Lalla R’kia, had
also found a dangerous emancipation in the death of Ba Hamed.
…

"Casually observant Nazarenes saw rich, cruel officials swept
from their high estate by wholesale, and predicted the birth
of probity at Court. Notorious gainers by oppression were
loaded with chains in Kasbah dungeons; the young Sultan’s
brother, the One-Eyed, whom cautious Ba Hamed had kept secure
in Tetuan prison, was established on parole at Mcquinez, and
‘Here’s positive purity of administration!’ cried the
surface-reading hopeful in Christian-ridden Tangier.

"Of a sudden, all movement ceased. The young Sultan was lost
sight of—behind the curtain. … It is not given to us to know
anything of pale Lalla R’kia’s attitude during this breathing
space. … (Lalla R’kia died last year.)

"Speaking metaphorically, his Shareefian Majesty Abd el Aziz
reappeared on the arm of a commercial agent, a French
Israelite, with a genius for the ‘placing’ of imported
commodities. Allah’s Chosen had been initiated into the select
manias of Europe, and become addicted to golfing, the use of
the camera, the bicycle, and other less pretty pastimes from
the West. …

"Commercial agents continued to press upon the young Sultan
the latest and most expensive of electrical and other toys,
and those far-seeing gentlemen, the newspaper correspondents,
bade Europe take note of the remarkable enlightenment and
progressive wisdom of the ruler of Morocco, as evidenced by
his interest in motor cars and Broadwood pianos. And the
friends of these optimistic gentry criticised the present
writer as a croaker and a bird of ill-omen when he published
in _The Fortnightly Review_ for July, 1901, the following
extract from a letter sent him by a Moorish friend:

"‘To sum all up, my friend, I grieve because I find the
affairs of my native land in parlous order, demanding as never
before in the history of Morocco the guidance of a strong,
clear mind, a veritable Sultan. That my country’s affairs most
urgently need. They have a governing power composed of half a
dozen corrupt creatures, of a corrupt, short-sighted, cruel,
and desperately greedy Wazeer, whose rightful Lord is occupied
exclusively in—Bah! We have spoken of those whose graves will
be defiled, and of the trumpery gauds from Paris bazaars. And
this, while the turbulent Sus is aflame, the far south-east a
mine charged by French aggression, waiting only the match of
knowledge of our Lord’s indifference; the country between
Tafilalt and Fas is openly given over to brigandage and
anarchy, and even Al Ksar, Arzila, and the Gharb, Tangiers
outskirts, are full of unrest and disorder, crimes and
indifference to crimes.’"

_A. J. Dawson,
Morocco, the Moors, and the Powers
(Fortnightly Review, February, 1903)._

{426}

"I have not seen the Sultan face to face, but I have conversed
with nearly all the leading Europeans who have been with him
either at Marrakesh or Fez, and from what they have told me I
have been forced to conclude that Mulai Abd-el-Aziz is a
charming, kindly, headstrong man, suffering badly from youth,
who delights in reforms for the sake of their novelty and
lacks the brain power that distinguished his father, Mulai el
Hassan, and his grandfather, Mulai Mohammed. While he stayed
in his southern capital he was comparatively free from the
attacks of commercial attaches and other rogues, whose designs
upon his treasury should have been obvious, though he was
guilty of many extravagances, including displays of fireworks
that made his envoy to England speak slightingly of the
special display arranged in his honour at the Crystal Palace.
In Fez the agents surrounded him like summer flies. He has
twelve motor cars and no roads to ride them over; he paid
between three and four thousand pounds for a yacht, sixty feet
long, that was to be used on the Sebu river, which is no more
than thirty feet wide; in spite of the Koran’s prohibition, he
has purchased a crown at a price I am afraid to name. He has
put some of his soldiers into European uniforms and boots,
only to find that they run away from Bu Hamara as readily as
they did when dressed in native garments. He has developed an
enthusiasm for photography—I have seen some of his work—and
in addition to cameras with cases of pure gold, he has one
apartment of his palace loaded from floor to ceiling with dark
plates, and he was persuaded to order ten thousand francs’
worth of printing paper. He has a menagerie in the grounds of
the palace at Fez, and on a day when it was reported that the
lion sent from England had quarrelled with and killed the lion
sent from Berlin, one of the European visitors to the court
suggested to him that a contest between the victorious lion
and the Bengal tiger would afford good sport. ‘No,’ said
Abd-el-Aziz, ‘the lion cost me three thousand pounds!’ All
Europe knows that the Sultan is poor."

_S. L. Bensusan,
Britain, France, and the Moorish Empire
(Contemporary Review, November, 1903)._

MOROCCO: A. D. 1903-1904.
Appearance of the Mahdi, Bu Hamara,
as a leader of Insurrection.

In 1903 there appeared in Morocco one of the prophetic
pretenders called Mahdis, of whom so many have arisen in the
Moslem world, to take advantage of occasions of religious
excitement, and to lead a rising of wild tribes. This Moorish
Mahdi, known as Bu Hamara, was helped to a leadership of
insurrection by an incident which greatly stirred the
religious temper of tribes wherever known. An English
missionary was killed at Fez, and the murderer, flying to a
sanctuary of special sanctity, was pursued thereto by the
Sultan’s guards, and slain within the sacred bounds. Against
this sacrilege, committed to satisfy hated Christians, Bu
Hamara roused the country, preaching extermination of all
Christians within it. The insecure throne of Abd el Aziz was
made more insecure, English influence in Morocco was shaken,
the French frontiers east and south were endangered, and Bu
Hamara’s revolt appears to have had much to do with the
producing of all that followed,—in the Anglo-French Agreement
of 1904, the Algeciras Conference, the dethronement of Abd el
Aziz, etc.

MOROCCO: A. D. 1904.
Declarations of England and France concerning Morocco
in the Agreements of the Entente of 1904.
Explanatory Despatch.

See (in this Volume)
EUROPE: A. D. 1904 (APRIL).

MOROCCO: A. D. 1904-1909.
Exploits of El Raisuli.
The Kidnapping and Ransoming of Messrs. Perdicaris and Varley.
The Capture and Ransom of Kaid Sir Harry MacLean.
Present Respectability of Raisuli as a Moroccan Governor.

One of the chiefs in that mountainous strip of northern
Morocco, nearly parallel to the Mediterranean, which is called
"The Riff," has played a startlingly troublesome part in
recent Moroccan history. His name is Mulai Ahmed ben Mohammed,
but he is commonly designated in all news-mentions of his
doings by the title he bears,—El Raisuli, chieftain of a clan.
The first exploit which made this title familiar to all the
world was in May, 1904, when he kidnapped, from their
residence near Tangier, a naturalized American and an
Englishman, Mr. Ion Perdicaris and his stepson, Mr. Varley,
carrying them into the mountains and holding them captive
until he had extorted a ransom of $70,000, despite the utmost
efforts of France, Great Britain, and the United States, with
the aid of the Sultan, to obtain their release on less
humiliating terms. This success failed, however, to satisfy
the audacious brigand, and in July, 1907, he laid hands on
another important hostage, this time a British officer, Sir
Harry MacLean, who had been long in the service of the Sultan
of Morocco, as military adviser, with the title of Kaid. Kaid
MacLean ventured to visit the brigand in his mountain retreat
for some negotiation, and was detained in pawn. Raisuli held
this notable captive until the following February, and
released him then on receipt of $25,000, cash down, with a
pledge of $75,000 more at the end of three years, if he gave
no fresh trouble within that time. Meanwhile, he and
twenty-eight of his family were to be under British
protection. Before this transaction was closed a new Sultan
had won the Moroccan throne (as will be explained below) and
he thought it wiser to employ the energies of Raisuli
officially than to try to maintain a contest of authority with
so unmanageable a subject. Accordingly, in February, 1909,
Raisuli was appointed governor of twelve tribes in Northern
Morocco, and is now one of the most respectable
representatives of government in the last of the Barbary
States.

MOROCCO: A. D. 1905-1906.
German hostility to the Anglo-French Agreement.
The Kaiser’s speech at Tangier.
The International Conference at Algeciras.
The resulting Act.

See (in this Volume)
EUROPE: A. D. 1905-1906.

MOROCCO: A. D. 1907-1909.
Mob-murder of Dr. Mauchamp at Morocco City.
Conflict with Tribesmen at Casablanca.
Bombardment by French and Spanish Ships.
Campaign against the Tribes.
Dethronement of Sultan Abd el Aziz by his brother Mulai Hafid.
Fresh friction between France and Germany.
Its Pacific Settlement by Arbitration at The Hague.

Organization of police forces for the service which France and
Spain were commissioned by the Powers at the Algeciras
Conference to perform in Morocco was retarded, necessarily, by
the prevailing anarchy in the Empire, and fresh causes of
disorder occurred before the means for prompt treatment of
them were prepared. In the spring of 1907 a French citizen,
Dr. Mauchamp, at Marrakesh (Morocco City), undertook to
install at his house the apparatus for wireless telegraphy.
His Moorish neighbors suspected some diabolical intention,
when he raised the necessary mast on his house, and proceeded
with fanatic enterprise to kill the man of too much science
and to demolish the house. The French Government demanded
punishment of the outrage, with indemnity to the family of the
victim, and put a force in motion, under General Liautey,
which occupied the city of Ujda, not far from the Algerian
frontier, to hold it until the demands of justice were
complied with. None of the Powers signatory to the Algeciras
Conference raised objections to this proceeding.

{427}

A more serious intervention was occasioned in July, 1907, when
the French took control of the collection of customs at the
ports, as directed by the Algeciras agreement. At Casablanca,
on the Atlantic coast, the tribesmen attacked a number of
European laborers, employed there in quarries, and killed
eight. All the foreign residents of the region were in danger,
and French and Spanish war-ships were hurried to the scene.
The local Moorish official confessed his inability to protect
the threatened foreigners, who had taken refuge in the French,
Spanish, and British consulates, with hostile tribes
swarming around the town, and he asked for help. Marines were
landed on the 4th of August and were attacked. "A sanguinary
battle followed between the Arabs and the European soldiery,
the French cruiser opening fire and shelling the Moorish
batteries. Scenes of great disorder and violence followed upon
the firing, a raging mob of Moors attacking and pillaging the
entire city. The Jews particularly were massacred by hundreds.
Another French warship soon appeared upon the scene,
accompanied by a Spanish cruiser, and troops were landed to
the number of 4000. General Drude, the French commander, was
chosen to head the allied troops, Spanish and French, and
reinforcements were hurried from France." A number of
encounters followed. "The most serious were the attacks, on
August 28, and September 2, upon Casablanca and its outskirts,
both resulting from a reconnaissance in force by the French
Algerian irregular cavalry and the famous Foreign Legion.
Seven or eight thousand Moors attacked the Europeans, sweeping
down from the hills with all the ferocity and courage
traditional in their race. By the aid of machine guns and the
batteries from their warships the French succeeded in
repelling the tribesmen with considerable loss of life."

Justification of the bombardment of Casablanca was somewhat
questioned at the time, and with good reason if the following
account of the circumstances, by an eye-witness, a Scotch
missionary, are to be believed. His statement was published in
the Glasgow _Herald_, and is given here as summarized in
_The Outlook_, of September 21, 1907.

"This missionary, Dr. Kerr, has lived many years in the
country, and he asserts that in many ways the French residents
and officials have continually irritated the Moors and
provoked them to anger. Dr. Kerr states that no further
outbreaks occurred after the massacre of French and Spanish
workmen on July 30, and that when the bombardment began on
August 1 there was absolutely no immediate provocation for it.
He denounces it as contrary to the usages of civilized war and
as ‘wicked and unjustifiable,’ adding that the British
merchants in Casablanca will probably sue the French
Government for damages caused to their property by what they
consider an unnecessary bombardment. The punishment of the
Moors concerned in the murder of the eight workmen, says Dr.
Kerr, no one could object to, but instead of this the
punishment took the form of an unprovoked massacre of persons
many of whom were entirely innocent. The details of the affair
as he gives them are certainly deplorable, and if his
assertion that the landing force of the French fired the first
shot is true, the succeeding episodes described are
unpardonable. One of these episodes may be quoted here:

"‘I saw two young women walking as quickly as they could. …
Suddenly a volley was fired into them by the Spanish marines.
They fell, but picked themselves up, and took refuge in a
ledge of a wall. After waiting a few minutes they made to
return, when another volley was fired at them, and they fell
again. … One of these brave daughters of Ishmael refused to
flee without taking with her the "khaik," or outer garment,
which fell from her [thus leaving her face uncovered, contrary
to Moslem law]. She turned back, picked up her garment, and
fled as fast as she could, bleeding all over.’"

In the fall of 1907 General Drude was succeeded in the command
at Casablanca by General d’Amade, who prosecuted a more
vigorous campaign against the obstinately hostile tribes of
the region, and made but slow progress in reducing them to
submission.

Meantime a rising against Sultan Abd el Aziz, in favor of one
of his brothers, Mulai Hafid, had been started and was making
rapid headway. Mulai Hafid was proclaimed Sultan at Marrakesh
on the 25th of August, 1907, and on the 4th of the following
January his supporters had gained possession of Fez and
proclaimed him there. Abd el Aziz kept the field against his
rival until August, 1908, when he had practically no following
left, and the direction of Government was assumed formally by
Mulai Hafid. His authority had soon become established so
fully that the German Government addressed a note to the
Powers proposing an immediate recognition of it. France and
Spain objected, insisting that Mulai Hafid must confirm
existing treaties, accept responsibility for the debts of the
previous regime, give pledges of indemnity for the Casablanca
outbreak, disavow the "Holy War" which he had countenanced and
which had given him his success, and take effective measures
for securing the safety of foreigners in the Empire. Their
objection was approved generally; Germany assented to the
requirements proposed, and it was not until Mulai Hafid had
satisfied them that he obtained recognition as the legitimate
sovereign of Morocco. This was given in the following note,
handed to his representative on the 5th of January, 1909, by
the _doyen_ of the Diplomatic Body at Tangier:

"The signatory Governments of the Act of Algeciras have
received the letter which Mulai Hafid sent to them through the
agency of the Diplomatic Body at Tangier in reply to their
_communiqué_ of November 18. The Governments represented
in Morocco received with satisfaction this reply, in which
they saw a proof that the explanations which they formulated
in their Note of November 18, in the interest of the relations
of friendship and confidence which they desire to maintain
with the sovereign authority of the Shereefian Empire, are in
accordance with the views of Mulai Hafid. In consequence the
signatory Powers of the Act of Algeciras have decided to
recognize his Majesty Mulai Hafid as legitimate Sultan of
Morocco, and have charged the _doyen_ of the Diplomatic
Body at Tangier to notify their recognition of him to the
representatives of his Majesty in that town."

{428}

Before this settlement was reached an incident had occurred at
Casablanca on the 15th of September, 1908, which irritated the
chronic sensitiveness of feeling between Germany and France.
Five or six soldiers of the Foreign Legion in French service
at Casablanca, including three Germans, deserted, and the
German Consulate attempted to protect the Germans when their
arrest was undertaken by French gendarmes. There was some
struggle, but the arrest was accomplished, and the demand of
the Consul for the release of the three Germans was refused.
Germany demanded satisfaction for the treatment of her Consul.
France maintained that satisfaction was due to herself for the
interference of the Consul with her military rights; but
offered to submit the affair to the Hague Tribunal for
arbitration. Germany was willing to arbitrate the questions
involved if France would first express regret for the official
conduct on her side of the matter. France in reply suggested
expressions of regret by both parties; and on these terms,
supposedly vindicating national dignity on each side, the case
went to The Hague. The Court of Arbitration held its first
meeting on the 1st of May, 1909, and announced its judgment on
the 22d of the same month. As summarized in an English
despatch from The Hague, the opinion of the Court was as
follows:

"The Court considered that in this case there was a conflict
of jurisdiction between the Consular and the military
authority of two foreign Powers, the one Power exercising full
Consular authority over her subjects, who happened to be
soldiers in the Foreign Legion of the other Power. The latter
Power had effected the military occupation of a certain
territory, and in consequence exercised full authority over
that territory. As it was impossible to decide this conflict
by any absolute ruling, which might indicate in a general way
the precedence of either jurisdiction, the Court considered
that the question must be determined by the particular
circumstances of any given case.

"In this case the jurisdiction of the occupying force had
precedence because the persons in question did not leave the
territory occupied by that force. The Court decided that the
Secretary of the German Consulate at Casablanca wrongly and
through a grave and manifest error tried to embark in a German
steamer deserters of the French Foreign Legion, who were not
of German nationality. The German Consul and the other
officials of the Consulate were not responsible for that fact;
the Consul, however, in signing the safe conduct, which was
laid before him, committed an unintentional error.

"The German Consulate in the circumstances obtaining at that
time was not entitled to grant its protection even to
deserters of German nationality; the legal error, however,
which was committed in this connexion by the officials of the
Consulate could not be reckoned either as an intentional or as
an unintentional error.

"The French military authorities were wrong in not respecting,
as far as possible, the _de facto_ protection exercised
over those deserters in the name of the German Consulate. The
circumstances did not justify either menace by revolver on the
part of the French soldiers, or the blows given to the
Moroccan soldier of the Consulate."

This proved satisfactory to all concerned, and the Casablanca
incident was happily closed.

A more important adjustment of matters between Germany and
France, aiming at a general clearing of causes of friction in
their relations, so far as concerned Morocco, had preceded the
Casablanca arbitration by nearly three months. All Europe had
been surprised and delighted on the 9th of February, 1909, by
the announcement of a Franco-German Agreement, just concluded,
in the following words:

"The Government of the French Republic and the German Imperial
Government, actuated by an equal desire to facilitate the
execution of the Act of Algeciras, have agreed to define the
significance which they attach to its clauses with a view to
avoiding any cause of misunderstanding between them in the
future.

"Consequently, the Government of the French Republic, wholly
attached to the maintenance of the integrity and of the
independence of the Shereefian Empire, decided to safeguard
economic equality there, and accordingly not to impede German
commercial and industrial interests, and the German Imperial
Government, pursuing only economic interests in Morocco,
recognizing at the same time that the special political
interests of France are closely bound up in that country with
the consolidation of order and of internal peace, and resolved
not to impede those interests, declare that they will not
prosecute or encourage any measure calculated to create in
their favour or in favour of any Power whatsoever an economic
privilege, and that they will endeavour to associate their
nationals in business for which these may be able to obtain
contracts (_l’entreprise_)."

This most important agreement resulted from negotiations that
were said to have been opened by a suggestion from the German
Foreign Secretary, Baron von Schön. Its importance to Europe
was hardly exaggerated by the Paris _Matin_, when it
said:

"It is a great and happy event, the importance of which need
not be emphasized. … This close of the Moroccan quarrel may,
if such be the desire, mark a date of capital importance in
the history of Europe. In fact, as Prince Bülow has said and
repeated, Morocco was only a pretext. If therefore it has
become an object of agreement, it is not merely because it has
been recognized that the local problem was not insoluble, but
also because the general situation has changed or because the
‘opportunity’ no longer exists."

MOROCCO: A. D. 1908.
A German Statement of the Moroccan Policy of Germany.

See (in this Volume)
GERMANY: A. D. 1908.

{429}

MOROCCO: A. D. 1909.
Discontent with the new Sultan.
His struggle with Pretenders.
Spanish War with the Tribes of the Riff.
Success of Mulai Hafid against his Rivals.
French operations in and around the Moorish Empire.
French Mauretanie.
French Demands.
The Mannesmann Mining Concession.

France and Spain were now strengthened in the execution of
their Algeciras commission, by a harmonious backing in Europe,
and the native Government in Morocco had acquired, seemingly,
a strong and capable man at its head. Sultan Mulai Hafid made
that impression very positively on a correspondent of the
London _Times_, to whom he gave audience on the 13th of
February, and who wrote of him that day: "It is quite evident
that Mulai Hafid is a man of large and independent ideas, with
a leaning toward democracy. In appearance and manner he is
most attractive, and both his looks and his conversation
betoken a character at once strong and of quick decision.
Everything he says is very much to the point, and his remarks
are often touched with humour and even cynicism. His
openmindedness and cordiality extend almost to breaches of the
rigorous Moorish etiquette."

Five days later the same correspondent wrote again: "The Fez
Moors had hoped at Mulai Hafid’s accession for material though
indefinite advantages, for they felt that the new Sultan, who
owed his throne not to inheritance but to election, would be
an instrument in their own hands, and that they would be able
to exert their influence for their own purely selfish ends.
But they had counted without Mulai Hafid. Once on the throne,
he consolidated, at all events locally, his power, and the Fez
population, who during the previous reign had undoubtedly held
and used considerable influence, found themselves in the hands
of a firm, masterful man, who did not hesitate to tax them to
an extent formerly unknown, and gave them clearly to
understand that he would brook no interference in matters of
policy. The effect was instantaneous. The Fezzis began openly
to regret the slack _régime_ of Mulai Abdul Aziz, and
Mulai Hafid became unpopular, as any monarch who really
governs in Morocco must always be.

"But if Mulai Hafid was unpopular, he inspired at the same
time a wholesome fear. His indifference to public opinion, his
breaches of the absurd prescriptions of Moorish etiquette, his
personal supervision of every detail, and the publicity in
which he lives show not only remarkable courage, but also
remarkable knowledge of the people whom he governs. … Yet he
has but a small army, and he is financially hampered. He
receives Europeans publicly, and grants audiences in the
presence of the whole Court, often before the whole army. He
invites his guests to be seated, and chats in a natural and
sympathetic manner on all kinds of subjects. But it is quite
apparent that his _entourage_ is in terror of him. Never
have the viziers had less freedom or fewer opportunities for
plunder. The Government is Mulai Hafid, and Mulai Hafid alone,
and yet Mulai Hafid is a democrat. He desires to put down—and
has already largely done so—the fanatical and always
mischievous influence of the great Shereefian families. He
works from morning till night, and keeps every one else
working. His negotiations with the French Minister are
progressing in a way that astonishes every one. … Mulai Hafid
obtained the throne by preaching a holy war against Europeans.
He will maintain himself upon the throne by a policy of reform
which will win for him the assistance of France against his
own fanatical people."

But subsequent events did not realize the confident
expectations of this writer. A month later he reported:

"Shereef Sid Mohammed Kittani, a descendant of a former
dynasty and chief of an important reactionary religious sect,
who was freely spoken of as possible Sultan before Mulai
Hafid’s proclamation, left Fez secretly yesterday. Apparently
he had previously succeeded in dispatching his family and
movable property from time to time to some spot in the Berber
tribelands without exciting suspicion. His flight has caused
what can only be described as consternation. His influence is
very great, and he is known to lay claim to the Throne."

Within another month this pretender had defeated Mulai Hafid’s
forces in a sharp engagement and had an army encamped about
eighteen miles east of Fez. French officers were reported to
be doing notable work in organizing and equipping the Sultan’s
troops. On the 8th of May there was alarming news that Mulai
el Kebir, another brother of Mulai Hafid and of the ex-Sultan,
Abd el Aziz, "who was accompanying the Southern Kaids to Fez,
had left their camp secretly by night and had fled into the
Zimmour country," and "many believe that he will take
advantage of the Sultan’s unpopularity to raise a rebellion."
Two days later "nothing is known of the whereabouts of Mulai
el Kebir," and "the Sultan does not conceal his anxiety.
Mulai-el-Kebir was on the best terms with his Majesty, but the
Sultan’s severe treatment of other members of his family no
doubt filled him with fear."

From Paris, on the 26th of May, it was telegraphed that the
Sultan’s Minister of Finance, El Mokri, then visiting Paris on
a financial mission, "observes that Mulai Hafid’s authority is
more solidly established at present than might at first sight
appear to be the case. At no time has any Sultan been
recognized over a much wider area of Moroccan territory. In
the Beled el Makhzen his sway is uncontested. The kaids of the
Haouz and the southern Atlas have always been his partisans.
El Mokri has no fear of the pretenders."

There were now two pretenders in the field: for Mulai Kebir
had been heard from, "beyond Mekinez," where he had raised the
standard of revolt. And Bu Hamara was on the stage of civil
war again, east of Fez, with an army which "is camped at less
than four hours distance from the capital," and which is
"actively pillaging the only tribe that remains loyal to Mulai
Hafid in that region." Troops sent against him a few days
later were said to have been badly beaten. The Sultan was
reported to be in quarrel with his viziers; was ill,—invisible
in the palace,—and the situation did not seem to look well for
him.

Then, suddenly, all news reports from Morocco became silent as
to Mulai Hafid and his rivals, and gave entire attention to a
serious outbreak of warfare in that northeastern corner of the
empire, known as the Riff, where Spain has had a long
recognized "sphere of influence," and where she had undertaken
the working of valuable iron mines near Melilla. Hostilities
were begun in July by an attack of tribesmen on the miners,
killing several, and the Spanish troops sent to the scene met
disaster, being insufficient in force. In the end, so
extensive a rising of Moorish tribesmen had occurred that
Spain was obliged to put a large army into the field against
them and organize a costly campaign. It was not until late in
September that much success attended the Spanish arms, and not
until late in November that the campaign was regarded as
closed, the Spanish forces having secured positions which,
when fortified, were expected to give them a firm footing in
the region, and having brought most of the tribes to terms.

{430}

Meantime, the war had been bitterly unpopular among large
classes in Spain, and the feeling had been manifested in
destructive rioting at Barcelona and elsewhere.

See (in this Volume)
SPAIN: A. D. 1907-1909.

What France had been doing meanwhile, in and around Morocco,
has been told by a writer in _The Atlantic Monthly:_

"During the year [May, 1908, to May, 1909] the French army
under General d’Amade, has continued occupying Casablanca, and
the fertile Chaouïa (Shawia) region. It has forced peace, law,
and order, and open markets on the inhabitants, to their great
advantage. Agriculture has revived; and German trade itself
has run up two million francs. Even so the ‘economic
interests’ of Germany in Morocco are scant indeed compared
with those of France and England; they are perhaps less than
those of Spain—and yet they have long threatened the peace of
Europe. … Meanwhile the interior of Morocco has been chiefly
occupied in the unmaking and making of Sultans. Toward the
German Emperor these fighting Moors have now a feeling much
like that of the Transvaal Boers when the Kruger telegram
failed to lead to eventualities. … The real success of France
is along the entire land-frontier of Morocco. For its whole
length this is now also the frontier of French
territory,--Algiers to the east, the Sahara with its line of
French posts to the south, and so on to the Atlantic Ocean
through the new French civil territory of ‘Mauritanie.’ Here
foreign geography will still be incomplete for some time; but
it is childish to dismiss these territorial stretches as so
many acres of sand. The empire which France might have had in
Canada was, in like manner, denounced by Voltaire as acres of
snow.

"France absolutely refused to allow any question concerning
this land-frontier to be brought up at the Conference of
Algeciras. It is no business of Europe; it concerns the two
neighbors, France and Morocco, only.

"General Lyautey has had its more than eight hundred miles
well under control. … Of late years France has successfully
occupied territory farther and farther to the south, pushing
forward the railway, and throwing out a long line of military
posts through the Sahara. People who amuse themselves marking
obscure changes of conquest on the map, may safely stick their
pins one full degree farther west all along this part of
Algiers, beginning where Spain at Melilla blocks the way along
the Mediterranean coast."

_Stoddard Dewey,
The Year in France
(Atlantic Monthly, August, 1909)._

When newspaper attention reverted to Mulai Hafid a great
improvement was found in his affairs. Seemingly, the
pretenders to his throne had disappeared, and Bu Hamara, the
rebel, now styled El Roghi, was decisively routed by troops of
the Sultan on the 16th of August, captured a few days later,
and taken to Fez in an iron cage. On the 13th of September it
was announced that he had been executed the day before. Later,
this was contradicted, and there seems to be no certainty as
to his fate.

The Moroccan Government was now being sharply pressed by
France with demands over which negotiation had proceeded
hitherto very slowly. M. Pichon, the French Minister for
Foreign Affairs, made a statement on the subject to the
Chamber of Deputies on the 23d of November, to the following
effect: "On August 14 the representatives of the Sultan
received a note summing up the conditions imposed by the
French Government. These conditions were the evacuation of the
Shawia region on condition of the organization by the Maghzen
of a force; the evacuation of Casablanca when the French
Government felt convinced that the organization of the Shawia
police had become sufficiently effective; the organization of
the police service on the Algero-Moroccan frontier; the
payment of the Maghzen’s debts and the reimbursement of the
costs of the French military expeditions. The Maghzen owed at
present £3,200,000, more than £400,000 of which was due to
private creditors. The French Government would allow the
Moroccan Government to raise a loan in France in order to
facilitate the payment of its debts. … The French conditions
had been acknowledged to be very moderate by all who had had
cognisance of them. Germany had recently informed the Maghzen
that it was high time to contract a loan. M. Pichon dwelt on
the loyalty with which the Franco-German Agreement had been
observed by the Berlin Government. Nevertheless the adhesion
of the Moroccan Government had not yet been obtained. That
Government had admitted the principle of the loan of
80,000,000f. and that of the indemnity of 70,000,000f. for the
French military expedition, but there was disagreement still
in regard to the guarantees required for the realization of
that operation. Mulai Hafid, moreover, demanded the immediate
evacuation of the Shawia and of Casablanca. On November 6 M.
Pichon informed the Sultan’s envoys that it was futile to
continue the _pourparlers_ if France did not obtain a
satisfactory reply. It would not be without danger for the
Moroccan Government to persevere in its attitude."

A little later it was made known that the Sultan had yielded
to the terms prescribed by the French Government and was to
obtain the loan which would help toward the payment of his
debts.

By this time a new Morocco question had sprung out of a
sweeping mining concession which certain German exploiters,
the Brothers Mannesmann, had obtained from Sultan Mulai Hafid,
in distinct violation of the agreements at Algeciras which the
Sultan had been a party to. The Mannesmann mining rights under
this concession, if allowed, would swallow up all others, and
large interests, French, Spanish, German, English, Italian,
and Dutch, were arrayed against their claims. The backing of
the Mannesmanns in Germany, however, by commercial and
newspaper influence, appears to have been very powerful, and
it has not been easy for the Government to resist being drawn
into alliance with it. But the attitude of the Imperial
Government appears to have been strictly loyal to the
Algeciras agreements, and it has gone no farther for the
Mannesmanns and their partisans than to negotiate with the
other Powers concerned for a submission of the question of
legality in the Mannesmann concession to a Court of
Arbitration. That will probably be the mode of settling it.

{431}

MOROS, The.

See (in this Volume)
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: A. D. 1901-1902.

MORRIS, SIR EDWARD:
Premier of Newfoundland.

See (in this Volume)
NEWFOUNDLAND: A. D. 1908-1909.

MORTON, PAUL:
Secretary of the Navy.

See (in this Volume)
UNITED STATES: A. D. 1901-1905.

MORTON, PAUL:
President of Equitable Life Assurance Society.

See (in this Volume)
INSURANCE, LIFE.

MOSCOW,
Risings and Disturbances in.

See (in this Volume)
RUSSIA.

MOSLEM LEAGUE.

See (in this Volume)
INDIA: A. D. 1907 (December); also, 1907-1909.

MOSQUITO TERRITORY, THE.

See (in this Volume)
CENTRAL AMERICA: A. D. 1905.

MOTIENLING.

See (in this Volume)
JAPAN: A. D. 1904 (JULY-SEPTEMBER).

MOVING PICTURE SHOWS.

See (in this Volume)
SCIENCE AND INVENTION.

MUIJTEHEDS:
The higher Persian Priests.

See (in this Volume)
PERSIA: A. D. 1905-1907.

MUKDEN: A. D. 1903.
Opened to Foreign Trade.

See (in this Volume)
CHINA: A. D. 1903 (MAY-OCTOBER).

MUKDEN: Battle of.

See (in this Volume)
JAPAN: A. D. 1904-1905 (SEPTEMBER-MARCH).

MULAI AHMED BEN MOHAMMED, EL RAISULI.

See (in this Volume)
MOROCCO: A. D. 1904-1909.

MULAI HAFID:
Sultan of Morocco by Dethronement of his Brother.

See (in this Volume)
MOROCCO: A. D. 1907-1909, and 1909.

MULAI HASSAN, Late Sultan of Morocco.

See (in this Volume)
MOROCCO: A. D. 1903.

MULLAH, ABDULLA MUHAMMED.

See (in this Volume)
AFRICA: SOMALILAND.

MULLAS:
The common Persian Priests.

See (in this Volume)
PERSIA: A. D. 1905-1907.

MUNICIPAL COMMITTEES IN INDIA.

See (in this Volume)
INDIA: A. D. 1907-1909.

----------MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT: Start--------

MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT:
American Democracy’s most Serious Problem.
Present Interest in it.
Hopeful Movements.

Americans have long been forced to acknowledge that political
democracy in the United States makes its worst showing in the
government of municipalities; and those who give any searching
thought to the matter have little dispute over reasons for the
fact. It connects very plainly with another fact, namely, that
_municipal politics_, as a political interest distinct
and apart from the interests of government in Nation and
State, has had no growth in the country as yet. Up to the time
of the formation of the national union, the few cities of
America had a quite positive political life of their own,
which might have carried them into conditions very different
from what they have realized since, if it had not undergone
the absorption that it did in the politics of a national
government. The national political parties formed then on
exciting issues, sectional, constitutional, and economic,
caught all political feeling into their embrace, not
instantly, but gradually, and surely, and appropriated the
whole mechanism of political organization to themselves.
Cities are the natural centers of such mechanism, and the
great parties of Federal politics were able easily to impose
on them a domination which left no free working of public
opinion on the immediate concerns of the cities themselves.
All political action was drawn into the mill which turns out
Presidents, Congresses, Tariffs, Bank Acts, etc., and the mere
by-product of Mayors, Aldermen, and City Ordinances which it
drops incidentally into the cities, receives almost no stamp
of quality or design from the local mind.

Until the wheels of local government are loosened in some way
from the clutch of the great party machines, and can work
independently, under motive forces of their own, to produce
the satisfaction of local needs, interests, and aims, there
will be little success in undertakings of municipal reform.
How to accomplish that political ungearing is one of the
greatest, if not the greatest, of the problems now occupying
the minds of the American people. Fortunately it is occupying
their minds. Within the last few years they have given more
thought to this subject than it ever received from them
before; and it has been bold thought, as well as profoundly
earnest. It has not been afraid of hospitality to new ideas
and new experiences, but is giving them fair hearings and fair
tests. The present attitude of the whole country in this
matter is of the happiest hopefulness, and every day brightens
the prospect of a better future for municipal government in
America.

MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT: BOSTON: A. D. 1909.
A Plan of Government chosen by popular vote.

In connection with the election of November 2, 1909, the
citizens of Boston, Massachusetts, had two plans of City
Government submitted to their vote, and the charter under
which the City will be ruled and its business conducted after
the beginning of February, 1910, was determined by the choice
between these plans which a majority expressed at the polls.
One of the plans emanated from an official body, called the
Finance Commission, which had been appointed to investigate
bad conditions in the City Government, and whose
investigations had given rise to the demand for a radical
reform. This plan had the approval, moreover, of a citizens
Committee of One Hundred, which had given much attention to
the subject; but it was exceedingly unsatisfactory to the
party politicians, whose personal interests were flagrantly
disregarded in its scheme. These drafted a form of charter
which fitted their own purposes, and the two plans were
submitted to the Legislature in the winter of 1909. That body
escaped the responsibility of a decision between them by
referring both to the voters of Boston. The charter wanted by
the party managers was designated as "Plan No. 1"; that of the
Finance Commission and the Committee of One Hundred as "Plan
No. 2."
{432}
A strenuous campaign of education was fought for some weeks
before election day by the supporters of Plan No. 2, who seem
to have included practically all single-minded seekers of good
government, and an equally active campaign of wire-pulling was
carried on by the champions of Plan No. 1. The education was
successful in convincing 39,175 voters that Plan 2 should be
preferred, while 35,306 were persuaded to the contrary, and
about 34,000 remained so indifferent or undecided that they
gave the question no vote. But public considerations prevailed
over party motives and influences by 3869 votes, which is a
highly important fact.

The charter thus adopted for Boston differs in many features
from what has acquired the name of "the Des Moines plan," but
is fundamentally akin to it in principle and aim. Its prime
purpose is to divorce local politics from national politics,
freeing municipal elections from the baneful control of
parties which have nothing rightly to do with the city’s
affairs. Its secondary object is to concentrate official
responsibility in a moderated way. It subjects the mayor of
Boston, at the middle of his term, to a reconsideration of the
vote which elected him (in the nature of the Swiss "recall"),
but it does not introduce the initiative and referendum. The
operation of the new charter under its provisions was outlined
as follows by the Boston _Herald_ on the day following
its adoption:

"By the acceptance of plan 2, party and all other designations
will be eliminated from the ballots for the municipal
elections, which will be held on the first Tuesday after the
second Monday in January of each year. The coming city
election will be held on January 11.

"Candidates for mayor must be nominated by petition of not
less than 5000 registered Boston voters. The candidate who
receives the highest vote at the city election will hold
office for four years, unless recalled at the end of two
years. The salary will be $10,000 a year.

"At the state election in the second year of the mayor’s term
the ballots will contain the question: ‘Shall there be an
election for mayor at the next municipal election?’ And this
will be answered by ‘Yes,’ or ‘No.’ If a majority of the
registered voters vote ‘Yes’ an election for mayor will be
held at the following city election.

"Whether recalled or not, the mayor holding office will have
his name on the ballot at the city election unless in writing
he requests the election commissioners not to place his name
on the ballot. The mayor then elected will hold office for
four years, subject to recall at the end of his second year.

"The city council will consist of nine members, all elected at
large. The salary will be $1500 each. In the election on
January 11 the voters may vote for nine candidates, and the
nine receiving the highest votes will be declared elected. The
three highest will have three-year terms, the three next
highest will serve for two years and the next three for one
year each. Each year thereafter three candidates-at-large will
be elected, and the voters may vote for three. All members of
the city council will be elected at large, and there will be
no ward members of the body. By the abolition of party
designations no primary elections or caucuses for municipal
offices will be held.

"All candidates for mayor, city council and school board must
be nominated by papers of not less than 5000 registered
voters. No voter may sign more than one paper for mayor, not
more than nine for council for the first election and for
three candidates thereafter, and not more than two papers for
the school board when there are two members to be elected.

"If a candidate for any of the offices decides to withdraw
from the contest before the election, vacancies in nominations
for any cause may be filled by a committee of not less than
five persons authorized in the nomination papers to fill such
vacancies.

"Members of the street commission, formerly elected at large,
will be appointed by the mayor, subject to approval by the
civil service commission, but without restriction as to their
political affiliation. All department heads will be appointed
by the mayor, subject to approval by the civil service
commission.

"The new municipal year will begin on the first Monday in
February, when the mayor and city council will be inducted
into office."

The election, held at the appointed time, January 11, 1910,
was managed so badly as to divide the vote of the reforming
element between three candidates, against one, the former
Mayor, Fitzgerald, whose scandalous administration had
afforded the prime incentive to the reform movement, and thus
giving opportunity for his election by a small plurality. A
committee of the reform leaders had chosen for their candidate
Mr. James J. Storrow, President of the Boston Chamber of
Commerce, and strove to concentrate the opposition to
Fitzgerald upon him; but the Mayor in office, who had secured
renomination, persisted in keeping the field, and won the
petty number of 1816 votes, which a little more than sufficed
to elect Fitzgerald. The vote given the latter was 47,142,
against 45,757 to Mr. Storrow, and 613 to the fourth
candidate, Taylor. A recount of the vote was secured, but made
no substantial change.

MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT: California:
Charter-framing Power given to Cities.