Chapter CI: Section 29 (21)

"This treaty was greeted with widespread favor in the press,
but was antagonized at once in the Senate by the jingo element
and by the personal adversaries of the administration. The
committee on foreign relations reported the draft favorably,
but with certain amendments, on February 1. The ensuing debate
soon revealed that a vote on ratification could not be
obtained before March 4, and the whole matter was dropped. At
the opening of the new Congress the Senate Committee again
considered the treaty and reported it, with amendments, on
March 18. During two weeks' discussion the Senate adopted the
committee's amendments and also others, with the result that
the draft was radically transformed.
{580}
Instead of the general reference of all disputes to the
tribunals, it was provided that any difference 'which, in the
judgment of either power, materially affects its honor or its
domestic or foreign policy,' should be submitted to
arbitration only by special agreement; that no question should
be submitted save with the consent of the Senate in its
treaty-making capacity; and that no claim of a British subject
against a state or territory of the United States should be
submitted under any circumstances. The first of these changes
was due mainly to the objection that without it the Monroe
Doctrine might be subjected to arbitration; the second to the
sensitiveness of senators as to their constitutional functions
in foreign relations; and the third to a desire to protect
states against claims on their defaulted bonds. Other changes
modified materially the method of appointing the arbitrators
for the United States, and struck out entirely the designation
of the King of Sweden as umpire. Even with these amendments,
the opposition to the treaty was not overcome; and the final
vote on ratification, taken May 5, resulted in its rejection,
the vote standing 43 to 26, less than two-thirds in the
affirmative. Thirty Republicans and 13 Democrats voted for the
treaty; 8 Republicans, 12 Democrats and 6 Populists against
it."

_Political Science Quarterly,
June, 1897._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1897 (March).
Inauguration of President McKinley.
Leading topics of the inaugural address.
The President's Cabinet.

The inauguration of President McKinley was performed with the
customary ceremonies on the 4th of March. In his inaugural
address, the new President laid somewhat less emphasis than
might have been expected on the need of measures for reforming
the monetary system of the country, but strongly urged that
instant steps be taken to increase the revenues of the
government by a return to higher tariff charges. "With
adequate revenue secured," he argued, "but not until then, we
can enter upon such changes in our fiscal laws as will, while
insuring safety and volume to our money, no longer impose upon
the government the necessity of maintaining so large a gold
reserve, with its attendant and inevitable temptations to
speculation. Most of our financial laws are the outgrowth of
experience and trial, and should not be amended without
investigation and demonstration of the wisdom of the proposed
changes. We must be both 'sure we are right' and 'make haste
slowly.' …

"The question of international bimetallism will have early and
earnest attention. It will be my constant endeavor to secure
it by cooperation with the other great commercial powers of
the world. Until that condition is realized, when the parity
between our gold and silver money springs from and is
supported by the relative value of the two metals, the value
of the silver already coined, and of that which may hereafter
be coined, must be kept constantly at par with gold by every
resource at our command. The credit of the government, the
integrity of its currency, and the inviolability of its
obligations must be preserved. This was the commanding verdict
of the people, and it will not be unheeded.

"Economy is demanded in every branch of the government at all
times, but especially in periods like the present of
depression in business and distress among the people. The
severest economy must be observed in all public expenditures,
and extravagance stopped wherever it is found, and prevented
wherever in the future it may be developed. If the revenues
are to remain as now, the only relief that can come must be
from decreased expenditures. But the present must not become
the permanent condition of the government. It has been our
uniform practice to retire, not increase, our outstanding
obligations; and this policy must again be resumed and
vigorously enforced. Our revenues should always be large
enough to meet with ease and promptness not only our current
needs and the principal and interest of the public debt, but
to make proper and liberal provision for that most deserving
body of public creditors, the soldiers and sailors and the
widows and orphans who are the pensioners of the United
States. …

"A deficiency is inevitable so long as the expenditures of the
government exceed its receipts. It can only be met by loans or
an increased revenue. While a large annual surplus of revenue
may invite waste and extravagance, inadequate revenue creates
distrust and undermines public and private credit. Neither
should be encouraged. Between more loans and more revenue
there ought to be but one opinion. We should have more
revenue, and that without delay, hindrance, or postponement. A
surplus in the treasury created by loans is not a permanent or
safe reliance. It will suffice while it lasts, but it cannot
last long while the outlays of the government are greater than
its receipts, as has been the case during the last two years.
… The best way for the government to maintain its credit is to
pay as it goes—not by resorting to loans, but by keeping out
of debt—through an adequate income secured by a system of
taxation, external, or internal, or both. It is the settled
policy of the government, pursued from the beginning and
practiced by all parties and administrations, to raise the
bulk of our revenue from taxes upon foreign productions
entering the United States for sale and consumption, and
avoiding, for the most part, every form of direct taxation
except in time of war.

"The country is clearly opposed to any needless additions to
the subjects of internal taxation, and is committed by its
latest popular utterance to the system of tariff taxation.
There can be no misunderstanding either about the principle
upon which this tariff taxation shall be levied. Nothing has
ever been made plainer at a general election than that the
controlling principle in the raising of revenue from duties on
imports is zealous care for American interests and American
labor. The people have declared that such legislation should
be had as will give ample protection and encouragement to the
industries and the development of our country. … The paramount
duty of congress is to stop deficiencies by the restoration of
that protective legislation which has always been the firmest
prop of the treasury. The passage of such a law or laws would
strengthen the credit of the government both at home and
abroad, and go far toward stopping the drain upon the gold
reserve held for the redemption of our currency, which has
been heavy and well-nigh constant for several years. In the
revision of the tariff, especial attention should be given to
the re-enactment and extension of the reciprocity principle of
the law of 1890, under which so great a stimulus was given to
our foreign trade in new and advantageous markets for our
surplus agricultural and manufactured products."

{581}

Without effect, the incoming President urged the ratification
of the treaty of arbitration with Great Britain, negotiated by
his predecessor and still pending in the Senate. In concluding
his address he announced his intention to convene Congress in
extra session, saying: "The condition of the public treasury
demands the immediate consideration of congress. It alone has
the power to provide revenue for the government. Not to
convene it under such circumstances, I can view in no other
sense than the neglect of a plain duty."

On the day following his inauguration, the President sent to
the Senate the following nominations for his Cabinet, which
were confirmed:

Secretary of State, John Sherman of Ohio;
Secretary of the Treasury, Lyman J. Gage of Illinois;
Secretary of War, Russel A. Alger of Michigan;
Attorney-General, Joseph McKenna of California;
Postmaster-General, James A. Gary of Maryland;
Secretary of the Navy, John D. Long of Massachusetts;
Secretary of the Interior, Cornelius N. Bliss of New York;
Secretary of Agriculture, James Wilson of Iowa.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1897 (March-July).
Passage of the Dingley Tariff Act.

Carrying out an intention announced in his Inaugural Address,
President McKinley called Congress together in extra session
on the 15th of March, asking for immediate action to increase
the revenue of the government by increased duties, "so levied
upon foreign products as to preserve the home market, so far
as possible, to our own producers." In his Inaugural Address
the President had expressed the understanding of his party as
to the chief meaning of the late election, by saying that "the
country is … committed by its latest popular utterance to the
system of tariff taxation. … The people have declared that
such legislation should be had as will give ample protection
and encouragement to the industries and development of our
country. … The paramount duty of Congress is to stop
deficiencies by the restoration of that protective legislation
which has always been the firmest prop of the treasury." To
the majority in both Houses of Congress these views were
entirely acceptable, and they were acted upon at once. The
Ways and Means Committee of the House of Representatives in
the previous Congress had already prepared a comprehensive new
tariff bill, which it passed on to its successor. This
ready-made bill was reported to the House on the first day of
the session, by Mr. Dingley, chairman of the newly appointed
committee, as he had been of the one before it. Debate on the
measure began a week later, and was controlled by a fixed
programme, which required it to be ended on the 31st of March.
The bill was then passed, by a vote of 205 against 121. Of the
action of the Senate upon it, and of the main features of the
bill as it was finally shaped and became law, the following is
a succinct account:

"The bill, referred at once to the Senate Committee on
Finance, was reported after a month, on May 8, with important
amendments. There was an attempt to impose some purely revenue
duties, and, as to the protective duties, the tendency was
towards lower rates than in the House bill, though on certain
articles, such as wools of low grade, hides, and others (of
which more will be said presently), the drift was the other
way. The Senate, however, paid much less respect than the
House to the recommendations of the committee in charge. In
the course of two months, from May 4 to July 7, it went over
the tariff bill item by item, amending without restraint,
often in a perfunctory manner, and not infrequently with the
outcome settled by the accident of attendance on the
particular day; on the whole, with a tendency to retain the
higher rates of the House bill. As passed finally by the
Senate on July 7, the bill, though it contained some 872
amendments, followed the plan of the House Committee rather
than that of the Senate Committee. As usual, it went to a
Conference Committee. In the various compromises and
adjustments in the Senate and in the Conference Committee
there was little sign of the deliberate plan and method which
the House had shown, and the details of the act were settled
in no less haphazard fashion than has been the case with other
tariff measures. As patched up by the Conference Committee,
the bill was promptly passed by both branches of Congress, and
became law on July 24. In what manner these political
conditions affected the character of the act will appear from
a consideration of the more important specific changes.

"First and foremost was the reimposition of the duties on
wool. As the repeal of these duties had been the one important
change made by the act of 1894, so their restoration was the
salient feature in the act of 1897. … Clothing wool was
subjected once more to a duty of 11 cents a pound, combing
wool to one of 12 cents. On carpet wool there were new graded
duties, heavier than any ever before levied. If its value was
12 cents a pound or less the duty was 4 cents; if over 12
cents, the duty was 7 cents. … The duties on carpet wool, as
has already been noted, were made higher than ever before. In
the House the rates of the act of 1890 had been retained; but
in the Senate new and higher rates were inserted. … They were
demanded by the Senators from some States in the Far West,
especially from Idaho and Montana. … They [the Senators in
question] needed to be placated and they succeeded in getting
higher duties on the cheap carpet wools, on the plea of
encouragement for the comparatively coarse clothing wool of
their ranches. … The same complications that led to the high
duty on carpet wool brought about a duty on hides. This rawest
of raw materials had been on the free list for just a quarter
of a century, since 1872, when the duty of the war days had
been repealed. … But here, again, the Senators from the
ranching States were able to dictate terms. … In the Senate a
duty of 20 per cent. was tacked on. The rate was reduced to 15
per cent. in the Conference Committee, and so remains in the
act. The restored duties on wool necessarily brought in their
train the old system of high compensating duties on woollens.
… In the main, the result was a restoration of the rates of
the act of 1890. There was some upward movement almost all
along the line; and the ad valorem duty alone, on the classes
of fabrics which are most largely imported, crept up to 55 per
cent. …

{582}

"On cotton goods the general tendency was to impose duties
lower than those of 1890. This was indicated by the drag-net
rate, on manufactures of cotton not otherwise provided for,
which had been 50 per cent. in 1890, and was 45 per cent. in
1897. On two large classes of textile goods new and distinctly
higher duties were imposed,—on silks and linens. … The mode of
gradation was to levy the duties according to the amount of
pure silk contained in the goods. The duties were fixed by the
pound, being lowest all goods containing a small proportion of
pure silk, and rising as that proportion became larger; with
the proviso that in no case should the duty be less than 50
per cent. … Thus, the duty on certain kinds of silks was $1.30
cents per pound, if they contained 45 per cent in weight of
silk; but advanced suddenly to $2.25, if they contained more
than 45 per cent. … On linens another step of the same kind
was taken, specific duties being substituted here also for
ad-valorem. … Linens were graded somewhat as cottons had been
graded since 1861, according to the fineness of the goods as
indicated by the number of threads to the square inch. If the
number of threads was 60 or less per square inch, the duty was
1¾ cents a square yard; if the threads were between 60 and
120, the duty was 2¾ cents; and so on,—plus 30 per cent.
ad-valorem duty in all cases. But finer linen goods, unless
otherwise specially provided for, were treated leniently. If
the weight was small (less than 4½ ounces per yard), the duty
was but 35 per cent. On the other hand, linen laces, or
articles trimmed with lace or embroidery, were dutiable at 60
percent.,—an advance at 10 per cent. over the rate of 1890. …
It was inevitable, under the political conditions of the
session, that in this schedule something should again be
attempted for the farmer; and, accordingly, we find a
substantial duty on flax. The rate of the act of 1890 was
restored,—3 cents a pound on prepared flax, in place of the
rate of 1½ cents imposed by the act of 1894. …

"On chinaware the rates of 1890 were restored. The duty on the
finer qualities which are chiefly imported had been lowered to
35 per cent. in 1894, and was now once more put at 60 per
cent. On glassware, also, the general ad-valorem rate, which
had been reduced to 35 per cent. in 1894, was again fixed at
45 per cent., as in 1890. Similarly the specific duties on the
cheaper grades of window-glass and plate-glass, which had been
lowered in 1894, were raised to the figures of 1890. … The metal
schedules in the act of 1897 showed in the main a striking
contrast with the textile schedules. Important advances of
duty were made on many textiles, and in some cases rates went
considerably higher even than those of 1890. But on most
metals, and especially on iron and steel, duties were left
very much as they had been in 1894. … On steel rails there was
even a slight reduction from the rate of 1894—$6.72 per ton
instead of $7.84. On coal there was a compromise rate. The
duty had been 75 cents a ton in 1890, and 40 cents in 1894; it
was now fixed at 67 cents. On the other hand, as to certain
manufactures of iron and steel farther advanced beyond the
crude stage, there was a return to rates very similar to those
of 1890. Thus, on pocket cutlery, razors, guns, we find once
more the system of combined ad-valorem and specific duties,
graded according to the value of the article. … Copper
remained on the free list, where it had been put in 1894. …
For good or ill the copper duty had worked out all its effects
years before. On the other hand, the duties on lead and on
lead ore went up to the point at which they stood in 1890.
Here we have once more the signs of concession to the silver
Republicans of the far West. … The duty on tin plate, a bone
of contention under the act of 1890, was disposed of, with
little debate, by the imposition of a comparatively moderate
duty. …

"A part of the act which aroused much public attention and
which had an important bearing on its financial yield was the
sugar schedule—the duties on sugar, raw and refined. … The act
of 1890 had admitted raw sugar free, while that of 1894 had
imposed a duty of 40 per cent. ad valorem. … The price of raw
sugar had maintained its downward tendency; and the duty of 40
per cent. had been equivalent in 1896 to less than one cent a
pound. In the act of 1897 the duty was made specific, and was
practically doubled. Beginning with a rate of one cent a pound
on sugar tested to contain 75 per cent., it advanced by stages
until on sugar testing 95 per cent. (the usual content of
commercial raw sugar) it reached 1.65 cents per pound. The
higher rate thus imposed was certain to yield a considerable
increase of revenue. Much was said also of the protection now
afforded to the beet sugar industry of the West. That
industry, however, was still of small dimensions and uncertain
future. … On refined sugar, the duty was made 1.95 cents per
pound, which, as compared with raw sugar testing 100 per
cent., left a protection for the domestic refiner,—i. e., for
the Sugar 'Trust,'—of 1/8 of one cent a pound. Some intricate
calculation would be necessary to make out whether this
'differential' for the refining interest was more or less than
in the act of 1894; but, having regard to the effect of the
substitution of specific for ad-valorem duties, the Trust was
no more favored by the act of 1897 than by its predecessor,
and even somewhat less favored. The changes which this part of
the tariff act underwent in the two Houses are not without
significance." In the bill passed by the House. "the so-called
differential, or protection to the refiners, was one-eighth of
a cent per pound. In the Senate there was an attempt at
serious amendment. The influence of the Sugar Trust in the
Senate had long been great. How secured, whether through party
contributions, entangling alliances, or coarse bribery, the
public could not know; but certainly great, as the course of
legislation in that body demonstrated." The Senate attempted
to make an entire change in the scheme of sugar duties, which
would give the Trust a fifth of a cent per pound of protective
differential, instead of an eighth; but the House resisted,
with more success than in 1894, and the senatorial friends of
the Sugar Trust had to give way.

See, also (in this volume),
TRUSTS: UNITED STATES;
and SUGAR BOUNTIES.

"The tariff act of 1894 had repealed the provisions as to
reciprocity in the act of 1890, and had rendered nugatory such
parts of the treaties made under the earlier act as were
inconsistent with the provisions of its successor. The act of
1897 now revived the policy of reciprocity, and in some ways
even endeavored to enlarge the scope of the reciprocity
provisions"

See below: A. D. 1899-1901.

_F. W. Taussig,
Tariff History of the United States,
4th edition, chapter 7 (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons)._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1897 (April-October).
Negotiations for an international bi-metallic agreement.

See (in this volume)
MONETARY QUESTIONS: A. D 1897 (APRIL-OCTOBER).

{583}

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1897 (June).
Appointment of the Nicaragua Canal Commission.

See (in this volume)
CANAL, INTEROCEANIC: A. D. 1889-1899.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1897 (November).
Refusal to negotiate with the insurgent republic of the
Philippine Islands.

On the 3d of November, 1897, Mr. Rounseville Wildman, the U.
S. Consul at Hongkong, addressed the following to the State
Department: "Since my arrival in Hongkong I have been called
upon several times by Mr. F. Agoncilla, foreign agent and high
commissioner, etc., of the new republic of the Philippines.
Mr. Agoncilla holds a commission, signed by the president,
members of cabinet, and general in chief of the republic of
Philippines, empowering him absolutely with power to conclude
treaties with foreign governments. Mr. Agoncilla offers on
behalf of his government alliance offensive and defensive with
the United States when the United States declares war on
Spain, which, in Mr. Agoncilla's judgment, will be very soon.
In the meantime he wishes the United States to send to some
port in the Philippines 20,000 stand of arms and 200,000
rounds of ammunition for the use of his government, to be paid
for on the recognition of his government by the United States.
He pledges as security two provinces and the custom-house at
Manila. He is not particular about the price—is willing the
United States should make 25 per cent or 30 per cent profit.
He is a very earnest and attentive diplomat and a great
admirer of the United States. On his last visit he surprised
me with the information that he had written his government
that he had hopes of inducing the United States to supply the
much-needed guns, etc. In case Señor Agoncilla's dispatch
should fall into the hands of an unfriendly power and find its
way into the newspapers, I have thought it wise to apprise the
State Department of the nature of the high commissioner's
proposals. Señor Agoncilla informs me by late mail that he
will proceed at once to Washington to conclude the proposed
treaty, if I advise. I shall not advise said step until so
instructed by the State Department."

To this communication, the Third Assistant Secretary of State,
Mr. Cridler, returned the following reply, December 15, 1897:

"I have to acknowledge the receipt of your dispatch Number 19
of November 3, 1897, in which you announce the arrival at your
post of Mr. F. Agoncilla, whom you describe as foreign agent
and high commissioner of the new republic of the Philippines,
and who holds full power to negotiate and conclude treaties
with foreign powers. Mr. Agoncilla offers an alliance
'offensive and defensive with the United States when the
United States declares war on Spain, which, in Mr. Agoncilla's
judgment, will be very soon,' and suggests that 20,000 stand
of arms and 200,000 rounds of ammunition be supplied to his
government by that of the United States. You may briefly
advise Mr. Agoncilla, in case he should call upon you, that
the Government of the United States does not negotiate such
treaties and that it is not possible to forward the desired
arms and ammunition. You should not encourage any advances on
the part of Mr. Agoncilla, and should courteously decline to
communicate with the Department further regarding his alleged
mission."

_Treaty of Peace and Accompanying Papers
(55th Congress, 3d Session, Senate Document
Number 62, part 1, pages 333,334)._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1897 (November).
Treaty with Russia and Japan to suspend pelagic sealing.

See (in this volume)
BERING SEA QUESTIONS.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1897 (December).
President McKinley on Cuban affairs.

See (in this volume)
CUBA: A. D. 1896-1897.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1897 (December).
Stringent measures against pelagic sealing.

See (in this volume)
BERING SEA QUESTIONS.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1897-1898 (December-March).
Reports from Cuba of the suffering condition of
the "reconcentrados."

See (in this volume)
CUBA: A. D. 1897-1898 (DECEMBER-MARCH).

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1897-1899.
Agreements with the Choctaw, Chickasaw, Creek, Cherokee,
and Seminole tribes of Indians.
Work of the Dawes Commission.

See (in this volume)
INDIANS, AMERICAN: A. D. 1893-1899.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1897-1900.
Treaty for the annexation of Hawaii.
Its failure of ratification.
Passage of joint resolution to annex, and of an Act
for the government of the islands.

See (in this volume)
HAWAII.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (February-March).
American sympathy with the Cubans and indignation
against Spain.
Destruction of the United States battle-ship "Maine"
in Havana harbor.
Investigation and findings of the American and
Spanish courts of inquiry.

Public feeling in the United States, excited by a terrible
state of suffering in Cuba, resulting from Spanish methods of
dealing with insurrection in that island, had been gathering
intensity for months past, and threatening a rupture of
peaceful relations between the United States and Spain.

See (in this volume),
CUBA: A. D. 1896-1897 and 1897-1898)

A sudden crisis in the situation was produced, on the morning
of the 15th of February, 1898, by news that the United States
battle-ship "Maine," while paying a visit of courtesy to the
harbor of Havana, had been totally destroyed, on the previous
evening, by an explosion which killed most of her crew. In a
subsequent message on the subject to Congress, President
McKinley recited the circumstances of the catastrophe, and the
proceedings adopted to ascertain its cause, with the
conclusions reached, in the following words: "For some time
prior to the visit of the 'Maine' to Havana Harbor our
consular representatives pointed out the advantages to flow
from the visit of national ships to the Cuban waters, in
accustoming the people to the presence of our flag as the
symbol of good will and of our ships in the fulfillment of the
mission of protection to American interests, even though no
immediate need therefor might exist. Accordingly on the 24th
of January last, after conference with the Spanish minister;
in which the renewal of visits of our war vessels to Spanish
waters was discussed and accepted, the peninsular authorities
at Madrid and Havana were advised of the purpose of this
Government to resume friendly naval visits at Cuban ports, and
that in that view the 'Maine' would forthwith call at the port
of Havana. This announcement was received by the Spanish
Government with appreciation of the friendly character of the
visit of the 'Maine,' and with notification of intention to
return the courtesy by sending Spanish ships to the principal
ports of the United States. Meanwhile the 'Maine' entered the
port of Havana on the 25th of January, her arrival being
marked with no special incident besides the exchange of
customary salutes and ceremonial visits.

{584}

"The 'Maine' continued in the harbor of Havana during the
three weeks following her arrival. No appreciable excitement
attended her stay; on the contrary, a feeling of relief and
confidence followed the resumption of the long-interrupted
friendly intercourse. So noticeable was this immediate effect
of her visit that the consul-general strongly urged that the
presence of our ships in Cuban waters should be kept up by
retaining the 'Maine' at Havana, or, in the event of her
recall, by sending another vessel there to take her place. At
forty minutes past 9 in the evening of the 15th of February
the 'Maine' was destroyed by an explosion, by which the entire
forward part of the ship was utterly wrecked. In this
catastrophe 2 officers and 264 of her crew perished, those who
were not killed outright by her explosion being penned between
decks by the tangle of wreckage and drowned by the immediate
sinking of the hull. Prompt assistance was rendered by the
neighboring vessels anchored in the harbor, aid being
especially given by the boats of the Spanish cruiser 'Alfonso
XII' and the Ward Line steamer 'City of Washington,' which lay
not far distant. The wounded were generously cared for by the
authorities of Havana, the hospitals being freely opened to
them, while the earliest recovered bodies of the dead were
interred by the municipality in a public cemetery in the city.
Tributes of grief and sympathy were offered from all official
quarters of the island.

"The appalling calamity fell upon the people of our country
with crushing force, and for a brief time an intense
excitement prevailed, which in a community less just and
self-controlled than ours might have led to hasty acts of
blind resentment. This spirit, however, soon gave way to the
calmer processes of reason and to the resolve to investigate
the facts and await material proof before forming a judgment
as to the cause, the responsibility, and, if the facts
warranted, the remedy due. This course necessarily recommended
itself from the outset to the Executive, for only in the light
of a dispassionately ascertained certainty could it determine
the nature and measure of its full duty in the matter. The
usual procedure was followed, as in all cases of casualty or
disaster to national vessels of any maritime State. A naval
court of inquiry was at once organized, composed of officers
well qualified by rank and practical experience to discharge
the onerous duty imposed upon them. Aided by a strong force of
wreckers and divers, the court proceeded to make a thorough
investigation on the spot, employing every available means for
the impartial and exact determination of the causes of the
explosion. Its operations have been conducted with the utmost
deliberation and judgment, and while independently pursued no
attainable source of information was neglected, and the
fullest opportunity was allowed for a simultaneous
investigation by the Spanish authorities. The finding of the
court of inquiry was reached, after twenty-three days of
continuous labor, on the 21st of March, instant, and, having
been approved on the 22d by the commander in chief of the
United States naval force on the North Atlantic Station, was
transmitted to the Executive. It is herewith laid before the
Congress, together with the voluminous testimony taken before
the court. Its purport is, in brief, as follows:

"When the 'Maine' arrived at Havana she was conducted by the
regular Government pilot to buoy Number 4, to which she was
moored in from 5½ to 6 fathoms of water. The state of
discipline on board and the condition of her magazines,
boilers, coal bunkers, and storage compartments are passed in
review, with the conclusion that excellent order prevailed and
that no indication of any cause for an internal explosion
existed in any quarter. At 8 o'clock in the evening of
February 15 everything had been reported secure, and all was
quiet. At forty minutes past 9 o'clock the vessel was suddenly
destroyed. There were two distinct explosions, with a brief
interval between them. The first lifted the forward part of
the ship very perceptibly. The second, which was more open,
prolonged, and of greater volume, is attributed by the court
to the partial explosion of two or more of the forward
magazines. The evidence of the divers establishes that the
after part of the ship was practically intact and sank in that
condition a very few moments after the explosion. The forward
part was completely demolished. Upon the evidence of a
concurrent external cause the finding of the court is as
follows:

"'At frame 17 the outer shell of the ship, from a point of 11½
feet from the middle line of the ship and 6 feet above the
keel when in its normal position, has been forced up so as to
be now about 4 feet above the surface of the water, therefore
about 34 feet above where it would be had the ship sunk
uninjured. The outside bottom plating is bent into a reversed
V shape (˄), the after wing of which, about 15 feet broad and
32 feet in length (from frame 17 to frame 25), is doubled back
upon itself against the continuation of the same plating,
extending forward. At frame 18 the vertical keel is broken
in two and the flat keel bent into an angle similar to the
angle formed by the outside bottom plates. This break is now
about 6 feet below the surface of the water and about 30 feet
above its normal position. In the opinion of the court this
effect could have been produced only by the explosion of a
mine situated under the bottom of the ship at about frame 18
and somewhat on the port side of the ship.'

"The conclusions of the court are: That the loss of the
'Maine' was not in any respect due to fault or negligence on
the part of any of the officers or members of her crew; That
the ship was destroyed by the explosion of a submarine mine,
which caused the partial explosion of two or more of her
forward magazines; and That no evidence has been obtainable
fixing the responsibility for the destruction of the 'Maine'
upon any person or persons.

"I have directed that the finding of the court of inquiry and
the views of this Government thereon be communicated to the
Government of Her Majesty the Queen Regent, and I do not
permit myself to doubt that the sense of justice of the
Spanish nation will dictate a course of action suggested by
honor and the friendly relations of the two Governments. It
will be the duty of the Executive to advise the Congress of
the result, and in the meantime deliberate consideration is
invoked."

_Congressional Record, March 28, 1898._

{585}

A Spanish naval board of inquiry, convened by the maritime
authority at Havana, and investigating the matter with haste,
arrived at a conclusion quite opposite to that stated above,
reporting on the 22d of March that "an explosion of the first
order, in the forward magazine of the American ironclad
'Maine,' caused the destruction of that part of the ship and
its total submersion in the same place in this bay at which it
was anchored. … That the important facts connected with the
explosion in its external appearances at every moment of its
duration having been described by witnesses, and the absence
of all circumstances which necessarily accompany the explosion
of a torpedo having been proved by these witnesses and
experts, it can only be honestly asserted that the catastrophe
was due to internal causes. … That the character of the
proceedings undertaken and respect for the law which
establishes the absolute extra-territoriality of a foreign war
vessel have prevented the determination, even by conjecture,
of the said internal origin of the disaster, to which also the
impossibility of establishing the necessary communication
either with the crew of the wrecked vessel or the officials of
their Government commissioned to investigate the causes of the
said event, or with those subsequently intrusted with the
issue, has contributed. … That the interior and exterior
examination of the bottom of the 'Maine,' whenever it is
possible, unless the bottom of the ship and that of the place
in the bay where it is sunk are altered by the work which is
being carried on for the total or partial recovery of the
vessel, will prove the correctness of all that is said in this
report; but this must not be understood to mean that the
accuracy of these present conclusions requires such proof."

_U. S. Senate Report Number 885,
55th Congress, 2d Session, page 635._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (February-December).
In the Chinese "battle of concessions."

See (in this volume)
CHINA: A. D. 1898 (FEBRUARY-DECEMBER).

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (March).
Account by Senator Proctor of the condition of
the "reconcentrados" in Cuba.

See (in this volume)
CUBA: A. D. 1897-1898 (DECEMBER-MARCH).

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (March-April).
Continued discussion of Cuban affairs with Spain.
Unsatisfactory results.
Message of the President asking Congress for authority
to terminate hostilities in Cuba.

On the 11th of April, President McKinley addressed another
special message to Congress, setting forth the unsatisfactory
results with which Cuban affairs had been further discussed
with the government of Spain, and formally asking to be
authorized and empowered to take measures for securing a "full
and final termination of hostilities" in the oppressed island.
He said:

"Obedient to that precept of the Constitution which commands
the President to give from time to time to the Congress
information of the state of the Union and to recommend to
their consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary
and expedient, it becomes my duty now to address your body
with regard to the grave crisis that has arisen in the
relations of the United States to Spain by reason of the
warfare that for more than three years has raged in the
neighboring island of Cuba. I do so because of the intimate
connection of the Cuban question with the state of our own
Union, and the grave relation the course which it is now
incumbent upon the nation to adopt must needs bear to the
traditional policy of our Government, if it is to accord with
the precepts laid down by the founders of the Republic and
religiously observed by succeeding Administrations to the
present day.

"The present revolution is but the successor of other similar
insurrections which have occurred in Cuba against the dominion
of Spain, extending over a period of nearly half a century,
each of which, during its progress, has subjected the United
States to great effort and expense in enforcing its neutrality
laws, caused enormous losses to American trade and commerce,
caused irritation, annoyance, and disturbance among our
citizens, and, by the exercise of cruel, barbarous, and
uncivilized practices of warfare, shocked the sensibilities
and offended the humane sympathies of our people. Since the
present revolution began, in February, 1895, this country has
seen the fertile domain at our threshold ravaged by fire and
sword in the course of a struggle unequaled in the history of
the island and rarely paralleled as to the numbers of the
combatants and the bitterness of the contest by any revolution
of modern times where a dependent people striving to be free
have been opposed by the power of the sovereign state. Our
people have beheld a once prosperous community reduced to
comparative want, its lucrative commerce virtually paralyzed,
its exceptional productiveness diminished, its fields laid
waste, its mills in ruins, and its people perishing by tens of
thousands from hunger and destitution. We have found ourselves
constrained, in the observance of that strict neutrality which
our laws enjoin and which the law of nations commands, to
police our own waters and to watch our own seaports in
prevention of any unlawful act in aid of the Cubans. Our trade
has suffered; the capital invested by our citizens in Cuba has
been largely lost, and the temper and forbearance of our
people have been so sorely tried as to beget a perilous unrest
among our own citizens which has inevitably found its
expression from time to time in the National Legislature, so
that issues wholly external to our own body politic engross
attention and stand in the way of that close devotion to
domestic advancement that becomes a self-contained
commonwealth whose primal maxim has been the avoidance of all
foreign entanglements. All this must needs awaken, and has,
indeed, aroused the utmost concern on the part of this
Government, as well during my predecessor's term as in my own.

"In April, 1896, the evils from which our country suffered
through the Cuban war became so onerous that my predecessor
made an effort to bring about a peace through the mediation of
this Government in any way that might tend to an honorable
adjustment of the contest between Spain and her revolted
colony, on the basis of some effective scheme of
self-government for Cuba under the flag and sovereignty of
Spain. It failed through the refusal of the Spanish Government
then in power to consider any form of mediation or, indeed, any
plan of settlement which did not begin with the actual
submission of the insurgents to the mother country, and then
only on such terms as Spain herself might see fit to grant.
The war continued unabated. The resistance of the insurgents
was in no wise diminished. The efforts of Spain were
increased, both by the dispatch of fresh levies to Cuba and by
the addition to the horrors of the strife of a new and inhuman
phase happily unprecedented in the modern history of civilized
Christian peoples.
{586}
The policy of devastation and concentration, inaugurated by
the captain-general's bando of October 21, 1896, in the
province of Pinar del Rio, was thence extended to embrace all
of the island to which the power of the Spanish arms was able
to reach by occupation or by military operations. The
peasantry, including all dwelling in the open agricultural
interior, were driven into the garrison towns or isolated
places held by the troops. The raising and movement of
provisions of all kinds were interdicted. The fields were laid
waste, dwellings unroofed and fired, mills destroyed, and, in
short, everything that could desolate the land and render it
unfit for human habitation or support was commanded by one or
the other of the contending parties and executed by all the
powers at their disposal.

"By the time the present Administration took office, a year
ago, reconcentration—so called—had been made effective over
the better part of the four central and western
provinces—Santa Clara, Matanzas, Habana, and Pinar del Rio.
The agricultural population to the estimated number of 300,000
or more was herded within the towns and their immediate
vicinage, deprived of the means of support, rendered destitute
of shelter, left poorly clad, and exposed to the most
unsanitary conditions. As the scarcity of food increased with
the devastation of the depopulated areas of production,
destitution and want became misery and starvation. Month by
month the death rate increased in an alarming ratio. By March,
1897, according to conservative estimates from official
Spanish sources, the mortality among the reconcentrados, from
starvation and the diseases thereto incident, exceeded 50 per
centum of their total number. No practical relief was accorded
to the destitute. The overburdened towns, already suffering
from the general dearth, could give no aid. So-called 'zones
of cultivation' established within the immediate areas of
effective military control about the cities and fortified
camps proved illusory as a remedy for the suffering. The
unfortunates, being for the most part women and children, with
aged and helpless men, enfeebled by disease and hunger, could
not have tilled the soil without tools, seed, or shelter for
their own support or for the supply of the cities.
Reconcentration, adopted avowedly as a war measure in order to
cut off the resources of the insurgents, worked its
predestined result. As I said in my message of last December,
it was not civilized warfare; it was extermination. The only
peace it could beget was that of the wilderness and the grave.

"Meanwhile the military situation in the island had undergone
a noticeable change. The extraordinary activity that
characterized the second year of the war, when the insurgents
invaded even the thitherto unharmed fields of Pinar del Rio
and carried havoc and destruction up to the walls of the city
of Habana itself, had relapsed into a dogged struggle in the
central and eastern provinces. The Spanish arms regained a
measure of control in Pinar del Rio and parts of Habana, but,
under the existing conditions of the rural country, without
immediate improvement of their productive situation. Even thus
partially restricted, the revolutionists held their own, and
their conquest and submission, put forward by Spain as the
essential and sole basis of peace, seemed as far distant as at
the outset. In this state of affairs my Administration found
itself confronted with the grave problem of its duty. My
message of last December reviewed the situation, and narrated
the steps taken with a view to relieving its acuteness and
opening the way to some form of honorable settlement. The
assassination of the prime minister, Canovas, led to a change
of government in Spain. The former administration, pledged to
subjugation without concession, gave place to that of a more
liberal party, committed long in advance to a policy of reform
involving the wider principle of home rule for Cuba and Porto
Rico.

"The overtures of this Government, made through its new envoy,
General Woodford, and looking to an immediate and effective
amelioration of the condition of the island, although not
accepted to the extent of admitted mediation in any shape,
were met by assurances that home rule, in an advanced phase,
would be forthwith offered to Cuba, without waiting for the
war to end, and that more humane methods should thenceforth
prevail in the conduct of hostilities. Coincidentally with
these declarations, the new Government of Spain continued and
completed the policy already begun by its predecessor, of
testifying friendly regard for this nation by releasing
American citizens held under one charge or another connected
with the insurrection, so that by the end of November not a
single person entitled in any way to our national protection
remained in a Spanish prison.

"While these negotiations were in progress the increasing
destitution of the unfortunate reconcentrados and the alarming
mortality among them claimed earnest attention. The success
which had attended the limited measure of relief extended to
the suffering American citizens among them by the judicious
expenditure through the consular agencies of the money
appropriated expressly for their succor by the joint
resolution approved May 24, 1897, prompted the humane
extension of a similar scheme of aid to the great body of
sufferers. A suggestion to this end was acquiesced in by the
Spanish authorities. On the 24th of December last I caused to
be issued an appeal to the American people, inviting
contributions in money or in kind for the succor of the
starving sufferers in Cuba, following this on the 8th of
January by a similar public announcement of the formation of a
central Cuban relief committee, with headquarters in New York
City, composed of three members, representing the American
National Red Cross and the religious and business elements of
the community. The efforts of that committee have been
untiring and have accomplished much. Arrangements for free
transportation to Cuba have greatly aided the charitable work.
The president of the American Red Cross and representatives of
other contributory organizations have generously visited Cuba
and cooperated with the consul-general and the local
authorities to make effective distribution of the relief
collected through the efforts of the central committee. Nearly
$200,000 in money and supplies has already reached the
sufferers, and more is forthcoming. The supplies are admitted
duty free, and transportation to the interior has been
arranged, so that the relief, at first necessarily confined to
Habana and the larger cities, is now extended through most, if
not all, of the towns where suffering exists.
{587}
Thousands of lives have already been saved. The necessity for
a change in the condition of the reconcentrados is recognized
by the Spanish Government. Within a few days past the orders
of General Weyler have been revoked; the reconcentrados, it is
said, are to be permitted to return to their homes, and aided
to resume the self-supporting pursuits of peace. Public works
have been ordered to give them employment, and a sum of
$600,000 has been appropriated for their relief.

"The war in Cuba is of such a nature that short of subjugation
or extermination a final military victory for either side
seems impracticable. The alternative lies in the physical
exhaustion of the one or the other party, or perhaps of both—a
condition which in effect ended the ten years' war by the truce
of Zanjon. The prospect of such a protraction and conclusion
of the present strife is a contingency hardly to be
contemplated with equanimity by the civilized world, and least
of all by the United States, affected and injured as we are,
deeply and intimately, by its very existence. Realizing this,
it appeared to be my duty, in a spirit of true friendliness,
no less to Spain than to the Cubans who have so much to lose
by the prolongation of the struggle, to seek to bring about an
immediate termination of the war. To this end I submitted on
the 27th ultimo, as a result of much representation and
correspondence, through the United States minister at Madrid,
propositions to the Spanish Government looking to an armistice
until October 1 for the negotiation of peace with the good
offices of the President. In addition, I asked the immediate
revocation of the order of reconcentration, so as to permit
the people to return to their farms and the needy to be
relieved with provisions and supplies from the United States,
cooperating with the Spanish authorities, so as to afford full
relief.

"The reply of the Spanish cabinet was received on the night of
the 31st ultimo. It offered, as the means to bring about peace
in Cuba, to confide the preparation thereof to the insular
parliament, inasmuch as the concurrence of that body would be
necessary to reach a final result, it being, however,
understood that the powers reserved by the constitution to the
Central Government are not lessened or diminished. As the
Cuban parliament does not meet until the 4th of May next, the
Spanish Government would not object, for its part, to accept
at once a suspension of hostilities if asked for by the
insurgents from the general in chief, to whom it would
pertain, in such case, to determine the duration and
conditions of the armistice. The propositions submitted by
General Woodford and the reply of the Spanish Government were
both in the form of brief memoranda, the texts of which are
before me, and are substantially in the language above given.
The function of the Cuban parliament in the matter of
'preparing' peace and the manner of its doing so are not
expressed in the Spanish memorandum; but from General
Woodford's explanatory reports of preliminary discussions
preceding the final conference it is understood that the
Spanish Government stands ready to give the insular congress
full powers to settle the terms of peace with the
insurgents—whether by direct negotiation or indirectly by
means of legislation does not appear.