Chapter 382: , Laws of 1889, to read as follows (22)
"The enemy having now taken complete possession of Dalny, at
once used it as their base. There, quietly and comfortably,
without any interference from us, they carried out the landing
of troops for the investment. Ten transports would arrive
daily, bringing everything necessary for the concentrating
army. The railway from Dalny and all the rolling stock was in
perfect order; … our fleet did not hinder them in any way;
they had command of both land and sea."
On the 6th of June Oku’s army was divided, that general
leading part of it (still called the Second Army) northward,
leaving the remainder, as a Third Japanese Army, under General
Nogi, to conduct the investment and siege of Port Arthur.
At about this time, according to Nojine, Stössel was persuaded
by Smirnoff to permit the latter to fortify some of the outer
hills of the peninsula, which had been neglected hitherto;
these were Kuen-san Hill, the Green Hills, Angle Hill, Wolf’s
Hill, Ta-ku-shan and Sia-gu-shan hills. "The latter," says
Nojine, "were of immense importance, as they were quite
inaccessible, and protected the whole of the western front of
the Fortress, but only so long as Wolf’s Hills were in our
possession." On the 26th and 27th of June the Japanese
attacked and captured Kuen-san and Green Hills. The latter
were recovered by the Russians on the 4th of July, but they
failed to retake Kuen-san. The loss of the latter was very
serious; for the Japanese from its summit could look into the
works on the Green Hills and, by telephone, direct the fire of
their batteries on them.
Until the 26th of July not much occurred, as the assailants
were busy strengthening the positions they had acquired. Then
they began a determined attack on Green Hill, and continued it
through two days. On the morning of the 28th the Russians gave
up the position and drew back towards Port Arthur, to what is
called the Wolf’s Hills line. They were driven from this on
the 30th, and the close investment of Port Arthur began then.
_E. K. Nojine,
The Truth about Port Arthur,
chapters 11-22._
As described in the "Epitome of the Russo-Japanese War"
prepared for the United States of America General Staff, the
immediate "defences of Port Arthur, divided into eastern and
western sectors by the valley through which the railway enters
the town, consisted of permanent masonry forts whose gorges
were connected by the old Chinese Wall, temporary works
constructed just prior to and during the siege, and connecting
and advance trenches. The west sector followed an irregular
crest, with an elevation of about 500 feet, around the new
town, and terminated on Laotiehshan, the highest point in the
vicinity, with an elevation of about 1000 feet. The east
sector encircled the old town at a distance of from two to two
and a half miles, running along an irregular crest, about 350
feet in elevation, within which was an elevation (Wangtai or
Signal Hill) of about 800 feet. The permanent forts were
polygonal in trace and had ditches with caponieres and
galleries. The gap between the two sectors was covered by the
fort on Paiyushan (Quail Hill).
"Of the works most intimately connected with the siege the
Sungshushan, Ehrlungshan, North and East Tungchikuanshan,
Itzushan, and Antzushan forts were strong permanent
fortifications. The two Panglungshan forts, East and West,
were semi-permanent redoubt-shaped fortifications; 203 Meter
Hill and Aksakayama were semi-permanent works with two lines
of advance trenches. Kuropatkin Fort was a strong field-work
with deep ditch; the Shuishihyung lunettes were also provided
with ditches, but not so deep. P. H., Kobu and Hachimakiyama
were more in the nature of semi-permanent trenches with
bomb-proofs."
_Epitome of the Russo-Japanese War,
United States War Department,
Second [Military Information] Division,
General Staff, Number 11, pages. 28-29._
"In this fortress, for the first time, were utilised all those
terrible agencies of war which the rapid advance of science in
the past quarter of a century has rendered available. Among
these we may mention rapid-fire guns, machine-guns, smokeless
powder, artillery of high velocity and great range, high
explosive shells, the magazine rifle, the telescopic sight,
giving marvellous accuracy of fire, the range-finder, giving
instantaneously the exact distance of the enemy, the
search-light, the telegraph and the telephone, starlight
bombs, barbed-wire entanglements, and a dozen other
inventions, all of which were deemed sufficient, when applied
to such stupendous fortifications as those of Port Arthur, to
render them absolutely impregnable.
"The Russians believed them to be so—certainly the indomitable
Stössel did. And well he might, for there was no record in
history of any race of fighters, at least in modern times,
that could face such death-dealing weapons and not melt away
so swiftly before their fury as to be swept away in defeat.
But a new type of fighter has arisen, as the sequel was to
tell."
_Richard Barry,
How Port Arthur Fell
(Fortnightly Review, March, 1905)._
"The first bombardment from the land side began suddenly on
August 7. … The bombardment continued all day, though doing
little material damage. Next morning, from 2 to 5 A. M., we
heard heavy musketry fire from the direction of Ta-ku-shan:
the enemy leaving the town and the main defences in peace,
were turning their attention to it.
{349}
This hill corresponded in the east to 203 Metre Hill in the
west, and was equally important and equally unfortified. It
and Sia-gu-shan, the natural forts of Arthur on the eastern
front, had a bad time. In the first place they had not been
made the most of, for in the original plan of defence of Port
Arthur they had been thought to be important points and so had
been neither fortified nor armed as their position with regard
to the Fortress warranted, and Smirnoff had only recently
succeeded in arming them to a small extent. In the second
place they became, after the abandonment of Wolf’s Hills, open
to flanking fire, and therefore untenable. The companies of
the 13th East Siberian Rifle Regiment sent there went
literally to their death, but, together with the gunners, they
held on as long as possible."
Both of the hills were taken by the Japanese that night. The
Russians immediately concentrated a heavy artillery fire on
the new occupants, and the next day they attempted to retake
Ta-ku shan by assault, but failed. On the 11th they repeated
the attempt, with no better success. On the 16th General Nogi
sent in a flag of truce, bearing the proposal of "a discussion
of negotiations for the surrender of the Fortress," saying:
"The Russians have given signal proofs of their gallantry, but
Arthur will be taken all the same." The invitation was
declined. On the 20th the Japanese gained Angle Hill and
Pan-lun-shan redoubt; but the Russians recaptured the latter
on the following night.
The Japanese now hoped to be able to take the Fortress by a
general assault, and made the attempt with extraordinary
determination on the 21st, 22d, and 23d. "On the night of the
23d," writes Nojine, "the Japanese made the most desperate of
all their attacks so far. They made three separate and most
determined assaults on Zaredoubt Battery, on the line between
it and Big Eagle’s Nest, and on Ruchevsky Battery. Though
temporarily successful at one or two points, they were finally
driven back out of all with shocking slaughter." It is of this
assault that Lieutenant Tadayoshi Sakurai tells the terrible
story in one of the chapters of his book, entitled "Human
Bullets: A Soldier’s Story of Port Arthur," from which the
following is quoted:
"I gathered my men around me and said: ‘I now bid you all
farewell. Fight with all your might. This battle will decide
whether Port Arthur is to fall or not. This water you drink,
please drink as if at your death moment.’
"I filled a cup with water that was fetched by one or two
soldiers at the risk of their lives, and we all drank farewell
from the same cup. Soon we received orders to advance to a
point half-way up the side of Panlung. … This fortress of
Panlung had been captured with the flesh and blood of the
Ninth Division of the Seventh and Eighth Regiments of the
Second Reserve, and was now an important base from which a
general assault on the northern forts of East Kikuan and
Wantai was to be made. This critical spot was finally taken
after a terrible struggle and a valiant action by the men of
General Oshima’s command. The sad story was eloquently told by
the horrible sights of the ravine. While running through the
opening in the wire-entanglement beyond, I noticed many
engineers and infantry men dead, piled one upon another caught
in the wire, or taking hold with both arms of a post, or
grasping the iron shears.
"When we reached the middle of the side of Panlung, I saw the
regimental flag that I used to carry, flying above our heads
in the dark. My heart leaped at the sight of the dear flag. …
As soon as we were gathered together the Colonel rose and gave
us a final word of exhortation, saying: ‘This battle is our
great chance of saving our country. To-night we must strike at
the vitals of Port Arthur. Our brave assaulting column must be
not simply a forlorn-hope ("resolved-to-die"), but a
"sure-death" detachment. I as your father am more grateful
than I can express for your gallant fighting. Do your best,
all of you.’
"Yes, we were all ready for death when leaving Japan. Men
going to battle of course cannot expect to come back alive.
But in this particular battle to be ready for death was not
enough; what was required of us was a determination not to
fail to die. Indeed we were ‘sure death’ men, and this new
appellation gave us a great stimulus. Also a telegram that had
come from the Minister of War in Tokyo was read by the
aide-de-camp, which said, ‘I pray for your success.’ This
increased the exaltation of our spirits.
"Let me now recount the sublimity and horror of this general
assault. I was a mere lieutenant and everything passed through
my mind as in a dream, so my story must be something like
picking out things from the dark. I can’t give you any
systematic account, but must limit myself to fragmentary
recollections. If this story sounds like a vain-glorious
account of my own achievements, it is not because I am
conscious of my merit when I have so little to boast of, but
because the things concerning me and near me are what I can
tell you with authority. If this partial account prove a clue
from which the whole story of this terrible assault may be
inferred, my work will not have been in vain.
"The men of the ‘sure-death’ detachment rose to their part.
Fearlessly they stepped forth to the place of death. They went
over Panlung-shan and made their way through the piled-up
bodies of the dead, groups of five or six soldiers reaching
the barricaded slope one after another. I said to the colonel,
‘Good-by, then!’ With this farewell I started, and my first
step was on the head of a corpse. Our objective points were
the Northern Fortress and Wang-tai Hill.
"There was a fight with bombs at the enemy’s
skirmish-trenches. The bombs sent from our side exploded
finely, and the place became at once a conflagration, boards
were flung about, sand bags burst, heads flew around, legs
were torn off. The flames mingled with the smoke, lighted up
our faces weirdly, with a red glare, and all at once the
battle-line became confused. Then the enemy, thinking it
hopeless, left the place and began to flee. ‘Forward! forward!
now is the time to go forward! Forward! Pursue! Capture it
with one bound!’ and, proud of our victory, we went forward
courageously. Captain Kawakami, raising his sword, cried,
‘Forward!’ and then I, standing close by him, cried,
‘Sakurai’s company, forward!’ Thus shouting I left the
captain’s side, and, in order to see the road we were to
follow, went behind the rampart. What is that black object
which obstructs our view? It is the ramparts of the Northern
Fortress. Looking back, I did not see a soldier. Alack, had
the line been cut? In trepidation, keeping my body to the left
for safety, I called the Twelfth Company.
{350}
"‘Lieutenant Sakurai!’ A voice called out repeatedly in
answer. Returning to the direction of the sound, I found
Corporal Ito weeping loudly. ‘What are you crying for? What
has happened?’ The corporal, weeping bitterly, gripped my arm
tightly. ‘Lieutenant Sakurai, you have become an important
person.’ ‘ What is there to weep about?’ I say, ‘what is the
matter?’ He whispered in my ear, ‘Our captain is dead.’
Hearing this, I too wept. Was it not only a moment ago that he
had given the order ‘Forward’? Was it not even now that I had
separated from him? And yet our captain was one of the dead.
In a moment our tender, pitying Captain Kawakami and I had
become beings of two separate worlds. Was it a dream or a
reality, I wondered?
"Corporal Ito pointed out the captain’s body, which had fallen
inside the rampart only a few rods away. I hastened hither and
raised him in my arms. ‘Captain!’ I could not say a word more.
But as matters could not remain thus, I took the secret map
which the captain had, and, rising up boldly, called out,
‘From henceforward I command the Twelfth Company.’ And I
ordered that someone of the wounded should carry back the
captain’s corpse. A wounded soldier was just about to raise it
up when he was struck on a vital spot and died leaning on the
captain. One after another of the soldiers who took his place
was struck and fell.
"I called Sub-Lieutenant Ninomiya and asked him if the
sections were together. He answered in the affirmative. I
ordered Corporal Ito not to let the line be cut, and told him
that I would be in the center of the skirmishers. In the
darkness of the night we could not distinguish the features of
the country, nor in which direction we were to march. Standing
up abruptly against the dark sky were the Northern Fortress
and Wang-tai Hill. In front of us lay a natural stronghold,
and we were in a caldron-shaped hollow. But still we marched
on side by side.
‘The Twelfth Company forward!’ I turned to the right and went
forward as in a dream. I remember nothing clearly of the time.
‘Keep the line together!’ This was my one command. Presently I
ceased to hear the voice of Corporal Ito, who had been at my
right hand. The bayonets gleaming in the darkness became
fewer. The black masses of soldiers who had pushed their way
on now became a handful. All at once, as if struck by a club,
I fell down sprawling on the ground. I was wounded, struck in
my right hand. The splendid magnesium light of the enemy
flashed out, showing the piled-up bodies of the dead, and I
raised my wounded hand and looked at it. It was broken at the
wrist; the hand hung down and was bleeding profusely. I took
out the already loosened bundle of bandages, tied up my wound
with the triangular piece, and then wrapping a handkerchief
over it, I slung it from my neck with the sunrise flag, which
I had sworn to plant on the enemy’s fortress.
"Looking up, I saw that only a valley lay between me and
Wang-tai Hill, which almost touched the sky. I wished to drink
and sought at my waist, but the canteen was gone; its leather
strap alone was entangled in my feet. The voices of the
soldiers were lessening one by one. In contrast, the glare of
the rockets of the hated enemy and the frightful noise of the
cannonading increased. I slowly rubbed my legs, and, seeing
that they were unhurt, I again rose. Throwing aside the sheath
of my sword, I carried the bare blade in my left hand as a
staff, went down the slope as in a dream, and climbed Wang-tai
Hill.
"The long and enormously heavy guns were towering before me,
and how few of my men were left alive now! I shouted and told
the survivors to follow me, but few answered my call. When I
thought that the other detachments must also have been reduced
to a similar condition, my heart began to fail me. No
reinforcement was to be hoped for, so I ordered a soldier to
climb the rampart and plant the sun flag overhead, but alas!
he was shot and killed, without even a sound or cry.
"All of a sudden a stupendous sound as from another world rose
around about me. ‘Counter-assault!’ A detachment of the enemy
appeared on the rampart, looking like a dark wooden barricade.
They surrounded us in the twinkling of an eye and raised a cry
of triumph. Our disadvantageous position would not allow us to
offer any resistance, and our party was too small to fight
them. We had to fall back down the steep hill. Looking back, I
saw the Russians shooting at us as they pursued. When we
reached the earthworks before mentioned, we made a stand and
faced the enemy. Great confusion and infernal butchery
followed. Bayonets clashed against bayonets; the enemy brought
out machine-guns and poured shot upon us pell-mell; the men on
both sides fell like grass. But I cannot give you a detailed
account of the scene, because I was then in a dazed condition.
I only remember that I was brandishing my sword in fury. I
also felt myself occasionally cutting down the enemy. I
remember a confused fight of white blade against white blade,
the rain and hail of shell, a desperate fight here and a
confused scuffle there. At last I grew so hoarse that I could
not shout any more. Suddenly my sword broke with a clash, my
left arm was pierced. I fell, and before I could rise a shell
came and shattered my right leg. I gathered all my strength
and tried to stand up, but I felt as if I were crumbling and
fell to the ground perfectly powerless. A soldier who saw me
fall cried, ‘Lieutenant Sakurai, let us die together.’"
_Tadayoshi Sakurai,
Human Bullets, chapter 26
(Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston).
https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/47548_
The soldier who offered to die with him stayed with the
Lieutenant till morning, binding his wounds, and finally
creeping away to find and bring help if he could. He, too, had
been wounded, and Sakurai found him later in a hospital. At
the end of many hours of constantly imminent death, the
helpless and suffering Lieutenant was saved by two soldiers
who bore him, stealthily and with infinite difficulty out of
the range of the Russian rifles and to a field hospital, where
he found himself among intimate friends.
{351}
Of the scene on the morning following the terrific assaults of
August 23d, the correspondent Nojine writes:
"The rising sun showed up sheaves of corpses on the ground
that was still ours. Death had indeed triumphed, and had
claimed 22,000 lives. From this time forward the enemy
remained content with the slower advance of regular siege
operations. … The enemy had got close up to our positions, and
the salient angle of the north-east was almost in their hands.
I say ‘almost,’ because the ruins of these works remained the
greater part of the time untenanted, neutralized by the
gun-fire of both sides." A month passed before another serious
assault was undertaken by the Japanese. Then, on the 21st of
September, they attacked what was called "203 Metre Hill."
"Column after column rushed forward on to 203 Metre Hill,
covering all its fore hills and slopes with heaps of dead; but
at 8.45 a. m. they were repulsed. This assault was
distinguished by particular obstinacy. … Having got
three-quarters of [the hill] they meant to get possession of
the rest at all costs: they slowly crawled upwards, fell dead,
rolled back, and others dashed forward; they lay concealed and
waited for reinforcements; nothing would drive them back. All
their thoughts, all their endeavors were to get possession of
this hill. Our men began rolling down great boulders from the
top. These bounded down, flattened out the dead and sought out
the living, who, in trying to dodge, exposed themselves and
were shot by our men on the lookout. … During the night of the
21st about 900 corpses were collected under 203 Metre Hill."
Nevertheless the assault was repeated on the following day.
"From the moment this assault was beaten back, the trenches in
front of 203 Metre Hill were gradually evacuated and the enemy
went to earth only on Angle Hill. All their sapping was
confined to the north-east. On the western front of the
Fortress there now remained in our possession only 203 Metre,
Flat and Divisional Hills. … October 1 was an epoch in the
history of the defence of Port Arthur, for it was on this day
that the first of the 11-inch shells fell into the Fortress,
and so changed the aspect of affairs. … Nowhere could we find
real safety from them. … The concrete of the forts, the armor
on the battle ships, were penetrated clean through." Mining
and counter-mining, by the besiegers and the besieged, were
now in progress, and the explosion of such mines was begun
near the end of October. On the 30th of that month the
Japanese made another general assault, after a "cruel
bombardment" of four days. "The October attacks were short,
but most determined and bloody. As regards their success, it
was but slight. The enemy had gained some dozens of yards—no
more. … The Japanese had fired over 150,000 shells." The
"November assault season" began on the 20th. Its climax was on
the 26th, "when time after time, the enemy threw themselves
with extraordinary gallantry and persistence on forts
Ehr-lung-shan, Chi-kuan-shan and B Battery. Thousands were
mown down, but the living surged onwards. But it could not go
on forever, and at 3.30 the infantry attacks slackened and
ceased. … All next day and night an incessant stream of
wounded poured into Arthur, our losses being more than 1500
men. … The slopes below and beyond Tumulus Hill were thickly
spread with dead Japanese. A thick, unbroken mass of corpses
covered the cold earth like a coverlet. On the day of the
assault the following order had been issued by Major-General
Nakamura, who commanded the Japanese force told off for that
forlorn hope: … ‘Our objective is to sever the Fortress on two
parts. Not a man must hope to return alive. If I fall, Colonel
Watanabe will take over the command; if he also falls, Colonel
Okuno will take his place. Every officer, whatever his rank,
must consider himself his senior’s successor. The attack will
be delivered mainly with the bayonet. No matter how fierce the
Russian fire, our men will not reply by a single shot until we
have established ourselves. Officers will shoot any men who
fall out or retire without orders.’ … This is the kind of foe
we had to fight. …
"We now come to the culmination of the tragedy, and perhaps
the bloodiest scene of carnage of the whole war—the fight for
and capture of 203 Metre Hill." The attack began November 27
and was continuous for eight days, excepting that an hour’s
truce was obtained by the Japanese, December 2, for the burial
of their dead. The next day "the fight on the hill was, if
possible, more exasperated. In the Fortress the feeling of
alarm was intensified, and all unemployed men had been got
under arms, … and the other points denuded, in order to feed
the maw of 203 Metre Hill. Even the hospitals gave their
contribution. December 4—bright and frosty—ushered in a fresh
hell. It was now hardly a fight between men that was taking
place on this accursed spot; it was a struggle of human flesh
against iron and steel, against blazing petroleum, lyddite,
pyroxiline and mélinite, and the stench of rotting corpses. It
was the last day but one of the long-drawn agony." At noon on
the 5th the Japanese gained the top of the hill, and held it
against an attempt that evening to drive them off. "203 Metre
Hill was lost, and with it more than 5000 Russians."
The end was now near. On the 15th four generals, and other
officers, including General Kondratenko, the most valued
assistant of General Smirnoff, were holding a consultation in
one of the casemates, and were killed by a 11-inch shell,
which penetrated even that shelter. On the 18th Chi-kuan-shan
Fort was captured; on the 28th Ehr-lung-shan was lost; on the
31st the Japanese took fortification Number 3, and on New
Year’s Day they won the Eagle’s Nest. That day General Stössel
sent a flag of truce to open negotiations for surrender. The
capitulation was signed the next day. "Of 18,000 sick and
wounded reported on the day the garrison marched out, 6000
only were wounded; the balance were cases of scurvy."
_E. K. Nojine,
The Truth about Port Arthur
(Dutton & Co., New York).
https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/59972_
General Stössel was subsequently ordered for trial before a
military commission, on a number of charges, including
disobedience of orders from the General Commanding in
Manchuria, false reports to headquarters, improper
interference with the commandant of the Fortress, and personal
absence from most of the engagements that had taken place in
and around Port Arthur. He was condemned to death, but the
Tzar commuted the sentence to imprisonment for ten years. He
began serving the sentence in March 1908, and was pardoned and
released on the 19th of May, 1909.
{352}
JAPAN: A. D. 1904-1905 (September-March).
War with Russia: The Campaign in Manchuria.
From the Battle of Liao-Yang to the end of
the Battle of Mukden.
Early in October, a month after the escape of the Russian army
from its defeat at Liao-Yang, General Kuropatkin attacked the
Japanese at the Sha-ho river and fought a desperate battle
with no substantial success. Extensive movements were then
interrupted by the approach of winter, and the campaign was
practically suspended for the next four months. "The three
Japanese armies had maintained the same relative positions in
which they had fought their way from Hai-Cheng northward.
Kuroki’s was the right, Oku’s the left, and Nodzu’s the
center. By the middle of February, Marshal Oyama had been
reënforced by Nogi’s one hundred thousand veterans of Port
Arthur, hereafter to be known as the fourth Japanese army,
operating to the west of Oku. A somewhat mysterious fifth
army, under command of General Kawamura, had been operating
somewhere between Kuroki and Vladivostok, and, while its
movements had not been known definitely, it had been expected
to threaten General Kuropatkin’s left. Both Russians and
Japanese were within a few miles of Mukden, the sacred city of
the Manchus. This city of half a million people lies in a
plain,—really the valley of the Hun River,—with the Hun and
the Liao rivers twenty to thirty miles west and southwest.
Eastward are the Mao-Tien Mountains, extending along the line
of the Port Arthur & Harbin Railway. The Russian and Japanese
lines formed a huge bow or crescent, the Japanese to the
southward, extending over a hundred miles of plains and hill
from Chang-Tan eastward across the railway to Lone Tree
(Putiloff) Hill, almost all the strong positions being held by
the Russians." In this position of the two stupendous armies
the long series of engagements known collectively as the
Battle of Mukden was opened by the Japanese on the 20th of
February, 1905. The center of the Russian army rested on the
Sha-ho; its right wing, commanded by General Kaulbars, was
distant from its left wing, commanded by General Linevitch,
more than one hundred and twenty miles. The Japanese attack
was begun by Kuroki, commanding their right. Crossing the
Sha-ho, he "swung around the Russian left, driving it from the
mountains in the vicinity of Tie Pass to Fushun, an important
fortified post (and the Russian coal depot) on the Hun River;
Nogi’s force had attacked General Kuropatkin from the west.
Nogi had marched through the neutral zone south of the Liao
River, to Sin-Min-Tun, a violation of neutrality against which
the Russians and Chinese had protested. This neutral zone,
however, had already been used by the Russians as a base to
forward coal and supplies to their army, so the Japanese
Government claimed that the neutrality had become null and
void. On March 3, Nogi rolled up the Russians in flight, and
his advance was not checked until his right wing had come into
touch with Oku’s left, only about eight miles south of Mukden.
While the armies of Oku and Nodzu continued to pound the
Russian center, with tremendous losses to themselves and to
the enemy, Nogi’s left, after a forced march of forty miles,
fell upon the Russian center. Through this Oku and Nodzu drove
a wedge, and, although Generals Linevitch and Kaulbars had
made a desperate defense and General Rennenkampf’s Cossacks
had performed prodigies of valor, the Russians had found
themselves (by the end of the first week in March) attacked in
so many places on the north of their flanks that it had become
a question with Kuropatkin, not only of retreat, but of saving
large bodies of troops from being surrounded and annihilated.
"Early on the morning of March 10, the Japanese occupied
Mukden, and the Russian retreat had become a rout. The next
day the important fortified town of Fushun was seized by the
Japanese, and thereafter the Russians, disorganized and
suffering from hunger and the weather, poured northward to Tie
Pass, forty miles from Mukden,—outmarched, outgeneraled, and
outfought."
_American Review of Reviews,
April and May, 1905._
"The sufferings caused by the retreat cannot be exaggerated.
It must be remembered that the weather remained intensely cold
and that the arrangements for collecting the wounded were all
disorganised. … Defeat, it may be added, was wholly unexpected
by the Manchurian Army, and that view was shared by the
foreign attaches and the war correspondents. Whatever their
opinions might be as to the possibility of General Kuropatkin
marching on Liao-Yang, they felt confident that the Japanese
would be unable to turn the Russians out of the positions so
long and so carefully prepared. The Japanese accomplished this
seemingly impossible task. …
"Following on the disaster of Mukden, General Kuropatkin was
relieved of his command, exchanging places with General
Linevitch. The new Commander-in-Chief fixed his headquarters
at Guntzuling, where the shattered army was re-formed."
_Lord Brooke,
An Eye Witness in Manchuria,
chapter 37._
JAPAN: A. D. 1904-1905 (October-May).
War with Russia: The expedition of the Baltic Fleet
to relieve Port Arthur.
The Dogger Bank incident.
The Seven Months Voyage.
Battle of Tsushima.
Destruction of the Fleet.
After the sea-fights of August 10-14, between Port Arthur and
Vladivostok (see above, A. D. 1904, February-August) Russia
had no naval force of any importance in the Pacific, and
hastened preparations for sending out a fleet from the Baltic
Sea.
See above,
JAPAN: A. D. 1904 (February-August).
Under the command of Admiral Rozhdestvensky, this intended
reinforcement of the defence of Port Arthur was despatched
from Reval and Libau, sailing from the latter port on October
15. At the outset of its voyage, while traversing the North
Sea, the Russian fleet experienced a misadventure which
occasioned much excitement for a time and threatened to raise
a serious question between the Russian and British
governments. Briefly stated, the main facts of the case,
according to evidence accepted subsequently by an
International Commission of Inquiry, were these:
Before sailing from Reval, and, further, while anchored at the
Skagen, making ready to pass to the North Sea, Admiral
Rozhdestvensky had been warned by agents of his government
that suspicious vessels were on the coast of Norway, and that
he must beware of hostile undertakings, which were likely to
have the form of torpedo attacks. Accordingly he sailed from
the Skagen, October 20, twenty-four hours earlier than he had
planned, sending off the fleet in six divisions, that which he
accompanied being the last, and starting at 10 p. m.
{353}
In one of the preceding divisions a transport, by reason of
defects in her engine, fell behind the cruisers which escorted
her, and at 8 p. m. on October 21 was some fifty miles astern
of the remainder of the fleet. She then met several Swedish
vessels which she imagined to be torpedo craft, and fired on
them, sending a wireless message to the Admiral that she was
attacked by torpedo boats on all sides. This message led the
Admiral to signal to his captains that they might expect
attacks and must keep a doubly vigilant watch. At an early
hour in the following morning his own immediate squadron
arrived at the Dogger Bank, where, as usual, many fishing
craft, mostly English, were "shooting their trawls," and doing
so in a regulated way, under the direction of a fishing master
or captain, who signalled with rockets to his fleet. One of
the preceding divisions of the Russian armada had passed these
without alarm, recognizing what they were; but Admiral
Rozhdestvensky and the officers of his flagship were so
expectant of enemies that the sight of a green rocket shot
into the air, and a distant glimpse of some kind of a ship
which seemed to be headed straight for them, at a great rate
of speed, convinced them instantly that they were in the midst
of swarming foes, and they opened fire.
According to testimony, their fire was kept up for about half
an hour, as they passed through the fishing fleet, one of the
vessels in which was sunk, her skipper and one other man
killed, while all but one of the remaining crew received
wounds. Two others of the fishing craft were struck, and the
hospital ship of the National Mission which attended the fleet
received some damage. Ultimately it was learned that the
Russians, in their wild firing, did harm to one another, so
seriously that the chaplain of one of their ships received a
wound from which he died.
Wild excitement was created in England by the news of this
strange performance. Hurried naval preparations were made for
vigorous action, if found necessary, and formal demands for
apology, inquiry and compensation were presented at St.
Petersburg. Nothing, however, was done rashly, and the two
governments concerned agreed sensibly and quickly to an
investigation of the affair by an International Commission,
which gave hearings in Paris soon afterwards. The Commission
found precedents in recent naval experience—even in the
manoeuvres of the British navy—of a similar mistaking of
fishing boats and other vessels for torpedo craft, and was
able to deal gently and pacifically with the facts brought
before it. It decided that the fishing fleet had committed no
hostile act, and that no torpedo boat was either among them or
near them, and that, consequently, the Russian Admiral was not
justified in opening fire. As for his not stopping to
ascertain the damage he had done, the conclusion was that
enough uncertainty on the subject of danger had been raised in
his mind to warrant that neglect; but a majority of the
commissioners expressed regret that he had not given notice of
what had happened when he passed through the Straits. Then, as
_The Naval Annual_ remarked, in reviewing the incident,
"diplomacy steps in and seeks to soothe military and national
susceptibilities by declaring that Admiral Rozhdestvensky’s
‘valeur militaire’ is unimpaired, and his ‘sentiments
d’humanité’ unimpeachable."
_Naval Annual, 1905,
chapter vi._
Between the English and Russian governments the affair was
settled amicably by an indemnity of £65,000 from the latter to
the fishermen who suffered.
The first halt in Rozhdestvensky’s voyage was off Tangier,
where he divided his fleet, sending one division, under
Admiral Folkersahm, by the Suez Canal route, and leading the
other in person down the Atlantic and round the Cape. They met
off Madagascar on the 3d of January, and got news there of the
fall of Port Arthur and, later, of the defeat of the Russian
army at Mukden. The stay of the reunited fleet at Nossi Bé
island, off the west coast of Madagascar, near its northern
extremity, was prolonged, awaiting orders, till the 17th of
March. Nothing was known of its next movements until it was
seen off Singapore, April 8. Thence it proceeded to Kam-ranh
Bay, in French Indo-China, where it stayed for some weeks,
waiting to be joined by another squadron from the Baltic,
which came under the command of Admiral Nebogatoff. This use
of the waters of a neutral Power was bitterly complained of in
Japan and sharply criticised elsewhere. The whole fleet
resumed its northward voyage on the 14th of May, and on the
27th, in the Korean Straits, off the island of Tsushima, it
was intercepted by Admiral Togo’s fleet. An account of the
circumstances of the interception, and of the wonderfully
decisive battle which ensued, derived by Mr. George Kennan
from both Russian and Japanese participants in the engagement,
was published in _The Outlook_ of July 29, 1905. Mr.
Kennan, who had been with the Japanese forces during the siege
of Port Arthur, and had described it for _The Outlook_,
obtained permission to visit some of the wounded and captured
officers of Rozhdestvensky’s fleet in hospital at one of the
naval stations in Japan. As he spoke their language they
talked with him freely, and information from both victors and
vanquished is thus combined in the account from which we quote
a few passages, as follows:
"When the Baltic fleet left the coast of Annam, on its way to
Vladivostok, Admiral Rojesvensky [so Mr. Kennan writes the
name] had no accurate information with regard to the
whereabouts of the Japanese squadrons. They might all be
concentrated in the Tsushima Strait, between Japan and Korea,
or they might be watching, in three separate detachments, the
three channels that give access to the Sea of Japan, viz,
Tsushima, Tsuguru, and La Perouse. Thinking that Togo would
not dare to leave wholly unguarded the two northern passages,
which are nearest to Vladivostok, Rojesvensky assumed that the
Japanese fleet had been divided into three sections, and that,
on any route which he might select, he would probably have to
deal with only one of them. …
"Admiral Togo, however, did not divide his fleet.
Anticipating, with acute prescience, the reasoning and the
decision of the Russian commander, he concentrated his whole
force in the Tsushima Strait, and concealed it so perfectly in
unfrequented harbors at the southern end of Korea that nobody
ever saw it or discovered its location. … It seems to have had
its main base near Masampho, Korea. The arrangements made for
discovering the approach and reporting the movements of the
Russian fleet were as comprehensive and perfect as possible.
{354}
All along the southwestern coast of Japan signal stations had
been established on prominent islands and on the tops of high
mountains, and every one of these ‘watch-towers,’ as they were
called, was connected by telephone, either with Sasebo or with
Maizuru. Fast scouting ships, equipped with wireless telegraph
instruments, patrolled the entrance to the strait, and on the
charts carried by them, as well as by all other vessels of the
Japanese fleet, the whole stretch of water between Japan and
Korea had been divided into small numbered squares, so that
the exact location of the enemy at any moment might be
designated by a number. There was no possibility of
Rojesvensky’s getting through the strait unobserved unless he
should be favored by dense fog.
"At five o’clock on the morning of Saturday, May 27, the
scouting ship Shinano-maru reported by wireless telegraphy
from the vicinity of Quelpart Island, ‘Enemy's fleet sighted
in square 203. He seems to be steering for the East Channel’
(the passage between Tsushima Island and the Japanese
mainland, which is called on English charts Krusenstern
Strait). The Japanese fleet, which was all ready for sea, left
its Korean base at once. Admiral Togo himself, with four
battle-ships and eight armoured cruisers, took a northerly
course in order to get ahead of the enemy and stop his
progress at or near Oki Island (Okinoshima), while Admirals
Kamimura, Uriu, Dewa, and Kataoka sailed in a southeasterly
direction for the purpose of enveloping his rear. The officers
last named came into touch with the Russian fleet between Iki
Island and Tsushima soon after ten o’clock; but as the
Japanese plan of action did not contemplate an attack at that
point, they merely kept the enemy in sight and reported to
Admiral Togo by wireless telegraphy the number and disposition
of his ships. Rojesvensky had in all thirty-eight vessels, and
they entered the strait in two parallel columns.
"The Russians, of course, saw on their left flank and in their
rear the squadrons of Admirals Kamimura, Kataoka, Uriu, and
Dewa, but, as these ships showed no disposition to attack,
they (the Russians) were confirmed in their belief that only a
part of the Japanese fleet was there, and that they should get
through the strait without a serious fight. They remained
under this delusion until half past one o’clock in the
afternoon, when, to their great surprise, Admiral Togo, with
four battle-ships and eight armored cruisers, appeared
directly ahead. … At 1.55 p. m., when the flag-ships of the
two fleets were a little more than four miles apart, Togo
hoisted the following signal: ‘The fate of the Empire depends
upon this battle. Let every man do his best.’ At two o’clock
the Japanese squadrons on the flank and rear of the Russians
closed in a little, and eight minutes later the fight began,
Admiral Togo opening fire at a distance of about four miles.
It became evident at once to the officers of the Orel that in
the matter of marksmanship they were wholly outclassed. The
fire of the Japanese was a little wild at first, but in a few
minutes they got the range with surprising accuracy, and
struck the leading battle-ships of the two Russian columns
with almost every shot. Ten minutes after the fight began, a
twelve-inch shell entered the forward turret of the Kniaz
Suvaroff, burst there with terrific violence, exploded three
or four rounds of ammunition that had just been brought up
from the magazine, wrecked both guns, and blew the top of the
turret completely off. In less than an hour the Russian
flag-ship had lost one mast and both funnels, and had taken
fire fore and aft; the Oslabya and the Alexander III. were
also in flames; the Orel, the Sissoi Veliki, and the Borodino
had been severely if not fatally injured; the Russian columns
had been broken up and thrown into disorder; and the issue of
the battle had been fully determined. In other words, the
Baltic fleet had been overwhelmed and defeated, by gun-fire
alone, in less than forty-five minutes. Most of the
second-class Russian vessels were still in fighting condition,
but the battle-ship section had lost more than half of its
original efficiency, and there was no longer any doubt as to
the outcome of the engagement. … Admiral Togo says, in his
detailed official report, that ‘at 2.45 p. m. the result of
the battle had been decided.’ And in this judgment the
officers of the Orel virtually coincide. They frankly admit
that they were overwhelmed from the very first by the accuracy
and destructiveness of Admiral Togo’s long-range gun-fire."
Though the result of the battle was made certain within its
first hour, the destruction of Russian ships went on to the
end of the day and through most of the night, with pursuit of
those in flight continued until the 26th. Twenty-two of the
Russian vessels of all classes were sunk, 6 were captured, 6
were afterwards interned in neutral ports, and two only made
their way to Valdivostok. The Japanese lost 3 torpedo boats;
116 of their officers and men were killed, and 538 received
wounds. The prisoners they captured numbered about 6000.
Admiral Rozhdestvensky, accused of cowardice in the battle,
was tried by court-martial and acquitted by a verdict rendered
in July, 1906.
JAPAN: A. D. 1904: A. D. 1904-1905.
War with Russia: Japan’s greatest achievement.
Sanitation of the Army.
"Without minimizing for a moment the splendor of Japanese
victories on land and sea, at Mukden, Port Arthur, Liao-Yang,
or with Togo off Tsushima, in the Korean Straits (and two of
these battles are among the bloodiest in history), I yet
unhesitatingly assert that Japan’s greatest conquests have
been in the humanities of war, in the stopping of the needless
sacrifice of life by preventable diseases. This dreadful and
unnecessary waste of life, especially in conflicts between
so-called civilized and Anglo-Saxon races, is one of the most
ghastly propositions of the age. The Japanese have gone a long
way toward eliminating it. …
"Longmore’s tables, which are accepted as the most reliable
statistics of war, and which are based on the records of
battles for the past two hundred years, show that there has
rarely been a conflict of any great duration in which at least
four men have not perished from disease for every one from
bullets. In the Russo-Turkish War, 80,000 men died from
disease and 20,000 from wounds. In the Crimean campaign, it is
asserted on eminent French authority that in six months the
allied forces lost 50,000 soldiers from disease and only 2,000
from casualties.
{355}
In the French campaign in Madagascar, in 1894, of the 14,000
men sent to the front 29 were killed in action and 7,000 from
disease, most of which was preventable. In our Spanish
American War, in 1898, in a campaign the actual hostilities of
which lasted six weeks, the deaths from casualties, as given
me by the surgeon-general of the United States army, last
week, were 293, while those from disease amounted to 3,681, or
nearly 14 to 1.
"Compare these frightful figures with the record of killed,
wounded, and sick in the Japanese army from February, 1904, to
May, 1905, as furnished me by Minister of War General
Terauchi, in Tokio, in August last. There were killed on the
field 43,892, or 7.32 per cent. of the entire army in the
field; there were wounded 145,527, or 24.27 percent.; there
died of wounds 9,054, or 1.51 percent.; there died from
sickness and disease, including contagious cases, 11,992, or
about 2 per cent. of the army. In other words, the total
number of deaths from casualties and wounds amounted to
52,946, or nearly 9 per cent, of the army, while the total
deaths from sickness amounted to 11,992, or 2 per cent. of the
army. This record is unparalleled and unapproached in the
history of warfare. How did the Japanese accomplish it? In
three preeminently fundamental ways. First, thorough
preparation and organization for war, such as was never before
made in history; second, through the simple, non-irritating,
easily digested ration furnished the troops; and third,
because of the brilliant part played by the members of the
medical profession in the application of practical sanitation
and the stamping out of preventable disease in the army,
thereby saving its great hosts for the legitimate purpose of
war, the defeating of the enemy in the field. …
"She organized her medical department on broad, generous
lines, and gave its representatives the rank and power their
great responsibilities merited, recognizing that they had to
deal with a foe which history has shown has killed 80 percent.
of the total mortality in other wars. She even had the
temerity (strange as it may seem to an American or an English
army official) to grade her medical men as high as the
officers of the line, who combat the enemy who kills only 20
per cent., and to accord them equal authority, except, of
course, in the emergency of battle, when all authority
devolves, as it should, on the officers of the line. In her
home land she organized the most splendid system of hospitals
that has ever been devised for the treatment of sick and
wounded, and with her army at the front she put into execution
the most elaborate and effective system of sanitation that has
ever been practised in war. Upon the declaration of war, she
was prepared to house, scientifically treat, and tenderly care
for 25,000 wounded in Japan alone, and as the war progressed
the hospital capacity was rapidly increased, so that one and
one-half years after its commencement, or on the sixth day of
July, 1905, the twelve military home hospitals possessed a
normal capacity of 58,261."
_Major Louis L. Seaman, M. D.,
Lessons for America in the Japanese Medical Service
(American Review of Reviews November, 1905)._
JAPAN: A. D. 1904-1905. War with Russia:
Casualties of the entire war on the Japanese side.
The following is an official Japanese statement of the
casualties of the entire war on the Japanese side:
"Killed in battle. 47,387
Died of wounds 11,500
Wounded, but recovered 161,925
Total killed and wounded 220,812
Died of sickness 27,158
Sick, but recovered 209,065
Total sick 236,223
Total of killed,
wounded, and sick 457,035
Total of fatal casualties 86,045
"These figures relate to the field only, not including cases
among the troops in Japan or Formosa, and they may be slightly
altered when all the reports of hospitals are compiled. Of
those who succumbed to disease nearly three-fourths died in
the field and one-fourth after reaching home.
"To find the total number of killed in battle and patients
treated the following additions must be made:
Total of killed, wounded,
and sick in the field 457,035
Patients treated at home 97,850
Russian prisoner patients 77,803
Grand total 632,688
"The above figures do not include slight cases remaining with
the Japanese regiments. In April, 1906, when these figures
were published, the Japanese missing had been reduced to
3,000.
"Comparative statement of the result of treatment, by wars:
Sick and wounded Wounded treated
treated in Hospital. in Hospital.
Recovered Died. Recovered Died.
completely. completely.
Per cent. Per cent. Per cent. Per cent.
Chinese-Japanese war 50.94 14.24 63.23 7.49
Russo-Japanese war 54.81 7.65 71.58 8.83
"The difference between each of the totals and 100 represents
men incapacitated for active service.
"Comparative statement of cases and deaths from sickness and
wounds, by wars:
Wounded. Sick. Died of Died of
Wounds. Disease.
Chinese-Japanese 1 6.93 1 12.09
North China 1 4.37 1 1.97
Russo-Japanese 1 1.07 1 0.46
"Comparative statement of percentage of sickness in total
number of troops in field, by war:
Percentage of Percentage of deaths
sickness for all from sickness for
troops engaged. all troops engaged.
Chinese-Japanese 59.20 9.29
North China war 34.88 4.33
Russo-Japanese 36.04 2.99
"The average monthly percentage of sickness during the
twenty-one months of the Russo-Japanese war was 8.69, while
the average monthly percentage for 1902, which is said to have
had an exceptionally good medical record, was 10.21."
_Charles Lynch,
Report (United States War Department,
Reports of Military Observers …
during the Russo-Japanese War, part 4)._
{356}
JAPAN: A. D. 1904-1905.
General Consequences in Europe of the Russo-Japanese War.
See (in this Volume)
EUROPE: A. D. 1904-1909.
JAPAN: A. D. 1904-1905.
Conventions with Korea, establishing a Protectorate over
that Empire, with Control of its Finances and its
Foreign Relations.
See (in this Volume)
KOREA: A. D. 1904-1905.
JAPAN: A. D. 1904-1905.
The Red Cross Society.
See (in this Volume)
RED CROSS SOCIETY.
JAPAN: A. D. 1905.
Report on treatment of the Opium Problem in Formosa.
See (in this Volume)
OPIUM PROBLEM.
JAPAN: A. D. 1905 (June-October).
Ending of the war with Russia.
Mediation offered by the President of the United States
and accepted.
Negotiation and Conclusion of the Peace Treaty of Portsmouth.
In the third article of the Convention for the Pacific
Settlement of International Disputes agreed to and signed at
the First International Peace Conference, at The Hague, in
1898, it was recommended, "in case of serious disagreement or
conflict," "that one or more Powers, strangers to the dispute,
should on their own initiative, and as far as circumstances
may allow, offer their good offices or mediation to the States
at variance." To this recommendation was added the declaration
that "Powers, strangers to the dispute, have the right to
offer good offices or mediation, even during the course of
hostilities"; and "that the exercise of this right can never
be regarded by one or the other of the parties in conflict as
an unfriendly act."
The first important action on this recommendation was taken by
the President of the United States, Mr. Roosevelt, on the 8th
of June, 1905, when he directed a communication from the then
acting Secretary of State, Mr. Loomis, to be dispatched by
telegraph to the Ambassadors of the United States at Tokyo and
St. Petersburg, identically the same to each, and to be
presented by the latter to the Governments of Russia and
Japan. The communication was in the following words:
Comments
Log in to leave a comment.
History for ready reference, Volume 7Chapter 382: , Laws of 1889, to read as follows (22)
0%33 min left in chapter